

12/27/79

MEMO

TO: PAUL  
FROM: CHRIS C.

RE: ANGOLA

1. Dos Santos is essentially on probation until the party congress in May.
2. Experts seem to disagree on the question of UNITA's survival after a UN settlement in Namibia. The Angolans seem to believe that once S.A. is out of Namibia, then Savimbi's source of funds and arms will dry up. Others feel that Savimbi is self sustaining and that a DMZ zone and a settlement will have little effect on UNITA.
3. The Angolans will be sensitive to your conversation with Savimbi.
4. Before the Angolans will discuss the release of mercenaries, the mercenary presence in Rhodesia must be resolved definitively. This is Bender's view.
5. Listed below are a broad range of factors which would bear upon your discussions with Angolan officials:
  - a) Benguela RR and Savimbi's capability to interdict it.
  - b) Numbers of Cuban troops
  - c) Namibia negotiations
  - d) South African military strikes in Angola
  - e) American prisoners of war
  - f) MPLA factions - pro vs. anti reconciliation, pro vs. anti mulatto
  - g) Crippled Angolan economy, coffee production way down, iron ore mining has shut down, etc.
  - h) Ex-Im Bank support for Gulf repressurization project
  - i) Angola owes Zaire some 7 million dollars in railroad car rental fees
  - j) McGovern willingness to conduct hearings on mercenaries.
  - k) Current improvement in Carter Ad. in regard to recognition.
  - i) PT is not a representative of the executive branch or President Carter.
6. Dick Moose advises you to say the following if the Angolans are interested in the Administration's official position:
  - a) There is currently strong sentiment in the Admin. in favor of recognition
  - b) The question of recognition is under active consideration now.
  - c) Admin. hopes to have additional exchanges with Angolans on the subject.
  - d) This new willingness here is in recognition of the important role played by the Angolans in the Namibia neg's.
  - e) Admin. is also pleased with expanding trade relations with US and with continuing rapprochement with Zaire.
  - f) Admin. will continue to exert firm pressure to keep the Namibian neg's moving.
  - g) Nothing occurred during the Savimbi visit which should alarm the Angolans. He did not ask for anything from Admin. and nothing was offered
  - h) Savimbi's visit has stirred interest, however, in reconciliation issue.
  - i) Admin. realizes and appreciates the fact that Frontline States have

- i) cont.... delivered the Patriotic Front in the Rhodesian neg's., and the Frontline states have a right to expect US to deliver S.A. on the Namibia neg's.

7. Dick Moose transmits the following confidential information to PT:

- a) There is the political will to move toward recognition and to carry it through at the moment.
- b) Iran preoccupies highest levels and bars action on Angola
- c) Within the Administration discussion of the issue boils down to two questions.
- d) One question is whether we will insist on a firm committment from Angolans on Cuban troop reductions if the Namibian negotiations succeed as a gneral precondition on recognition, or
- e) Should we go ahead and normalize with the understanding that if there are no significant reductions of Cuban troops, then there will be heavy restraints on the development of more full relationship. This refers to Congressional obstacles to assistance, both in funding terms and in terms of the existing direct prohibition.
- f) There is a consensus that either way it goes, the Angolans should reduce Cuban troops significantly if Namibia is settled.
- g) There is no prospect of an immediate settlement in Namibia. Moose feels that S.A. will drag out the neg's until there is a clear result in Rhodesia elections.