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vinced there should be unity of command over all these branches so the entire operation will be under one man. He is willing to assume that responsibility and believes he should since he is charged with planning both SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP.

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LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 1, 1942--Following a tour of the Poole-Bournemouth area, Brigadier General Roosevelt and other 1st Division officers of the advance echelon call on General Clark to tell him they are convinced they can train in that region. It is virtually decided that the 1st Division will set up near Poole and relieve the 38th British division.

The Commander of the Ground Forces discloses he is fighting to have complete command over amphibious operations and training. In a letter to General Eisenhower he states that since the Ground Force Commander has "primary interest" in the invasion training and execution, "he should have primary responsibility and should be charged with making recommendation of sites to the Theater Commander after coordinating with the Navy and SOS commanders." He declares the Navy "should not direct and supervise these training centers, nor appoint the commanding officers thereof."

"The object of the training," General Clark writes in objecting to amphibious training plans outlined in a letter from Colonel Barker, "must be to enable ground troops, properly supported, to get ashore in proper formation and proper condition to execute the assault. This will require the coordinated action of all elements: boat crews, ground forces, and direct support aviation. Coordination implies unity of command and since the ground force will make up the major element and will present the major training problem, it is logical that that command should be vested in the Task Force Commander, who is in the best position to direct the unified training of his various elements that go to make up the assault. His representative should be in command of these training centers in order to assure that training is directed in accordance with the training program prescribed by the Task Force Commander."

General Clark maintains that the amphibious force commander should be attached to him both during preparation and the invasion operation. The II Army Corps commander writes General Eisenhower that he is "perfectly willing to accept the responsibility" of running the amphibious centers. "I have grave doubts," the letter concludes, "that this combined training will work smoothly if these centers are placed under Navy Command."

The general is going to London for conferences Monday with Lord Mountbatten, ETOUSA, Army Corps, SOS and Navy officials concerning amphibious training. He plans to outline his plan for unity of command. He has asked that officers be sent who can make decisions" and speak for their bosses." He hopes to get the entire problem of command decided so work can go forward.

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The general, despite his forthrightness and brevity, is exceedingly human. Today he sends out his first "birthday letter" to an officer under his command. He plans to send similar letters to each officer when his anniversary arrives. Here is a typical one:

"Dear Lieutenant:

"Today being your birthday, no doubt your thoughts instinctively will be turned to your loved ones at home. With the hope of helping to fill the void caused by your separation, I want to extend my best wishes.

"I hope that the combined American-British resources can bring about the destruction of our common enemy in time for you to be at home on your next birthday.

"Sincerely,

(signed)

"Mark W. Clark,

"Major General, U.S.A.,

"Commanding."

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LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 2, 1942--The American Red Cross hospital in Salisbury is being turned over to the United States Army for the duration and last night General Clark entertained the nurses, many of whom are joining the Army Nurse Corps. A few are returning to the United States and officers try and convince them they should remain here and help.

The general says the hospital, which has been used for the past year to take care of pulmonary trouble and communicable diseases, must be expanded materially for our use.

The nurses are driven from the hospital to New Hall, the general's quarters, in jeeps chauffeured by officers. There are about 35 nurses and 60 officers at the dancing and buffet party.

After having Sunday dinner at Cowesfield where our headquarters Engineers are quartered, General Clark, accompanied by Major C.C. Smith, leaves at 1530 for London and conferences concerning his having command over all phases of amphibious training and operations. He plans on talking over the involved problem with General Eisenhower tonight so they can get cleared away for the conferences tomorrow.

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**LONDON,**

~~General Clark~~ AUG. 3, 1942--General Clark today won his fight to have amphibious training under his direct command. He will soon go to Ireland to pick the training area so construction can be started.

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During a discussion this morning with General Spaatz and Admiral Bennett, General Clark outlined his plan for the setting-up and operation of amphibious training areas. When Admiral Bennett of the US Navy passed around a paper stating his views on how training should operate, General Clark disagreed since Admiral Bennett's ideas were exactly those contained in the plan of Colonel Barker and to which the general already had taken exception.

General Eisenhower suggested that Admiral Bennett, General Clark and the general's amphibious expert, Colonel O'Daniel, confer and reach an agreement. As soon as the general outlined his views in detail, Admiral Bennett agreed to 100 percent cooperation. He said his sole mission would be to train the boat crews so they can handle, service and navigate the small craft and put the invading forces on the proper beach.

Admiral Bennett accepted General Clark's suggested North Ireland training location and agreed to get the proper craft and submit training plans. These will be reported to General Clark's expert who will then give the Navy its instructions for proceeding.

At 1500, Generals Clark and Eisenhower and Lord Louis Mountbatten meet with representatives of the British War Office, the British Admiralty, Air Command, SOS, ETOUSA and the Ground Forces. After three hours of discussion, the group accepted General Clark's recommendations on amphibious command and training methods. A letter was dictated to the British War Office. General Clark took 15 of his own officers to the meeting and, laughingly explains, "I was able to outvote them for the first time!"

General Clark then made arrangements to fly to North Ireland on Wednesday to look over the proposed training center. He will take Navy officers and members of his own staff with him.

Later, General Clark discussed with the British his plan for moving our 1st Division into the Poole area. The British, he says, "bucked a bit" but they acceded when he told them that unless he followed this plan he would be unable to relieve the British 38th Division, now holding the region. He added that all the anti-invasion installations in the Poole area would have to come out so the 1st Division could practice landings on the only available hard beach. The British agreed but said that defense of the area would be his problem. He replied he had no doubt he could solve it. So the Poole area is going to be used by the 1st Division.

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LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 3, 1942--The British Broadcasting System sends an announcer and technician down today to make transcriptions of a program that will be broadcast this coming Sunday night to the United States.

Twenty-three enlisted men and two officers participate. Half of them are interviewed on their reactions to England and their

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jobs. The remainder participate in a round-table, barber-shop discussion. Parents and friends of the soldiers participating will be notified that their men will be on the air. The program, which will be carried by 147 stations in the U.S., is known as "The Stars and Stripes in Britain." It is shortwaved to New York then relayed over longwave.

The first big batch of mail in several days arrives in the evening. Mail from home is so very important to everyone.

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LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 4, 1942--Plans for the TORCH (North African) operation are increasing in scope and momentum and General Clark is apprehensive that ROUNDUP, which he is charged with planning and executing, may be postponed until 1944, if not indefinitely.

That, the general explains, might be a "great calamity."

He is alarmed that TORCH will act as a sponge, taking away from his planned operation the necessary ships to transport his Ground Forces to the United Kingdom to prepare for the continental assault. If the TORCH operation is successful it may take more and more planes that would be training to support ROUNDUP; it would take away troop and cargo ships and naval vessels that would participate in the French Coast operation; and it might actually take away troops that are scheduled to participate in the opening phases of ROUNDUP.

The general is alarmed lest TORCH be executed at the expense of his mission and that it will leave him with insufficient air power to soften up the French Coast for the assault or without sufficient ships and men to undertake the operation successfully.

Two newspapermen and a newspaperwoman come to headquarters today. They are the first to show up since our arrival. The general chats in his office with Myron Berger of the New York Times, Paul Manning of N.E.A. and Maxine Davis of the Saturday Evening Post. He stresses to them the amicability of British-American troop relations and tells of the problem confronting negro troops arriving in England. Manning is going to do a "profile sketch" of the general while Berger is interested in writing a story about New York men over here--a "Brooklyn Bum in A Country Castle" theme along the lines of "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court." Miss Berger talks to both troops and Salisbury residents about the British-American relations.

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NORTHERN IRELAND, AUG. 5, 1942--The major amphibious training base for the Army Ground Forces in the European Theater of Operations is tentatively selected today as General Clark, members

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of his staff and Navy personnel inspect the North Irish Coast area between the mouth of Loch Foyle and the Bann River.

A United States Army cargo transport picks General Clark and his party up at the Oatfield RAF airdrome, near Salisbury, and it takes off for Ireland at 0806. We fly over parts of England where planes with the U.S. blue circle and white star haven't been seen before. The ship carries Very lights and a message flasher in case we are challenged. Several times Hurricanes and Spitfires climb up to inspect us, then dart away.

The weather is perfect until we hit the English Coast of the Irish Sea. The beautifully tilled and hedge-bordered fields pass beneath us in crazy-quilt patterns of deep greens, light browns, pea greens and amber browns. We pass over several airdromes and large towns, hitting the coast at 0914. General Clark spends most of his time forward with the pilot and co-pilot. He takes the controls for a while.

Over the Irish Sea we hit heavy overcast and have to climb to 7,000 feet to keep above it. Finally, the pilot, Captain Bradley, drops down through it and we are over the Isle of Man, exactly on our course. At 0956 we are over the Irish coastal islands and at 1016 we hit the Irish coast and thunder along in the bi-motored ship at an altitude of from 800 to 1,000 feet to keep under the low-hanging clouds.

For a time we lose our course and find we are flying over neutral Eire. If we had to put down we would be interned. We know we are the first U.S. warplane to fly over Eire! Finally, we hit the Atlantic Ocean and discover we are over Donegal Bay. We head northwest over the well-kept Irish farm country and at 1138 we arrive at an RAF airdrome, Englington, near Londonderry.

General Clark is met by Major General Hartle, commander of our Vth Army Corps. We are taken immediately by automobiles to the proposed amphibious area, 15 miles away. General Clark's party consists of Colonels Gale, Ferenbaugh, O'Daniel, Dabney and Lieutenant Beardwood. The navy men with us are Commander W.C. Ansel, operations officer under Admiral Bennett; Lieutenant Commander Shiler, construction officer, and Ensign Donovan.

The proposed amphibious area has 8,000 yards of beach with a 25-yard apron of hard packed sand that leads back to dunes covered with harsh grass and low bushes. The water, General Clark, finds, is deep enough for small boats and the area is so formed that ship-to-shore landings could be practiced. The necessary naval facilities are nearby.

General Clark is highly pleased with the area and says it is akin to the type of shoreline that our troops will run into when they attempt either SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP. At some spots the English, as anti-invasion defense, have installed pilings, pill

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boxes and barbed wire. Behind the beach, dunes stretch back until they become matted hillocks that would make good defensive positions against beach landings. The general stresses that there is a similarity between the neutralization problem here and the one that troops are likely to run into on the French coast.

The northwest end of the 8,000 yards of practical beach has about 1,000 yards of cliff where invasion troops will be able to fire ball ammunition as they make their practice assaults. The entire area is quite isolated, reachable only by narrow roads that already have sentries and tank blocks. The proposed region for landings has a six to eight foot tide. There is a sandbar across part of the landing area but General Clark says natural obstacles will make the training area even more valuable. North winds will whip the sea up, giving the troops practice in both rough and smooth water.

General Clark describes the area as "splendid" and he holds innumerable waterside conferences with Colonel O'Daniel, Colonel Ferenbaugh and General Hartle. They make tentative plans for bringing in the first unit for training--probably the 34th, part of General Hartle's Army Corps. After inspecting the area closely, the party, which is accompanied by Major Rawlins, a British officer on the staff of the North Ireland Command, goes to Coleraine for luncheon. They then go to the mouth of the Bann River, near the amphibious area, and the Navy experts say the region will be perfect for mooring small invasion craft. The party continues on to Londonderry, second largest city in North Ireland, and then returns to the airdrome at 1642.

Our plane, named the "Nazdarovia," takes off at 1709 and, before heading for England, we cruise over the area we have been inspecting all day on foot. The sandbar is easily seen from the area and it is marked in on the detailed maps we have with us.

During the trip home, members of the general's staff confer with the navy men on a rough table bolted to the floor in the tail of the plane. They sketch tentative installation and training plans as we fly over Belfast and start across the Irish Sea.

Once again the sight of an American plane over the area creates interest. The pilots get inquiry flashes from the ground and they reply with their signal lights. The code letter with which a friendly craft identifies itself changes every hour; so does the color of the friendly signal given by Very lights.

The plane alights at Salisbury at 1932 and the general and his staff drive to New Hall. The three Naval officers fly back to London. In an informal meeting with his staff, General Clark says the Loch Foyle region will suit the amphibious training purposes fine. Further conferences will be held with the Navy and ETO before the first training force is sent in for its six to nine week course that is scheduled to conclude with a mock invasion across 80 miles of the North Channel with an assault on the Scottish Coast.

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LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 6, 1942--The strange case of General Charles De Gaulle, tall, somber-faced leader of the Fighting French, was outlined today by General Clark as he recounted a meeting in London with the most enigmatic man of the war to date.

The British have been reluctant to give De Gaulle any highly secret information concerning their plans and the French Fighter, hoping to find something out, scheduled a conference with General Marshall just before the Second Front conferees left London on July 29. The British feel they can't trust De Gaulle because he is so eager to promote his own interests.

As he wanted to sidestep General De Gaulle's obvious attempt to circumvent the British and obtain secret plans, General Marshall had Admiral King and Generals Clark and Eisenhower and Brigadier General W.B. Smith attend the conference with De Gaulle in Admiral King's hotel room. The French general, realizing something was in the wind, wanted to find out about TORCH so he could be in on one of the biggest potential developments of the war. This would add stature to his hoped-for position of being the outstanding French post-war figure.

General De Gaulle was obviously displeased when he entered the hotel room and found that instead of being alone with General Marshall, four other American officers also were present. He shook hands limply with them and ignored them throughout the conference. The French general, tall, thin and gaunt, entered the hotel room with an aide-interpreter who was as drab as De Gaulle. The Fighting French leader shook hands with the officers "with a hand as cold and clammy as a spittoon," General Clark recounted. "It was evident that he wanted a private audience with General Marshall, that he resented our presence and that he felt General Marshall had let him down."

Admiral King, in honor of the French general, had ordered a bottle of champagne. A glass was poured for each man present but De Gaulle, who stared icily at everyone but General Marshall, didn't touch his drink.

De Gaulle told the Americans he was placing at their disposal the handful of French troops he has in England, French South Africa, New Caledonia, Syria and other possessions. In a deep voice, he told the officers with what joy the Fighting French would welcome the opening of a Second Front. He then asked General Marshall what he could tell him.

General Marshall told De Gaulle how America appreciated the fine work being done by the Free French. Admiral King then made an equally polite but secret-free speech. De Gaulle, obviously impatient and upset, said to General Marshall bluntly through his interpreter:

"Tell me about the Second Front plans!"

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Once again General Marshall spoke in generalities, omitting any reference to specific plans such as TORCH or ROUNDUP. Admiral King again took part of the conversational load off General Marshall. Soon De Gaulle found that he was going to get no specific information and told the Americans that he would "take no more of your time." He shook hands in the same fish-like way and, followed by his aide, "a stiff automaton who sat there parrot-like, repeating throughout the conference what General De Gaulle had said," marched out of the hotel room.

As soon as De Gaulle had left, General Marshall turned to the other officers and said: "Isn't that the most pathetic thing you've ever seen!" They then discussed De Gaulle's place, agreeing that he might have a keen military mind but that he was totally devoid of personality or leadership qualities.

General Clark described De Gaulle as: "Absolutely without personality and lacking any personal magnetism. He may be an excellent military expert but it was easy to see why he is the United Nations' problem child."

The group agreed that De Gaulle's collaboration and the co-operation of the liberty-loving people in France was essential. The revolt must be timed to coincide with our invasion and such plans eventually must be made.

General Clark, in recounting the meeting with De Gaulle, said there had been discussion concerning how the British raid on St. Nazarre was timed to coincide with a French uprising. The French rioted and shot German soldiers and police. When the big commando raid was over, The Germans shot hundreds of rioters and made every effort to crush their spirit.

"There's only one good revolt left in the French people," General Clark says. "It must be carefully timed to come with the opening of the Second Front so it will benefit our operation. We must drop weapons and ammunition by parachutes to them so they can be as effective as possible."

