

their interests are not fairly represented; that they are not dealt with in a fair spirit of trust and forbearance; if they be isolated and estranged by pride and neglect; or sought for to be cajoled; or hardened by want of sympathy: then, when they awaken to the sense of their full power, they may, in "bettering the example," be "dangerous;"—*but not else!*

ART. V.—JOHN STUART MILL.

Autobiography. By JOHN STUART MILL. London:
Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer. 1873.

THE present memoir which John Stuart Mill has bequeathed to the world contains, not the narrative of a life, but the growth of a mind. We find none of the smaller incidents and details that make up the history of the individual, and which readers commonly look for with a pardonable curiosity and interest, greater or less in degree, according to the importance of the place the author of the biography has filled in public estimation. It is not therefore surprising that those who had expected a graphic picture of an entire career, intellectually remarkable, should feel some disappointment, and conclude that the real memoir has still to be written. Against any expectation of this sort Mr. Mill in the first words of the autobiography has done his utmost to guard. He wrote it, he tells us, not with any conception of self-importance, but because education is now a subject of more profound study among us than at any former period of our history, and the experiment, as it might well be called, of which he is an example, may tend to economize the tasks of the young, and save the many early years that are little better than wasted; because it might interest and help those, who in an age of transition are searchers for truth, to see how one engaged in the same pursuit has profited by a readiness to learn and to unlearn in his forward course; and last, but not least, because he desired to acknowledge the debt which he believed that in his moral and intellectual development he owed to others.

The absence of any minute record of passing events affecting himself or the persons and objects immediately around him, cannot be regarded as a defect. It is obviously the very condition under which the work is prepared. We see that the author rigidly adheres to the purposes indicated. He does not permit himself to be diverted by any matters, however interesting they might have been to himself, but which he looks upon as valueless

to the world. His evident design is, first to convey by the testimony of experience of no ordinary kind, a great lesson on the extent of teaching or education that it is possible for the mature mind to communicate to the immature; and again, on that never-ceasing process of education which continues from youth to manhood, and thence to the latest period of life, which it is the business of every mind to gather for itself.

In order that this education should have its proper and beneficent influence on character, he shows that it must not simply operate on the reasoning powers—that there is needed the culture of the feelings as well as of the reason; that the work is moral as well as intellectual. Having dwelt on the process for reaching more perfectly that condition of mental equilibrium the best suited for forming a right judgment of the result of conduct and action, we learn the effect which his labour to attain, and his progress toward that condition, had in confirming or modifying his earlier views of the great subjects affecting mankind, sociological and economical principles, law, religion, and political government.

Although it is difficult to assent to the judgment Mr. Mill pronounces upon himself, that in powers of apprehension and memory, and in activity and energy of character, he was rather below than above par, yet it is impossible not to perceive from the facts stated to what an incalculable degree he was indebted to the early training of his father, which enabled him, as he says, to start with the advantage of a quarter of a century over his contemporaries.

James Mill must be regarded as one of the most remarkable men of his own or any other age. Born without any of the advantages of fortune, and educated by the aid of one of the Barons of the Exchequer in Scotland, after whom he named his son, he went through the studies of the University of Edinburgh, and was licensed for a preacher, but finding himself unable to believe the Church doctrines, he left the profession. Holding, and always fearlessly asserting, opinions both in politics and religion more odious at that time to the influential and wealthy of this country than they have been either before or since, he maintained himself and his family by his work as a tutor and an author. Amidst the perpetual interruptions of settled labour, caused by this necessary struggle for existence, added to the time employed in the education of his children, he planned and in about ten years completed the "History of India." In this work he comments with great severity on many of the acts of the East India Company in their government, and expresses unqualified hostility to their commercial privileges. A book full of opinions and modes of judgment of a democratic

radicalism, then regarded as extreme,—he might, as his son truly observes, have expected it at some future period to win for him reputation, but certainly not advancement. The Directors of the East India Company, feeling a far deeper personal responsibility in the exercise of their powers than perhaps can be expected from the members of an executive government, whose attention is at best divided between considerations of party exigency and regard for the public good, perceived in the author of the *History* the qualities of a public servant of inestimable value, and disregarding his adverse criticisms, appointed him to an important office in their establishment. It is an event rare in the dispensation of public patronage, and should be ever remembered to their honour. The *Autobiography* contains very much relating to the character and works of James Mill, which deserves an attentive perusal, and there are few who will not agree in the judgment, that his place was an eminent one in the literary and political history of his country. He died in 1836. "The eighteenth century," Mr. Mill observes, "was an age of strong and brave men;" and he was a fit companion for its strongest and bravest. The last of that century, as Brutus was called the last of the Romans, he had continued its tone of thought and sentiment into, without partaking of the reaction which was the characteristic of, the first age of the nineteenth.

It was the good fortune of Mr. Mill that his education from his earliest years was conducted by such a teacher. The account of the progress which he made is full of instruction for a people now entering upon the work of National Education, and who are almost everywhere treating the mere instruments of knowledge as its substitute. While this *Autobiography* was in the press, an address was delivered by one who has given as much study to the subject of Education as any one living, pointing out the utter insufficiency of an educational method which assumes that the power to read will develop the love of reading—the ability to understand and appreciate what is read, to choose the worthy and reject the unworthy, elevate the taste, arm it against temptation, and ennoble life!* What is needed is the training of the mind, "to observe nature, animate and inanimate, to watch and classify ordinary social arrangements, to trace the relation of cause and effect, to think of the consequences of different kinds of actions, and to guide conduct accordingly; to forego immediate enjoyment for the sake of greater good to oneself or others." We perceive in the *Autobiography*, how these, the true objects of Education, were attained, the mechanical part being subordinated

* See "Professor Hodgson's Address as President of the Educational Department, Social Science Congress, Norwich," (*Transactions*). 1873.

and acquired almost unconsciously. Mr. Mill tells us that he had no remembrance of the time when he began to learn Greek. He had been told that it was when he was three years old. His earliest recollection on the subject was that of committing to memory what his father termed vocables, being lists of common Greek words, with their signification in English, which he wrote out for him on cards. Of grammar, until some years later, he learnt no more than the inflexions of the nouns and verbs, but, after a course of vocables, proceeded at once to translation :—

“The only thing besides Greek, that I learnt as a lesson in this part of my childhood was arithmetic : this also my father taught me ; it was the task of the evenings, and I well remember its disagreeableness. But the lessons were only a part of the daily instruction I received. Much of it consisted in the books I read myself, and my father’s discourses to me, chiefly during our walks. From 1810 to the end of 1813 we were living in Newington Green, then an almost rustic neighbourhood. My father’s health required considerable and constant exercise, and we walked habitually before breakfast, generally in the green lanes towards Hornsey. In these walks I always accompanied him, and with my earliest recollections of green fields and wild flowers, is mingled that of the account I gave him daily of what I had read the day before. To the best of my remembrance this was a voluntary rather than a prescribed exercise. I made notes on slips of paper while reading, and from these in the morning walks, I told the story to him ; for the books were chiefly histories, of which I read in this manner a great number : Robertson’s histories, Hume, Gibbon ; but my greatest delight, then, and for long afterwards, was Watson’s Philip the Second and Third. . . . Next to Watson, my favourite historical reading was ‘Hooke’s History of Rome.’ Of Greece I had seen at that time no regular history, except school abridgments and the last two or three volumes of a translation of Rollin’s Ancient History, beginning with Philip of Macedon. But I read with great delight ‘Langhorne’s Translations of Plutarch.’ In English history, beyond the time at which Hume leaves off, I remember reading ‘Burnet’s History of his Own Time,’ though I cared little for anything in it except the wars and battles ; and the historical part of the ‘Annual Register,’ from the beginning to about 1788, where the volumes my father borrowed for me from Mr. Bentham left off. I felt a lively interest in Frederick of Prussia during his difficulties, and in Paoli, the Corsican patriot ; but when I came to the American War, I took my part, like a child as I was (until set right by my father) on the wrong side, because it was called the English side. In these frequent talks about the books I read, he used, as opportunity offered, to give me explanations and ideas respecting civilization, governments, morality, mental cultivation, which he required me afterwards to restate to him in my own words. He also made me read, and give him a verbal account of many books which would not have interested me sufficiently to induce me to read them of myself. Among others, ‘Millar’s Historical View of the English Government,’ a book of great

merit for its time, and which he highly valued ; 'Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History,' 'McCrie's Life of John Knox,' and even 'Sewell and Ruttys Histories of the Quakers.' . . . Two books which I never wearied of reading were 'Anson's Voyages,' so delightful to most young persons, and a collection (Hawkesworth's, I believe) of 'Voyages round the World,' in four volumes, beginning with Drake and ending with Cooke and Bougainville. Of children's books, any more than playthings, I had scarcely any, except an occasional gift from a relation or acquaintance ; among those I had, 'Robinson Crusoe' was pre-eminent, and continued to delight me through all my boyhood. It was no part, however, of my father's system to exclude books of amusement, though he allowed them very sparingly."

The Latin and Greek stories were carried on from his eighth to his twelfth year. Among other authors he read much of Cicero. His strongest predilection was for history, especially ancient, and writing histories was throughout his boyhood a voluntary exercise. A spontaneous attempt at a continuation of Pope's Iliad, led to a command of his father to continue his attempts at English versification. Experimental Science, especially Chemistry—not by actual experiment, but as treated in scientific works—was also one of his greatest amusements. In this course of instruction a method was adopted in which the mind was actively employed without being overtaxed.

"Most boys or youths who have had much knowledge drilled into them have their mental capacities not strengthened, but overlaid by it. They are crammed with mere facts, and with the opinions or phrases of other people, and these are accepted as a substitute for the power to form opinions of their own ; and thus the sons of eminent fathers, who have spared no pains in their education, so often grow up mere parroters of what they have learnt, incapable of using their minds, except in the furrows traced for them. Mine, however, was not an education of cram. My father never permitted anything which I learnt to degenerate into a mere exercise of memory ; he strove to make the understanding not only go along with every step of the teaching, but, if possible, precede it. Anything which could be found out by thinking I never was told until I had exhausted my efforts to find it out for myself."

