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TOLERATION:

WITH SOME REMARKS ON

PROFESSOR TYNDALL'S ADDRESS AT BELFAST.

BY

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"Things are to each man according as they seem to him."—*Anaxagoras.*
"The eye sees only what it brings the power to see."—*T. Carlyle.*

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TOLERATION.

"EVERY man," says Dr. Johnson, "has a right to his own opinion, and every one else has a right to knock him down for it." I do not know whether this is the meaning he gives to Toleration in his dictionary, but it pretty correctly expresses both its theory and practice in his day. Witness the brute who knocked down Shelley. The Poet one day in Italy was asking for his letters at the post-office, and gave in his name—"What!" said an Englishman present, "are you that d—d Atheist Shelley?" and knocked him down, endangering his life; no doubt understanding toleration in the above Johnsonian sense. I need not say that such an outrage would not be permitted in the present day, neither could it take place if it would, not so much from any alteration of theory or opinion on the subject as from an entire alteration of feeling; and it is our feelings, not the intellect, that rule us. The instincts of the multitude are often in advance of the reason, and it is the imperceptible growth of the moral sense and not the intellect that determines conduct. It would be impossible in the present day to re-light the fires of Smithfield or to burn a Witch; and yet there can be no doubt that, from an intellectual point of view, both the Inquisition and the Witch burners were only acting consistently in accordance with their creed. It is the moral judgment of the world that has condemned the creed; logically it is as sound as ever.

It is true the age does not now admit of persecution; or, if it does, only in a very restrained and modified sense. People are avoided or sent to Coventry for certain opinions that are supposed to militate against

what is now considered "good society;" but "the naughty man, who does not believe in anything," is well received. In this, however, there is no thought of toleration; few know even the meaning of the word. Let us then inquire what is toleration, and if it be really a virtue or not?

Religious Toleration.

Toleration in a dictionary sense is bearing, enduring, allowance of what is not approved, liberty to teach religious opinions different to the Established Church. It is in the latter sense—in a religious sense—that toleration is best known to the Dissenters, because they have suffered legally from the want of it. But is religious toleration a virtue—*i.e.*, is it right or wrong? From the Roman Catholic point of view it must be wrong; from the Protestant it is right. The Roman Catholic, as we are told by Archbishop Manning in the June number of the *Contemporary Review*, not only believes in the moral and divine certainty of his revelation—*i.e.*, the Christian revelation—but he also believes that a necessary provision has been made for the safe custody, the proper interpretation, and full understanding of this revelation in his own church, "divinely founded, divinely preserved from error, and divinely assisted in the declaration of the truth." He believes that the voice of the living Church at this hour is no other than the voice of the Holy Spirit. That the decrees of the nineteen General Councils, by which the present Canon and other fundamental dogmas have been established, are also undoubtedly the voice of the Holy Spirit. The Roman Catholic Church, whether dispersed or gathered in one Œcumenical Council, is pronounced to be infallible; and every one who shall deny such a Council to be Œcumenical is excommunicated—*i.e.*, damned to all eternity. Now, how any one who believes that God has not only given us a revela-

tion, but his Spirit also to guard and interpret it, can consistently tolerate any other doctrine, I cannot conceive. But the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and of its Œcumenical Councils have been *profanely* denied by the Protestants, who say that, inasmuch as the members of these Councils differed in opinion, they could not all have the Holy Ghost, and to say that it dwelt with the majority is a pure assumption. (See Article 21 of the Church of England.)

But it is not the Catholics only who have persecuted and who have burnt people to death in order to inspire them with a proper faith. Protestants also have done so; "and if he that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned," and if belief is in our own power, I cannot see how we can be justified in not taking every step, even the most extreme, to promote that faith which alone leads to salvation. For what is the suffering of an hour or two here at the stake compared to an eternity of such burning in hell with the devil and his angels? Intolerance, therefore, is a virtue in a Roman Catholic and in all who believe that they have infallible truth, and that all men can believe that truth if they are so disposed. But it has been discovered that slow burning at the stake, even with greenwood, which gives more time for faith and repentance, does not tend to clear the judgment and enable people to see what they could not see before. The error, however, both of Catholic and Protestant, was not in the want of toleration, but in the dogma that belief is in our own power, and that we can believe what we like, whereas we cannot believe that to be black which appears to us to be white, or in any of the various steps between, although we should be burned for it both here and hereafter. Persecution may make hypocrites, but it cannot make us believe that which appears to us to be incredible. It has been the gradual perception and recognition of this truth by the wise that has given the tone to society, and made the foolish—*i.e.*, the multi-

tude—more tolerant. Protestantism proclaimed the right of private judgment; and when people really took the liberty to think for themselves, and did not leave it to their church or chapel, the consequences were exactly what might have been expected—viz., that no two people ever do think alike. This was more manifest among the Scotch—a reasoning and theological people—than among the English. A small band of Presbyterians had seceded from a small body that had itself seceded from the National Church. The suffering remnant, we are told, dwindled away until it was composed but of two persons, an old man and an old woman. "I suppose, Janet," said a scoffer to the dame, "that you believe yourself and John to be now the only true members of Christ's Kirk." "Weel mon," she replied, "I'm nae so sure of John." It is this tendency to divide—the right of private judgment having been conceded—that makes toleration almost a necessity in religion.

