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ITALIAN UNITY

AND THE

NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN EUROPE.

* * These Lectures were lately delivered at Brighton. The intention of the Lecturer was to explain the nature of the national idea, now fermenting in the minds of so many European populations ; an historical sketch of the movement in Italy, from its rise to the present time, being given as affording the best practical illustration of the principle at work. The subject derives, perhaps, more interest from the recent visit of Garibaldi, and from the remarkable discussion which took place in our House of Commons, concerning the character and doctrines of Mazzini, as the friend of a member of the Government.

A few additions have been made in preparing the Lectures for publication.

London, June, 1864.

LECTURE I.

Prevalent Mistakes concerning the Movement—True Character of the National Idea—This Idea best illustrated in the Italian Movement—Rise of the National Feeling in Italy—Mazzini, the Apostle of Unity—His Teaching—The Giovine Italia—The National Party—The Moderate Party—Revolution at Milan and Venice—Charles Albert—His Vacillation and Defeat—Flight of Pius IX.—The Roman Republic—Mazzini, Saffi Armellini, Triumvirs—The French Invasion—Garibaldi—Fall of Rome—This Epoch misunderstood in England—Prejudice against Mazzini,

IN addressing you upon the Italian question and the National movement in Europe, my only claim to your attention consists in my acquaintance with a subject which has become one of deep and general interest. The views I am about to express are founded upon observation during many years passed in Italy, and upon much study of the general question of nationality.

Italian unity,—that is to say, the formation of Italy into one state,—which for so many years we were accustomed to regard as a mere Utopia, a dream of the enthusiast, is now generally accepted as a probable reality of future European history; and even beyond Italy, in other populations, we recognise the same aspiration to national existence growing up and gaining strength continually. Hence the Italian movement has a double claim upon our interest and upon our study. It has a claim for Italy's own sake: Italy, that has twice given law to Europe, and rises now to new life amid the ruins of two epochs of the world's history—the Rome of the Cæsars, the Rome of mediæval Christianity: Italy, upon whose brow may still be traced the radiance of imperishable genius. But it has yet a stronger claim; if we study the rise and development of the national sentiment among the Italians, as an illustration of the nature and working of a great power which is already acting in a wider sphere; and which heralds the approach of a new era for Europe as well as Italy.

One glance over Europe at the present moment shows us the national idea, the form of its expression varying from local circumstances, manifesting itself in the aspirations or the struggles of more than half the people of the Continent. In some countries, as in Germany and Italy, it is tending to the amalgamation of many states into one; in the Austrian and Turkish Empires it acts, on the contrary, as dissolvent, and is likely to separate those great empires into several states. In Poland it takes the simple and direct form of a struggle against a foreign domination; and, turning at the cry of agony which reaches us from that country, we behold a spectacle of sublime energy and indomitable courage. Hungary has gone through one contest already, and is preparing for another, to win for herself a perfect and independent

national existence. In Italy there are signs indicating that a fresh advance will soon be made for the completion of unity by the acquisition of Venice and of Rome. In the Ionian Islands our government has lately recognised and acceded to the desire of the people to form one nation with those of their own race and language. Even the war in Schleswig-Holstein was first entered upon in the name of German nationality ; while, in reference to Denmark, we have heard prophecies of a future Scandinavian nation comprising that country, Sweden, and Norway.

But what is the real nature of this great motive power at work in Europe, and tending to such gigantic changes ?

I think English impressions generally concerning it may be thus described. Until the year 1859 or 1860 we never thoroughly believed in it ; since that time we have believed in it, but still very imperfectly understanding it.

It is better to begin by clearing the ground of obstructions which impede the view of the question in its true and grand proportions, and I will strike at once at what I conceive to have been our chief source of disbelief or error. I mean the practice of applying to other countries opinions derived only from the traditions, or founded on the wants of our own.

England and France are almost the only countries not likely to be affected by this great movement ; hence we have not felt its force or its necessity. In all the revolutionary agitation and tendency to change pervading Europe, we saw only political questions, restiveness under oppression, a question, in short, of good or bad government. If Poland rose in insurrection, we thought of no way of accounting for it but by the tyranny of the Czar, as if the Poles, but for this tyranny, would neither have a claim to national existence, nor desire it. If Hungary was in revolt, it was in our eyes simply the result of the bad government of Austria. If the Christian populations of the Turkish Empire were discontented or rebellious, we imputed it only to the insupportable oppression of their Turkish masters. It was the same in regard to Italy ; for nearly half-a-century that country had presented to us a picture of continued revolutionary agitation. In the intervals between the more marked and important insurrections, repeated conspiracies still showed the volcanic fire smouldering under compression ; and periodically our sympathy and indignation used to be raised at once by beholding the flower of Italian manhood, intelligence, and worth, perishing on the scaffold, cast into dungeons, or driven into exile. But while we contemplated the outward form of the struggle, the hearts of the Italians were a sealed book to us, we knew nothing of the thoughts, hopes, and aspirations that were written there. While they were yearning for national existence, and for redemption from the yoke of the foreigner and the priest, they used to hear from England only the reiterated recommendation to imitate the English form of government. And Englishmen, generally impressed with the practicability of so simple an antidote to tyranny on one side and revolution on the other, used to marvel at the blindness both of the people and their rulers.

By our indiscriminate recommendation of constitutional government we used to appear in the eyes of European people like a charlatan,

who has the same remedy for every disease. The question never seemed to occur to us; if all this discontent and this tendency to change in Europe are caused only by bad government, how is the bad government itself to be accounted for? Have so many European sovereigns, without any motive whatever, adopted and resolutely persevered in a system of oppression that endangers their own thrones? Such a theory could not be accepted. Self-interest is clear-sighted; and, though some princes may play the tyrant for love of the part, still, as a general rule, each adopts the system dictated by his interests or his safety. Those sovereigns were trembling in the presence of a danger we did not believe in, or could not see. All that revolutionary ferment was to them prophetic of a reconstruction of the map of Europe; and their tyranny, like most tyranny, was the offspring of fear. In Italy, for instance, the national idea obviously excluded the possibility of retaining more than one, if any, of the seven Italian monarchies; and circumstances had long ago pointed to the sovereign of Piedmont as the one who, if he chose, might profit by this door of escape. What chance of safety then had the other six but in resistance? in either crushing out this great hope from the hearts of their subjects, or holding them chained and prostrate, powerless to work out in action the aspiration of their souls?

The year 1860 may, I think, be taken as the epoch when we awakened to the conviction of the reality of the national tendency. The events of that year in Sicily and Naples could not be misinterpreted; and our diplomatists, enlightened in their views of other countries by this tardy discovery of the truth in Italy, began then to recognise this national aspiration as a great European question and difficulty.

But truth still contends with error; some of the old mistakes or prejudices linger. Either our statesmen do not grasp the full meaning of the national idea, or they shrink from following it out to its logical consequences, and from entering, even in discussion, upon a region so vast and unexplored. Whenever the state of those countries which are agitated by this great hope, is under discussion in our Parliament, the debates still turn upon the merits or demerits of the governments; as if the root of the question, and the solution of the problem, were to be found in the mode of governing.

Now, a desire to be better governed is one thing; the aspiration to national existence is another. No doubt, good government, material prosperity, the gradual perfecting of society, are all comprised in the anticipated results of the realisation of national existence; but they do not constitute the direct aim that is worked for; they do not form the banner that is fought under. This aim is something loftier and more ideal; something from which a people would not be turned aside by beneficence in its government, as we have seen in the case of the population of the Ionian Islands; something that has even been pursued, in certain instances, deliberately at a sacrifice for a time of material prosperity, or with the consciousness that governments were thus being driven into oppression that might otherwise be endurable. The national aspiration is a tendency in European populations to form themselves into groups; such as are dictated by an awakening consciousness that each people, in its collective or national life, has a distinct phase of humanity

to represent, and, beyond the question of its rights or interests, has a duty to fulfil to humanity, and a special mission in the work of European civilization. The phenomena of the movement are not consistent, as I apprehend I shall be able to show you, with the theory of a less ideal or elevated aim.

In giving our sympathy or compassion to the Poles, Italians, Hungarians, or other European peoples suffering under oppression, and in expressing our indignation against their oppressors, we have done well. May Englishmen ever feel thus for the oppressed on one side, towards the oppressor on the other. But let not this compassion or this indignation divert our attention from the higher meaning of the European movement; neither the suffering nor the tyranny constitute the true question of nationality; they have been only incidents—and incidents inevitably occurring—in the course of the great work of change, as the Europe of the future began to clash with the Europe of the past.

In inquiries of this kind, much depends upon the extension of the view over a wide expanse of time and space. If the view is contracted, events are taken in isolation, and each is imputed to some local or transitory source. A pervading principle is manifest in the whole, not in the fragments. There is a story told of Rembrandt, that he reproved some one who examined closely the details of his picture piece by piece, saying, "Pictures are not painted to be smelt, but to be looked at." And he was right. The details which, examined closely and separately, have no meaning, seen from the point of view at which the eye takes in the whole, blend harmoniously together to form one great design; and each has its signification and importance in conveying the idea of the artist's mind.

I shall now present to you an historical sketch of the movement in Italy from its rise to the present time. Italy affords the most complete and advanced manifestation of the principle. And, slight as my sketch must necessarily be, it will enable you to embrace in one view the whole movement in that country: and you will clearly see the great thought or purpose that pervades it all.

More than six centuries ago Dante, had a presentiment of a future Italian nation—of the unity of Italy; and from time to time this national thought revived in the minds of the profoundest thinkers among the Italians. But it remained an abstract idea, a theory of the philosopher, a poet's dream, till Mazzini transported it from the sphere of imagination to the ground of reality; and, wedding action to thought, made its practical achievement the subject of teaching and of contest. This great idea was like some sacred fire kept unextinguished for six centuries, passing from hand to hand, guarded in succession by the elect among the priesthood. The symbol of a future faith, and preserved in the holiest recesses of the temple, it remained a secret or a mystery for the multitude; waiting in the fulness of time, the coming of its apostle, and the maturity of the people to receive it.

And in the interval between the prophecy of Dante, and the apostleship of Mazzini, a change was gradually working in the populations of Italy, preparing them for their future destiny.