Once he had used the word idea, and his father instantly asked what an idea was, and expressed displeasure at his ineffectual attempts to define the word. On another occasion, he used an expression—still commonly repeated by not less than nine out of ten of the so-called instructed classes—that something was true in theory, but false in practice ; provoking the indignation of his father, who, after making him vainly strive to define the word theory, explained its meaning, and showed him the fallacy of the vulgar form of speech he had uttered. In and after his twelfth year the objects of instruction were chiefly re-

garded—not the aids and appliances of thought, but the thoughts themselves. The reading of the scholastic logic, then begun, was accompanied and followed by the numerous and searching questions of his father in their daily walks.

“It was his invariable practice, whatever studies he exacted from me, to make me, as far as possible, understand and feel the utility of them. . . . I well remember how, and in what particular walk in the neighbourhood of Bagshot Heath (where we were on a visit to his old friend Mr. Wallace, then one of the mathematical professors at Sandhurst), he first attempted, by questions, to make me think on the subject, and frame some conception of what constituted the utility of the syllogistic logic; and when I had failed in this, to make me understand it by explanation. The explanations did not make the matter at all clear to me at the time; but they were not, therefore, useless; they remained as a nucleus for my observations and reflections to crystallize upon; the import of his general remarks being interpreted to me, by the particular instances which came under my notice afterwards. My own consciousness and experience ultimately led me to appreciate, quite as highly as he did, the value of an early practical familiarity with the school logic. I know of nothing, in my education, to which I think myself more indebted for whatever capacity of thinking I have attained. The first intellectual operation in which I arrived at any proficiency was dissecting a bad argument, and finding in what part the fallacy lay; and though whatever capacity of this sort I attained, was due to the fact that it was an intellectual exercise in which I was most perseveringly drilled by my father; yet, it is also true, that the school logic and the mental habits acquired in studying it, were among the principal instruments of this drilling, I am persuaded that nothing, in modern education, tends so much, when properly used, to form exact thinkers, who attach a precise meaning to words and propositions, and are not imposed on by vague, loose, or ambiguous terms. The boasted influence of mathematical studies is nothing to it, for in mathematical processes none of the real difficulties of correct ratiocination occur. It is also a study peculiarly adapted to an early stage in the education of philosophical students, since it does not presuppose the slow process of acquiring, by experience and reflection, valuable thoughts of their own. They may become capable of disentangling the intricacies of confused and self-contradictory thought, before their own thinking faculties are much advanced; a power which, for want of some such discipline, many otherwise able men altogether lack; and when they have to answer opponents, only endeavour, by such arguments as they can command, to support the opposite conclusion, scarcely even attempting to confute the reasonings of their antagonists; and, therefore, at the utmost, leaving the question, as far as it depends on argument, a balanced one.”

There was no author to whom James Mill had thought himself more indebted for his own mental culture than Plato, or whom

he more frequently recommended to young students; and to the value of this recommendation his pupil bears the like testimony. By the Socratic method, the man of vague generalities is constrained either to express his meaning to himself in definite terms, or to confess that he does not know what he is talking about. The perpetual testing of general statements by particular instances, the siege in form laid to abstract terms, the distinctions which limit and define the thing sought, and separate it from the cognate objects, Mr. Mill pronounces to be an education for precise thinking which is inestimable, and one which, even at that early age, took such hold of him as to become part of his own mind.

High as the cultivation of the intellect stands, it is not that alone that is needed for the creation of a better ideal of humanity. In the parental intercourse there had been, if not a want of tenderness, at least the absence of its display. His father, Mr. Mill remarks, resembled most Englishmen in being ashamed of the signs of feeling, and starving it by want of demonstration. He found that intellectual culture required correction by joining other kinds of cultivation with it. Poetry, art, music, to which he had not before been unsusceptible, began at an early period to fill a large place in his thoughts. In this part of his self-education he encountered, in his circle of friends, an opposite theory. There were those who, if possessed of strong susceptibilities of temperament, yet found them more painful than pleasurable—as standing rather in their way than the contrary; and who, therefore, regarded the pleasures to be derived from the fine arts as impediments, rather than aids in the formation of character. Mr. Mill considered it too much a part of the English habit, derived from social circumstances, to count the sympathies for very little in the scheme of life,—to see little good in cultivating the feelings, and none at all in doing so through appeals to the imagination. He more than once adverts to this side of English life—the absence of enlarged thoughts and unselfish desires, the low and petty objects on which the faculties are, for the most part intent, and the habit of taking for granted that they are always the motives of conduct; and the effect of this, in lowering the tone of feeling, making people less earnest, and causing them to look on the most elevated objects as unpractical, or too remote from realization, to be more than a vision or a theory.

Several incidents in the *Autobiography* are introduced to show the wholesome and vivifying power which the fancy and imagination can exercise over the will. Between his eighth and twelfth years he spent intervals of time at Ford Abbey, the occa-

sional abode of Mr. Bentham, and he regarded these visits as fruitful in his education. Elevation of sentiments in a people are nourished by the large and free character of their habitations. The mediæval architecture and the spacious and lofty rooms of Ford Abbey, so unlike the cramped externals of English middle-class life, gave the sentiment of a larger and freer existence. The house and grounds in which it stood, secluded, umbrageous, and full of the sound of falling waters, were to him in themselves a sort of poetic cultivation. Again, two or three years later, Sir Samuel Bentham and his wife, whom he refers to as "a daughter of Dr. Fordyce, and a woman of much knowledge and good sense of the Edgeworth kind," invited their brother's young friend and disciple to their residence in the South of France, at the Château of Pompignan, on the heights overlooking the plain of the Garonne between Montauban and Toulouse. He spent nearly a year in this visit, accompanying his hosts in an excursion of some duration to the Pyrenees. This, his first introduction to the highest order of mountain scenery, gave a colour to his tastes through life. After adverting to the lectures on chemistry, zoology, and logic which he attended in the winter at Montpellier, he adds that the greatest, perhaps, of the many advantages which he owed to this episode in his education was, that of having breathed for a whole year the free and genial atmosphere of continental life, though at that time he did not estimate or consciously feel the advantage he was deriving. It was not until long afterwards that he learnt to appreciate the general culture of the understanding, which results from the habitual exercise of the feelings, and is thereby carried down into the most uneducated classes of several countries on the Continent in a degree rarely equalled in England.

The impulse and force given to the cultivation of new tastes and sympathies, served to elevate the ideal of a noble and unselfish life which his previous teaching had done much to form. Of his earliest historic readings he says, "the heroic defence of the knights of Malta against the Turks, and of the revolted provinces of the Netherlands against Spain, excited in me an intense and lasting interest." His father was fond of putting into his hands books which exhibited men of energy and resource in unusual circumstances, struggling against difficulties and overcoming them. The interest which in boyhood he had taken in the wars and conquests of the Romans culminated in an engrossing contemplation of the struggles between the patricians and plebeians, and in his juvenile essays he vindicated the Agrarian Laws, and upheld the Roman Democratic party. In his fifteenth or sixteenth year, in 1821 or 1822, after his visit to France, he read the history of the French Revolution. Then, he says:—

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"I learnt with astonishment that the principles of democracy, then apparently in so insignificant and hopeless a minority everywhere in Europe, had borne all before them in France thirty years earlier, and had been the creed of the nation. As may be supposed from this, I had previously a very vague idea of that great commotion. I knew only that the French had thrown off the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV. and XV., had put the King and Queen to death, guillotined many persons, one of whom was Lavoisier, and had ultimately fallen under the despotism of Bonaparte. From this time, as was natural, the subject took an immense hold of my feelings. It allied itself with all my juvenile aspirations to the character of a democratic champion. What had happened so lately, seemed as if it might easily happen again; and the most transcendent glory I was capable of conceiving was that of figuring successful, or unsuccessful, as a Girondist in an English Convention."

This admiration of great and persistent effort in a worthy cause, which with advancing years he came more and more to regard as of incalculable value, in bringing the memory and imagination to the aid of conduct, had been early rooted in his mind."

"Long before I had enlarged in any considerable degree the basis of my intellectual creed, I had obtained, in the natural course of my mental progress, poetic culture of the most valuable kind, by means of reverential admiration for the lives and characters of heroic persons; especially the heroes of philosophy. The same inspiring effect which so many of the benefactors of mankind have left on record that they had experienced from 'Plutarch's Lives,' was produced on me by 'Plato's Picture of Socrates,' and by some modern biographies, above all by 'Condorcet's Life of Turgot'—a book well calculated to rouse the best sort of enthusiasm, since it contains one of the wisest and noblest of lives, delineated by one of the wisest and noblest of men. The heroic virtue of these glorious representatives of the opinions with which I sympathized, deeply affected me, and I perpetually recurred to them as others do to a favourite poet, when needing to be carried up into the more elevated regions of feeling and thought."

It is interesting to trace the abiding influence of the remembrance of great examples, and of the memories of an heroic past, in the fact which Mr. Mill mentions, that upwards of thirty years after the impressions, of which he speaks in the foregoing extract, had taken root, the thought of completing and giving to the world as a volume the "Essay on Liberty," first arose in his mind, in mounting in 1865, the steps of the Capitol.

We have described Mr. Mill in his youth, as a disciple of Bentham, but this he does not appear thoroughly to have become until, in 1821 or 1822, he read the *Traité de Législation*, which he terms an epoch in his life. The standard of "the greatest

happiness," the exposure of the fallacy contained in such sounding expressions, as "law of nature," "right reason," and "moral sense," burst upon him with all the force of novelty. The classification of offences and punishment under the guidance of the ethical principle, of pleasurable and painful consequences, seemed to place the moralist and student of jurisprudence upon an eminence, from which he could survey a mental domain of vast extent, affording the most aspiring prospects of practical improvement in human affairs. It opened to him a grand conception of the changes to be effected in the condition of mankind through that doctrine. Before this time the book which had contributed most largely to his education in the best sense of the word, was his father's *History of India*. In this he was not alone. There are others living who acknowledge, as he does, their debt to this work, and to its disquisitions on society and civilization, on institutions, and acts of government, for a multitude of new ideas, and for a great impulse and stimulus as well as guidance in their future studies.