The altered tone of Society as illustrated in Professor Tyndall's late Address at Belfast.

The last meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science furnishes a complete illustration of this. Galileo was imprisoned and Giordano Bruno burnt for much less heresy than that displayed by the President of the Association in the Annual Address. The *Spectator* is a clever journal, but it admits no science that cannot be strained through its rather old and narrow theological sieve, and it says:—"Professor Tyndall will be much less persecuted for denying the existence of God than he would be for denying the value of Monarchy, and may defend Atheists with much less abuse than communists or oligarchs. English 'society' nowadays holds two things to be divine, Property and the Usual."

But is Professor Tyndall's Address Atheism or a defence of Atheists? In the *Spectator's* view it may

be, with others it may be only a step towards a more complete understanding of the character of God. The anthropomorphic view must give place to one in which God must be "All in All," and not a part only of nature or the universe; "for," as St. Paul says, "there are diversities of operation, but the same God worketh all in all." "God," as Victor Cousin says, "must be everything or nothing." *A priori*, we must feel that the Infinite must contain everything; and science, *a posteriori*, is now only beginning to recognise this view. Professor Tyndall says, "Is there not a temptation to close to some extent with Lucretius, when he affirms that 'Nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself, without the meddling of the Gods?' or with Bruno, when he declares that Matter is not 'that mere empty capacity which philosophers have pictured her to be, but the universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her own womb?'" "Abandoning," he says, "all disguise, the confession I feel bound to make before you is that I prolong the vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that Matter, which we in our ignorance, notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of every form and quality of life." "The teaching of the whole lecture is," says the *Spectator*, "that, so far as science can ascertain, Matter—expanding that word to include Force as one of its attributes—is the Final Cause;" and it says "that the result of such a philosophy, if universally accepted, would be evil, or rather, to avoid theological terminology, would be injurious to human progress, we have no doubt." Then why tolerate it? "Because," says the *Spectator*, "that, if it be true, the injury is no argument against its diffusion; for the injury, whatever its amount, is less than that which must proceed from the deliberate lying of the wise, or from the existence of that double creed, an exoteric and esoteric one, which is the invariable

result of their silence or their limitation of speech to a circle of the initiated." But the question is, *if true*, can it possibly be evil, or injurious to human progress? I think not; and the result of this philosophy appears to me to lead, not only to the destruction of much that now stands in the way of real religion, and that tends to Atheism, but it would also lead to the most important of all truths. Thus what is "Lucretius denying God and deifying nature" but saying with Pope that—

> All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
> Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.

and *that this body and soul, as far as we can see, are inseparable.* It is the recognition of the fact, not of a God *in* Nature, but that God *is* Nature and Nature is God, and that the government of the Universe by a separate Being is altogether untenable. The *Spectator* says that it is Professor Tyndall's opinion "that the Unknown and the Unknowable is discovered, and is 'Matter,'" and that this Matter "is the ultimate source of all things, and its own first cause." In this I think the *Spectator* does not truly represent the Professor. Both Matter and Spirit are mere phenomena, that is, modes of manifestation of the Great Unknown and Unknowable. As Professor Huxley says, "For, after all, what do we know of this terrible 'Matter,' except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'Spirit' over whose threatened extinction by Matter a great lamentation is arising like that which was heard at the death of Pan, except that it is also a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of consciousness? In other words, matter and spirit are only names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena." * There is no reason to suppose that Tyndall disagrees on this subject with his brother Professor. Elsewhere than in his Address he tells us

* 'On the Physical Basis of Life.'

that Matter is "essentially mystical and transcendental." And this is true, for what do we really know about it that enables us to say that it differs essentially from Spirit? We know only our own consciousness, that is, to know and to be conscious are the same things, and this consciousness tells us nothing of Matter but as the cause of our varied consciousness; as Mill tells us, these groups of external natural phenomena, of which Matter is the supposed substratum, are mere "possibilities of sensation." Tyndall admits with Spencer that, "Our states of consciousness are mere *symbols* of an outside entity which produces them and determines the order of their succession, but the real nature of which we can never know." Both Matter and Mind are phenomenal, and are the mere modes of action of the common "substance"—the Great Unknown which underlies both. When we talk of material and immaterial as indicating a difference, *per se*, we are talking of what we know nothing; Matter is known to us only in its modes of action, and Mind as consciousness.

The *Spectator* (in "The Stronghold of Materialism") says that, "whatever Matter may be, it is at bottom the fruit rather than the germ of mind." But to set up the rival claims of Spiritualism and Materialism under such conditions of our knowledge is simply absurd—it is talking of that of which we really know nothing certain. All we know is that we never find Matter without Force, or Life without Matter, or Mind without Matter. Tyndall says, "Man the *object* is separated by an impassable gulf from man the *subject*." Is it not rather the fact that the active and passive principle—the body and soul of Nature—are one and inseparable. God is the Universe, and the Universe is God. In the Church of the Latter Days, says St. Simon, man is to feel and realise the divinity of his whole nature, material as well as spiritual.

