



A RESEARCH GUIDE TO THE NANJING MASSACRE 1937 - 1938

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CREATED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH:



ALPHA
Education

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INTRODUCTION

Every historical event is subject to debate and interpretation. There is never unilateral consensus on how a historical event should be analyzed by modern historians, or even on how the event may have transpired. Many students wrongly define history as a methodical study of the facts of the past - a monotonous memorization of statistics, dates and events. A better way to view the study of history is the consolidation of a wide range of differing perspectives in order to synthesize lessons and knowledge from the past, which can then be translated into the future. In this sense history is an extraordinarily difficult field of study. A student of history must be able to not only internalize key data about an event, but also consider the sources of their information and critically analyze the facts such that they provide meaningful conclusions.

There are countless essays, discussions and books available which discuss the intricacies of the study of history; as such, there is no need to go into great detail here. Suffice it to say that success and failure, harms and benefits, and values and limitations, are not mutually exclusive or easy to understand. As a general rule to historical research, it is crucial that a historian collect data from a wide range of sources, encompassing a variety of perspectives. It is equally important that the historian then analyze the sources they are using (if not explicitly in writing, then at least in the process of reading). A source's content must be interpreted differently depending on its creator and purpose, as well as its degree of reliability.

It is important to note, however, that even data from a questionable or untrustworthy source can have historical value. A relevant example would be sources on the Nanjing Massacre produced by the Japanese government in the latter half of the 20th century. The Japanese government held a policy of censorship and denial, and thus much of the data they provide is likely to be misleading or inaccurate. Nevertheless this data can provide valuable insight into the mindset of the Japanese on the subject, as well as the role of its government in the massacre and its subsequent reporting.

The goal of this guide is to provide a starting point for those students interested in pursuing research on the Nanjing Massacre, including valuable considerations and sources on the topic. Perhaps even more so than many other historical events, the Nanjing Massacre is subject to an enormous number of perspectives and complexities for which a historian must be well prepared.

NOTES ON THE NANJING MASSACRE



An exhibit at the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, Nanjing, China. Taken by the Editor (2018)

The Nanjing Massacre is a story of intense, indiscriminate violence and rape. Historians have used the words “massacre,” “atrocity,” “tragedy,” and others when describing those 6 weeks (December 1937 to February 1938). Often compared to the Holocaust, it often sparks powerful emotions in both witnesses and researchers. Students pursuing the Nanjing Massacre should be prepared for harsh imagery and tragic historical accounts. This is not intended to scare budding researchers but to honestly inform them of the difficulty of the task ahead.

The emotional nature of this event is one of the difficulties that may be encountered when inquiring about the massacre. Responses to the event have created much controversy in the historical community, and often historians must tread carefully when conducting interviews, asking questions, and reporting their findings. To understand how to navigate sources on this event, it is important to have a general sense of the primary historiographies on Japanese expansionism in the 20th century, and more specifically the Nanjing Massacre.

Contemporary Foreign Revisionism: Modern historians who assert that the Japanese government planned not only the war, but also many of the war crimes committed by the army to further its imperialist purpose. Japan intentionally neglected to prevent military misconduct, and should take full responsibility and provide meaningful compensation for its crimes.

Example Text: Chang, Iris. *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1997.

Foreign National Interpretation: The view of foreigners at the time, who believe the army was responsible for the atrocities committed in China, and that only external pressure was ultimately able to restore Japanese discipline. The Japanese government had little control over the events in Nanjing.

Example Text: Rabe, John. *The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe*. Edited by Erwin Wickert. Translated by John E. Woods. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2000.

Chinese Victimization: The majority of Chinese scholars, who believe atrocities were a combination of government and military action, and should warrant apology and compensation by the Japanese government. Many of the actions taken in the war were strategic decisions of military and ministry officials.

Example Text: Zhang, Xianwen, Lianhong Zhang, and Weixing Wang, eds. *A History of the Nanjing Massacre*. Translated by Michelle LeSourd and Kan Liang. Nanjing, Jiangsu: Nanjing University Press, 2015.

Japanese War Guilt: This group of Japanese nationals corroborates stories of atrocities committed by Japan, and believe it is the army that should be held accountable for performing war crimes in China.

Example Text: Azuma, Shirō. *The Diary of Azuma Shiro*. Translated by Kimberly Hughes. Jiangsu: Phoenix Publishing & Media Group, 2006.

Japanese Reconciliation: Primarily Japanese historians who believe that the Sino-Japanese war and all the atrocities therein were a product of planning by the Japanese government. Japan should be held responsible for its war crimes.

Example Text: Katsuichi, Honda. *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame*. Edited by Frank Gibney. Translated by Karen Sandness. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.

Japanese Revisionism: Primarily composed of right-wing Japanese authors, this group believes that data on the Nanjing Massacre is largely fabricated, and that Japan’s actions lay within the limits of self-defence and international law. They often work to discredit works written by Western historians.

Example Text: Higashinakano, Shudo. *The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction*. Translated by Shuppan Sekai. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2005.

USING THIS GUIDE

While this guide will provide some background information on each of the contained topics, its purpose is not to be an extensive source of data. Rather, it will focus primarily on outlining accessible and insightful sources which students can use throughout their research. The guide begins with sources a historian can use to gather some general understanding of the Nanjing Massacre, and is then organized by more specific areas of focus students may choose to follow.

Each section of the guide will be occasionally interjected by boxes similar to that on the right, which will list a source which may be valuable when researching the specific subject currently being discussed in the section. The box will have as its subheading the type of source, and will contain the source’s title, author/editor and publication year below. A source may appear in more than one section if its contents are relevant to multiple topics; indeed, several sources are relevant to many of the subtopics included in the section.

At the end of each section there will be a complete list of all sources mentioned, in addition to a list of guiding questions that can be used for further inquiry. The end of the guide will contain an annotated source list/bibliography containing every source mentioned throughout the guide as well as helpful notes on each, indicating the source’s key values but also its potential limitations and historiographical lens. If relevant, these descriptions will also include details as to the accessibility of each source.

Language Note: Whereas the anglicization using the modern system of *pin yin* is “Nanjing,” the city name was spelled “Nanking” during the time of the massacre. This creates some level of confusion, but both spellings refer to the same place. This guide will use the modern “Nanjing” except in cases where the title of a source, or a key phrase used by historians employs the original (ex: The Rape of Nanking).

SOURCE: COLLECTION

“AMERICAN MISSIONARY
EYEWITNESSES TO THE
NANKING MASSACRE,
1937-1938”

EDITED BY MARTHA LUND
SMALLEY (1997)



INTRO TO THE NANJING MASSACRE

In the West, it is generally agreed that the Second World War began with Germany's invasion of Poland, on September 1st, 1939. In Asia, however, the war can be said to have started significantly earlier than that. There are historians that place this as early as September of 1931, but it is reasonable to say that major conflict between China and Japan erupted in the aftermath of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July of 1937.

Japan had been building its military might for some time before conflict broke out, having been brought forcefully out of isolation by American military officials, triggering the Meiji Restoration period in 1867. To respond to the newfound threat of Western military and economic dominance, Japan began to quickly reform its religious, economic, social, and military policy. An increasing focus on nationalism allowed Japan to carry out these reforms incredibly quickly, soon developing significant military manpower and strong ideological unity within its borders.

Japan's first conflict with China was the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, during which it handily defeated Chinese forces and captured Taiwan, Korea, and the Liaodong Peninsula (which it was later forced to return). In the First World War, Japan had allied itself closely with the United Kingdom, and in its quest for territory it captured the Shantung Peninsula and a number of small islands, all formerly belonging to Germany. As a result of its involvement in the war, it participated in negotiations at Versailles and was among the original members of the League of Nations. It chose to withdraw its membership prior to World War II - an indicator of its newfound alliance with Germany.

SOURCE:

BOOK

"THE NANJING ATROCITIES:
CRIMES OF WAR"

FACING HISTORY AND
OURSELVES (2014)

SOURCE:

BOOK


"THE CHINESE WAR OF RESISTANCE
AGAINST JAPANESE AGGRESSION: A
CONCISE HISTORY"

ZHI SHAOZENG ET AL. (2015)

China, meanwhile, had been experiencing significant upheaval during the early part of the 20th century, including the overthrowing of the Manchu dynasty, failure of the Republic of 1911, and eventually the Chinese civil war. Japan's invasion ended the first phase the civil war, with China led by Chiang Kai-Shek

and his Nationalist party. The Nationalists and the Communists formed what is known as the Second United Front, temporarily suspending their conflict to unite against the Japanese.

Despite having a clear advantage in numbers, China's military power at the start of the war was drastically inferior to that of the Japanese due to limited technological development and a lack of equipment. Japan felt, at the outset of its invasion, that it would have no difficulty crushing the Chinese and sweeping their way through the country.



A comparison of Chinese and Japanese military strength at the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Based on the graphic provided at the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, Nanjing, China

THE FALL OF NANJING

The first major target for the Japanese army was the coastal city of Shanghai, which was at the time China's industrial capital. Unfortunately for Japan the battle at Shanghai proceeded far slower than they had originally planned. It took until November of 1937, after a 3 month siege, to take the city. From here the Japanese turned their eyes to Nanjing, China's official capital and the headquarters of the Nationalist party. Air raids on Nanjing had been going on since August, but after Shanghai's fall, Japan pushed its land forces towards the capital. The Japanese soldiers made their way to the city in 2 groups, which converged on either side of the city. Bordered by the Yangtze river to the North, Nanjing was easily surrounded by the Japanese military, who then began their attack. Frightened of the Japanese advance, Chiang Kai-Shek transferred his capital and government to Chongqing on November 20th, 1937.

SOURCE:
BOOK

"A HISTORY OF THE NANJING MASSACRE"

EDITED BY ZHANG XIANWEN,
ZHANG LIANHONG AND
WANG WEIXING (2015)

SOURCE:
BOOK

“THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR II”

IRIS CHANG (1997)

Compared to the gruelling battle to take Shanghai, the battle of Nanjing seems almost trivially short. It is sometimes argued that the Chinese defence in Nanjing was lacklustre and minimal due to heavy losses in Shanghai. It is also often attributed to a lack of communication within the army, or insufficient aerial manpower and reconnaissance. Others argue that the Japanese offence was equally poor and hastily executed. In preparation for the Japanese advance, Chinese troops prepared a kind of “battle-zone” around the city’s perimeter, meticulously ridding the land of any resources that might be salvaged by the Japanese. Inside the city, soldiers prepared for battle, constructing dugouts and beginning measures to evacuate if the Japanese successfully advanced. Japanese troops quickly began capturing Chinese defensive positions around the periphery of the city.