After the *Traité de Législation* followed the reading of most of the other works of Bentham; of Locke's *Essay*, an abstract was made, and discussed, and the other principal English writers on mental philosophy were also read. In 1822 he wrote his first argumentative essay, on the aristocratic prejudice which is supposed to attribute to the rich, moral qualities superior to those of the poor, and in the winter of the same year he gathered together and formed a small society of young men called the *Utilitarian Society*.* In 1823 his father obtained for him an appointment in the office of *Examiner of India Correspondence* in the service of the Company.

The constant occupation in the India House had the necessary effect of abridging his opportunities of gratification afforded by a country life, and by travel. The latter was now restricted to the short annual holiday.

"I passed (he says) most Sundays throughout the year in the country, taking long rural walks on that day even when residing in London. The month's holiday was, for a few years, passed at my father's house in the country: afterwards a part or the whole was spent in tours, chiefly pedestrian, with some one or more of the young men who were my chosen companions; and at a later period, in longer journeys or excursions, alone, or with other friends. France, Belgium, or Rhenish Germany were within easy reach of the annual holiday: and two longer absences, one of three, the other of six months, under medical advice, added Switzerland, the Tyrol, and Italy to my list. Fortunately, also, both these journeys occurred rather early, so

* A title borrowed from Galt's "Annals of the Parish."

as to give the benefit and charm of the remembrance to a large portion of my life."

In a chapter entitled "Youthful Propagandism," we are told of the efforts which were made to propagate the main tenets of Utilitarian Radicalism in the columns of the *Globe and Traveller*, the *Morning Chronicle*, and finally in the *Westminster Review*. His part in the first appearance of this Review, had been that of reading through all the volumes of the *Edinburgh Review*, and making notes of the articles which he thought his father would like to examine for the purpose of his intended paper. This article, of James Mill, treated the *Edinburgh Review* as the political organ of one of the two aristocratic parties constantly endeavouring, without any essential sacrifice of aristocratical predominance, to supplant each other. The *Quarterly Review* was the subject of an article, as a sequel to that of the *Edinburgh*. Mr. Mill was one of the most active of the very small number of young men who, drawn around his father, had imbibed from him a greater or smaller portion of his opinions, and were supposed to form the so-called Bentham school in philosophy and politics. The chief characteristics of their creed were in politics, an almost unbounded confidence in the efficacy of two things; representative government and complete freedom of discussion; and in psychology the formation of all human character by circumstances, through the universal principle of association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind by education. It was in the spirit of what Mr. Mill terms youthful fanaticism that these opinions were seized by the little knot of young men of whom he was one. For himself, he conceives that the epithet of "reasoning machine" was not altogether untrue, or may be said to be as applicable to him as it could well be to any one, for two or three years of his life:—

"Ambition and desire of distinction I had in abundance, and zeal for what I thought the good of mankind was my strongest sentiment, mixing with and colouring all others. But my zeal was little else, at that period of my life, than zeal for speculative opinions. It had not its root in genuine benevolence, or sympathy with mankind, though these qualities held their due place in my ethical standard. Nor was it connected with any high enthusiasm for ideal nobleness. Yet of this feeling I was imaginatively very susceptible: but there was at that time an intermixture of its natural aliment, poetical culture, while there was a superabundance of the discipline antagonistic to it, that of mere logic and analysis. Add to this, as already mentioned, my father's teaching led to the under-valuing of feeling. It was not that he was himself cold-hearted or insensible; I believe it was rather from the contrary quality; he thought that feeling could take care of itself; that

there was sure to be enough of it if actions were properly cared about."

"From this neglect both in theory and in practice of the cultivation of feeling, naturally resulted, among other things, an undervaluing of poetry, and of imagination generally, as an element of human nature." "As regards me (and the same thing might be said of my father), the correct statement would be, not that I disliked poetry, but that I was theoretically indifferent to it. I disliked any sentiments in poetry which I should have disliked in prose, and that included a great deal. And I was wholly blind to its place in human culture, as a means of educating the feelings; but I was always personally very susceptible to some kinds of it. In the most sectarian period of my Benthamism, I happened to look into Pope's *Essay on Man*, and though every opinion in it was contrary to mine, I well remember how powerfully it acted on my imagination."

A time came when something more was felt to be needed. The attainment of a condition of physical comfort alone, in which the pleasures of life would no longer be kept up by struggle, and in the midst of privation, could afford no sufficient hope of human happiness. What had been founded in a large degree on the intellectual and abstract conception of aggregate results, had to be converted into an exercise of genuine benevolence, and sympathy with individual distress and suffering. For the mere rational conviction that such and such things were good and evil, and the proper objects of praise and blame, reward and punishment, higher and deeper motives were substituted. At the same time in external things, a sense of vague and general admiration of grandeur and beauty was concentrated and intensified by examples brought into immediate contact with the mind and eye. The experiences of the time led him to adopt a theory of life which, while admitting that all rules of conduct must be tried by their tending to promote happiness as the end of life, yet that end could not be reached by its direct and sole pursuit, or by making it the principal object of desire. This has given occasion to a singular criticism. "He found," say the objectors, "that it was not a safe or successful course to pursue happiness as a direct end, therefore," they add, "it follows, that it is not the proper end and aim of life, and the utilitarian principle fails!" This is a confusion of two things entirely distinct from each other, the particular and the general happiness, and the diverse methods of their pursuit. Nothing in the theory that the happiness of the individual should not be the direct end of his existence, would forbid the direct pursuit of ordinary pleasures. He may attend the performance of a play of Shakspeare, or listen to a composition of Mendelssohn, set out on a spring day for a woodland walk, or ascend an Alpine hill, with a direct view to the enjoyment which such a

use of his time will produce. But if one passes his life in seeking nothing else but his own direct and personal enjoyment, if he does not look beyond this to a higher and nobler purpose of existence—a purpose into which the idea of its bearing upon his individual happiness does not enter, except as a sense of the performance of duty in the promotion of the good of others, which is attended with an unsought pleasure—the narrow objects he has pursued will ultimately fail him, and the time will come of decaying natural powers, and of blunted capacities for the accustomed enjoyment. Breadth of affection is an element in its durability. “When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring for nobody but themselves. To those who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death; while those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and health.”* “I do not,” he said, in concluding his address to the University of St. Andrews, “attempt to instigate you by the prospect of direct rewards, either earthly or heavenly; the less we think about being rewarded in either way, the better for us. But there is one reward which will not fail you, and which may be called disinterested, because it is not a consequence, but is inherent in the very fact of deserving it; the deeper and more varied interest you will feel in life, which will give it tenfold its value, and a value which will last to the end. All merely personal objects grow less valuable as we advance in life; this not only endures but increases.”

He was also now led to give its proper place to internal culture, as among the prime necessities of human well-being. We have seen how much of the pleasure he had before enjoyed had been derived from the love of rural objects and natural scenery. He now found in the poetry of Wordsworth, the expression not alone of outward beauty, but of “states of feeling, and of thought coloured by feeling, under the excitement of beauty.”

“In them I seemed to draw from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginary pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings; which had no connexion with struggle or imperfection, but would be made richer by every improvement in the physical or social condition of mankind. From them I seemed to learn what would be the perennial sources of happiness, when all the greater evils

* Utilitarianism. Its Meaning, p. 20.

of life shall have been removed. And I felt myself at once better and happier as I came under their influence." . . . "I needed to be made to feel that there was real permanent happiness in tranquil contemplation. Wordsworth taught me this, not only without turning away from, but with a greatly increased interest in the common feelings and common destiny of human beings."

This part of the *Autobiography* introduces the acquaintance with Frederick Maurice and John Sterling, the former a disciple of Coleridge, and the latter of Coleridge and Maurice, and both were of use in his development. Nothing is more interesting than the account Mr. Mill gives us of his intimacy with them:—

"With Sterling I soon became very intimate, and was more attached to him than I have ever been to any other man. He was indeed one of the most loveable of men. His frank, cordial, affectionate, and expansive character; a love of truth, alike conspicuous in the highest things and humblest; a generous and ardent nature, which threw itself with impetuosity into the opinions it adopted, but was as eager to do justice to the doctrines and the men it was opposed to, as to make war on what it thought their errors; and an equal devotion to the two cardinal points of Liberty and Duty, formed a combination of qualities as attractive to me, as to all others who knew him as well as I did. With his open mind and heart, he found no difficulty in joining hands with me across the gulf which as yet divided our opinions. He told me how he and others had looked upon me (from hearsay information) as a made or 'manufactured' man, having had a certain impress of opinions stamped on me, which I could only reproduce; and what a change took place in his feelings when he found, in the discussion on Wordsworth and Byron, that Wordsworth, and all that that name implies, 'belonged' to me as much as to him and his friends."

From a brief view of the sources and method of Mr. Mill's education, and the primary effect it had on his mind and character, we pass to the opinions of his mature years, and then to some of the results of those opinions upon his labours in moral and political science, as well as in practical politics.

And first, on the subject of religion, the *Autobiography* supplies us with a less perfect account of the opinions of Mr. Mill than it is understood we may expect from some hitherto unpublished essays which will be soon before the world. What is to be collected from the work before us cannot, however, properly be passed over in silence. The views of James Mill are clearly stated.