And what is the important truth to which this absorption of Nature into God, or the deification of Nature points? Why, that not only the moral laws,

or man's relation to his fellow man, are divine, but that the physical laws are so also; for man's relation to Nature is his relation to God, and his well-being will be assured in proportion as he studies these divine laws of Nature, and acts in complete conformity and harmony with their invariable sequence. Follow Nature, that is, obey God. Professor Tyndall's Address, when carried out to its legitimate consequences, does not land us in Atheism, but just the reverse; it leads through Nature up to Nature's God, or, rather, to the fact that God and Nature are One; that God is All in All. If the perpetual changes in the combination of Molecules are enough by themselves to produce all the varying forms of inanimate and animate existence, God is the source of all power and cause of all change. It is not Force that is persistent, but His Will, consciously or automatically displayed. The argument, which I have used elsewhere, put briefly is this. We know of Mind or Consciousness only as a Force, and we know of that which acts upon Mind, and of which it is the correlative, only as Force, and as all these forces—of Heat, Light, Magnetism, Electricity, Attraction, Repulsion, Chemical Affinity, Life and Mind—so-called separate forces for the sake of convenience in classification—all change into each other, there is therefore but One, and as this tends always to a given purpose, or acts with design, it must be intelligent; and, if intelligent, conscious or automatic, *i.e.*, originally conscious; and the conscious action of Power or Force is Will. All Power is, therefore, or was, Will Power, and "Causation the Will, Creation the Act of God;" that is, the Act of that which underlies all Force, or of which it is the Force, variously named Noumenon, Substance, Life, Being, the Very God.

The only knowledge we have of Force, or Power, or Causation is that exercised by our own minds which we call Will Power; and the connection between that power and what it effects is one of purpose—a purely mental one. In mind joined with structure—and we

know of no other mind, for the mind of the universe is inseparable from the structure of the universe, both being equally an evolution or emanation from God: or rather being God Himself—mental acts frequently repeated pass from the conscious to the unconscious state; the original purpose is continued in the act, and the act repeated without the sense or consciousness of it. Judging by analogy, and of great things by small, this is probably the source of General Causation. We find invariable sequence only, and no reason why this sequence should take place in the recognised order than in any other. We can trace no *necessary* connection between cause and effect; and the great probability is that it was originally established and is maintained to effect a given purpose, as in the action of our own wills, and that this originally conscious action has passed in the ages into the unconscious or automatic. Specific purposes have passed into general laws, and it is thus:

The Universal Cause
Acts not by partial but by general laws.*

What we call the Laws of Nature are nothing more than unconscious or automatic Will Power.

In trying, then, to comprehend the mystery of what is called "Evil"—*i.e.*, pain, in all its different degrees, both mental and bodily—we must take into consideration not only this automatic or unconscious action of law, but also that it is not the partial but the general—not man, but humanity—we have to consider. As the innumerable cells of which the body is composed are to man, so is man to the great body of humanity. As each cell in the body gives up its life to another, and the rapidity with which it does so increases the vitality of the individual man, so it is in the great body of humanity. But man is only the last and most perfect form of enjoyment; we have to consider the whole of

* See "Note on Professors Huxley and Clifford," at the end.

the animal creation spreading a fine network of nerve over the whole world. The natural function of nerve is *pleasurable* sensibility, and pain is the exception, not the law: the pains not being as one in a hundred to the pleasures. The aggregate of pleasurable sensations constitutes happiness. The difference between the optimist and pessimist is one, therefore, of the simplest rule in arithmetic. We cannot look upon this question from the individual point of view. Individuals are only individuals to our forms of thought. Underneath the whole of sensitive existence lies one common force or "substance," and life—all life—is only a form or mode of this. The lilies that spread themselves over the surface of the water, each in its separate existence so beautiful a development, have under the water but one common root. The pains, of which individually so much is made, are as much swallowed up in the happiness of the whole as in the pain or "sacrifice" we are all called upon to make of our lower nature to the highest purposes of existence. As increased fineness of nervous texture seems necessary to the increase of sensibility, so pain would seem to be the only guardian to so wonderfully complicated a structure. Man quarrelling with pain is like a child quarrelling with its nurse for keeping it out of the fire, or a schoolboy with his schoolmaster, for pain is a better teacher than pleasure.

There can be no exception to general laws, as both instinct—which is organised experience—and reason depend upon the uniformity and invariableness of such laws, and all men's actions depend upon his knowledge of, and adaptation to, this uniformity. Exceptions, like eleemosynary charity, would sap the springs of self-reliance and self-dependence, the foundation of all manhood.

There is another mystery also upon which the above views of the automatic action of mind throws some light.