Before even beginning the full-scale attack on Nanjing, Japanese military leaders asked for a Chinese surrender, to avoid unnecessary casualties. This was apparently considered by Chinese officials, despite outward commitment to fight the Japanese invaders. Ultimately, when no surrender came, the Japanese began bombarding the city. For reasons not entirely known to historians, it took only a day of battle for Chiang Kai-Shek to issue an order to retreat from Nanjing. The plan was to evacuate army divisions across the Yangtze River to regroup outside of the city. With troops still actively engaged in battle, the order was relayed successfully to only part of the Chinese army, which then began a messy and hurried retreat, pursued by the advancing Japanese force.

SOURCE:
BOOK

“NANKING: ANATOMY OF AN ATROCITY”

MASAHIRO YAMAMOTO (2000)

It is in this environment that the Nanjing Massacre began. Even before the retreat, Japanese troops were reportedly ordered to execute prisoners and salvage Chinese resources. It is a matter of much historical debate whether these mass killings were institutional or a product of many individual soldiers acting in the same way. One interesting perspective argues that the operation in Nanjing was decided without approval by officials in Japan, and was therefore a result of division commanders acting in haste and failing to discipline their soldiers. Another argues that it was a symptom of ultranationalism in Japan, and the military culture experienced by Japanese soldiers being translated onto Chinese civilians. Regardless, Nanjing fell to the Japanese army after just 4 days of full combat around the city, on December 12th, 1937.

SOURCE:
NOVEL

“WHEN THE PURPLE MOUNTAIN BURNS”


SHOUHUA QI (2005)

SOURCES ON INTRO TO THE NANJING MASSACRE

- 1 A History of the Nanjing Massacre
Published 2015
Edited by: Zhang Xiaowen, Zhang Lianhong
& Wang Weixing
Translated by: Michelle LeSourd & Kan Liang
- 2 Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity
Published 2000
Written by: Masahiro Yamamoto
- 3 The Chinese War of Resistance Against
Japanese Aggression: A Concise History
Published 2015
Written by: Zhi Shaozeng et al.
- 4 The Nanjing Atrocities: Crimes of War
Published 2014
Produced by: Facing History and Ourselves
Lead Writer: Fran Sterling
- 5 The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten
Holocaust of World War II
Published 1997
Written by: Iris Chang
- 6 When the Purple Mountain Burns
Published 2005
Written by: Shouhua Qi

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. What was the role of ultranationalism in the development of Japan's aggressive expansionist policy?
2. To what extent was China prepared for the conflict with the Japanese in 1937?
3. What was the significance of the fall of Shanghai in the Japanese campaign?
4. How effective was Japan's military strategy during its siege of Nanjing? Should the result be attributed to Japan's success or China's failure?
5. What was the nature of the Chinese retreat? How did the Japanese respond to the evacuation of Nanjing?
6. To what extent was the Japanese government involved in the invasion of Nanjing? To what extent can Japan's actions be attributed to systematic decisions as opposed to individual soldiers?



THE RAPE OF NANKING

The phrase “The Rape of Nanking” or alternatively “The Nanjing Massacre” refers to the indescribable number of wartime atrocities carried out by the Japanese army during its occupation of Nanjing. These crimes ranged from execution and murder to looting and rape, - it is considered one of the most brutal tragedies of the Second World War. Much of the controversy surrounding the Nanjing Massacre lies in a debate over the exact number of Chinese prisoners killed, the number of civilians murdered, or the number of women raped. Every source will have its own claim - the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders famously quotes over 300,000 victims. Japanese revisionists often attempt to place the number as low as a few thousand. Arguably, fixating on the question of numbers only plays into the arguments of ultranationalist historians, and detracts from historical investigation and learning.

SOURCE: ARTICLE

“THE NANJING MASSACRE: PRIMARY SOURCE RECORDS AND SECONDARY INTERPRETATIONS—A TEXTUAL CRITIQUE OF BOB TADASHI WAKABAYASHI’S REVIEW”

SUPING LU (2013)

Another key historical debate that is particularly relevant in the aftermath of the Nanjing Massacre is the question of historical credibility. A large part of the argument posed by revisionist historians is that much of the evidence supporting the existence of a massacre in Nanjing is “hearsay” and unsubstantiated. Historiographical analysis is key to evaluating elements of embellishment, politicization or manipulation in historical data. As it applies to the Rape of Nanking, it is generally agreed that the number of corroborating reports by Chinese, foreign, and even Japanese accounts is sufficient to establish that there is truth to eyewitness accounts of the Nanjing Massacre. It is nevertheless crucial that every researcher evaluate this for themselves by studying works of varying historical perspective.

The massacre is interpreted by Japanese author Masahiro Yamamoto as occurring in two phases - the first consisting of the systematic and unlawful execution of Chinese prisoners of war, and the second encompassing the murder, looting and rape carried out by Japanese soldiers.

SOURCE: BOOK

“NANKING: ANATOMY OF AN ATROCITY”

MASAHIRO YAMAMOTO (2000)

PHASE 1: EXECUTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Iris Chang provides perhaps the most extensive and most accessible account of this first phase of the massacre in her book, “The Rape of Nanking.” The Chinese troops in Nanjing were reportedly prepared to surrender, when an order (later shown to have been fabricated by a staff officer of the Japanese army) was distributed calling for the killing of all

SOURCE:

BOOK

“THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR II”

IRIS CHANG (1997)

Chinese captives. This was justified as a method of dealing with the inevitable food shortage in the Japanese army, should such large number of prisoners be taken. Chinese soldiers who surrendered were taken in groups to different areas of the city and its surroundings to be executed - the largest of these was reportedly a massacre of as many as 57,000 soldiers and civilians.

Japanese military textbooks argued that China’s military was such that not all soldiers were nationally affiliated or wore a national uniform. Killing prisoners for convenience or “safety” could thus be justified. Treatment of Chinese soldiers often varied wildly between companies. When a prisoner’s identity was uncertain, he was killed for safety.

PHASE 2: LOOTING AND MURDER OF CIVILIANS

There are countless accounts and retellings of the atrocities committed against Chinese civilians once the Japanese entered the city. Soldiers conducted systematic searches of Chinese homes, during which they would kill the inhabitants and loot as many valuables as they could find. Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi described it as a “war of annihilation.” One account tells of a Japanese machine gun encampment set up directly in front of an air raid shelter, so that fleeing civilians could be easily gunned down. Another chilling report tells of Japanese “killing contests” in which competing soldiers would race to hit a target number of kills.

SOURCE:

BOOK

“THE NANJING MASSACRE: A JAPANESE JOURNALIST CONFRONTS JAPAN’S NATIONAL SHAME”

HONDA KATSUICHI (1999)

SOURCE:

DIARY

“THE DIARY OF AZUMA SHIRO”

TRANSLATED BY KIMBERLY HUGHES (2006)

Even more startling are the reports of brutality and torture inflicted upon the civilian population. Japanese soldiers would often mutilate their murder victims, and often subjected captives to live burial, frostbite, dogs, and incineration. In the diary of Japanese soldier Azuma

Shiro, he describes one instance in which a group of his fellow soldiers placed one Chinese prisoner in a sack, which they doused in gasoline and then set on fire. Soldiers would also procedurally incinerate homes across the city, to dispose of bodies and other remnants of their actions.

SOURCE:

BOOK

“FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPAN'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1932-1945, AND THE AMERICAN COVER-UP”

SHELDON H. HARRIS (1994)

It is impossible to say exactly what motivated Japanese soldiers to commit atrocities in Nanjing. Some argue that it was a product of Japanese military culture, while some argue that the actions were systematic rather than individual crimes. Azuma Shiro describes how civilians were sometimes beaten when they could not comply with Japanese orders, often due to misunderstanding and language barriers. Japanese revisionists frame the events as being in fact in accordance with international law, and committed only by motivated individual soldiers. The question of motivation has been investigated by scholars as a sociological, psychological, and political phenomenon. An important circumstance to note is the rise of ultranationalist military sects in Japan in the 1920s (led by mostly junior or mid-level officers) in response to financial disasters and political isolation experienced in the aftermath of World War One.

RAPE AND THE COMFORT WOMEN

Besides murder, Chinese women in Nanjing were frequent victims of mass rape. While outlawed officially by the Japanese military and by international law, rape was still a part of the Japanese military culture. Women of all ages would be taken by Japanese soldiers to be raped, after which they were often killed so they would not talk. Many accounts also describe mutilation experienced by girls who were victims of gang rape.

SOURCE:

BOOK

“CHINESE COMFORT WOMEN: TESTIMONIES FROM IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEX SLAVES”

PEIPEI QIU, SU ZHILIANG, AND CHEN LIFEI (2013)

In response to the vast number of reports of Japanese misconduct, the Japanese government implemented a system of sanctioned military prostitution, developing brothels which became known as “comfort stations.” Japanese soldiers could visit these dens as a way to satisfy their pleasures. While some of the women in these places were volunteer prostitutes from both China and Japan, a great many were lured or forcefully taken from their homes in China, Korea, the Philippines, and more, to be raped by the Japanese. Suicide was extremely common among these women, who could not face the shame generated by their experiences. Note the interpretation of the

Japanese government that institutionalized prostitution could “diagnose” murder, looting and rape - a way to satisfy soldiers’ biological urges. It is intriguing to contemplate the misogynistic significance of these institutions.

There has been an enormous amount of pressure on the Japanese government since the Sino-Japanese war to acknowledge responsibility for the Comfort Women system. Thus far the government has failed to do so to the satisfaction of many critics and former victims. The re-emergence of right-wing political leadership in current Japan has put a stop to many of the efforts for reconciliation proposed by the former left-wing government. The recent international movement promoting Japanese reconciliation may yet create change.