Wherever the love of liberty prevailed in Europe during the middle ages, it seems to have been associated with a municipal spirit; there

was, besides, among the Italians an excess of vitality and an individual energy all tending to impede their union by the formation of many distinct centres of activity. In some other parts of Europe, as the feudal system declined, vast military despotisms were gradually forming by conquest or absorption, out of more passive or servile materials; and in the sixteenth century the three great European powers, Austria, France, and Spain, eager for conquest, burst at once upon Italy—a fresh irruption of barbarians attracted by a wealth and civilisation superior to their own. In the same century, Clement the Seventh commenced the alliance of the Papacy with European despotism; and this may be said, speaking generally, to be the epoch of the loss of independence for the Italians. Italy writhed and struggled for a time under the iron heel of her tormentors, then sank into the apathy of exhaustion or despair. For nearly three centuries her populations seemed resigned to be alternately torn as a prey and distributed as prizes by foreign powers, with scarcely vitality enough remaining for a sense of their degradation. But it was the stillness of a trance, not death; under this seeming apathy the germs of a new life were forming. As foreign domination fell upon them, it crumbled by its weight their old animosities into dust, and the work of amalgamation into one people instinctively and rapidly proceeded. After the last arbitrary partition of spoil and distribution of populations by the great powers at the Congress of Vienna, Italy awakened from her trance, palpitating with an undefined sense of a new life.

No sooner were the arrangements decreed by the treaties of 1815 carried into effect in Italy, than it became apparent that there prevailed throughout the country a general restlessness. In the course of a few years three distinct insurrections were each for a time completely successful: in Naples in 1820; in Piedmont during the following year, and in Central Italy in 1831. In each instance the reins of government passed for the moment into the hands of the insurgents; but when insurrection had triumphed and revolution should have begun, all enthusiasm, vigour, or even union disappeared, and the impotence of the movement revealed itself. The leaders raised the banner of constitutionalism; but the people looked upon it with indifference; it did not image to them their own unshaped thought, nor interpret the vague longing in their hearts. All these insurrections were prepared by the sect of the Carbonari. The programme of this sect was—Independence, Liberty; but it put forth no definition for either one or the other. It fitly personified the general state of feeling in Italy at the time—hostility to the governments and to the whole system as it was, without any distinct consciousness of what it wished for in its place. Yet it seems strange that the very existence of such an association, spread as it was over the whole of Italy, and thus showing the community of interests, affections, tendencies throughout, did not reveal to its members the secret of the future.

But the genius destined to initiate the new epoch was waited for.

While yet a student at the University of Genoa, Mazzini entered earnestly, both as a writer and an actor, into the political agitation of the time; and in 1831, at the age I believe of twenty-two, he was a political prisoner in the fortress of Savona. But he had already seen

enough of the movement as it then existed, to discover the impotence of all that spirit of hostility to Austria, that hatred to despotism, that aversion to priestly rule, without a regenerating and reconstructing force. He saw that the true source of strength would be found less in the hatred that disturbs or destroys, and which had produced only isolated and fruitless insurrections, than in the love that associates, combines, and creates; he saw that it was necessary to work for a revolution more profound, for a larger and sublimer aim, than reforms and constitutions; to concentrate every ray of Italian patriotism upon one focus—a great hope representing a new creation—a simple and grand idea that would be intelligible to the multitude, would attract and elevate them, appealing to a national or patriotic instinct, and would excite the enthusiasm of the more enlightened youth. When Mazzini's imprisonment was exchanged for exile, he had resolved to make the realisation of the prophecy or dream of Dante the labour of his life.

When forming this design he took a very different view of human nature from those who believe that men are to be moved only by interests, by the hope of redressing some grievance, by impatience of suffering, or by some prospect of advantage to themselves. "It needs," wrote Mazzini, "the religious thought which gives the sense of duty and power of self-sacrifice, to produce those great changes which mark the progressive steps of humanity."

That you may understand how Mazzini could believe that in working to create an Italian nation, he was fulfilling in a certain sense a religious mission, and how he could inspire with the same faith, and with a sublime spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice, as he did, thousands of his countrymen, I must endeavour to give you in few words a general idea of his teaching. The Italian question cannot be thoroughly understood without it; for the self-devotion and enthusiasm which were based upon his appeal to what I can only call the religious element in man's nature, have been the true source of the vitality of the Italian struggle.

The fortress of Savona in which he was imprisoned is situated on the shore of the Mediterranean, near Genoa. His cell was in the highest tower of the castle; the window towards the sea—I am giving his own description of his prison. The earth beneath was invisible to him; he was reminded of it only by the voices of the fishermen on the beach, which occasionally, when the wind was favourable, rose so high; but he could see the distant Alps—the grandest things of earth, and the sea and the sky, both symbols of the infinite. With these before him, in unreleased solitude, almost unbroken silence, for many months, he meditated on God's law of progress for humanity as manifested throughout its history, and on the mission of Italy in connection with this law.

His whole political religious creed rests on the theory of human progress. To explain more clearly, its foundation is this:—That God has decreed that his design or idea, which is incarnated in humanity, shall be continuously and progressively developed by humanity's own efforts. Hence, to aid in this development, to work for human progress, is to identify oneself with His design, to do His will on earth, and the aspiration towards the infinite which sustains the spirit here in suffering and self-sacrifice, is in effect, according to this doctrine, a sense in the individual being, that its own progress, its own movement towards God,

which will take place elsewhere than here, is to be advanced its first step by aiding, while here, in the improvement and progress of the collective being—humanity, the scene of whose development must always be on earth.

This theory of progress once admitted, it follows necessarily that the dominant thought which gives the form or character to the progressive movement must change—perhaps I should rather say, must be enlarged from time to time. In Mazzini's own words, "Our view will extend with our discoveries, our mission increase with our strength, advancing from age to age towards destinies yet unknown, for ever purifying and completing the formula of devotion, as star after star shall be unveiled for man in the heaven of intelligence."

In order, then, to direct the religious aspirations in the individual to its practical labour for humanity in fulfilment of God's design on earth, the form which the progressive movement is assuming must be understood: it ought, indeed, to find some embodiment in the faith of the period. This form is to be ascertained by interrogating the wants of the age. Mazzini did so; and came to the conclusion that the form which European civilisation and improvement would take in the epoch then approaching was the development of the principle of nationality. He supported this opinion by reasoning somewhat as follows.

We need not follow him through the tradition of humanity further back than to the Christian era. Then the principles of liberty and equality—which is but liberty for all—of which antiquity had in some instances a presentiment, received the sanction of religion; and our Saviour completed and crowned these principles by teaching us our divine origin and the sublime doctrine of fraternity. It was the emancipation of the individual man by giving him a sense of power and dignity, and of a great destiny hereafter. As Christianity has triumphed and spread, Liberty and Fraternity have necessarily come to be recognised as abstract principles representing a sort of ideal to be approached; although their practical realisation is contested, except to a very limited extent, on the ground of inexpediency or impracticability.

Now liberty means freedom to act; and man emancipated, with a sense of power and responsibility, and having freedom to act, must have an object to act for. Liberty never can be realised so long as men are inclined to use it for their own advantage only; and religion sanctions it evidently with the intention that it should be used for some high and unselfish purpose. But man, isolated, cannot act for good in a wide circle; he may practice charity to his neighbour, but before he can work in a grander sphere and extend the action to humanity, there needs a power derived from a combination of individual forces—a combination of the forces of men each having freedom to develop and use all his faculties. The principle of Fraternity implies the creation of this power, for it gives the means of association among those who are free. And this association or organisation, intermediate between the individual and humanity, formed spontaneously by those who are conscious that they represent a special group of the human family, conscious that they have common tendencies and a common mission confided to them by God for the good of mankind, at which they are to work together—

this is the nation in the high and true sense of the word ; the nation such as, according to Mazzini, God intends that it should be.

And thus the chain of human progress is continued link by link ; Liberty and Fraternity, which have been established as abstract principles in a former epoch, advancing towards their practical realisation through the development of the principle of nationality. Liberty being possible without anarchy, association without despotism, only when they are sought for as a means, not as an end ; sought for more in a sense of duty than with a thought of self-interest. And the very construction of the nation upon this principle implying an aim beyond itself, so it becomes but another link in the chain ; it is in effect a division of labour for human civilisation and improvement, each group taking the work that it is fitted for, as each country has its products, and all harmonising together in a common aim.

I need hardly point out how different this is from what the nation has hitherto usually been ; how different from what monarchs and diplomatists have understood it, or treaties between governments have made it ; how different from a mere aggregation of human beings held together by the sword, without community of language, faith, traditions, or tendencies ; how different from any state where the will of an absolute sovereign supersedes the collective thought and life of the people. But the truly progressive element in this principle of nationality resides in the idea which floats over all—that the nation is no association formed only for the sake of interests or to gain strength for aggression, but that the right to national existence is inseparable from a duty to humanity.

Now you see the train of reasoning which led Mazzini, more than thirty years ago, to proclaim that the national movement would be the form taken by European progress in its advance ; and you see how working for the unity of Italy assumed in his eyes the character of a religious mission. "When in my solitude and imprisonment," he wrote, "the thought came to me that Italy might perhaps be destined to initiate this new epoch, this faith of progress, this new life and fraternity for the nations of Europe, the immense hope shone like a star to my soul."

In attempting thus briefly to give you an idea of his political faith, which he unfolds in many volumes with force of argument and eloquence, and supports by evidence drawn from history, I know I am doing him injustice, and giving you a very imperfect conception of his teaching. But it is an essential part of my subject, no description of the Italian movement can be complete without it, and I have done the best I could in so few words.

Some years ago it might all have been condemned by an English audience as visionary. Now the test of the future can to a certain extent be applied, and his prediction of the tendency of the epoch—the rising up of nationalities, and his assertion that in the Italian people there was an instinct of national unity which needed but to be awakened, are no longer ridiculed as wild and silly theories.

His teaching infused an enthusiasm into many of the youth of Italy which enabled them to meet with a smile of faith persecution and reiterated defeat ; they taught, conspired, fought, and died on the scaffold and the battle-field, acting not only without a thought of self-

interest, but influenced, even beyond the sentiment of patriotism, by the conviction that they were working for the triumph of a principle that involved the good of mankind.

If the movement had been based only on a sense of interests, every failure would have had a damaging effect, and it would have been abandoned altogether, whenever the danger or suffering of perseverance outweighed the advantage anticipated from success. But the Italian cause has won its way, especially during its earlier period, as Christianity was propagated, by martyrdom. Whenever some patriot suffered persecution or death for teaching the national programme, whenever any little band of heroes perished as a forlorn hope in some attempt at insurrection, for every one that fell on the field or on the scaffold, there rose up a hundred converts ready to follow his example. And you will see, throughout the narration of events, how this appeal to what I call the religious element in man's nature, has been the Promethean spark, drawn from Heaven, that has given life to Italy.