He said a tin .45 pistol that looks like a dime-store toy gun has been developed for supplying underground armies. It is extremely effective at close range. The guns, ammunition and other materiel will be dropped with instructions.

In the late afternoon today, Margaret Bourke-White, the famous American woman photographer, arrives to do series of pictures for Life magazine. She is accompanied by Lincoln Barnett, European news editor of Time magazine. Miss Bourke-White, who has already covered wars in Spain, China and Russia, wants to accompany General Clark's forces when the European invasion comes.

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54

LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 7, 1942--Thirty-nine newspapermen, representing the major United Nations news agencies and individual newspapers in London, New York, Boston, Kansas City and Chicago, had a mass interview today with General Clark in the lounge room at New Hall.

Following a buffet luncheon, the General was photographed in the garden. Then, sitting in a chair at the head of the lounge room, he faced reporters lounging before him in rows of folded chairs. In the audience were Americans, Britishers, Swedes, South Africans and Australians. The general told them that everything would be "on the record."

After explaining his command and that at present the only troops in England were service units, the general said this area would soon house "thousands upon thousands" of fighting troops. "American troops," the general said, "are not over here to sit on their back-ends on the defensive. We're here to take the offensive, and, the sooner the better as far as we are concerned."

*M.J. writes reaction*

He added that he was sorry but he could say nothing definite about the opening of the Second Front. He explained that his troops would concentrate on amphibious training and on Air-Ground cooperation. He told correspondents that the troops coming over were among the finest in the United States and that the training they would receive in Britain would be "specialist training for offensive operation." You can draw your own assumptions, it will include amphibious training."

American troops, he continued, will be toughened up by long marches--up to 25 miles--and that infantry will learn to advance with artillery fire breaking as close to them as possible. He warned that men would get hurt but that they must learn to have trust in their supporting units and work under realistic conditions.

*Save lives in combat*

He told British correspondents that he wanted to make his Ground Forces "as hard as the British soldiers who are hard, tough and fine." He said he was certain that present-day U.S. troops are far superior to those of the 1917-18 A.E.F. One of the present-day faults of armies, however, is that they are road-bound. "They want to ride to battle in trucks," the general said. "They're going to get out of that habit." The general also discussed Anglo-American relations, the problems presented by the arrival of negro troops and told the newspapermen of rationing problems.

He threw the conference open to questions and finally closed it by telling newspapermen he wanted no personal publicity. "I haven't commanded troops in battle yet," the general told them. "Until I have proven my fitness, the less said about me the better."

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55

Since the general has to prepare to depart for Scotland where he will greet the 1st Division, he has only time for more picture taking in the garden before he bids the newspapermen goodbye.

The party is then taken to the Castle headquarters, shown through the section offices and the art gallery. The newspapermen then choose what they want to do: inspect officers and troops quarters, interview enlisted men or browse around the headquarters area. They catch the 1642 train back to London.

During the morning, the general meets with Navy Officers and his Army Corps amphibious experts to outline to them his plans for amphibious training. The Navy and II Army Corps group will tour proposed areas at Poole, Appledore and in the Cornwall area during the next four days.

The general, accompanied by Colonels Adcock and Markoe and Lieutenant Barker, leaves at 1545 for Cheltenham to join General Lee who is also making the train trip to Scotland.

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GURROCK? SCOTLAND, AUG. 8, 1942--The 1st Division, less one battalion of the 16th Infantry which is already at Tidworth, arrives here this morning aboard the Queen Mary. The former crack liner, carrying more troops than any vessel has ever carried before, made a six-day dash across the Atlantic without any protection except for the first day out of New York and the last day out of Scotland.

Generals Clark and Lee go out to the ship aboard a lighter soon after dawn. As they draw alongside the troop-crammed transport, General Clark is astounded at the size of "the biggest thing I ever saw afloat." The Queen Mary has 15,045 persons aboard--the entire 1st Division, less one battalion, and the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion which is attached.

Men are sleeping everywhere. General Clark confers with General Terry Allen, 1st Division commander, and his high-ranking officers. General Allen reports that the morale of the men is high, that discipline has been good and that debarkation plans have been perfected. At dangerous spots on the voyage, every officer went below and stayed alongside his particular outfit.

General Clark goes ashore with the first lighter load of troops. At Gurrock, the 1st Division starts boarding trains for the long trip to Tidworth. General Clark watches them board. A Scottish band plays martial music and the American Red Cross furnishes the officers and men with hot tea, sandwiches and cakes.

The debarking from the Queen Mary and the train loading goes smoothly. General Clark remarks that the entire movement "reflects the discipline and morale of one of our best divisions.

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56

It is very foggy and rainy but General Clark stands on the docks and moves around the railroad station from 0700 to 1900, watching the debarkation and loading and talking to the enlisted men and officers. The general says he feels great pride as he watches this top-notch division, with which he had been closely associated as former Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, unload for early combat duty. He has no doubt that the 1st Division will play an important part in the forthcoming fight.

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LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 9, 1942--General Clark returns to II Army Corps headquarters following a night of train riding and an automobile trip to the Castle from Cheltenham. He immediately plunges into conferences with his sections chiefs regarding reception of the 1st Division at Tidworth. The conferees also discuss plans for getting the 1st into immediate training.

The conferences last throughout most of the afternoon, then the general, accompanied by some members of the general staff, go to Fyfield Manor, home of Minister of Agriculture and Mrs. Hudson, for tea. Discussion centers around a proposal that American troops, in small groups, help with the British harvest and supplement the labor shortages in localities where our troops will be stationed.

The II Army Corps officers and Naval officials touring the proposed amphibious training centers in Southern England report back to the general, concurring in his selections, particularly the Poole area where, tentatively, the 1st Division is scheduled to train. With the receipt of the report, the general is able to go ahead with plans for designating the necessary personnel, starting construction and making plans for troop movement to the various centers. A letter concerning this over-all amphibious training program is drafted for dispatch to the European Theater of Operations.

The North Ireland base, near Londonderry, definitely will be set up and preparations for the less training areas will be started as soon as necessary. Another group of Army Corps officers will fly to North Ireland to do additional reconnaissance and submit recommendations on the big amphibious base.

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LONDON, AUG. 10, 1942--London newspapers ran extensive stories today concerning American Ground Forces in England and about Major General Clark. The correspondents visited the general's headquarters near Salisbury last Friday. Comment included:

London Times--"Major General Clark...has established his headquarters in England...General Clark, at the age of 46, is a vigorous leader of striking personality. He impresses one as the typical democratic soldier, a man who readily gains the confidence of his men and inspires them to give their best. Almost his first remark today, when speaking to a party of British and American correspon-

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57

dents was: 'Obviously we are not over here to sit back and take the defensive; if you asked me about the second front, all I will say is, 'the sooner the better.' The troops coming over from the United States are, he is satisfied, well trained. They are picked men, and the training they do here will be specialist training for offensive operation, including amphibious warfare..."

London Daily Mirror--"...General Clark...aims to make every one of his men as hard as the British soldiers--'who are hard, tough and fine'...He said this yesterday as he sat in one of the rooms of a beautiful old English castle which is now his headquarters...This tall, pale, intensely live and active soldier is one of the youngest Major Generals in the U.S. Army. He holds one of the key commands and when the Allies attack in the West his responsibilities will be enormous. 'The sooner the better as far as we are concerned,' he said..."

London Daily Express--"Major General Clark, deep-voiced, 6 foot 3 inches tall, holding a command of the U.S. Ground Forces in the European Theater of Operations, greeted me at his H.Q. in England yesterday by saying: "American troops are not over here to sit on their back--ends on the defensive. We're here to take the offensive--the sooner the better, as far as we are concerned.'... This is a general who will have a great responsibility and enormous problems when the Second Front opens...'Our troops here are well-trained--better than the A.E.F. that went to France in the last war. I know what these troops can do.'..."

LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 10, 1942--General Clark leaves in the early morning for London where he is to meet with the Anglo-American command, possibly to discuss new phases of the TORCH operation. He lunches with General Eisenhower; Major General George R. Patton, tank warfare expert, and Lieutenant General Anderson who is with the British Middle East Forces.

The general returns to his headquarters late, then has dinner at his New Hall quarters in honor of Generals Loyd and Creagh. The original purpose of the dinner was to have the British generals meet General Eisenhower, but, as had happened twice before, General Eisenhower, buried with work in London and particularly busy because of a last-minute war-plan development, is unable to attend, so General Clark entertains the British generals despite the Theater Commander's absence.

LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 11, 1942--The entire picture of General Clark's command and his position in the war has changed! He is going to be Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the TORCH operation!!

It has been decided that TORCH is definitely on and that it will be the big Allied offensive of 1942. The War Department has

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cabled that TORCH must no longer be considered a minor operation to ROUNDUP. Instead, TORCH is now a substitute for ROUNDUP. The entire available resources of both the United States and Great Britain will be thrown into TORCH.

"I don't know what is going to happen to the II Army Corps command," the general explains. "General Eisenhower is being buried with demands on him. He wants me to be his Deputy Commander-In-Chief on the British-American TORCH expedition. The question was put up to me as to whether I wanted that job or whether I wanted to sit on a dead fish."

The general's decision was based on three factors: first, he felt he wanted to do what General Eisenhower wanted him to do--take second command of the African expedition; second, he did not want to run the risk of sitting the war out in a relatively inactive theater, despite the fact command of the II Army Corps would probably mean promotion to lieutenant general. Third, he felt that the decision was one of a combat or relatively non-combat command and he didn't want "to back away from fire."

The proposal that General Clark be made Deputy Commander-In-Chief of TORCH was put up to the Combined Commanders meeting in London yesterday. General Clark was accepted for the command and a cable so instructing the War Department was sent to Washington last night. From now on, General Clark will spend almost all his time in London, building up a staff for his part in the planning and execution of TORCH.

The general says it hurts him to think of giving up command of the II Army Corps but that he will be returning to it from time to time. Also, part of the Corps will participate in the Mediterranean Coast phase of the African invasion so his finger will remain, more or less, on the Corps' pulse. Nothing will be said for the time being about the general's new job. If such an announcement were made, the immediate query is going to be "what is he going to do?" and that would not help the security of the TORCH operation.

Composition of the joint American-British staff to direct TORCH will begin immediately. It will mean the drafting of many good officers from the II Army Corps headquarters, the European Theater of Operations staff and the Service of Supply. The general has already begun to consider what men he wants for this all-important task.

W4 I took large corp's staff

Major General George R. Patton will command the American Army Corps that will make the African invasion from the Atlantic, landing in the vicinity of Casablanca. The general praises him highly and tells of his amicable relations with General Patton while General Clark was Chief of Staff of the Army Ground Forces.

Command of the British half of TORCH has changed three times in the past four days! The man handling the British end of the operation--and who will be working under General Eisenhower who

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59

will be Commander-In-Chief of TORCH--will be Lieutenant General Anderson.

At the start, General Auchinleck had complete command of the British Middle East campaign. Then it was felt that the load was too great for one man so Lieutenant General Alexander was designated to assist him. Because of the growing importance of the African operation, it was then decided to send Lieutenant General W.H.E. Gott down to take command of the British 8th Army. However, General Gott's plane was shot down and he was killed while flying to his new command.

British Lieutenant General Montgomery had been designated to take over active command of the British phases of TORCH but he was relieved, because of General Gott's sudden death, and assigned to command the 8th Army. That left the TORCH assignment open again and it was given yesterday to General Anderson.

"I hope," smiles General Clark, "that the turnover on American generals won't be that fast!"

Because of the TORCH development, General Clark confers with Colonel Ferenbaugh and orders him to arrange for the 1st Division to begin ship-to-shore amphibious training immediately. Parts of the 34th Division, now in North Ireland, must also have this type of training so they can join with the 1st and British forces in invading the Mediterranean Coast of Africa.

"This means a complete change in the original plans for training of the 1st Division," the general says. "It looks as though it won't be able to go into the Poole area and relieve the British 38th Division. The 1st can't be involved in coast defense responsibilities if it is going to be used in TORCH by the end of October.

"Hence, I must find another amphibious training site where I can house the 1st Division and give it ship-to-shore training where it won't be burdened by relieving a British division. That site probably will be the Appledore region."

During the day, General Clark goes to the Southern Command headquarters to tell General Loyd of some of the sudden developments and advise him what it is going to mean in the general scheme of having American troops relieve British in the Southern Command area.

Regarding his new job as Deputy Commander-In-Chief of the African invasion, General Clark says he foresees the necessity of returning to the United States two or three weeks before General Patton's forces are ready to leave from the United States for a direct assault on the coast near Casablanca.

"The two operations (that is, the American attack on the Atlantic coast and the Anglo-American attack on the ~~Atlantic coast~~)

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Mediterranean coast) must be synchronized carefully and I must satisfy General Eisenhower and myself that preparations are going right and that the American attacking force leaving the United States is set to perform its mission."

The general receives a cable from the national convention of the Military Order of the Purple Heart through which delegates extend him their felicitations. The general, replying by letter, tells the National Commander of his appreciation, then writes:

"I am very proud to be able to wear the Purple Heart. I have many wearers of this decoration in my command, all of whom are eager to get this great allied effort under way. All other members of my command are anxious to get at grips with the enemy in order that we can bring to our country the success it deserves. I am sure that before this affair is over there will be many more candidates for the Military Order of the Purple Heart for we intend to go where the bullets are flying and not sit back here on the defensive."

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We see our first German planes this afternoon!

Two Focke-Wolfe's come roaring over the Castle Area at 1623. Almost half our officers and enlisted men are out under the trees taking gas mask training. The planes, traveling at a terrific speed, go right over our heads but the pilots can't spot them because of the foliage so they miss a prime chance. About two miles from the Castle, the Focke-Wolfe's dump two bombs, one falling near the Salisbury railroad station and the other at the edge of town. The pilots machine-gun the streets, hitting only one military objective, a petrol tank-truck.

The German raid was unusual in two ways. First, the planes hedge-hopped all the way in from the English Channel--22 miles--without an alarm being turned in until our troops spotted them from the Castle towers. Normally, the English air raid alarm system is very effective. The planes were going so fast the anti-aircraft batteries around us didn't have a chance to get their guns in firing position. Second, the Germans came in very clear weather. Usually they come over to bomb when it is cloudy, even rainy. The barrage balloons in Salisbury weren't up.

The first sight of Germans causes quite a stir around the camp!

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LONGFORD CASTLE, AUG. 12, 1942--Working at top-speed to clear up as much work as possible before he leaves for his new post, General Clark prepares to leave his II Army Corps headquarters. He probably will return only infrequently to the Castle since his new headquarters will be in London.

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In mid-morning he goes to Tidworth to make a welcoming talk to the 1st Division. However, just before he arrives, the division, which has been massed in Tidworth stadium, is dispersed because the British, jittery about yesterday's surprise bombing by the Germans, do not believe so many men should congregate in one spot at the same time. The general, accompanied by General Allen and Colonel Rooks, tours the 1st Division staging area. Troops, lean and strong looking, are marching back to their quarters by companies. The general is pleased with their morale and the military bearing of the newly-arrived men. While at Tidworth, Colonel Rooks, who will be carrying a large share of the II Army Corps load now that General Clark has a double-barreled assignment, gets word that the President has sent his nomination for a brigadier generalcy to the Senate. General Clark is delighted.

General Clark leaves for London at 1120 to start work on his new task as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of TORCH. Immediately, he goes into conference with General Eisenhower and finds that the War Department has cabled back approval of his African invasion assignment. He also is to retain command of the II Army Corps, at least for the time being.

Following a conference with ETO, SOS, Navy and British officers, the general sets up his headquarters in Norfolk House. The bare skeleton of a staff is here. Throughout the afternoon there are conferences with General Anderson, the top British officer on TORCH; Brigadier General Jimmy Doolittle, the bomber of Tokyo; General Lee, and others. According to General Clark, General Anderson is "very apprehensive" about the sagacity of doing TORCH. The crux of the invasion is what the French in Tunisia will do. The French are reported to have 150,000 troops in the area where the principal assault is to be made.