"My father had been early led to reject not only the belief in Revelation, but the foundations of what is commonly called natural religion. I have heard him say that the turning-point of his mind

on the subject was reading Butler's Analogy. That work, of which he always continued to speak with respect, kept him, as he said, for some considerable time, a believer in the divine authority of Christianity; by proving to him that whatever are the difficulties in believing that the Old and New Testaments proceed from, or record the acts of, a perfectly wise and good being, the same and still greater difficulties stand in the way of the belief, that a being of such a character can have been the Maker of the Universe. He considered Butler's argument as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it was intended. Those who admit an omnipotent as well as perfectly just and benevolent maker and ruler of such a world as this, can say little against Christianity but what can, with at least equal force, be retorted against themselves. Finding, therefore, no halting place in Deism, he remained in a state of perplexity, until, doubtless, after many struggles, he yielded to the conviction that, concerning the origin of things, nothing whatever can be known. . . . These particulars are important, because they show that my father's rejection of all that is called religious belief, was not, as many might suppose, primarily a matter of logic and evidence; the grounds of it were moral still more than intellectual. He found it impossible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an Author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness."

While he impressed upon his son from the first that the manner in which the world came into existence was a subject on which nothing was known—

"He at the same time, took care that I should be acquainted with what had been thought by mankind on these impenetrable problems. I have mentioned at how early an age he made me a reader of ecclesiastical history; and he taught me to take the strongest interest in the Reformation, as the great and decisive contest against priestly tyranny for liberty of thought."

In this negative state of opinion on religion which one of the critics of the Autobiography gravely attributes to the want, on the part of both father and son of a comprehension of the higher mathematics, Mr. Mill grew up.

"I looked (he says) upon the modern exactly as I did upon the ancient religion, as something which in no way concerned me. It did not seem to me more strange that English people should believe what I did not, than that the men I read of in Herodotus should have done so. History had made the variety of opinions among mankind a fact familiar to me, and this was but a prolongation of that fact."

Of unbelievers (so called) as well as of believers, Mr. Mill observes, there are many species, including almost every variety of moral type, many of the best of the former being more generally religious in the best sense of the word, than those who exclusively arrogate to themselves the title. They repudiate all dogmatism, and especially dogmatic atheism, which they regard as absurd;

but they deny that beings endowed with reasoning faculties are justified in permitting themselves to receive as true the character and acts commonly attributed to an Omnipotent Author of all things, who created the human race with the infallible foreknowledge, and therefore with the intention that the great majority of them were to be consigned to terrible and everlasting torment.

“Though they may think the proof incomplete that the universe is a work of design, and they assuredly disbelieve that it can have an Author and Governor who is *absolute* in power as well as perfect in goodness, they have that which contributes the principal worth of all religions whatever, an ideal conception of a Perfect Being, to which they habitually refer as the guide of their conscience; and this ideal of good is usually far nearer to perfection than the objective Deity of those who think themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in [one whom they are taught to believe is] the author of a world so crowded with suffering and so deformed with injustice as ours.”

In this aspect, the argument, however orthodox believers are disposed to repudiate it, ought to be regarded even by them according to its manifest design, as an effort to vindicate the Divine Ideal. It is the belief of those who thus argue that a low and imperfect conception of the Being which is adored, radically vitiates the standard of morals, and causes fictitious excellences to be set up and substituted for genuine virtues. It is true that—

“Christians do not in general undergo the demoralizing consequences which seem inherent in such a creed, in the manner, or to the extent which might have been expected from it. The same slovenliness of thought, and subjection of the reason to fears, wishes, and affections, which enable them to accept a theory involving a contradiction in terms, prevents them from perceiving the logical consequences of the theory.”

Another cause through which such consequences are avoided may be found in the great counteracting principles that are embodied in the Christian doctrine, and which teach forbearance, love of others, and self-sacrifice. These, the fundamental teachings of Christianity, apart from dogma, few would appreciate better than Mr. Mill. He found in them the corroboration of the doctrine he advocated. “In the golden rule,” he says, “of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.”

Mr. Mill attributes one bad consequence to this part of his education. In giving him an opinion contrary to that of the world, his father thought it necessary to give it as one which could not be prudently avowed to the world. This lesson of keeping his thoughts to himself at that early age was attended

with some disadvantages, though his limited intercourse with strangers, especially such as were likely to speak to him on religion, prevented him from being placed in the alternative of avowal or hypocrisy. Looking at the present advance in the liberty of discussion since the time of which he was speaking, he thinks that few men of his father's intellect and public spirit, with such intensity of moral conviction, would now withhold his opinions from the world, unless in cases, becoming fewer every day, in which frankness would risk the loss of subsistence, or be an exclusion from a sphere of usefulness to which the individual was particularly suited. On religion—

“The time appears to have come, when it is the duty of all, who being qualified in point of knowledge, have on mature consideration satisfied themselves that the current opinions are not only false but hurtful, to make their dissent known; at least, if they are among those whose station or reputation, gives their opinion a chance of being attended to. Such an avowal would put an end, at once and for ever, to the vulgar prejudice, that what is called, very improperly, unbelief, is connected with any bad qualities either of heart or mind. The world would be astonished if it knew how great a proportion of its brightest ornaments—of those most distinguished even in popular estimation for wisdom and virtue—are complete sceptics in religion; many of them refraining from avowal, less from personal considerations, than from a conscientious, though now in my opinion a most mistaken apprehension, lest by speaking out what would tend to weaken existing beliefs, and by consequence (as they suppose) existing restraints, they should do harm instead of good.”

As years have passed on, the evidences of the truth of this view of the progress of thought have multiplied. Mr. Mill mentions the well-remembered collision of his friend Frederick Maurice with orthodox opinion, and the penalty to which he submitted rather than recognise a doctrine utterly inconsistent with a Divine benevolence. Between himself and Sterling the distance in opinion we find was always diminishing. Still later the author of “*Literature and Dogma*,” setting out from a starting-point as distant as the poles, and pursuing an entirely different route, has sought like him to raise an ideal conception of a true Divine Guide. What is the object of that moral and intellectual culture which Mr. Mill has laboured to prove the most suitable for mankind, other than that they should be taught to know, “the best that has been thought and said in the world?” In what does the Ideal of Perfection, to which he refers as the best guide of the human conscience, differ from that “Enduring Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness?”

Turning to philosophy let us see what was the especial object

which Mr. Mill had in view in his examination of that of Sir William Hamilton. And here the first thing that strikes the reader is, that even in his most abstract works, those apparently of a nature purely speculative, and falling within the region of metaphysics, he had chiefly, if not wholly, in view a great and practical end. He did not seek merely to establish a barren theory of remote application, but to assert a truth which to the extent to which it was accepted and influenced conduct, might have a practical result in the consideration of the conditions of human existence. It was nothing less than this which led him to attack the foundation of a system, that theoretically denies the effect of the conditions of existence upon the moral as well as the intellectual state of society, and thus goes far to discourage and cripple real efforts for improvement.

“The difference between these two schools of philosophy, that of Intuition and that of Experience and Association, is not a mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the greatest differences of practical opinion in an age of progress. The practical reformer has continually to demand that changes be made in things which are supported by powerful and widely-spread feelings, or to question the apparent necessity and indefeasibility of established facts; and it is often an indispensable part of his agreement to show, how those powerful feelings had their origin, and how those facts came to seem necessary and indefeasible. There is therefore a natural hostility between him and a philosophy which discourages the explanation of feelings and moral facts, by circumstances and associations, and prefers to treat them as ultimate elements of human nature; a philosophy which is addicted to holding up favourite doctrines as intuitive truths, and deems intuition to be the voice of Nature and of God, speaking with an authority higher than that of reason. In particular, I have long felt that the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked distinctions of human character as innate, and in the main indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part of those differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not only might, but naturally could be produced by differences in circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human improvement. My father’s *Analysis of the Mind*, my own *Logic*, and Professor Bain’s great *Treatise*, had attempted to re-introduce a better mode of philosophizing, latterly with quite as much success as could be expected; but I had for some time felt that the mere contrast of the two philosophies was not enough, that there ought to be a hand-to-hand fight between them, that controversial as well as expository writings were needed, and that the time was come when such controversy would be useful.”

The treatise on Liberty Mr. Mill regards as likely to survive longer than anything else he has written, with the possible

exception of the *Logic*. It stood pre-eminent in his estimation, not only from its intrinsic importance, but as the last and most elaborate result of the joint labours of himself and his wife, and consecrated to her memory. None of his other writings was either so carefully composed or sedulously corrected. "After it had been written as usual twice over, we kept it by us, bringing it out from time to time, and going through it *de novo*, reading, weighing, and criticising every sentence."

The joint revision, which was to have been the work of the winter of 1858-9, was frustrated by Mrs. Mill's death. Its publication was his first undertaking after that event. It is, he says, the text-book of a single truth—the importance to man and society of a large variety in types of character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions. A danger was that the growth of social equality, and of a submission to public opinion, should impose on mankind an oppressive yoke of uniformity in opinion and practice. The doctrine of Individuality, the right and duty of self-development, asserted by insulated thinkers from age to age, worked out in the labours of Pestalozzi, and having among its promulgators Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe, De Tocqueville, and others less known but not less ardent in its cause, was with modifications and differences of detail embodied in this work. It was, moreover, in direct conflict with Positivism. Agreeing with Comte that from the necessity of the case, the mass of mankind, even including their rulers, must accept many of their opinions on political and social matters, as they do on physical, from the authority of those who have made those subjects their especial study; that Europe during the Middle Ages had greatly profited by the distinct organization of the spiritual power, and the moral and intellectual ascendancy once exercised by priests would naturally pass into the hands of philosophers, he yet repudiated with his utmost energy the conclusion that a corporate hierarchy should be formed of the latter. He could not see in such a body any bulwark against oppression, or security for good government. The "*Système de Politique Positive*" he regarded as the most complete system of spiritual and temporal despotism which had ever emanated from the human brain, except possibly that of Ignatius Loyola. "The book stands a monumental warning to thinkers on society and politics, of what happens when once men lose sight in these speculations, of the value of Liberty and Individuality." The *Essay on Liberty* has recently been the subject of an able and appreciative article by Mr. John Morley,* to which we may refer our readers.