It is startling to compare the immensity and splendour of the aim Mazzini formed for himself—and still more so if we think how far it is already accomplished—with his position at the time, his imprisonment, his youth, the slenderness of his means. It is curious too, as a coincidence, that at the very time, the year 1831, when he was forming this great design which was eventually to concentrate every ray of Italian patriotism to one focus, and give to the revolutionary spirit that already prevailed an irresistible force by directing it to its true aim, a severe political prosecution was going on in Central Italy. An insurrection had just been subdued there, the executioner was standing sentinel by the side of every throne, and the governments seemed resolved to crush out the very germs of the revolutionary agitation. They thought they had their enemy in their grasp; they saw him bleeding on their scaffolds, they imagined him groaning in their dungeons, or driven to the distant shores of England or America there to linger in the privations of exile, and in all this they read their own security and repose. Their fears never carried them to that cell in the highest tower of the fortress of Savona; they thought not of that youth there, gazing through the grating of his prison window upon the Alps, the sea, the sky; they saw not in the solemn meditation of his soul, the birth of the great power that in its irresistible growth would change the face of Italy.

When Mazzini's imprisonment was exchanged for exile, he began his labour by addressing a letter to Charles Albert, who had just mounted the throne of Piedmont, inviting him to identify himself with the Italian aspiration to freedom from Austria and unity as a nation. "You can lead us to it," said Mazzini, "if you choose, and we will follow, gratefully; if you renounce this leadership, we will press onwards without you; if you oppose us, we may die, but our children will snatch the sword falling from our grasp, and sooner or later our aim will be achieved, for it is a God-given aim." The whole sense of the letter was a reiteration of the motto at its head, "Se no, no." If no, no. If you are not with us, we are against you.*

* This motto is derived from the form of the declaration which was used by the nobles of Arragon at the coronation of their kings. "Nos, que cada uno somos

In addressing this letter to Charles Albert, Mazzini certainly could not have expected that he would take up what every Italian statesman looked upon as the wildest possible Utopia of a young enthusiast; but at all events such a letter afforded at the time the best practical means of setting before the Italian people the idea of unity. It was circulated openly or clandestinely throughout Italy. The answer vouchsafed by the King to Mazzini, was simply exclusion from the political amnesty which he had just granted on coming to the throne.

Mazzini then, with a few friends, founded the association of the *Giovine Italia*. It soon counted in its ranks hundreds of young men, chiefly of the middling class, of all parts of Italy; and absorbed the best elements of the old sect of the Carbonari. Its aim was distinctly defined and promulgated in the three words, Unity, Independence, Liberty. Upon the two first it admitted no compromise. In regard to the last, although the members of the association were all republicans, and professed to be so, it was considered that they had no right to decree beforehand under what form of government the future nation should exist, substituting their own banner for that of the entire people; and that if Italy willed monarchy, it would be for them to respect the decision of the majority; retaining always the right of expression of opinion. So while they drew the sword for unity and independence, they would use only the weapon of persuasion for the republic. Thus at the present time, in submitting to Victor Emmanuel, these workers for Italian unity do not violate their original programme; and Mazzini, Garibaldi, and many others, we know still profess themselves republican in principle and at heart. Indeed, the doctrines of Mazzini, as I have explained them to you, are clearly democratic; but the monarchy may be submitted to, though not efforts sanctioned as an enduring principle.

The first efforts of the Association were directed to awakening the national sentiment in the Italians. Writings, printed generally at Marseilles or in Switzerland, were spread by the members of the Association throughout the Peninsula. The governments soon became aware that they had now a more formidable danger to encounter than before. An energetic and relentless persecution commenced, and it was even punishable with death to be found in possession of a writing of the Association.

The *Giovine Italia* was not intended, however, to be educational alone. Thought can be completed only by action; besides there is a language in action which speaks to all. In the year 1833 insurrection was attempted in Savoy; and a simultaneous movement was to have taken place at Genoa. The first failed through treachery or mismanagement; the second was discovered and prevented. Among those condemned to death for this attempt was Garibaldi; condemned though, like Mazzini, in his absence, for he escaped. He was one of the earliest members of the *Giovine Italia*, and here we see these two young men, nearly of the same age—Garibaldi is, I believe, a few months the eldest—first acting together, who were destined at each great crisis of

tanto como vos; y todos juntos mas que vos; os hacemas Rey: si respectais nuestras leyes y privilegios, os obediceremos: si no, no." "We, each of us being equal to you; and all together greater than you; take you for King: if you respect our laws and privileges, we will obey you: if no, no."

the movement, at intervals of years, to work again in concert, as they are working now. The one, the hero of Italian unity on the field of battle; the other, the great teacher and the warrior in the mental contest.

This failure did not check the progress of the cause. Propagandism went on, and other attempts were made at action. The brothers Bandiera, who, with seven companions, were executed in 1844 for attempting insurrection in Southern Italy, answered those who remonstrated with them on the rashness of their enterprise, "That Italy may live, we must show the Italians how to die." And in saying this, they expressed the very spirit in which many of these attempts were made. In the course of a few years many perished on the scaffold with the cry, *Viva l'Italia!* on their lips as the cord tightened round the throat or the bullet pierced the heart, and thousands were exiled or imprisoned. But as the rage of persecution increased, the fervour of apostleship grew also.

Thus the word Unity was cast upon Italian soil, thus it was watered by blood and tears, and kept taking root deeper, deeper, and spreading over the country from the Alps to the furthest shores of Sicily.

When Pio Nono ascended the Papal throne in 1846, Italy seemed on the eve of a general outbreak. The national party, into which the Giovine Italia had by that time expanded, was growing continually stronger under persecution, and Pio Nono determined to try a new policy with his subjects—a policy of conciliation. Supporting him in this policy, and encouraging other Italian princes to follow his example, there rose up at this time the moderate party. It represented essentially conservative and aristocratic interests; but was supported by all the timid and the indolent, who were appalled at the gigantic changes contemplated by Mazzini. Now, within the last few years, the moderate party has accepted the programme of unity; but at the time I speak of, it was the avowed opponent of that doctrine, and raised in opposition the banner of constitutionalism. While the national party necessarily looked to the overthrow of the governments that held Italy in division, the moderates condemned revolution altogether, and intended to ameliorate and support these governments. They strove to allure the people by the prospect of reforms and other present advantages, from devotion to the great hope of existing as a nation; and used to accuse Mazzini of forcing the sovereigns to be tyrannical by alarming them, and turning the people aside from seeking real advantages for the sake of a dream.

Such was the state of parties when in March, 1848, revolution suddenly triumphed in the Austrian States of Northern Italy. In the course of some fifteen or twenty days Austria lost the whole of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, except Mantua and Verona; and this solely through popular insurrection, without encountering one battalion of professional soldiers. Six thousand Austrians capitulated at Venice; four thousand fell at Milan during a struggle which raged for five days in the streets of the city; some were cut off in almost every town, and Hungarian and Italian soldiers in the Austrian service deserted, whole companies at a time. The loss of Austria in those few days is estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 men. The insurrection burst forth at Milan immediately after some constitutional concessions

had been granted; it was promoted and led by a nucleus of young men, most of whom had been members of the Giovine Italia; and the people rose to the cry which symbolised Italian unity—"Viva l'Italia!" And "Viva l'Italia!" resounded throughout Italy from Milan and Venice to Messina and Palermo. While in almost every Italian city little bands of young men began to arm themselves, and to start off to help their brethren against Austria.*

The teaching of the Giovine Italia was bearing fruit.

The Italian princes trembled at this evidence of national feeling; they dared not openly oppose the general enthusiasm, and to save their own thrones they mostly professed for the moment to yield to the desire for war against Austria. The moderates also gave in to the irresistible attraction of the national idea, so far as to propose a sort of league among Italian princes, and a crusade in common against Austria. Among the chief promoters of this project were Gioberti and D'Azeglio. But the princes saw the goal to which such a path must tend: they knew their power had no root in Italian soil, nor was there one among them whose throne had not, once at least, since the Congress of Vienna, required the presence of Austrian bayonets to prop it up. They pretended to yield only to pervert, delay, or in some way paralyse every effort. Charles Albert alone made real war, and even *he* was only half sincere. When the insurrection broke out in Lombardy his position was full of danger; the excitement of his subjects, and their sympathy with the insurgents, were intense; besides, the cry, *Viva la Repubblica!* had been coupled with that of *Viva l'Italia*, on the barricades at Milan. When the news reached Turin that the Austrians had been driven from Milan by the citizens, he saw that his only safety from revolution at home was to be found in immediately declaring war and crossing the frontier. He acted from a double motive; from hope and from fear. On the one hand he saw a prospect of aggrandisement for Piedmont; and possibly a crown of Northern Italy glittered to his imagination in the distance. But he also entered upon the war, in order to put down or supersede revolutionary or popular action, and to check that sense of their own power in the people, with all its democratic tendencies, which their recent triumph would excite. The diplomatic correspondence of the time shows that this was the motive he put forward to all European governments, and pleaded as his justification for declaring war. He was acting, his ambassadors declared, for the safety of all monarchical states.

The entrance of the King into Lombardy changed the aspect of the movement: it lost the character of a war of the Italian people against Austria for their own independence and existence as a nation, and became simply a war by a king of Piedmont, to be fought by a royal Piedmontese army, Lombardy being the prize contended for. The men of the national party who had led the insurrection gave place to a provisional government composed of Milanese noblemen of the moderate

* An interesting account of this insurrection, and the war which followed, was written by Carlo Cattaneo, himself the president of the committee of the barricades during the insurrection. He was a professor at the University of Milan, and a man of European celebrity for literary and scientific attainments.

party, who had had no share in the insurrection. The formation of volunteer bands was discouraged, everything was done to check enthusiasm, and lull the people into inertness ; the national idea began to fade into the background, while the Royal army during three months did little else than occupy Lombardy ; neither opening communications with Venice, nor attempting to intercept the reinforcements which Radetski was receiving through the Tyrol.

At length Radetski, having reorganised and reinforced his army, issued forth from Mantua and Verona, gave battle to the Piedmontese army, and defeated it at Custoza.

