

METZENBAUM, Mr. STEWART, and Mr. BRADLEY, proposes an amendment numbered 227:

On page 33, line 1, strike all through line 13, and insert the following:

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

SEC. 802. It is the sense of Congress that the President shall remove economic sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia when he determines, after consultation with Great Britain and other interested states, after periodic monitoring of events in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to determine whether there is a broadening of political participation and movement toward genuine majority rule, and after consultation with Congress, that the removal of such sanctions is in the national interest of the United States.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. TSONGAS. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. This is an important proposal, the amendment that is offered by the Senator from Massachusetts. I am sure it is of vital concern to every Member.

We have disposed of a great number of minor amendments today. Some are major amendments, and this is a major one. We have another highly important amendment, but we may be approaching the end of consideration of the bill, this subject having been before the Senate recently.

Will the Senator consider a time agreement now on the debate? I have no desire to be stingy with time. We are concerned with the certainty of time.

Mr. TSONGAS. I would be amenable.

Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator wish to suggest a time? The leader is not here at this moment, but we can get him here. Does the Senator want an hour to each side?

Mr. TSONGAS. If we could have an hour on each side and if Senator BYRD and Senator HELMS find it agreeable, that would be fine.

Mr. STENNIS. I believe it would be agreeable. Let us send up a trial balloon, and if we get consent, I might help convince them. I suggest that the Senator ask unanimous consent that an hour be allowed to each side, in the usual form.

Mr. TSONGAS. I so move.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. STENNIS. Let us have it stated, so that it will be in the RECORD, that debate on this amendment will be limited to 1 hour to each side, and the time will be controlled by the Senator from Massachusetts, for the amendment, and by the chairman of the committee, in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. TSONGAS. If the Senator will yield on that point, I do not believe the chairman of the committee is in full opposition to the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. I am really speaking as floor manager of this bill. That was the reference I made to myself. I am the floor manager of this bill. The proposal of the Senator from Massachusetts, if I heard it correctly, is to strike out what we have in the bill.

Mr. TSONGAS. And substitute—yes, that is right.

Mr. STENNIS. I would be backing the committee, as it sent the bill to the floor

with the amendment sponsored by Senator BYRD.

Mr. TSONGAS. I am in perfect agreement on the time limitation, so long as whoever controls the time on my side happens to agree with me.

Mr. STENNIS. I think we can work it out. I do not want to control the time. I would be glad to have someone else control it.

Mr. TOWER. The proponent of the amendment controls the time on his side.

Mr. TSONGAS. I am persuaded by that.

Mr. TOWER. That is the usual way we do things around here. The chairman of the committee controls the time in opposition, unless he favors the amendment. Then it is controlled by the minority leader or his designee. That is the usual form.

May I suggest, however, that the Senator from Massachusetts withhold his request for a unanimous-consent agreement at the time, which I am prepared to accept. But I think there are some bases I must touch, particularly with members of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the Republican side of the aisle. Therefore, I suggest that the Senator withhold his request for controlled time, for the time being.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator withdraw his request?

Mr. TSONGAS. I do.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. President, I am offering this amendment to S. 428, the Department of Defense fiscal year 1980 authorization bill. My amendment deletes language in the bill ordering the President to remove economic sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It substitutes language providing the President with a prudent, yet flexible, approach to the sanctions issue. My amendment instructs the President to lift sanctions only after he has accomplished three tasks. First, he must consult with Great Britain. Second, he must periodically monitor events in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to determine whether there is a broadening of political participation and movement toward genuine majority rule. Third, he must confer with Congress regularly on the sanctions issue. And last, he must determine that lifting sanctions is in the national interest of the United States.

I believe that this amendment sets out for the President a balanced, constructive approach to the question of economic sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. There are a number of sound, commonsense reasons why lifting sanctions is now unwarranted and dangerous to our national interest.