SOURCE:

FILM

“THE APOLOGY”

TIFFANY HSIUNG (2016)


SOURCES ON THE RAPE OF NANKING

- 1 Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves
Published 2013
Written by: Peipei Qiu, Su Zhilian, and Chen Lifei
- 2 Factories of Death: Japan’s Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-Up
Published 1994
Written by: Sheldon H. Harris
- 3 Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity
Published 2000
Written by: Masahiro Yamamoto
- 4 The Apology
Released 2016
Directed by: Tiffany Hsiung
- 5 The Diary of Azuma Shiro
Published 2006
Translated by: Kimberly Hughes

- 6 The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame
Published 1999
Written by: Honda Katsuichi
- 7 The Nanjing Massacre: Primary Source Records and Secondary Interpretations - A Textual Critique of Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi's Review
Published 2013
Written by: Suping Lu
- 8 The Rape of Nanking
Published 1997
Written by: Iris Chang

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. To what extent were the atrocities of the Japanese military institutional?
2. What degree of accuracy should be given to different figures for the number of victims in the massacre?
3. How reliable are eyewitness accounts of the events of the massacre?
4. What was the impact of ultranationalist movements in Japan on the eventual atrocities of Japanese soldiers?
5. How has the debate on Comfort Women evolved since the rise of Japanese revisionist historiography in the 1960s?
6. What is the impact of modern activists on the reconciliation efforts of the Japanese government with regards to the Nanjing Massacre and the Comfort Women?



THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE

The International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone was formed as a coalition of 15 foreign nationals who chose to remain in Nanjing throughout the Japanese occupation. It was chaired by German businessman John H. D. Rabe, and headquartered at 5 Ninghai Lu in North-Western Nanjing. When the Chinese government fled the city in early December of 1937, the Committee was given administrative authority in its place, with the task of providing relief to fleeing civilians and eventually refugees. During the occupation, the Committee corresponded with both the Japanese military and foreign embassies in an effort to provide for those under its care.



The headquarters of the International Committee during the Japanese occupation. Photo retrieved from “The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe” (2000)

The Committee established the Nanking Safety Zone as a demilitarized, protected region within the city’s borders which the Japanese military could not enter. At its peak, it is estimated that the Safety Zone cared for roughly 250,000 Chinese civilians and refugees, many living in refugee camps located in key buildings within the Zone (such as Nanking University or Ginling College). Many even found refuge in the homes of Committee members. John Rabe’s home held around 650 refugees at the peak of the occupation. The Committee was instrumental in providing essential services to preserve the livelihoods of the people of Nanjing, and ensuring the safety of those within the Zone in the midst of Japanese atrocities.

SOURCE: COLLECTION

**“EYEWITNESSES TO MASSACRE:
AMERICAN MISSIONARIES BEAR WITNESS
TO JAPANESE ATROCITIES IN NANJING”**

EDITED BY ZHANG KAIYUAN (2001)

Not only did the Committee save the lives of thousands of Chinese civilians, its members created what are now among the most complete and valuable records of the Nanjing Massacre.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Organization</i>
1 Mr. John H. D. Rabe, Chairman	German	Siemens Co.
2 Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe, Secretary	American	University of Nanking
3 Mr. P. H. Munro-Faure	British	Asiatic Petroleum Co.
4 Rev. John G. Magee	American	American Church Mission
5 Mr. P. R. Shields	British	International Export Co.
6 Mr. J. M. Hansen	Danish	Texas Oil Co.
7 Mr. G. Schultze-Pantin	German	Shingming Trading Co.
8 Mr. Iver Mackay	British	Butterfield & Swire
9 Mr. J. V. Pickering	American	Standard-Vacuum Oil Co.
10 Mr. Eduard Sperling	German	Shanghai Insurance
11 Dr. M. S. Bates	American	University of Nanking
12 Rev. W. P. Mills	American	Northern Presbyterian Mission
13 Mr. J. Lean	British	Asiatic Petroleum Co.
14 Dr. C. S. Trimmer	American	University Hospital
15 Mr. Charles Riggs	American	University of Nanking

**A list of the members of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone.
Retrieved from "Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone" (1939)**

1. Finances	4. Food	(c) vacant residential
2. Police	Quantity	7. Utilities
Control of entrances	Location and distribution	Water
Boundaries	5. Transportation	Light
Number and location	6. Housing	Telephone
3. Soldiers and Military elements	Survey	8. Sanitation and Health
Removal orders and inspection	Mat sheds	Extra latrines: disposal
Anticipation of flight	Use and management of buildings	Garbage and refuse collection
Wounded	(a) public	Medical
	(b) institutional	

Problems to be tackled by the International Committee when it was established, according to John Rabe in his diaries. Retrieved from "The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe" (2000)

FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE

John Rabe writes in his diary that the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone was formed on November 19th, 1937. Three days later, Rabe was voted Chairman of the Committee, and on that same day the Committee was officially recognized by the Chinese government. The goals of the Committee were immediately communicated to the Japanese military with support from the American and German embassies. On November 29th, the Nanjing municipal government transferred administrative authority to the Committee, with a grant of 100,000 dollars as well as 60,000 sacks of rice.

On December 2nd, the Committee received notice from the Japanese that they would not be able to officially recognize the proposed Nanking Safety Zone, but would “endeavour to respect the district as far as consistent with military necessity.” This continued to be the official response to the Zone throughout the occupation. The treatment of the Zone by the Chinese military was similarly mixed. Officials frequently disrespected the Zone and constructed military defences within its borders (despite it being officially demilitarized). Colonel Huang of the Chinese military was wholly against the Zone - “Every inch of soil that the Japanese conquer should be fertilized with our blood [...] If you had not established your Safety Zone, people now fleeing into the Zone could have helped our soldiers,” (The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe).

Before the Japanese occupation, the International Committee attempted to act as a mediator between the Chinese and Japanese forces, with support from the German embassy. After attempting to work with the two governments on a truce, they eventually switched tactic, suggesting to Chiang Kai-Shek an armistice which would allow a secure retreat followed by a peaceful handover of Nanjing to the Japanese. It was the rejection of this proposal that triggered the Japanese assault on the city.

THE SAFETY ZONE DURING JAPANESE OCCUPATION

The Committee worked long and hard throughout the Japanese occupation, shouldering the many logistical and administrative responsibilities of the former municipal government, in addition to protecting the city’s civilians against Japanese atrocities. It also served as a crucial communicator with both Japanese government officials and the representatives of various foreign embassies, including the US, Germany and Britain.

SOURCE: DIARY

“THE GOOD MAN OF NANKING:
THE DIARIES OF JOHN RABE”

EDITED BY ERWIN WICKERT (2000)

The main Japanese contacts for the International Committee were Fukuda Tokuyaso and Fukui Kiyoshi, both of which were attachés of the Japanese embassy. Through these two officials they made frequent requests to guard the Safety Zone as well as work towards the reestablishment of essential services such as food distribution, police, and other utilities. Committee secretary Lewis Smythe also reported to the embassy a total of 444 cases of misconduct among Japanese soldiers witnessed by Committee members, but repeatedly noted that many more were simply not recorded in time.

SOURCE:
COLLECTION

“DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE”

SHUHSI HSÜ (1939)

The Committee also sent frequent letters to representatives Allison, Prideaux-Brune, and Rosen (of the American, British and German embassies respectively). In these letters they reported on the ongoing problems facing the Committee, and requested support in proposing solutions to the Japanese. Many of the letters involved requests for monetary aid, support in acquiring foodstuffs from outside the city, and promoting the safety of civilians within the Zone. It is often through these channels that information on the massacre reached beyond Nanjing’s walls.

SOURCE:
COLLECTION

“DOCUMENTS ON THE RAPE OF NANKING”

TIMOTHY BROOK (1999)

On January 22nd, 1938, John Rabe reported that 250,000 civilians were under the care of the Committee, 90% of which resided within the Zone. The Committee operated 25 major refugee camps, and were distributing rice to over 50,000 impoverished people. The Committee’s biggest struggle was providing supplies, often due to altercations with the Japanese military. Requests to ship in food from Shanghai were denied, and many of the Committee’s rice stores were looted by the Japanese. The Committee also worked (often unsuccessfully) to mobilize Chinese workers to restore essential services when the Japanese army failed to do so.

	<i>Assignment Vouchers</i>	<i>Actually received</i>	<i>Confiscated by Japanese authorities</i>
Rice	20,009 bags	9,076 bags	10,933 bags × 96 kilograms
Flour	10,000 bags	none	10,000 bags × 50 lbs.

In a letter sent to the three foreign embassy officials, Rabe provides a comparison of resources promised by the government to those actually received by the Committee. Retrieved from “Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone” (1939)

SOURCE:
BOOK

“THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR II”

IRIS CHANG (1997)

Committee members also served as physical protectors for the safety of the citizens of Nanjing. Reports often describe Rabe arriving with his Nazi armband to repel Japanese soldiers, and other Committee representatives supervising restoration operations to ensure the security of its workers. When the Japanese took steps to clear the Safety Zone in February of 1938, refugees would frequently flee back to the Zone for fear of Japanese soldiers, seeking the protection of Committee members. Even within the Zone, Committee members acted as bodyguards, as John Rabe often did in chasing Japanese intruders from his property as they attempted to loot his belongings and take female refugees.

The Japanese military held a certain animosity towards the Safety Zone and the members of the Committee. John Rabe writes of a speech by a Japanese garrison commandant which blamed foreign involvement for the resistance of Chinese civilians, and by extension for the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers. The Japanese embassy threatened Rabe to prevent him from sharing reports of the massacre with the outside world. There were even cases of Japanese troops attacking American committee members who ventured outside of the Zone. Despite the apparent support of the Japanese embassy, John Rabe wrote in his diary on the day 20,000 civilians were taken away during official registration, “we shrug in silence at these barbaric measures. But sad to say, we are totally powerless.” There are still many efforts today by Japanese revisionist historians to discredit the accounts and efforts of the International Committee.

SOURCE:
BOOK

“THE NANKING MASSACRE: FACT VERSUS FICTION”

HIGASHINAKANO SHUDO (2005)

SOURCE:
MEMOIR

“MY EIGHTY YEARS IN CHINA”

GEORGE A. FITCH (1967)

On February 18th, 1938, the Committee rebranded itself as the Nanking International Relief Committee, transferring most administrative duties to the newly installed Japanese Self-Government Committee (whose members were mostly sympathetic towards the Safety Zone). Historians have retrieved 23 letters to Japanese officials, 20 reports of Japanese disorders, 9 letters to foreign embassy attachés and 10 memorandums by this point in the occupation. The Committee is reported to have saved thousands upon thousands of Chinese refugees during the occupation.

THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS IN NANJING

SOURCE: COLLECTION

“AMERICAN MISSIONARY
EYEWITNESSES TO THE NANKING
MASSACRE, 1937-1938”

MARTHA LUND SMALLEY (1997)

In addition to the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, foreign nationals also founded and approved a Nanjing branch of the International Red Cross on December 13th, 1937. Foreign medical professionals in Nanjing worked day and night in campuses such as Nanking University and Ginling College to treat Chinese civilians injured by

Japanese soldiers. Many of the members of this group were American missionaries and doctors, and provide valuable eyewitness accounts of the massacre.

1	Rev. John G. Magee, Chairman	10	Dr. C. S. Trimmer
2	Mr. Li Chuin-nan, Vice-Chairman	11	Rev. James McCallum
3	Mr. W. Lowe, Vice-Chairman	12	Dr. M. S. Bates
4	Rev. Ernest H. Forster, Secretary	13	Mr. John H. D. Rabe
5	Mr. Christian Kroeger, Treasurer	14	Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe
6	Mrs. Paul de Witt Twinem	15	Rev. W. P. Mills
7	Miss Minnie Vautrin	16	Mr. Cola Podshivoloff
8	Dr. Robert O. Wilson	17	Pastor Shen Yu-shu
9	Mr. P. H. Munro-Faure		

Members of the International Red Cross Committee; many members were also part of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. Retrieved from "Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone" (1939)

Many Red Cross Committee members also provided support to the many victims of rape during the massacre. Minnie Vautrin for example was the protector of thousands of women within Ginling College and was also often seen with her Chinese coworkers supervising Japanese registration efforts to

deter misconduct by military personnel. Her diaries have been frequently utilized as a record of the treatment of women under the Japanese occupation of Nanjing.

SOURCE:

NOVEL

“AMERICAN GODDESS AT THE
RAPE OF NANKING: THE COURAGE
OF MINNIE VAUTRIN”

HUA-LING HU (2000)

OFFICIAL FOREIGN REACTIONS TO NANJING

Studying the Nanjing Massacre reveals a number of discrepancies between the accounts of foreign nationals in Nanjing and those of foreign newspapers and governments. The reality is that the official views of many nations were politically motivated, and this is a relevant historiography to take note of in one's research. Consider an excerpt from John Rabe's diary regarding the Japanese refusal to officially acknowledge the Safety Zone: "London regards this reply as a flat-out refusal. We are of a different opinion here. The answer is cleverly couched in diplomatic terms, leaving a backdoor open, but is generally favourable," (The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe). Official and local interpretations have the potential to vary wildly. Below are summaries of the official reactions of various foreign powers to the Nanjing Massacre:

SOURCE: BOOK

"A HISTORY OF THE NANJING
MASSACRE"

EDITED BY ZHANG XIANWEN,
ZHANG LIANHONG AND WANG
WEIXING (2015)

The United States: There were 4 American journalists present in Nanjing when it fell, and they all published similar reports of atrocities to American newspapers. The attitude of the US was to remain neutral. The government did condemn the Japanese for the sinking of the American gunboat, the *Panay*, but commended the swift Japanese response. Communications with Japan stressed the protection of American nationals and property, but took no aggressive action against atrocities, in line with its isolationist attitude at the time. It is important to note that principal weaponry used by the Japanese was American-made.

Germany: The 3 German officials who remained in Nanjing during the massacre corroborated the brutal stories, and frequently discredited Japanese propaganda. Reports reached the German embassy in Beijing but were swiftly censored. German diplomats emphasized German national interests, even providing the Japanese with maps of the city indicating German property. It was the view of Germans in Nanjing that Japan was not a sufficiently valuable ally to warrant the loss of Chinese economic partnerships. When Japan threatened the Anti-Comintern pact, Hitler's Nazi government switched rapidly to a pro-Japan stance, withdrawing advisors from China and freezing Chinese loans. After the war, accounts of the massacre by German nationals were very heavily suppressed.

The United Kingdom: A UK journalist was responsible for the first book on the Nanjing Massacre, "What War Means: The Japanese Atrocities in China." They made frequent reports of Japanese atrocities, claiming that foreign pressure was helping push the Japanese army

towards reform. Diplomat R. G. Howe presented this view of Japanese actions: atrocities were intentionally ignored as a way to indulge soldiers and punish the Chinese; newfound contempt for the West prompted military disorders. The British pointed out the failure of the Japanese embassy to influence military commanders, and tried to communicate directly with officials in Tokyo. The official stance was nevertheless wary of getting too involved in the affairs of the East.

Spain: In the midst of the Spanish Civil War, attitude towards the massacre was divided. Republican media reported the atrocities to the best of its ability, while those allied with Franco played down Japanese behaviour, believing Japan would bring order to East Asia.

Italy: As an ally of Germany and Japan, Italy censored the massacre in a similar way to the Japanese. Its reporting took a heavily anti-communist stance, criticizing the false hatred towards Japan and focussing attention on the threat of communist China.

The Soviet Union: The Soviet interpretation was that Japan started the war and was committing atrocities as a way to destroy the will to resist. The Japanese army feared Chinese resistance, resulting in unnecessary brutality. This stance was generally sympathetic towards China.

SOURCES ON THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE

- 1 A History of the Nanjing Massacre
Published 2015
Edited by: Zhang Xiaowen, Zhang Lianhong
& Wang Weixing
Translated by: Michelle LeSourd & Kan Liang
- 2 American Goddess at the Rape of
Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin
Published 2000
Written by: Hua-Ling Hu
- 3 American Missionary Eyewitnesses to
the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938
Published 1997
Compiled by: Martha Lund Smalley
- 4 Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
Published 1939
Compiled by: Shuhsi Hsü

- | | | |
|----|--|---|
| 5 | Documents on the Rape of Nanking
Published 1999 | Compiled by: Timothy Brook |
| 6 | Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American
Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese
Atrocities in Nanjing
Published 2001 | Edited by: Zhang Kaiyuan |
| 7 | My Eighty Years in China
Published 1967 | Written by: George A. Fitch |
| 8 | The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries
of John Rabe
Published 2000 | Edited by: Erwin Wickert
Translated by: John E. Woods |
| 9 | The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus
Fiction
Published 2005 | Written by: Higashinakano Shudo
Translated by: Sekai Shuppan |
| 10 | The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten
Holocaust of World War II
Published 1997 | Written by: Iris Chang |

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. To what extent was the International Committee necessary for protecting the citizens of Nanjing from the Japanese?
2. How successful was the Nanking Safety Zone in providing security to Chinese civilians? In reducing casualties? In preventing Japanese atrocities?
3. To what extent can the eyewitness accounts of foreign nationals in Nanjing be trusted as credible sources of data?
4. How successful was the International Red Cross Committee in helping injured refugees?
5. What was the impact of foreign government involvement in Nanjing?
6. How has Japanese revisionism handled the actions and accounts of the International Committee?



THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Japan formally surrendered to the Allies on August 15th, 1945, thus ending its 14 years of militarism and expansion. On January 19th, 1946, the Allies established an international criminal court in Tokyo called the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), with the intension of trying and punishing Japanese political and military leaders for their actions during the war. The Tribunal oversaw the Tokyo Trial, which brought to court 28 Japanese leaders intended as a representative group of Japanese aggressors. The Trial began in May of 1946 and lasted 2 and a half years, with final verdicts announced on November 12th, 1948. The Trial transcript was over 48,000 pages long at its conclusion.



The defendants and defence team at the Tokyo Trial. Photo retrieved from "The Japanese on Trial" (1979)

SOURCE:

BOOK

"THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II"

YUMA TOTANI (2008)

The Tokyo Trial is often referred to as the "second Nuremberg," (the trial which saw the sentencing of Germany's chief war criminals and political leaders). Indeed the Tribunal's charter was in many ways similar to that of Nuremberg, declaring as its purpose to advance international law, promote peace, and serve unbiased justice. It also served as a step towards outlawing military aggression (more on that debate to follow), set a precedent for international criminal justice, and aimed to reveal the nature of militarist Japan to the Japanese people.

To this effect, the trial was the prosecution of Class A war criminals - those who were guilty of "crimes against peace," such as aggressive warfare (these charges were in effect created for the Nuremberg Charter and were then translated over to Tokyo). Class BC

criminals, those guilty only of conventional war crimes and “crimes against humanity,” were generally tried in national courts of law. It is argued that in many ways, the Tokyo Trial was a form of American propaganda and performance (the United States controlled most of the Trial proceedings) and a way to justify the actions of the Allies during the war.

STRUCTURE OF THE TRIBUNAL

Whereas the trial at Nuremberg was presided upon by only 4 justices of the major Allied powers, the Tokyo Trial called for a massive panel of 11 justices, one each from Australia, Britain, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and the United States. These same countries each contributed a prosecutor to form the prosecution team. The president of the tribunal was Sir William F. Webb, the Australian justice, nominated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur also drafted the Tribunal charter and had the power to review its verdicts once the trial was over. The prosecution was led by American prosecutor Joseph Keenan (though many would argue British prosecutor Comyns-Carr was the chief contributor to the team).

As for the defence, each of the 28 defendants was given a Japanese counsel approved by MacArthur. An American defence team was also formed to support Japanese lawyers in the Western judicial process. The leader of the defence was Japanese lawyer and specialist in Western law Takayanagi Kenzo. A full secretarial team was also put together by MacArthur; the trial was conducted bilingually in both English and Japanese.

INDICTMENT, PROSECUTION, AND DEFENCE

The prosecution team presented 55 counts in their indictment of the 28 defendants - 36 of which constituted crimes against peace, 16 murder charges, and 3 for conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity. Of these counts, the Tribunal ended up passing judgement on only 10, feeling the others as either insufficiently proven or redundant. Chief among these counts was the claim of an overarching military “conspiracy” to wage aggressive war as a means to develop dominance of the entire Pacific (issues with the conspiracy charge to be discussed in detail below).

The prosecution furiously began developing a case by collecting national data on Japanese war crimes in an attempt to find patterns that implicated the Japanese leadership (an attempt to prove institutional aggressive warfare). Collecting Japanese war records was difficult due to the coordinated destruction of these records by Japan after the surrender; chief prosecutor Keenan chose to focus on witness statements and interviews. When the

international prosecution team arrived (the Americans had begun ahead of their arrival), they took issue with Keenan's approach and slowly took over responsibility and leadership for the prosecution. The dynamic of the prosecution was oftentimes troubled - Keenan's defensive takeover of cross-examinations and speaking roles against the desires of the team constituted some of the worst moments of the trial for the prosecution.

