

‘War and Peace’ and the APRC Proposals¹

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Key findings:

- The preliminary APRC proposals have gained more Sinhala support after the war so that they are now equally acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamils, Up-Country Tamils and Muslims.
- Although the majority of Tamils and Muslims across Sri Lanka want a unitary state a significant minority of Tamils from the Northern Province still want to keep the ‘right to secession’. However most of them will give this up for the complete ‘package’ of APRC reforms.
- The President, political and religious leaders can all influence support for these preliminary APRC proposals but although Eastern Tamils will follow their politicians on this issue Northern Tamils ‘Don’t Know’ how to respond to theirs.
- Although all communities strongly support language and fundamental rights Tamil concerns about the special status of Buddhism has increased after the war as a political issue.

¹ This research is based on a preliminary set of proposals formulated in February 2009.

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About the poll

The research for this poll was carried out by the staff of Social Indicator of Colombo, on behalf of Dr. Colin Irwin from the University of Liverpool who developed the peace polls method as part of the successful Northern Ireland peace process. The survey work for the first poll in this series was completed between March and May 2008 and included a random sample of 1,700 people from all parts of Sri Lanka with the exception of the Northern Province. Using the same methods the survey work for the second poll was completed a year later in March 2009 to test the then preliminary APRC proposals against public opinion before the end of the war. A year later in March 2010 these same proposals were tested again but with a larger sample that included the Northern Province. Additionally four versions of the questionnaire were run to measure the impact that the support of the President, religious and political leaders would have on the acceptability of the proposals (Table 1). All interviews were face-to-face and the margin of error varied between +/- 2% and +/- 4.3% depending on the question and version of the questionnaire being analysed. A copy of the questionnaire is given in the Appendix with additional results.

Table 1. Sample plan

	Neutral	President	Religious	Political	Total
Sinhala	300	250	250	250	1050
Tamil	200	100	100	100	500
Up-Country Tamil	200	75	75	75	425
Muslim	200	75	75	75	425
Total	900	500	500	500	2400

Introduction

The President of Sri Lanka established the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to draft a set of constitutional reforms that, following the war, would provide the country and all its citizens with a real opportunity for enduring political stability, increased economic growth and improvements in the quality of life. Critically, when tested against public opinion a year ago these proposals, with some minor reservations were acceptable to a significant majority of both Sinhalese and Tamils (Table 2). But due to the ongoing conflict the Tamils in the North could not be sampled then. With the end of the war and the defeat of their leadership would they accept the APRC proposals? Additionally 21% of Sinhalese did not know or were unwilling to give an opinion on such important issues at that time. With the end of the war would their views change and if so would this be for or against the APRC proposals?

Table 2. Question: 'Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?' (March 2009).

Per cent	Yes	No	DK
Sinhala	67	12	21
Tamil	86	4	10
Up Country Tamil	92	0	8
Muslim	90	1	9

The poll run in March 2009 also indicated that the President then enjoyed unprecedented popularity (93% 'trust very much or trust quite a bit' amongst the Sinhala) so it also seemed important to test the effects his support and the support of religious and political leaders could have on the acceptability of the APRC proposals. This was done by framing the questions in these terms and also by asking if such support would change the views of the person being interviewed in a neutral version of the questionnaire.

A summary of the APRC proposals as they existed in February 2009 is listed in Table 3 as a series of 14 'show cards'. Those being interviewed were asked what they thought of each item on a given card. Was it 'essential', 'desirable', 'acceptable', 'tolerable' or 'unacceptable'? Then they were asked what they thought of the 'package' as a whole, if they would support such a 'package' and under what circumstances.

Table 3. The APRC proposals in summary form, as they existed in February 2009.

SHOW CARDS 1 to 14

1. **The Structure of the State** – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under a unitary state.
2. **The Powers of the Centre and Provinces** – These powers will be clearly defined in two separate lists. One for the Centre and one for the Provinces.²
3. **The Parliament** - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the same number of Senators.
4. **Amending the Constitution** – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.³
5. **The Powers of the President** – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent's term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives.

² An additional constitutional item overlooked at the time of drafting the APRC proposals for this questionnaire could be inserted here as follows:

Land and Water – The Central Government will retain State lands required for the functions in its list of powers. All other State lands will go to the Provinces subject to the rights of persons owning or occupying such land. The Provincial Government will be responsible for the management of these lands with priority in land settlement being given to the needy of local Districts. An independent Commission of experts with equal representation from the Central Government and Provinces will be established to develop and oversee land and water use policies.

Although this item has not been tested against public opinion it seems unlikely that it should diminish support for the APRC proposals.

³ Since drafting this questionnaire the APRC have refined the amendment procedure as follows:

Amending the Constitution – Amendments to the Constitution will require the approval of two thirds of the members of each House of Parliament sitting and voting separately. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.

It is not expected that this change would significantly alter the results of the public opinion poll as it has almost the same effect in law

6. **The Powers of Local Authorities** – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution.
7. **Language Rights** – The Tamil and Sinhala languages will have parity of status as national and official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes where it is expedient to do so. Sinhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the school level as well as English if facilities are available. Sinhala, Tamil and English shall be used at institutes of higher education.
8. **Religious Rights** – Buddhism shall have ‘pride of place’ with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.
9. **Fundamental Rights** – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law.
10. **Electoral System** – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation.
11. **The Judiciary** – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts.
12. **Public Service** – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent.
13. **Safeguards against secession** – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against attempts by any Province to succeed from the State.
14. **Law and Order** - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre.

Sinhala response

The results for the Sinhala community are listed in Table 4 for 2010 and Table 5 for 2009 with a rank ordering of those items they consider ‘essential or desirable’ in Tables 6 and 7.

The key percentages to look at in Tables 4 and 5 are the levels of ‘unacceptable’. First of all it should be pointed out that these results are very good when compared to places like Northern Ireland and the Middle East where levels of ‘unacceptable’ of 50 per cent plus had to or have yet to be negotiated. Having said that of course Sri Lanka is not Northern Ireland or Israel and Palestine. The political context in Sri Lanka is very different.

Table 4. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Sinhala per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	25	42	14	3	8	8
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	19	40	16	3	11	11
3. The Parliament	19	33	18	4	12	15
4. Amending the Constitution	22	40	14	5	6	13
5. The Powers of the President	23	37	13	5	15	8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	13	36	18	9	15	10
7. Language Rights	47	35	8	3	5	2
8. Religious Rights	64	25	5	2	2	1
9. Fundamental Rights	60	31	7	1		2
10. Electoral System	21	34	15	7	8	15
11. The Judiciary	37	39	14	2	3	6
12. Public Service	24	36	21	4	5	11
13. Safeguards against secession	43	33	10	3	4	7
14. Law and Order	39	32	10	2	9	7
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	20	38	22	7	4	10

Table 5. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Sinhala per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	20	35	16	5	9	16
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	13	28	23	5	11	21
3. The Parliament	9	21	19	6	15	29
4. Amending the Constitution	14	23	19	5	8	31
5. The Powers of the President	12	26	14	5	23	19
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	11	22	27	7	11	23
7. Language Rights	33	35	12	3	9	8
8. Religious Rights	46	30	10	3	5	6
9. Fundamental Rights	35	36	16	2	3	7
10. Electoral System	18	25	18	4	13	24
11. The Judiciary	18	28	16	4	10	24
12. Public Service	13	28	21	6	6	25
13. Safeguards against secession	18	25	19	4	8	26
14. Law and Order	21	25	16	7	14	17
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	13	21	25	11	9	22

The most important finding to note here is that the level of ‘unacceptable’ has fallen significantly across most of the APRC proposals from a high of 23% ‘unacceptable’ for the ‘The Powers of the President’ in 2009 to only 15% in 2010. Most significantly the levels of acceptability have risen, while, at the same

time the ‘Don’t Knows’ in 2010 are half of what they were in 2009. Perhaps the Sinhala who were reluctant to express their views before the end of the war had, for the most part, positive views of the APRC proposals but were only willing to express those views now that the war is over or, perhaps, post war they have decided to be magnanimous towards their Tamil countrymen and women when they have been faced with military defeat especially in the context of growing confidence that their country will not be divided. Whatever the reason the trend is clear and can be seen across all the results for the Sinhala community.

Table 6. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’		
1st.	Fundamental Rights	91
2nd.	Religious Rights	89
3rd.	Language Rights	82
4th.	The Judiciary	76
5th.	Safeguards against secession	76
6th.	Law and Order	71
7th.	The Structure of the State	67
8th.	Amending the Constitution	62
9th.	The Powers of the President	60
10th.	Public Service	60
11th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	59
12th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	58
13th.	Electoral System	55
14th.	The Parliament	52
15th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	49

Table 7. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Sinhala per cent ‘essential or desirable’		
1st.	Religious Rights	76
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	71
3rd.	Language Rights	68
4th.	The Structure of the State	55
5th.	The Judiciary	46
6th.	Law and Order	46
7th.	Electoral System	43
8th.	Safeguards against secession	43
9th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	41
10th.	Public Service	41
11th.	The Powers of the President	38
12th.	Amending the Constitution	37
13th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	34
14th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	33
15th.	The Parliament	30

As to the benefits these are prioritised for the Sinhala in Tables 6 and 7. Interestingly the top three items in 2009 were Religious, Fundamental and Language Rights at 76%, 71% and 68% ‘essential or desirable’. In 2010 the order has changed a little with Fundamental Rights first at 91% (20% up on last year) followed by Religious and Language Rights at 89% and 82% (up 13% and 14% respectively). As one of the top priorities for the Tamil community remains ‘Language Rights’ this result continues to be most encouraging for the prospects of long term peace.

Tamil response

The results for the Tamil community are listed in Tables 11 and 12 with a rank ordering of those items they consider 'essential or desirable' in Tables 13 and 14.

Again the key percentages to look at in Table 11 and 12 are the levels of 'unacceptable' and again the results are very good. However, unlike the results for the Sinhala there is little change between 2009 and 2010 with one notable exception. The one serious potential difficulty here is 'Religious Rights' at 28% 'unacceptable' in 2009 rising to 50% 'unacceptable' in 2010. But on the same issue 44% of Tamils consider this feature of the APRC proposals to be 'essential' in 2009 falling to 22% in 2010. They are clearly 'split' on this item. Why? And why is opposition to this constitutional provision so unusually strong?

Perhaps the answer is to be found in the way the question was asked? In the summary proposals 'Religious Rights' was drafted as, 'Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.' It seems very likely that those Tamils who considered this proposal to be 'unacceptable' were focusing on the suggestion that 'Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' while those who considered this proposal to be 'essential' were focused on 'with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.' The problem here seems to be a matter of education, understanding and or some sort of good or bad previous experience in this regard. Clearly this item requires some explanation or clarification to make sure there are no misunderstandings in the Tamil community and that their religious freedom will be effectively guaranteed by a new Sri Lanka constitution. Unfortunately, with the end of the war and the defeat of the Tamil insurgency in the North of the country more Tamils are now concerned about the implications of this provision than they were before the end of the war. Perhaps a certain amount of 'triumphalism' on the part of the Sinhala community or some sense of not knowing their own position in a newly united Sri Lanka has aggravated this problem. The Government may wish to consider what steps it can take to address this issue before it becomes a cause for disaffection. Fortunately the end of a season of electoral politics and the formation of a new Parliament will provide the people of Sri Lanka with a new opportunity for reconciliation.