First, consider the new government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It inherits a civil war which rages more intensely every month. It rules by a constitution which entrenches white control over the government indefinitely. It is embarrassed by one political party which refuses to take the seats in Parliament it won in the election. This government is ruled by a man whose political experience is by all accounts limited and whose popular

support is in grave doubt. It is surrounded by hostile black states and besieged by two guerrilla armies. Instability and unpredictability define the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Should the United States rush in to support this regime? Would it not be wiser to wait and see what develops?

The second sound reason for caution and flexibility is the restraint of our allies in Europe, especially the British who exercise a special relationship with Zimbabwe. Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain promised in her election campaign to immediately lift sanctions and recognize the new government in Zimbabwe. But what happened? Maggie Thatcher has now assumed her office, and with all the realities and responsibilities in clear focus, she has decided to go slow on sanctions, very slow. It is an important decision and she intends to proceed cautiously. Should we approach the problem differently? Should we rush in where Maggie Thatcher fears to tread?

What about the rest of Europe, indeed, the rest of the world? Has any country moved to lift sanctions? Has any country anywhere decided to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia? The answer is no. If the Senate votes today to lift economic sanctions, the United States will have earned the dubious distinction of being the first country in the world to openly support a government condemned around the world as colonialist and preserving minority rule.

There is, however, one country which is actively supporting the Salisbury regime. Cash, arms, and equipment flow into Zimbabwe from one country and that country is South Africa. South Africa, whose formal policy of apartheid systematically deprives blacks of all political rights, has struck an informal alliance with Zimbabwe. Bishop Muzorewa and his foreign minister have declared their open acceptance of South African support. Is this budding alliance something the Senate wishes to join? Is it the Senate's wish that we join the forces of minority rule in Southern Africa? I think not. Cooler heads must prevail.

How does black Africa regard this new government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia? This is a question which I invite my colleagues to consider carefully. Black Africa cares about this issue deeply. Minority rule in southern Africa offends and threatens every black African state. They have spoken out in no uncertain terms against the new regime in Salisbury.

Zambia—This is a country ravaged by air and ground attacks from Zimbabwe; her economy is near collapse due largely to depressed copper prices; the capital of the country has been hit by commandos from Zimbabwe; many civilians have lost their lives. Yet, Zambia condemns the Salisbury regime as racist and vows to fight on.

Mozambique—This nation, like Zambia, is militarily weak and economically impoverished. Mozambique has suffered great destruction from the Zimbabwe Air Force and Army. Many civilians have died; many economic assets have been

destroyed. Yet, Mozambique also remains committed to genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe.

The other states neighboring Zimbabwe—Angola, Botswana, and Tanzania—all condemn the new government, refuse to recognize it, and have voiced their dismay over the last Senate vote to lift sanctions.

Some of my colleagues might argue that these African states are not representative of African opinion. The idea is that these states are too involved in the fight to have a dispassionate opinion. Let us look at the statements of moderate, even pro-capitalist states in Africa.

Kenya is an example. A long-time American friend in East Africa, Kenya has officially urged "all peace-loving nations" not recognize the Muzorewa-Smith "puppet" regime. Kenya is a stable, pro-free enterprise, moderate African state.

Ivory Coast, a growing economic power in West Africa and a staunch ally of the West, has officially called on the United States not to lift sanctions.

Sudan, a key friend to the United States in the Horn of Africa, with great economic potential and strategic importance, has condemned last month's Senate vote and has urged that sanctions remain in force.

Liberia's President Tolbert represents America's oldest ally in Africa. He has written that he would regard the lifting of economic sanctions as disastrous.

Senegal, another moderate African state, has conveyed its opposition to lifting sanctions.

The list goes on. It includes Nigeria, the economic and political powerhouse of Black Africa. Nigeria opposes the lifting of sanctions so strongly that they are considering cutting off oil supplies to the United States. We should realize that Nigeria needs all the oil revenue it can get. Nigeria has also been a friend to us in Africa, helping us through the recent oil shortage by increasing production. But the sanctions issue touches Nigeria deeply. They seem willing to inflict tremendous costs on themselves just to tell us how important it is to leave sanctions in force.