In the evening General Clark dines with General Eisenhower. The working schedule of both generals is terrific. General Clark says he feels as though he is "sitting on a thousand volcanoes."

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LONDON, AUG. 13, 1942--Brigadier General Doolittle, one of the most famous of the "aviation-era" personalities and the man who led the first bombing raid of Tokyo, is going to have charge of United States Air Force units that will participate in Torch.

That decision is made today by General Clark, who, as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of TORCH, has been given power by General Eisenhower to make his own decisions, pick his personnel and merely report what is being done to the Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower.

General Clark conferred with Doolittle today. The flier was called in to discuss TORCH. General Clark outlined the plan and then asked Doolittle:

"Who do you think should handle the air end of this?"

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"That's a pretty tough one to answer, general," said Doolittle. "There are a lot of good men..."

"Do you think you're one of them?"

"Well...Yes sir! I think I'm the man for the job," replied Doolittle.

"You're it! Get going!" shot back the general.

General Doolittle was flabbergasted at the quickness of General Clark's decision. Later that afternoon the general informs General Eisenhower of Doolittle's appointment. Most of the aircraft for TORCH will come from the Air Support Command of General Spaatz.

General Clark keeps a racehorse schedule all day, dashing over to the European Theater of Operations headquarters twice to talk to General Eisenhower. When the general is at Norfolk House, one long conference after another is held in his office while phone men and carpenters wait in the hall outside to complete installation work. The principal conferees are Generals Clark, Patton, Doolittle, Guenther and Lieutenant General Anderson, Admiral Ramsey and Vice-Air Marshall Welsh, the latter three British. General Anderson is doing a lot of bucking.

An important after-dinner conference is held in the evening. General Clark makes the following statement on opening the meeting. It is typical of him in its directness and brevity:

"I have asked you gentlemen to come here in order to meet you, to let you look me over, and to tell you that I know you crave information. I am probably more confused than you are at this moment but hope to get this operation clear in my own mind and be able to make decisions as they are presented to me.

"First I want to make it clear that as Deputy Commander under General Eisenhower, I have been given full power by him to make decisions and issue orders in his name. This should facilitate our business. Please let us make it clear now that all matter affected towards operation which you think are decisions for the Commander-in-Chief are to be taken up with me, or, in my absence, General Geunther, instead of presenting them to General Eisenhower.

"Organization is our first problem. By tomorrow I will have heard each section chief's requirements for American personnel and will have made decisions as to what officers will be available to them. We have ample talent in the Theater, SOS and Ground Force headquarters. I have no compunctions about pulling any of these people away from those staffs providing we do not totally disrupt them in so doing.

"I have a little information on decisions made today. I will ask General Geunther to read you a cablegram which has been sent to General Marshall. (This cable concerned needed equipment for the Torch operation).

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"I know that General Anderson is anxious to get a mission and directive given him. So is General Eisenhower. However, in the absence of instructions from higher levels, directives for important subordinate commanders will be prepared and issued to you immediately on the assumption that the plans presented to General Eisenhower are approved.

"General Anderson--the two American regimental combat teams which are to be made available to you can be made. At the present time I will take, after discussion with you, the necessary steps to have them reinforced as you desire. We can talk this over at a later time.

"Vice-Air Marshall Welsh--I am prepared to discuss with you your planning set-up. I will see you at your convenience.

"Admiral Ramsey--I have talked with Admiral Biery and have laid the ground work for an appropriate naval officer and staff to be made available to you in this plan.

"General Gale--(British)--I am sorry I missed you today. I want to talk to you about your set-up."

General Patton, the United States expert on tank warfare, is sitting in on every conference. He will soon return to the United States to carry the plans to General Marshall and begin preparing for the final training and departure of American units that will go straight from the United States into the TORCH operation.

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LONDON, AUG. 14, 1942--The terrific problems of and preparations for TORCH begin to come out in the open today.

Because of the lack of equipment for the 1st Division, it appears certain that combat teams of the 34th Division, instead of the 1st, will operate in TORCH alongside the British.

A difference of opinion is arising between the British and American TORCH leaders over use of the American Air Force.

The TORCH plan has been changed. The American invasion force that will come directly over from the United States under General Patton is going to attack in the vicinity of Oran, on the Mediterranean, instead of at Casablanca, on the Atlantic Coast. The first objective of that force will be to establish beachheads and secure airdromes. General Doolittle's Air Force will be in direct support of the ground forces under General Patton. The combined Anglo-British force will attack in the Bone-Algiers vicinity.

General Clark confers with General Allen of the 1st Division and they decide it probably will be impossible to employ the 1st in TORCH because of its late arrival in the United Kingdom and because its equipment is not yet here. As a safeguard for the possible use

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64

of the 1st Division, General Clark cables Washington to find out what is holding up the division's equipment and urging that its shipment be speeded. The 34th Division, at present in North Ireland under General Hartle, probably will take the spot originally set for the 1st.

Regarding the difference of opinion over use of American air units, General Anderson, believing the British-American force landing in the Bone area will be subjected to heavier Axis attack, is dissatisfied with the air support being given him, particularly the light number of bombers. He admits the United States will have enough planes for the Oran operation but he says there will be no U.S. surplus for the British operation at Bone and Algiers. General Clark directs General Anderson and Vice-Air Marshall Welch to get together on the British requests and see if they can't provide sufficient air power from British sources.

Generals Clark, Patton and Allen oppose the attempt by the British to divert some of the United States Air Force to the British attack area. "We must not," General Clark reports to General Eisenhower, "be placed in a position where it will be necessary for us to lessen the chances of success at Oran in order to make up for British deficiencies. After operational bases for aircraft have been established in Africa, the command can decide as to the employment of both United States and British air units, depending on the situation at that time."

It is decided that there will be separate British and United States staffs for the air operations with liaison being carried on with the RAF for the United States by General Doolittle, deputy commander of air operations for the entire TORCH operation, and Colonel Vandenburg. The first priority of the operation will be the seizure of airdromes.

General Anderson is told that one combat team of the 34th will train in North Ireland for the invasion while the other team will use a base in Scotland. General Clark phones General Ryder, commander of the 34th Division, and tells him to come to London so he can confer with General Anderson.

The British report they can handle the problem of transporting both the British and American troops from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean. Admiral Ramsey says the British have several warships leaving tomorrow for the Mediterranean and he wants to send down six large, motor-powered invasion barges so they can be convoyed to a Mediterranean parking spot. General Clark objects vigorously, declaring the movement of the invasion barges at this time will impair the security of TORCH. The British naval official points out that the weather between England and the Straits of Gibraltar is likely to be bad and the sea rough in the late fall and that it would be better for the barges to go now. General Clark finally agrees to let three of the barges go by tomorrow's convoy since the British moved two others down on a previous

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occasion and the movement of three might not be interpreted as being significant.

A United States Navy delegation is instructed to come from Washington to London so it can confer with Admiral Ramsey and the British admiralty about the TORCH problems. It is recommended that a U.S. Flag Officer be sent so he can remain here to work with Admiral Ramsey after the delegation returns to the United States. General Patton is informed that the movement of his invasion force will be under command of the navy from the time it embarks until the men go over the side to attack.

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LONDON, AUG. 15, 1942--Because of the shipping problem and the necessity of giving TORCH every priority, General Clark decides today that not more than 50,000 troops per month will move from the United States to the United Kingdom for the next six months.

This figure is set following discussion of the amount of shipping necessary for the supply of American forces in the British Isles while TORCH is in progress. The 50,000 per month figure is set for Services of Supply planning purposes. In addition to taking care of General Patton's All-American force in TORCH and the U.S. contingent that will be with General Anderson's British troops in the Algiers-Bone area attack. Details of what supply General Patton's force will need will be worked out by his staff when he returns to the United States.

Another Britain-bound United States troop convoy is leaving the United States August 19 and it will include 7,000 additional troops for the II Army Corps. These troops will be selected on the basis of their applicability to TORCH.

Colonel O'Daniel reports to General Clark that he can start amphibious training by September 1 but General Clark wants to confer with General Anderson before a definite date is set for the start of training. General Clark tells his amphibious expert of the change in plans, how the 34th is taking the place of the 1st Division and that one combat team will be trained in North Ireland and the other in Scotland. General Anderson says he is ready to take over training of the infantry combat teams at any time. The United States training center will be in North Ireland and the other, in Scotland, will be a British-operated base. The British will furnish some of the staff and part of the boat crews for the North Ireland base.

Major Carver, military assistant to General Ismay of the British War Cabinet, requests comments on the cover plan of TORCH and makes arrangements to bring over Mr. Mack of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has been appointed head of the Political Section of TORCH. He is to be attached to the expeditionary force planning group and will handle plans of a non-military

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nature that will arise in connection with the future operation. He will be required to make plans for dealing with administrative and other problems that will arise in the occupied territory after the opening of operations.

General Ismay is anxious to present the views of the American Command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the British War Office. Ismay says the target date of TORCH should not be postponed. Brigadier Mock<sup>ter</sup>-Ferryman, the British staff G-2, tells General Clark he thinks it would be unwise to use code names in connection with Algiers, Bone and Oran. He says a code system has been considered impractical by the British since many code words would have to be listed and officers would have to be provided with the code in order to carry on their work. General Clark agrees and rules that no code words, except TORCH, will be used.

The Air Support problem raised by the British is being ironed out. Air Vice-Marshal Welch has presented an estimate of requirements for the Algiers-Bone operation to the Air Ministry which is at present considering it.

The streets of London are sprinkled with American soldiers tonight. Many of the newly-landed troops, most of them with the 1st Division, have their first leaves, since it is a weekend, and they flock to London, gushing out of every train that has come up from the Salisbury-Andover region.

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LONDON, AUG. 16, 1942--The British Foreign Office expert who is the political officer on the TORCH staff believes that when the attack comes Vichy will order the French in the North African area to fight "and they undoubtedly will do so."

General Clark instructs the political officer, Mr. Mack, to make the necessary contacts, arrange for his own personnel and organization and set up an office as part of the TORCH headquarters.

The organization of TORCH now shapes up as follows: the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief will include a combined Anglo-American general staff, a combined air section and a combined administrative and supply section. The Commander-in-Chief in an operation of this scope cannot avoid direct concern in many phases of supply and administration because of the tremendous importance that will lay in both land and sea communications. The British are turning over their best man in that field--General Gale. His deputy will be Colonel E.S. Hughes of the U.S.A.

Political, intelligence, supply and air staff sections will be headed by British officers. Americans will head operations, personnel and a number of technical services. General Clark has this staff rapidly organizing and efficiently working.

At the beginning of the operation the following will be dir-

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ectly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief: British Army Commander, British Naval Support Commander, British Air Force Commander, American Army Commander who will also command U.S. Air Units, and the American Naval support commander. After the landings have been completed and the operation is well under way, a single naval commander might be set up for the entire command. It is also possible that after the initial position has been consolidated and strategic air units become available, a single air commander may be designated.

Either General Clark or General Eisenhower will go to Gibraltar by air when TORCH is ready to start. They will arrive on the date the first convoy passes the strait. When a substantial landing has been effected, the main headquarters group will go south by water and set up either at Algiers or Oran, preferably the first. In order to avoid the issuance of additional orders for a number of months after TORCH starts, General Clark suggests that General Marshall revise the southern boundary of the TORCH theater to include Africa down to the equator. The Commander-in-Chief would then be free to act and control events. After TORCH is solidly underway, a new theater probably will be established and the European Theater will be turned over to another man. General Lee is suggested. The present organization of the European Theater of Operations will remain as it is for the present except that eventually, another officer will be appointed to take General Clark's place as head of the II Army Corps staff.

As a sidelight, following is an extract from a secret message submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff by the commanding general of Gibraltar:

"If Gibraltar is made use of on more than a very small scale before operations commence it will be practically impossible to conceal that some form of operation is being mounted. There is no doubt that any evidence in this direction will cause profound concern to the Spanish authorities. It is urgently desirable that TORCH should not only have initial success but should not lose momentum; otherwise the temptation to the Spaniards, if we find ourselves held up or in difficulties, might be too great to resist. I cannot overstress the importance of concealing our objective from the Spanish government and, above all, of reassuring them convincingly and rapidly should their suspicions be aroused. Both the naval base and the air station would go out of commission completely and at once should Spain decide to attack."

Generals Clark and Eisenhower decide that every possible step will be taken to avoid arousing suspicion in the Gibraltar area. The hazards are too great since the attitude of Spain is of great importance to the success of TORCH.

Today is another day filled with conferences for General Clark. He calls in General Allen and some members of the 1st Division staff and they discuss the relative availability of combat teams of the 1st and 34th Divisions. General Marshall has cabled

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68

that all of the 1st's equipment has been shipped and that it will all arrive in England before August 20 with the exception of three ships--one coming the 23rd of August, another the 27th. The third vessel, the William Mc Clay, which has carrying 11 105's, 10 155's and 24 Self-Propelled guns for the first, has run aground off Newfoundland. Replacements for these pieces have been expressed to the Port of Embarkation and should reach the 1st Division by August 31. Colonel Hamblen is to figure when the 1st Division would be ready for training and combat. He says the British estimate it will take three weeks to load the vessels for the expedition. General Allen requests permission to accompany his combat teams if they go with General Anderson's force but General Clark is non-committal as yet. Colonel Hamblen estimates the 1st can't be ready before Oct. 7.

General Patton will be responsible for both air and ground operations in the sector where his straight-from-America troops are going to attack. General Doolittle, who will direct command of the U.S. Air Forces in the operation, has been instructed that air as well as ground will be under General Patton.

General Ryder, commander of the 34th Division, is down for conferences and he tells General Clark he could prepare two combat teams from his division for movement, with equipment, within five days.

Proper headquarters during the initial stages of TORCH are discussed. General Anderson believes he should be at Gibraltar during the movement of the convoy and that he should join his command by destroyer or air as soon as a foothold has been gained ashore. General Clark says he must go to Washington and confer with General Patton about mid-September so that all arrangements can be completed satisfactorily. Brigadier General Truscott, now in England with General Patton, is to remain here temporarily when General Patton goes to the United States. Truscott will represent Patton and take care of arrangements at this end. Brigadier General Lemnitzer has been made TORCH Anti-Aircraft officer. He will also serve as deputy chief of staff.

Headquarters Combined Operations does not want landing craft used in the invasion to be used in training. Under these conditions only one U.S. combat team can be trained. One British Brigade group will have to be substituted in General Anderson's force. General Anderson indicates he would like a few additional U.S. troops in his contingent, not to be used in an assault role but to indicate to the French a more extensive American participation in the Algiers expedition than is actually true. General Anderson and General Ryder will be conferring to work out details in connection with the movement of the combat team from North Ireland to the British amphibious training area. No landing craft is yet available in North Ireland.

Communications are pouring back and forth between our headquarters and the War Department. General Marshall says he is pushing preparations to meet the October 1 sailing date which, he says,

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69

appears the earliest practicable time. The Navy thinks it can provide enough fighter escort for the Oran force, also escort for the second convoy which will be at sea at the time the original landing is made.

General Marshall cables that "there is unanimity of opinion of Army officers here (Washington) that the proposed operation appears hazardous to the extent of less than a 50 percent chance for success. This is an immediate and somewhat superficial view as we do not know the details of the British carrier support proposed. Also, to what extent are you prepared to meet possible German air assaults launched from Spain or Spanish Morocco. Give me your completely frank view and a similarly frank expression from Patton."

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LONDON, AUG. 17, 1942--Generals Clark, Eisenhower and Patton cable General Marshall that their consensus is that the African Coast operation will be a success "if Spain remains absolutely neutral and the French offer only token resistance or are so badly divided by internal dissension and by Allied political maneuvering that the effect of their resistance will be negligible."