With regards to the benefits of the APRC proposals the top items for the Tamils are 'Language Rights' at 85% 'essential or desirable', 'Fundamental Rights' at 76% and 'The Judiciary' at 73% in 2009 and 'Fundamental Rights' at 87%, 'Language Rights' at 86% and 'The Judiciary' at 84% in 2010 (Tables 13 and 14). Fortunately the Sinhala also welcome these reforms so there should be no political difficulty with each community's top priorities. In other conflicts around the world such a result is most unusual. Top priorities generally require a degree of 'horse trading'. It is perhaps a mark of the understanding of each community's needs by the other community that has produced this unusual but most welcome result and/or the careful drafting of the All Party Representative Committee.

In 2009 it was not possible to undertake this research in the Northern Province. However in 2010 this was now possible. Table 15 gives the results for the APRC proposals broken down for the Tamil response in the Eastern Province and Northern Province separately and also for the rest of Sri Lanka without these Provinces included - 'Other Sri Lanka'.

There is little difference between these three samples with one exception. Again all three groups of Tamils reject the 'Religious Rights' proposal at 52%, 49% and 49% 'unacceptable' in the Eastern, Northern and 'Other' Provinces respectively. But Northern Tamils also reject the proposal for 'Safeguards against secession' at 28% 'unacceptable' although 38% believe it is 'essential or desirable', 15% 'acceptable', 5% 'tolerable' and 14% 'don't know'. So like the other Tamils in Sri Lanka this group remain a minority which is reduced further to only 7% 'unacceptable' for Northern Tamils and 3% for all Sri Lanka Tamils providing the other provisions of the APRC proposals are implemented together as a 'package'.

Table 11. The Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	37	29	17	5	7	5
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	44	29	13	4	4	5
3. The Parliament	46	27	14	2	4	8
4. Amending the Constitution	41	25	19	2	5	8
5. The Powers of the President	51	19	14	3	5	8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	37	34	17	4	2	6
7. Language Rights	75	11	11	2	1	1
8. Religious Rights	22	11	7	8	50	2
9. Fundamental Rights	66	21	10	1	1	2
10. Electoral System	34	22	26	5	3	10
11. The Judiciary	57	27	7	2		7
12. Public Service	38	39	17	1	1	6
13. Safeguards against secession	28	24	18	7	15	9
14. Law and Order	41	32	14	5	5	4
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	42	24	17	5	3	8

Table 12. The Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	33	19	16	11	15	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	31	22	21	15	4	7
3. The Parliament	37	24	17	13	1	8
4. Amending the Constitution	39	26	15	7	2	11
5. The Powers of the President	37	29	12	6	6	9
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	34	21	15	15	6	9
7. Language Rights	72	13	8	2	1	4
8. Religious Rights	44	10	6	6	28	6
9. Fundamental Rights	69	7	11	4	2	7
10. Electoral System	31	21	15	12	7	13
11. The Judiciary	49	24	12	7	1	6
12. Public Service	38	28	17	8	3	7
13. Safeguards against secession	33	17	17	16	7	11
14. Law and Order	55	17	11	7	2	8
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	41	27	14	6	2	11

Table 13. Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Tamil per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Fundamental Rights	87
2nd.	Language Rights	86
3rd.	The Judiciary	84
4th.	Public Service	77
5th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	73
6th.	The Parliament	73
7th.	Law and Order	73
8th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	71
9th.	The Powers of the President	70
10th.	The Structure of the State	66
11th.	Amending the Constitution	66
12th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	66
13th.	Electoral System	56
14th.	Safeguards against secession	52
15th.	Religious Rights	33

Table 14. Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Tamil per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Language Rights	85
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	76
3rd.	The Judiciary	73
4th.	Law and Order	72
5th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	68
6th.	The Powers of the President	66
7th.	Public Service	66
8th.	Amending the Constitution	65
9th.	The Parliament	61
10th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	55
11th.	Religious Rights	54
12th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	53
13th.	The Structure of the State	52
14th.	Electoral System	52
15th.	Safeguards against secession	50

Table 15. Northern, Eastern and 'Other' Sri Lanka Tamils in the rest of the country (March 2010)

Eastern Tamil	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	39	34	19	2	3	5
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	46	32	15	3	2	2
3. The Parliament	45	29	20		3	3
4. Amending the Constitution	49	26	20	2	2	2
5. The Powers of the President	59	23	9		6	3
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	39	31	28	2		2
7. Language Rights	69	12	19			
8. Religious Rights	8	11	9	20	52	
9. Fundamental Rights	54	29	15		2	
10. Electoral System	34	17	35	8	2	5
11. The Judiciary	72	22	3	2		2
12. Public Service	37	46	14		2	2
13. Safeguards against secession	39	19	23	14	5	2
14. Law and Order	31	49	17	3		
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	45	29	19	6		2

Northern Tamil	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	31	26	21	9	11	2
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	39	26	17	8	6	5
3. The Parliament	41	26	14	2	6	11
4. Amending the Constitution	25	28	21	4	11	12
5. The Powers of the President	41	19	20	7	5	8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	37	37	12	8	2	5
7. Language Rights	72	13	11	4	1	
8. Religious Rights	27	13	6	4	49	1
9. Fundamental Rights	65	19	14	1		1
10. Electoral System	21	25	29	7	5	13
11. The Judiciary	46	29	17	2		6
12. Public Service	27	41	25	1	1	5
13. Safeguards against secession	14	24	15	5	28	14
14. Law and Order	31	22	21	8	11	7
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	32	21	20	8	7	12

Other Sri Lanka Tamil	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	44	28	10	2	7	9
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	49	31	7		4	9
3. The Parliament	53	25	7	4	2	9
4. Amending the Constitution	54	19	15		2	10
5. The Powers of the President	56	15	12	2	3	13
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	37	34	15	2	3	10
7. Language Rights	85	7	3	2		3
8. Religious Rights	28	9	7	3	49	4
9. Fundamental Rights	78	16			2	4
10. Electoral System	49	24	13		3	12
11. The Judiciary	56	28		2		15
12. Public Service	53	28	9			10
13. Safeguards against secession	34	29	18	3	7	9
14. Law and Order	65	27	2	2	2	4
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	53	24	13			10

Up-Country Tamil response

Although the recent war has largely been viewed as a conflict arising from Tamil grievances the APRC proposals have been drafted for the benefit of all the communities in Sri Lanka. Like other Tamils the Up-Country Tamils share an increasing concern about the 'Religious Rights' provision rising to 60% 'unacceptable' in 2010 from 46% in 2009 (Tables 16 and 17). Their top priority remains 'Language Rights' at 91% 'essential or desirable' in 2009 and 94% in 2010 (Tables 18 and 19). So like other Tamils they will accept the reforms proposed by the APRC as a package (only 2% 'unacceptable' in 2010) providing their major concerns are dealt with.

Table 16. The Up-Country Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	42	27	18	2	2	10
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	45	22	17	4	1	11
3. The Parliament	30	25	13	8	8	16
4. Amending the Constitution	42	22	15	8	2	11
5. The Powers of the President	47	26	11	5	6	5
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	32	28	20	6	2	11
7. Language Rights	88	6	5		1	1
8. Religious Rights	19	6	6	6	60	2
9. Fundamental Rights	74	17	4	2	2	1
10. Electoral System	23	32	12	7	3	22
11. The Judiciary	62	21	9	2	3	3
12. Public Service	41	22	22	4		11
13. Safeguards against secession	51	20	11	5	5	8
14. Law and Order	66	18	7	2	2	5
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	50	26	14	2	2	6

Table 17. The Up-Country Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	44	23	12	2	11	9
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	38	23	17	1	8	13
3. The Parliament	37	16	15	5	13	13
4. Amending the Constitution	58	21	2	3	4	13
5. The Powers of the President	34	13	8	24	11	10
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	49	20	11	3	1	17
7. Language Rights	79	12	2	1	2	5
8. Religious Rights	42	4	2	0	46	6
9. Fundamental Rights	79	8	4	2	0	7
10. Electoral System	35	17	14	12	5	17
11. The Judiciary	52	20	7	6	3	13
12. Public Service	37	23	18	6	1	15
13. Safeguards against secession	63	10	6	4	6	12
14. Law and Order	67	12	8	1	3	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	71	15	4	0	0	9

Table 18. Up-Country Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Up-Country Tamil per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Language Rights	94
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	91
3rd.	Law and Order	84
4th.	The Judiciary	83
5th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	76
6th.	The Powers of the President	73
7th.	Safeguards against secession	71
8th.	The Structure of the State	69
9th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	67
10th.	Amending the Constitution	64
11th.	Public Service	63
12th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	60
13th.	The Parliament	55
14th.	Electoral System	55
15th.	Religious Rights	25

Table 19. Up-Country Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Up-Country Tamil per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Language Rights	91
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	87
3rd.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	86
4th.	Amending the Constitution	79
5th.	Law and Order	79
6th.	Safeguards against secession	73
7th.	The Judiciary	72
8th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	69
9th.	The Structure of the State	67
10th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	61
11th.	Public Service	60
12th.	The Parliament	53
13th.	Electoral System	52
14th.	The Powers of the President	47
15th.	Religious Rights	46

Muslim response

Although the Muslim community were also split on 'Religious Rights' at 30% 'essential' and 17% 'unacceptable' in 2009 (Table 21) this concern, unlike their Tamil countrymen and women, seems to have diminished at only 10% 'unacceptable' in 2010. Perhaps then it is not the 'Religious Rights' as such that is the problem here but the special place Buddhism is given in the APRC proposals, the Tamil defeat and a degree of associated Sinhala triumphalism?

But as Tamil speakers one of their top priorities is 'Language Rights' at 82% 'essential or desirable' in 2010 and 85% in 2009 (Tables 22 and 23). Clearly this problem needs to be addressed for the benefit of all the minorities in Sri Lanka reviewed in this report.

Table 20. The Muslim response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Muslim per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	45	37	8	2	5	4
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	48	29	11	5	5	2
3. The Parliament	33	27	19	12	6	4
4. Amending the Constitution	38	28	21	4	3	7
5. The Powers of the President	37	22	19	2	13	5
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	28	44	17	4	5	3
7. Language Rights	67	15	10	5	1	2
8. Religious Rights	47	19	13	9	10	3
9. Fundamental Rights	53	29	8	8		2
10. Electoral System	32	32	19	6	7	5
11. The Judiciary	47	31	13	4	1	5
12. Public Service	39	34	13	7	5	4
13. Safeguards against secession	35	31	14	5	6	10
14. Law and Order	46	37	8	2	4	5
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	40	32	16	4	2	7

Table 21. The Muslim response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Muslim per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	29	39	17	3	4	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	25	36	17	10	2	10
3. The Parliament	22	42	17	4	5	10
4. Amending the Constitution	28	43	13	4	3	9
5. The Powers of the President	28	30	16	4	11	11
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	25	33	20	8	2	13
7. Language Rights	49	36	8	2	1	4
8. Religious Rights	30	32	9	9	17	3
9. Fundamental Rights	47	35	10	2	3	4
10. Electoral System	28	36	16	9	3	9
11. The Judiciary	33	42	10	4	1	9
12. Public Service	34	40	9	7	1	9
13. Safeguards against secession	24	37	11	11	4	13
14. Law and Order	35	38	11	4	3	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	27	45	13	4	0	10

Table 22. Muslim priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Muslim per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Law and Order	83
2nd.	The Structure of the State	82
3rd.	Language Rights	82
4th.	Fundamental Rights	82
5th.	The Judiciary	78
6th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	77
7th.	Public Service	73
8th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	72
9th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	72
10th.	Amending the Constitution	66
11th.	Religious Rights	66
12th.	Safeguards against secession	66
13th.	Electoral System	64
14th.	The Parliament	60
15th.	The Powers of the President	59

Table 23. Muslim priorities for the APRC proposals (March 2009)

Muslim per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Language Rights	85
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	82
3rd.	The Judiciary	75
4th.	Public Service	74
5th.	Law and Order	73
6th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	72
7th.	Amending the Constitution	71
8th.	The Structure of the State	68
9th.	The Parliament	64
10th.	Electoral System	64
11th.	Religious Rights	62
12th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	61
13th.	Safeguards against secession	61
14th.	The Powers of the President	58
15th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	58

Support for reform

All these results are very good but if, for example, the people of Sri Lanka were asked to vote for them in a referendum would the results be different? With this point in mind each person being interviewed was asked if they would support this set of proposals as a simple 'Yes'/'No' or 'Don't Know' question (Table 24).