I do not applaud Nigeria's use of the oil weapon. In fact, I will do all I can to prevent them from using it. My home State of Massachusetts depends heavily on imported oil and I want no oil embargo.

But it strikes me as especially pointless if the Senate infuriates black Africa over this issue. It is clearly contrary to our national interest to act now on the sanctions issue. There is no good reason to provoke Nigeria or any other African state. Why lengthen service station gas lines in the name of haste and poor judgment on the sanctions issue?

I would like to close with one final point.

We are not the only super power following events in Southern Africa. We have a rival, the Soviet Union, and that rival is looking for an entree into southern Africa. In Zimbabwe, in Namibia, and in South Africa, the Soviets hope to make great strides at America's expense.

But it so happens that the Soviets

are inept in Africa. They have lost almost every foothold they ever had there. Their inability to meet the needs of African development means failure for the Soviets again and again.

Africans know this. The Soviets know this. But for some reason, many of my colleagues in Congress think the Soviets are an irresistible force in Africa.

The fact of the matter is, and I say this as someone who lived in Africa for 2 years, that the Soviets can only thrive if we, the United States, nourish them. Only through our needless failures in Africa do the Soviets advance. History is clear on this point. Ethiopia and Angola are the most recent examples. Soviet success depended directly on American blunders.

Today, the Senate can set in motion a tragedy. We are on the brink of making the fundamental error the Soviets are waiting for in Zimbabwe. The question is whether we will side with white minority rule. We should know by now that the forces of history are moving against the minority regimes of southern Africa. The Soviets know this. They are sitting back and waiting for frustrated African nationalists to give the Soviet Union an entree.

Today, the Senate has a choice. My colleagues can vote for a prudent, cautious approach to the sanctions issue, or they can play into the hands of the Soviets and lift sanctions now. The choice is clear. Commonsense and our national interest point to one path. I request support on the amendment.

But I wish to make it very clear. If Senators vote to lift the sanctions they are going to hand black Africa over to the Soviets. That is the sum and substance of what Senators are going to do. However the Senate votes, whether it chooses to support my amendment or not, I want Senators to know what they are doing so that at no point down the road can they say "I wasn't aware of the consequences." These are the consequences and I hope that the Senate at this point will show its judgment, its concern about its future and for once not try to give the Soviets something they cannot get themselves.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. May I inquire does the Senator from Ohio know we are under controlled time.

Mr. METZENBAUM. I am not aware of that.

Mr. TOWER. We are not.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senator there is no agreement on time at this point.

Mr. STENNIS. I think there was when

I left the Chamber. When I got back it was off.

All right.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts withdrew his request for the time agreement.

Mr. STENNIS. Excuse me.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I wish to take this opportunity—

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I do not know what happened to the Senator from Massachusetts. He was speaking and someone put in a quorum call. He may still wish to speak. He has given up the floor without protecting himself, but someone should protect him if he wishes to retain the floor. He was speaking.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yielded the floor.

Mr. TSONGAS. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Oh, the Senator yielded?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No. The Senator yielded the floor.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. All right. Very well.

The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to commend Senator TSONGAS for the courageous and principled stand he has taken on the question of Rhodesia. The Senator has shown an impressive ability to identify this Nation's true interests and I am pleased to join him as a cosponsor of this amendment.

Mr. President, I believe that the Senate acted prematurely last month by expressing support for lifting the economic sanctions now in force against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

That action was premature, because it amounted to an endorsement by the Senate of a government whose legitimacy is widely challenged, whose cohesion is in doubt and whose ability to command the support of its own people is open to the most serious question.

And such action remains premature.

It is premature, because Britain, the nation with direct responsibility for Rhodesia, has not as yet taken any new initiatives whatever on this issue. And in spite of Mrs. Thatcher's statements during the recent campaign, the shape of future British policy will not become clear until the upcoming Commonwealth meeting has concluded.