* *Fortnightly Review*, August, 1873, pp. 234-256.

On Political Economy, especially in the distinction between the laws of the production and distribution of wealth, Mr. Mill's later views were a material modification of his earlier ones. The capacity to learn and unlearn, which he regards as essential to real progress, one of his reviewers describes as a constant state of vacillation, and an absence of any firm standing ground. Mr. Mill had no fear of such reproaches. In the days of his most extreme Benthamism he tells us that he had seen little further than the old school of political economists, into the possibilities of fundamental improvement in social arrangements. He subsequently became less indulgent to ordinary social opinion, and less willing to be content with secondary and more superficial improvements. Any diminution of the evil involved in the fact that while some are born to riches, the vast majority inherit nothing but poverty—except such amelioration as might result from a voluntary restraint on the numbers of the latter—had before appeared chimerical. While still repudiating the tyranny of the society over the individual which most Socialistic systems involve, he came to look forward to a time when the division of the produce of labour will depend less on the accident of birth, and it will be more common for all to labour strenuously to procure benefits that shall not be exclusively their own, but shall be shared by the society of which they are members. The capacity of all classes to learn by practice to combine and labour for public and social purposes, and not solely for narrowly interested ones, had always existed, and was not hindered by any essential difficulty in the constitution of our nature. Why should it be more difficult to persuade a man to dig or weave for his country than to fight for it? In the gradual formation of such opinions, and their publication in the second and third editions of the *Principles of Political Economy*, we must not pass over the share which Mr. Mill attributes to his wife. No one who knew him will feel surprise at the place which her memory fills in the *Autobiography*. Few narratives appeal more powerfully to every mind sensitive to human affections than the story of their partnership of thought, of feeling, concurrent labour, and entire existence; and in truth there seem to have been qualities existing in each which made their association with one another eminently valuable. One happily possessed that which the other needed. The chapter on Political Economy which Mr. Mill believes has had the most influence on opinion,—that on “*The Probable Future of the Labouring Classes*,” he informs us is entirely due to his wife. She pointed out the need of such a chapter, and the imperfection of the book without it. It certainly deals with that part of the subject in which the reflections of an acute woman, conversant with the social necessities of the

people around her, would be likely to be of great value. Thoroughly sensible of the folly of premature attempts to dispense with the inducements of private interest in social affairs, they welcomed all experiments, such as co-operative societies, which whether they succeeded or failed, would be an education for those who took part in them, by cultivating their capacity for acting upon motives pointing directly to a more general good. Speaking of this work, he says:—

“It was chiefly her influence that gave to the book that general tone by which it is distinguished from all previous expositions of political economy that had any pretensions to being scientific, and which has made it so useful in conciliating scientific minds which those previous expositions had repelled. This tone consisted chiefly in making the proper distinction between the laws of the production of wealth, which are real laws of nature, dependent on the properties of objects, and the modes of its distribution, which, subject to certain conditions, depend on human will. The common run of political economists confuse these together, under the designation of economic laws, which they deem incapable of being defeated or modified by human effort; ascribing the same necessity to things dependent on the unchangeable conditions of our earthly existence, and to those which, being but the necessary consequences of particular social arrangements, are merely co-extensive with these: given certain institutions and customs, wages, profits, and rent will be determined by certain causes; but this class of political economists drop the indispensable presupposition, and argue that these causes must, by one inherent necessity, against which no human means can avail, determine the shares which fall, in the division of the produce, to labourers, capitalists, and landlords. The ‘Principles of Political Economy’ yielded to none of its predecessors in aiming at the scientific appreciation of the action of these causes, under the conditions which they presuppose; but it set the example of not treating those conditions as final. The economic generalizations which depend, not on necessities of nature, but on those combined with the existing arrangements of society, it deals with only as provisional, and as liable to be much altered by the progress of social improvement.”

An observation is often made that Mr. Mill was not a practical politician. Indeed, his more virulent detractors have not shrunk from attributing to him an “utter incapacity to grapple with practical legislation or the real business of life.” The ground of this conclusion is not very difficult to discover. It arises from a radical difference in the sense of duty. To those who measure the value of the business of life, and the practical character of those who undertake it, by the immediate prospect of success, by the probability of their acquiring some personal distinction or profit, in fact, by the question whether the work is likely “to pay,” Mr. Mill’s labours will naturally appear mistaken and absurd. We can fancy the supreme contempt with which such critics

must have read in the Autobiography, "the idea, that the use of my being in Parliament was to do work which others were not able or not willing to do, made me think it my duty to come to the front in defence of advanced Liberalism, on occasions when the obloquy to be encountered was such as most of the advanced Liberals in the House preferred not to incur." Mr. Mill was one of those who are dissatisfied with human life as it is, and whose feelings are wholly identified with its radical amendment. With such there are two main regions of thought, one that of ultimate aims, the constituent elements of the highest realizable ideal of human life; the other that of the immediately useful and practically attainable. Some test of the value of these criticisms may be found by selecting one or two of the principal subjects within the domain of politics, to which a portion of the labours of Mr. Mill have been directed. For this purpose let us take, first, the general question of Government, in the aspect in which it is presented to modern inquirers; and secondly, the legislation affecting the proprietorship or occupation of land.

First, on government, Mr. Mill thought that in his father's "Essay on Government," the premises were too narrow, and included but few of the general truths on what, in politics, the important consequences depend. He was dissatisfied with the answer to the criticisms of Macaulay, and thought a better reply would have been, "I was not writing a scientific treatise on politics, but an argument for Parliamentary reform." His progress in logical analysis subsequently helped him to a different conception of philosophical method as applicable to politics, of the pedantry of adopting and promulgating a systematized political creed. He acquired a conviction that the true system of political philosophy was something much more complicated and many-sided than he had previously had any idea of, and that its object was to supply, not a set of model institutions, but principles from which the institutions suitable to any given circumstances might be deduced. This train of thought produced a clearer conception than he had ever before had of the peculiarities of an era of transition in opinion, and he ceased to mistake the moral and intellectual characteristics of such an era for the normal attributes of humanity. He looked forward to a period of unchecked liberty of thought, and unbounded freedom of individual action in all modes not hurtful to others, combining the best qualities of the critical with the best qualities of the organic times.

A complete view of his most matured opinions on the subject will be found in the Considerations on Representative Government. The problem stated is the combination of complete popular control over public affairs, with the greatest attainable perfection of skilled agency. James Mill, as well as his son,

were in comparison with others who hold democratic opinions, comparatively indifferent to monarchical or republican forms; and, in this work, the existence of a constitutional monarchy—with an hereditary king—is considered, as in many cases, a favourable condition for the attainment of good government. He may, by his position, have an interest in raising and improving the mass, under circumstances such as those which make up a great part of the history of the English Parliament. In other cases where none, or only some fraction of the people feels a degree of interest in affairs of State necessary to the formation of a public opinion, and the suffrage is only used by the electors to serve their private interest, or that of the locality, or of particular persons, of whom they are adherents or dependents, the selfish and sordid factions of which the assembly is likely to be composed, if struggling for the Presidency or chief place in the Government, would, as in the case of Spanish America, keep the country in a state of chronic revolution and civil war. A despotism of illegal violence would be exercised by a succession of political adventurers, and representation would have no effect but that of preventing that stability of government by which some of the evils of a legal despotism are mitigated. In such a case, the struggle for place—under an hereditary king—would be far less mischievous. The tranquillity of Brazil, as compared with that of the other parts of the South American continent, is an illustration of this argument. In our own government, Parliament virtually decides who shall be Prime Minister, or who shall be the two or three individuals from whom the Prime Minister shall be chosen, without nominating him, but leaving the appointment of the head of the administration to the Crown, in conformity with the general inclinations which the Parliament has manifested. This initiative method, in the formation of the executive government, seemed to Mr. Mill to stand on as good a footing as possible. In this conclusion he will have the sympathy of most of the English people, who will not readily be persuaded that the periodical election of a President would be an improvement in Government.

The evil effect produced on the mind of any holders of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only themselves to consult, was the consideration which appeared to him of the greatest weight in favour of a second chamber. Without it the majority in a single assembly, might easily become overweening and despotic. It was this which induced the Romans to have two Consuls. In every polity there should be a centre of resistance to the predominant power. If any people, possessing a democratic representation, are, from

their historical antecedents, more willing to tolerate such a centre of resistance in the form of a second Chamber or House of Lords than in any other shape, this constitutes a strong reason for so constructing it. It did not, however, appear to him the best or most efficacious shape. Of such a body, the construction of the Roman Senate seemed to be the best example. He suggests how a chamber of statesmen might be formed of the heads of the Courts of Law ; those who had been Cabinet Ministers ; the more distinguished chiefs in the Army and Navy ; the diplomatic servants of long-standing ; governors of colonies and dependencies. In England it was highly improbable, from its historical antecedents, that any second chamber could possibly exist which is not built on the foundation of the House of Lords ; but there might be no insuperable difficulty in adding the classes mentioned, to the existing body, in the character of peers for life.