When the news reached Milan the population rose up like an enraged lion ; what they had won by their own heroism and their blood was now lost by the King and the moderate party. The provisional government in dismay begged Mazzini, who had arrived at Milan from England, the country of his exile, to counsel and assist them. Under his direction the population was armed, volunteers were enrolled, and in three days the city was in an excellent state of defence. The heroes of the Five days re-appeared ; the people felt it was their own battle coming over again, and saluted it with joy.

Such was the aspect of affairs when Charles Albert reached Milan in his retreat. He beheld the popular or revolutionary element, which he had taken such pains to check and subdue, once more in action. By allying himself with it he might yet retrieve his defeat. But he hated or feared it more than he feared or hated Austria ; he wavered for a few days and ended by rejecting it. Before he entered Milan an armistice with Radetski and a capitulation for the city had been already signed ; yet, in the city, whether drawn for a moment into sympathy with the enthusiasm he saw around him, or whether trembling at the sight of it ; either sincerely or not, he publicly declared that he would perish beneath the ruins of Milan before it should be delivered up to Austria. The people trusted him. Mazzini then saw that his own presence there was useless ; that all would depend on the firmness or sincerity of the King ; and he hastened to Bergamo to join Garibaldi, who was advancing with about 4,000 volunteers. A few days afterwards Charles Albert left Milan almost secretly, and his troops immediately delivered up the gates and outworks of the city to the Austrians, in accordance with the capitulation.

Garibaldi had, a few weeks before this occurred, returned from South America ; where, an exile since 1833, he had taken part in the wars in those countries, fighting always on the side of liberty ; and had obtained renown as a daring and successful leader. The movement in Italy drew him back to his own country, where he arrived with about a hundred companions, Italians, and mostly exiles like himself. Charles Albert hesitated to employ him, and he immediately collected volunteers to act for the cause as he best could. When the King made the armistice with Radetski, Garibaldi at once repudiated it ; and prepared to advance to the support of Milan, hoping it would be defended. Mazzini having joined him carried the banner of the little force. Arriving at Monza they heard that Milan was already in possession of the Austrians ; they were attacked and almost surrounded by superior numbers of the enemy,

but defended themselves in their retreat as far as Como, where they found shelter in the mountains.*

All this time Venice held out under Manin, but the scene of the next great struggle made by the national party was at Rome.

But I must pause here for a moment to point out some conclusions which may be drawn from these events, to apply to the present time. First, we see in this insurrection an answer to those, whether in Italy or England, who think, or pretend to think, that popular insurrection

* A short account of this affair of Monza was written by Jacopo Medici, one of Garibaldi's companions, and now a general in the Italian army. The following extract may interest the reader:—

"After the engagement of Custoza, at the end of which Charles Albert fell back upon Milan, General Garibaldi, then at Bergamo, with a small body of republican Lombard volunteers, about 4,000 altogether, believing that the King of Piedmont, who was still at the head of an army of 40,000 men, would have defended to the utmost, as he had promised, the capital of Lombardy, conceived the bold project of pushing forward and marching towards Milan. His object was to harass the left flank of the Austrian army in its pursuit of the Piedmontese army, and thus to come in aid of the future operations which the king's resistance in Milan might bring about.

"It was on the morning of the 3rd of August, 1848, and Garibaldi was just about to quit Bergamo, when we saw appear among us, carbine on shoulder, Mazzini, asking to join our ranks as a simple soldier of the legion I commanded, which was to form the vanguard of the division of Garibaldi. A general acclamation saluted the great Italian, and the legion unanimously confided its banner, which bore the device 'God and the people,' to his charge.

"As soon as Mazzini's arrival was known at Bergamo, the population ran to see him. They pressed around him; they begged him to speak. All those who heard him must remember his discourse. He recommended raising barricades to defend the town in case of attack, whilst we should march upon Milan; and he conjured them, whatever might arrive, to love Italy always, and never to despair of her redemption. His words were received with enthusiasm, and the column left amid marks of the deepest sympathy.

"The march was very fatiguing; rain fell in torrents; we were drenched to the skin. Although accustomed to a life of study, and little adapted to the violent exercise of forced marches, his constancy and serenity never forsook him for an instant; and notwithstanding our counsels, for we feared for his physical strength, he would never stop, nor leave the column. It happened even that seeing one of our youngest volunteers clothed merely in linen, and who consequently had no protection against the rain and the sudden cold, he forced him to accept and wear his cloak.

"Arrived at Monza, we learned the fatal news of the capitulation of Milan, and heard that a numerous body of Austrian cavalry had been sent against us, and was already at the other side, at the gates of Monza.

"Garibaldi, very inferior in forces, not wishing to expose his small body to a complete and useless destruction, gave orders to fall back upon Como, and placed me with my column as rearguard, in order to cover the retreat.

"For youthful volunteers whose greatest wish was to fight, the order to retreat was a signal of discouragement, and in the first moments was accompanied with some disorder. Happily, this did not occur in my rearguard. From Monza to Como, my column, always pursued by the enemy, menaced with destruction at every moment by a very superior force, never wavered, remained compact and united, showing itself always ready to repulse all attack, and kept the enemy in check to the last.

"In this march full of danger and difficulty, the strength of soul, intrepidity, and decision of Mazzini, were the admiration of the bravest among us. His presence, his words, the example of his courage, animated our young soldiers, who were besides proud of partaking such dangers with him; and all decided to perish to the last man for the defence of a faith of which he had been the apostle, and for which he was ready to become the martyr."

and the volunteer element can do nothing against Austria. Secondly, we see the paralysing effect which naturally follows when a revolutionary movement, after its first successes, passes under the guidance of those who did not prepare it, and not thoroughly identified with its object either by their past acts or by their wishes for the future.

When Pius IX. fled from his dominions to Gaeta in November, 1849, the Republic quickly sprang up from the ruins of the Papal Government; and it seemed as if the future Italy had found a cradle where all the vigorous elements of true national Italian life might draw together. With Rome, the national party had won the key of the position in the struggle for nationality; the centre, through which there might be union between north and south. In the deliberations in the assembly for the election of a triumvirate, while Armellini was chosen to represent Rome, and Saffi, the Legations, Mazzini was chosen professedly as the representative of Italy—the incarnation of the idea of Italy, one and free. And by this election Italian unity may be said to have been inscribed on the banner of the infant state, as it actually was upon its coin. Energetic preparations were set on foot to carry this banner into the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom; it was calculated that by the end of May 45,000 men would be armed and organised; these would have entered the Austrian States, not to act alone as the Piedmontese army had done, but to act in alliance with Venice, and in concert with the popular insurrection. Such were the hopes of the national party when, in the month of April, these preparations being still incomplete, the French Government decided upon sending an expedition against Rome.

We must glance for a moment however at events occurring in other parts of Italy, and bearing upon the position of Rome. In the month of February, the Grand Duke of Tuscany had followed the example of Pio Nono, fled from his dominions, and joined the Pope at Gaeta. The national party immediately agitated for the amalgamation of Tuscany with the Roman States, thus to commence the unification of Italy; and there seemed a good prospect of success. The Piedmontese Government, Gioberti being minister, then formed the injudicious design of restoring by an armed intervention, both the Pope and the Grand Duke to their dominions; a design which, if carried into effect, would inevitably have lighted up the flame of civil war. But those princes rejected such assistance; they regarded the Piedmont Government with no friendly feeling, and considered that, by making real war against Austria, it had separated itself from the common cause and interests of Italian sovereigns. While, at the same time, the national party was indignant that such a design should have been cherished for a moment; and its distrust of Piedmont was increased. This project falling to the ground, Charles Albert, on the 12th of March, suddenly put an end to the armistice with Austria, and renewed the war. No doubt he was induced to take this step by the preparations for war which the Roman Republic was making; and he acted wisely as far as his own interest and safety were concerned. It would have been dangerous, perhaps fatal, to the Piedmontese monarchy for a new crusade against Austria to be initiated and led under the Republican banner. It would have been impossible for Charles Albert to hold back, and humiliating to the monarchy to follow in the

wake of the Republic. He resolved either at once to gain a victory over Austria, and render his throne secure by surrounding it with the prestige and the glory thus acquired; or else to find, through defeat, an excuse for retiring from any further contest. When the unexpected renewal of the war was known at Rome, a generous spirit towards the monarchy pervaded all the councils of the Republic. Mazzini said in the chamber, "Let us think no more about forms of government; there is now but one real distinction among Italians: it is between those who join in the war of independence against Austria, and those who do not." A proclamation was issued, which thus concluded: "The legions of the Republic will combat side by side with those of the Subalpine Monarchy; there shall be no contention between them save in valour and in sacrifice; may he be cursed who would promote discord between brother and brother." But before the Roman troops could reach the North of Italy, the campaign was ended. It lasted but a few days; and, after the defeat of Novara, Charles Albert abdicated in favour of his son Victor Emanuel.

On the 18th February, a note had been addressed to the diplomatic body at Gaeta by the Pope, publicly requesting the armed assistance of France, Austria, Spain, and Naples, for his restoration. It was soon known, or rumoured, that France was about to enter the field as a new enemy for the Roman Republic; and the timid began everywhere to hold back. The moderate party in Tuscany, headed by the chief nobility of Florence—Ricasoli among the number—took advantage of this state of the public mind, and also of the discouragement which the Austrian victory at Novara had just produced, to bring about a reaction. They promised in the name of the Grand Duke, though, as it afterwards appeared, without his authority, that, if recalled, he would govern constitutionally, and that no foreign soldier should enter Tuscany. A proposal made in the Chamber at Florence for union with Rome, was negatived; and the Grand Duke recalled by the acclamations of the populace of Florence. One of his first measures, however, was to invite an Austrian army to enter Tuscany; and it met with no resistance except at Leghorn.

The battle of Novara had also the effect perhaps of hastening the French expedition against Rome. The French Government had already promised to restore the Papal sovereignty, but it wished for some veil which might soften the harsh and unjust features of the measure in presenting it for the approval of the Chamber at Paris. The Chamber was given to understand that the object of the expedition was merely to support the interests and influence of France in the Peninsula in opposition to those of Austria; as if a French army on the Tiber were calculated to counteract the influence of Austria, whose forces were on the Mincio and Adige; for it was not until the French were besieging Rome that the Austrians either entered Tuscany or invaded the Legations. And when they besieged Bologna, although the forces of the Republic had been drawn away for the defence of the capital, still it was defended heroically for a time by the citizens alone.