This Nation has no responsibility whatever to move out in front of Britain on the Rhodesian issue.

There is no reason for this Nation to move alone—or even worse, hand-in-hand with South Africa—to recognize a government that is opposed by every single state of black Africa.

And there is no reason whatever for this Nation to show such enthusiasm for a government that still has much to prove, particularly to its own people.

We have heard repeatedly that the Muzorewa Government was installed as the result of reasonably free and fair elections.

That may or may not be true—there are persuasive arguments on both sides. But there is no question at all about the

fact that the elections were held on the basis of a constitution that was submitted for approval to a mere 4 percent of that country's population.

That 4 percent was defined by race. Only whites were allowed to vote.

The constitution they approved is riddled with loopholes that make meaningless its guarantees of fundamental human rights.

The constitution preserves for a tiny minority, defined by race, a degree of control that is inconsistent with the principle of majority rule.

The government that is based on that constitution is the direct successor of the illegitimate and openly racist Ian Smith regime.

Now that some would like to believe that Mr. Smith has become a statesman, there may be a tendency to forget that the government he led until recently was and remains illegal in international law.

Now that Mr. Smith is a part of a government that purports to represent the black majority, there may be those who want to forget the racist laws that he inflicted upon Rhodesia. And there may well be those who do not remember, or choose not to remember, that Mr. Smith has publicly referred to black Africans as "Baboons."

Many of us may forget that. But I do not believe that anyone in Africa has forgotten it.

And I do not believe either that those who advocate our support for the current Rhodesian government fully understand just what is at stake there.

For black Africa, the issue in Rhodesia has little or nothing to do with political ideology or with the personalities and programs of the various leaders.

I believe that for blacks in Africa and in this country as well the issue in Rhodesia is simple and straightforward. The issue is racism—the racism that for 400 years or more has condemned black people to the unspeakable horrors of slavery and to the profound humiliation of colonial rule.

That issue—racism—is the one issue that unites all Africans.

It is the issue that calls forth the strongest passions and the most profound beliefs.

And if we in America believe that we can ignore that issue, we do so at the greatest peril to our future relations with Africa.

I do not doubt for a moment that Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues are sincere, honest people.

I do not intend to cast aspersions upon their credentials as authentic African Nationalists. And I hope that they will, in fact, be able to bring about a solution that will end the violence and the bloodshed in their country.

But the fact is, Mr. President, that this government has a lot to prove.

This government must prove that it can, in fact, move the country toward full majority rule.

This government must show that it can rally its own people behind it.

This government must show that it can come to terms in one way or another with the African Nationalists who are now in armed opposition.

And this government must prove to its own people and to the people of Africa as a whole that it is more than a puppet regime, more than a convenient instrument for perpetuating minority rule.

If the new Rhodesian government can do those things, then I believe that it should have our support.

But, Mr. President, there is no evidence that the new government has as yet accomplished any of those things.

There is no evidence that success in any of these areas is even remotely possible within the bounds of the current constitution.

And there is no reason for this Nation to change its policy until we see clear and unambiguous evidence of substantial progress toward greater democracy.

Mr. President, I do not believe that a change in our policy at this time will serve the cause of peace in Rhodesia. It will serve only to harden the opposition, to estrange us from all of black Africa, and to tempt the Africans to call upon the Soviets and the Cubans for assistance.

And I cannot accept, Mr. President, the argument that I have heard in some quarters that African opinion does not matter.

I have heard it said that Africans do not know what free elections are all about.

I have heard it implied that the barbarous Idi Amin regime is the norm for Africa, rather than the gruesome exception.

I have heard that black Africans cannot govern themselves.

I have heard that they are somehow or other "not ready" to undertake the responsibilities that our own country assumed 200 years ago.

I have heard these arguments about Africa. And not too many years ago, all of us heard them about blacks here—in this country.