Table 24. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?

Per cent (2010)	Yes	No	DK
Sinhala	83	9	9
Tamil	84	7	8
Up Country Tamil	86	12	2
Muslim	80	13	8

Per cent (2009)	Yes	No	DK
Sinhala	67	12	21
Tamil	86	4	10
Up Country Tamil	92	0	8
Muslim	90	1	9

For the Sinhala the results are significantly better up from 67% 'Yes' in 2009 to 83% 'Yes' in 2010 as Sinhala 'Don't Knows' move to the 'Yes' column. For the Tamils (86% to 84% 'Yes') and Up-Country Tamils (92% to 86% 'Yes') the results are a little down in 2010 from 2009 but not significantly so. But the Muslims have dropped ten points from 90% 'Yes' in 2009 to 80% 'Yes' in 2010 which brings them more in line with other parties included in this poll. Nonetheless a stunning result over all with little or no significant difference between Sinhala, Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim support for the APRC proposals at an average of 83% 'Yes'. Subject to some reservations over a couple of items a broad consensus for constitutional reform has been achieved.

The question of leadership was also dealt with by asking, after all the other questions on the APRC proposals had been asked, if the person being interviewed would change their view and switch from 'No' or 'Don't Know' to 'Yes' if their leaders were for the proposals or if they would switch from 'Yes' to 'No' if they were against them. These results are given in Tables 25 to 32. The results are mixed with no particular leader (President, Religious, Political) having any more significant effect on the outcome than any other leader. However all these leaders do have the ability to influence support for the proposals one way or another but as the 'No' and 'Don't Knows' were so low for all the communities at an average of only 17% the impact that they can have to raise support above the average of 83% is not a great deal. They might be able to get above 90% but not much more than that. However, if all the leaders worked together to undermine support for the APRC proposals their efforts would be felt. Together the political elites of Sri Lanka could weaken the present consensus and reduce it to less than a simple majority providing they worked together to this end. With little or no effort political reform is there for the taking with the overwhelming support of the people or, with a concerted effort on the part of all the political elites they could deny the people of Sri Lanka the prize they presently seek. The future of Sri Lanka, as always, is in their hands.

Table 25. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Sinhala per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	56	28	16
Your religious leaders supported them?	50	28	22
The political party you are closest to supported them?	54	30	16
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	62	16	22

Table 26. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Sinhala per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	54	43	3
Your religious leaders were against them?	50	42	8
The political party you are closest to was against them?	56	40	4
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	44	50	6

Table 27. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	27	47	27
Your religious leaders supported them?	27	50	24
The political party you are closest to supported them?	38	44	18
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	35	32	32

Table 28. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	42	50	9
Your religious leaders were against them?	45	48	8
The political party you are closest to was against them?	42	51	8
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	37	54	9

Table 29. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	28	44	28
Your religious leaders supported them?	17	56	28
The political party you are closest to supported them?	44	33	22
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	28	39	33

Table 30. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	64	35	2
Your religious leaders were against them?	67	29	4
The political party you are closest to was against them?	62	36	3
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	60	38	2

Table 31. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Muslim per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	37	44	19
Your religious leaders supported them?	44	30	26
The political party you are closest to supported them?	44	33	22
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	56	26	19

Table 32. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Muslim per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	42	47	11
Your religious leaders were against them?	45	45	10
The political party you are closest to was against them?	40	46	14
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	48	38	14

Some further notes on Northern, Eastern and Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka

Table 33 gives a breakdown of the support for the APRC proposals for the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in the rest of Sri Lanka. They all support the proposals in a range from 77% 'Yes' in the North to 89% in the East and 90% in the rest of Sri Lanka. However when asked what impact their respective leaderships might have on their decision the Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka and East can be significantly moved to change their opinions by as much as 67% from 'Yes' to 'No' with only 2% 'Don't Know' in the East when their politicians are involved in the decision (Tables 35 and 37). However the Tamils in the North are not quite so easily moved with 39% from 'Yes' to 'No' and 15% 'Don't Know' when the views of their politicians are taken into account (Table 39). The lowest turn out in recent elections was in the North suggesting the Tamils in that Province have little confidence in their political parties at this time. Unlike the political elites who led the Tamils in the Eastern Province out of a disastrous war to peace and political influence the Tamils in the North lost their leadership in a bloody defeat and it may take them some years to find new leaders who they can trust. This observation is further supported by the results from another questionnaire where support for the APRC proposals is framed specifically in terms of being supported by the informant's political party. In this case Eastern Tamil support rises from 89% to 96%. However, when the same question is put to the Northern Tamils support drops from 77% to 32% with a very significant 54% 'Don't Know' which is very probably due to the political parties in the North not yet being firmly established in the post war era (Table 40). Critically, however, they do support the APRC proposals with only 7% rejecting the package as 'unacceptable' (Table 15), but any effort to manipulate their views in this regard may presently have little effect or even be counterproductive.

Table 33. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?

Per cent	Yes	No	DK
Eastern Tamil	89	0	11
Northern Tamil	77	15	8
Other SL Tamil	90	4	6

Table 34. If answer is 'No', 'Don't know' or 'No Response' would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:⁴

Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	43	43	14
Your religious leaders supported them?	43	43	14
The political party you are closest to supported them?	57	29	14
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	43	43	14

Table 35. If answer is 'Yes' would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	43	54	3
Your religious leaders were against them?	48	48	5
The political party you are closest to was against them?	48	48	5
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	41	54	5

⁴ As the number of persons saying 'No' or 'Don't Know' was very low in this sample the results in this table are not reliable.

Table 36. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:⁵

Eastern Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	71		29
Your religious leaders supported them?	71		29
The political party you are closest to supported them?	71	14	14
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	71		29

Table 37. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Eastern Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	48	47	5
Your religious leaders were against them?	40	59	2
The political party you are closest to was against them?	31	67	2
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	26	71	3

Table 38. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:⁶

Northern Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	5	65	30
Your religious leaders supported them?	5	70	25
The political party you are closest to supported them?	20	60	20
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	20	40	40

Table 39. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

Northern Tamil per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	35	48	17
Your religious leaders were against them?	46	39	15
The political party you are closest to was against them?	46	39	15
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	43	40	17

Table 40. If the political party you are closest to supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it?

Per cent	Yes	No	DK
Eastern Tamil	96	0	5
Northern Tamil	32	14	54
Other SL Tamil	84	13	3

⁵ As the number of persons saying ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ was very low in this sample the results in this table are not reliable.

⁶ As the number of persons saying ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ was very low in this sample the results in this table are not reliable.

Political party response

As the SLFP is the President's ruling party and has the largest number of seats in the Parliament it is to be expected that their response to the APRC proposals (Table 41) most closely mirrors the response of the Sinhala community in general (Table 4). This seems to be the case with significant percentages of 'Don't Knows' in 2009 (Table 42) moving to the 'essential', 'desirable' and 'acceptable' columns in 2010 and the overall unacceptability of the package as a whole falling from 8% in 2009 to only 3% in 2010.

Table 41. The SLFP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

SLFP	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	25	43	15	3	8	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	22	41	16	3	12	7
3. The Parliament	20	35	20	4	11	11
4. Amending the Constitution	23	39	19	4	5	10
5. The Powers of the President	21	35	12	4	21	6
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	18	33	21	8	12	7
7. Language Rights	51	30	8	3	6	2
8. Religious Rights	61	25	5	3	5	1
9. Fundamental Rights	62	28	7	1	1	2
10. Electoral System	20	33	19	6	11	11
11. The Judiciary	40	37	14	2	2	5
12. Public Service	23	38	20	5	4	10
13. Safeguards against secession	44	31	12	3	3	7
14. Law and Order	40	34	10	3	8	6
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	23	36	24	6	3	8

Table 42. The SLFP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

SLFP per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	24	37	15	4	8	13
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	16	32	22	4	9	17
3. The Parliament	11	23	22	5	12	27
4. Amending the Constitution	18	25	18	3	6	28
5. The Powers of the President	15	25	15	5	23	18
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	15	24	27	5	8	20
7. Language Rights	37	33	13	4	8	6
8. Religious Rights	45	30	11	3	7	3
9. Fundamental Rights	38	36	16	2	3	5
10. Electoral System	19	26	16	6	13	21
11. The Judiciary	20	31	14	5	8	23
12. Public Service	17	30	22	5	6	20
13. Safeguards against secession	20	28	18	5	7	23
14. Law and Order	25	26	16	7	12	14
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	19	26	25	9	8	13

For the main opposition party, the UNP, there does not seem to be a great deal of difference between the results for this question when asked in 2009 and 2010 with overall resistance to the package at only 3% and 2% ‘unacceptable’ respectively (Tables 43 and 44). However, their enthusiasm seems to have waned a little with those who consider the package to be ‘essential’ falling from 39% in 2009 to 29% in 2010. They seem to have moved across to the ‘desirable’ column, which is now up from 29% in 2009 to 36% in 2010. Similarly the JVP support for the APRC proposals has shown a decline from only 4% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 going up to 9% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010 (Tables 45 and 46) and like the JVP and UNP the SLMC support for these proposals is also a little down on last year from 0% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 rising to 3% ‘unacceptable’ in 2010 (Tables 47 and 48) with significant shifts from the ‘essential’ column to the ‘desirable’ column for all three of these opposition parties.

Table 43. The UNP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

UNP	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	35	33	16	1	8	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	32	32	17	5	6	9
3. The Parliament	27	32	11	7	10	13
4. Amending the Constitution	32	29	16	6	5	13
5. The Powers of the President	41	29	11	2	11	6
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	20	36	21	8	7	9
7. Language Rights	60	30	4	2	4	1
8. Religious Rights	49	22	5	3	18	2
9. Fundamental Rights	61	27	7	1	1	4
10. Electoral System	30	31	18	4	5	12
11. The Judiciary	45	32	13	1	2	7
12. Public Service	26	42	15	3	3	11
13. Safeguards against secession	42	29	14	5	2	8
14. Law and Order	43	33	11	3	4	7
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	29	36	19	6	2	8

Table 44. The UNP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

UNP per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	29	29	18	7	7	10
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	23	26	22	12	4	13
3. The Parliament	24	24	18	10	11	13
4. Amending the Constitution	34	26	16	7	7	10
5. The Powers of the President	28	28	13	10	13	7
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	27	22	21	13	4	13
7. Language Rights	53	29	9	2	2	5
8. Religious Rights	43	20	7	5	20	5
9. Fundamental Rights	59	20	12	3	0	5
10. Electoral System	29	25	21	11	5	8
11. The Judiciary	40	24	17	5	4	10
12. Public Service	31	26	23	7	1	12
13. Safeguards against secession	38	19	13	10	5	15
14. Law and Order	43	24	12	7	4	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	39	29	16	6	3	6

Perhaps the explanation is quite simple. There has been a great deal of discussion about these proposals since the end of the war particularly during the recent Presidential Election. Also the 2010 poll was taken in March of this year between the Presidential and General Elections at a time when the party in Government and their SLFP supporters felt confident about their future, including constitutional reform, while the opposition parties, and their supporters, are not quite so willing to embrace change when they are less certain about their political influence over the coming years. These results could change again when the elections are all over but it seems very unlikely that they will change a great deal given their stability from a time of war to a time of peace.