It is in the constitution of the Representative Assembly that his hopes of good Government depend, and he devotes a chapter to the consideration of its infirmities and dangers. The greatest among these is the delivery over of the management of public affairs to the representatives of a numerical majority alone, and the placing of all the unrepresented classes at their mercy. It is as possible, and as likely, for this numerical majority, being the ruling power of a democracy, to be as much under the dominion of sectional or class interests, or supposed interests, as any other ruling power. The constituencies to which most of the highly educated and public-spirited persons in the country belong—those of the large towns—are in great part either unrepresented or misrepresented. This had been thought irremediable, and from despairing of a cure, people had gone on for the most part to deny the disease. An attempt to obtain a somewhat more true representation, proposed by Earl Russell in one of the Reform Bills, met with no support. The late Mr. Marshall subsequently suggested the method of the cumulative vote, to rescue at least some portion of a constituency from the tyranny of the numerical majority. This system is now tolerably well understood from the experience of the school board elections, and consists in enabling the electors of every constituency, having more than one representative, not only to give, as before, one vote to each person to be chosen, but, instead of that, to give all their votes to one, or distribute them as they please among the candidates. The effect of this system may be made clearly intelligible in a few words, which will show also its infirmities, as a vehicle for bringing into the elected body any complete expression or representation of the individual thought or study of the members of a large community. Thus suppose 100 persons are about to elect a committee of 4 to

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settle some business which concerns them, and that 21 out of the 100 place their confidence in A, while 51 prefer B, C, D, and E, as those through whom their interests will be better secured. Under the old system, the latter might have elected the whole committee; and not only the 21 desiring to be represented by A, but as many as 28 others might have been excluded from any voice in their deliberations. With the cumulative system, every voter may give his 4 votes to any one or more candidates, and thus 21 persons may give their single candidate 84 votes; the other 79 persons cannot altogether poll more than 316 votes, one of their candidates at least must, therefore, be left with no more than 79 votes, and the election of the candidate of the united 21 is thus secured. It will be thus seen that though it is a great improvement on the exclusive majority system, it yet requires that the holders of opinions differing from the majority shall combine and adhere rigidly together in voting for the same person in order that their success may be certain. If one or two of the 21 had failed to poll for their candidate, the efforts of all the rest of the 21 might be thrown away; or the 79, not submitting to direction, may, if there were more candidates than 5, have less representatives than they are entitled to by their numbers. Meetings, verbal and written communications, and the guidance of party leaders are necessary; and every sort of manipulation may thus be brought to bear. If the voter does not approve of the candidates presented to his constituency, he is helpless; and if he does, he cannot, without placing himself in the hands of the party leaders or agents, be certain that his vote will have any effect.

The method of popular election, which has since been known under the various appellations of the Minority, Personal, Proportional, and Preferential, system, had been put forward in a crude form in 1857,* and in its matured shape in 1859.† This system effected the object that Mr. Mill had thought desirable as an antidote to the exclusive representation, and therefore exclusive rule of local majorities, and was at the same time subject to none of the infirmities and inconveniences of the cumulative system, inasmuch as it enabled every single elector, while he exercised the most extensive choice practicable, to give an independent vote, with the certainty that it will not be thrown away. The scheme was made known to Mr. Mill in 1859, after the publication of his "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," and it immediately obtained his assent and adoption. After a careful

* "The Machinery of Representation." Maxwell, 1857.

† "A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal." Longmans, 1859.

examination of the proposed plan, in a letter* suggesting an alteration in a matter of detail, he said that it appeared to him "to have exactly, and for the first time, solved the difficulty of popular representation, and by so doing to have raised up the cloud of gloom and uncertainty that hung over the futurity of representative government, and therefore of civilization." In a conversation on the subject which took place a few weeks afterwards Mr. Mill expressed his belief and expectation that the idea of such an improvement as was proposed would soon have a prominent place in the minds of statesmen and reformers; and those who were present have not forgotten that almost his first inquiry was, whether the plan had been brought to the attention of Mr. Gladstone. "Had I met with the system," Mr. Mill says, in his Autobiography, "before the publication of my pamphlet, I should have given an account of it there. Not having done so, I wrote an article in *Fraser's Magazine*, reprinted in my miscellaneous writings, principally for that purpose. In his "Considerations on Representative Government," he devotes the greater part of a chapter to this subject.† After explaining the mode in which the votes would be given and counted, and referring to Mr. Fawcett's pamphlet on the system, he explains its immediate result, that all parties sufficiently numerous to be entitled to be represented would be sure of being so; that the representation would be real and not merely nominal, or what is called "virtual;" that the tie between the elector and representative would commonly have a strength, value, and permanence now unknown; that while localities would secure adequate attention, general and national interests would be paramount; that every person in the nation honourably distinguished among his countrymen would have a fair chance of election, and with such encouragement such persons might be expected to offer themselves in numbers hitherto undreamt of; that when the electors were no longer reduced to Hobson's choice, the majorities would be compelled to look out and put forward men of higher calibre, and their leaders could no longer foist upon the people the first person who presents himself with the catchword of the party in his mouth, and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket; that it would correct the tendency of representative government towards collective mediocrity; that though the representatives of the majorities would be the most in number, they must speak and vote in the presence and subject to the criticism of their opponents, and before the public.

* March 3, 1859.

† Chapter vii. "True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only."

“The multitude have often a true instinct for distinguishing an able man when he has the means of displaying his ability in a fair field before them. If such a man fails to obtain any portion whatever of his just weight, it is through institutions or usages which keep him out of sight. In the old democracies there were no means of keeping out of sight any able man: the bema was open to him; he needed nobody’s consent to become a public adviser. It is not so in a representative government; and the best friends of representative democracy can hardly be without misgivings that the Themistocles or Demosthenes whose counsels would have saved the nation, might be unable during his whole life to obtain a seat. But if his presence in the representative assembly can be insured, or even a few of the first minds in the country, though the remainder consists only of average minds, the influence of these leading spirits is sure to make itself sensibly felt in the general deliberations, even though they be known to be in many respects opposed to the tone of popular opinion and feeling. . . . This portion of the assembly would also be the appropriate organ of a great social function, for which there is no provision in any existing democracy, but which in no government can remain permanently unfulfilled without condemning that government to infallible degeneracy and decay. This may be called the function of Antagonism. In every government there is some power stronger than all the rest; and the power which is strongest tends perpetually to become the sole power. Partly by intention, and partly unconsciously, it is ever striving to make all other things bend to itself, and is not content while there is anything which makes permanent head against it, any influence not in agreement with its spirit. Yet, if it succeeds in suppressing all rival influences, and moulding everything after its own model, improvement in that country is at an end, and decline commences. Human improvement is a product of many factors, and no power ever yet constituted among mankind includes them all; even the most beneficent power only contains in itself some of the requisites of good, and the remainder, if progress is to continue, must be derived from some other source. No community has ever long continued progressive, but while a conflict was going on between the strongest power in the community and some rival power: between the spiritual and temporal authorities; the military or territorial and the industrious classes; the king and the people; the orthodox and religious reformers. When the victory on either side was so complete as to put an end to the strife, and no other conflict took its place, first stagnation followed, and then decay. The ascendancy of the numerical majority is less unjust, and on the whole less mischievous, than many others, but it is attended with the very same kind of dangers, and even more certainly; for when the government is in the hands of one or a few, the many are always existent as a rival power, which may not be strong enough ever to control the other, but whose opinion and sentiment are a moral, and even a social, support to all who, either from conviction or contrariety of interest, are opposed to any of the tendencies of the ruling authority. But when the democracy is supreme, there is no one or few strong enough for dissentient opinions and injured or menaced interests to lean upon.

The great difficulty of democratic government has hitherto seemed to be, how to provide in a democratic society what circumstances have provided hitherto in all the societies which have maintained themselves ahead of others—a social support, a *point d'appui*, for individual resistance to the tendencies of the ruling power; a protection, a rallying point, for opinions and interests which the ascendant public opinion views with disfavour. For want of such a *point d'appui*, the older societies, and all but a few modern ones, either fell into dissolution or became stationary (which means slow deterioration) through the exclusive predominance of a part only of the conditions of social and mental well-being.

“Now, this great want the system of personal representation is fitted to supply, in the most perfect manner which the circumstances of modern society admit of. . . . The representatives who would be returned to Parliament by the aggregate of minorities, would afford that organ in its greatest perfection. A separate organization of the instructed classes would, if practicable, be invidious, and could only escape from being offensive by being totally without influence. But if the *élite* of these classes formed part of the Parliament, by the same title as any other of its members—by representing the same number of citizens, the same numerical fraction of the national will—their presence could give umbrage to nobody, while they would be in the position of highest vantage, both for making their opinions and counsels heard on all important subjects, and for taking an active part in public business. Their abilities would probably draw to them more than their numerical share of the actual administration of government; as the Athenians did not confide responsible public functions to Cleon or Hyperbolus (the employment of Cleon at Pylos and Amphipolis was purely exceptional), but Nicias, and Theramenes, and Alcibiades, were in constant employment both at home and abroad, though known to sympathize more with oligarchy than with democracy. The instructed minority would, in the actual voting, count only for their numbers, but as a moral power they would count for much more, in virtue of their knowledge, and of the influence it would give them over the rest. An arrangement better adapted to keep popular opinion within reason and justice, and to guard it from the various deteriorating influences which assail the weak side of democracy, could scarcely by human ingenuity be devised. A democratic people would in this way be provided with what in any other way it would almost certainly miss—leaders of a higher grade of intellect and character than itself. Modern democracy would have its occasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior and guiding minds.”*

Subsequently in Parliament, in moving, as an amendment to Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill, the introduction of clauses for the distribution of seats according to the proportional system, Mr. Mill brought it forward in an expository and argumentative

* “Considerations on Representative Government.” 3rd edit. p. 148-152.

speech.* The House was, however, as might be expected, unprepared for its consideration. The debate is not, however, uninteresting, as much perhaps for what was not, as for what was, said. Mr. Mill, in his *Autobiography*, adds on this subject:—

“I was active in support of the very imperfect substitute for that plan, which in a small number of constituencies, Parliament was induced to adopt. This poor makeshift had scarcely any recommendation, except that it was a partial recognition of the evil which it did so little to remedy. As such, however, it was attacked by the same fallacies, and required to be defended on the same principles, as a really good measure; and its adoption in a few parliamentary elections, as well as the subsequent introduction of what is called the Cumulative Vote in the elections for the London School Board, have had the good effect of converting the equal claim of all electors to a proportional share in the representation, from a subject of merely speculative discussion, into a question of practical politics, much sooner than would otherwise have been the case.”