All of us know that those arguments are false. Those arguments are repugnant. They are reprehensible and they are racist to the core.

African opinion matters—it matters a great deal.

In the long run, Africa has incalculable strategic and economic importance for this country.

And in the long run, our relations with Africa will depend heavily upon the degree to which we adhere to our own highest principles on this issue.

Once again, Mr. President, I commend the junior Senator from Massachusetts for his outstanding leadership on this vital issue and I urge in the strongest terms that his amendment be adopted.

Mr. JAVITS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, in due course I will present for Senator CHURCH, the chairman of the committee, and myself and several other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, a substitute or a perfecting amendment, as the technical situation may require, for the Tsongas amendment, without in any way derogating, Mr. President, from the initiative and the intelligence which dictated Senator TSONGAS' work.

I would like to tell the Senate about it before I offer it, and give the Senate the genesis of this amendment, which is not any idea, any new idea, of mine, but which came out of the necessities of the situation which we faced in the long day of hearing of the Secretary of State, consultation by the Secretary of State with the President, and the resultant reflection of a point of view to us.

Mr. President, I start with this proposition: I believe it is a rather solemn duty of every Member of this body, if we can—and I emphasize those words "if we can"—that we should not divide the Senate in a party sense on issues of foreign policy.

If we can—and sometimes that may be necessary, but if we can—avoid it we ought to avoid it. Indeed, it is probably proper to say that if we can we should try to avoid acerbic differences even in the Senate, avoid any cleavage in the Senate, on major issues of foreign policy.

This particular issue is extremely sensitively balanced, and I would like to lay before the Senate briefly the considerations on both sides.

On the one side, of those who would lift the sanctions, the argument is a very strong one: We at last have some kind of a government in Rhodesia which has black representation. Now, it is true that the whites tricked up the constitution so that, at least according to its terms, they have the main portfolio for the next 10 years, anyway, unless they change. But considering the fact that they are an infinitesimal part of the population in Rhodesia, and that the hewers of wood and drawers of water overwhelmingly outnumber them, and that they at long last have a prime minister who is black and three-quarters of the legislature that is black, it is very doubtful that, notwithstanding the terms of the constitution, it is likely to last in the face of operative reality.

That is one argument; and that therefore, it being a beginning, we ought to encourage that beginning and not rebuff it, and, in a sense, impliedly encourage the guerrillas—or the Patriotic Front; I have no desire to call it names at all—who are trying to bring down this particular regime.

These are very potent arguments, and for this reason, Mr. President: There is no doubt about the fact that the Patriotic Front is being harbored in neighboring states, including a frankly Communist state, Mozambique, and that notwithstanding all of this high-flouting talk about our being the first to lift the sanctions, the fact is that the United Nations will never lift them so long as the Russians have a veto. In addition, the United Nations is now, as we all know, very heavily dominated by African-Asian nations, which have different ideas from those of other people.

But what is even more important is that the Soviet Union, without expressly violating the sanctions—because they are not sending anything, as far as we know, into Rhodesia per se—are supplying the Patriotic Front, which is, for practical purposes, tearing up the sanctions between countries.

So those in favor of lifting the sanctions have a right to ask, "What kind of nonsense is this? The Soviets are absolutely doing as they please, but we say to the United States, 'Don't you be the first to lift the sanctions; no, no, no, that's a no-no.'"

The President says, with a great deal of importance to it, that if we lift the sanctions it will only result in escalating the violence, that it will only impede efforts in the blacks' own area, that it could have very serious repercussions on what we are attempting to accomplish toward peace in Namibia, that it would be engendering more war rather than peace in the hope of a solution, and that we would promote rather than discourage the violence which now goes on in that country.

There is no doubt about the fact that black Africa is dead set against lifting these sanctions. There is no question about that. And I think Senator METZENBAUM is correct when he says, and I think we all realize it, that African opinion is important. It is dignified, and must be respected and regarded.