The defence, meanwhile, was fighting an uphill battle against a panel of Japan's wartime enemies. Its case was primarily a legal one, but was mostly dismissed by the Tribunal. Among the arguments were that Japan had never waged a "formal" war, and therefore its captives could not be judged as "prisoners of war." They also argued that the Japanese had acted in self-defence, responding to the economic blockade and military encirclement posed by the West. It was also pointed out that the Allies were guilty of many of the same "crimes" Japan was now being prosecuted for.

SOURCE:
BOOK

**"THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED
WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE
EAST, 1945-1951"**

PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO (1979)

The jurisdiction and legality of the Tribunal was an issue that lasted throughout and beyond the Trial, and the defence frequently raised significant challenges to the Tribunal's authority. Four of these principal challenges were presented formally as follows:

1. The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme Commander have no authority to include in the Charter of the Tribunal and to designate as justiciable 'Crimes against Peace';
2. Aggressive war is not *per se* illegal and the Pact of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of national policy does not enlarge the meaning of war crimes nor constitute a war crime;
3. War is the act of a nation for which there is no individual responsibility under international law;
4. The provisions of the Charter are 'ex post facto' [retroactive] legislation and therefore illegal (Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial).

The right to legislate "crimes against peace" was justified primarily under the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 and the resultant Instrument of Surrender. The defence frequently questioned these agreements as carriers of "international law."

THE TOKYO TRIAL AND THE RAPE OF NANKING

The Nanjing Massacre came up as the quintessential focus of the war crimes portion of the Trial, which ran from June 4th, 1946 to January 17th, 1947. As opposed to the Geneva Convention, war crimes were, at the time, defined by the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 and the Prisoner of War Convention of 1929. The trial on the Rape of Nanking focussed primarily on General Muto Akira, foreign minister Hirota Koki, and Matsui Iwane, the commander-in-chief of Japanese forces in Nanjing. This portion of the trial was a massive defeat for the defence.

SOURCE: BOOK

**“THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO
WAR CRIMES TRIALS”**

ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN (1987)

The prosecution brought forward an enormous number of victim and witness statements to support the existence of atrocities in Nanjing. These corroborated stories of mass executions, murder, and rape. The prosecution brought up about a dozen witnesses, including many members of the International Committee. Foreign records were also often presented as evidence, including the diary of George A. Fitch. Reports filed with the Japanese embassy during the massacre were also presented to prove the widespread knowledge of atrocities in Japan.

The argument presented by the prosecution team was that the actions at Nanjing were a deliberate policy, which continued despite extensive knowledge of atrocities by Tokyo and the rest of the world. The diplomatic staff, they claimed, had no power, and the massacre was carried out on the orders of political and military leaders. Three primary points were presented - that atrocities occurred against civilians and disarmed soldiers after Chinese resistance had ceased, that attacks occurred even on those fleeing into the Safety Zone, and that top level military and government leaders were well informed of the atrocities.

The case offered by the defence can best be described as meagre. Witnesses on their part were primarily Japanese soldiers who claimed their orders had been to “love the people.” They maintained that they had gained the respect of the Chinese people in Nanjing, and that the atrocities described by the prosecution were unfounded. The prosecution did not even feel the need to cross-examine these witnesses, showing a policy of contempt towards massacre deniers. The defence, too, did little to contest evidence, often waiving the right to cross-examine - frequently attempts by the defence backfired, as was the case with the testimony of Miner Searle Bates which was infamous for accidentally contributing evidence to the prosecution.

In their final judgement, the Tribunal stated its understanding was that disciplinary measures to counteract atrocities were taken, but authorities either did not pay them attention or even approved of the criminality displayed by Japanese soldiers. Matsui Iwane was found guilty of criminal negligence to take the necessary measures to prevent atrocities. Hirota Koki was found guilty of the same. Only Muto Akira was acquitted, on the grounds that he did not have sufficient authority to take action.

THE VERDICT AND ITS DISSENTERS

After 2 and a half years of debate, the Tribunal announced its verdicts on November 12th, 1948. In a judgement spanning over 1,200 pages, the panel of justices presented what is called the “majority opinion,” detailing their interpretation of the facts, addressing criticism of trial procedures, and ultimately announcing their individual judgements and verdicts for 25 of the accused (2 had died before the Trial’s conclusion and one had been declared mentally unfit for trial). All 25 were declared guilty of one or more of the 10 accepted counts, and given punishments ranging from 7 years of imprisonment to death.

<i>Count</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>Sentence</i>
ARAKI	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Life Imprisonment
DOIHARA	G	G	G	G	G	A	G	G	G	O	Hanging
HASHIMOTO	G	G	A	A	A				A	A	Life Imprisonment
HATA	G	G	G	G	G		A	A	A	G	Life Imprisonment
HIRANUMA	G	G	G	G	G	A	A	G	A	A	Life Imprisonment
HIROTA	G	G	A	A	A	A	A		A	G	Hanging
HOSHINO	G	G	G	G	G	A	A		A	A	Life Imprisonment
ITAGAKI	G	G	G	G	G	A	G	G	G	O	Hanging
KAYA	G	G	G	G	G				A	A	Life Imprisonment
KIDO	G	G	G	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	Life Imprisonment
KIMURA	G	G	G	G	G				G	G	Hanging
KOISO	G	G	G	G	G			A	A	G	Life Imprisonment
MATSUI	A	A	A	A	A		A	A	A	G	Hanging
MINAMI	G	G	A	A	A				A	A	Life Imprisonment
MUTO	G	G	G	G	G	A		A	G	G	Hanging
OKA	G	G	G	G	G				A	A	Life Imprisonment
OSHIMA	G	A	A	A	A				A	A	Life Imprisonment
SATO	G	G	G	G	G				A	A	Life Imprisonment
SHIGEMITSU	A	G	G	G	G	G	A		A	G	7 Years Imprisonment

SHIMADA	G	G	G	G	G		A	A	Life Imprisonment	
SHIRATORI	G	A	A	A	A				Life Imprisonment	
SUZUKI	G	G	G	G	G	A	A	A	Life Imprisonment	
TOGO	G	G	G	G	G		A	A	20 Years Imprisonment	
TOJO	G	G	G	G	G	G	A	G	O	Hanging
UMEZU	G	G	G	G	G		A	A	A	Life Imprisonment

Key: Blank — Not indicted on the count.
 G — Guilty.
 A — Acquitted.
 O — Charged but no finding made by the Tribunal

Count 1 — The Over-all Conspiracy.
 Count 27 — Waging war against China.
 Count 29 — Waging war against the United States.
 Count 31 — Waging war against the British Commonwealth.
 Count 32 — Waging war against the Netherlands.
 Count 33 — Waging war against France.
 Count 35 — Waging war against USSR at Lake Khassan.
 Count 36 — Waging war against USSR at Nomonhan.
 Count 54 — Ordering, authorizing or permitting atrocities.
 Count 55 — Disregard of duty to secure observance of and prevent breaches of Laws of War.

Verdicts and sentences of the 25 remaining accused at the Tokyo Trial. Notice Matsui Iwane, who was sentenced to death despite being acquitted of all but 1 count. Retrieved from “Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial” (1971)

This judgement was called the “majority opinion” for a reason. Of the 11 justices of the Tribunal, 9 were signatories to the final verdict (one reluctantly so), which by the charter of the Tribunal required only a simple majority to be made final. Even within this majority group, separate “concurring opinions” were submitted by Justice Delfin Jaranilla of the Philippines, Justice Henri Bernard of France, and president of the Tribunal William F. Webb of Australia. Jaranilla, for his part, argued that the sentences given to the accused were too lenient, likely due to his experience with the Bataan Death March. Webb, conversely, argued strongly against the death penalty, and disagreed with “conspiracy” being under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. He also argued for the trial of Emperor Hirohito. None of these points were put to writing at the time of the Trial.

SOURCE:

BOOK

“THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND”

B.V.A. RÖLING (1994)

Justice Bernard dissented more heavily, along with Justice B. V. A. Röling of the Netherlands. Bernard took issue not with the conclusions of the majority opinion, which he felt were correct, but the procedure by which the conclusions were reached. He claimed that the Emperor's exclusion from the trial rendered many of the verdicts invalid, and complained about the lack of independent investigation permitted to the Tribunal. He took issue with the presentation of evidence, and the disadvantaging of the defence. He said famously, "a verdict reached by a tribunal after a defective procedure cannot be a valid one," (Victors' Justice). Justice Röling was more sympathetic to the defence, and argued that aggressive war had no precedent for being treated as a crime under international law. He also felt that the government of Japan played a much smaller role in its military policy. Rather, what began as an economic and political expansion evolved only by the urging of the military. Röling wanted to reduce many of the Tribunal's sentences (even acquitting 4 of the accused) on the grounds that they should be treated as military enemies and not criminals.




Justice Radhabinod Pal.
Retrieved from "Victors' Justice" (1971)

Undoubtedly the most radical dissenting opinion was infamously provided by Justice Radhabinod Pal of India. In a seemingly radical statement, Pal declared that all 28 of the initial accused should be acquitted of all charges. His dissent focussed primarily on the failure of the Tribunal to successfully prove its legal jurisdiction - there had never been an international judicial body before World War II (the first had been Nuremberg), and charges of aggressive war did not exist before World War II. Conspiracy, he argued, was also never defined as criminal in any legally binding international agreement. Supposing the Tribunal had jurisdiction, Pal still disagreed with the verdict. He claimed war could not be considered aggressive if the country had "*bona fide* belief" that it was threatened, which Japan did amidst a hostile international environment. On the subject of conventional war crimes, Pal argued that incidents like the Rape of Nanking were not institutional but discrete cases, for which the responsibility lay among low ranking soldiers and officers. Anyway, he argued, the Fourth Hague Convention and Prisoner of War Convention on war crimes did not apply to Japan, who had never formally signed them.

Pal's dissenting opinion became a powerful symbol to Japan's right-wing. Organizations were founded to bring Pal to Japan to speak about his judgement. This happened three times before Pal's death in 1967. The Japanese published Pal's opinion formally, and it is often argued that it fuelled the rise of Japanese revisionism.

THE MISSING TRIAL OF HIROHITO



Emperor Hirohito.

Retrieved from *The New York Times* (2016)

The intention of the IMTFE was to bring to justice Japan's major political and military leaders. Despite this lofty goal, there seems to be a notable absence among those indicted, that being Emperor Hirohito. In Japan, the Emperor stood at the highest level of government. One major controversy surrounding the Tokyo Trial is the immunity given to the man who was supreme political leader of Japan throughout the entirety of the war. Where was Hirohito's missing trial?