The view which Mr. Mill took of the absolute need of this change in the method of creating representative bodies, is in no small degree justified by the attention which it has since received in our own† and in nearly every other country where free institutions exist.‡ Its fundamental principle is, in fact, a corollary of that of Individuality. It puts forward in a practical shape the necessity of freedom for individual action. It liberates every voter from the condition of being an instrument of those around him, and enables him to bring all he knows and feels,—his maturest judgment, to his aid in the choice of the man in whose hands he would place power. We know that there are many who are ignorant or stupid, and to whom this discretion would be of little use. It is enough to say that they would be no worse off than they now are, and could do far less harm in corrupting and degrading the constituency of which they are a part. On the other hand, there are large numbers whose intelligence and public spirit ought not to be wasted and lost to the nation. A careful observer of the English mind and manners, and one who certainly takes no optimist view of the present or future conditions of society, in his latest publication, remarks that “no nation in the world possesses anything like so large a class of intelli-

* “Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,” 30 May, 1867, vol. clxxxvii. pp. 1343-1362.

† See “The Debate on Mr. Morrison’s Bill—Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,” vol. cexii. pp. 890-926.

‡ “The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal.” A Treatise. By Thomas Hare. 4th edit. Appendices A to O, pp. 292-380. See also on the Empirical Character of the Three-cornered Constituency Clause, and the Cumulative Vote.—*Ibid.* pp. 16-19. Longmans, 1873.

gent, independent, and vigorous-minded men in all ranks of life, who seriously devote themselves to public affairs, and take the deepest possible interest in the national success and well-being;" while he truly adds that, "the character of our public men is the sheet-anchor on which our institutions depend. So long as political life is the chosen occupation of wise and honourable men, who are above jobs and petty personal views, the defects of Parliamentary Government may be endured; but if the personal character of English politicians should ever be seriously lowered, it is difficult not to feel that the present state of the constitution would give bad and unscrupulous men a power for evil hardly equalled in any other part of the world."* The safeguard surely is to place it distinctly and certainly in the power of every intelligent and vigorous-minded elector to give a vote which shall secure the return of a wise and honourable man.

Secondly, on the Land Laws. A pamphlet, entitled "England and Ireland," published before the season of 1868, after an argument to show the undesirableness, for Ireland as well as for England, of separation, contained a proposal for settling the land question by giving to the tenants a permanent tenure, at a fixed rent, to be assessed after due inquiry by the State:—

"If no measure short of that which I proposed would do full justice to Ireland, or afford a prospect of conciliating the mass of the Irish people, the duty of proposing it was imperative; while if, on the other hand, there was any intermediate course which had a claim to a trial, I well knew that to propose something which would be called extreme, was the true way not to impede, but to facilitate a more moderate experiment. It is most improbable that a measure conceding so much to the tenantry as Mr. Gladstone's Irish Land Bill, would have been proposed by a Government, or could have been carried through Parliament, unless the British public had been led to perceive that a case might be made, and perhaps a party formed, for a measure considerably stronger. It is the character of the British people, or at least of the higher and middle classes who pass muster for the British people, that to induce them to approve of any change, it is necessary they should look on it as a middle course: they think every proposal extreme and violent unless they hear of some other proposal going still further, upon which their antipathy to extreme views may discharge itself. So it proved in the present instance; my proposal was condemned, but any scheme for Irish Land Reform, short of ruin, came to be thought moderate by comparison. I may observe that the attacks made on my plan usually gave a very incorrect idea of its nature. It was usually discussed as a proposal that the State should buy up the land and become the universal landlord; though, in fact, it only offered to each individual landlord this as an

* "Parliamentary Government." By James Fitzjames Stephen, Q.C. *Contemporary Review*, Dec. 1873, p. 3.

alternative, if he liked better to sell his estate than to retain it on the new conditions ; and I fully anticipated that most landlords would continue to prefer the position of landowners to that of Government annuitants, and would retain their existing relation to their tenants, often on more indulgent terms than the full rents on which the compensation to be given them by Government would have been based."

With regard to the English land system, Mr. Mill says that the criticisms of the St. Simonians had some effect in showing the very limited and temporary value of the old political economy, which assumes all the rules affecting private property and inheritance as indefeasible facts, and the abolition of entails and primogeniture—the freedom of production and exchange, as the *dernier mot* of social improvement. The question here, as in other subjects, was the way in which all practicable ameliorations could be justly and wisely aided, by the promulgation of sound principles and adopting the means best suited to lead to their application. Asserting emphatically the value of private property as the root of industry, the ultimate object appeared to be that of uniting the greatest individual liberty of action with a wide diffusion and accessibility of the ownership of land—the raw material of the globe. With this view Mr. Mill took the chief part in framing the programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association, to which he gave his name and cordial support. We find in this programme the result of a careful study both of what he thought desirable, and what he deemed at once possible—the distant ideal, and the course to be immediately taken towards its accomplishment, or to bring us nearer to a better condition of things. It contains all that is comprehended in the words "free land" as recently interpreted, but it does not stop there. Concurring with those who believe that merely opening the ownership of land to competition in the money market, however valuable it may be in one of the aspects of economical improvement, would do but very little towards placing it under the control of the workman or giving him a direct interest in it ; he regarded it as an indispensable condition that some part of the land of the kingdom should be placed within the reach of the industrious labourer, so as to be attainable in the shape of property of reasonable duration. The programme of the Association consists of ten articles. The earlier clauses contain the old tenets of the "free land" reformers. We will take the clauses in their inverse order, the last seven being especially the work of Mr. Mill. A prominent object, we find, is the mental culture of the classes which have the least opportunity for such improvement, by encouraging and fostering their tastes for rural scenery, for history, and art. The things to which he felt himself so greatly indebted—the love of nature and of

beauty, and the cultivation of the power of recalling in the imagination what is memorable and great in former ages, he would bring home to all, as things not to be forgotten in the daily struggles for material results. The programme (X.) claims the preservation of all natural objects or artificial constructions attached to the soil, of historical, scientific, or artistic interest; that (IX.) the less fertile lands, and especially those within reach of populous districts, should be retained in a state of wild natural beauty, for the general enjoyment of the community, and the encouragement in all classes of healthful rural tastes, and of the higher order of pleasures. The next clauses deal with land already belonging to the public, or dedicated to permanent uses, not of a private character. They ask (VIII.) that land of which Parliament alone can authorize the inclosure shall be retained for national uses, compensation being made for manorial and common rights; that (VII.) lands belonging to the crown, to public bodies, or charitable and other endowments, be made available to be let for co-operative agriculture, and to small cultivators, as well as for the improvement of the dwellings of the labouring classes; and no such lands to be suffered (unless in pursuance of those ends, or for exceptional reasons) to pass into private hands. To protect such lands from alienation to private uses, which is rapidly taking place; to obviate all legal impediments to a voluntary dedication of land to public objects, and to secure their prudent and productive administration under skilled district agents of local appointment, exercising their powers without partiality to any class, Mr. Mill approved the action of the Association in the preparation and introduction of the "Public Lands and Commons Bill," of 1872.* His view of endowments it is known differed materially from that of Turgot. It forms the subject of the first article in his "Dissertations and Discussions."† Notwithstanding, he observes, the reverence due to that illustrious name, it is now allowable to regard his opinion of that subject as the prejudice of the age. Mankind are dependent for the removal of their ignorance and defect of culture, mainly on the unremitting exertions of the more instructed and cultivated, to awaken a consciousness of this want, and to facilitate the means of supplying it. "The instruments for the work are not merely schools and colleges, but every means by which the people can be reached, either through their intellect or their sensibilities, from

* See "Hansard's Parliamentary Debates," vol. ccxii. p. 583. (Erroneously printed as "Commons' Protection, &c., Bill") 3 July, 1872.

† "The Right and Wrong of State Interference with Corporation and Church Property." Published in *The Jurist* for May, 1833.

preaching and popular writing, to national galleries, theatres, and public games. Here is a wide field of usefulness open to foundations."

His article on this subject, first published in 1833, shadowed forth the policy which has now, in spite of the opposition of bodies and persons interested in retaining local patronage, and influence arising from the power of dealing with estates, and selecting beneficiaries, been partially adopted by the Government and Parliament. The only point as to which Mr. Mill's opinions had undergone a change was on the question of the utility of endowments being held in the shape of land. In the essay referred to, he spoke of the evils of allowing land to pass into mortmain—adding that trustees ought to have no concern with the money, except applying it to its purposes. Their time and attention should not be divided between their proper business and the management of landed estates. He now felt that the only objections to the application of the produce of land to the uses of endowments would be obviated altogether by separating the management of the property from the administration of its income. If the management were placed under competent local agents, having charge of large districts, responsible alike to the public and the several institutions, and always accessible to the offers of cultivators and tenants of all classes, vast tracts of land in the country, and extensive areas covered with houses in cities and towns, would be opened to co-operative associations and others, whom the prejudices of private owners, in favour of fewer or more wealthy occupiers, might exclude. The Bill therefore proposed to repeal the mortmain Act of George II., which prevents land only from being devoted to charitable uses, leaving all other property to be so disposed of. It is not surprising that the House was unprepared for such a measure. It is only after repeated agitation that it is likely to succeed; but such tentative proceedings are obviously the practical course. A reform bill was introduced many successive years before it passed. It will, some day, probably be thought worth while to appoint a committee or commission to examine the subject. It will be found that nothing could be more moderate or just than the proposed measure: it secured the interests of the objects of the trust, and left the trustees unencumbered with alien duties, and at liberty to employ their undivided attention exclusively to the business of making the best use of the fund.* The great im-

* This subject is discussed in a Paper read at the Social Science Association, on the 27th Jan. 1873—"On Lands held by Corporations, and on the Policy either of their Alienation or of Providing for their Management with regard to the Public Utility."

pediment in the way of measures such as these, is the fact that almost every constituency contains a few persons, forming a compact body of much influence, whose importance in the locality may be lessened by the withdrawal of public property from their control. Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, in the article before referred to, points out the power of a small knot of persons in a constituency to turn the balance against any candidate who has the courage to take an independent view differing from them.*

The two next articles of the Land Tenure Programme (V. VI.) are for the encouragement of co-operative agriculture and the tenancies of small cultivators. Of the remaining clause (IV.), proceeding from Mr. Mill, the claim of the State to intercept by taxation the unearned increase in the rent of land; it is unnecessary here to say much. It has, perhaps, been subjected to more adverse criticism than any other part of the programme; but it exhibits the elaborate care with which, in any great change, he endeavoured to guard existing interests. All who have read or heard the explanation which Mr. Mill has repeatedly given of this suggestion know well that not the value of one farthing, of any realized or existing property, would be taken thereby from any proprietor. To characterize the proposal, therefore—as has been done recently—as one involving the virtual confiscation of the estates of the great landowners, and whereby, as regards the present, most landed proprietors would be reduced to ruin, is a gross misrepresentation.

