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A Proposal to Guide the Negotiation of a
Soviet-American Citizens Exchange

I. FOREIGN POLICY RATIONALE FOR A SOVIET-AMERICAN CITIZENS EXCHANGE

A. There is an urgent need to confront Soviet propaganda successes with American initiatives which place the burden of proving peaceful intentions on the Soviets, not on the U.S.

1. A backlog of Administration pronouncements and decisions, such as the President's "evil empire" Orlando speech, the "Star Wars" proposal, and the Adelman nomination itself have created the perception in Europe and the United States, that the Reagan Administration is reviving the cold war and has no serious interest in arms control.

2. Europe should be a primary focus of such efforts due to divisive forces at work within NATO, the emergence of European neutralism, and the growing opposition to the INF deployment.

3. Without a concrete demonstration of peaceful American intentions, a political vacuum on arms control and Soviet-American relations will grow in size and importance, thereby transforming later American efforts to reduce tensions and negotiate arms control agreements into suspect and apparently hypocritical stratagems to disguise preparations for conflict and hostility.

4. As these unfavorable trends develop and gather strength, Soviet intransigence in Geneva will be interpreted as justifiable, thus making any sincere negotiating efforts on our part either easily rejected or publicly assailable.

B. An American initiative to negotiate with the Soviets a large scale, bilateral, reciprocal, and comprehensive Citizens Exchange would serve to counteract the above cited unfavorable trends in the following ways:

1. Because detente is still a major policy goal in key European nations, any American proposal to increase Soviet-American contact and understanding would be viewed as complimentary to European, particularly German, support for East-West visits and exchanges, a key feature of detente.

2. Those who assert that a new cold war mentality has permeated American policy will be faced with a stark contradiction to their thesis.

3. American negotiators in Geneva will finally be equipped with a lever of considerable effectiveness to pry their Soviet counterparts loose from their no progress position.

C. Because the Soviets have proven so reluctant in the past to enter into fully reciprocal substantial exchange programs, this American initiative will demonstrate the limitations of the closed, totalitarian Soviet system and place the Soviet leadership in a position of having to either accept the American proposal or justify their rejection of a plan for understanding and peace.

II. PROGRAM GOALS FOR A SOVIET-AMERICAN CITIZENS EXCHANGE

- A. To promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union.
- B. To help improve the general state of relations between the two countries.
- C. To provide a large-scale, continuing exchange of people, and thus a greater mutual understanding of their problems and perceptions.
- D. To make a long-term investment towards the demonstration of peaceful intentions and reduction in international tensions.

III. SUGGESTED PROGRAM PRINCIPLES OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN CITIZENS EXCHANGE

A. The program should draw from a large cross-section of the American and Soviet public, such as:

1. Government officials
2. businessmen
3. scientists
4. teachers
5. laborers
6. journalists
7. doctors
8. students
9. artists
10. athletes

B. The program should not replace cultural exchange programs. It should be a part of a new cultural exchange treaty negotiated between this country and the Soviet Union, including a renewal of the programs which were included in the 1973 treaty (which expired in 1979).

C. The program should emphasize person-to-person contacts as the optimum means to gain mutual understanding and tolerance.

D. The program should entail short exchange periods (less than two months), to increase both the number and the variety of participants.

E. The experiences of the participants should be shared with the general public and with future participants.

F. The exchanges should include people with similar backgrounds and experience in their respective fields.

G. The program should be long term. It is too much to expect to achieve any returns from a program of limited duration, given the degree of differences between the two nations.

IV. SUGGESTED PROGRAM OUTLINES OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN CITIZENS EXCHANGE

A. Administration

1. U.S. Information Agency (USIA) would have administrative responsibilities. They generally subcontract out for program development to International Citizens Exchange (consortium of private agencies), Citizens Exchange Council and non-profit organizations. Major oversight responsibilities would remain with the agency.
2. Possible Soviet counterpart--State Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations.
3. Establishment of an International Program Review Committee of American and Soviet Representatives to review program on a regular basis and to resolve disputes over program implementation.

B. Pre-trip Preparations

1. language seminar
2. seminars on understanding Soviet culture
3. interaction with previous exchange participants
4. packets of information on group or family participants will be working with

C. Program Flexibility

1. group exchanges
2. professional exchanges
3. individual exchanges
4. youth exchanges

D. Host Facilities

Facilities should be developed to maximize exposure to family, social, cultural, educational, and professional experiences. They should include, but not be limited to:

1. private homes
2. retreat facilities
3. college campuses
4. hotel, motel arrangements

V. ESTIMATED PROGRAM COSTS OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN CITIZENS EXCHANGE

A. Financial and transportation agreements

1. Sending country will bear all costs for
 - a. Travel expenses to and from country visited
2. Receiving country will bear all costs for
 - a. internal travel expenses
 - b. suitable living quarters
 - c. a monthly stipend
 - d. illness or accident and medical-hospital expenses

B. Total program budget: \$80,000,000 for each country.

1. Approximate cost for 1 person for 1 month: \$3,800
2. Approximate total no. of people supported for 1 month: 1,7500
3. Approximate total no. of people supported: 20,000 per year

C. Contributions/donations from private foundations will reduce the cost to the United States government.

D. Total approximate annual program cost represents less than one-third the cost of one B-1B bomber.

VI. OBSTACLES TO THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN CITIZENS EXCHANGE

A. Negotiations to establish a large and continuing Soviet-American Exchange will be arduous, but, ultimately can succeed if the Soviet and American objectives are taken into account and addressed directly and creatively.

B. Soviet Objections

1. American law prevents the visit of Soviet trade union delegations.
2. The Reagan Administration has prohibited the landing of the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, in the United States.
3. Soviet Union has usually rejected "home hospitality" arrangements in the Soviet Union, thus making it difficult to arrange person-to-person visitor accommodations.
4. Past and existing exchange programs are for the most part dominated by Americans traveling to the Soviet Union with far less Soviets coming to the U. S. on a reciprocal basis.
5. The Soviets prefer to work with large groups of visitors who can be programmed along touristic lines.
6. The Soviets claim that they have received threats and abuse while in the U.S.

A. American Objections

1. Soviets have tended to send to the U.S. scientists and technicians whose experiences in the U.S. will be valuable to Soviet security interests, whereas the United States has been able to send social science and humanities professors.
2. A large-scale visitor program may well be used by the Soviets for espionage and intelligence purposes.