This question is answered with the understanding that the trials at Tokyo were very much politicized events, especially that of Class A war criminals. Everything from the courtroom to the proceedings was controlled largely by the American government - Justice Röling called it "an American performance" in his 1994 book. As such, many historians believe Hirohito's immunity to be a calculated political decision. The decision to not try the Emperor was in fact announced exclusively by the United States, without significant backing from the other Ally nations.

When Japan accepted the theoretically "unconditional" surrender offered by the Allies, it demanded a caveat by which the Allies promised to keep the Emperor in power. The United States and the United Kingdom ultimately agreed on the usefulness of retaining the Emperor for a number of reasons. First, it would secure the prompt Japanese surrender rather than needlessly extend the war. More importantly, however, the Emperor was a beacon to the Japanese population. Japanese culture treated the Emperor like a religious icon. A surrender endorsed by the Emperor would be much more readily accepted by the masses. Removing the Emperor, on the other hand, could create mass rebellion among the Japanese people. The Allies accepted the Japanese caveat, but did not promise Hirohito immunity from prosecution.

While working on the establishment of the IMTFE, the Allies frequently brought up the question of whether or not to act on their threat and prosecute the Emperor. Reportedly, an agreement could never quite be reached. The United States fervently argued for Hirohito's immunity, whereas countries like France and the Soviet Union believed he should, as a symbol of his people, be shown justice. The decision was "deferred" multiple times - even as the trial began no official decision had been made (though inaction was in itself a choice). General MacArthur is often given credit for securing Hirohito's immunity.

Emperor Hirohito was not the only subject missing from the Tokyo Trial. The United States is often criticized for prohibiting certain other subjects to enter Trial proceedings. Key among these are the biological experiments of Unit 731 in Harbin, as well as the government-sanctioned Comfort Women system. Of Unit 731 it is said that the United States salvaged Japanese scientists and their data, and that trying the Japanese on their experiments would compromise the American ability to use the information they gathered. Comfort Women were left out in order to establish more diplomatic relations with the new Japanese government once the trial was over.

CRITICISM OF THE TOKYO TRIAL

Unfavourable opinions of the Tokyo Trial began to surface even as the Tribunal was still in session. While the Allies praised the Trial for bringing objective justice to criminals of war, many criticisms began to form on the conduct, nature, and jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Among these criticisms is of course the forceful omission of certain key individuals and events from the Trial (see above), but many more dealt with faulty legal proceedings, errors in judgement, and manipulation of international law.

Legality of Aggressive War: The “crime against peace,” or the crime of aggressive war, was only given legal meaning at Nuremberg. It was once again the United States that urged the Allies to establish aggressive war as a crime. “Aggression” was arguable not even formally defined, a fact which was largely circumvented by the majority judgement. While many international agreements “condemned” the waging of wars of aggression, none were legally binding and none were officially ratified by Japan. Justices Bernard, Röling, and Pal all found that the prosecution’s argument that aggressive war was a crime to be unconvincing, though Bernard and Röling eventually developed their own arguments to reach that conclusion.

SOURCE: BOOK

“VICTORS’ JUSTICE: THE
TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL”

RICHARD H. MINEAR (1971)

Illegal Conspiracy: Counts 1-26 listed in the indictment all charged the accused with “conspiracy” - any plot to perform acts of aggression against foreign powers to expand Japan’s dominance across Asia and the world. Also allegedly developed for Nuremberg, the conspiracy charge was a way for the Allies to indict those involved in early planning stages but did not themselves wage aggressive war - consider how this might subvert the democratic principle of “innocent until proven guilty” by finding methods to assume guilt. The conspiracy charge, in domestic law, is also more lenient in the acceptance of prosecution evidence (a fact which was heavily used during the Tokyo Trial). Justices Pal and Webb both agreed that conspiracy was not a crime under international law at the time of the Trial.

Individual Responsibility: The Tokyo Trial tried individuals as being responsible for actions they took under their capacity as members of government. This is a questionable legal practice, and was indeed questioned by many of the Trial's critics. Justice Pal claimed that "individuals comprising the government and functioning as agents of that government incur no criminal responsibility in international law for the acts alleged." This criticism was also largely ignored by the majority judgement.

Negative Criminality: Also known as "criminal negligence," negative criminality declares that a person who fails to prevent a crime despite having reasonable ability to do so has himself committed a crime. This was of course the basis of count 55 in the indictment, which notably single-handedly condemned Matsui Iwane to death. It is questionable whether or not this was criminal under international law, and therefore whether or not it was within Tribunal jurisdiction during the Tokyo Trial. There is also debate over the justification given for charging certain accused on this count - the definition of "reasonable ability to act" is very much ambiguous.

Retroactive Law: Many of the above criticisms posit that the Allies used Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trial as an opportunity to make additions to international law, specifically adding crimes that were not illegal prior to World War II. This is *ex post facto* or retroactive law. The Tribunal and prosecution claimed all of the above as already being part of international law, but included the odd argument that even if they were not, the Tribunal did have the right to create new law. The Allies established (arguably intentionally) flimsy definitions of what actions were illegal, namely anything against the "sound perception of the people." It is this behaviour that caused many to call the Tokyo Trial "victors' justice," in that the Allies permitted themselves to circumvent the law for the purpose of convicting the Japanese.

Disadvantaged Defence: The above criticisms also note many instances of the Tribunal siding with the prosecution, and indeed many Trial procedures seemed to disadvantage the defence team. Evidence brought by the defence was more often declared impermissible, and the Tribunal (majority) often took executive actions to throw out the defence's objections without discussion in court. This is perhaps another instance of "victors' justice."

Procedural Flaws: The Trial was fraught with inconsistencies in its procedure that call into question the validity of the Tribunal's judgement. The process of choosing the accused was controversial - out of 250 government officials in Ally custody, the accused were chosen intentionally as the representative group that would be easiest to convict. The Trial was set up such that there was little chance of acquittal, securing a way for the Allies to condemn the Japanese. The rules governing the final judgement were also lenient in favour of prosecution - the death sentence could be given out upon the agreement of 6 of the 11 justices (in fact

none of the Trial's death sentences were agreed to by more than 7 justices). US domestic law would have made it that 9 votes would have been required to even sentence an individual to anything over 10 years in prison. This would have saved all of the accused from death and many from life imprisonment. The last critique is that of criminal judgement - the Allies were prosecuting the Japanese for war crimes that they too had arguably committed. Japan was charged for aggressive war, despite the fact that the USSR had itself broken their neutrality pact when they declared war on Japan. The US dropping of the atomic bombs is often considered a crime against humanity.

SOURCES ON THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

- 1 The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951
Published 1979
Written by: Philip R. Piccigallo
- 2 The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials
Published 1987
Written by: Arnold C. Brackman
- 3 The Tokyo Trial and Beyond
Published 1994
Written by: B.V.A. Röling
Edited by: Antonio Cassese
- 4 The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II
Published 2008
Written by: Yuma Totani
- 5 Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial
Published 1971
Written by: Richard H. Minear

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. To what extent was the IMTFE unfairly skewed in favour of the prosecution?
2. How effectively did the Trial handle war crimes such as the Rape of Nanking?
3. To what extent was Hirohito responsible for Japan's actions during the war?
4. Was the Tokyo Trial "victors' justice?" How has it established a precedent for international law today? Is this precedent positive or poor?



SOURCE LIST / BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1 **A History of the Nanjing Massacre** Published 2015
Book by Nanjing University Press
Ed. Zhang Xianwen, Zhang Lianhong, Wang Weixing Nanjing, Jiangsu, China
Trans. Michelle LeSourd, Kan Liang

Zhang, Xianwen, Lianhong Zhang, and Weixing Wang, eds. *A History of the Nanjing Massacre*. Translated by Michelle LeSourd and Kan Liang. Nanjing, Jiangsu: Nanjing University Press, 2015.

Although difficult to access in the West, this source is a comprehensive overview of the Nanjing Massacre written by a group of Chinese professors at Nanjing University. This personal and physical closeness to the event offers the writers local sources and extensive archives on the massacre. This book was preceded by the creation of a 72 volume historical collection on the massacre, also compiled by the authors. The source is analytical in nature, providing specific details and statistics on each of its topics, but still manages to include witness testimonies and individual stories. It is very narrowly focussed on Nanjing from the prewar to the postwar period, and is an excellent introductory source. Keep in mind the potential pro-China and propagandistic leanings of the authors, although suppressed by the academic nature of the work.

- 2 **American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking:** Published 2000
The Courage of Minnie Vautrin by Southern Illinois University Press
Biographical Novel Carbondale, Illinois, US
Hua-Ling Hu

Hu, Hualing. *American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000.

This source draws primarily on Minnie Vautrin's personal diary, as well as eyewitness accounts from Chinese survivors and foreign missionaries, to construct a narrative based on her experiences at the Rape of Nanking. The novel spans from Vautrin's arrival in China in 1918 to her return to the US in 1940. This perspective gives insight into the sheltering of refugees in the Safety Zone by foreign nationals in an engaging and accessible way. This is recommended as an introduction to the work of the International Committee during the Japanese occupation, despite its broad time frame.

- 3 **American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938** Published 1997
Collection by Yale Divinity School Library
New Haven, Connecticut, US
Ed. Martha Lund Smalley

Smalley, Martha Lund. *American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre: 1937-1938.* New Haven, CT: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997.

The Yale Divinity School is a premier source of missionary records on various historical events, and the Nanjing Massacre is no exception. This particular publication is, for the most part, a collection of primary documents (valuable for research) helpfully put in chronological order. Introductions accompany the book as well as the various missionaries, providing helpful context to those unfamiliar with the International Committee or the Red Cross. Photos and journals provide a narrative of the massacre, but lack statistical data, which might be found in more clerical records. Documents are given in their raw form (post-translation) and are therefore absent of any external authors' historiographical lens. This source is recommended for further inquiry into the Safety Zone and the role of foreigners in the massacre.

- 4 **Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves** Published 2013
Book by Oxford University Press
New York, New York, US
Peipei Qiu, Su Zhiliang, Chen Lifei

Qiu, Peipei, Su Zhiliang, and Chen Lifei. *Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013.