That is the dilemma in which the committee found itself. I had hoped that we could develop an amendment to this bill to replace the amendment which is in it lifting the sanctions, which would preserve the power of Congress to lift the sanctions and would preserve the power of the President to have some maneuvering room.

He needs maneuvering room, Mr. President, in the interests of the nation, because the British, who are the technical government or governing authority over Rhodesia, have orders-in-council, as they call it, which continue these sanctions until November 9, 1979. Therefore, they will not face this issue until about that time. I think it would be highly imprudent for the United States to proceed in this matter without at least an effort to coordinate with British policy, considering the background of the British-United States plan, and so forth. Obviously, if we lifted the sanctions now, the fat would really be in the fire, even though the Conservative Party has stated as one of its campaign promises that it will lift the sanctions. We all know that when a government gets in power it may have different ideas and different motivations.

So there is the mosaic of the situation.

The amendment in the bill as reported to which I refer, to wit, to give the President maneuvering room and to continue the control of the Congress over the situation by giving it a veto if the President decided that he would lift the sanctions after a given time, seems to result in a big struggle, a tug of war between the President and Congress. He feels that under the United Nations Participation Act he is entitled to exercise this power. We have on one occasion set it aside as to chrome, and we may set it aside again if we wish; but that was repealed, so there is some substance to his feeling that it is a power which we want him to exercise alone, or which, by precedent, he is entitled to exercise alone. In any case, we could not agree with the President on such an amendment.

Under these circumstances, the committee has now given profound consideration to what might be done, in a day of hearings with the Secretary and a day of discussion among its members, and has come up with a proposal which I shall in due course, for the chairman of the committee and myself, submit to the Senate.

Under this proposal, we are trying to maintain the same situation which obtained when we passed the Case-Javits policy originally, which goes back to 1973. Under that, we lifted the sanctions by law, assuming that we could pass such a law through the House and obtain the President's signature or override his veto if he decided to veto it.

The proposal which I shall lay before the Senate continues that way of dealing with the situation, but it gives to the President the opportunity to justify a continuance of the sanctions if he can, without giving a congressional veto and running into that conflict between the President and Congress on this particular power respecting sanctions.

The amendment, which has now been approved by a vote of the committee of 8 to 1, with nine members present, would substitute other language for section 802 of this bill, which is before all Members and which I would like to read so that it becomes clear exactly what we are talking about.

Section 802 is found at page 33 of the bill. It first specifies what is to be amended, and then goes on, on page 33, lines 6 through 13, as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after the date of enactment of this section or on and after June 30, 1979, whichever is later, the President shall not prohibit the importation from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia into the United States of any material determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions of this Act, nor shall he prohibit trade in lawful goods between Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the United States."

The amendment which I shall propose strikes that language, and proposes to insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 802. In furtherance of the foreign policy interests of the United States, the Government of the United States shall not enforce sanctions against Rhodesia after December 1, 1979, unless the President certifies to the Congress in writing addressed to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate that the national interest of the United States requires the sanctions to be continued and specifies his reasons therefor.

That is the end of the substitute.

Bearing in mind, Mr. President, the following factors, the committee by this vote now commends this provision to the Senate:

First, it maintains the power of the Congress to lift the sanctions, and that is exactly the way in which the original basis for this policy, Case-Javits, read. The language of that I would again like to repeat for the Senate because it is important in having an understanding of this thing. It begins exactly the same way as the language which I have just referred to, to wit, "In furtherance of the foreign policy interests of the United States, the Government of the United States shall not enforce sanctions

against Rhodesia after"—and that date was December 31, 1978. We have moved that date ahead now to take account of the British situation which will mature, which must mature, at least on or about November 9.

Second, it requires the President to do what he has not done in respect of Case-Javits, and which I blame myself for. We should have written into that the requirement which is now written here, that is, that he must formally address the Congress in writing and give his reasons. We left it open. What the President chose to do is to do it in a press conference and a press release. I do not think that is the way government ought to be run. So we have locked that up here.

