

MEMO

TO: PAUL
FROM: CHRIS C.

RE: TALKING POINTS FOR UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SPEECH

The London Conference on Rhodesia -

As of Thursday morning, Carrington had announced that 1000 Commonwealth monitors would be invited to oversee the cease fire, thus breaking another British imposed impasse. Carrington agreed to set up a cease fire commission with equal representation of the PF and the Salisbury regime. Still unresolved is the length of the transition period, cease fire arrangements, and the disposition of the rival forces.

The Pf has abandoned their demands for a governing commission and have accepted the role of a British governor. The PF also has backed away from their demand for a 6 month transition period, and seem willing to accept three.

It is clear that both sides clearly want a settlement. Even Ian Smith has said in Salisbury that the future of the country's government includes the PF. The stumbling block seems to be the overly hard headed tactics of the British. A settlement seems to be in reach, but the British back away when they get too close, then rescue themselves from the impasse of their own making.

If the Conference succeeds then these unusual tactics will be praised as brilliant and innovative. If the Conference fails, the British will stand accused of obstructionism and a poor choice of tactics. One explanation for the British approach is that they have adopted tactics which would insure their dominant control of the pace and direction of the Conference. By withholding the obvious and acceptable compromises until the last possible moment, the Brits reduce the number of negotiating steps and create a sense of expectation and impatience which help carry their compromises past the relieved PF delegates. Muzorewa has been very quick to accept every British proposal. Only the PF has had any quarrels with the Brits.

Another explanation is the "arrogant British colonials" thesis. People in the PF feel that the Brits have always dictated to Africans how their countries would be decolonized. Brits wrote the constitutions and set up the new governments in every detail. The success of such arrangements can be seen in the rate at which the newly independent governments abandoned Westminster parliamentary democracy which the Brits imposed. In any event, the PF feels that the Brits are responding to that tradition and cannot face up to the fact that the Pf is not a band of young hotheads with no education and no experience. The PF is in fact blessed with an abundance of legal, academic and political talent. One or two white lawyers are long standing members of the PF and are in London helping out. People like Calistus Ndlovu (NKLOVU) and Elliot Zvogbo are very sharp and very tough. In summary the British bullies, according to this thesis, have met their match and are acting as if they haven't.

A third explanation is that Thatcher is determined to force the PF out of the negotiations through overly tough tactics and unreasonable positions.

The PF, however, has been wise to her strategy, and has decided to force her to make the precipitous move by staying in the negotiations indefinitely. Still, Carrington and Thatcher take the negotiations to the brink by insisting on pro-Muzorewa positions only to find the PF resolutely opposed to jumping ship. This war of nerves will ultimately force one or the other to break ranks and show their true intentions. But as the Conference moves ahead, the penalty for wrecking the Conference goes higher and higher. Those who look at the Conference in this way are now optimistic that Thatcher and the PF may well come to an agreement in spite of themselves.

The last theory says that the pressure on the PF to come to an agreement is intense and effective. It is also no secret, and Thatcher and Carrington know that they have much latitude in pushing the PF around. The Soviets and the Cubans are overextended in Africa and the Third World and are not eager to enter the Rhodesian war in a big way. The Frontline States are suffering so grievously from the war that their own political stability is endangered. This applies to Zambia most strongly, then Mozambique which is bothered by a Rhodesian sponsored liberation group, and lastly Angola and Tanzania and Botswana whose resources are stretched from feeding refugees and training guerillas. So, Carrington bullies the PF who must take it. By doing so, he placates his right wing supporters in the Party and weakens the PF politically in Rhodesia where Blacks learn that the PF is making concession after concession.

All of these theories capture a section of reality, but the bottom line is whether Thatcher will accept a PF victory in a fair election. Will she allow the Conference to succeed knowing that the PF has a very good chance of winning all the marbles in Rhodesia? Has she abandoned her long standing commitment to recognition of the Muzorewa regime and an immediate lifting of sanctions? How far can she let this conference go before it becomes too costly? If cool heads prevail, she will let the Conference succeed and take credit for an act of statesmanship and conciliation unmatched in the history of Rhodesia negotiations.

PLEASE SEE ATTACHED STORY FROM THE WASHINGTON STAR CONCERNING THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON TRANSITION NEGOTIATIONS. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON AN 11 WEEK TRANSITION PERIOD. THAT EFFECTIVELY WRAPS UP THE TRANSITION ISSUES AND LEAVES THE CEASE FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. MR. TEKERE OF ZANU TOLD ME THAT HE DOES NOT FORESEE ANY GREAT DIFFICULTIES ON THIS SCORE. PRESS REPORTS, HOWEVER, INDICATE THAT IT COULD TAKE AS LONG AS 10 days.

Financing of the election campaigns would come from South Africa, again, for Muzorewa and from the eastern block, Nigeria, and others for the PF.

Carter's determination left open when we would lift sanctions if a settlement is reached. State says that we would lift at the beginning of the transition period if it is appropriate.

Unofficially the Senate Foreign Relations Com. will hold hearing around November 27 on Helms' resolution to lift sanctions immediately.

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Under law provided by the State Dept. Authorization for FY 80, Congress can overturn the President's determination by majority vote on a concurrent resolution passed by both houses. The two foreign affairs committees must report out the resolution within ten days of receipt.

Don Bandler feels that Carrington's tactics have been effective and well chosen. The Brits fear a long term involvement in Z R and thus want a short transition. They also fear long drawn out negotiations and have played hard ball to speed things up.