Table 45. The JVP response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

JVP	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	14	38	13		35	
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	6	40	19		27	9
3. The Parliament	19	45	17	1	17	
4. Amending the Constitution	15	40	27		13	4
5. The Powers of the President	44	40	6		10	
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	6	32	22	9	32	
7. Language Rights	35	57		9		
8. Religious Rights	36	48	9		8	
9. Fundamental Rights	42	48	10			
10. Electoral System	23	42	22		13	
11. The Judiciary	20	62	14		4	
12. Public Service	13	46	19		23	
13. Safeguards against secession	37	30	10	6	13	4
14. Law and Order	21	35	14		30	
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	16	37	17	22	9	

Table 46. The JVP response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

JVP per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	39	22	13	9	13	4
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	17	35	22	4	17	4
3. The Parliament	30	35	4	9	17	4
4. Amending the Constitution	36	36	14	5	5	5
5. The Powers of the President	30	26	17	4	17	4
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	14	23	23	9	27	5
7. Language Rights	57	22	4	0	13	4
8. Religious Rights	65	17	4	0	13	0
9. Fundamental Rights	52	35	4	0	9	0
10. Electoral System	35	35	4	0	13	13
11. The Judiciary	43	22	9	0	22	4
12. Public Service	26	52	0	9	4	9
13. Safeguards against secession	39	22	9	0	22	9
14. Law and Order	39	35	0	9	13	4
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	30	26	9	26	4	4

Table 47. The SLMC response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

SLMC	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	31	41	14	2	8	5
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	39	30	19	6	4	3
3. The Parliament	28	22	23	18	6	4
4. Amending the Constitution	31	33	19	8	4	6
5. The Powers of the President	35	19	19	12	11	5
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	25	34	28	6	3	5
7. Language Rights	64	16	10	5	1	4
8. Religious Rights	56	19	8	7	8	2
9. Fundamental Rights	63	18	10	4		5
10. Electoral System	41	24	21	7	2	6
11. The Judiciary	49	26	15	4	2	5
12. Public Service	38	35	14	7	3	4
13. Safeguards against secession	35	28	17	5	6	9
14. Law and Order	49	29	8	6	4	5
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	38	27	18	5	3	10

Table 48. The SLMC response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

SLMC per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	34	37	24	0	2	2
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	27	46	22	2	0	2
3. The Parliament	19	57	14	2	5	2
4. Amending the Constitution	19	50	19	7	2	2
5. The Powers of the President	25	38	23	3	5	8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	27	39	22	2	0	10
7. Language Rights	46	34	10	2	5	2
8. Religious Rights	26	31	12	12	17	2
9. Fundamental Rights	33	36	19	2	5	5
10. Electoral System	26	45	17	0	5	7
11. The Judiciary	36	40	12	5	0	7
12. Public Service	30	43	10	13	3	3
13. Safeguards against secession	24	46	15	7	0	7
14. Law and Order	36	43	10	2	2	7
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	28	38	26	3	0	5

However, the results have changed considerably for the TNA up from only 3% ‘unacceptable’ in March 2009 to 11% ‘unacceptable’ in March 2010 (Tables 49 and 50). Similarly those opposed to ‘Safeguards against secession’ has risen from only 5% in 2009 to 25% in 2010, but then it is also 28% for Tamils in the Northern Province (Table 15). ‘Religious Rights’ are also up for the TNA supporters from 47% ‘unacceptable’ in 2009 to 66% in 2010 and 49% for Tamils in the Northern Province. Two factors may explain these changes. Firstly that the sample now includes the Northern Province where most of the TNA supports are to be found and secondly that the ‘Religious Rights’ issue, or rather the ‘pride of place’ of Buddhism issue has strong political connotations for TNA supporters.

Table 49. The TNA response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

TNA	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	45	23	14	3	13	3
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	52	24	10	3	6	5
3. The Parliament	41	30	13	3	5	8
4. Amending the Constitution	39	29	13	3	8	8
5. The Powers of the President	53	24	7	4	6	6
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	49	26	9	6	4	6
7. Language Rights	77	9	13		2	
8. Religious Rights	14	7	6	7	66	
9. Fundamental Rights	63	20	12		2	3
10. Electoral System	32	21	24	8	3	13
11. The Judiciary	66	19	6	3		5
12. Public Service	50	29	13	3	1	6
13. Safeguards against secession	26	22	14	9	25	3
14. Law and Order	33	28	15	7	10	8
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	40	17	16	9	11	8

Table 50. The TNA response to the APRC proposals (March 2009)

TNA per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	31	24	14	8	22	0
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	28	23	30	13	6	0
3. The Parliament	42	28	16	13	1	0
4. Amending the Constitution	44	35	15	1	0	5
5. The Powers of the President	39	33	13	4	7	4
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	39	19	19	15	9	0
7. Language Rights	90	7	2	0	0	0
8. Religious Rights	43	4	4	2	47	0
9. Fundamental Rights	88	4	5	1	1	1
10. Electoral System	31	28	18	10	9	5
11. The Judiciary	51	39	8	1	1	0
12. Public Service	40	35	17	5	2	0
13. Safeguards against secession	35	20	20	19	5	1
14. Law and Order	71	17	8	2	1	0
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	40	34	20	3	3	1

When asked the constitutional package question again in a simple ‘Yes/No’ format the pattern of responses for the political parties remains much the same (Table 51). The SLFP come out with the strongest support up from 68% ‘Yes’ in 2009 to 87% ‘Yes’ in 2010 followed by the UNP at 80% ‘Yes’ (down from 85% in 2009), then the TNA at 78% (down from 90% in 2009), then the SLMC at 74% (down from 88% in 2009) and finally the JVP at 69% ‘Yes’ in 2010 down from 83% in 2009. As before these results are most likely a result of ongoing discourse on constitutional issues, the inclusion of the Northern Province in the sample and government verses opposition electoral politics.

Table 51. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?

Per cent (2010)	Yes	No	DK
SLFP	87	6	7
UNP	80	11	9
JVP	69	27	4
TNA	78	17	5
SLMC	74	14	12

Per cent (2009)	Yes	No	DK
SLFP	68	10	22
UNP	85	3	12
JVP	83	4	13
TNA	90	2	7
SLMC	88	5	7

One more observation that was to be expected can be taken from this political party analysis. The SLFP can be significantly moved to change their opinion in favour of the constitutional proposals by their President, religious leaders and party (Table 52) while the UNP are more influenced by their party and not so much by the President (Table 54). The same goes for the TNA (Table 58).

Table 52. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

SLFP per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	65	24	11
Your religious leaders supported them?	51	24	25
The political party you are closest to supported them?	53	32	15
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	65	17	18

Table 53. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

SLFP per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	50	47	3
Your religious leaders were against them?	49	44	7
The political party you are closest to was against them?	56	41	3
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	42	53	5

Table 54. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

UNP per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	15	50	35
Your religious leaders supported them?	22	51	28
The political party you are closest to supported them?	40	36	24
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	34	34	32

Table 55. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

UNP per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	52	45	3
Your religious leaders were against them?	48	43	10
The political party you are closest to was against them?	49	42	9
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	45	51	4

Table 56. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

JVP per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?		100	
Your religious leaders supported them?	46	54	
The political party you are closest to supported them?	92	8	
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	46	8	46

Table 57. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

JVP per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	50	50	
Your religious leaders were against them?	24	61	15
The political party you are closest to was against them?	9	92	
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	35	61	4

Table 58. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

TNA per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?		81	19
Your religious leaders supported them?		91	9
The political party you are closest to supported them?	28	62	9
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	19	34	47

Table 59. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

TNA per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	43	52	5
Your religious leaders were against them?	31	64	5
The political party you are closest to was against them?	33	62	5
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	29	67	5

Table 60. If answer is ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No Response’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

SLMC per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them?	54	35	12
Your religious leaders supported them?	77	12	12
The political party you are closest to supported them?	76	24	
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them?	76		24

Table 61. If answer is ‘Yes’ would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

SLMC per cent	Yes	No	DK
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was against them?	42	49	8
Your religious leaders were against them?	41	55	4
The political party you are closest to was against them?	34	58	8
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to were all against them?	38	51	11

A further note on the politics of ‘Religious Rights’

If it is the case that the problem with the ‘Religious Rights’ proposal is essentially political rather than religious then it seems very likely that the reaction of Tamil speaking Christians and Sinhala speaking Christians will be different if it is a political/ethnic problem but the same if it is a religious problem. An analysis of these communities on this issue confirms support for the ‘political hypothesis’ with 39% of Tamil speaking Christians considering these proposals to be ‘unacceptable’ and only 14% of Sinhala speaking Christians sharing this view (Table 62). Additionally, the TNA ‘top’ this list at 66% ‘unacceptable’ suggesting it is a political issue for their supporters.

Table 62. Political, religious and ethnic response to the ‘Religious Rights’ provision in the APRC proposals sorted in rank order by per cent ‘unacceptable’.

Religious Rights per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
TNA	14	7	6	7	66	
Up-Country Tamil ⁷	19	6	6	6	60	2
Tamil ⁸	22	11	7	8	50	2
Tamil Christian	43	3	10	4	39	1
UNP	49	22	5	3	18	2
Sinhala Christian	46	25	4	11	14	0
Muslim	47	19	13	9	10	3
SLMC	56	19	8	7	8	2
JVP	36	48	9		8	
SLFP	61	25	5	3	5	1
Sinhala	64	25	5	2	2	1

⁷ As the Up-Country Tamils were not directly involved in the Sri Lankan insurgency this result of 60% ‘unacceptable’ seemed to be too high. However, when those doing the interviews were asked about this issue they pointed out that the survey work had been done in the largely Hindu Up-Country towns of Hatton and Kotmale in the District of Nuwara Eliya where recent incidents had led to the raising of religious tensions.

⁸ The Tamils represented here are a combination of Hindu and Christian Tamils. As the Christian Tamil response to the ‘Religious Rights’ issue was 39% ‘unacceptable’ it necessarily follows that the Hindu Tamil response to this question will be higher than the 50% recorded here.

Summary of results for the APRC proposals

Table 63 gives an island wide response to the APRC proposals. It was not possible to do this in March 2009, as access to the Northern Province was not possible before the end of the war. However, with the benefit of a sample from all the Provinces in March 2010, including the Northern Province, it is now possible to produce a weighted sample that is representative of Sri Lanka as a whole. At 25% 'essential', 34% 'desirable', 22% 'acceptable', 7% 'tolerable' and only 3% 'unacceptable' this is an excellent result for the proposals taken together as a 'package' with only 8% 'Don't Know'. However, it should be emphasised that when the same results are looked at from an ethnic perspective the special place for Buddhism in the proposed constitution is presently a problem for Tamils at 50% 'unacceptable' (Table 11) and the future role of the President is a matter for concern for his SLFP supporters at 21% 'unacceptable' (Table 41).

