

NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY

INGERSOLLISM

DEFENDED AGAINST

ARCHDEACON FARRAR.

BY

G. W. FOOTE.

Price Twopence.

LONDON:
R. FORDER, 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.

1892.

LONDON :
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE
28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.

INGERSOLLISM AND DR. FARRAR.

WHAT a swarm of Christian apologists flutter round Colonel Ingersoll! He is a perfect nobody; he has no learning, and no brains to speak of; nothing he says is new, and it has all been answered before; in brief, he is a smart pretender, a showy shallow-pate, and every sensible Christian should leave him alone. But somehow they *cannot* leave him alone. He requires no answer, but they *will* answer him. He is not worth a thought, but they shower their articles upon him. Meanwhile the Colonel smiles that great, genial smile of his, and never loses his temper for a minute. He knows his own strength, and the strength of his cause, and he knows the meaning of all this pious *blague*.

Judge Black tilted at Ingersoll, and would not try a second round. Then came Dr. Field, then Mr. Gladstone, then Cardinal Manning, then Dr. Abbott and some smaller fry, and now comes Archdeacon Farrar with "A Few Words on Colonel Ingersoll" in the *North American Review*. Dr. Farrar is a prolix gentleman, with a style like a dictionary with the diarrhoea, and his "few words" extend to fifteen pages. All he has to say could have been put into a third of the space. On Mr. Gladstone's admission, Colonel Ingersoll "writes with a rare and enviable brilliancy." Archdeacon Farrar writes effeminately, with a vehemence that simulates strength, and a glare that apes magnificence. He revels in big adjectives and grandiose sentences, and is a striking specimen of literary flatulence.

This is not a complimentary description, but the Archdeacon has invited it. To prove the invitation we quote his opening sentence. "Although the views of Colonel Ingersoll," he says, "lie immeasurably apart from my own, he will not find in this paper a word of invective or discourtesy."

Now this sentence is loose in style and false in statement. "Although" implies that invective and discourtesy might well be expected by anyone who differs from Dr. Farrar. "Immeasurably" is nonsense, for Colonel Ingersoll and Dr. Farrar both have definite views, and the difference between them is easily ascertained. "Discourtesy," at least, is infelicitous. Dr. Farrar speaks of Colonel Ingersoll's "enormous arrogance of assumption"; of his looking down "from the whole height of his own inferiority"; of thousands of intellects that, compared with his, are "as Dhawalaghari to a molehill." Here is "courtesy" for you! But this is not all. With his customary extravagance of language, the Archdeacon speaks of "those *myriads* of students of Holy Writ, who probably know *ten thousand* times more of the Scriptures than Colonel Ingersoll." What delightful good breeding! It seems that the Christians have so long enjoyed the right of "immeasurably" abusing Freethinkers, that they fancy themselves quite polite when they are impudent enough to invite a kicking.

Let us now see what Dr. Farrar's "few words" amount to. He accuses Ingersoll of asserting; instead of arguing, of indulging in "the unlimited enunciation of immense generalities," of "tossing aside the deepest and most permanent convictions of mankind as though they were too absurd even to need an answer," and generally of putting forth arguments which have been killed by the theologians, and really ought to feel that they are dead, and to get decently buried. Dr. Farrar evidently regards Ingersoll as a sceptical Banquo who indecently haunts the supper-room of the theological Macbeth.

But when he condescends to details the Archdeacon cuts a sorry figure. He takes some of Ingersoll's "immense generalities" and tries to explode them, with shocking results to himself. Here is number one.

I. *The same rules or laws of probability must govern in religious questions as in others.*

This would have been regarded by the great Bishop Butler as an axiom. But Dr. Farrar is not a Bishop Butler, so he calls it "an exceedingly dubious and disputable assertion." Revelation appeals to man's *spirit*, and Colonel Ingersoll