It would take too long to enter upon the details of the drama that was acted before the walls of Rome. Perhaps most of you remember how the first expeditionary force of 10,000 men was defeated under the walls

of the city by Garibaldi, who issued forth with his volunteers and gave it battle; how Oudinot, in his retreat towards Civit  Vecchia, proposed an armistice; how Lesseps was sent to Rome to open sham negotiations, and, while they were going on, the French army was gradually increased to nearly 40,000 men; how the attack was then renewed, and, after an heroic resistance that lasted for a month, during which nearly 3,000 of the truest, noblest, bravest, hearts of Italy gave their life's blood, the city was surrendered.

To appreciate the grandeur of this defence, we must bear in mind that those who fought or died at Rome, did so without any hope of an immediate favourable result, without any expectation of victory against the French. They fought for a victory in the future; that future which is coming now. They fought or died to afford a great moral teaching to the people, and to call forth reverence for the sanctuary of Italian nationality, the future capital of Italy. They gave their blood that in it the Italian people might be baptised at the font of unity; and, although the Papal government was restored, the true lasting victory was with the Italian national party. It was the climax to all that series of acts of self-devotion by which for eighteen years it had been working out its mission. The moral teaching for the Italians was complete, and their education to the idea of unity, was advanced beyond the possibility of future reaction or decline. Although the weight of France was then added to that of Austria to keep Italy prostrate, it became a certainty that sooner or later the innate vitality of the tendency to unity must wear out all artificial external pressure.

It is remarkable how little this epoch was understood either by our statesmen or our press; they appeared to see only a meaningless struggle without system or object, where in reality a great purpose was being resolutely and irresistibly worked out. In the Roman Republic they saw only the form of political liberty—the republic; they were either ignorant or incredulous of its higher meaning in the national sense, and judging Italy of to-day by her history in the middle ages, they used often to condemn or lament the incapacity of the Italians for union among themselves.*

* Mr. Gladstone did much to retard the enlightenment of English public opinion as to the true character of the Italian movement, by giving the authority of his name to the translation of Farini's Roman History. That history is of some value, on account of the numerous diplomatic and other documents it produces; but the English reader is led astray, who studies it without being aware that it expresses exclusively the views of the Italian moderate party of that day. None can read it, I apprehend, without receiving the impression that something is kept back, without feeling that they are introduced into a labyrinth to which no clue is presented. They read of a prolonged revolutionary or popular movement without any explained or apparent object, and of tyranny without a cause. The fact is, Farini systematically keeps in the background the tendency to unity, and diminishes the importance, or distorts the meaning, of all those events in which this tendency was manifest. The translation of his work into English was the more unfortunate, because the error pervading it is precisely the one to which we were already predisposed.

At the time Farini wrote, the leaders of the moderate party had discovered the impracticability of their own programme—that of converting the reigning princes into constitutional sovereigns, but they had not acquired faith in the possible

In this slight sketch I have necessarily omitted the mention of many important events occurring during this period, and which bore more or less visibly the impress of the national tendency. My subject has required that I should follow the course of those in which the prominent actors were professedly working for this great aim of unity. Sicily was in revolt during 1848 and 1849, and in Naples there were revolutionary movements, but the national feeling was partially concealed in these states by a thin veil of demands for constitutional government. Venice held out against Austria for seventeen months under the direction of Manin; but the Venetians followed his views, and, at that time, his idea of the future Italy was that of a federation of republican states.

Thus I have shown you throughout the sequence of events from 1831 to 1849, how a nucleus of young patriots, which expanded gradually into a great political party, embracing the flower of Italian manhood and intelligence, and working always under the influence of one master spirit, succeeded by resolute propagandism, by a series of daring enterprises, by failures and martyrdoms, and by glorious though momentary victories, in converting the programme of the *Giovine Italia*—Italy one and free—into a distinct hope irrevocably awakened in the Italians.

In the second period of the Italian struggle, which will be the subject of my second lecture, Garibaldi and some other actors are more prominent on the scene than Mazzini; though his influence is still omnipresent, and his labour unceasing though silent: but during the whole period embraced in my present lecture, he has been the necessary hero of the scene throughout. Now it is not that I assume you to be particularly interested in a fair appreciation of him for his own sake, but up to this

achievement of unity. Materialists themselves, without enthusiasm, love, or genius, they were slow to believe in the devotion of the multitude to a grand and unselfish idea. They saw only that the programme of the national party had so far triumphed over their own in the hearts of the people, as to constitute a danger sufficiently formidable in the eyes of the Italian rulers, to deter these from relinquishing any part of that despotic power which supplied the most efficacious means of defence against it. The leaders of the moderate party could not forgive the authors of their defeat, and their bitterness is illustrated in the tone of alternate sarcasm and anger which Farini adopts, in writing of Mazzini or others who had joined in teaching the unity of Italy. He speaks of unity as a *crochet* of Mazzini, and declares it to be an aim which is neither good nor grand.

Four years ago Farini proclaimed his own acceptance of unity as the true goal of the Italian movement, and his doing so was a severe comment on his Roman history.

It would appear, also, from Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet upon the State prosecutions in Naples, published in 1851, that he was not himself aware of the real character of the movement in Italy. He evidently fancied the Neapolitan government actuated in these prosecutions only by an unreasonable suspicion or hatred of constitutional ideas. He claims our sympathy for Poerio, and other prisoners, on the ground that they were constitutionalists, and that their only object had been to establish in Naples a government resembling our own. Now Poerio himself had been a member of the *Giovine Italia*, and the charges against him at his trial were these: that he had, while minister, corresponded with Mazzini, and joined in the formation of a secret society at Naples, having the unity of Italy for its object. Whether the charges were true or false, it is surprising that they did not enlighten Mr. Gladstone as to the direction taken by the fears of the government, and give him an insight into the real danger which the widely spread system of political persecution was intended to guard against.

time he so completely personified the national aspiration, that to misunderstand his teaching and action is to misunderstand the movement itself. And because I have been obliged to say so much concerning him, I must yet in concluding add another word.

Mazzini has encountered, as all teachers of new truths or introducers of great changes have encountered for a time, prejudice, misrepresentation, calumny; all which has found an echo in England. Completely merging all thought of self in the great aim of his existence, seldom has he replied to, or protested against, this disloyal mode of warfare. Among other charges, his enemies used to cast upon his head the blood of all the patriots who from time to time perished on the field or on the scaffold, because his teaching had urged them on. And although he had deliberately relinquished fortune, and all the joys of life, for exile, danger, and incessant toil; although the risks he has incurred of arrest and death have been so numerous, and his escapes so marvellous, that his friends have believed that a special providence watched over him; although, in a word, he has suffered a life of martyrdom, his enemies have charged it against him as a sort of crime that he happens to have escaped a martyr's death.

In some moment, when writhing perhaps under this cruel injustice, or when possibly repeated failures made him doubt for an instant his own power of perseverance, or even his own faith, he wrote these touching lines I am about to read to you, in the preface to his memoirs of the brothers Bandiera. I have already spoken of the brothers Bandiera, who were executed in 1844. In writing their memoirs he appropriately dedicates them to Jacopo Ruffini, who had been one of the first victims of the persecution against the Giovine Italia. When Jacopo Ruffini was imprisoned at Genoa, the police authorities, in order to make him confess who were the members of the Association, showed him a forged document purporting to be a confession by others, who, they told him, were in prison, and had bought their lives by this confession. Then they urged him to do the same. He begged for a day to consider; and, in the agony of this great trial, tore a nail from his prison door, opened a vein with it and killed himself, writing with his blood upon the wall:—"This is my answer." In the dedication of the memoirs to Ruffini, Mazzini thus addresses the spirit of his friend:—

"Help me; oh, help me that I do not despair! From the sphere where you now live a life more powerful in intellect and love than the earthly can be, and into which new martyrs to the Italian faith have just risen up to meet you, pray with them to God that He will hasten the fulfilment of the destinies that He has ordained for Italy. But if, indeed, this uncertain light, which I have saluted as the dawn, should be only the light of some falling star, and long years of darkness and suffering must yet pass over Italy before the ways of the Lord shall be revealed to her; then, for the love I bear you, help me, your poor friend, that I may think and act, live and die, uncontaminated; that I may never relinquish, either through insupportableness of suffering or bitterness of disappointment, the worship of the eternal idea, God and Humanity; God the Father and Educator—Humanity the progressive interpreter of His law. So that when we meet in the future life assigned

to us, you may not have occasion to veil yourself, blushing, with your wings, and repent of the affection you bore to me on earth."

What bitter moments of trial in the life of the Apostle, what struggling against despair or doubt do these lines reveal. They were written in 1845.

I have now shown you how the national idea took root in Italian soil; in my second lecture we shall see how it has flowered and borne fruit in the events of the last few years.

LECTURE II.

Terms of the Alliance between France and Piedmont, 1858—Peace of Villafranca—National Party re-organised as the Party of Action—Policy of the Moderates—Sicilian Insurrection—Garibaldi lands—His Victories—Cavour sends an army to the South—His motive—The Movement arrested—Cavour's Policy—The Party of Action in the Italian Chamber—An Attempt on the Venetia stopped by the Italian Government—Garibaldi prepares to move on Rome—Aspromonte—Future Prospects of the Italian Movement—Louis Napoleon's position in Italy—The Papal Church at Rome—Concluding Remarks on the National Idea—Our own Attitude and Policy towards the National Movement in Europe.