Table 63. Sri Lanka response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Sri Lanka per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	29	38	15	2	9	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	26	37	15	4	11	8
3. The Parliament	23	33	17	5	10	12
4. Amending the Constitution	26	35	17	4	5	12
5. The Powers of the President	28	32	12	4	17	7
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	21	32	20	7	11	9
7. Language Rights	54	29	8	3	4	2
8. Religious Rights	54	23	6	3	11	2
9. Fundamental Rights	60	28	7	1	1	2
10. Electoral System	24	30	19	5	9	13
11. The Judiciary	42	36	13	2	2	6
12. Public Service	25	37	19	5	4	11
13. Safeguards against secession	41	29	13	4	5	8
14. Law and Order	41	31	11	3	7	6
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	25	34	22	7	3	8

Similarly the result for Sri Lanka as a whole at 83% 'Yes', 9% 'No' and 8% 'Don't Know' when asked the more simple 'Yes/No' question regarding support for the constitutional package is very encouraging (Table 64). The most important points to note here are that Sinhala and SLFP support has shifted from the 'Don't Know' column before the war to the 'Yes' column after the war and even the Northern Tamils and TNA support the proposals at 77% and 78% 'Yes' respectively. However, when asked how they felt about the proposals in the context of support from their political leaders the Northern Tamil 'Yes' dropped to only 32% with 14% 'No' and 54% 'Don't Know' but when the Eastern Tamils were asked the same question in the same context their 'Yes' rose from 89% to 96% (Table 40). Northern Tamils, it would seem, need time to develop new political leaders who they can trust.

Table 64. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?

March 2010	Sri Lanka	Sinhala	Tamil	UC Tamil	Muslim	Eastern Tamil	Northern Tamil	Other Tamil	SLFP	UNP	JVP	TNA	SLMC
Yes	83	83	84	86	80	89	77	90	87	80	69	78	74
No	9	9	7	12	13	0	15	4	6	11	27	17	14
DK	8	9	8	2	8	11	8	6	7	9	4	5	12

March 2009	Sri Lanka	Sinhala	Tamil	UC Tamil	Muslim	Eastern Tamil	Northern Tamil	Other Tamil	SLFP	UNP	JVP	TNA	SLMC
Yes	-	67	86	92	90	-	-	-	68	85	83	90	88
No	-	12	4	0	1	-	-	-	10	3	4	2	5
DK	-	21	10	8	9	-	-	-	22	12	13	7	7

Problems

Before the end of the war in March 2009 all those being interviewed were asked to rate the importance of 51 different problems collected from the different communities of Sri Lanka. However, in March 2010, after the war, it was no longer possible to ask questions about ‘The ongoing war’ or LTTE. Similarly questions about the JVP and JHU in government could not be asked as the government had been dissolved. So these items had to be cut from the questionnaire when it was repeated in March 2010 (Table 65).

Table 65. Problems asked in 2009 as being ‘Very significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of some significance’, ‘Of little significance’ or ‘Of no significance at all’. Items struck through were not repeated in March 2010.

1. Unemployment
2. Lack of basic health care
3. The decline of the economy
4. Inflation
5. The ongoing war
6. Violence over the past 30 years
7. Escalating violence in the last 2 years
8. Fragmentation of the island into ‘cleared’ and ‘un-cleared’ areas
9. State aided colonization and change of demographics
10. Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East
11. Failure to protect historic Hindu sites
12. The continued violence of the LTTE
13. It is not possible to kill the last Tiger
14. The LTTE can only be weakened by war
15. A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups
16. Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces
17. The Police do not provide a police service for the public
18. The Police are predominately Sinhalese
19. The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese
20. Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life
21. Polarisation of civil society
22. Increasing number of IDPs
23. Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka
24. Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE
25. Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces
26. Abuse of Human Rights by the Police
27. Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces
28. Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice
29. All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces
30. Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes
31. Failure to implement language rights
32. Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment
33. Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems
34. Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems
35. Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems
36. Politicisation of the public service
37. Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU
38. Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU
39. Corrupt politicians
40. Vested interests in ongoing conflict
41. Non-productive Peace Secretariat
42. Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes

43. Politicians frequently changing party
44. Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation
45. State control over media
46. The failure of successive governments to find a political solution
47. Failure to implement 13 th Amendment
48. Failure to implement 17 th Amendment
49. Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka
50. The British Colonialism
51. Discrimination after independence

The full results for this question in 2009 and 2010 are given in the appendix in rank order of ‘Very significant’ for the different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, Eastern Tamils, Northern Tamils, Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka and the major political parties. However, to summarize, Table 66 lists the top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2010 and Table 67 in 2009. The top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2010, are given in Table 68 and in Table 69 for 2009.

Table 66. Top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2010

Sinhala per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Inflation	68
2nd	Corrupt politicians	64
3rd	Unemployment	62
4th	The decline of the economy	54
5th	Politicisation of the public service	53

Table 67. Top 5 problems for the Sinhala in 2009

Sinhala per cent (2009)		Very Significant
1st	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	63
2nd	The continued violence of the LTTE	61
3rd	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	45
4th	Violence over the past 30 years	42
5th	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	41

Lists of problems like these have been produced for many different conflicts around the world. Although every list is different they all have one characteristic in common. If the items at the top of each communities list is not addressed and the causes of the conflict remain in place then the conditions required for long-term peace and stability will not be met. For example, in the Middle East the number one priority for Israelis is security and for Palestinians it is a Palestinian state. If Israelis do not get security and if Palestinians do not get a state there will not be peace in the Middle East.

Fortunately for the Sinhala of Sri Lanka their pre-war concerns have all been met. Their top 5 items in March 2009 were ‘Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE’ 1st at 63% ‘very significant’, followed by ‘The continued violence of the LTTE’ 2nd at 61%, then ‘Vested interests in ongoing conflict’ 3rd at 45%, ‘Violence over the past 30 years’ 4th at 42% and ‘It is not possible to kill the last Tiger’ 5th at 41% ‘very significant’. None of these questions could even be asked in March 2010 as, with the end of the war and defeat of the LTTE none of them were relevant and in this context any attempt to ask these questions was met with incredulity and the interview could not be completed. After the war in March 2010 the top 5 items for the Sinhala were ‘Inflation’ 1st at 68% ‘very significant’ followed by ‘Corrupt politicians’ 2nd at 64% then ‘Unemployment’ 3rd at 62%, ‘The decline of the economy’ 4th at 54% and ‘Politicisation of the public service’ 5th at 53% ‘very significant’. These are all problems of the economy and good governance. If not dealt with the government may lose its popularity and electoral mandate but not much more than that.

Table 68. Top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2010

Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Unemployment	66
2nd	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	62
3rd	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	61
4th	Inflation	60
5th	Violence over the past 30 years	59

Table 69. Top 5 problems for the Tamils in 2009

Tamil per cent (2009)		Very Significant
1st	Discrimination after independence	66
2nd	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	63
3rd	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	62
4th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	60
5th	Failure to implement language rights	60

In 2009 the top 5 problems for the Tamils were ‘Discrimination after independence’ 1st at 66% ‘very significant’ followed by ‘Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems’ 2nd at 63%, then ‘The failure of successive governments to find a political solution’ at 62%, ‘All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces’ 4th at 60% and ‘Failure to implement language rights’ 5th also at 60% ‘very significant’. The government can take comfort from the fact that in 2010 this list has changed a little with ‘Unemployment’ now first on the Tamil list at 66% ‘very significant’ and ‘Inflation’ 4th at 60%. So the government’s policy to stimulate the Sri Lankan economy will go some way to resolving the problems of all Sri Lankans. However, the ‘Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems’ at 62% ‘very significant’ and ‘The failure of successive governments to find a political solution’ at 61% remain the 2nd and 3rd priorities for Tamils. Fortunately the government’s policies for constitutional reform as set out in the APRC proposals are acceptable to the vast majority in all the communities of Sri Lanka. If the government were to bring such reforms into law by the end of the year then it seems very likely that the constitutional problem could be resolved and thus provide a political context within which the economic needs of the country can be effectively addressed.

However policy makers should also be aware that there are some regional differences in Tamil priorities and concerns. For the Tamils living in the Northern Province the top priorities remain issues of constitutional and political reform both 1st and 2nd at 71% and 69% ‘very significant’ and ‘Unemployment’ 3rd at 64% (Table 70). However, in the East the passing of the war has given way to slightly different priorities. For them ‘Violence over the past 30 years’ came 1st at 80% ‘very significant’ followed by ‘All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces’ 2nd also at 80%, then ‘Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces’ 3rd at 74%, ‘The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese’ 4th and ‘Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment’ 5th both at 70% ‘very significant’ (Table 71). As for the Tamils in the rest of the country their priorities are not so very different to everyone else with an emphasis on issues of the economy and good governance (Table 72).

Table 70. Top 5 problems for the Northern Tamils in 2010

Northern Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	71
2nd	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	69
3rd	Unemployment	64
4th	Violence over the past 30 years	64
5th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	64

Table 71. Top 5 problems for Eastern Tamils in 2010

Eastern Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Violence over the past 30 years	80
2nd	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	80
3rd	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	74
4th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	70
5th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	70

Table 72. Top 5 problems for other Tamils in the rest of Sri Lanka in 2010

Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Inflation	79
2nd	Unemployment	72
3rd	Corrupt politicians	69
4th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	68
5th	The decline of the economy	68

Similarly the needs of the Muslim and Up-Country Tamils are a little different, as well as the priorities of those who support the major political parties (SLFP, UNP, JVP, TNA and SLMC) but as would be expected party priorities tend to follow ethnic and regional concerns (see appendix for full results).

If there is no Reform

One of the most welcome results from the pre-war and post-war analysis of the APRC proposals was the fact that Sinhala support for these proposals rose from 67% 'Yes' in March 2009 to 83% 'Yes' in March 2010 (Table 64). This was achieved by significant numbers of 'Don't Knows' moving to the 'Yes' column in post-war Sri Lanka. Similarly when asked what they 'think will happen if there is no reform of the constitution to deal with the problems of the past' the Sinhala who said they 'Don't Know' in 2009 have now clearly expressed their view that there will be a political, economic and social cost to pay (Table 73 and 74). In 2009 8% of Sinhala considered it 'very probable' that 'The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again' rising to 15% in 2010 (18% 'probable' and 34% 'possible') with 'Don't Knows' falling from 25% in 2009 to only 6% in 2010.

Table 73. Sinhala concerns if there is no reform in 2010.

Sinhala per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	16	19	30	21	7	7
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	19	18	24	25	9	6
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	10	15	37	18	11	10
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	15	18	34	16	11	6
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	16	17	34	16	10	8

Table 74. Sinhala concerns if there is no reform in 2009.

Sinhala per cent (2009)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	7	18	19	25	13	18
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	7	18	22	23	15	15
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	7	20	23	16	9	25
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	8	21	21	14	11	25
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	11	16	19	18	13	24

Following the same pattern of support for the APRC proposals there is little difference between the 2009 and 2010 results for this question for the Tamils at 41% 'very probable' in both 2009 and 2010 but a slight drop in concern (and support for the APRC proposals – Table 64) for Muslims at 44% 'very probable' in 2009 and 31% in 2010. Clearly there is a relationship between a persons support for the APRC proposals and their concern for the future of Sri Lanka although this concern is felt more strongly amongst Tamils than Sinhala (Table 75).

Table 75. Concerns if there is no reform in 2010 as per cent 'Very probable'.