Such conditions, the three generals agree, would give TORCH "more than fair chances of success."

"It is our opinion," the generals state after a conference on General Marshall's cable of yesterday, "that Spain will stay neutral at least during the early stages. We think there will be considerable resistance from certain sections of the French and that the Algiers operation at best will have less than 50 percent chances of success. If Spain enters in the results can be serious."

Sufficient naval and air support is imperative. Reports show the French have about 500 planes in Africa. These are not modern but they are superior to the normal types on British and American carriers. Present plans call for 160 Anglo-British naval planes to support the landing. The other planes will have to be land-based at Gibraltar. Good weather is going to be a prime invasion factor.

The French are reported to have 14 divisions in French Africa but they are poorly equipped. "If the French make a determined and unified stand," the generals cable General Marshall, "and if they strongly resist the initial landing, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their forces against either of the major points, they can seriously interfere with, if not prevent, a landing at the chosen points. A French concentration of forces would hamper the initial objective of TORCH--seizing control of the north shore of Africa before Axis reinforcements can be brought up." The possibility of the Spanish army striking, particularly if things do not go on schedule, must also be considered, the general add.

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The general set the following up as the Air Force requirements of the American side of TORCH: two heavy bomber groups, two single-engine fighter groups, two twin-engine fighter groups, one light bomber-reconnaissance squad, two transport groups. All these units are now in the United Kingdom or enroute here. Additional units now in the United States are required for TORCH as follows: one B-25 bomber group, two B-26 medium-bomber groups, one light bomber group. It is imperative, the general cables, that the air echelon of medium and light bomber groups now in the United States arrive in the United Kingdom not later than October 1. Ground echelons of these groups must be included in convoys from the U.S. direct to the TORCH area. They will come over with General Patton's forces.

General Clark confers with Generals Allen and Ryder. Allen is instructed to alert one of his combat teams for prompt movement to the amphibious training area. General Ryder designates the 168th Infantry combat team for amphibious training, saying this unit has a strong commander and excellent personnel. It still hasn't been definitely decided whether the American combat team operating alongside General Anderson's British army in TORCH will come from the 1st or the 34th Division. General Clark is making every effort to get the 1st's equipment off the ships in the least possible time. In event the target date is set back and the equipment has arrived, it is still possible that the combat team of the 1st Division may be substituted for that of the 34th. General Allen is informed that the plans call for units of the 1st Division to go to Inveraray for training as soon as the 34th Division units vacate. Some personnel from the 1st Division can be trained at the same time as the combat team from the 34th Division. Colonel O'Daniel is instructed that he and his staff will go to Inveraray to assist in training of the 34th Division. Colonel Hughes is instructed to get Ryder's combat team moved and the SOS is told to work fast on getting combat equipment for the 1st Division.

TORCH operations involving the All-American force under General Patton, proposed composition of convoys and the schedule of arrival for the various units is gone into during a conference between General Clark and General Patton. The need for hospital ships to accompany the first convoy is stressed. General Patton himself plans to be on the Admiral's ship and to go ashore as early as possible.

General Clark confers again with intelligence and political section leaders. He tells Mr. Mack that the French should be permitted, in civil matters, to retain nominal control, if possible. Mr. Mack should function more or less in the background. Regarding the obtaining of intelligence reports from Spain, Brigadier General Mc Clure, our military attache in London, tells General Clark he thinks it would be dangerous to have the attache to Madrid come to London at this time. No decision was reached, pending G-2 reports.

The proposed amphibious training centers in the Southwest of England are going to be prepared for use despite immediate plans for TORCH.

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71

LONDON, AUG. 18, 1942--Physical gears that will get TORCH into action begin to mesh today. Orders are issued for the movement tomorrow of a 34th Division combat team from Ireland to Scotland so it can begin training for the part it is scheduled to take in the North African invasion. General Patton is returning to the United States to start things rolling on the training and movement of his All-American force that will move directly from the United States to the attack area.

The 34th Division combat team will be moved by British transportation authorities. It will begin pulling out of its North Ireland base at dawn. The British have agreed to supply bread and meat components of the ration while the combat team is under training, probably six weeks. The 1st Division will remain as an invasion force possibility. Colonel Hughes is working on plans so the 1st will receive its equipment quickly as soon as the cargo boats reach port.

Both General Clark and General Eisenhower are eager for General Patton to return to the United States so the desert warfare expert can begin assembling units that will be under his important command. Colonels Larkin and Truscott will remain here for the time being to take care of any problems that might arise from this end concerning the American TORCH force.

Although General Clark now has a command more important and pressing than his II Army Corps command, which he still retains despite being Deputy Commander-in-Chief of TORCH, it is possible that the two jobs may be used. In order to prepare for the possible use of the II Army Corps in the TORCH theater, General Clark has Colonel Rooks come up from Longford Castle to make arrangements for the prompt movement of the Corps staff if necessary. Secrecy is still paramount since not even the Army Corps officer must know of the new development. Colonel Rooks is instructed to prepare requirements for personnel, equipment and transportation. He is also told that development of the Combined Training Areas in southern England should continue. Another matter on which the Corps must concentrate is the training of the 1st Division, preparing for its possible use in the new theater. Lieut. Colonel Ramsey of the II Army Corps is selected by General Clark as the commandant of his new headquarters. He will head up all planning in connection with the size, composition, location and protection of this headquarters. "Allied Force Headquarters" has been adopted tentatively as its title. Because of its vital position in invasion-planning and the need for security, steps are taken to make Norfolk House accessible to only those officers connected with TORCH.

Unusual activity at Gibraltar will cause suspicion so General Clark orders Colonel Matejka, the signal officer, to clear every shipment of material to the fortress-island through him. Quarters in Gibraltar are going to be very cramped and the amount of material shipped there must be dispatched strictly on the basis of necessity.

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72

General Clark believes that the civil government that will be established in North Africa after our landing has been made must be headed by an American, rather than a Britisher. The general feels it would be unwise for civil affairs to operate under Mr. Mack since one of the prime reasons for the use of American troops is the anti-British feeling among the French.

Admiral Burroughs, the British naval officer who led the much-battered but successful convoy through to beleaguered Malta two weeks ago, comes in to see General Clark. He is a husky, stern-looking man with light blue eyes. He tells the general of the tremendous difficulties he had moving through the Mediterranean to much-bombed Malta. The Axis started bombing and torpedoing the convoy as soon as it nosed through the Straits of Gibraltar. Admiral Burroughs' flagship was hit and he got aboard another ship. He lost the aircraft carrier Eagle and another carrier was damaged. One cruiser was sunk and two crippled.

Of the 14 merchant ships entering the Mediterranean, five reached Malta. The admiral had set a goal of getting half the convoy through but the mission was still successful, despite the losses, because now Malta has enough food to last her until January. Perhaps by that time the Allies will have control of the Mediterranean. The Germans and Italians were all set to attack the convoy. They knew it had to come through or the people of Malta would starve. The moon was right for a "black" crossing so the Axis partners were primed for action the moment the convoy got inside the Straits.

The general realizes an air and submarine attack awaits American and British troop ships when they start to execute TORCH. Admiral Burroughs predicts rather light air resistance as far east as Algiers. He believes the principal difficulty--just as it was with his convoy--will be submarines. E-boats, he believes, will not be an important factor. Like General Clark, Admiral Burroughs believes Gibraltar should be used as little as possible to assemble men and materiel for TORCH.

This evening General Clark is the dinner guest of General Ismay, military advisor to Prime Minister Churchill, at the British general's apartment. General Ismay seems somewhat apprehensive about TORCH and questions General Clark for his reactions. The Prime Minister is sold completely on the sagacity of TORCH. The general's theory about TORCH is, he tells General Ismay:

"We've got our assignment. Let's execute it. Discussion of it is unnecessary."

The British Commandos pull another raid on the French Coast tonight. General Clark had been invited and he asked for the chance to go. But he was told it was too hazardous an operation for a man in his position. Observes the general, grinning: "I think I'd welcome something as quiet as a commando raid after the firing I'm facing at the office every day!"

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73

The following is an excerpt from the official minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting held at the British War Cabinet Offices July 25, 1942:

"General Marshall agreed that this (Prime Minister Churchill's suggestion that the supreme commander of TORCH be an American) would be desirable and said that the U.S. would be prepared to furnish a Supreme Commander. He had been considering which U.S. troops would be allocated to the operation. The 1st Division now in process of moving to Great Britain could be made available for the operation against the North Coast, to furnish the spearhead of the operation under British Command. General Clark, who is the C corps Commander here and one of the best American officers, might be used with his Corps staff if ROUNDUP was abandoned."

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LONDON, AUG. 19, 1942--Major developments in preparation for TORCH are piling one on top of the other now as the plan begins to take more definite form. These vital matters are disposed of today:

1--The European Theater of Operations is extended to include most of North Africa, or, specifically, all land and adjacent sea areas east of 20 degrees West Longitude, north of the Tropic of Cancer, and west of 15 degrees, East Longitude. This decision, cabled from General Marshall, gives the planners of TORCH more freedom for operations should they become necessary.

2--The question of air support is becoming more concrete. The necessary number of U.S.-British planes for TORCH is set at 1,200 craft. The British now are firm as to the number of aircraft to be used and have worked out a tentative plan for their use. The U.S. Air Force for the operation is not definitely set as yet but a schedule of requirements has been submitted to Washington.

3--Colonels Bentley and Vandenberg, and possibly General Hansell, are going to fly to Gibraltar next week so they can inspect facilities for the staging of aircraft. To prevent suspicion, they will wear British uniforms and go in a British plane. General Clark discusses with Colonel Bentley matters concerning the training of transport crews with the parachute troops they will carry.

4--Radio propaganda to "soften up" the French in North Africa and make them more receptive toward the Anglo-American task force is discussed. Mr. W.H.B. Mack wants to set up a special station at Gibraltar but General Clark tells him that can not be done for security reasons. A new station in England, directing its beam to North Africa, will be ready in about two weeks, Mr. Mack says. The political advisor on TORCH requests an American assistant for his own section so the man can be used for production of U.S. propaganda. At present the propaganda going out is entirely British in its context and approach.

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5--General Clark, General Gale and Mr. Mack agree that planning for the administration of civil affairs in North Africa should be handled by an American and Mr. Mack agrees it should be separate from his political section. The job, General Clark says, calls for an American who is well-known in the diplomatic field. He is forwarding such a request to Washington.

6--General Patton completes his London conferences. Upon departure for the United States where he will begin assembling the Oran force, he is given a secret directive outlining every phase of TORCH. (This paper is so secret that it will be picked up and inserted in this diary after the TORCH operation is well-underway.

The 1st Division may still have one combat team in TORCH. Colonel Hughes reports to General Clark on the progress being made and General Allen recommends that in addition to the one proposed combat team of the 1st that an anti-aircraft battery and a reconnaissance platoon be attached. The 1st Division combat team is not going to draw any equipment from the 34th; its own is to be delivered to it as soon as it arrives in the United Kingdom.

Just what combat teams will be used is not yet definite but a cable is sent to General Marshall stating: "Remembering the tremendous importance of the time factor and the proper stage of the moon, it is considered highly inadvisable for our concrete preparations to risk delaying the operation merely in the hope of utilizing the combat team from the 1st Division rather than the 34th Division. Each day that passes is a day of additional risk with regard to secrecy and secrecy is vital to success. This fact, coupled with the possibility that the enemy may soon possess greater freedom of strategic movement than at present, has led us to intensify efforts to achieve an early execution." Everything is set for the 34th Division combat team to move to its training area at Inverary, Scotland. Colonel O'Daniel and his staff leave London for the amphibious base tonight.

The question of air operations and personnel is further clarified. Air Vice-Marshal Welch and General Anderson are worried about bomber support and General Clark assures them that the entire air strength, both American and British, should be regarded as a unit to be used under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief. However, General Clark tells Welch that if the British foresee a weakness in the air support for the Bone-Algiers landing they should take necessary steps to obtain additional craft from British sources before the operation starts. General Clark informs the British officers that General Patton is sacrificing his shipping space--which he might have used for ground troops--in order to obtain the necessary air support for his scheduled attack in the Oran region.

General Clark discusses the air operations command with General Doolittle and General Hansell. Colonel Vandenberg will be Doolittle's Operational Chief of Staff and General Hansell will remain at head-

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quarters. The use of parachute troops at Oran is discussed and it is decided tentatively that Colonel Bentley will command the air transport squadrons and that Major Yarborough of the II Army Corps will come to London to plan details of the parachute attack. The first troop transport probably will attempt to land on the Oran airport. While it goes down, the remaining transports will circle overhead. If the first plane gets in without any serious opposition, the others will land. If there is any fight, the pilot of the lead paratroop plane is to crash his craft into any enemy planes that might be on the field. Paratroopers in the other planes will then bail out and come down fighting.

General Clark, able at last to see that TORCH is shaping up, has General Eisenhower and four other officers to his flat in Hays Mews for dinner. Because of the food shortage situation, General Eisenhower brings the 'piece de resistance,' a ham shipped to him from the United States!"

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LONDON, AUG. 20, 1942--The shipping bugaboo--a major factor in every operation of the war to date--is rising to haunt the planners of TORCH.

General Clark is informed by General Gale that the tactical plan for General Anderson's combined Anglo-American force is not logistically workable in its present form--that the rate of buildup for the operation cannot be met because of insufficient shipping and port data. This will necessitate a revision of the plan for the Algiers attack. Since requirements cannot be met, the rate of buildup will have to be reduced. General Gale says this unavoidable reduction will also retard the scheduled movement on Tunis and, thus, increase the time available for the enemy to send troops to that area.

The second shipping problem involves movement of General Patton's forces from the United States to Africa. Major General Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Department, who has flown here from Washington for TORCH conferences, says Pattons' force will be able to sail from the United States on October 1 but adds that the Navy will be able to furnish escorts for only two convoys at a time. If this is true, the rate of buildup for General Patton's troops will be materially slowed, the arrival of the reinforcing troop convoy being set back about two weeks. One naval escort will take over Patton's assault force and a second will leave a few days later with reinforcements. The original plan was for a third escort to bring the bulk of reinforcements a week or so later. But now, the escort taking the original assault group across will have to rush back to start the third convoy--the major reinforcements--across. This will mean that Patton's landing forces will have to wait longer than expected for reinforcements.

A Britain-bound convoy left Brooklyn yesterday and plans call for its naval escort to return to the States for use as an escort

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in the second Patton group. General Patton's operational plan is dependant to a great extent on what escorts the navy can furnish since they must help cover the landing and protect vital materiel coming in slower merchant ships.

General Clark stresses to General Handy the need for "firm commitments" from Washington on just what naval support will be available for TORCH. "The difficulty of preparing plans without definite knowledge as to when troops are to be available for use in the operation is obvious," General Clark declares.

Regarding shipment of men and material from the United Kingdom to the North African coast, General Handy says that as U.S.-British vessels come in from the United States with American troops and supplies, the ships will be held on this side for use in TORCH. General Holmes, director of movements for the British War Office, informs General Clark that personnel shipping for 25,000 men must be available by September 20, and that additional shipping must come from the BOLERO pool--code name for maritime movements between the United States and the United Kingdom. The American group planning TORCH recommends to Washington that General Holmes' request be met "in so far as it does not conflict with United States requirements."

The question of whether the 1st Division or the 34th will supply the American combat team operating with General Anderson at Algiers has boiled down to this: If the equipment for the 1st Division can reach the combat team by about September 9, the amphibious training of the 34th will be stopped immediately and 1st Division troops will be substituted. Loading tables, now being prepared, will apply to either the 34th or the 1st Division combat teams. Training of cadres from both divisions will start next Monday. Convoys are now enroute to the United Kingdom with the 1st Division's missing equipment, including replacements for the guns made unavailable when the William Mc Kay went aground off Newfoundland.