Bear in mind, Mr. President, that we have a lot of bills, and that we can put a lifting of the sanctions on any bill we choose if the votes are here—and the votes are here to override a veto—to put it on any bill we please, and bear in mind now the promise of the President that he will report to us every month on the situation and also the testimony of the Secretary of State, which he gave us this morning, in which he said what would have been appropriate for the President to have included in saying what he did. Again I would like to quote the President because I think all of these things are important. He said in his press statement:

After the most careful and thorough consideration I have made a decision on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia sanctions. First, I am absolutely convinced that the best interests of the United States would not be served by lifting the sanctions.

That is the President's quote.

Had he added there "now" or "for the time being," it would have made all the difference between black and white. But he did not. The Secretary of State this morning testified that that is what it means, that it means for the time being, and we are taking him at his word in this substitute which we are offering.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 243

Mr. JAVITS. So, Mr. President, for Senators CHURCH, MCGOVERN, BIDEN, PERCY, MUSKIE, ZORINSKY, and HAYAKAWA, I send an unprinted amendment to the desk in lieu of the amendment which is before the Senate and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), for himself and Senators CHURCH, MCGOVERN, BIDEN, MUSKIE, ZORINSKY, PERCY, and HAYAKAWA, proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 243 in lieu of amendment 227:

In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted, insert the following:

SEC. 802. In furtherance of the foreign policy interests of the United States, the Government of the United States shall not enforce sanctions against Rhodesia after December 1, 1979, unless the President certifies to the Congress in writing addressed to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate that the national interest of the United States requires the sanctions to be continued and specifies his reasons therefor.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I hope the Senate will give very serious consideration to this proposal. It bears the strong endorsement of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We would not offer it but for the fact that the present bill contains a provision which would lift the sanctions at this time, were it to become law.

Let me say at the outset that the Secretary of State made clear in his testimony before the committee today that, in his judgment, the President will veto the military procurement bill if it contains the provision lifting sanctions against Rhodesia at this time.

The distinguished Senator from New York has properly pointed out that there is no justification, no reason that serves our own national interests, for the United States to be the first country to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.

Senator JAVITS has also reminded us that the British Government, which has legal ties with Rhodesia, and recognizes its historic responsibility in connection with that country, must decide what to do on the question of sanctions in the fall, no later than November. Meanwhile, we have an opportunity to observe the progress of the Salisbury government; to determine whether it acts in its own right and not simply as a front for the white elements which constitute only 4 percent of the population; and whether it continues to make progress toward a larger measure of majority rule, and thus demonstrates its entitlement to legitimacy.

Let me say, Mr. President, I am encouraged by developments in Rhodesia. I believe that the recent elections there constitute a great step forward. Furthermore, I am optimistic that the next few months will demonstrate that this government has earned recognition by the way it performs in office. But we cannot know that today. All that we can know today is that this government in Salisbury is not recognized by any country in the world, and that if the United States rushes in making a premature judgment even before Great Britain can act, then we shall invite very serious consequences upon our own position in Africa. We have to expect that our own influence throughout all of black Africa will be gravely diminished. We may even be the objective of reprisals that could be very damaging. And all of this is quite unnecessary.

On the other hand, if the Senate were to adopt the amendment recommended by the committee, we will have sacrificed nothing. It still will be within the power of the Congress after December 1 to lift the sanctions.

In fact, the amendment calls for the lifting of the sanctions on December 1 unless the President can present a persuasive case to the Congress that it would not be in our national interest to do so.

What this amendment obtains for us is time—time to be certain we are doing the right thing; time to give the United Kingdom, the government that has the

primary responsibility, an opportunity to act; time to avoid the costly mistake of rushing to judgment on an issue of this sensitivity, one that has taken on a certain symbolic significance that could gravely affect the American position throughout all of black Africa.