Per cent 'Very probable' (2010)	Sinhala	Tamil	North Tamil	East Tamil	Other Tamil	UC Tamil	Muslim	SLFP	UNP	JVP	TNA	SLMC
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	16	44	36	50	48	37	26	16	27	9	45	19
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	19	51	40	67	50	49	27	19	30	19	64	23
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	10	39	27	38	53	24	31	10	23	23	42	33
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	15	41	37	59	32	47	31	16	24	19	53	33
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	16	54	53	62	48	51	30	16	26	14	65	24

Those for or against the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka

The results of this poll suggest that approximately 10% of the population of Sri Lanka are opposed to the APRC proposals and that this 10% are a feature of both the Sinhala and Tamil communities, but clearly not for the same reasons. So who are these 10% and what are their characteristics? In an effort to answer this question a battery of demographic questions were asked at the end of the questionnaire not only to ensure a good sample but also to explore the attitudes of those who supported or who did not support constitutional reform. Table 76 lists these questions and demographic variables along with their correlation coefficients for all those who said 'No' to the APRC proposals. These are quite easy to interpret. If the coefficient is positive (+) then the variable in question is a characteristic of those who said 'No'. However if the coefficient is negative (-) then the variable is a characteristic of those who said 'Yes'. Finally if the coefficient has one asterisk* then it is 'significant' and if it has two asterisks** it is 'very significant'. (Copies of the questions used can be found in the appendix)

Variable	Sinhala 'No' (N=882) ⁹	Tamil 'No' (N=477)
Gender (male)	0.041	0.039
Age	0.044	0.024
Type of area (urban)	0.011	-0.094*
Income	-0.071*	0.042
Education	-0.012	0.108*
Central	0.043	-0.107*
North Central	-0.077*	-0.03
Northern	-0.029	0.252**
Eastern	0.053	-0.122**
North Western	-0.063	-0.015
Sabaragamuwa	0.002	0.029
Southern	-0.031	
Uva	0.055	-0.033
Western	0.019	-0.072
SLFP	-0.111**	-0.05
UNF	0.04	-0.078
JVP	0.116**	-0.015
TNA		0.147**
SLMC		-0.021
Importance of religion	-0.072*	-0.168**
Importance of own ethnic group	-0.111**	0.002
Importance of being Sri Lankan	-0.096**	-0.259**
Contact with other ethnic group	-0.015	-0.244**
Democratic value	-0.125**	-0.066
Victim of conflict	0.084*	0.089

There is a slight but insignificant positive correlation with gender suggesting males are a little more likely to say 'No' to the APRC proposals than females. This is to be expected, as males tend to be slightly more involved in conflicts and confrontation than females but not significantly so. Age does not seem to be an important factor but there is a significant negative correlation for being urban and being a Tamil who might say 'No' to the APRC proposals. So Tamils who might say 'No' tend to be rural. They also tend to be from the Northern region, are better educated and are associated with the TNA. No surprise there except perhaps for education. But the Tamils who are most likely to say 'Yes' to the APRC proposals and who are most definitely NOT in the 'No camp' are the Tamils in the East. As indicated in the 'Problems' section of this report there are significant differences between the Tamils of the North and the Tamils of the East (Tables 70 and 71).

⁹ Comparisons of the value of the correlation coefficients can only be made within each group (Sinhala or Tamil) but not between each group as the number in each group (N) is not the same.

From the available data the Sinhala who are most likely to say 'No' tend to be associated with the JVP while those who would be most strongly 'Yes' live in the North Central region, might be a little poorer and vote for the President's party the SLFP. Significantly the importance of religion does NOT correlate with saying 'No' for either the Sinhala or Tamils. Religious 'radicalisation' does play a role in other conflicts around the world but this does not seem to be a feature of the conflict here according to this data. However, the politics of religion may be a different matter as noted earlier in this report (see Table 62). Being Sinhala correlates with saying 'Yes' to the APRC proposals as does being Sri Lankan for both Sinhala and Tamils. A lack of contact between Tamils and Sinhala may be a problem in Sri Lanka as Tamils who do not have such contact are more likely to say 'No' to the APRC proposals. For Sinhala democratic values correlates with saying 'Yes' but being a victim of the conflict, for them, also correlates with saying 'No'.

Those who know and understand Sri Lanka society better than this author will no doubt be able to add more meaning and appreciation to the numbers briefly reviewed here. The important point to be made, however, is that now that the whole of Sri Lanka is open to the kind of social research undertaken in this poll such research will be able to make a positive contribution to peace making, peace building and reconciliation in the future.

Opposition to progressive reform outside Sri Lanka

The years of careful negotiation by the members of the APRC, including informal discussions with parties outside the APRC process, has led to the formulation of a set of proposals that are equally acceptable to all the communities in Sri Lanka. This program of research has now been able to explore and describe that support (or lack of support where applicable) in much detail pointing out the problems where they exist.

Throughout the years of similar negotiations in Northern Ireland there was a considerable lack of understanding of what was really going on in Northern Ireland in the USA. There many Americans of Irish descent continued to support the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and their aspiration for a united Ireland with little knowledge or appreciation of the power sharing arrangements being negotiated under the terms of the Belfast Agreement. Similarly, it seems to be the case that the Tamil diaspora are not fully aware of the efforts of the APRC to find a constitutional solution to their country's problems. In contrast to the detailed APRC proposals tried and tested here (Table 3) the members of the Tamil community around the world were recently provided with the following statement in what they called a Tamil Referendum:

'I aspire to the formation of the independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in the contiguous north and east territory of the island of Sri Lanka on the basis that the Tamil speaking people in the island of Sri Lanka make a distinct nation, have a traditional homeland and have the right to self determination.'

They were then asked to 'Mark a cross (X) in the appropriate box' which provided for only a 'Yes' or a 'No' response. These polls or referenda were held in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland for a total turnout of 207,058 votes cast out of a possible 323,500 to produce a combined result of 99.68% for the Tamil Eelam proposition and only 0.32% against (Table 77).

Table 77. Results of the Tamil Referendum in April 2010

Country	Total Polled	'Yes' per cent	'No' per cent
Australia	8,154	99.38	0.62
Canada	48,583	99.82	0.18
Denmark	4,147	99.49	0.51
France	31,148	99.86	0.14
Germany	23,089	99.41	0.59
Italy	3,680	98.79	1.21
Netherlands	2,750	99.67	0.33
Norway	5,633	99.11	0.89
Switzerland	16,441	99.80	0.20
UK	64,692	99.71	0.29
Total	207,058	99.68	0.32

It was very important that the Belfast Agreement was put to the people of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (the South of Ireland) in a referendum to give the peace agreement political legitimacy. In that referendum held on May 22nd 1998, 71% of the people of Northern Ireland voted 'Yes' and in a public opinion poll conducted on behalf of the parties in the negotiations, just 2 weeks before the agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments on Good Friday 1998, 77% said they would support the agreement. The opposition of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), who were able to get their members to vote against it, can explain the drop of 6% between the results of the poll and the referendum. So the poll was very accurate.

The results for the test of the APRC proposals in Sri Lanka are certainly as good as if not better than the results for the Belfast Agreement poll, and in Northern Ireland the people there were able to make peace

on the strength of those results. Hopefully, now that the elections are over in Sri Lanka the new government will take steps to bring the APRC proposals into constitutional law. With effective implementation all the people of Sri Lanka can reasonably expect to share in all the benefits that will inevitably flow from the peace and stability that these reforms can bring. Referendums that only offer the options of independence for Tamil Elam or the status quo can't achieve this. Neither of these two options is what is wanted in Sri Lanka now. The people there are prepared to move on. However, it remains an open question as to whether or not the political leadership in Sri Lanka will take this opportunity to resolve the 'national question' once and for all. As far as the people are concerned this door is open. Given the unprecedented electoral mandate handed to the President and his government by the people they are now in an exceptionally strong position to lead them through.

Appendix

Questionnaire and additional results for questions 1 and 2 not given above

Political Reform in Sri Lanka

Good morning/afternoon/evening my name is _____ from _____ At this critical time we are conducting a survey of public opinion to find out what the people of Sri Lanka believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the island.

The Research is being carried out by the staff of Social Indicator in Colombo.

The Survey involves interviewing two thousand people from all parts of Sri Lanka to complete a representative sample in terms of age, gender, social class, political and ethnic affiliation and geographical area.

Topics covered include:

- The range of problems faced by the people
- What you think will happen if reforms are not put in place
- The major elements of possible reforms for achieving lasting peace and stability
- Your views on some of these reforms
- Your views about yourself
- And finally some questions that tell us where you fit into our sample

All your answers will be kept completely confidential.

1. The Problems

People from different communities often hold very different views about the current problems faced by them. Here is a list of some of the problems given to our research team from the different regions of Sri Lanka. Which problems do you consider to be ‘Very significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of some significance’, ‘Of little significance’ or ‘Of no significance at all’.

	Sinhala per cent (2010)	Very Significant
1st	Inflation	68
2nd	Corrupt politicians	64
3rd	Unemployment	62
4th	The decline of the economy	54
5th	Politicisation of the public service	53
6th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	52
7th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	50
8th	Lack of basic health care	44
9th	Violence over the past 30 years	42
10th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	42
11th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	41
12th	Politicians frequently changing party	38
13th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	37
14th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	36
15th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	32
16th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	32
17th	Increasing number of IDPs	28
18th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	27
19th	State control over media	27
20th	Polarisation of civil society ¹⁰	26
21st	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	25
22nd	The British Colonialism	23
23rd	Failure to implement language rights	20
24th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	19
25th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	19
26th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	17
27th	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	15
28th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	15
29th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	14
30th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	13
31st	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	13
32nd	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	13
33rd	Discrimination after independence	13
34th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	13
35th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	12
36th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	10
37th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	9
38th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	8

¹⁰ Divisions among civic organisations, political groups and media

Sinhala per cent (2009)		Very Significant
1st	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	63
2nd	The continued violence of the LTTE	61
3rd	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	45
4th	Violence over the past 30 years	42
5th	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	41
6th	The ongoing war	37
7th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	32
8th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	32
9th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	31
10th	Corrupt politicians	25
11th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	25
12th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	20
13th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	20
14th	The decline of the economy	19
15th	The British Colonialism	19
16th	Polarisation of civil society	18
17th	Failure to implement language rights	18
18th	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	18
19th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	18
20th	Inflation	17
21st	Unemployment	15
22nd	State aided colonization and change of demographics	15
23rd	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	15
24th	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	15
25th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	15
26th	Politicisation of the public service	15
27th	Discrimination after independence	15
28th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	14
29th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	14
30th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	14
31st	Lack of basic health care	12
32nd	The Police do not provide service for the public	11
33rd	Politicians frequently changing party	11
34th	State control over media	11
35th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	11
36th	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	11
37th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	10
38th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	10
39th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	10
40th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	10
41st	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	9
42nd	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	8
43rd	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	8
44th	Increasing number of IDPs	8
45th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	7
46th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	6
47th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	6
48th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	3
49th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	2

Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Unemployment	66
2nd	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	62
3rd	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	61
4th	Inflation	60
5th	Violence over the past 30 years	59
6th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	58
7th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	58
8th	Failure to implement language rights	58
9th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	56
10th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	55
11th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	55
12th	Corrupt politicians	55
13th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	55
14th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	54
15th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	53
16th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	52
17th	State control over media	51
18th	Increasing number of IDPs	51
19th	The decline of the economy	50
20th	Discrimination after independence	50
21st	Politicisation of the public service	49
22nd	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	47
23rd	Polarisation of civil society	44
24th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	42
25th	Lack of basic health care	41
26th	Politicians frequently changing party	41
27th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	40
28th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	36
29th	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	35
30th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	35
31st	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	34
32nd	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	33
33rd	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	30
34th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	26
35th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	24
36th	The British Colonialism	22
37th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	21
38th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	14