ignores that "sphere of being." He is therefore like a blind man arguing about colors, or a deaf man arguing about music. In other words, Dr. Farrar cannot *prove* the truth of his religion. He knows it intuitively, by means of a high faculty which Ingersoll does not possess, or only in an atrophied state. But this piece of fatuous impudence is far from convincing. Besides, Dr. Farrar is shrewd enough to see that the sceptic may reply, "Very well, then, what is the use of your talking to me?" Consequently he falls back upon the contention that the evidences of Christianity are "largely historical." But instead of adducing these evidences, and firmly defending them, he flies back immediately to his special faculty. "Men of science tell us," he says, "that there are ultra-violet rays of light invisible to the naked eye. Supposing that such rays can never be made apprehensible to *our* individual senses, are we therefore justified in a categorical denial that such rays exist?" Certainly not. Those ultra-violet rays of light can be *demonstrated*. They *are* apprehensible, though not to the naked eye. The analogy, therefore, is perfectly fallacious. Nor would anyone but a hopelessly incapable logician have adduced such a *mal à propos* illustration. Dr. Farrar is affirming the existence of a spiritual faculty as common as sight, and whose absence is as rare as blindness, and he adduces an instance of a fact which is only known to specialists.

II. *There is no subject—and can be none—concerning which any human being is obliged to believe without evidence.*

This proposition of Ingersoll's is indisputable. Dr. Farrar allows its truth. But he says it "insinuates that Christianity is believed without evidence, and this is "outrageous and historically absurd." We will not discuss "outrageous," but we venture to say that "historically absurd" is a great absurdity. Nothing is clearer than that the mass of mankind, whether Christian or heathen, *do* believe without evidence. Their religion is simply a matter of education, and their faith depends on the geographical accident of their birth. Dr. Farrar may deny this, but every man of sense knows it is true.

We will not follow Dr. Farrar's tall talk about "the divine beauty of Christianity," the "unparalleled and transcendent loveliness" of Christ, and the "*proved* adaptation" (heaven save the mark!) of Christianity "to the needs of every branch of the human race." All this is professional verbiage. It is like the cry of "fresh fish!" in the streets, and is perfectly useless in discussion with Freethinkers.

III. *Neither is there any intelligent being who can, by any possibility, be flattered by the exercise of ignorant credulity.*

Dr. Farrar cannot deny this, but again he complains of insinuation. What right has Colonel Ingersoll to stigmatise as *ignorant credulity* "that inspired, inspiring," etc., etc.?

IV. *The man who, without prejudice, reads and understands the Old and New Testaments will cease to be an orthodox Christian.*

Dr. Farrar flies into a passion over this proposition, though the Catholic Church has always acted upon it, and tried to keep the Bible out of the people's hands. He also flies off on the question of "what is an orthodox Christian?" Colonel Ingersoll, he says, would probably include under the word *orthodox* "a great many views which many Christians have held, but which are in no sense a part of Christian faith, nor in any way essential to it." But who constituted Dr. Farrar the supreme authority on this question? Colonel Ingersoll judges for himself. He follows the sensible plan of taking the Bible as the Christian's standard. After that he takes the accepted and published doctrines of the great Christian Churches. He is not bound to discuss the particular views of Dr. Farrar. Indeed, it is ludicrous that at this time of day, nearly two thousand years after Christ, a discussion on Christianity should be stopped to settle what Christianity is.

V. *The intelligent man who investigates the religion of any country without fear and without prejudice will not and cannot be a believer.*

Ingersoll's opinion may be unpalatable to Christians, though they would endorse it with regard to every religion but their own. His language, however, is perfectly courteous. Having to convey such an opinion, he could not have chosen less irritating words. But this moderation is lost on Dr.

Farrar, who bursts into a characteristic storm of sound and fury.

"*Argal*, every believer in any religion is either an incompetent idiot [did you ever know a *competent* idiot?] or a coward with a dash of prejudice! If Colonel Ingersoll really takes in the meaning implied in his own words [really!], I should think that he would have [grammar!!] recoiled before the exorbitant and unparalleled hardihood of thus branding with fatuity, with craven timidity, or with indolent inability to resist a bias, the majority of mankind, as well as the brightest of human intellects. Surely no human being can be taken in by the show of self-confidence involved in such assertions as this! It is as useless to combat their unsupported obstreperousness as it is to argue with a man who bawls out a proposition in very loud tones [could he bawl in *soft* tones?] and thumps the table to emphasise his own infallibility. We have but to glance at the luminous path in the firmament of human greatness to see thousands of names of men whose intellect was, in comparison with the Colonel's, as Dhawalaghari to a molehill, who have yet studied each his own form of religion with infinitely [infinitely?] greater power than he has done, and have set to their seal that God is true."

Hallelujah! But after all this sputter the question remains where it was. Dr. Farrar is too fond of "words, words, words," and like Gratiano he can "talk an infinite deal of nothing." He would do well to study Ingersoll for a month or two, and prune the nauseous luxuriance of his own style.