I think the case for adopting the committee's recommended substitute for the earlier amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. TSONGAS) is a very persuasive one. I commend Senator TSONGAS for his initiative in bringing this matter to the Senate floor by offering his amendment. I commend him further for having agreed to substitute in its place the amendment recommended by the committee.

This is not a matter we should take lightly. Nothing is to be gained for the United States by rushing to judgment on the Rhodesian question, and a great deal could be lost. On the other hand, if we approve the amendment, nothing will be lost and much could be gained. Therefore, I strongly urge the Senate to approve the substitute offered by members of the committee, led by my good friend and colleague (Mr. JAVITS), who suggested the language at a special meeting of the committee, which was called for that purpose this afternoon.

I know there are other Members who wish to speak to the subject. For that reason, Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN and Mr. McGOVERN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I want to take just a very few minutes, first of all, to express my appreciation to the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) for assisting the Senate and, I think, the entire country in a very difficult issue. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has been in session for most of this day, beginning with the Secretary of State's testimony at 11 o'clock this morning and including some 2 hours in an executive session this afternoon. I think it is fair to say that we examined every aspect of the Rhodesia issue and the language that Senator JAVITS has suggested, which was overwhelmingly endorsed by the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and which I am happy to cosponsor, has helped us to avoid what I think are several very costly and needless confrontations.

It was agreed by the clear majority of members of the committee that we do not want a confrontation with black Africa on this issue, that it is not in the interests of the United States to put ourselves in that position, which we very clearly would have had we moved unilaterally today to lift sanctions.

Second, it would have been a clear departure from our position of cooperating with the British in an area of the world where they have had a 100-year special legal and historical relationship. As has been pointed out here several times, for us to act this quickly on this issue would, for the first time, have placed us at odds with British policy.

Mr. CHURCH. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. To my knowledge, no other country besides Rhodesia, and possibly South Africa, favors lifting the sanctions against Rhodesia at this time. I know that most of our allies and friends, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Egypt, and nearly all of the African states, are opposed to lifting the sanctions now. These are the very countries with which we normally attempt to coordinate our policy. Does not the Senator feel that, in the light of the nearly unanimous opposition to any unilateral action on the part of the United States lifting sanctions at this time, it would be a very grave mistake for us to do so; that it would not only weaken our position in Africa but tend to affront our allies; and that, therefore, no American interest would be served by a precipitate decision on this delicate issue, as contained in the version of the bill brought to us by the Committee on Armed Services?

Mr. McGOVERN. That is my very strong judgment, I say to the Senator. I think not a single country around the world has yet recognized the Government of Rhodesia. Not even South Africa has recognized the Government of Rhodesia. I do not know of any government that has made a move at this point to lift sanctions.

As a matter of fact, states that are very important to the United States, in Africa and elsewhere, have spoken out very strongly against the lifting of sanctions now. That does not mean that, a month or 2 months or a few months down the road, when we can assess the situation further, some of them may not move in that direction, including ourselves. But at least as of now, what we know is that all of Africa, all the governments of Africa as well as states around the globe, are opposed to the lifting of sanctions.

The Nigerian Government, that supplies us with 16 percent of all the oil we import, has gone so far as to say that if we were now to lift sanctions, they would have to cut off oil exports to the United States. I would have to say that I am uncomfortable in the face of that kind of ultimatum, but nevertheless, it is one of the realities we have to consider. We have been on the receiving end of oil embargoes before. I would not let that one threat determine American policy, but I do think it is an indication of how strongly even a government that is comparatively moderate, like Nigeria, among the most important countries in Africa, feels on that issue.

Why take this risk? What is there to be gained by moving now, alone, as the only country in the world to break sanctions?

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes; I yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. SARBANES. In his testimony this morning and then in the questioning period subsequently, the Secretary of State discussed at some length the role which the United Kingdom has now undertaken, subsequent to the election of the new government. I think it is very important in considering this matter to appreciate the fact that the sanctions upon Rhodesia were imposed at the ini-