The evolution of Mind from Matter, "the passage," says Professor Tyndall, "from the physics of the brain

to the corresponding facts of consciousness, is unthinkable." Physical Force is Automatic Mind, and when under the molecular action of the brain, or other conditions, at present not well known to us, it resumes its consciousness, no inexplicable gulf is passed of Mind from Matter, but Mind has simply passed from the automatic state to its originally conscious state. There is no such thing as blind force or a Mindless Universe, only a Soul of Nature and its body, like our own, acting automatically in its physical functions. Mind, under the action of the brain, not only resumes its consciousness, but takes a specific character which we call Intelligence and Feeling—forms of thought and impulses to action which fit us as individuals to do our part in the world in which we live. Intelligence, as known to us, is thus a mere form which Universal Mind takes for specific purposes, and we have no right whatever to assume that what we call Intelligence exists in the Universal Mind in the form in which it is known to us.

This subject illustrates more forcibly than any other the necessity for Toleration, and the folly of dogmatising. The question has many sides, all leading to the Unknown. The Materialist and the Positivist stop far short of the deductions which I think I have drawn legitimately, and the Theist makes a god after his own image, with his own feelings, passions, and modes of thought or intelligence: both, in my opinion, are equally wrong, and we require the utmost limit of free thought and full toleration on a subject on which we all know so little; but it is well said that controversy is to truth what the polish is to the diamond—it makes it shine the brighter.

Not only this most difficult of all subjects, but most questions appear simple to him only who knows little about them. All are many-sided and appear clearest to him who sees but one side, or, at least, but few; and dogmatism and intolerance are, generally, in proportion

to the extent, not of a person's knowledge, but of his ignorance.

The Eye sees only what it brings the power to see.

It used to be thought that the mind was a *tabula rasa*, upon which anything could be written by education; no allowance was made for difference in natural faculty; but now it is pretty generally acknowledged that, although things without us may be the same to all people, they are seen and apprehended in proportion to the greater or less perfection of our instrument of thought. If a man is blind we do not expect him to see, but if he is equally blind in some of his mental faculties, we expect him to see with them just the same. This blindness is recognised in those who cannot distinguish colours, but not in any other of our perceptions. Sir David Brewster found that one in eighty-nine were colour blind, and this was thought to be an imperfection in the organ of sight—the eye; but this is a mistake, the defect is in the brain—in the absence or deficiency of the part upon which the sense of colour depends. This may be seen by any one who chooses to look. The same absence of brain may cause equal blindness in all our other mental powers, both perceptive and reflective. The consequence is that all people necessarily see things differently according to their natural powers of apprehending. The worst of it is that we are seldom or ever aware of our deficiencies; a specialist and physicist, with great perceptive power, may see further into a millstone than most other people, but he may be utterly deficient in the reasoning power; and a metaphysician may have great reasoning power, but may reason incorrectly from want of power to collect and appreciate correct data to reason upon. Experience has shown the folly of believing that because a person is clever in one department, his judgment may be equally trusted out of his special department. Specialists, in physical science especially, are but too often both narrow and intolerant.

In all departments the focus of people's mental eyes differs: some can perceive only details, others only generals, while others look only at the inner nature of all they see. Consequently the evidence of such diverse observers is as contradictory as their diverse mental powers. I have known persons with a wonderful memory, well stored in scientific facts, and in facts of Natural History and History, with great power of language, and great orators, but blind or almost blind in the reasoning power, and therefore utterly without Judgment. The world seldom recognises such deficiencies, if a man is a clever talker, still seldomer does the man himself. "It would cost me," says Lord Lytton, in his Speeches just published, "immense labour to acquire the ready, cool trick of words with little knowledge and no heart in them, which is necessary for a Parliamentary debater." And yet it is such clever Parliamentary debaters, such heaven-born ministers! with "little knowledge and no heart in them," to whom we entrust the power to govern the world. "The World embraces," says Professor Tyndall in his Address, "not only a Newton, but a Shakespeare—not only a Boyle, but a Raphael—not only a Kant, but a Beethoven—not only a Darwin, but a Carlyle." It is these differences, dependent upon the difference in the development of brain, recognised at a glance by those who have made cerebral physiology their study, that make us feel that Toleration is a necessity, and that all that a wise man will be justified in doing will be to try to make another see a thing in the light he sees it, and if he fails he will bear it, that is, *tolerate* it. It was almost a generation before the *savans* on the Continent could see things as Sir I. Newton saw them. If the wise man likes to console himself with the reflection suggested to us by Carlyle, viz., "that Great Britain consists of twenty-one millions of inhabitants—mostly fools," he can do so, but he had better keep that opinion to himself, as to give expression to it is a mode of intolerance not much more justifiable than knocking a man down *à la* Dr. Johnson.

