

presentation by thinking through the sequence in which the paragraphs are put; "sections need to be more distinctly marked. Do not be afraid to say 'I come now to so-and-so.' . . . you cannot take the human mind from subject to subject . . . as quickly [as the present draft of this speech has attempted to do]." An illustration of the many suggestions for more precise diction is the instruction, accompanied by its rationale, to change a statement from "confidence has developed" to "constantly increasing confidence" in order to make clear that a "continuing action" is being described. (Eisenhower ranked 10th in his West Point class in English composition.)

Eisenhower's personal correspondence ranges from "personal and confidential" letters, many of which are quite long, to brief memoranda to aides and Administration officials. In the long, confidential communications, the prose is crisp and the reasoning is geometric in its tightness and clarity. It is remarkable that these highly focused letters were usually dictated in one draft that required little editing. The memos tended to be much shorter, conveying suggestions or information rather than elaborate arguments. For instance, his comments on and proposed changes in drafts of his aides' letters and speeches were often phrased as polite suggestions or ideas he wanted his colleagues to consider, rather than as commands. Nonetheless, they appear to have been understood as directions, not suggestions.

A provisional sketch of certain of Eisenhower's personal qualities, notably his manner of expressing feelings and convictions, will help to provide interpretive "glue" for connecting the traits and patterns of action described thus far. I say "provisional" because his psychological makeup is difficult to analyze, let alone to pigeon-hole: he did not reveal as consistently patterned a set of traits as some other Presidents.

One thing is clear from the Whitman File: Eisenhower was neither personally nor politically a two-dimensional man, notwithstanding the joke of the 1950s that under him the bland led the bland. The public portrayals of his beaming, homey manner and the impression to be gathered from the unpublished record differ markedly. The former suggests blandness; the latter, vitality and spirit. A striking demonstration of Eisenhower's spark is afforded by another personal and confidential letter—a nominally amiable but actually caustic response to a testy letter from his brother Edgar, an outspoken old guard conservative. Ike's letter provides a glimpse of his fiery temper, the strength of his convictions, and his ability to write vivid as well as clear prose.

Edgar had asserted in his letter that he saw little difference between his brother's policies and those of Truman. Dwight's reply, in which he emphatically denied that the Fair Deal and his own policies were virtually indistinguishable but insisted on the need for moderate conservatism, abounds with passages like the following:

Should any political party attempt to abolish social security and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history. There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes that you can do these things. Among them are H. L. Hunt . . . a few other Texas oil millionaires, and an occasional politician and businessman from other areas. Their number is negligible and they are stupid.

Referring to a contention by Edgar that the two administrations seemed not to differ in their approaches to economic controls, Dwight comments: "Nothing in your letter shows such complete ignorance."

Noting that his Administration had removed wage and price controls in the face of "the most dire predictions of disaster, runaway inflation, and so on and so on," he continued: "I must say that if the people of the United States do not even remember what took place, one is almost tempted to regret the agony of study, analysis, and decision that was then our daily ration."

Dwight went on to assure Edgar, "I am delighted to get your own honest criticism, particularly if you will only take the trouble to lay down the facts on which you reach what seem to me to be some remarkable conclusions. But the mere repetition of aphorisms and political slogans and newspaper headlines leaves me cold." Finally, he expressed regret that Edgar would not be at a planned family reunion in Abilene, where they could talk, but suggested that there was some advantage to a written exchange, since "by this method I hope to make you do a little thinking rather than devote yourself just to the winning of a noisy argument."

The emphatic yet controlled tenor of these passages and the remainder of this letter bring me to a consideration of Eisenhower's temper. Lyndon Johnson shared Eisenhower's propensity to fly into towering, red-faced rages, but whereas Johnson's ire turned to bullying his subordinates and he seemed to luxuriate in his grudges, Eisenhower's blowups came on like summer thunderstorms and as rapidly were followed by balmy good humor.

Eisenhower felt his temper was a special curse. His desire to restrain his combative impulses probably contributed to his well-known team approach to leadership and to his preference for "hidden-hand" over confrontational leadership.

On re-examination, then, Eisenhower's approach to Presidential leadership emerges as distinctive and consciously thought-out, rather than an unfortunate example of artless drift and unthinking application of military organizational principles to civilian leadership. In the 1950s, of course, there was no lack of public confidence in and respect for the Presidency. The literature of the time, in fact, undoubtedly took as perennial a support for the Presidency that Eisenhower helped mold and that since has become seriously eroded. His status as a long-time public hero is not transferable to future Presidents. But there may be lessons to be learned from the means through which he avoided the potential erosion of support that even a national icon would have experienced if his performance in office had seemed disastrous to the general public. Presumably such an approach would involve a greater emphasis on confidential efforts to accomplish practical results and resistance to the temptation to flaunt one's political virtuosity.

Presidents also may find it profitable to put their prestige on the line as readily as most of those succeeding Eisenhower have. This is not a counsel for lowering expectations about what can and should be achieved by public policy; it is, however, a possible (if not easily executed) approach for avoiding raising expectations about what the President as an individual actor can ever accomplish in this centrifugal political system.

Other Presidents will not be able to imitate Eisenhower slavishly, even if they wish to. Not only do few men become Chief Executive with so great a reservoir of public esteem, but also many will consider it necessary to seek more substantial and hence more controversial policy innovations than he deemed desirable. Whether one likes

what Ike liked or not, aspects of the distinctive approach to conducting the Presidency he devised will bear examination as future options. ●

LOCK UP ALASKA'S LANDS

HON. DON YOUNG

OF ALASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 24, 1980

● Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, the reaction by my colleague from Arizona regarding the abolition of the Alaska State income tax typified the myopic policies espoused by those who desire to "lock up" Alaska's lands.

Alaskans will benefit in the short run from our oil and gas revenues, but anyone familiar with the pattern of land ownership in our State would consider Mr. UDALL's constituents the lucky ones. Mr. UDALL's people know where they can build, mine, hunt, and establish their homes. Alaskans live in a state of uncertainty because of Federal policies. Alaskans want to develop a stable, long-term economy but to the chagrin of Alaskans, it is virtually impossible to invest in Alaska's economy due to the uncertainty of the Alaska lands situation.

In previous remarks printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on April 22, 1980, there was a sardonic allusion made by Mr. UDALL that Alaska is a downtrodden State. Alaska is a downtrodden State. In comparing Alaska where it is today with where it could be if rational policies were adopted, there is more truth than humor in Mr. UDALL's label of Alaska. Alaska's people are being told that they cannot have all the land entitled to them under a contract with the Federal Government. I submit to you that my State is far from reaching its potential due to tremendous constraints placed upon it by bureaucrats in Washington, D.C.

The revenues accruing to the State from the oil at Prudhoe Bay will not last forever. Alaska has the potential to benefit many Americans by providing them with oil, gas, coal, uranium, as well as renewable resources such as fish and timber. Without a rational land policy, this contribution to the United States will not be possible. Instead of reacting with jealousy and malice toward Alaskans, I urge my colleagues to listen to Alaskans and join with me in prompting the wise and prudent use of Alaska's resources. ●

COMMUNICATIONS WEEK 1980—CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, FULLERTON

HON. WILLIAM E. DANNEMEYER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 24, 1980

● Mr. DANNEMEYER. Mr. Speaker, in order to allow an extensive study of the field of communications, the students and faculty of the California