Dr. Farrar gives a curious list of these gentlemen who have given God a certificate. It includes Charlemagne, who had such a fine notion of "evidence" that he offered the Saxons the choice of baptism or instant death, and so converted them at the rate of twenty thousand a day. It includes Shakespeare, whose irreligion is a byword among the commentators. It also includes Dr. Lightfoot and Dr. Westcott, two highly-fed dignitaries of the Church. Among the scientific names is that of Faraday, who "had the Christian faith of a child," which is a very happy description, for Faraday deliberately refused to submit his faith to any test of reason. Dr. Farrar mentions Darwin, Huxley and Tyndall as "exceptions." But they cease to be exceptions when the names of Haeckel, Büchner, Clifford, Maudsley, Galton, and a score of others are added. Among the poets, Tennyson and Browning may be called believers, but Swinburne, Morris, and Meredith are not; and in France the foremost living poet, Leconte de Lisle, is a pronounced Atheist. Sir William Hamilton was a

believer, but John Stuart Mill was not. Dr. Gardiner, the historian of England, is a believer, but Grote, the greater historian of Greece, was an Atheist. After all, however, this bandying of big names is perfectly idle. Propositions must ultimately rest on their evidence. What is the use of discussion if we are not to judge for ourselves?

Not only does Dr. Farrar give us a scratch list of eminent believers—as though every creed and every form of scepticism did not boast its eminent men—but he gives another list of assailants of Christianity, and declares that it has survived their attacks, as it will survive every assault that can be made upon it. It survived “the flashing wit of Lucian,” which, by the way, never flashed upon the ignorant dupes who were gathered into the early Christian fold. It survived “the haughty mysticism of Porphyry.” Yes, but how? By burning his books, and decreeing the penalty of death against everyone who should be found in possession of his damnable writings. It survived “the battering eloquence and keen criticism of Celsus.” Yes, but how? By destroying his writings, so that not a single copy remained, and all that can be known of them is the extracts quoted in the answer of Origen. Then there are Hobbes, Spinoza, Bayle, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Voltaire, Diderot, Strauss and Renan—and “what have they effected?”

This is what they have effected. They have broken the spirit of intolerance, and made it possible for honest thinkers to express their opinions. They have crippled the power of priests, tamed their pride, and compelled them to argue with heretics instead of robbing and murdering them. They have leavened Christian superstition with human reason, and made educated Christians ashamed of the grosser aspects of their faith. They have driven Dr. Farrar himself to juggle with the words of Scripture in order to get rid of the infamous doctrine of everlasting torture. They have compelled the apologists of Christianity to alter their theory of Inspiration, to discriminate between better and worse in the Bible, and to practise all kinds of subtle shifts in order to patch up a hollow treaty between religion and science. They have loosened the Church’s grasp on the mind of the child, and very largely secularised both private and public life, which

were once under the domination of priestcraft. They have made millions of Freethinkers in Christendom, shaken the faith of the very worshippers in their pews, and helped to create that ever growing indifference to religion, which is a theme of wailing at Church Congresses, and bids fair to absorb all the sects of theology, as the desert absorbs water or the ocean a fleet of sinking ships.

What have they effected? Dr. Farrar's article furnishes an answer. Fifty years ago what dignitary of the Church would have replied to an "infidel" except with anathemas and the terrors of the law? Now the proudest of them rush to cross swords with Colonel Ingersoll, and, although they do it with a wry face, they shake hands with him before beginning the combat. Fifty years ago what "infidel," if he openly avowed his infidelity, had the remotest chance of occupying any public post? Now Mr. John Morley is Mr. Gladstone's first lieutenant, and Mr. Bradlaugh himself was marked out as a member of the next Liberal administration. All this may be "nothing" to Dr. Farrar, but it is much to Freethinkers, and they need not argue who has the best reason to be satisfied.