In my first lecture I traced the progress of the Italian national movement to the fall of Rome in 1849, which concluded, what may be called, the educational period of the mission of the Giovine Italia. The consciousness of nationality had then become so thoroughly awakened in the Italians, that it was certain to be the true lever of every future movement. Rome and Venice fallen, the leaders of the national party went into exile, but undaunted. If the edifice they had begun to raise was shattered, they felt that they had laid the foundation for a new one in the hearts of the people; and in spite of France and Austria, they could say of the national cause, as Galileo said of the earth when before the Inquisitors, "*Eppur si muove.*"

For ten years, however, the cold hand of Louis Napoleon on the heart of Italy seemed to paralyse her action. The most daring and most enthusiastic sacrificed their lives, or lost their liberty, in several vain attempts at insurrection; the many held back, appalled at the prospect of encountering Austria and France at once. The most important of these attempts were an insurrection in Milan in 1853; and an expedition which, starting from Genoa, where it was organised, landed in the South, and attempted to promote insurrection there. Both failed, and both were condemned; yet the former was but an attempt to repeat what had succeeded in 1848, and the latter to anticipate the movement which was successful in 1860. At the head of this expedition were Pisacane and Nicotera: Rosolio Pilo was to have taken part; he was in another vessel with men and arms, but by some accident the vessels did not meet; so he was reserved for a more successful enterprise, and was the leader of the Sicilian insurrection three years later. He fell at Palermo. These three young men were among the most devoted and the bravest of the Italians; all belonged to noble and influential families in the south; the two former Neapolitans; the latter, Sicilian. Pisacane was killed during the expedition, in an encounter with the Neapolitan troops—Nicotera alone remains; he was taken and condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Released by Garibaldi, in 1860, he was afterwards

elected a deputy to the Italian Parliament by the very city—Salerno—which had been the scene of his trial. For the latter attempt, Mazzini was among those condemned to death by the Piedmontese government. He was at Genoa when the expedition started, and with difficulty escaped. He had been condemned to death also in 1833, for the insurrection in Savoy; and as from that time to the present, he has been excluded from every political amnesty, two sentences of death hang over his head. Hence his life is one of exile; he frequently visits Italy, but while there is obliged to be concealed.

At length, in 1859, the weight of France was partially removed. It was not removed, however, that Italy might rise. Italy *did* rise; but this was not the intention of the Emperor of the French.

It has often been assumed that the advance which the Italians subsequently made towards unity, was made in consequence of an impulse in that direction given by Louis Napoleon and the Piedmontese government. This was not the case. When the alliance was formed between France and Piedmont against Austria, neither Louis Napoleon nor Cavour contemplated any such advance; all that has been won in that direction, has been won, I may almost say, in spite of the Emperor of the French. As for the Piedmontese government, it has simply floated on the summit of the wave, moving with it, but the wave has advanced by a power within itself. If I should appear to take pains to establish this, and to direct your attention to it, it is because the conclusions I would draw concerning the nature of the movement, the great issues, the vast and lasting changes which I believe it is leading to in Europe, evidently depend on the fact that it is not stimulated, or brought about, by any government; but springs from the instincts, or the ideas, which are in the hearts of the people.

The terms of the alliance between France and Piedmont, as arranged by Louis Napoleon and Cavour at Plombieres in October, 1858, were simply an aggrandisement of territory for each: Piedmont to be aggrandised at the expense of Austria, France to have Savoy and Nice. Besides this, Prince Napoleon was to marry a Sardinian Princess, as he did, and in case the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who was an Austrian Prince, should be dethroned during the war, then Prince Napoleon was to have the crown of Tuscany. It is true, independence and nationality for Italy, served as a war-cry against Austria; but the nationality intended was a sham; it meant merely a federation of States, a sort of diplomatic league among Italian sovereigns under the Presidency of the Pope, who would himself necessarily be still under the protection of the Emperor of the French. And by independence was meant only independence of Austria, to be purchased by a more humiliating, a moral as well as material, dependence upon France.

When the war broke out, the national party became for a time, to a certain extent, disorganised. Cavour, dreading any independent revolutionary action by this party in Italy during the war; dreading lest the cry of unity should be raised, which, in the councils of the Piedmontese Government and in the ministerial organs of the press, was condemned at the time as a cry subversive of European order, invited Garibaldi to act under the King; permitting him to summon volunteers, and promising that he should have the command of 30,000,

if so many obeyed his call. More than that number flocked to Piedmont from different parts of northern and central Italy, generally in the hope of serving under him. Of these, however, he was allowed to have about 3,000 only, without cavalry or artillery. The rest were sent to the depôts of the regular army in Piedmont, and took no part in the war. But thus a portion of the enthusiastic youth—the revolutionary element in fact—was removed from the cities of northern and central Italy.

The Italian people generally, and indeed many of the national party, at the outset, applauded this war, and this alliance; influenced at the moment, I think, less by any thought whether the alliance or protection of a foreign despot was likely to lead either to independence or liberty, than by an intense hatred of Austria. Mazzini protested against the alliance, but at the same time, he prepared to ward off the danger it might bring, and to turn the opportunity for acting, which it afforded, to good account. A secret committee of the national party already existed at Florence, composed of Dolfi, a baker, whose name was often mentioned in our papers at that time; a man of immense influence with the Florentine people; Piero Cironi, a well-known literary man, and two or three others. This committee wrote to Mazzini in England, immediately the war broke out, telling him that Tuscany was ripe for revolution and asking for his counsel—I am telling you now something of the inner life of the movement—Mazzini, in reply, advised them to promote revolution by all means, only to be careful that nothing was done, no cry raised, which could possibly serve as a pretext to Louis Napoleon for saying that the people of Tuscany were willing to accept his cousin as their Prince. Thus this danger was guarded against from the commencement; and, when the Grand Duke fled from Tuscany, the scheme of placing Prince Napoleon on the vacant throne, was defeated by the resolute attitude of the population.

It may be doubted if Louis Napoleon ever intended to drive the Austrians out of Italy, but, probably, the conclusion of peace was hastened by his finding that his cousin had but little prospect of an Italian throne; and that revolution was extending into the Roman States. Indeed, he frankly declared afterwards at Paris to the ambassadors and great bodies of the state, when they met to thank him for the restoration of peace, that he concluded it in order to avoid the dangerous co-operation of the revolution.

The position of Austria in Italy was not really weakened by this war; she lost only a part of Lombardy, with the city of Milan—an open country with a large city containing a hostile population, which, in a military sense, were only an embarrassment. Thus the direct consequence of the war and the alliance with the Emperor of the French, amounted to but a small gain for Piedmont; especially as the cession of Savoy and Nice was afterwards sternly exacted according to the original compact. But there was an *indirect* consequence of immense value; a consequence which was never intended by Louis Napoleon, and for which, therefore, no debt of gratitude was due. Revolution had been suffered to raise its head in Tuscany and the legations; free popular action had commenced, and here was a field for the national party to work upon. After the peace of Villafranca this party began to

reorganise itself, and Garibaldi and Mazzini once more to act together. In answer to a letter from Mazzini about this time, Garibaldi wrote:—"Hence forward let us work together as brother and brother." And they have done so.

Throughout all the subsequent events there has been going on a constant struggle, more or less beneath the surface, between the policy of Louis Napoleon on one hand—a policy absolutely adverse to the realisation of unity—and, on the other, the irresistible aspirations of the Italian people in that direction; guided and inspired still by the same party, for the most part even by the same men, that had been working for unity from the commencement.

I think it will help you to understand the events that followed the peace of Villafranca, if I describe more clearly than I have done, the two great Italian parties. Each of them has always acted under the influence of one dominant idea, and a knowledge of this, affords the key to all their policy. The national party, or, as it began to be called at this time, the party of action,—but I must pause for a moment to explain this change of name. When the Piedmontese government and the moderate party gave the name of nationality to their project of a league among Italian princes or a federation of states, and especially when some of this party, going further, accepted, as a theory, but without acting for it, the doctrine that Italy might become one nation, the true national party began to distinguish itself by this new name. Thus it was first the *Giovine Italia*, then the national party, and, during the last few years, the party of action; by which name I shall in future call it. For thirty years then, this party has worked unceasingly to make Italy one and independent; and although the members of the party are thoroughly democratic in principle and feeling, all question of the form of government—republican or monarchical—is kept secondary or subservient to the accomplishment of this great aim of unity.

The dominant idea which has always influenced the policy of the moderate party, may be defined to be—hostility to revolution; that is to say, hostility to free popular action, to any movement not initiated or controlled by some established government. The shifting policy of this party in regard to the question of nationality, is to be accounted for by its consistent adherence to this dominant idea. Thus in 1848 and 1849, when unity meant revolution throughout Italy, it condemned and opposed this doctrine, and counselled the governments to grant reforms and constitutions as the surest way of warding off revolution. In 1860, the moderate party, as we shall see, definitively proclaimed its adherence to the programme of unity; but still a spirit of hostility to all free popular movements had much to do with this decision; for Garibaldi had just revolutionised Southern Italy in the name of unity, and it was only by taking possession as it were of Garibaldi's banner, that the control of the movement could be transferred from him to the Piedmontese Government, and so completed, if completed at all, by the government and not by popular and revolutionary action. This party represents generally aristocratic and conservative interests, and its hostility to revolution is chiefly based on a dread of the democratic tendency of popular movements. But its numbers and its strength are augmented by all the timid and the indolent throughout the country,

and it finds adherents too wherever there exists a remnant of that old stain upon the Italian character—the preference for working by crooked ways, by statesmanship and cunning rather than by courage, through others rather than by oneself.

Between these two parties, inclining sometimes to one, sometimes to the other, there is the multitude, with the instinct of national unity in their hearts, and with tendencies generous and good, as the multitude always has, but wavering and uncertain; capable of being roused into enthusiasm and heroism by the party of action, or lulled into apathy by the soporific influence of the moderates.

To return now to the state of Italy after the peace of Villafranca. The policy then adopted by the party of action was this:—to persuade or to compel Victor Emanuel to co-operate with them for unity. Mazzini published a letter to him immediately after the peace. He exhorted him to continue the war against Austria, and, in place of the alliance of Louis Napoleon which he had lost, to accept the alliance of twenty-six millions of Italians. He said, “You have but to utter one word—unity; and you have them with you sublime in enthusiasm, faith, and action.” He assured Victor Emanuel that five hundred thousand volunteers would flock to his standard, and he said, “If you have a soul capable of loving or understanding the Italian people, you know that you may trust to their gratitude for your reward.”

Soon afterwards—to encourage the king to enter on this path—the populations of Tuscany and the Legations voted their annexation to Piedmont.

The first project of the party of action after the peace of Villafranca, was to spread revolution throughout the Roman and Neapolitan states, by the passage of Garibaldi at the head of his volunteers from the Legations southward. This was the project of Mazzini, who was there in Italy, unseen, but organising and influencing all; he sent arms to Ancona, and prepared insurrection there and in Sicily, the signal for whose outbreak was to be the advance of Garibaldi. The Italian hero and his volunteers entered into the project with enthusiasm. Ricasoli and Farini, then at the head of the provisional governments in Tuscany and the Legations,—it was just before the annexation of those provinces—yielded a reluctant consent, and they required that Mazzini himself should not come forward. On the eve of his advance Garibaldi was stopped by an order from the king.