It is difficult, however, to prevent this mode of consolation suggesting itself when we consider how Gall's Great Discoveries are treated by the Physiologists of the present day. They appear to be utterly ignored by them, or quite forgotten, and yet they have given to the world the only intelligible and practical system of mental and moral philosophy it has yet known. At the British Association Meeting at Belfast, in Section D for Anatomy and Physiology, the leading Physiologists, in opposition to Dr. Byrne, Dean of Clonfert, declared that the cerebrum is a single organ, with no more separation of function in its lobes than is the case with the lobes of the liver; so that the long life of Gall, a man superior in every way to any of them, was spent in vain, and all that his followers have seen and discovered since, for nearly one hundred years now, of the functions of the brain, is all a delusion. Among the "Problems of Life and Mind," there is, perhaps, nothing more wonderful than this. Either the leading men of science in all departments, who filled Combe's book of Testimonials in 1836 in favour of Phrenology, were either grossly ignorant, or the physiologists of the present day must be so. To say that Phrenology is not a certain science, that mind cannot be weighed and measured, or as yet given in foot-pounds, is quite beside the mark, for as much is known of the functions of the brain as of any other organ. The brain of the civilised man exceeds that of the savage by thirty cubic inches—thirty cubic inches more of organised experience—of instinct or feeling, of intuition or intelligence, and yet all this, we are told, is contained in a single organ, with, of course, a single function. There is no such case of "reversion," or of a return to ignorance on record as this, and there is no excuse for it, as every one who has eyes may, if he pleases, compare the functions of the brain with its development. There are few people who do not know, or who may not discover upon inquiry, some one who is colour blind, and they will always find in

the centre of the eyebrow a deficiency of brain as compared with others who can distinguish colours. The connection between other faculties and organs are not so easy to discriminate, but they may be found with care and patience. Huxley, who ought to be our great leader in this matter, speaks of an organ of consciousness as if it were generally admitted, whereas the vividness of consciousness is always in proportion to the size of the organ with which each separate faculty and feeling is found to be connected. There may be, and probably is, an organ that gives us the intuition of the "I," or feeling of identity. What is called self-consciousness or reflection on consciousness, depends upon the reasoning faculties, which the brutes do not appear to possess; they possess, however, most of the other intellectual faculties that man has, and some of them in even a greater degree, and are as much capable of a train of thought as he is, and of communicating it, as it is very evident they have a language of their own. Huxley, however, admits that as, "in other cases, function and organ are proportional, so we have a right to conclude it in with the brain." He does not, however, appear yet to have compared function and organ in the brain; if he had, perhaps, he would be able to tell the Phrenologists where they are wrong, and how it is that the lives of several generations of clever men have been quite thrown away. Dr. Carpenter, however, is not so reticent; he has examined, and has come to the conviction that if the intellect is in the brain at all, *i.e.* in the cerebrum, it is in the back of the head and not in the front. He appears to think that Dr. Ferrier has put us into the right road at last, and that, as by taking off the skull, and other altogether abnormal conditions, a dog may be made to wag his tail and roll his eyeballs, and show other such-like wonderful special indications of intellect and feeling when parts of the brain are artificially stimulated, we are justified in assuming, from this admirable mode of proceeding, that

this intellect is in the back of the head, and not in the front or forehead; and it was this original discovery of his, he tells us, now twenty-five years ago, that completely smashed phrenology and phrenologists!

It is not the Intellect that determines judgment so much as Feeling, and it is not what we *know* but what we *feel* that ordinarily determines conduct. A man generally tells you what he feels rather than what he thinks upon important subjects. Indeed, very few people think at all—they absorb their opinions from the mental and moral atmosphere around them, and speculative opinions are accepted, not from the arguments on which they rest, but from a predisposition to receive them. We think according to the mode of this age and country, and we dress our minds as we dress our bodies in the fashion of the period. Tyndall's Address would not have been received twenty-five years ago.

The extent to which feeling influences judgment is well known and acknowledged in certain familiar cases, but it is less recognised in others, where not quite so potent.

The lover's feeling for his mistress, for instance, and the tendency he has to transfer all the best qualities of his own mind to the object of his affections; the perfection which the mother sees in her little fluffy, squabby infant darling, and all its pretty ways, each one believing there never was such a baby before; and singular enough every woman sees every woman's folly but her own. We can all see, and laugh up our sleeves at such follies, unless, indeed, we are too greatly the victims, and then it is no laughing matter, particularly if we are expected to qualify to nurse as well as to admire.

All our feelings are liable to deceive us in the same way in proportion to their strength; our fears as well as our hopes, our hates as well as our loves, all influence

and warp the judgment, and tend to make us intolerant. A man *feels* justly or kindly, not in proportion to his familiarity with the truths of Christianity, but in proportion as his conscientious or benevolent feelings are strong or weak; and his feeling towards his religion is very much like a child's for its doll: he makes an idol of it, however wooden it is, and loves it all the better if it has no brains, or has lost an eye or even its head, or all its body has branned away. Religious people thus clothe their god in all the gorgeous imagery of an Eastern despotic monarch, sitting on a throne in some spot in this Infinite Universe of suns and stars, which they call Heaven, invested with passions like their own, angry, jealous, partial, greedy of praise, creating all things for his own glory, doing what is right and kind towards his creatures only when he is bothered into it by repeated importunity, and when you refuse to acknowledge and to bow down to this their god,—to this image which they have set up, they call you an Atheist, and you are committed to the fiery furnace of their wrath. This is the worst and narrowest phase of dogmatism, fanaticism, and intolerance, and yet it is much too common. It is this, our dependence upon feeling, and often upon good feeling, rather than upon intellect, that makes Toleration so difficult to practise—a man may have nothing to give in support of his views but his feeling on the subject, and as he knows that the feeling is a good one, he looks upon any attack upon his opinions as a personal attack upon himself. It was thus, as Thackeray tells us in his "Lectures on the Georges," with good old stupid George the Third. This was how he reasoned: "I wish nothing but good, therefore every man who does not agree with me is a traitor and a scoundrel," and as far as he was able he treated them as such. It was for him to command, "In this way you shall trade, in this way you shall think; these neighbours shall be your allies whom you shall help, these others your enemies whom you shall slay at my orders;