Dr. Farrar proceeds to tackle Ingersoll's agnosticism. In doing so he explains why he introduces the word "infidel." He does not desire "to create an unfair prejudice." Why then does he use the word at all? Certainly he is incorrect in saying that "the word has always been understood to mean one who does not believe in the existence of God." "Infidel" was first used by the Christians as a name for the Mohammedans. It was afterwards applied to the unbelievers at home. The Deists of last century were called infidels. Voltaire and Thomas Paine are arch-infidels, and both believed in the existence of God. Johnson defines "infidel" as "an unbeliever, a miscreant, a pagan; one who rejects Christianity." Bailey as "a Heathen, or one who believes nothing of the Christian religion." A similar definition is given in Richardson's great dictionary. It is clear that Dr. Farrar's etymology is no improvement on his manners. He covers a bad fault with a worse excuse. We are ready, however, to make allowance for him. His mind is naturally loose, and he is rather the slave than the master of his words. In the

very next paragraph he says that "our beliefs are surrounded by immense and innumerable perplexities," forgetting that if they are immense they cannot be innumerable, and if they are innumerable they cannot be immense.

Ingersoll's arguments against theology are reduced by Dr. Farrar under four heads: "first, the difficulty of conceiving the nature of God; secondly, the existence of evil; thirdly, the impossibility of miracles; and fourthly, the asserted errors and imperfections of the Bible."

"Is it possible," asks Ingersoll, "for the human mind to conceive of an infinite personality?" Dr. Farrar replies, "Why, certainly it is; for human minds innumerable have done so." But have they? Dr. Farrar knows they have not. He knows they cannot. Otherwise he would not argue that we are bound to believe in the existence of things which are inconceivable.

"Can the human mind imagine a beginningless being?" asks Ingersoll. Dr. Farrar evades the question. He gives us another dissertation on conceivability. He asks whether Ingersoll believes "there is such a thing as *space*," and presently calls it "an entity." We venture to say that Ingersoll believes in nothing of the kind. You may call space "a thing," but it is only indefinite extension, as time is indefinite succession. The metaphysical difficulty arises when we try to use the word *infinite* in a positive sense. Then we are brought face to face with antinomies because we are trying to transcend the limits of our faculties. Still, it is absurd to affirm that "space is quite as impossible to conceive as God." We know extension by experience, and increasing it *ad infinitum* is rather an exercise in transcendent geometry than in practical reason. But what experience have we of God? Is it not easier to conceive that to be unlimited of which we have knowledge than that of which we have no knowledge at all? And if God be considered as a personality—without which he is not God—is it possible to combine infinitude and personality in the same conception? Dr. Farrar affirms that it is. We say it is not, and we appeal to the judgment of every man who will try to think accurately.

With regard to the existence of evil, all Dr. Farrar can say is that it is a mystery. Now a mystery, in theology, is

simply a contradiction between fact and theory, and arguing from mystery is only justifying a particular contradiction by a general contradiction. Dr. Farrar must also be exceedingly simple to imagine that it is any reply to Ingersoll to appeal to St. Paul. Nor is it permissible to argue from the assumed "restoration of all things" which is to take place in the future, unless conjecture and argument are the same thing, in which case it is idle to discuss at all, for every time the Christian is beaten he has only to start a fresh assumption. It is foolish, likewise, to complain that the argument from evil is an old one, and that there is "nothing new in the reiterated objection," for there is nothing new in the reiterated reply, and the objection remains unanswered. The Catholic theologian would address Dr. Farrar in the same futile fashion. He would reply to objections against Transubstantiation, for instance, that they are musty with age and have been answered again and again.

Dr. Farrar finally sees he has a poor case and resigns the argument. After trying to explain away a great deal of the world's evil by saying it is "transitory," which is questionable; or "phantasmal," which is a mockery; he ends by throwing up the sponge altogether. He admits he has "no compact logical solution of the problem," and cries out in despair that the theologians "are not called upon to construct theodiceas." But that is precisely what they *are* called upon to do, and if they cannot do it they should have the modesty to be silent. It is their function to "justify the ways of God to men." Let them perform it, or confess they cannot, and retire from their pretentious business.

But we must be just to Dr. Farrar. He does supply two arguments, not for God's goodness, but for God's existence. The first is "the starry heavens above." Did they come by *chance*?—as though God and chance were the only possible alternatives, or as though chance were anything but contingency arising from human ignorance!

"The starry heavens above." "*It is all very well, gentlemen, but who made these?*" asked the young Napoleon, pointing to the stars of heaven, as he sat with the French *savans* on the deck of the vessel which was carrying him to Egypt, after they had proved to their satisfaction that there is no God. To most minds it is a question finally decisive.

Colonel Ingersoll must smile at this childish logic. No doubt to most minds it is finally decisive. Who made the world or the stars? is a pertinent question to those who have been taught that they *were* made. It is an idle question to anyone with a moderate acquaintance with astronomy. On that subject the French *savans* were better informed than Napoleon.