General Clark says amphibious training must end about one month prior to D-day (tentatively set for October 15) since the British estimate it will take 12 days to load the task force vessels and 18 days to make the voyage to the jump-off points. Only one U.S. combat team is to be employed at Algiers with General Anderson's force. However, some additional American troops will be distributed in the British Brigade which is assaulting alongside the American combat team. The United States Ranger Battalion will be used at Bone. General Patton's direct-from-America forces will handle the Oran assault alone.

Admiral Ramsey of the British Navy points out the dangers which the Bone force, landing farthest east, is going to face. He expects heavy attacks, both from submarines and airplanes, while the convoy is enroute to the more easterly part of the Mediterranean. He expects, he says, to lose ships.

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The commando raid on Dieppe, France, is a major topic of conversation around the "Allied Force Headquarters" today. Approximately 50 American "Rangers" were in on the attack with Canadians, British and Fighting French. Our "Rangers" stumbled into an enemy convoy that delayed their landing 20 minutes and they suffered heavy losses when they hit the shore. General Clark expects only a handful of them to return. Three of our officers went on the raid as observers, including Brigadier General Truscott and Colonel Holsinger. There is no need to go into details since the press carries extensive stories. The play given the participation of American troops, particularly in U.S. newspapers, causes consternation at the War Department and General Marshall cables General Eisenhower that he thinks there was too much stress on the Ranger angle.

General Eisenhower cables back that "every effort is being made to mention the matter-of-fact appearance of American activity in this theater, including early participation in air and commando operations. The Dieppe raid communiques were released originally by the Commander of Combined Operations and our following statement merely confirmed the presence of American detachments from one battalion in the expedition. I consider absolute censorship cannot be applied to these affairs since casualties are inevitable. Anticipating the certainty of early casualties, it appeared wise to me to establish the fact American leadership is present whenever American troops are engaged and that American officers share the risks with their men. There will be no mention of names unless casualties or decorations are involved. Confidentially, it appears from early reports that the American contingent in the Dieppe operation may have suffered extremely heavily. Almost the entire American contingent accompanied an assault force which by accident encountered an enemy coastal convoy. Apparently only remnants of this part of the assaulting force escaped..."

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LONDON, AUG. 21, 1942--General Clark, as he watches new and revised reports crossing his desk regarding the number of available invasion and supply boats, the restricted North African port facilities, the problems of securing naval escorts and the difficulties of supply, says he finds himself becoming more pessimistic every day about the advisability of TORCH.

Two great hazards face the operation: First, that Germany will get wind of TORCH and rush troops into Tunisia and Algeria. Second, that once the operation is started Spain will become a belligerent, thus cutting the TORCH group off from supply routes. Rommel and his army in Libya already block the way to the Red Sea route, and if Spain enters the war the Straits of Gibraltar and Gibraltar itself will be menaced by the Spanish with the Mediterranean supply route virtually useless.

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The TORCH force would then be marooned in an isolated section, cut off from supplies and with the enemy on both sides. If the operation is successful and Tunisia is taken, the Allies will have greater control of the Mediterranean and Rommel will have greater difficulty supplying his army. It will also show Russia that the United States and Great Britain are trying to do something in 1942 to relieve the pressure on the Eastern front. But, General Clark points out, the Allies will still be a long way from their real objective--invading the continent and getting at grips with the bulk of the German army.

General Handy discusses with General Clark other objectives in the event TORCH is not put into operation as now planned. Handy recommends as a first alternative the old GYMNAST plan, an attack on Casablanca and Oran. The other alternative is to send United States troops into the Near East to reinforce the British fighting in Egypt.

General Doolittle, who is flying back to the United States tomorrow, has a final conference with General Clark. The air general is concerned about the availability of three medium bomber groups for TORCH. He had counted on them but now he understands Lieutenant General Arnold, commander of the Air Corps, has assigned them in part to other tasks. General Doolittle feels, however, that TORCH air plans will not be impaired seriously if he can get one of the medium bombardment groups over here by October 1. He will discuss the matter personally with General Arnold in Washington and return to London in a few days.

General Truscott, who went on the Dieppe Commando raid as an observer, reports to General Clark that what he saw on the French beach merely confirms the teaching that an attack against a defended beach "is most unlikely to succeed unless it is a complete surprise to the defenders." He reports that many special landing craft were lost in the attack. General Clark orders an investigation into what effect the Dieppe losses will have on landing craft available for TORCH.

The port capacity at Oran has been double-checked by General Larkin and he reports he is satisfied that the earlier figures--larger than the later ones--are sound for planning purposes. He is going to check them again to be certain nothing has been overlooked before he sends them to General Patton in the United States. General Gale expresses concern about the planning for General Patton's force but General Clark tells him that on Patton's staff, as well as that of U.S. Admiral Hewitt, there are officers who have had considerable experience in planning for amphibious operations.

In the evening General Clark and other high-ranking officers, including Generals Eisenhower and Handy, have dinner at the apartment of Sir John Dill, highest-ranking general in the British Army and the senior officer on the combined war planning board that

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meets in Washington. Sir John has returned to London briefly for conferences. General Clark says Sir John is quite enthused about TORCH and thinks it will be a wise operation.

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LONDON, AUG. 22, 1942--The entire basic plan for TORCH was drafted into a secret document today after an almost day-long meeting at the Grosvenor Square headquarters of General Eisenhower. This is the way General Clark, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of TORCH, sketches this outline:

The immediate objective is a combined land, sea and air assault against the Mediterranean Coast of Algeria with a view to the earliest possible occupation of Tunisia and the establishment in French Morocco of a striking force that can insure control of the Straits of Gibraltar by moving rapidly, if necessary, into Spanish Morocco.

The tentative date of assault is October 15--hereafter referred to as D-day. General Clark says that "strategy and policy dictate that the operation be initiated at the earliest possible date--the earlier the better." That is why October 15 has been designated as D-day. It is the earliest that all components can be ready for the attack.

The assault will take place simultaneously at Oran, Algiers and Bone.

At Oran, there will be two pre-dawn landings, each by a force of approximately one regimental combat team: one in the vicinity of the Gulf of Arzeu, 20 miles east of Oran, and the other at Bay Des Andalouses. The aggregate assault force--composed entirely of Americans--will comprise four regimental combat teams and one light armored force. The objective will be to secure the port of Oran and the nearby airdromes at La Senia and Tafaroui.

At Algiers, there will be three pre-dawn landings, each by a regimental combat team: one near Sidi Ferruch, 15 miles west of Algiers; one near Castiglione, 20 miles southwest of Algiers, and the third near Ain Taya, 11 miles east of Algiers. The aggregate force will be four regimental combat teams and their objective will be to secure the port of Algiers and the airdromes at Maison Blanche and Hussien Dey. The Algiers force will be composed of one British Division (the 78th), with one U.S. Regimental combat team (probably from the 34th U.S. Division. The operation will be under the Commanding General of the 78th British Division.

At Bone, there will be a pre-dawn landing in the vicinity of Cap de Garde, north of Bone, by approximately one regimental combat team. The Bone force will be made up of one United States "Ranger" battalion with the remainder of the force British. The objective will be to secure the port of Bone and the airdromes near Dozzer-ville, six and a half miles south of Bone.

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The assumption is that Oran and Algiers will have been captured by the end of the third day (D.3, October 18) and the movement of supporting and follow-up troops into Oran, Algiers and Bone will be timed for D.4.

Troops landing at Algiers and eastward will then consolidate, with the aid of reinforcements, their positions and prevent an enemy landing in Tunisia or westward. A total of six divisions, four infantry and two armored, will be required. These will include the original landing forces. The striking force in Tunisia will be built up by land, sea and possibly air movement eastward from Algiers and Bone with advance elements starting as quickly as possible after they have taken the ports and airdromes.

The Oran landing force will consolidate its position in Oran and French Morocco and build up striking forces that could occupy Spanish Morocco if necessary. This will require seven divisions, five infantry and two armored, including the original landing forces. The second convoy landing at Oran will land air forces and an armored division. They will strike west immediately to open up communications through Morocco and seize Casablanca from the rear. If there is no French resistance in bulk, this convoy might be diverted, while it is still enroute to Oran, to Casablanca and thereafter the troop build-up could continue through both ports--Casablanca and Oran.

The ultimate disposition of all troops in the Northwest African theater would be as follows: one division to garrison Casablanca; another to garrison Oran; one division to keep communications open between Casablanca and Oran; one division to form a striking force on the southeast border of Spanish Morocco, and three divisions to form a striking force at the southwest border of Spanish Morocco. After assault units have been brought up to normal strength in men, equipment and supply, the probable rate of build-up for the entire new theater will be: through Algiers, one and a half divisions per month; Bone, two-thirds of a division monthly; Oran, one division per month, and Casablanca, one division per month.

TORCH is really divided into two parts--American and Anglo-American operations. The All-American force under General Patton is to occupy Oran and French Morocco, maintain communications between Oran and Casablanca, and be ready to go into Spanish Morocco if necessary. The Anglo-American force is to occupy Algeria (except the Oran area) and Tunisia. However, because it has been deemed expedient for political reasons to have all assaults against French North Africa led by United States troops, one U.S. combat team (from the 34th Division) is being allotted to the British for the Algiers assault and the U.S. "Ranger" battalion that has been assigned to the British for use at Bone will land first.

Eventually the British troops participating in TORCH will be relieved by American," General Clark explains. "Since a strong force must be maintained in Great Britain for the defense of the islands as well as to furnish troops for other theaters, it is apparent

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81

that after a permanent position has been reached each British division sent to the New North African front must be replaced by an equivalent American unit. British troops are being sent into the initial invasion and consolidation because we must utilize troops readily available and properly trained. Of the estimated 13 division required for the entire operation, it is contemplated that approximately nine will be American and four British."

As to air operations, aviation will provide protection and support for the initial assault, protect bases and communications, and support subsequent overland operations. Carrier-based planes will support the assaults at Oran and Algiers until airdromes have been secured and land-based planes moved in. Fighters for the relief of carrier-based fighters will be flown during assault from Gibraltar. Bombers will be flown from the United Kingdom and the United States after African bases have been secured.

"The requirements for air support," says General Clark, "are so critical to the success of the operation that the provision of necessary air forces must be given the highest priority."

The mission of American and British naval forces will be to safeguard overseas movement--from the United States and the United Kingdom, support and land military forces for assault, and maintain sea communications and supply.

In addition to the most important TORCH operations conference to date, General Clark has a number of side meetings during the day. Colonel Stokes, the War Department's shipping expert, breaks down the TORCH water transportation problem and tells the general that the actual problem does not involve shipping for troops or materiel, but that rather the difficulty lies in the inability of the Navy to provide escorts for later convoys that will bring build-up troops. Water movement is also going to be restricted by cramped port facilities at Oran and Algiers. The number of combat loaders available is limited but there are sufficient for the operation as now planned and more could probably be found if required.

On the basis of this report, and because Sir John Dill brought up the question of using additional shipping to strengthen TORCH, General Clark asks General Anderson whether he would like to make an additional landing at Philippeville provided troops, ships and more time could be made available. General Anderson favors the plan. Next, General Clark asks Admiral Ramsey to give him a "firm answer" as to the British Admiralty's capacity to convoy and furnish sea and air support for such an operation. Commodore Douglas-Pennant advises General Clark that a report is being prepared by Combined Operations to show the number of landing craft lost at Dieppe and what effect these losses will have on craft assigned to TORCH.

The importance of TORCH and the fact it is becoming the big operation raises the question of the future of the Service of Supply in the European Theater of Operations. If ROUNDUP is dropped, which appears likely, the number of U.S. Troops we had planned to

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receive in the United Kingdom will be greatly reduced. General Truscott believes a corresponding reduction in the present plans of SOS expansion should be made, that certain SOS units and personnel should become available for the new North African theater and that General Lee should be so advised.

General Clark and General Matejka discuss the possibility of placing the forward echelon of TORCH headquarters on a naval vessel rather than at Gibraltar. Matejka believes Gibraltar must be a link in our system of signal communications and that headquarters should be there during the early phases of the operation. Major Yarborough, parachute specialist of the II Army Corps headquarters, arrives for duty with the new staff. He will work out detailed plans for TORCH parachute operations.

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LONDON, AUGUST 23, 1942--It looks as though an assault on Philippeville, Algeria, will not be included in TORCH. Admiral Ramsay reports to General Clark that neither the ships nor the landing craft required are available without drawing from other assault convoys or from follow-up convoys. Also, no Naval Air Force could be provided for the Philippeville attack.

General Clark reports that such an assault "would therefore have to take the same form as that now planned against Bone."

The Bone landing looks as though it is going to be the toughest landing of the three--Algiers, Oran and Bone. General Anderson reports to General Clark that, although heavy losses are "inevitable," the Bone assault must be included in TORCH. "Unless it is," General Anderson declares, "we cannot, in all probability, get to Tunis in time." The Bone attack is to be made with U.S. "Ranger" troops who will spearhead a combined Anglo-American attack.

General Anderson turns over to General Clark a revision of the Outline Plan for the Eastern Task Force, stating that this study represents what actually can be accomplished with the means placed at his disposal. "It is not based on guess work as were the earlier drafts," says General Anderson who will command the Eastern Task Force that will land at Bone and Algiers and then drive for Tunisia.

Combined British and American Intelligence reports have an interesting TORCH sidelight in them today. The item reads:

"Unconfirmed reports indicate that there are 500 tanks in underground hiding places in western Spanish Morocco and that there is an underground hangar five miles east of Tetuan where the Italians are reportedly assembling planes."

General Clark instructs Major Yarborough to study every phase of TORCH with a view to examining all possibilities offered for the effective employment of parachute troops.

Organization of General Patton's convoy that will bring American

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troops direct from the States to their assault-jumpoff at Oran is already underway. General Marshall cables that three converted passenger liners which used to be on the New York-Buenos Aires run have been earmarked for the task: the Argentina, the Brazil and the Uruguay. They are all about 17,500 gross tons and carry about 5,200 troops each. The Argentina was one of the ships in the convoy that came over with headquarters of the II Army Corps. In addition, General Marshall says the use of nine cargo ships for the All-American side of TORCH is also authorized. "No further ships," he adds, "can be allocated to you pending clarification of our needs here." Cables are flowing back and forth regarding the dispatch of ground and air forces for the air side of TORCH.

General Clark is building up the TORCH headquarters organization, bringing in some of his best junior officers from headquarters of the II Army Corps. He discusses with Lieut. Col. Ramsey, the headquarters commandant, the composition of the headquarters security force and movement of headquarters echelons to the African theater. They talk over the personnel required to fill key positions.

The cable requesting an American to head up civil affairs in North Africa once the occupation is underway is sent to Washington.

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LONDON, AUG. 24, 1942--General Anderson is pushing for the inclusion of Philippeville as a fourth point of attack in the TORCH operation. He tells General Clark that he "can't put on the show" without use of an additional port. He considers Philippeville, despite its hazards, to be the best spot available.

The British general's argument is that harbor facilities at Algiers and Bone will not enable him to get essential transport and supplies ashore in time to move his troops into Tunisia to forestall Axis occupation. He tells Deputy Commander-in-Chief Clark that to cut the strength of his force further would make his mission--a quick drive into Tunisia--impossible of accomplishment. He says he will need more assault ships, more landing craft and additional air support if another harbor is included. By using another harbor he maintains he can get sufficient equipment ashore and start his drive eastward on schedule.

In discussing the additional means needed for the Philippeville attack, General Clark tells General Anderson that if U.S. troops participated they would go forward with him to Tunis, if he so desired, and would subsist on British rations. General Anderson seems reluctant to accept additional U.S. troops, saying it would involve increased logistical complications. General Clark maintains that the assault on Philippeville should be made--for French reaction reasons--on Philippeville and that, preferably, it should be a second combat team of the 1st Division. General Anderson is instructed to prepare a report showing the additional means required for the operation, including shipping and landing craft.