in this way you shall worship God." Who can wonder that under such guidance, aided by the Tories and a "heaven-born" Minister with a head about the size of a pin's, we should have spent 1,200 millions in trying to stay the march of Progress and in putting the Holy Alliance in its place.

The conscientious bigot, James the Second, thought that to differ from him in opinion was to doubt his word and call him a liar, and, although unexpressed, this is too frequently the tone of people generally—particularly of good and shallow people. They reason in this way, as illustrated above: "You differ from me; I know I *mean* well, you cannot therefore mean well as you differ from me, and you must therefore be a scoundrel," —confounding feeling and intellect. If, therefore, you differ from them on any point whatever, but especially on Theological grounds, they regard the fact of your differing from them as proof, not merely that you are intellectually stupid, but that you are morally depraved. This kind of intolerance is certainly less than it was some twenty years since, when the slightest tendency to free thought was represented as a wish to free yourself from the restraints of Religion; and the belief that an Almighty and Infinitely Benevolent Creator of Hell was a contradiction could only be held by those who were afraid that they should go there.

The wise are always tolerant, and the ignorant are intolerant, generally in proportion to their ignorance. The whole history, not only of Religion but of Science, shows the necessity for Toleration. In Religion, the sphere of the occult and transcendental, we have good and wise men on all sides; and in Science, prejudice very much obscures the eyesight. The study of Human Nature shows us that the power to form a correct opinion depends upon natural capacity, and the degree of cultivation such powers have received; upon how people feel as well as think, and that people cannot be made to think and feel alike. "To submit our conclu-

sions," says Lewes, "to the rigorous test of evidence, and to seek the truth, irrespective of our preconceptions, is the rarest and most difficult of intellectual virtues." (Problems of Life and Mind, p. 472). A dogmatic manner is therefore felt to be not only unwise but ungentlemanly, and the custom now of good society is shortly to give an opinion, without defending it, and we have little controversy. The *Pall Mall Gazette,* October 28, 1874, says:—"The modern peculiarity known as 'many-sidedness' is strictly in harmony with the characteristics of an age in which much that has been hitherto regarded as certain is proved to be questionable, while no certainty of any kind is brought forward to supply the place of that which is destroyed. Not long since, the ability to see more than one side of a question, and the candour which confesses to so doing, would have been branded as half-heartedness. Now, these attributes are reckoned as valuable as they are amiable." Is there, however, really nothing to fear from "half-heartedness," and may not this suppression of all feeling lead to indifference towards truth itself? The highest feeling we have, and the most desirable to cultivate, is the love of truth and light, and are we ever to be indifferent, or ever appear to be indifferent, to it? "Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum," should be our motto.

And yet it is certain that at the present time, where the general tendency is not towards indifference, it is towards intolerance and even persecution. This is the natural feeling, only to be overcome by cultivation. It is natural—1st. Because, in difference of opinion, if others are right we are wrong, unless, which few suspect, another side of the same question is seen. 2nd. Because, we think we raise ourselves by depreciating or depressing others, and certainly relatively we appear taller. 3rd. As members of the human family we cannot avoid being responsible for others' errors, and as the end of persecution is, in our opinion, to put down error, it has the appearance of standing up for truth.

Full and complete Toleration is only to be found with the highest culture and the wisdom that that culture ought to bring, but does not always. Knowledge invariably shows so many sides to every question that it cannot but make people tolerant, and truth, when divested of feeling and quietly expressed, has always the best chance of acceptance. Truth has always a natural advantage, but this is destroyed immediately force or any element of persecution is introduced. We are bound to listen quietly and respectfully to all earnest opinion, feeling certain that if we differ from good and clever men, that there is some side of the question we have not yet seen. "Whatever retards a spirit of inquiry is favourable to error, and whatever promotes it is favourable to truth," says the Rev. Robert Hall. Although, therefore, we are bound to stand up for what we consider to be the truth, regardless of consequences, yet the conviction is forced on us that the interests of truth are best promoted by complete Toleration. Full, and free, and open discussion must be allowed on all subjects, and perfect toleration for all opinions, as long as they remain opinions, but when opinions turn to practice, then toleration ceases to be a duty, and the community has a right to step in and insist that such action or practice shall be in accordance with its supposed interests; and whether any action is so or not can only be determined by the voice of the majority. Every one, then, has the right to his opinion as long as it remains opinion, but when a man proceeds to put his opinion into practice he must accept what the majority, not what he, thinks right, and Compromise thus becomes the law of progress. There can, however, be no compromise in opinion, which must be left perfectly free to make the minority the majority by argument; to cut off the heads of the minority, which is the prevailing custom in a neighbouring country, can scarcely be said to be giving it a fair chance of getting that acceptance for the truth which is generally at first in a minority.