Dr. Farrar is erroneous in supposing that the Atheist or Agnostic is bound to "account for the existence of matter and force." Accounting for them can only mean explaining how they began, and the Atheist or Agnostic is not aware that they *had* a beginning. The "source of life" is a question that biology must solve. Until it does, the "infidel" waits for information. No light is shed upon the problem by supernatural explanations. Still less is the "infidel" called upon to account for "the freedom of the will." He knows of no such freedom as Dr. Farrar means by this phrase. As for "the obvious design which runs through the whole of nature," it is so *obvious* that Charles Darwin wrote, "the longer I live the less I can see proof of design."

The second of the two things that are "ample to prove the being of a God" is "the moral law within." Dr. Farrar asserts that Conscience "is the voice of God within us." But assertion is not proof. Colonel Ingersoll would reply that Conscience is the voice of human experience. No student of evolution would admit Dr. Farrar's assertion. The origin and development of morality are seen by evolutionists to be perfectly natural. It is futile to make assertions which your opponent contradicts. Argument must rest upon admitted facts. Dr. Farrar strikes an attitude, makes dogmatic statements, draws out the conclusion he has put into them, and calls that discussion. He has yet to learn the rudiments of debate. The methods of the pulpit may do for a pious romance called the *Life of Christ*, but they are out of place in a discussion with Colonel Ingersoll.

Misled by his fondness for preaching, Dr. Farrar has forgotten two of the four heads under which he reduced Colonel Ingersoll's arguments. He says nothing about "the impossibility of miracles" or "the errors and imperfections of the Bible." But these are the very points that demanded his

attention. The existence of God, and the problem of evil, belong to what is called Natural Religion. Dr. Farrar is a champion of Revealed Religion. He is not a Deist but a Christian. He should therefore have defended the Bible. His omission to do so may be owing to prudence or negligence. He has given us fifteen pages of "A Few Words on Colonel Ingersoll." We should rejoice to see a "Fewer Words on Dr. Farrar"

ARCHDEACON FARRAR'S SEVEN SILLY QUESTIONS.

"ARCHDEACON FARRAR'S Seven Questions" is the title of a paragraph in the current number of *The Young Man*, a paper which is proving the certitude of Christian truth, after nearly two thousand years of preaching, by carrying on a symposium on "What is it to be a Christian?" We have interpolated the word "Silly," which is quite accurate, and for which we owe Dr. Farrar no apology, since he does not shrink from applying the description of "stupendous nonsense" to the belief of his opponents.

Our method of criticism shall be honest. We shall give the whole of the paragraph, and then answer the seven silly questions *seriatim*.

"If you meet with an Atheist, do not let him entangle you into the discussion of side issues. As to many points which he raises you must make the Rabbi's answer: 'I do not know.' But ask him these seven questions: 1. Ask him, What did matter come from? Can a dead thing create itself? 2. Ask him, Where did motion come from? 3. Ask him, Where life came from save the finger tip of Omnipotence? 4. Ask him, Whence came the exquisite order and design in nature? If one told you that millions of printers' types should fortuitously shape themselves into the divine comedy of Dante, or the plays of Shakespeare, would you not think him a madman? 5. Ask him, Whence

came consciousness? 6. Ask him, Who gave you free will? 7. Ask him, Whence came conscience? He who says there is no God, in the face of these questions, talks simply stupendous nonsense."

These questions, be it observed, are put with great deliberation. With regard to many points, not one of which is specified, Dr. Farrar admits that he can only say "I do not know." But on these particular points he is cocksure. His mind is not troubled with a scintillation of doubt. He has no hesitation in saying that those who differ from him are guilty of "stupendous nonsense." It is a matter for regret, however, that he did not answer the questions himself. By so doing he would have saved Christian young men the trouble of hunting up an Atheist, good at answering queries, in order to get the conundrums solved; while, as the case now stands, the Christian young men may go on for ever with a search as weary as that of Diogenes, unless they happen to light on this number of the *Freethinker*.

First (a) Question (we leave out "Silly" to avoid repetition): *What did matter come from?*—First prove that matter ever *came*, and we will then discuss what (or where) it came from. Matter exists, and for all that anyone knows to the contrary, it always existed. Its beginning to be and its ceasing to be are alike inconceivable. The question is like the old catch query, "When did you leave off beating your father?" the proper answer to which is, "When did I begin to beat my father?"