In the following year, 1860, Mazzini planned and prepared the Sicilian insurrection; though he remained in the back ground during the movement that followed, because it was thought that by coming forward, he would increase the risk of open hostility from the Emperor of the French. Sicily was chosen as the scene for initiating a general movement having Italian unity for its scope. Rosolino Pilo and Crispi were the principal agents in organising the insurrection; both were Sicilian refugees; they went disguised from England to Sicily for the purpose, and the former was in effect the chief of the insurrection until Garibaldi arrived. He was killed just before the taking of Palermo. The plan of the intended movement was this:—“It was proposed that revolution, beginning in Sicily, should pass thence into the kingdom of Naples; all Southern Italy once gained over to the national cause through popular

action, the Venetian states would be attached by sea and land, in concert with internal insurrection. It was hoped that Victor Emanuel would be then forced to cast in his lot unreservedly with the Italian people, lest he should lose the prospect of the Italian crown; and the people of the North and South thus united, would say to Louis Napoleon, "Now deliver up our capital." You may remember how the Sicilian insurrection, which broke out prematurely, maintained itself for about six weeks until Garibaldi landed at Marsala from Genoa with just a thousand volunteers. On his march towards Palermo he first encountered four thousand Neapolitans whom he defeated at Calatafimi. His little force was then joined by two or three thousand of the insurgents under Rosilino Pilo. As he advanced towards Palermo, an army of twelve thousand men issued forth to meet him; and here Garibaldi made use of a stratagem which just illustrates his genius. Out of the direct road to Palermo, a road branches off leading to the mountains and the interior of the island; but Garibaldi knew that out of *this* road, at a distance of some twenty or thirty miles, there branched another which returned to Palermo on the other side. Instead of meeting the twelve thousand Neapolitans, Garibaldi took the road leading into the interior, and they immediately followed in pursuit of him. When he arrived at the branch road which led back to Palermo, he with his little army turned into that, sending on his artillery, however—he had two guns—still upon the road into the interior. The twelve thousand Neapolitans, following the track of the guns and other signs of the march of troops which were purposely placed to mislead them, went on into the interior; and were still pursuing these two guns, thinking they had Garibaldi before them, after he was in possession of Palermo. By this stratagem he got rid of nearly half of the garrison of the city.

At Palermo, Garibaldi was soon joined by thousands of volunteers from Northern Italy. With nearly thirty thousand men he arrived at the Straits of Messina, and gained another battle over a Neapolitan army at Milazzo. But the Piedmontese Government dreaded the spreading of revolution, and made an effort to prevent Garibaldi from crossing into Naples. Victor Emanuel himself wrote to him desiring him not to cross, while at the same time severe measures were taken to prevent any more volunteers from embarking in the ports of Northern Italy. Garibaldi, however, was firm, and crossed the Straits.

From Calabria he advanced without resistance to Naples. The Neapolitan soldiers on his road seemed awe-struck. As the vanguard of the volunteer army approached, bodies of troops joined in the shout—"Viva l'Italia! Viva Garibaldi!" and either fraternised with the volunteers or retired and let them pass. Once, a few officers, Mario, Missouri, and some others, miles in advance of their army, came suddenly upon a force of six thousand Neapolitans. They expected to be made prisoners, but they cried—"Viva l'Italia! Viva Garibaldi!" There was magic in the sound. Six thousand men laid down their arms, and the shout—"Viva Garibaldi! Viva l'Italia!" was echoed to the skies. One may almost imagine that these men heard the voices of the martyrs who for so many years had been dying for the great hope of national unity, saying to them, "Ye, also, are Italians: stand by; let Italy's deliverer pass!"

The King dared not wait for his approach, but fled from Naples to Capua, taking with him the remains of his army, about forty thousand men.

What military pomp, what glitter of royal ceremonial, can compare with the glory of that heart-felt enthusiasm which saluted the entrance of Garibaldi into Naples! He came worn and ragged; his army was miles behind; he was accompanied only by half-a-dozen officers as ragged as himself. No glittering epaulets, gold lace, or plumes. But the Neapolitans beheld him in his old red shirt with a radiance around him: he was encircled to their eyes by the bright and glorious aureole of the Italian idea.

Soon afterwards, on the 1st October, was fought the battle of Maddalena, or of the Volturno, near Capua. There eighteen thousand volunteers completely defeated the entire army of the King of Naples. The battle was obstinate and bloody; it lasted from dawn till evening. In the army of the King of Naples remained his choicest soldiers. There were his guards and his Swiss battalions; and Garibaldi said of them after the battle, that they fought better than he had ever seen French or Austrians fight. It was the last battle of this marvellous campaign. The original plan of the movement, as it was projected when the Sicilian insurrection was prepared, had so far been carried out precisely as it had been intended, but it was only half completed; and now it was arrested; not by the force of the King of Naples—his last effort in the field was made at the Volturno, and he could only hold out for a time at Gaeta or in other fortresses; not by the power of Austria or of France; but by the Piedmontese government and the moderate party, simply through fear of the democratic tendencies inherent in popular insurrections and in these volunteer forces.

I have told you how Cavour tried to dissuade Garibaldi from crossing the straits into the kingdom of Naples. Failing in this, he foresaw that Garibaldi would triumph throughout the South, and would advance through the Roman States along the shores of the Adriatic to Venetia. Then Piedmont would be forced into war with Austria, not in alliance with a foreign power, but in alliance with the revolution. At all risks he determined to avoid this; he hated or feared the revolution more than Austria. He took a bold step; he resolved to anticipate Garibaldi and the revolution, and to occupy the ground before them, by sending a Piedmontese army into the Roman provinces on the Adriatic, so to enter the north of the Neapolitan kingdom. The diplomatic documents of the time show the motives by which Cavour professed to be influenced in explaining the step to the French Emperor. Baron Talleyrand, the French Ambassador at Turin, reporting a conversation with Cavour, thus repeats his words:—"If we are not in Umbria and the Marches before Garibaldi we are lost; the revolution will invade central Italy: we are forced to act." And Thouvenel, the French Minister, in a diplomatic circular of the 18th October, thus reports Cavour's own exposition of his motives, made to the Emperor at Chambéry, by the Italian envoy Farini:—

"Signor Farini has explained to the Emperor the very embarrassing and dangerous position in which the triumph of the revolution, to a certain extent personified in Garibaldi, threaten to place the Govern-

ment of his Sardinian Majesty. Garibaldi was on the point of freely traversing the Roman states, raising the populations as he went, and, had he once passed that frontier, it would have been impossible to prevent an attack upon Venice. The Government of Turin had but one mode left open to it to prevent that eventuality, and that was to enter the Marches and Umbria as soon as the approach of Garibaldi had produced disturbance there, and then advancing, without infringing on the authority of the Pope, to give battle, if it should be necessary, to the revolution in the Neapolitan territory. Afterwards to request a congress to decide upon the destinies of Italy."

So, you see, this army which was sent to invade the Roman provinces and enter the kingdom of Naples, was sent not so much for the sake of completing Garibaldi's victories—Cavour did not doubt his triumphant advance—as to supersede him and the revolution; to give battle to him if he persisted. Garibaldi yielded, as he afterwards told Cavour in the chamber at Turin, to avoid the risk of civil war; and retired broken-hearted to his little Island of Caprera. He was even insulted by the offer of pensions and a dukedom; it seemed as if the men of the government were as incapable of understanding him as of imitating him. The remnant of his glorious and now veteran army of volunteers dispersed. Apostles of an idea, they had fought neither for gold, nor a decoration, nor the smile of a prince. On the long road from Marsala to the Volturno how many of them had fallen! At Calatafimi, Palermo, Melazzo, and on the Volturno. When, after his last battle, Garibaldi decreed a medal for the thousand who started with him from Genoa, little more than four hundred were found alive to receive it.

Before Garibaldi gave place to the royal army and the royal government, he did the best he could, however, to place the King under a moral obligation to continue and complete the work himself, in which he was thus superseding his, Garibaldi's, own action. The election of the King by the population of the South was certain, Garibaldi had inscribed the name of Victor Emanuel on his banner in association with that of Italy. Now he took care that the form of the plebiscite should be no unconditional election; no mere annexation of the South to the Kingdom of Piedmont. The form was as follows:—*We vote that Italy be one and indivisible, with Victor Emanuel and his descendants for constitutional kings.* This clearly signified that the South united with the North under his rule, in order to accumulate the force of twenty-two millions of Italians in his hands, and render him strong enough to make Italy, one, by driving the Austrians from Venice, and the French from Rome.

When Cavour, in the Parliament at Turin, announced the King's acceptance of this vote, he for the first time proclaimed the adhesion of the Government to the principle of unity; but while doing so, there was some sign of evading the obligation of practically completing this unity; for he said that war for the Venetia would at that moment be displeasing to the great powers, and that, though Rome would, no doubt be theirs, it must be with the consent of the Emperor of the French.

I do not condemn Cavour that, up to this period, he, or the Piedmontese government, did not work for unity. True nationality resides in the hearts of a people, and the effort to constitute themselves as one

State should come from them, and be the expression of their consciousness that they form together one collective life. If this movement for unity had been fomented by a Prince or his minister, it would have sunk from being the assertion of a right, and from the dignity of a principle, into the vulgar wickedness of royal ambition and State aggrandisement. But though a Prince cannot initiate a truly national movement, he may obey the call of a people whose aspiration to national existence is manifest, and help them in the struggle: and I *do* condemn Cavour that, after 1860, when the king might have said to European Governments:—"Behold, I am not led by ambition; I but obey the call of the Italian people:"—he then evaded or indefinitely postponed the fulfilment of the implied condition of Victor Emanuel's election. I know it may be argued with some show of reason that postponement might be the wisest course, the surest path to eventual success. But then it should have been postponement for a few months only, postponement for the sake of preparation. Whereas Cavour, instead of arming the country, encouraging the formation of more volunteer forces, making all possible naval and military preparations, showed the old spirit of subserviency to Louis Napoleon, and distrust of the Italian people generally, but especially of all those who had been instrumental in the revolutionary changes that had made Victor Emanuel already king of three-fourths of Italy.