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84

Generals Clark and Anderson and Air Vice-Marshall Welsh also discuss the possibilities of an "inside-outside" operation, that is, attacking simultaneously within the Mediterranean and outside at Casablanca. Anderson says this does not alter his problem. He agrees that Oran should be an all-U.S. operation. He adds that the extensive front--Algiers-Bone--is too much for one commander to control, particularly since the forces will advance in divergent directions after landing. The Air Vice-Marshall observes that aircraft based on Gibraltar could move to the Casablanca area as readily as to Oran if the "inside-outside" operation is decided upon.

Following his conference with the two British officials, General Clark calls in Admiral Bieri of the U.S. Navy and instructs him to study and report on the additional naval means required to broaden TORCH. He will consult with Admiral Ramsay and determine the U.S. Navy capabilities for the task. General Clark points out that the planners of TORCH are faced primarily with a naval problem and that "no amount of planning on the part of my staff can provide an answer until naval authorities state what they can and will do."

At a morning conference at Grosvenor Square, a cable from Washington is read to the Anglo-American group planning TORCH. It indicates the U.S. Navy can't aid TORCH to any further extent than it is already committed and that what the navy has promised is not yet definitely earmarked. General Clark says the naval problem "is the root of the evil of this thing. They won't say what we can have despite the fact President Roosevelt has said that Russian convoys and TORCH must have number one priority. There is no such thing as two operations having number one priority. One thing alone must be decided upon." He adds that the U.S. Navy "won't pull anything out of the Pacific and somebody's got to tell them what they have to do."

Later, SOS officials report to General Clark that they believe equipment for the combat team of the 1st Division can be delivered in time for the unit to start training by September 1. They say the combat team "will be reasonably well equipped by September 4." General Clark feels these dates are "probably optimistic." Some motor transport has already reached the unit and some items are being sent over from North Ireland.

Lieut. Colonel Raft, commander of the 503rd Parachute Battalion, reports for duty. With Colonel Bentley and Major Yarrowborough he will explore all possibilities for the employment of paratroops in TORCH.

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LONDON, AUG. 25, 1942--An urgent cablegram from General Marshall routes General Clark out of bed at 3 A.M. and sends him hurrying to his St. James Square office. General Marshall says it is the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington that

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TORCH is too ambitious for the means on hand and that it should be contracted in scope.

"It has become necessary to prepare a new directive...because of the limited military forces available," General Marshall cables. "The hazard is too great, especially considering the extreme seriousness of the effect on the peoples of occupied Europe, India and China if the United States should fail in its first major operation." General Marshall says the U.S. Chiefs of Staff "are not favorably disposed to the movement of approximately an Army Corps to the Mediterranean as recommended." He instructs General Handy to return to Washington by the first available plane. General Marshall adds that it will be impossible to get U.S. Naval units from the Pacific because of the battle of the Solomon Islands which he says "is going in our favor" but which is still developing.

This is the new proposal outlined in General Marshall's cable: that United States forces, probably combat teams of the 1st and 34th Divisions, move into the Agadir-Marrakech-Casablanca-Rabat-Fez area in French Morocco and into Oran-Mostaganain-Mascara area in Algiers; they will consolidate and rapidly exploit their attack to complete control of the French Morocco area; they will move into Spanish Morocco only if it is necessary, and make plans to push on to Western Algeria "to facilitate the extension of effective air and ground attack to the eastward and keep the sea lanes open."

The plan would eliminate the Algiers, Bone and Philippeville landings. It would call for control of all of North Africa from Rio de Oro to Tunisia so the forces could facilitate air operations against enemy forces and installations in the Mediterranean area. It would be an All-American attack and the occupation of Tunisia, at least for the time being, would not be attempted. Later, British forces would follow the Americans. The attack would take place at the earliest practicable date and would be accomplished as rapidly as possible.

All the American planners of TORCH immediately go into conference. Because of the suggestion that the revised plan involve only American troops, there are no British officers included. Only yesterday the British proposed that TORCH be made stronger and on a wider front. Now, General Clark tells his officers, Washington proposes that we reduce the scale of the attack heretofore planned. Colonel Nevins speaks of the effect of the limited harbor capacity of both Oran and Casablanca, bringing out that small and frequent convoys would be required, hence more demands from the U.S. Navy. The entire picture has changed overnight but the answer to General Marshall is going back by General Handy. The Marshall cable brings mixed reactions which are finally boiled down to this suggested answer:

The proposed operation does not offer us a chance to gain control of Tunis, the key locality in North Africa and the natural

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route for Axis invasion. While our scale of attack would be too weak to impress the French and bring them to our side, it would offer the Axis sufficient excuse and sound military reasons for moving forces into French North Africa. This consideration strongly indicates that military and political sense calls for a strong attack on the broadest possible scale and front. Time and space also favors the Axis in the subsequent race to gain control of Algiers. Full tactical successes at Oran and Casablanca do not insure reasonable prospect for the ultimate strategical improvement of the position of the United Nations in the Mediterranean-North African theater.

Employment of the 1st Division with parts of the 34th at Oran, using British ships, is practicable. The TORCH planners suggest that all forces at Oran comprise the II Army Corps and that General Clark command the operation from the outset. General Patton's forces, in substantially the same force they were originally scheduled to use at Oran, should now be used at Casablanca.

Note must be taken that limited United States Air Forces already in or earmarked for the North African theater would be inadequate for support of attacks on both Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the Royal Air Force. Also, physical capacities of the two ports impose stringent limits on the number of vessels that can be accommodated. The limit for Oran is 25 and for Casablanca, 14.

General Clark and his staff agree that they "are ready and anxious to proceed with any operation directed." They add that there is "urgent need for an early decision."

This, substantially, is the answer General Handy will carry back to General Marshall. He will leave tomorrow.

General Larkin raises the question of what additional service units will be required by the revised plan--if it goes into effect. The problem of getting the 1st Division ready is discussed and General Allen is called up from Tidworth. General Allen informs General Clark that he would be entirely willing to attack with two combat teams from the 1st Division, reinforced by one combat team from the 34th Division and detachments from the 1st Armored Division, in event TORCH is changed.

In the event the operation now proposed is put into effect, General Clark says we must prepare at least two more U.S. combat teams for landing through the surf. He proposes to keep a combat team of the 34th Division in training until September 12, then move the 1st Division for training between September 14 and 26. General Anderson says 10 days will be needed for rehearsal of the attack. An additional 1st Division combat team may be trained at Roseneath and Toward, England, from September 7 to 21. The combined operations headquarters, however, cannot provide crews for the additional landing craft in the actual operation.

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General Clark discusses the problem of air support with Col. Vandenberg and he says it is obvious that the U.S. Army Air Force will not be present in sufficient strength to carry out the landings at Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the Royal Air Force.

The remarkable, irrepressible man that is Winston Churchill is at his best again tonight as Generals Clark and Eisenhower dine with him at Number 10 Downing Street. As usual, the effervescent Prime Minister is wearing a smock. His first remark when he enters the room where the two American generals are waiting for him is:

"TORCH offers the greatest opportunity in the history of England! It is the one thing that is going to win the war. President Roosevelt feels the same way. We're both ready to help in any way we can."

"We face two battles in TORCH," booms out the Prime Minister, "The first battle is to have no battle."

Mr. Churchill only returned to England yesterday from a 14,000-mile trip that took him through the Middle East and to Moscow. He says, if necessary, he is ready to fly to Washington at a moment's notice to talk over TORCH with President Roosevelt. "This thing must go over," he declares.

He asks the generals what is on their minds and General Clark tells him the greatest need is for someone with the necessary power to make decisions. "We're floundering around in a trough of day-to-day changes," General Clark explains. "We must have had ten sets of details. There have been so many plans that we are dizzy. We'd like to get one definite plan so we can go to work on it. It's not a military man's job to say whether the French will resist or whether Spain will enter the war. The political factors should be handled by politicians."

The Prime Minister promises to get in touch with President Roosevelt immediately so the set-up can be frozen to one specific task. Mr. Churchill emphasizes and re-emphasizes that he is "100 percent for TORCH."

Mr. Churchill then tells of his recent conversations in Moscow with Stalin. "We talked very bluntly and sometimes I had to squirm a bit," the Prime Minister recounts. "Stalin says the war over there has proven that the German army isn't as tough as it's cracked up to be."

"Why don't you do something," says Stalin. And I have to admit we can't get across the channel. Then I tell him about the TORCH plan. I tell him we are going to do it. Stalin is disappointed that there will be no Second Front in Europe this year. Then, the more he thinks about the North African attack, the more he likes it."

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Mr. Churchill then tells of a huge banquet--a formal state dinner--held in his honor in Moscow. "I attended it in me smock," the Prime Minister grins. "I thought I'd show them how proletarian I was!"

Stalin, before he was told in detail about TORCH, kept telling the British leader that he "couldn't see why your two great nations can't attack. You've got to plunge in!"

On the night before he took off from Moscow, Mr. Churchill was invited to Stalin's apartment in the Kremlin. "There'll be just the two of us for dinner and we can do a bit of drinking," Churchill says the Russian premier told him. "When I got there," the Prime Minister continues, "Joe started uncorking bottles. After a while he says: 'Let's call in Molotov, he's a good drinker! So we sit up until four o'clock and talk. At five o'clock I take off for home.'"

The Prime Minister also tells how Stalin's 19-year-old, red-haired daughter came into the apartment. "And do you know," says Mr. Churchill, "she walked right up and kissed the bloke!"

While the Prime Minister is recounting these stories or else talking about international affairs, he is likely to do unpredictable things. At one point, he gets up, goes over to a corner and rubs his back up and down on the jutting edge of the wall. "I guess I got them in Egypt," he observes, smiling, and then plumps back into his chair to continue with serious discussion.

At another point, he rings one of the many bells beside him and the valet comes in. "Change me socks," he commands, and while he talks to Generals Clark and Eisenhower he holds up one foot after the other while the valet takes off his socks and puts on fresher ones of lighter weight.

Seeing the Prime Minister eat is an event. When the soup is brought in, he tackles it vigorously. His mouth is about two inches from the liquid; he hunches over the plate. He eats very noisily, purring and slurping and working the spoon from mouth to plate so rapidly you can hardly see it. Scraping the bottom of the dish, he looks up and bawls out lustily: "More soup!" Then, he turns to his guests and says: "Fine soup, ain't it!" General Clark and General Eisenhower have a hard time to keep from laughing at the Prime Minister's boylike actions.

After dinner, Mr. Churchill and the two generals get down to a point-by-point discussion of TORCH. General Clark outlines transportation difficulties and soon Mr. Churchill is summoning Lord Louis Mountbatten and Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord. General Clark is puzzled by reports made to him that it will take 12 days to combat load TORCH vessels and 18 days to make the voyage to assault points.

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Churchill turns the heat on Sir Dudley. "Why is it going to take you 18 days to get to this point when it is only going to take the Americans 14 days to get to the Theater of Operations from New York?" Mr. Churchill asks. Sir Dudley says the convoy is going to look as though it is going to the Middle East, then suddenly switch back and shoot toward the Straits of Gibraltar. He says if the cover plan were changed he could go more directly and the trip would take only 10 days.

"Do it," says the Prime Minister, then, turning to General Clark, says triumphantly, "See, I've saved you eight precious days already!"

General Clark says he wants a direct order telling the TORCH planners that they are going to carry out TORCH, that they must start the operation on a certain date and that they are going to occupy certain positions and accomplish certain definite results. This will cut out a lot of red tape and get TORCH on a concrete footing. The five men talk about the operation until 2 A.M.

Mr. Churchill's observations include:

"I want troops pouring into the new area. I want them to come through the walls, the ceilings--everywhere!"

"The French will go with us if we are going to win. But the French can't afford to pick a loser."

"What about crossing the channel? Well, I told Stalin 'Why stick your head in the alligator's mouth at Brest when you can go to the Mediterranean and rip his belly!'"

The men talk about the reaction of the North African French to the invasion. General Clark tells the Prime Minister that he thinks paratroopers should go down with parachutes made of American flags and that aerial sky-writers should zoom across the heavens writing: "Viva France! Lafayette, we are here again--for the second time!"

As the conference breaks up at 2 A.M., General Clark tells the Prime Minister that he and the other TORCH planners "are tired of this piddling around."

"Every minute counts," the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of TORCH declares. "We've spent days talking about how we ought to do this thing. What we need now is the green light."

Mr. Churchill promises action.

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LONDON, AUG. 26, 1942--General Clark tells a combined British-American staff meeting this afternoon that TORCH "is definitely on" and that it probably will be launched "not later than October 15." He tells his section chiefs to proceed on that basis, concentrating, for the time being, on the inside operation, including Philippeville.

To coordinate work, particularly between the British and American G-3 and G-4 sections, General Clark announces to the combined staff that a British Deputy Chief of Staff and a British Assistant Secretary of the General Staff will be added to his personal TORCH staff.

On the heels of General Marshall's cable and the talk with Prime Minister Churchill, General Marshall calls in high-ranking officers throughout the day. General Anderson, who is to be called before Mr. Churchill today, is informed, for background purposes, of the gist of the conversation of last night. General Clark informs General Anderson that the Prime Minister says that November is too late and that TORCH must start by mid-October. The two generals discuss how the necessary combat teams can be ready to go into action by October 15.

The conference turns into a round-table discussion of how supply problems are going to interfere with operational plans. General Gale, Brigadier Benoy and Colonel Philipps, all British supply experts, join the conference. As usual, the chief topic is the difficulty of supplying the expedition. Benoy says that the combined capacity of the ports at Philippeville and Bone fail to meet by some 5,000 tons the requirements for troops to be landed and concentrated at those points for an advance on Tunis. This figure, he says, is based on minimum maintenance requirements--food, ammunition, fuel--and that it does not include any allowance for reserves or for losses. According to Benoy's calculations, the shipping deficiency cannot be made up until it is possible to establish coastwise shipping from Algiers to the smaller ports. General Anderson says that under the circumstances it will not be possible for his forces to begin their advance on Tunis by D.24.

General Anderson seems conservative and cautious. At one point the conversation goes like this:

Anderson: "I am left with no reserves, except at Algiers."

Clark : "Can't we get it ashore in lighters?"

Anderson: "Logistics bring us to one irrefutable fact: there are no allowances for losses; no allowances for delays. The Mission is extremely dangerous. I might not be able to get stores."

Clark : "You've got to land and do the best you can. The Prime Minister says November first would be out of the question and that TORCH must start the middle of October."

Anderson: "In other words, land, even if I can't advance?"

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Clark : "That's right. Land and you'll get your chance to advance!"

General Anderson agrees that regardless of what date is set for D-day, his ability to advance in time to forestall Axis occupation of Tunisia is doubtful. General Clark breaks up the conference by telling the other officers that "the operation is definitely on" and that "ways and means will have to be found to make it successful."

Before General Handy leaves for Washington, General Clark tells him of the conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, of Churchill's insistence on action by mid-October and how the Prime Minister took immediate steps to assist TORCH by ordering the First Sea Lord to cut down the time required for the voyage to the Mediterranean. General Clark points out to General Handy that TORCH planners must be furnished "a definite directive without a moment's unavoidable delay--we are ready to go ahead just as soon as we get the basic decision."

General Gale, who felt slighted yesterday when the American leaders of TORCH met without the British, is told by General Clark that the Americans received a personal message from General Marshall that required consultation by a few American officers before an answer could be sent back to Washington. He explains, not only to General Gale but to the late afternoon Anglo-American conference, that the subject matter has been turned over to the British Joint-Mission in Washington and that it will reach the joint TORCH planning board in the near future.