So much space has been occupied in thus attempting to convey a just idea of the vast field over which Mr. Mill's labours have extended, and upon which his autobiography is full of interest and instruction, that a multitude of subjects must still remain untouched. Of his work on the Subjection of Women, and in the cause of extending to them the political franchise, we need not speak. They have been more or less discussed in most houses and families.

In December, 1859, appeared "A Few Words on Non-Intervention,"† in which he pointed out the situation of Great Britain, "as an independent nation, apprehending no aggressive designs, and entertaining none, seeking no benefits at the expense of others, stipulating for no commercial advantages, and opening its ports to all the world; yet, finding itself held up to obloquy as the type of egotism and selfishness, and as a nation which thinks of nothing but outwitting and outgeneralling its neigh-

* *Contemporary Review*, December, 1873, pp. 6, 7.

† *Fraser's Magazine*, vol. lx., p. 766.

hours. This was the continental estimate of English policy. What was the cause of this? First, was it not our common mode of argument for or against any interference in foreign matters, that we do not interfere in this or that subject 'because no English interest is involved?' Secondly, how is the impression against us fostered by our acts? Take the Suez Canal—a project which, if realized, would give a facility to commerce, a stimulus to production, an encouragement to intercourse, and therefore to civilization, which would entitle it to high rank among the industrial improvements of modern times. Assume the hypothesis that the English nation saw in this great benefit to the world a danger, a damage to some peculiar interest of England—such as, for example, that shortening the road would facilitate the access of foreign navies to its Oriental possessions, that the success of the project would do more harm than good to England—unreasonable as the supposition is. Is there any morality, Christian or secular, which would bear out a nation in keeping all the rest of mankind out of some great advantage, because the consequence of their obtaining it may be, to itself, in some imaginable contingency, a cause of inconvenience? If so, what ground of complaint has the nation who asserts this claim, if in return the human race determines to be its enemies? In the conduct of our foreign affairs in this matter, England had been made to appear as a nation which, when it thought its own good and that of other nations incompatible, was willing to prevent others even from realizing an advantage which we ourselves are to share." The subsequent history of the Suez Canal has proved the errors of English diplomacy here pointed out. The remainder of the article on the few and rare cases—if any—in which interference in the domestic affairs of one nation by another is permissible, has probably not been, and will not be, without its influence in the subsequent and future history of the world.

Mr. Mill's sympathy with the downtrodden and oppressed, whether as slaves, while there still existed a slave power in America, or in the condition of their emancipated brethren in Jamaica, is well known. He saw from the first, as many clear-sighted persons in our country did—though perhaps they formed a minority—that the Civil War in America "was an aggressive enterprise of the slave owners, under the combined influences of pecuniary interest, domineering temper, and the fanaticism of a class for its class privileges—to extend the territory of slavery." A passage in his article on "The Contest in America,"* justifying the determined course taken by the North, is

* *Fraser's Magazine*, Jan. 1862.

worth quoting as an emphatic rejection of a misplaced feeling of humanitarianism—a feeling which in a fitting case no one would have respected more than he. He says :—“I cannot join with those who cry Peace, Peace. I cannot wish it should be terminated on any conditions but such as would retain the whole of the territories as free soil. War in a good cause is not the greatest evil which a nation can suffer. War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things ; the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing *worth* a war is worse.”

There are some who say they find in this Autobiography evidence of self-sufficiency and self-glorification, and that it is defaced by egotism ! Such charges appear amazing, not only to those who remember Mr. Mill's entire freedom from self-assertion, and readiness to attribute to others even the merit of works or suggestions proceeding from himself, but to the readers of the Autobiography, who find throughout instances of the same self-abnegation. He is only bold and uncompromising in the assertion of what he deems right. Instead of egotism, he is, at other times, charged with sentimentality and weakness in ascribing such praise to others. One distinct proof of the absence of any thought of self-sufficiency or egotism is found in a passage in the Autobiography which has probably no parallel in any other personal memoir : “Whoever,” he says, “either now or hereafter, may think of me, and of the work I have done, must never forget that it is the product, not of one intellect and conscience, but of three.” It is a painful example of the low pitch to which literary criticism may at this day sink, to read a comment on it such as this : “All touches of natural affection have been sedulously kept under or suppressed ; his brothers and sisters are only mentioned as annoyances or checks to progress.”* So far from

* The tone of complacent triumph with which the author of an Article in *Fraser's Magazine*, for Dec. 1873, acquaints his readers of the “rapid change of the public mind concerning Mr. Mill,” and of the “startling *collapse* of his reputation which has happened,” since, as he says, Mr. Mill's admirers met the “mildest protest” against his fame with “clamour and abuse,” might provoke a smile. He has probably reiterated this announcement so many times that at length he fancies himself “the public,” as the three tailors in Tooley Street styled themselves, “We, the people of England.” It will, however, be a somewhat curious chapter in the literary annals of the day, if he should inform his readers in some future paper when and whence this “mildest” of protests issued, and who were the “audacious” delinquents who tried, and how, to put down discussion. Was it put down because the answer was so complete that nothing was left to be said ? At present, however, those who listen to every breath relating to the venerated object of their regard, have heard only of one unjust attempt to cast reproach on a pure and honourable life, which, when indignantly challenged, was found to be utterly unsupported by even the pretence of evidence. It cannot, however, but be regretted that a periodical

his brothers and sisters being mentioned as hindrances, Mr. Mill tells us expressly that, from the discipline involved in teaching them, which after his eighth year his father required, he derived the great advantage of learning more thoroughly, and retaining more lastingly, the things which he was set to teach. The insinuation that natural feeling was wanting, leads us to borrow a passage from the current number of the *Workman's Magazine* (p. 385): "It was our good fortune," says the writer, "to know Mr. Mill in early life. One of our class-fellows at University College was James Bentham Mill, a younger brother of John, and we (the younger ones) soon became very intimate friends. Strong mutual sympathies led to interchanges of visits during the long vacations and after we had left the college, so that we had frequent opportunities of seeing and conversing with the elder brother in his pretty cottage home at Mickleham, where the whole family spent all the summer months for several years. . . . John Stuart Mill was, of course, then unknown to fame, but we well remember the impression he made on us by his domestic qualities, the affectionate playfulness of his character as a brother in the company of his sisters, and of the numerous younger branches of the family."

Without further noticing comments such as that which has led us to introduce this reminiscence, it seems strange, as a correspondent of the *Spectator* touchingly remarks, "to hear accused of heartlessness and coldness in his affections the man over whose grave a chorus of friends has just been pouring the strains of sorrowing love and gratitude, to hear of the 'meagre nature,' 'the want of homely hopes,' 'the monotonous joylessness' of him whose delight in nature and in music, whose knowledge of flowers, whose love of birds, whose hearty happiness in country walks with friends, whose long genial talks with those friends, have been so variously and beautifully delineated."

We are able to add to that chorus another strain issuing from the voices of some who, a few years ago, visited him in his southern home, and there learnt his genial powers of participation and sympathy with various and dissimilar tastes. Mr. Mill's fondness for natural studies and appreciation of historic associations had taken him much through Provence and Languedoc, parts of which they visited with him. None failed to be struck with the uncommon degree of affection and reverence with which he and his step-daughter were met in their neigh-

so high in character as *Fraser's Magazine* should have admitted into its columns an Article that, first misrepresenting Mr. Mill, both as respects his words and works, then proceeds to draw unfounded inferences from them, which nothing but a prurient imagination could have suggested.

bourhood, and journeying with them was made doubly pleasant from their cordial and warm reception by those to whom they were known. Mr. Mill's conversation carried all vividly back to the Roman and mediæval days, of which the ruins in the country round Avignon reminded him. Under his guidance every spot became replete with interest: "One day we traversed the hills above Vaucluse"—we copy from the journal of one to whom Mr. Mill was before unknown—"over the mountains, among the wildest stony paths, through gorges, over dwarf box, lavender, thyme, cistus, rosemary, fragrant as it was crushed under our feet, botanizing, talking, till finally we descended, as the day closed, to Petrarch's fountain. Whether visiting the flourishing town of Carpentras, or ascending Mont Ventoux, he directed attention to a multitude of interesting objects, taking himself the most laborious part and exhibiting no symptom of fatigue." "Apart from the charm of his converse," writes another, "there was the unceasing kindness with which he pointed out to one the rarer flowers, to another the geological formation, and again the peculiar construction of the several ancient remains; and all saw and felt his delight at having brought them to the summit of the hill, on which stands the excavated and almost deserted town and castle of Les Baux, at a moment when they could behold the beauties of the lovely light of sunset shedding its glory over the valley of the Rhone."

"The life of one," says the writer we have quoted, "who lives and strives in opposition to the ideas of his age, will scarcely be expected to be a very bright and cheerful one; but it is noble instead, and many a one will feel that for such nobleness he would exchange all that the world calls pleasant." We have gathered enough from Mr. Mill's works, and the testimony of others, to show that a career of unselfish devotion to the highest object on which man can be employed—the welfare of his fellow creatures—is consistent with every rational enjoyment of life, while it incalculably increases the capacity to enjoy it.