This book contributes a historical analysis of the Comfort Women system, presenting it as a military and political tool against the Chinese population. The content focusses primarily on the establishment of the first Comfort Stations, describing the rules and regulations imposed by the Japanese government (and the very different conduct of the Japanese army). Also included is a meaningful discussion on the mental repercussions suffered by former victims of the system, as well as social backlash against those who did manage to return to their families. All three authors are professors, two of which specialize in Chinese and Japanese history, and one which specializes in computer science and data collection. This gives them access to the wide range of testimonies and sources they draw from in this work. The stance aligns with the Chinese Victimization historiography, analyzing the impact of government action as well as military insubordination in creating institutionalized rape.

5 Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone

Collection

Ed. and Trans. Shuhsi Hsü

Published 1939

by Kelly & Walsh, Limited

Shanghai, China

Hsü, Shuhsi. *Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone*. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1939.

This now extremely rare publication is a compilation created immediately after the massacre containing correspondence by the International Committee in Nanjing. Apart from a very brief preface, the documents are in entirely raw form, translated by the editor. They provide a comprehensive narrative of the actions and successes of the Committee starting with its formation and ending with its rebranding as the International Relief Committee. Most revealing are the included letters written to the Japanese embassy, which demonstrate the Committee's progress and the formal response of Japanese officials. Raw primary documents are invaluable but more difficult to dissect - this is a source specifically about the Safety Zone and recommended for intensive study. Note: the entire collection is now more easily accessed in *Documents on the Rape of Nanking* (see below).

6 Documents on the Rape of Nanking

Collection

Ed. Timothy Brook

Published 1999

by The University of Michigan Press

Ann Arbor, Michigan, US

Brook, Timothy, ed. *Documents on the Rape of Nanking*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999.

This is a much more easily accessible collection of primary source documents on Nanjing and the Tokyo Trial. Containing all the documents from *Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone* in unaltered form, it adds letters by Dr. Robert Wilson and a copy of the judgement from the IMTFE. This adds breadth and makes the source an excellent place to investigate many facets of the massacre before choosing an area of focus. Although all the contained documents can be found elsewhere, they are most easily accessed through this publication. The editor, Timothy Brook, is a Canadian professor of history specializing in the study of China. While his other works usually pertain to the Ming Dynasty, he does often extend to modern Chinese history, using his wide access to sources to develop this collection. He provides limited analysis but leaves the documents in raw form. This is an excellent and broad collection of documents to supplement secondary source reading.

7 **Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing**
Collection
Ed. Zhang Kaiyuan

Published 2001
by M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
Armonk, New York, US

Zhang, Kaiyuan, ed. *Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001.

A brief introduction provides historical context for the otherwise unaltered collection of American missionary documents on the Nanjing Massacre. A mixture of letters, reports, and memorandums are provided from 10 individuals present at the time; a description of each is also provided for context. Letters, as private correspondences, can be revealing in their descriptions of eyewitness experiences and emotional reactions. This source also uniquely includes documents outlining expenditures of the International Committee - insightful towards evaluating the operations and difficulties of the Safety Zone. It also provides eyewitness reports of murder, rape and other atrocities. The only struggle is the disjointed nature of the provided documents, which will require synthesis in order to provide a picture beyond the separate experiences of the individuals.

8 **Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-Up**
Book
Sheldon H. Harris

Published 1994
by Routledge
London, England

Harris, Sheldon H. *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932-1945 and the American Cover-up*. London: Routledge, 1994.

This book is often listed in the West as the premier source on Japanese biological experiments during World War II. Indeed its primary focus is on biological atrocities and specifically those at Unit 731 in Harbin. However, this book's introduction is an excellent analysis of sociopolitical context for the Sino-Japanese War. This analysis bears resemblance to the Foreign National historiographical view. Whereas most Western sources on the massacre tend to be revisionist, this provides a unique alternative view that is worth reading. Aside from this, however, the source does not particularly pertain to the Nanjing Massacre. It is, for this purpose, best described as an analytical introduction to pre-war Japan.

9 My Eighty Years in China

Memoir

George A. Fitch

Published 1967

by Mea Ya Publications, Inc.

Taipei, Taiwan

Fitch, George A. *My Eighty Years in China*. Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1967.

George Fitch of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone wrote these memoirs 30 years after the Nanjing Massacre had taken place. He admits that his diaries and records before 1950 were largely destroyed by the Japanese and later Communist occupations. That being said, he draws from the letters he wrote to his wife at the time to provide a narrative account of China from as far back as 1883 up to 1948. This broad scope and narrative nature means that perhaps the accuracy of his details could be called into question. Nevertheless, a narrative is an excellent way to gauge the lives of individuals during the massacre and introduce researchers to the subject. The work was requested by the YMCA as a way to keep record of events in China - this implies Fitch's purpose was to recount history as accurately as he could, given the records he had remaining. This is recommended as a source early in the research process for a general overview of the Safety Zone and life in Nanjing.

10 Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity

Book

Masahiro Yamamoto

Published 2000

by Praeger Publishers

Westport, Connecticut, US

Yamamoto, Masahiro. *Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000.

This book can loosely be called a revisionist work - it is written by a Japanese national who questions the role of military leaders and the government in the atrocities in Nanjing. However, the author takes the more moderate position: there was responsibility on the part of the Japanese, but the atrocities took place as an inevitability of conventional warfare. This stance is unique among the sources. Yamamoto draws primarily from Chinese and Japanese written sources and statistical data. Most valuable are his detailed descriptions of the military efforts and maneuvers of the Japanese leading up to Nanjing, as well as his numerical analysis of atrocities. The desire to justify the actions of the military should be considered when evaluating the data provided. Nevertheless, it is a valuable and largely unused analytical source.

11 The Apology

Film

Tiffany Hsiung

Published 2016

by ALPHA Education

Toronto, Ontario, Canada

The Apology. Directed by Tiffany Hsiung. Canada: ALPHA Education, 2016. Film.

This film very specifically addresses the Comfort Women system across Asia, including in Korea, China and the Philippines. It focusses primarily on the impact of sexual slavery on former Comfort Women, and the lack of responsibility or compensation offered by the Japanese government. The producing organization, ALPHA Education, is a Canadian group focussed on advancing the knowledge of World War II in Asia and increasing engagement in the West. Their work primarily follows Contemporary Western Revisionism, and often (in this film in particular) demands action and responsibility from the Japanese government. As such, the work is quite intentionally accusatory, with anti-Japanese leanings. Nevertheless it is a gripping narrative account and overview of the lives of former Comfort Women and the institution of military prostitution.

12 The Chinese War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression: A Concise History

Book

Ed. Zhi Shaozeng et al.

Trans. Cao Zhigang et al.

Published 2015

by Central Compilation &

Translation Press

Beijing, China

Zhi, Shaozeng, ed. The Chinese War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression: A Concise History. Translated by Zhigang Cao. Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2015.

This is an official historical work funded and produced by the Communist Party of China. Unsurprisingly, it is riddled with propaganda and loaded language which appeals to Chinese Victimization while also being distinctly pro-Communist and anti-GMD. It is also broad in scope, covering not only Nanjing but the entirety of the Sino-Japanese war; it chooses to provide a narrative account, likely as a medium for its glorification of China and its people. That being said, the narrative is thorough and valuable for its unique perspective. The section on the Nanjing Massacre is very brief but manages to cover the primary details of the event - Japan's seizure of Nanjing, atrocities, and the Safety Zone. This is best recommended as a source to extent prior learning and to add an additional perspective to a student's research.

- 13 **The Diary of Azuma Shiro** Published 2006
Diary by Phoenix Publishing & Media Group
Trans. Kimberly Hughes Jiangsu, China

Azuma, Shirō. *The Diary of Azuma Shiro*. Translated by Kimberly Hughes. Jiangsu: Phoenix Publishing & Media Group, 2006.

This is perhaps the quintessential example of Japanese War Guilt literature. Azuma Shiro was a Japanese soldier during the Sino-Japanese war. This collection of his diaries spans from July of 1937 to September of 1938, covering many of Japan's military operations during the war. This is an important source to gain insight into the experiences and psyches of Japanese soldiers. Historians have difficulty understanding the motivations of those who committed atrocities - Azuma mentions few, but those he does are insightful and startling. While the diary is often self-justifying, the contextual foreword and afterword provide notes on Azuma's position after the war. The source is also unique in that it is written similarly to a novel, and in the first person. It is recommended as both a source to increase engagement in the topic, and a source to provide alternate historiographies to a researcher.

- 14 **The Good Man of Nanking:** Published 2000
The Diaries of John Rabe by Vintage Books (Random House, Inc.)
Diary New York, New York, US
Ed. Erwin Wickert
Trans. John E. Woods

Rabe, John. *The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe*. Edited by Erwin Wickert. Translated by John E. Woods. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2000.

John Rabe was chairman of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, and as such his diaries are an excellent source on the massacre as well as the efforts of foreign nationals. This particular source is a collection of his records during and after the massacre, interspersed with documents selected by the editor to provide statistical and contextual data to supplement the diary. As such, it provides an extremely detailed account of the circumstances in Nanjing throughout the occupation. It also uniquely provides a look into the suppression of news about Nanjing, not only by the Japanese but by foreign powers in the years after the war. The collection is both informative and engaging - an excellent starting source for those introduced to the Nanjing Massacre and would like to pursue research on the International Committee.

- 15 **The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951** Published 1979
by University of Texas Press
Austin, Texas, US
Book
Philip R. Piccigallo

Piccigallo, Philip R. *The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979.

This work is a comprehensive account of Allied war crimes trials after the end of World War II, especially those pertaining to events in the Far-East. The author states as his intention to make clear the machinery behind trial proceedings, and identify distinctions between Class A war criminals (those at the major Tokyo Trial) and Class BC criminals tried in national courts. It tackles all the Allied powers in isolation to discuss their treatment of war criminals, in addition to discussing the Class A Tokyo Trial and its judgement. Despite being a freelance writer and historian, Piccigallo does not appear to demonstrate any strong historiographical leaning, leaving this to be a fairly good objective overview of the trials. It is recommended as a starting source, and will require other supplementary materials to build on the data it provides.

- 16 **The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography** Published 2000
by University of California Press
Los Angeles, California, US
Book
Joshua A. Fogel, Mark Eykhold, Takashi Yoshida, Daqing Yang
Ed. Joshua A. Fogel

Fogel, Joshua A., Mark Eykhold, Takashi Yoshida, and Daqing Yang. *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*. Edited by Joshua A. Fogel. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2000.