Tamil per cent (2009)		Very Significant
1st	Discrimination after independence	66
2nd	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	63
3rd	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	62
4th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	60
5th	Failure to implement language rights	60
6th	The ongoing war	59
7th	Violence over the past 30 years	54
8th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	53
9th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	53
10th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	52
11th	State control over media	51
12th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	50
13th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	50
14th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	49
15th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	46
16th	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	46
17th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	44
18th	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	43
19th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	42
20th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	41
21st	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	40
22nd	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	39
23rd	Increasing number of IDPs	38
24th	Politicisation of the public service	38
25th	Unemployment	37
26th	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	37
27th	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	36
28th	The Police do not provide service for the public	36
29th	The continued violence of the LTTE	35
30th	The British Colonialism	34
31st	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	33
32nd	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	32
33rd	Inflation	31
34th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	30
35th	The decline of the economy	29
36th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	28
37th	Corrupt politicians	28
38th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	28
39th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	25
40th	Politicians frequently changing party	25
41st	Polarisation of civil society	24
42nd	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	22
43rd	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	22
44th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	21
45th	Lack of basic health care	20
46th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	20
47th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	20
48th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	17
49th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	14

Up-Country Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Inflation	78
2nd	Failure to implement language rights	77
3rd	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	75
4th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	71
5th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	67
6th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	67
7th	Corrupt politicians	66
8th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	65
9th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	63
10th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	63
11th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	63
12th	Unemployment	59
13th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	59
14th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	58
15th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	58
16th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	57
17th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	57
18th	The decline of the economy	54
19th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	52
20th	Lack of basic health care	51
21st	Discrimination after independence	50
22nd	Violence over the past 30 years	50
23rd	State control over media	50
24th	Politicisation of the public service	47
25th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	47
26th	Politicians frequently changing party	40
27th	Polarisation of civil society	40
28th	Increasing number of IDPs	35
29th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	33
30th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	33
31st	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	28
32nd	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	27
33rd	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	27
34th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	25
35th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	21
36th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	19
37th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	15
38th	The British Colonialism	12

Up-Country Tamil per cent (2009)		Very Significant
1st	Violence over the past 30 years	80
2nd	The ongoing war	79
3rd	State control over media	73
4th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	72
5th	Failure to implement language rights	71
6th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	65
7th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	64
8th	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	62
9th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	62
10th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	62
11th	Discrimination after independence	61
12th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	60
13th	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	59
14th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	59
15th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	58
16th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	56
17th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	52
18th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	50
19th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	47
20th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	47
21st	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	47
22nd	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	42
23rd	Corrupt politicians	41
24th	The continued violence of the LTTE	40
25th	The Police do not provide service for the public	39
26th	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	38
27th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	38
28th	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	37
29th	Inflation	35
30th	The decline of the economy	31
31st	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	31
32nd	Polarisation of civil society	31
33rd	Politicisation of the public service	31
34th	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	31
35th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	30
36th	Politicians frequently changing party	30
37th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	26
38th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	22
39th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	22
40th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	22
41st	Increasing number of IDPs	21
42nd	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	19
43rd	The British Colonialism	19
44th	Unemployment	16
45th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	16
46th	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	13
47th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	13
48th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	10
49th	Lack of basic health care	5

Muslim per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	53
2nd	Unemployment	50
3rd	Violence over the past 30 years	50
4th	Inflation	48
5th	The decline of the economy	45
6th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	44
7th	Corrupt politicians	43
8th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	43
9th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	42
10th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	42
11th	State control over media	41
12th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	41
13th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	41
14th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	40
15th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	40
16th	Politicisation of the public service	38
17th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	37
18th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	37
19th	Lack of basic health care	37
20th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	36
21st	Failure to implement language rights	35
22nd	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	34
23rd	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	34
24th	Polarisation of civil society	34
25th	Increasing number of IDPs	33
26th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	32
27th	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	29
28th	Discrimination after independence	27
29th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	26
30th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	25
31st	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	24
32nd	Politicians frequently changing party	24
33rd	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	23
34th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	23
35th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	22
36th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	22
37th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	19
38th	The British Colonialism	12

Muslim per cent (2009)		Very Significant
1st	The continued violence of the LTTE	57
2nd	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	55
3rd	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	54
4th	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	53
5th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	52
6th	Violence over the past 30 years	51
7th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	51
8th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	50
9th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	49
10th	The ongoing war	48
11th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	48
12th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	46
13th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	45
14th	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	44
15th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	44
16th	Failure to implement language rights	43
17th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	43
18th	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	42
19th	The Police do not provide service for the public	40
20th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	40
21st	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	40
22nd	Politicisation of the public service	39
23rd	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	37
24th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	37
25th	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	37
26th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	37
27th	Discrimination after independence	37
28th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	35
29th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	34
30th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	33
31st	Corrupt politicians	33
32nd	State control over media	33
33rd	Unemployment	32
34th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	31
35th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	31
36th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	31
37th	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	28
38th	Inflation	27
39th	The decline of the economy	25
40th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	25
41st	Increasing number of IDPs	23
42nd	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	23
43rd	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	22
44th	Politicians frequently changing party	20
45th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	19
46th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	17
47th	Polarisation of civil society	17
48th	The British Colonialism	17
49th	Lack of basic health care	9

Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Inflation	79
2nd	Unemployment	72
3rd	Corrupt politicians	69
4th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	68
5th	The decline of the economy	68
6th	Failure to implement language rights	66
7th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	63
8th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	62
9th	Lack of basic health care	59
10th	Politicisation of the public service	57
11th	State control over media	57
12th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	52
13th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	48
14th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	48
15th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	47
16th	Increasing number of IDPs	47
17th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	46
18th	Politicians frequently changing party	46
19th	Polarisation of civil society	44
20th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	44
21st	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	43
22nd	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	43
23rd	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	43
24th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	43
25th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	41
26th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	41
27th	Violence over the past 30 years	37
28th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	37
29th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	37
30th	Discrimination after independence	36
31st	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	25
32nd	State aided colonization and change of demographics	24
33rd	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	24
34th	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	23
35th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	23
36th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	22
37th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	14
38th	The British Colonialism	11

Eastern Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Violence over the past 30 years	80
2nd	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	80
3rd	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	74
4th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	70
5th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	70
6th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	67
7th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	66
8th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	63
9th	Unemployment	62
10th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	60
11th	Increasing number of IDPs	60
12th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	58
13th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	56
14th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	55
15th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	55
16th	Inflation	51
17th	Discrimination after independence	51
18th	Corrupt politicians	50
19th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	46
20th	Politicians frequently changing party	46
21st	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	45
22nd	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	44
23rd	State control over media	43
24th	Polarisation of civil society	40
25th	Failure to implement language rights	40
26th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	40
27th	The decline of the economy	39
28th	Politicisation of the public service	38
29th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	35
30th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	34
31st	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	31
32nd	Lack of basic health care	28
33rd	The British Colonialism	26
34th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	25
35th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	25
36th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	21
37th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	19
38th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	16

Northern Tamil per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	71
2nd	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	69
3rd	Unemployment	64
4th	Violence over the past 30 years	64
5th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	64
6th	Failure to implement language rights	63
7th	Discrimination after independence	62
8th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	59
9th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	56
10th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	56
11th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	55
12th	State control over media	52
13th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	51
14th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	51
15th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	51
16th	Politicisation of the public service	49
17th	Inflation	48
18th	Polarisation of civil society	48
19th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	48
20th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	48
21st	Increasing number of IDPs	47
22nd	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	45
23rd	Corrupt politicians	44
24th	The decline of the economy	42
25th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	42
26th	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	39
27th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	36
28th	Lack of basic health care	34
29th	Politicians frequently changing party	34
30th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	30
31st	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	30
32nd	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	29
33rd	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	28
34th	The British Colonialism	28
35th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	20
36th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	16
37th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	15
38th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	7

SLFP per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Inflation	66
2nd	Corrupt politicians	61
3rd	Unemployment	59
4th	The decline of the economy	54
5th	Politicisation of the public service	51
6th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	49
7th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	47
8th	Violence over the past 30 years	46
9th	Lack of basic health care	44
10th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	42
11th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	41
12th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	37
13th	Politicians frequently changing party	36
14th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	34
15th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	33
16th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	32
17th	Increasing number of IDPs	30
18th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	28
19th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	27
20th	The British Colonialism	26
21st	Polarisation of civil society	25
22nd	State control over media	23
23rd	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	22
24th	Failure to implement language rights	21
25th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	20
26th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	18
27th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	18
28th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	17
29th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	17
30th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	16
31st	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	16
32nd	Discrimination after independence	16
33rd	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	15
34th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	15
35th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	14
36th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	14
37th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	11
38th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	10

UNP per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Inflation	70
2nd	Corrupt politicians	66
3rd	Unemployment	63
4th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	61
5th	Politicisation of the public service	55
6th	The decline of the economy	54
7th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	54
8th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	51
9th	State control over media	51
10th	Lack of basic health care	48
11th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	47
12th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	44
13th	Politicians frequently changing party	43
14th	Violence over the past 30 years	40
15th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	38
16th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	38
17th	Polarisation of civil society	35
18th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	33
19th	Failure to implement language rights	32
20th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	31
21st	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	30
22nd	Increasing number of IDPs	29
23rd	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	28
24th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	28
25th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	28
26th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	28
27th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	27
28th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	26
29th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	22
30th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	21
31st	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	21
32nd	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	20
33rd	Discrimination after independence	20
34th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	18
35th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	16
36th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	15
37th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	15
38th	The British Colonialism	14

JVP per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Unemployment	80
2nd	Inflation	64
3rd	Politicisation of the public service	59
4th	Corrupt politicians	58
5th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	58
6th	The decline of the economy	47
7th	Lack of basic health care	46
8th	Politicians frequently changing party	40
9th	State control over media	40
10th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	38
11th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	37
12th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	37
13th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	35
14th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	33
15th	Violence over the past 30 years	32
16th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	28
17th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	28
18th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	27
19th	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	26
20th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	25
21st	Failure to implement language rights	25
22nd	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	25
23rd	Increasing number of IDPs	20
24th	Polarisation of civil society	19
25th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	17
26th	The British Colonialism	17
27th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	16
28th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	16
29th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	16
30th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	16
31st	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	14
32nd	Discrimination after independence	13
33rd	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	12
34th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	12
35th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	10
36th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	7
37th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	6
38th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	4

TNA per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	82
2nd	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	77
3rd	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	77
4th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	77
5th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	77
6th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	76
7th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	75
8th	Violence over the past 30 years	74
9th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	72
10th	Discrimination after independence	70
11th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	69
12th	Failure to implement language rights	67
13th	Corrupt politicians	66
14th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	63
15th	Unemployment	61
16th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	61
17th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	60
18th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	60
19th	Politicisation of the public service	59
20th	State control over media	58
21st	Polarisation of civil society	57
22nd	Increasing number of IDPs	55
23rd	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	54
24th	Politicians frequently changing party	46
25th	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	46
26th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	44
27th	Inflation	43
28th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	42
29th	The decline of the economy	39
30th	The British Colonialism	35
31st	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	34
32nd	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	33
33rd	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	33
34th	Lack of basic health care	32
35th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	29
36th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	24
37th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	20
38th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	15

SLMC per cent (2010)		Very Significant
1st	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	56
2nd	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	53
3rd	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	53
4th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	53
5th	Violence over the past 30 years	51
6th	Failure to implement language rights	50
7th	Corrupt politicians	50
8th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	48
9th	State control over media	47
10th	Unemployment	46
11th	Increasing number of IDPs	46
12th	Inflation	45
13th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	45
14th	The Police do not provide a police service/adequate service for the public	45
15th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	44
16th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	43
17th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	43
18th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	42
19th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	40
20th	The decline of the economy	39
21st	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	38
22nd	Lack of basic health care	37
23rd	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	36
24th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	36
25th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	36
26th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	36
27th	Failure to implement 13 th Amendment	36
28th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	35
29th	Politicisation of the public service	35
30th	Polarisation of civil society	34
31st	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	31
32nd	Failure to implement 17 th Amendment	28
33rd	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	26
34th	Discrimination after independence	26
35th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	23
36th	Politicians frequently changing party	23
37th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	19
38th	The British Colonialism	12

2. If there is no Reform

Q2.From the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if there is no reform of the constitution to deal with the problems of the past. Please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Possible', 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.