General Gale again brings up his proposal that he be placed on a level with the Chief of Staff. General Clark explains that organization for TORCH will follow the U.S. type and that there will be only one Chief of Staff. However, General Gale is to feel free to go direct to General Clark anytime he wishes. General Gale says that will satisfy him. He then says there is lack of staff coordination, especially between G-3 and G-4. Generals Gale and Dewing say they believe the difficulty lies in the difference between British and American staff procedure. They feel a British Deputy Chief of Staff would assist in smoothing staff work. General Clark, who, although nothing has been said yet, feels that General Dewing, who would out-rank the American Chief of Staff, wants the job, asks him to submit a name and promises that he will put the man in as deputy. Moreover, General Clark adds, a British secretary might be added to the secretariat of the General Staff.

Cables being dispatched to Washington cover a multitude of TORCH sidelight operations: the U.S. is to furnish funds for civil administration within occupied areas, using local French currency; procurement of radio equipment is asked; wavelengths that TORCH will operate on once the troops go into action are set.

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LONDON, AUG. 27, 1942--Despite the scarcity of time if proper preparations are to be made, the plan for TORCH still is not definite. General Marshall cables Generals Clark and Eisenhower that President Roosevelt appears to have decided definitely that the attack on North Africa be made exclusively by United States troops assaulting at Oran and Casablanca.

The President thinks that 80,000 American troops are necessary to accomplish the mission. It must be a large and powerful landing force for political as well as military purposes. At a conference with General Marshall, President Roosevelt says he feels a joint landing, even if led by United States troops, will not suffice. He believes if it is an All-American operation he can, within a week after the assault, arrange matters so there will be no complications concerning the landing of British troops to reinforce the Americans. In the initial assault, British naval forces and shipping would be used.

General Marshall, who wired the two American generals immediately following the White House conference, tells Clark and Eisenhower that he is convinced the President "has fully made up his mind and intends to dictate" an All-American TORCH. He says that if such a directive is issued, the force attacking Oran will be made up of troops already in the United Kingdom. General Patton will head the Casablanca attack. General Clark probably will be the Commander-in-Chief if TORCH becomes All-American.

Cabling General Marshall as rapidly as possible, the TORCH leaders say that only two combat teams, plus a Ranger battalion, will be ready if the Oran landing is to be made October 15. The bulk of the attacking force, Generals Clark and Eisenhower, agree will have to come from the United States. They point out that the British opinion is that such a TORCH operation won't accomplish the real purpose and what is the reason for going at all if we don't gain Tunisia. They add that Allied troops cannot get Tunisia unless they do so quickly and attack as far east as Bone. They point out that Prime Minister Churchill promised last night to strip down his Indian Ocean fleet to assist in TORCH since the American fleet has the Japanese well engaged in the Solomon Islands battle.

General Clark is in conferences all day. General Anderson, saying that he will be able to assault at Algiers and Bone "with prospects of success but without a mobile force to advance," asks for a new TORCH directive. He says the chances of reaching Tunisia in time to defeat German forces is slight, even with Philippeville included. He adds that if there is no French resistance, he may, by requisitioning local transport, be able to move into Tunisia before D.24. He holds that regardless of the Prime Minister's views, his present mission cannot be carried out against resistance. The new directive might, he believes, order him to assault at the selected points, secure airdromes and ports in the vicinity, then move to the east without specifying a date for the accomplishment of the latter objective.

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General Clark asks Anderson when he will have enough transport to move forward without French assistance and the Britisher replies that when the first follow-up force is in, about D.8, he will be able to move a brigade group but the remainder of the force will not be mobile until after arrival of the second follow-up convoy. General Clark tells him that if all goes well in the initial landing at Oran there will be some air transports available to assist him in getting his troops forward. General Anderson says that will be very helpful.

According to General Anderson, the First Sea Lord is now hedging on the 10-day figure for the sea voyage, pointing out the danger from air attack to a convoy on a course laid near the West Coast of Europe. The Director of Movements is also doubtful that the time for combat loading can be reduced much below 12 days as five days is the normal time required for loading one vessel, but not enough berths exist for simultaneous loading of all ships in the convoy. However, General Clark points out to Anderson, Mr. Churchill has said he is willing to light the ports at night to expedite loading.

General Gale and Colonel Stokes are called in to discuss the shipping situation. General Gale says if D-day is early ships now in the United Kingdom will not have time to make another return trip to the United States.

The top-ranking intelligence officer on TORCH, British Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, tells General Clark he cannot agree with those who think the French in North Africa will not resist. He believes firm resistance will be encountered for at least 48 hours. He says the French army in Africa lacks both moral stamina and physical means for prolonged resistance.

After talking over the proposed organization of the Headquarters Security Force for TORCH with Colonel Ramsey, General Clark believes it would be best to take the required reconnaissance unit and infantry battalion from the 1st Armored Division. Units brought in from the U.S. later will replace these so they can rejoin the division when it enters the theater.

General Clark calls in General Allen and Brigadier General Roosevelt and outlines to them the training plans for the 18th Infantry Combat team of the 1st Division which will begin training at Inverary, Scotland, about September 10. General Roosevelt says that all special amphibious equipment is being shipped from the States and that it probably will be here by September 15.

A long intelligence report concerning what Washington G-2 officials think will be the reaction of the French and Spanish to the African attack is received by General Clark. Excerpts from it include:

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"The Vichy French may try to influence us into Occupied France in order to give them some guidance for their own action vis-a-vis the Germans, or bait us into a German net, or to warn us as to the futility of our effort. There is nothing however to indicate that the Vichy French are other than realists, and they are expected to make a decision which will put them on the winning side. There is nevertheless a hopeful tone in some French information which suggests that if U.S. forces go into French territory they should be in sufficient force to impress the local French authorities and to hold on at all costs.

"With reference to the Free French, there is a slight indication that they may know or suspect something about it. x x (Officials) fully understand the vital importance of not telling them anything with regard to future operations. x x x There is a report that the French in North and Northwest Africa are on edge. In this connection, there is something on this in "a most reliable source." There is nothing reliable to indicate that the French will assist us anywhere, but on the other hand, much information to indicate that they will resist. However, emphasis is again laid upon the fact that resistance may be considerably less if they are faced by a strong and apparently resolute force.

"We have no information to indicate that Spain will remain remain aloof or that the Germans will not use the Spanish airfields. In this connection, if Spain stays out of it, or the Germans do not use their airfields initially, surface units can reach certain points in North Africa without effective interception by Axis air and surface forces. If, however, German Air uses Spanish airfields, earlier and serious interception of our forces must be expected. If this Axis activity from Spain is withheld until after our forces are ashore, the Axis Air might make it very difficult for the recently landed forces. However, the operation offers considerable hope of success if the Germans are kept out of Spain until a later date. It would be in error to plan, however, definitely on the Germans staying out of Spanish airfields. If the operation is put through, German air and other forces might be sent down toward Spain for purposes of destroying United Nations' forces in the Mediterranean and an opportunity might arise for other United Nations' forces from England to strike in the German flank."

General Clark points out that "there is considerable difference of opinion in these views with those of the Prime Minister."

The Washington G-2 also brings up in its report the subject of "Cooperation with Allies." It declares "it is of vital importance to thoroughly war game and practice with the British on this subject (coordination of air, ground and armored forces) practice with the British on this subject of coordination of the several elements from distant and near bases in any aspect of the special operation planned. This should be thoroughly examined with the British in London, and as well should be soundly practiced with our naval forces. The coordination and timing of the various elements of this

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operation are of absolutely vital importance."

General Clark remarks that these platitudes about coordination "give me a pain in the hind end."

"It is axiomatic," the general declares, "that staff officers in high positions, far removed from the front, reiterate doctrine which is well known to all of us, but which to put into effect requires considerable time. In other words, Kroner (Brigadier General Kroner of the Washington G-2 staff) is going on record that for an operation of this kind to be successful, coordination of air, ground and mechanized units is essential. We have been preaching this in our training in the States for the past two years. We know it is essential and would do it here, but time does not permit."

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LONDON, AUGUST 28, 1942--Plans for United States air operations in TORCH are progressing favorably and the air sections are preparing plans for movement of both ground personnel and supplies from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Colonel Vandenberg confers with General Clark and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief discusses with him the possibility of using various devices to prepare the way for the American landing: sky writing, American flags dropped by parachute and leaflets. Some Spitfire mechanics have been shipped to the United States to come over with General Patton's force. Gasoline supply at first will be by five-gallon cans, later by barrels, and finally by tankers. Packing of equipment must begin in about two weeks if the date is to be October 15.

Vandenberg says Generals Arnold, Doolittle and Hansel all agree that we have not more than about one-fourth the air strength supporting the American attack that might profitably be used. They also believe that the British effort is so weak in air support that it is unlikely to succeed in view of the Axis Air Force strength in the Sicily-Sardinia area. Vandenberg says that General Doolittle, with his principal staff officers, plans to go from Gibraltar to La Senia airport just as soon as it has been captured. In line with air operations, General Anderson, during a conference with General Clark, asks if the general would be willing to have American planes land at various points, including Tunis, on the morning of the attack. He feels that a big bluff might work but points out that American officers landing at Tunis might be made prisoners of war. As a sidelight to this British request, Colonel Vandenberg tells General Clark that the Fighter Command is holding back from the TORCH operation. He says the Command is "reluctant" to be changed from its present role of escorting bombers to that of ground support in the TORCH operation. General Clark says this is a matter which will "require definite action." American bombers, accompanied by the fighters, are raiding Occupied France almost daily now.

Admiral Ramsay calls to discuss the readjustment of naval

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forces required in order to provide means for the protection of the Philippeville attack. No additional vessels or naval aircraft are available. The British Navy is planning to provide four carriers and two auxiliary carriers in the Mediterranean with a total of about 60 to 70 fighting planes in addition to some reconnaissance and a few bombers. Admiral Ramsay plans to provide air protection for the forces attacking at Bone and Philippeville up to dark on D.1. At that time, carriers will turn back to assist in covering the attack at Algiers the next morning. The British Admiral feels that the limited support that he could afford for the attacks at Bone and Philippeville by naval planes does not justify the risk entailed to the carriers from Axis land-based planes.

Admiral Ramsay does not suggest that the Philippeville attack could not be made due to naval limitations but he does point out that in order to mount the attack, use must be made of special ships now being converted. These are large vessels of about 20,000 tons which lack armored landing craft and which are not of the best type. Crews for the landing craft will not be well trained. He also states that in order to place landing craft in condition for operations that training would have to cease about September 10. The general tells him such a condition cannot possibly be agreed to; that the training of the combat teams had to be carried through, and that if the landing craft were not in the best shape, that was merely another risk that we would have to accept. General Clark brings up the possibility of including a fient at Casablanca if the large-scale TORCH operation goes on. Admiral Ramsay thinks the idea is sound provided a suitable naval covering force can be found. In his opinion, the risk involved in bringing a large convoy into the vicinity of Casablanca without strong naval support would be great. He feels that more battleships, some cruisers and a carrier are essential.

General Anderson joins in the discussion and soon a sharp difference of opinion arises between the British General and the British admiral concerning the use of landing craft prior to embarkation. Admiral Ramsay emphasizes the need for craft overhaul; General Anderson the need for training of assault troops.

After Admiral Ramsay leaves, General Clark explains to General Anderson that he is ordering a second reserve combat team of the 1st Division into amphibious training. Anderson understands that he will have the 168th U.S. Infantry regiment at Algiers and the 18th U.S. Infantry at Philippeville. General Clark brings up the subject of anti-aircraft protection for the regimental combat teams in the assault and on the beach. General Anderson states that none has been provided and that none is required since the landing would be made at night. He believes A-A weapons on the ships will take care of the situation until anti-aircraft units can be put ashore. He says that in the attack at Algiers some tanks would be used with one of the combat teams. The Commanding General of the 78th British Division will give General Clark details of this attack plan at a later date.

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General Clark tells General Anderson that he wants every minute detail of every plan laid before him and that he intends to go into them fully as the plans develop.

Satisfactory progress is being made on amphibious training at Inverary, Scotland. Colonel O'Daniel reports in today to General Clark. Colonel O'Daniel says no provision is being made for anti-aircraft support with landing craft or on the beach, a thing that the general feels must be provided.

General Clark tells General Allen that he has no objection to Brigadier General Roosevelt going to inspect the Scotland base but that he must understand clearly that the training is under British command and that he is not to interfere in any way. General Allen is also told that another regimental combat team, the 26th, would go into amphibious training and that the 18th U.S. Infantry Regiment combat team will move to Toward about September 7 for advanced training. The 26th Infantry Regiment team will go to Inverary September 26 to take over from the 34th Division combat team that will have completed its training by then. General Clark explains that in case the American TORCH plan is put into effect we would need an additional U.S. combat team for the assault--or, a total of three combat teams at Oran.

Other urgent matters that get attention today include discussion of the advance party that will go to Gibraltar by plane, arriving there just before the TORCH convoy gets ready to enter the Straits of Gibraltar; (General Matejka feels there is no insurmountable difficulty to providing signal communications at Gibraltar.); organization of the Anglo-American relations in the G-3 section, and formation of a definite staff program to bring out weaknesses or omissions that might otherwise be undetected until too late.

In the evening, Generals Clark and Eisenhower leave for Prime Minister Churchill's country home at Checkers. They will remain overnight so they can hold lengthy, undisturbed conferences with Mr. Churchill.

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CHECKERS, ENGLAND, AUG. 29, 1942--While Generals Eisenhower and Clark are at the Prime Minister's country estate, an officer courier arrives from London with a secret code message of greatest importance. General Marshall cables that President Roosevelt appears to have decided definitely that the attack on North Africa will be made exclusively with United States troops assaulting at Oran and Casablanca.

The President thinks that 80,000 American troops are necessary to accomplish the mission. It must be a large and powerful landing force for political as well as military purposes. At a conference

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with General Marshall, President Roosevelt says he feels a joint landing, even if led by United States troops, will not suffice. He believes if it is an All-American operation he can, within a week, after the assault landing, arrange matters so there will be no complications concerning the landing of British troops to reinforce the Americans. In the initial assault, British naval and air forces and shipping would be used.

General Marshall, who wired the two American generals immediately following the White House conference, tells Clark and Eisenhower that he is convinced the President "has fully made up his mind and intends to dictate" an All-American TORCH. He says that if such a directive is issued, the force attacking Oran will be made up of troops already in the United Kingdom. General Patton will head the Casablanca attack. General Clark probably will be the Commander-in-Chief if TORCH becomes All-American.

The President, General Marshall says, apparently is unwilling to accept the hazards of a single line of communications through Gibraltar. He does not agree with the British argument that such a TORCH operation will mean the loss of Tunisia and possibly Algeria to the Germans. The President also believes it is imperative that the United States strengthen its guard of the South Atlantic. Another argument Mr. Roosevelt gives is that there is not enough naval support for more than two landing points.

General Marshall says the President expects to convey his decision to the Prime Minister on Monday and that all information concerning Mr. Roosevelt's stand must be highly secret and that the British must not hear a single word about it.

Prior to arrival of the cable, Generals Clark and Eisenhower have spent hours in conferences with the Prime Minister and other British leaders talking over the proposed African operation. Upon their arrival at Checkers last night, the two American generals were met by the Prime Minister who, as usual, was wearing baggy, informal clothes. The entire dinner conversation revolves around TORCH. Seated around the table are the Prime Minister, General Ismay, General Sir Alan Brooke (chief of staff of the British army), General Clark, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Eisenhower. The Prime Minister expresses his enthusiasm concerning TORCH. Eden is also sold on it 100 per cent. Following dinner and the showing of motion pictures, including newsreels of the Dieppe raid and the Prime Minister's visit in the Middle East.

Afterward the officials go to Mr. Churchill's study where the conversation continues until 2 AM. The same ground is covered as was covered at the London conference earlier in the week. General Clark again outlines the shipping problems, transport and naval. At 2 AM, all of the party but Mr. Churchill, Generals Brooke and Clark and Foreign Minister Eden retire.