In fact the government of a country by the majority is only safe when the rights and interests of the minority are protected by a Constitution.

The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at Athens, as reported by Zenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia, ran thus:—"Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in those gods in which the city believes, but introduces other novelties in regard to the gods; he is guilty also, inasmuch as he corrupts the youth." We have laid down the axiom that Socrates had a perfect right to believe in whatever gods he liked; with respect to the corruption of the youth by the spread of his opinions, I hold that truth must never be judged by its supposed consequences, and that the inferred "Corruption" could only be dealt with when it showed itself in actions opposed to the good of the community. Every one must not only have full toleration for his opinions but full liberty to spread whatever he believes to be true, or otherwise full, free, and open discussion, by which truth is tested, would be impossible. "Freedom of thought and expression," says Dr. J. W. Draper, "is to me the first of all earthly things." Error is best met in open daylight and not when driven into dark corners. We cannot give too wide scope to our conviction that "Magna est veritas et prevalebit."

NOTE ON
PROFESSORS HUXLEY AND CLIFFORD.

Professor Huxley, in his Lecture "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata," published in the *Fortnightly Review* for November, lays down these propositions, that:—

I. "The brain is the organ of sensation, thought, and emotion, that is to say, some change in the condition of the matter of this organ is the invariable antecedent of the state of consciousness to which each of these terms is applied."

II. "The movements of animals are due to the change of form of the muscles, which shorten and become thicker; and this change of form in a muscle arises from a motion of the substance contained within the nerves which go to the muscle."

III. "The sensations of animals are due to the motion of the substance of the nerves which connect the sensory organs with the brain."

IV. "The motion of the matter of a sensory nerve may be transmitted through the brain to motor nerves, and thereby give rise to a contraction of the muscles to which these motor nerves are distributed; and this reflection of motion from a sensory into a motor nerve may take place without volition, or even contrary to it."

Here everything is made to arise from, and to be due to, motion, but motion is *nothing* in itself; it is the mere transference of a body from one point of space to another, and is *inseparable* from the thing moving. How, then, can it be the cause of anything, or be transmitted? How can you pass on *nothing*, or a *condition*, inseparable from the thing of which it is the condition? You cannot transmit motion without transmitting the thing moving with it. It is the cause of motion that is transferred. That which causes motion in one body is transmitted, and causes motion in another. This cause

or active principle we call Force, and is the force of some entity unknown, but is as measurable and as indestructible as Matter itself. It is regarded as a mere abstraction, but it is an abstraction only so far as it is the force or power of some thing or entity unknown. It is this loose mode of speaking by nearly all physicists — of transmitting motion, &c., that leads to all sorts of confusion, both in physics and metaphysics; it obscures the active principle (spirit), and gives undue prominence and importance to the passive (matter), whereas matter never originates anything, but merely conditions or determines the specific mode of action of the active principle, Force. We have an illustration of this kind of confusion in Professor Clifford's "Body and Mind," in the December *Fortnightly*. He says, "it is not a right thing to say that the mind is force, because if the mind were a force we should be able to perceive it." Now no force is ever perceived by us, it is known to us in physics only as a mode of motion; but when physical force is subjected to the molecular action of the brain and becomes conscious force or mind, it is known to us then *directly as consciousness,* and not secondarily as a mode of motion; but it is not the less persistent or known to us from what it does. Thus Professor Clifford himself tells us:—"In voluntary action what takes place is that a certain sensation is manipulated by the mind, and conclusions are drawn from it, and then a message is sent out which causes certain motions to take place. Now the character of the person is evidently determined by the nature of this manipulation." If the mind can manipulate, it must possess power or force to do it. How he reconciles this with the assertion afterwards "that if anybody says that the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense. The will is not a material thing, it is not a mode of material motion. Such an assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the savage. Now the only thing which influences matter is the position

of surrounding matter or the motion of surrounding matter." He is evidently here in the usual muddle of the physicists and materialists about motion being transmitted instead of the cause of motion. Huxley also says, "there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism." Now the Will and Motives are states of consciousness, and however high the authority, although myself a Necessitarian, I am not prepared to admit that the Will has no power over a man's body, and that the Will itself is not governed by motives. The mental states are, with me, links in the chain of causation, and I do not see that this is inconsistent with the fact that consciousness is dependent upon molecular action. Surely the volitional centres consciously put other parts of the brain in motion. Whence is Memory but from the conscious effort to put the brain in motion, and thus recall other mental states? If a man receives an insult and, in a passion, knocks another down, surely the consciousness of the insult and the passion must have something to do with "the motion of the matter of the organism." Professor Huxley does not mean to assert, I suppose, that exactly the same motion could be made to take place automatically, by the mere stimulation of the organs, without the aid of consciousness? The brain contains an enormous amount of potential energy which is put in motion by the Will, and becomes conscious by the Will setting the brain in motion—the Will, of course, being subject to the law of persistent force. In this sense we are automata, being worked by the same force or spiritual power, which everywhere else is working to purpose. Should the Professor take to the study of Mesmerism, in which, of late, he appears to have shown some slight interest, he will ascertain with more correctness the power that conscious Will can exercise, not only upon our organisations but upon that of others, silently, at considerable distances, and without any apparent medium of communication.