This unique book assumes an understanding of the Nanjing Massacre in order to discuss revisionism and other issues of historiography pertaining to the events of the Sino-Japanese war. In its 4 distinct essays by 4 different authors, it offers a wide range of interpretations on the gathering of data from the massacre, the rise of revisionism in Japan, and the credibility of eyewitnesses and documents. The book is very unique in its historiographical focus and an excellent read to provide historians with crucial context. While it does contain relevant data on the massacre, that is not its purpose, and is limited in the information it provides. It is recommended that this be read after establishing a knowledge base on the massacre and before delving into sources with more intense perspective leanings.

17 **The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame**
Book
Honda Katsuichi
Ed. Frank Gibney ; Trans. Karen Sandness

Published 1999
by M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
Armonk, New York, US

Katsuichi, Honda. *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame*. Edited by Frank Gibney. Translated by Karen Sandness. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.

This narrative account of the massacre is written by a Japanese journalist representing the Japanese Reconciliation historiography. It begins with the landing of Japanese forces in China and ends at the conclusion of the Nanjing Massacre. This allows it to provide ample historical context before an in-depth account of Japanese atrocities. The author does contribute quite a bit of his own writing, but much of the account is centred on the stories of witnesses and victims that he collected in his capacity as a journalist. Possibly the most unique and valuable addition to this source is the author's use of pictures and diagrams to supplement the text - this allows for clearer understanding of Japanese behaviour and the progress of the war. The author's sources are primarily Chinese and Japanese eyewitness accounts - the source lacks official documents and reports by foreigners in Nanjing.

18 **The Nanjing Massacre: Primary Source Records and Secondary Interpretations - A Textual Critique of Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi's Review**
Article
Suping Lu

Published 2013
by Project MUSE

Lu, Suping. *The Nanjing Massacre: Primary Source Records and Secondary Interpretations—A Textual Critique of Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi's Review*. PDF. Project MUSE.

This article is a defence of a work formerly published by the author, Suping Lu, on the Nanjing Massacre. The text is not an addition of new information on the massacre but rather a discussion pertaining to the credibility of eyewitnesses and the objectivity of reporting - this is particularly informative because it showcases some comparative tools that can be used to verify historical data. She also notably critiques the fixation on the issue of the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre. There is a slight Contemporary Revisionist leaning to the work, but given some context of the massacre, this source will provide a potent historiographical discussion.

19 The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction

Book

Higashinakano Shudo

Trans. Sekai Shuppan

Published 2005
by Sekai Shuppan, Inc.
Tokyo, Japan

Higashinakano, Shudo. *The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction*. Translated by Shuppan Sekai. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2005.

Fact Versus Fiction is a hardline Japanese Revisionist book, seeking to refute and condemn conventional wisdom on the Nanjing Massacre. It presents some basic retelling of the Japanese capture of Nanjing (with an obvious pro-Japan leaning) but concerns itself mostly with attacking eyewitness accounts, foreign documents, and Western literature concerning the massacre. The attack on John Rabe's diary is particularly insightful to historians who have access to it - an independent analysis and comparison would reveal argumentative issues. For those acquainted with the conventional wisdom, this is an extremely difficult read - many of the arguments have seemingly obvious flaws. Nevertheless, this perspective is highly rare in Western literature, and it is important to read critique of commonly accepted data. Also included are discussions of the conduct of Chinese soldiers prior to the occupation, often not explored by historians. It is difficult to recommend this book as a source of data, but it is nevertheless a very valuable read with a heavy historiographical tilt.

**20 The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story
of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials**

Book

Arnold C. Brackman

Published 1987
by William Morrow and Company, Inc.
New York, New York, US

Brackman, Arnold C. *The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial*. New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 1987.

This source is a comprehensive look at the Tokyo Trial, starting with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal and ending with its verdict. The primary value of this source, which does not provide much insightful information unique from other sources on the topic, is its comparative nature - evaluating the Tokyo Trial alongside the trials at Nuremberg to tell a more complete story of legal actions taken by the Allies. Also unique is a detailed section on the treatment of the Nanjing Massacre, which is particularly relevant. Two appendices also provide biographies of the accused and an excerpt of the findings of the Tribunal. Brackman was an American journalist present at the Trials and so provides a detailed narrative of its proceedings with the relative objectivity associated with his profession.

21 **The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten
Holocaust of World War II**
Book
Iris Chang

Published 1997
by Penguin Books
New York, New York, Canada

**Chang, Iris. *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*.
New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1997.**

Iris Chang's book is considered the source that sparked Western engagement in the Nanjing Massacre - it is likely the most accessible source on Nanjing for Western historians and offers a narrative specifically on the massacre. This includes the Japanese occupation, the International Safety Zone, and the eventual restoration of order. Iris Chang is very much a Contemporary Western Revisionist historian - she uses the book, particularly in its later sections, to heavily condemn Japan for its actions and demand the attention of the Japanese government. She also critiques the Tokyo Trial for failing to convict Japan's highest level political leaders (such as Hirohito). Recently, the numbers Chang provides have also been called into question. Other sources provide a more detailed analysis of statistics and data. Despite this anti-Japanese lens and powerful language, this source is an excellent introduction for researchers, which draws from foreign, local, and even Japanese source material.

22 **The Tokyo Trial and Beyond**
Book
B. V. A. Röling
Trans. Antonio Cassese

Published 1994
by Polity Press
Cambridge, UK

**Röling, Bert V. A. *The Tokyo Trial and Beyond*. Edited by Antonio Cassese.
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.**

As one of the 3 dissenting justices at the Tokyo Trial, B.V.A. Röling provides his unique analysis of the Trial's proceedings and of international law. The author appears to align himself with the Foreign National historiography, which argued against the culpability of government officials, but rather claimed that mid-level Japanese military leaders were responsible. Röling's other major contribution in this source is a discussion of the precedent set by the Tokyo Trial on international law. The editor compiled the book as a continuous interview with Röling which spans trial proceedings, legal failures, and modern law. This can be an engaging format for researchers. The focus is to advance Röling's stance of the trial - the book is limited in its presentation of specifics on the prosecution team, the defence, and the case. A justice's perspective is nevertheless revealing and unique.

23 **The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II**
Book
Yuma Totani

Published 2008
by Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts, US

Totani, Yuma. *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Yuma Totani specializes in publishing work on the Tokyo Trial. This particular source is an overview of the Trial, and an evaluation of perspectives and historiographies on the Trial's success and legitimacy. Topics addressed include the missing trial of Hirohito, the narrative of the war agreed upon by the Tribunal, responsibility for war crimes, and the Rape of Nanking. An insightful section also details how the failures of the Tokyo Trial, as well as the dissenting opinion of Justice Pal, may have contributed to the rise of the Japanese Revisionist historiography in the 1960s. It examines in detail many such impacts and interpretations of the trial. This makes it an excellent and comprehensive starting point. Its limitation is perhaps in its refusal to take a stance, lending itself more to objective retelling than providing specific insight.

24 **Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial**
Book
Richard H. Minear

Published 1971
by Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey, US

Minear, Richard H. *Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Similarly to Yuma Totani's book, this source provides a complete account of the Tokyo Trial, ranging from the establishment of the Tribunal to the eventual judgement. This is not, however, its focus. Minear is a professor specializing in Japanese history, and *Victors' Justice* is a critique of the Tokyo Trial which points out key flaws and discrepancies in procedure, legality, and historical accuracy. It is not a revisionist book - it does not attack the facts of the Sino-Japanese war - but rather makes the argument that the Tokyo Trial was a flawed and to some extent illegal method of judging the Japanese. Minear stands in favour of trying Hirohito, and in favour of acquitting the 25 accused. The book makes frequent use of the dissenting opinions of Justices Bernard and Pal, as well as an analysis of the Trial transcript. While this view is slowly becoming more popular and more accessible, this book remains a uniquely focussed source. The singular focus on the critique does take away from relaying the narrative of the Trial - it is recommended that this be read with prior understanding of context.

25 **When the Purple Mountain Burns**

Novel

Shouhua Qi

Published 2005

by Long River Press

San Francisco, California, Canada

Qi, Shouhua. *When the Purple Mountain Burns*. San Francisco, CA: Long River Press, 2005.

This novel follows the first 6 days of the Japanese occupation of Nanjing in December of 1937 - an extremely narrow scope that makes use of multiple character perspectives to provide a general image of the massacre. The characters represent inhabitants of Nanjing, military personnel, Japanese journalists, and foreign nationals, creating a varied overview. This book very heavily aligns itself with Chinese Victimization, with increased emphasis on the role of military culture on shaping the behaviour of Japanese soldiers in Nanjing. Shouhua Qi is a Nanjing native and an associate professor of English. The book is criticized as being overly dramatic in its portrayal of atrocities, but Qi seems to maintain verifiable historical accuracy in many of her descriptions, despite having little expertise in history. The book's wide range of perspectives makes it an excellent introduction to the Nanjing Massacre, and the novel format allows it to be engaging for those unsure about the subject.

THE NANJING MASSACRE is one of the untold tragedies of the early twentieth-century. It is also one of the most controversial topics among historians studying the Second Sino-Japanese War. This brief guide provides an overview of those three months in which the citizens of the capital of Nanjing struggled to cope with Japanese occupation, and examines the efforts of key individuals in shaping the course of atrocities. It also discusses the events of the war in the context of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, the Asian counterpart to Nuremberg, and questions the validity of the Tribunal's conclusions in 1945.

Aimed at young historians, this guide includes references to sources that may be relevant to those wishing to study the Nanjing Massacre in detail. It evaluates each source with reference to its historiographical perspective and pertinence to the topic. Guiding questions are also included to point aspiring historians in the right direction.

Tomer Zaidman is a Canadian student currently studying International Relations at the University of Toronto. He was born in Ramat Gan, Israel, and moved to Shenzhen, China at the age of five. Five years later he moved to his current home in Markham, Ontario. Over the course of his high school career he travelled twice to the Far East - first to Taipei, Taiwan, to teach English to junior high school students, then to Nanjing, China, where this guide was produced. He developed a love for history in grades 11 and 12 when he studied twentieth-century China and Japan. Aside from being a young historian, he is a recreational mathematician, and spends his time playing clarinet with groups such as the Toronto Youth Wind Orchestra. The opportunity to write this guide came from his history teacher, who suggested he apply for an internship working with the Memorial Hall to the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders.



SPECIAL THANKS TO:

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AND

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