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99

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The Prime Minister suggests that "a little fresh air might be in order" after being closeted in the study so the four men go out onto the lawn to walk up and down in the moonlight discussing every phase of TORCH. At first, the men walk in twos: the Prime Minister and General Brooke in front and General Clark and Anthony Eden in the rear. Eden tells the general he thinks TORCH is the right operation but that he hasn't yet made up his mind just what the Spanish reaction will be. Since Mr. Churchill keeps flinging remarks back over his shoulder, the men fall in a line of four and stride up and down the lawn. They talk until 4 AM.

The next morning the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, is summoned and the shipping situation is again gone over. Sir Dudley tells the Prime Minister that he does not believe he can reduce the time for loading ships and that it looks as though the estimate of a 10-day trip to the Mediterranean is optimistic.

When the secret cable arrives by courier, Prime Minister Churchill, who intimates he has been getting reports from his officials in Washington indicating the President is not satisfied with the Anglo-American TORCH plan, is curious but Generals Clark and Eisenhower stall him off. He invites them to remain during the afternoon but they both tell him they must return to London.

While the Marshall cable is going to Checkers, General Gruenther, acting Chief of Staff for General Clark, calls a conference of key U.S. members of the Headquarters Staff and orients them so they can start work with a view to determining the earliest possible date for the operation. They are cautioned to be particularly careful not to drop the slightest hint to the British that a change might be made.

As soon as General Clark returns, General Gale and Admiral Ramsey come in to fish for information. Ramsey has learned something through Admiralty channels. General Clark tells them in a general way of the conference at Checkers and then tells them that the American and British governments are not yet in agreement on TORCH; that nothing definite has been set but that a decision is expected soon. General Clark informs Admiral Ramsey that the Prime Minister wants further examination of the possibility of securing the naval means necessary for simultaneous attacks at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers (temporarily eliminating operations at Philippeville and Bone. Ramsey states that the British cannot support Algiers and Oran alone. He adds the operation might be done if the U.S. can, in addition to supporting Casablanca, help the British at Oran. The assistance required by the British from the U.S. Navy for Oran is as follows, Ramsey says: one auxiliary carrier, 12 destroyers, 8 combat loaders complete with landing craft, 5 cargo carriers and 8 personnel ships. Admiral Ramsey points out that the attack on Casablanca will require stronger naval support than that now planned for Oran. He considers a covering force, including two old battleships, to be essential at Casablanca. The conclusion is that the proposed three-prong attack is beyond the capacity of the combined navies at this time.

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General Clark is making arrangements to Bring General Ward to London from Northern Ireland to work out plans for employment of the First Armored Division at Oran. Tanks that go with the regimental combat teams must be trained with them and Colonel O'Daniel is charged with finding a suitable location for this type of work. The General is also bringing down General Ryder of the 34th Division to discuss the work of the division's combat team now in training at Inverary, Scotland.

Amphibious training for the 1st Division is discussed with Generals Allen and Barker. General Clark discusses the ways and means of getting the maximum training for the regimental combat teams of the 1st Division and the 168th Infantry of the 34th Division on the supposition that they will make the attack on October 28. General Allen recommends moving his entire division to Scotland, saying a large fraction of his command will be under training in that area anyway. General Clark reserves a decision but instructs a reconnaissance party to look for a suitable area for the division in Scotland. General Allen is told that General Roosevelt will not accompany the reconnaissance party. It is now anticipated that most of the equipment for the 18th Infantry combat team should be in the hands of troops by September 10 and, for the 26th Infantry by September 15.

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LONDON, AUG. 30, 1942--Despite the indecision and the nerve-wracking tension of waiting for the men higher up to make up their minds as to what should be done, General Clark continues to hold conferences--hold them even though he doesn't know what the scope of the plan is going to be, even though he must speak very carefully with the British officers who sense that TORCH is in a state of flux.

Political factors have now become so interwoven with military factors that General Clark and his staff can't even guess which way the next jump will be. This, the general hopes, will all be cleared up tomorrow when President Roosevelt is scheduled to send his recommendation or directive to London.

A cable is sent to Washington declaring that it is now "evident that the estimated date of October 25 is too optimistic." Assault equipment for the 1st Division is still far out of reach and it appears that certain amounts will not be available before the middle of September. The American generals tell General Marshall that they can "scarcely attack earlier than the first of November." The Oran force, tentatively, will be composed of: 1st Infantry Division; one Regimental Combat Team of the 34th Division; one composite regiment; a small detachment of armored troops from the 1st Armored Division. Followup troops will come from the United States directly to Africa. The balance of the 1st Armored and the 34th Divisions will be left in the United Kingdom. General Clark points out that the U.S. must bring additional ground formations to the United Kingdom. He says this "has always been accepted and the length of the convoy from England to the North African theater will make it highly

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101

desirable to avoid double shipment if it can possibly be done. On the other hand, the necessity of an early follow-up to TORCH may compel us to take the remainder of these two divisions into the new theater."

General Clark has one visitor with whom he can frankly discuss a problem without having to be troubled as to whether TORCH will be as originally planned or whether it will be confined to Oran and Casablanca. The visitor is Lieut. Colonel W.A. Eddy, USMC, U.S. Naval Attache at Tanger. Colonel Eddy believes that if the United States alone enters French North Africa there will be a popular uprising to support us. However, he does not believe this will happen if the British are with us. Groups of guerillas, he says, have been formed in Morocco and Algiers and they are ready to take an active part in any operation started by American forces. Leaders of these groups have been tested for loyalty and, in his opinion, they would be trustworthy.

Colonel Eddy supervises the work of 12 control officers who are charged with observing the distribution of materials imported from the U.S. under the North African Economic Aid program. These control officers, ostensibly under the Consul at Algiers, are all army and navy men--former officers or reserve officers who are on inactive-duty status. Captain Nochs, now on duty at Algiers, is acquainted intimately with Oran and key people in that area. He will come to London for conferences and provide TORCH leaders with a list of the men who should receive letters from our government at the time the landing is made.

Colonel Eddy has conferred with General Patton recently and General Patton has requested certain action ashore at Casablanca as soon as his forces land. This includes rounding up of the German Armistice Commission as soon as American forces go into action. Colonel Eddy is to confer with Mr. Mack on certain political aspects of the operation. He will also discuss with General Matejka the use of the Tanger Broadcasting station to transmit information to our convoys.

General Anderson, as worried as a stenographer with a stork hovering over her house, comes in again to ask General Clark just what is going on. He says he has heard rumors that U.S. combat teams earmarked for his force may now be used with U.S. forces. He insists that he must know of any contemplated action that would bring about changes in his plans. He is aware of the proposal to attack at Casablanca and Oran only. He knows of the unfavorable reaction of the British government. General Clark tells him there is nothing more he can tell him at present and adds that until the British and American governments agree "we might as well not worry over details." General Clark tells the British general that "the lack of naval means almost certainly precludes a simultaneous attack at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers."

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102

Air Vice-Marshall Welsh comes in to discuss the general air plan for TORCH but General Clark tells him "we'll have to wait until things are on a firmer basis." Without giving the Britisher any indication of a probable change in plan, the General gets his views concerning air support of the Oran-Casablanca operation. He sees no particular difficulty, believing the air plan can be adjusted to meet any operation finally decided upon. He says he will go ahead with the shipping of crated fighters to Gibraltar. Welsh says he is pleased with the general set-up. In his opinion, the greatest menace to the expedition will be submarines. This will be combated by flying-boat patrols based initially at Gibraltar. Later they will be based at Oran and other North African ports. Plans call for anti-submarine aircraft squadrons to move onto North African bases by D.3.

General Clark confers throughout the day with his own officers. The amphibious training program, running on a more-or-less day-to-day basis because of the indecision of what will compose the TORCH force, requires almost constant revision. The 18th Infantry Combat team, under present plans, will be moved into the Toward-Roseneath area by September 7. There will be two landing ships available for training. After the 18th has completed its training at Toward, a combat team from the 1st Armored Division will start its training there, the 18th moving into a tent camp, the location of which has yet to be selected. The 168th Infantry combat team will remain at Inveraray until September 12 and be followed there by the 26th Infantry which will go into training between September 12 and 15th. General Clark points out to Colonel O'Daniel the necessity for training that will be a realistic rehearsal for the actual attack. O'Daniel says exercises of this type are provided for. The training in the Toward-Roseneath area as now planned will be under the British. In case an All-American operation is carried out, O'Daniel's staff will take charge of instruction.

Generals Gruenther and Barker and Colonels Hamblen and Nevins are called in to discuss with General Clark what service units must be obtained additionally for the Oran force. Hamblen mentions a water supply unit, evacuation and surgical hospital as of vital importance. Hamblen is instructed to prepare a complete list and send a dispatch to Washington listing special equipment requirements such as fine-mesh head nets, mosquito repellents and other tropical equipment. General Clark says there will be an acute need for quarter-ton amphibious trucks. The time necessary to get additional service units from the U.S. probably will set the earliest possible date for the attack back to the first week in November.

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LONDON, AUG. 31, 1942--President Roosevelt wants to keep TORCH an All-American operation!

The all-important cable is sent this afternoon to Prime Minister Churchill. It outlines the President's plans and arguments but, as

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103

yet, the plan for TORCH is not set. President Roosevelt wants the ideas of the Prime Minister and Generals Clark and Eisenhower within 48 hours.

The President cables Mr. Churchill that he has considered all TORCH phases and that he feels "very strongly that the initial attacks must be made by an exclusively American ground force supported by your (British) Naval and Transport and Air Units." He says the operation "should be undertaken on the assumption that the French will offer less resistance to us than they will to the British."

"I would even go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simultaneous landing by the British and Americans would result in full resistance by all French in Africa whereas an initial American landing without British ground forces offers a real chance that there would be no French resistance or only token resistance. I need a week if possible after we land to consolidate the position of both of us by securing the non-resistance of the French. I sincerely hope I can get this. Then your force can come in to the eastward. I realize full well that your landing must be made before the enemy can get there. It is our belief that German air and parachute troops cannot get to Algiers or Tunis in any large force for at least two weeks after initial attack. Meanwhile your troops would be ashore, we hope, without much opposition and would be moving eastward.

"As to the place of landings it seems to me that we must have a sure and permanent base on the northwest coast of Africa because a single line of communications through the Straits is far too hazardous in the light of our limited joint resources. I propose therefor that: (a) American troops land simultaneously near Casablanca and near Oran. (b) that they seek to establish road and rail communication with each other back of the mountains. The distance is little more than 300 miles. This gives the enterprise a supply base in Morocco which is outside the Straits and can be used to reinforce and supply the operations in Algiers and Tunis.

"The real problem seems to be that there is not enough cover and combat loadings for more than two landings. I realize it would be far better to have three with you handling the one to the Eastward a week after we get in. To this end I think we should re-examine our resources and strip everything to the bone to make the third landing possible. We can give up the Russian convoy temporarily at that time and risk or hold up other merchant shipping. It is essential of course that all ships now assigned to Eisenhower for his two landings remain intact. Hence the eastward landing must be made on ships not now available to TORCH. I will explore this at our end. Can we not get an answer on this within 48 hours or less? I want to emphasize, however, that under any circumstances one of our landings must be on the Atlantic.

"The directive to the Commander in Chief of the operation should be launched at the earliest practicable date. The date should be consistent with the preparation necessary for an operation with a

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104

fair chance of success and accordingly it should be determined by the Commanders in Chief. But in no event later than October 30. I still would hope for October 14. (signed) Roosevelt."

General Clark rushes over to General Eisenhower's Grosvenor Square office when the copy of the President's cable to the Prime Minister is received. The result of this conference is a cable back to Washington saying that "the chief points<sup>that</sup> occasioned the concern of the British Chiefs of Staff were the omission of Algiers from the original attack and the fact that the assault proposed by the president disposes at least half of its strength on a coast where possibilities of landing are dependent entirely upon the weather with the probability th t four out of five days will be unsuitable for landing. Consequently while the British Chiefs of Staff completely share the American opinion as to the importance of Casablanca and the opening of an auxiliary line of communications, they believe that the Casablanca attack should be the one, if possible, that should be made on invitation and at all events should not play too great a part in the first display of overwhelming tactical power."

As a counterproposal, Generals Clark and Eisenhower "believe the British Chiefs of Staff will suggest something about as follows: that the British provide all escorting, supporting and other naval craft possible to the United States with the request that the two main American attacks be made at Algiers and Oran with a smaller U.S. force ready to attack simultaneously at Casablanca. By eliminating the Bone and Philippeville attacks from the present plan, some additional escorting vessels and combat loaders will become available. The British could dispatch to the U.S. a few combat loaders to assist in making up the Casablanca force under the general plan just described. It is clear, however, that to provide the necessary naval strength for giving reasonable protection to the Casablanca attack, even on a relatively small scale, the U.S. will have to produce additional strength to that used by the U.S. naval planners here in making their calculations."

A suggestion that a British division might be placed in American uniforms was rejected as involving risk of "laying ourselves open to the charge of bad faith." The cable to the War Department declares "there is no hope of the First Division being able to take part in a major expedition from the United Kingdom before October 30." Generals Eisenhower and Clark say "this is absolutely the most optimistic date upon which we can calculate." The cable, signed by General Eisenhower, concludes: "General Clark and I both believe that every possible chance of including Algiers in the first attack should be explored but we repeat our conviction that this can be done only with some additional naval strength from the United States, which prior investigation has indicated could not be forthcoming."

Before arrival of the Presidential cable, General Clark holds a series of conferences. General Larkin is informed he probably will

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105

head the SOS in the Oran area. Initially, the SOS at Casablanca will not be unified with that at Oran under one command. General Rooks is called up from Longford Castle, where he has been heading the II Army Corps as Chief of Staff since General Clark came to London. Rooks is told that in case the projected U.S. plan goes through, he will be designated Chief of Staff of the Oran Task Force. He remains at Norfolk house to work out the slate for the task force staff which will be held down to the minimum.

General Ryder is called in and oriented on the proposal for an all U.S. operation. General Porter is going to be placed in command of the 168th Infantry combat team. General Clark discusses with General Ryder the possible use of the 34th Division in the follow-up phase. Ryder is also told that General Clark might take one infantry battalion from his division for use as a headquarters security force. The cadre of the 135th Infantry, now in Scotland, is to return to Northern Ireland at once. The 34th, General Ryder says, is considerably under strength but replacements will be made from troops enroute to the European Theater of Operations.

Once again the 1st Division is having trouble getting the equipment to replace that on the ship that went aground off Newfoundland. Colonel Hughes reports that one ship carrying an estimated 5,000 tons of organization equipment for the 1st's infantry and artillery units has had to turn back in mid-ocean. Hughes believes the ship is carrying the express shipment which was rushed to New York to replace the equipment that was on the vessel that went aground. Under the circumstances it is unlikely that this equipment will be in the hands of troops before October 5. For a D-day of November 5 it would have to be reloaded immediately for shipment to the African theater and would not be available to the troops for training purposes.

General Gale and Brigadier Benoy advise General Clark that the British War Office wants to send telegrams tonight directing movement of supplies to go on the first follow-up convoy for the Algiers-Philippeville-Bone force. The War Office is willing to hold up the issuance of telegrams for the Philippeville and Bone forces, but has instructed General Anderson to release telegrams for the Algiers equipment. This conference occurs prior to receipt of Mr. Roosevelt's cable and General Clark instructs Brigadier Benoy to request the War Office to "send no telegrams for at least the next 24 hours, or until further advice is given by me." General Gale is told that no "new plan" directive has been issued and that "work is to continue along the lines indicated at the last staff conference--Oran, Algiers, Philippeville, Bone."

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LONDON, SEPT. 1, 1942--The British are finally told today that TORCH has developed a split personality; that, as things now stand, there are really two plans--President Roosevelt's All-American attack and the combined Anglo-American assault that has Prime Minister Churchill as its chief proponent.

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