First (b) Question: *Can a dead thing create itself?*—The question is paradoxical. "Create itself" is a self-contradiction. Creation, however defined, is an act, and an act implies an actor. To create, a thing must first exist; and self-creation is therefore an absurdity. The question is consequently meaningless.

Second Question: *Where did motion come from?*—Another nonsensical question. Motion does not "come" as a special change. Motion is universal and incessant. Molecular movement is constantly going on even in what appear stable masses. The presumption is that this was always so in the past, and will be always so in the future.

Third Question: *Where did life come from save the finger*

tip of Omnipotence?—Why not the big toe of Omnipotence? Life is not an entity, but a condition. Its coming from anywhere is therefore nonsensical. A living *thing* might “come,” because its position in space can be changed. Then arise fresh difficulties. Can any man conceive the finger of an infinite being, or form a mental picture of life, as a something, flowing from the tip of that finger? The question of the origin of life pertains to the science of biology. When biology answers it, as it has answered other perplexed questions, Dr. Farrar will be enlightened. Meanwhile his ignorance is no excuse for his dogmatism.

Fourth (a) Question: *Whence came the exquisite order and design in nature?*—This is tautology. Design in nature includes order in nature. And the question invites a Scotch reply. *Is there design in nature?* No one disputes that there is *adaptation*, but this is explained by Natural Selection. The fit, that is the adapted, survives. But the unfit is produced in greater abundance than the fit. Theologians look at the *result* and blink the *process*. Darwin, who studied both, said, “Where one would most expect design, namely, in the structure of a sentient being, the more I think the less I can see proof of design.” Dr. Farrar must catch his hare before he cooks it. He must prove design before he requires the Atheist to explain it. Perhaps he will begin with idiots, cripples, deaf mutes, fleas, bugs, lice, eczema, cancers, tumors, and tapeworms.

Fourth (b) Question: *Could millions of printers' types fortuitously shape themselves into the works of Dante or Shakespeare?*—No, nor even into the works of Dr. Farrar. But who ever said they could? Why not ask Atheists whether the moon could be made of green cheese? Dr. Farrar is no doubt alluding to what is called Chance. But Atheists do not recognise chance as a cause. Chance is contingency, and contingency is ignorance. The term denotes a condition of our minds, not an operation of external nature.

Fifth Question: *Whence came consciousness?*—This is a very silly or a very fraudulent question. Putting the problem in this way insinuates a theological answer. Consciousness, like life, is not an entity, and did not come from

anywhere. The only proper question is, What is the nature of consciousness? This is an extremely difficult and intricate problem. It will be solved, if at all, by the Darwinians of physio-psychology, not by the Farrars of the pulpit. The worthy Archdeacon and the Christian young men must wait until their betters have explained the development of consciousness. The supposition that *they* understand it is simply ludicrous. Nor is any theory to be built on the bog of their ignorance.

Sixth Question: *Who gave you free will?*—Ay, who? Has man a free will, in the metaphysical sense of the words? Martin Luther replied in the negative. He would have laughed, or snorted, at Dr. Farrar's question. Atheists are all with Martin Luther on this point; although, of course, they reject his theory that God and the Devil are always contending for the rulership of the human will. They hold that the will is determined by natural causes, like everything else in the universe. To ask an Atheist, therefore, who gave him free will, is asking him who gave him what he does not possess.

Seventh Question: *Whence came conscience?*—This, again, is stupidly expressed. Conscience did not "come" from anywhere. Further, before the Atheist answers Dr. Farrar's question, even in an amended form, he requires a definition. What is meant by Conscience? If it means the perception of right and wrong, it is an intellectual faculty, which varies in individuals and societies, some having greater discrimination than others. If it means the recognition of distinct, settled categories of right and wrong, it depends on social and religious training. In a high state of civilisation these categories approximate to the laws of social welfare and disease; in a low state of civilisation they are fantastic and fearfully distorted by superstition. There is hardly a single vice that has not been practised as a virtue under a religious sanction. Finally, if conscience means the feeling of obligation, the sense of "I ought," it is a product of social evolution. It is necessarily generated among gregarious beings, and in the course of time Natural Selection weeds out the individuals in whom it is lacking or deficient. Social types of feeling survive, and the anti-social perish. And this is the whole "mystery" of conscience.