When we say the Mind is Force we mean, not that it is any of the recognised physical forces, but is composed of that unknown something which is the active cause of all things.

Herbert Spencer says:—"That no idea or feeling arises, save as the result of some physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science." I think this will not be disputed, as we are all more or less conscious of the extent to which mental effort, or strong emotion, draws upon the physical forces of the body. Each idea or feeling consumes or absorbs a certain amount of physical force, which, as consciousness, is no longer attended by a mode of motion, but it is not the less persistent.

But Professor Clifford does not appear to be always quite consistent. Thus in one place (p. 724, *Fortnightly Review*) he tells us "he is speaking of voluntary actions—those actions in which the person is consulted, and which are not done by his body without his leave," and yet in another he says, "we are to regard the body as a physical machine, which goes by itself according to a physical law, that is to say, is automatic." It can have no voluntary action then. And he consequently tells us "that the mind is to be regarded as a stream of feelings which runs parallel to, and simultaneous with, a certain part of the action of the body, that is to say, that particular part of the action of the brain in which the cerebrum and the sensory tract are excited." But we are told that it is wrong to say the mind is a force; of what then is the mind, regarded as a stream of feeling, composed? "The actual reality," the Professor tells us, "which underlies what we call matter is not the same thing as the mind, is not the same thing as our perception, but it is made of the same stuff. To use the words of the old disputants, we may say that matter is not of the *same* substance as mind, not *homoousion*, but it is of *like* substance, it is made of similar stuff differently compacted together, *homoi-ousion*."

But the question is, What becomes of "this stream of

feelings" which runs parallel to, and simultaneous with, the action of the brain? Where does it come from, and where does it go to? As to the former, the Professor says "the reality which we perceive as matter is that same stuff which, being compounded together in a particular way, produces mind." The "stream of feelings" then comes, we presume, from the body, compounded by the molecular action of the brain. As thought or feeling, then, *is something*—an entity, as much as matter is—the question is, What becomes of it? Upon this most interesting question the Professor attempts to throw no light. The mind is not force, he says, and it is not therefore persistent as force; and he does not seem to think any answer is required, although, if it is the same stuff as matter, it must be equally indestructible. A materialistic friend of mine, of some note, from whom I have just heard on this subject, is more consistent, if more wrong. He says, "Huxley is quite right, thoughts are not things; matter thinks, but does not think things, but of things: the consciousness in a will or effort is not a thing nor a power, but the mere sense accompaniment of the physical action." This is a curious inversion of the real state of things, as coming from a Philosopher. We know "thoughts," but we know nothing of "things" until things become thoughts. Thus, as Professor Huxley tells us, "The great fact insisted upon by Descartes, that no likeness of external things is, or can be, transmitted to the mind by the sensory organs, but that between the external cause of a sensation and the sensation there is interposed a mode of motion of nervous matter, of which the state of consciousness is no likeness, but a mere symbol, is of the profoundest importance. It is the physiological foundation of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, and a more or less complete idealism is a necessary consequence of it." But what is this "sense accompaniment" of the physical action to which my friend alludes? It must be something or nothing. Professor Clifford seems to think it is some-

thing as to where it comes from, but nothing as to where it goes to. When we come to consider where thoughts and feelings go to, then we shall come to occupy that ground of which the Spiritualists now make such superstitious uses. Professor Clifford says, "We are obliged to assume that along with every motion of matter, whether organic or inorganic, there is some fact which corresponds to the mental fact in ourselves. The mental fact in ourselves is an exceedingly complex thing: so also our brain is an exceedingly complex thing. We may assume that the quasi-mental fact which corresponds and which goes along with the motion of every particle of matter is of such inconceivable simplicity, as compared with our own mental fact, with our consciousness, as the motion of a molecule of matter is of inconceivable simplicity when compared with motion in our brain."

"This doctrine is not merely a speculation, but a result to which all the greatest minds that have studied this question in the right way have gradually been approximating for a long time."

This presence of Universal Mind, as an accompaniment and cause of motion, I have endeavoured to teach in my own way. I have endeavoured to show that body—whatever that may be—and mind, from the lowest form to the highest, are inseparable. The Religious World has allied itself with the Spiritual only, but the Physical must be taken equally into account. We shall no more succeed in putting Spiritualism above Materialism than Materialism above Spiritualism. They must go together; some common ground must be found on which both can meet. It is the opinion, Roden Noel tells us, of both Schelling and Hegel that consciousness and matter are not absolutely divorced, but radically identical, although superficially diverse.

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