Sinhala per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	16	19	30	21	7	7
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	19	18	24	25	9	6
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	10	15	37	18	11	10
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	15	18	34	16	11	6
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	16	17	34	16	10	8

Sinhala per cent (2009)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	7	18	19	25	13	18
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	7	18	22	23	15	15
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	7	20	23	16	9	25
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	8	21	21	14	11	25
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	11	16	19	18	13	24

Tamil per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	44	27	14	5	3	6
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	51	26	13	4	2	4
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	39	28	18	4	4	6
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	41	19	21	5	6	9
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	54	22	12	4	4	4

Tamil per cent (2009)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	44	26	19	3	3	4
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	55	21	17	3	1	3
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	34	28	24	8	1	4
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	41	22	19	3	1	14
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	52	22	14	2	1	8

Up-Country Tamil per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	37	29	16	4	7	7
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	49	26	13	4	4	5
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	24	35	19	6	7	9
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	47	14	17	6	9	7
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	51	25	9	3	4	7

Up-Country Tamil per cent (2009)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	35	21	18	12	10	5
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	63	10	9	10	4	4
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	51	18	13	7	4	6
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	58	15	4	7	6	9
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	67	12	6	4	6	5

Muslim per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	26	39	18	9	4	5
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	27	23	31	11	5	4
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	31	27	15	12	10	7
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	31	24	21	10	7	7
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	30	32	20	6	4	8

Muslim per cent (2009)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	45	32	11	4	0	7
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	49	31	10	5	1	4
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	24	38	23	4	1	11
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	44	27	13	1	2	13
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	36	38	12	3	1	10

Other Sri Lanka Tamil per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	48	25	8	7	5	8
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	50	24	13	6	4	2
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	53	21	12	5	7	3
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	32	20	19	9	15	6
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	48	22	10	4	10	6

Eastern Tamil per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	50	33	7	2	2	6
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	67	23	3	2	1	4
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	38	37	16	4	2	4
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	59	19	14	2	1	6
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	62	31	5	2		1

Northern Tamil per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	36	25	27	5	2	5
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	40	30	20	4	1	6
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	27	28	27	5	4	10
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	37	18	27	3	2	14
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	53	15	19	6	2	5

SLFP per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	16	16	31	23	7	7
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	19	17	25	26	9	5
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	10	15	37	18	11	8
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	16	18	32	16	12	6
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	16	18	32	17	11	6

UNP per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	27	30	21	12	3	7
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	30	24	18	17	5	7
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	23	25	21	13	9	9
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	24	21	27	12	10	6
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	26	26	26	7	7	9

JVP per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	9	43	26	17	4	
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	19	30	23	23	4	
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	23	19	45	9	4	
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	19	44	33	4		
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	14	28	49		4	4

TNA per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	45	24	15	5	6	4
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	64	15	8	3	3	6
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	42	25	18	5	3	7
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	53	16	21	3	3	3
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	65	17	5	4	3	6

SLMC per cent (2010)	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	19	44	27	10		1
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	23	21	44	10	1	2
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	33	25	14	16	9	4
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	33	22	27	9	6	4
The present opportunity to make peace/lasting solution will be lost for a generation	24	36	23	8	6	4

3. A Program for Reform

With regards to the future peace and stability of Sri Lanka I am now going to present you with a number of reforms on a series of cards. For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable' and for the purposes of this poll 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' and 'Unacceptable' mean:

'Essential' – You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better future for the island and should be fully implemented.

'Desirable' – This option is not what you would consider to be 'Essential', but you think this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice.

'Acceptable' – This option is not what you would consider to be 'Desirable', if you were given a choice, but you could certainly 'live with it'.

'Tolerable' – This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you would be willing to put up with it.

'Unacceptable' – This option is totally unacceptable under any circumstances. You would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the island.

(VERSION 1 - Neutral)

You may use each of the terms 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' and 'Unacceptable' as many times as you wish in each question.

(VERSION 2 - President)

If President Mahinda Rajapaksa strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using the terms 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' and 'Unacceptable' as many times as you wish in each question.

(VERSION 3 - Religious)

If your religious leaders strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using the terms 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' and 'Unacceptable' as many times as you wish in each question.

(VERSION 4 - Political)

If the political party you are closest to strongly supported these proposals please indicate your support using the terms 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' and 'Unacceptable' as many times as you wish in each question.

SHOW CARDS 1 to 14

15. **The Structure of the State** – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under a unitary state.
16. **The Powers of the Centre and Provinces** – These powers will be clearly defined in two separate lists. One for the Centre and one for the Provinces.
17. **The Parliament** - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the same number of Senators.
18. **Amending the Constitution** – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.
19. **The Powers of the President** – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent's term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives.
20. **The Powers of Local Authorities** – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution.
21. **Language Rights** – The Tamil and Sinhala languages will have parity of status as national and official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes where it is expedient to do so. Sinhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the school level as well as English if facilities are available. Sinhala, Tamil and English shall be used at institutes of higher education.
22. **Religious Rights** – Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.
23. **Fundamental Rights** – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law.
24. **Electoral System** – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation.
25. **The Judiciary** – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts.
26. **Public Service** – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent.
27. **Safeguards against secession** – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against attempts by any Province to succeed from the State.
28. **Law and Order** - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre.

SHOW CARDS 1 to 14...

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1. The Structure of the State					
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces					
3. The Parliament					
4. Amending the Constitution					
5. The Powers of the President					
6. The Powers of Local Authorities					
7. Language Rights					
8. Religious Rights					
9. Fundamental Rights					
10. Electoral System					
11. The Judiciary					
12. Public Service					
13. Safeguards against secession					
14. Law and Order					
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'					

Q4 (VERSION 1) Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here? **Yes/No**

(VERSION 2) If President Mahinda Rajapaksa strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? **Yes/No**

(VERSION 3) If your religious leaders strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? **Yes/No**

(VERSION 4) If the political party you are closest to strongly supported a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here, would you support it? **Yes/No**

Q5 (VERSION 1 ONLY) If answer is 'No' or 'Don't know' or No Response:

Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

- 1) President Mahinda Rajapaksa supported them? **Yes/No**
- 2) Your religious leaders supported them? **Yes/No**
- 3) The political party you are closest to supported them? **Yes/No**
- 4) President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all supported them? **Yes/No**

Q6 (VERSION 1 ONLY) If answer is 'Yes':

Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here if:

- 1) President Mahinda Rajapaksa did not support them? **Yes/No**
- 2) Your religious leaders did not support them? **Yes/No**
- 3) The political party you are closest to did not support them? **Yes/No**
- 4) President Mahinda Rajapaksa, your religious leaders and the political party you are closest to all did not support them? **Yes/No**

Q7 Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government."
(Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?)

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree
98. Don't know/Not sure
99. No response

SECTION III: DEMOGRAPHICS

1. Sex:

1. Male
2. Female

2. Religion:

1. Buddhism
2. Hinduism
3. Islam
4. Roman Catholicism
5. Christianity (Non-RC)
6. Other _____

2.1. Which of the following BEST describes the importance of religion on your life?

1. It's the most important thing in my life
2. It's very important but it doesn't dominate my life
3. It's somewhat important in my life.
4. It's not very important in my life
5. It's not at all important in my life

3. Age: _____

4. Ethnicity:

1. Sinhala
2. Tamil
3. Up-country Tamil
4. Muslim
5. Burgher
5. Other _____

4.1. How important is being (use group from question 4) to the way you think of yourself, very important, important, neither important or unimportant, not very important, or not important at all?

1. Very important
2. Important
3. Neither important or unimportant
4. Not very important
5. Not important at all

4.2. And how important is being Sri Lankan to the way you think of yourself, very important, important, neither important or unimportant, not very important, or not important at all?

1. Very important
2. Important
3. Neither important or unimportant
4. Not very important

4.3. How often you tend to come into contact with people from other ethnic groups?

1. Daily
2. Once a week
3. Once a month
4. Once a year
5. Rarely/Never

5. First language:

1. Sinhala
2. Tamil
3. English
4. Other _____

6. Occupation of the respondent (**SINGLE CODE ONLY**)

1. Executives, Managerial and Administrative Professionals	8. Housewife
2. Professionals	9. Retired
3. Technicians and Associate Professionals	10. Business
4. Clerk	11. Self employed
5. Travel, Restaurant, Protective Service Workers and Sales Workers	12. Elementary Occupations
6. Agricultural and fisheries workers	13. Unemployed
7. Students	14. Other

7. Could you please tell me your educational qualifications? (**SINGLE CODE ONLY**)

1. Cannot read and write	8. Advanced Level
2. Literate but no formal education	9. Vocationally trained
3. Up to grade 5	10. Technically trained
4. Grade 6-9	11. Professional
5. Up to O' Level	12. Undergraduate
6. O' Level	13. Graduate and above
7. Up to Advanced Level	

8. Total monthly income of the household:

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Below Rs 5000 | 4. Rs 15,001-Rs 20,000 |
| 2. Rs 5001-Rs 10,000 | 5. Rs 20,001-Rs 25,000 |
| 3. Rs 10,001-Rs 15,000 | 6. Rs 25,001 & above |

9. Please tell me that in your view, which political party is the closest to your personal political ideologies?

1. SLFP
2. UNF
3. JVP
4. JHU
5. TNA
6. SLMC
7. EPDP
8. UCPF
9. NFF
10. NUA
11. Other _____

10. Can you tell me if you have ever:

Conditions	Yes 1	No 2	Don't know/Not sure 98	No response 99
a. Had a family member fight in the conflict?	1	2	98	99
b. How about your friends or neighbours? Have any of them had a family member fight in the conflict?	1	2	98	99
c. Have you or any family member been physically injured, killed, or disappeared in the conflict?	1	2	98	99
d. How about your friends or neighbours?	1	2	98	99
e. Have you or anyone in your family had property damaged or lost land in the conflict?	1	2	98	99
f. Have you ever experienced any loss or limitation of your rights as a result of the conflict?	1	2	98	99

1. RESPONDENT'S NAME:			
2. ADDRESS:		3. TEL NO:	
4. PROVINCE		5. DISTRICT	
1	Central	1	Colombo
2	North Central	11	Ampara
3	Northern	12	Trincomalee
4	Eastern	13	Kurunegala
5	North Western	14	Puttalam
6	Sabaragamuwa	15	Anuradhapura
7	Southern	16	Polonnaruwa
8	Uva	17	Badulla
9	Western	18	Moneragala
		19	Ratnapura
		20	Vavuniya
		21	Mannar
		22	Jaffna
6. DIVISIONAL SECRETARIAT:			
7. GN:			
8. TYPE OF AREA: 1. Rural 2. Urban			
9. LGB:			
10. DATE:	11. START TIME:	12. END TIME:	

THANK YOU!