It is a common mistake in England to suppose that Cavour worked for the unity of Italy; and, as he represented the influence and action of the Piedmontese Government, it is important to correct this mistake. It originated, I imagine, in this way:—After the banner of unity had proved in the hands of Garibaldi to be that of victory, and the Piedmontese Government accepted it as their own; the moderate party and the members of the Government, in their eagerness to identify themselves with this banner, began to speak and write of it as if it had long represented their aspirations and their aim. This tone was natural enough, and to be expected, in the ministerial press of Italy; but it was curious to observe how an influential portion of our own press blindly followed the example; and many of our newspaper correspondents in Italy adopted this tone after 1860, whose letters of a year or two before remained to show, that, at that time, it never occurred to them to connect the policy of Piedmont, or of Cavour, with what they then still considered a dangerous and Mazzinian Utopia.

The truth is, that, up to 1860, the policy of Cavour, as far as it extended to Italy generally, was in favour of a settlement of the country on the basis of a federation of States; and whenever he spoke of Italian nationality, he meant no more than this. Indeed, at the Congress of Paris, in 1856, he proposed a still further division of Italy, by forming the Legations into an eighth Italian State. His great ambition, and his aim, almost from his first becoming minister, had merely been to form Piedmont into a kingdom of Northern Italy by the acquisition of Lombardy, and, perhaps, some further aggrandisement at the expense of Austria. And, to carry out this aim, he had always looked to the help of France. It was but a repetition of the old policy begun by Ludovico Sforza, imitated by many Italian statesmen, and condemned by almost every historian—that of bringing in the French

against the Germans. This help, of course he knew, was to be purchased only by concessions, either to France or to the Imperial Family ; and it was at length so purchased in 1859. Two years previously, he had encouraged intrigues and conspiracies for revolutionising Naples, and placing a Murat on the throne ; always with a view of obtaining the favour of the Emperor of the French ; and the proposal to form the Legations into a separate State, was probably made with the idea of giving a throne to a Buonapartist Prince.

One circumstance alone seems to connect Cavour's policy with a thought of unity. He was supposed to give secret encouragement to a society called the National Society, formed in Piedmont two or three years before the war, by La Farini and a few of the more advanced moderates. This association acquired some importance by enrolling Garibaldi for a short time among its members, though he separated from it after the peace at Villafranca. Its programme may be thus described :—Independence, Unification. The substitution of the latter word for unity, signifying that Italy was to be *made* one as by some agency acting upon her ; it pointed to the exclusion of revolutionary or popular action in the work, and implied rather the operation of regular armies. The idea of the association appeared to be the extension of Piedmont, little by little, as any combination in European politics might give help from without. Such support as Cavour gave to this association was no doubt given in part because it opposed Mazzini's teaching of popular action ; and also because, in case the tendency to unity proved a reality, it would attract that tendency to Piedmont as a centre. Still, not only his avowed policy, but his actual efforts were directed to a settlement of Italy as a federation of States. And it is remarkable that after Garibaldi was in Sicily, at the time when Cavour hoped he would not extend the revolution beyond that Island, negotiations were going on between the Piedmontese and Neapolitan governments for a settlement of Italy as three States ; a kingdom of the North, one of the South, and the papacy in the centre ; with some sort of federation or alliance between the three. I confess, my own opinion is that Cavour was one of the last among the Italians to acquire faith in the achievement of unity. He represented essentially the views and feelings of the moderate party ; and the leaders of that party, materialists themselves, without enthusiasm, love, or genius, were slow to believe in the devotion of the multitude to a grand and unselfish idea. Cavour had faith in the power of interests rather than ideas ; and was not the man to devote the energies of a life to realise a great conception of uncertain practicability. And when the events of 1860 had convinced the most sceptical that unity was the true goal of the movement, instead of looking to means corresponding in grandeur with the aim, instead of stimulating the enthusiasm and developing all the powers of the country, his plan for working in the direction of that aim, was a revival of the French alliance against Austria of 1859. In the meantime he tried to lull the people into inertness by vain hopes, teaching them that if they remained tranquil all might be done for them by their great protector. Negotiations were undoubtedly going on continually for such an alliance ; the terms discussed were a cession of the island of Sardinia, and co-operation with France in a war for the provinces on the Rhine in

case Prussia came to the aid of Austria ; as Prussia probably would do if Austria were attacked in Italy by the French. Such negotiations might or might not have come to any thing, they terminated at the death of Cavour ; though subsequent Italian ministers have been inclined to the same policy.

Even if independence of Austria could be thus achieved, what well-wisher to the Italians would desire it? Independence and unity for Italy form one of those aims whose value depends upon the manner of achieving it. The limbs might be put together ; the form might be complete in all its fair proportions, and Italy remain a corpse. The consciousness of independence, the sense of their own power and dignity, all that constitutes a nation's life—the spirit that should animate the body—might yet be wanting. I confess, for my own part, had I the power now by merely opening my hand, to give the Italians at once a complete and independent national existence, I would not do it. For their own sakes, and because I wish them well, I would not do it. Let them win it for themselves. Let them obey God's law—fulfil the duty first, then enter on the enjoyment of the right.

When the Giovine Italia first raised the banner of unity, their expectation of practical success was logically founded on the conviction that a people of twenty-six millions can be independent and united, if they resolutely will it. During a long apostleship of thirty years, they have striven by precept and example to rouse the Italians to a new life of enthusiasm and energy. They intended that the Italians should deserve and become fitted for national existence by the very struggle to obtain it. I remember in one of his earliest addresses to his disciples, the founder of the Giovine Italia thus wrote :—

“Think how grand, how religious, and holy, is the work that God confides to us ; the creation of a people ! It never can be done by crooked ways, or court intrigues ; nor by doctrines invented just to meet the circumstances of the moment ; but only by long struggles, by the living example of austere virtue set to the multitude, by resolutely and unceasingly teaching the truth, by the boldness of faith, by the expenditure of our blood, and by such a solemn, undying, never-failing enthusiasm, as should be stronger than any suffering or misfortune that can afflict the heart of man.”

Who can dispute either in a practical or a moral sense the soundness of this teaching ? Who can deny that it was the very way to accomplish unity ? And even whenever the monarchy and its regular forces have come in and taken part, it has been because the people were acting without them.

When the North and South were first united under the sceptre of Victor Emanuel, the party of action had resolved to give the monarchy a fair trial as a means of completing unity. In assembling the first Italian Parliament, Cavour applied to the elections for Italy the electoral suffrage in use in Piedmont. This suffrage is so narrow that probably, on the average, the sitting members have not polled more than three hundred votes apiece. The use of this suffrage, together with the exertion of Government influence, had the effect of introducing into the chamber a large majority of the moderate party. This result was assisted no doubt by the fact that the candidates of this party were as

loud in their expressions of devotion to unity during the elections, as if they had been working for it all their lives. Thus a state of things which had been brought about by the people acting under the influence of the party of action, was to be regulated in its development by the moderate party; and here was an inevitable source of future discord and confusion. Nevertheless the party of action, represented by about a sixth of the entire chamber, acted loyally, and laboured constitutionally to obtain the arming of the country, and a development of all its powers to bring to a completion the great national work. First, they endeavoured to obtain the introduction into Italy of a system of militia, resembling that in Switzerland; where, out of a population of a million and a half, it supplies two hundred and fifty thousand armed and trained men. It would have given more than two millions in Italy. Failing in this, they struggled for permission to form volunteer regiments as in England. But these and other efforts which they made for arming the people were all made in vain; and even the regular army was but very gradually and slowly increased.

When the party of action, after nearly two years of patient trial, found that the monarchy would not spontaneously continue the movement, it turned again to work out its mission in the old way. Preparations were made in the spring of 1862, for a movement in the Tyrol, and the Italian provinces of Austria. Insurrection and an invasion of volunteers were to take place at once. Some twenty or thirty thousand volunteers would have entered those provinces at four different points, and communications were established with Hungarian troops in Italy. While these preparations were in progress, both Mazzini and Garibaldi appealed to Rattazzi, then Minister,—the one appealing to him in writing from England, the other personally—in this sense:—They entreated him not to check such a movement, if only in the interest of the monarchy itself. A Government, they said, based upon a half accomplished revolution, cannot remain secure if it ceases to identify itself with the aim of the revolution; and the continued postponement of any preparation for accomplishing this aim, must eventually lead to anarchy and civil discord. They promised him that if the attempt should fail, the party of action would take the whole responsibility, and the Government should not be compromised; but that if the insurrection maintained itself successfully for two or three weeks, the Italian Government could then step in, and the leadership of the war with Austria should be abandoned to it. Rattazzi seemed half to acquiesce.

Before these preparations were mature, all was stopped by the Italian Government. It was said, and probably with reason, that Louis Napoleon, informed of what was going on by his spies or those of Austria, sent orders to Rattazzi to do so. Volunteers were flocking towards the Austrian frontier in small separate bands. Suddenly, four hundred were arrested at once at Sarnico; others at Brescia. Two officers, Colonels Nullo and Catabene, were arrested in the presence of Garibaldi, who had just arrived at Sarnico himself. It was during an impulse of indignation at this check, which he imputed to the orders or the influence of the Emperor of the French, that Garibaldi went to Sicily, and commenced the movement against Rome which terminated at Aspromonte.

When Garibaldi conceived this project of attacking the French in Rome, Mazzini was not at hand to counsel him; and when he wrote from Sicily to Mazzini in England, to say what he was doing, the latter answered:—"You know I thought it would be wiser to organise a new attempt on the Venetia rather than to move on Rome, but now you have raised the cry, 'Rome or Death,' and the people of Sicily have responded to it, we must go on. I am with you with my whole heart, and hope to meet you at Naples." He left England and was already in Italy, on his way to join Garibaldi, when he heard of the disaster at Aspromonte.

No doubt this enterprise of Garibaldi was imprudent. What then? Have not all freedom's battles been fought against fearful odds? Had not Greece a hopeless cause against Persia; has not Poland against Russia? But however imprudent this enterprise may have been, it was not so desperate as our newspapers seemed to think it. It was undertaken in the hope that the Italian army would refuse to act against him. Nor was this hope altogether unreasonable, for until he reached Aspromonte, it had refused to do so; and the regiments which acted then, had been selected and brought from Northern Italy on purpose. If he had approached Naples, that city would undoubtedly have declared for him. Then, the country with him, and the army not against him, the king must have changed his ministers and joined him too. There would have been people, army, prince,—all the powers of the country combined in the great enterprise. When Garibaldi found the troops prepared to act, his hope of success was extinguished in a moment; he never dreamt of civil war. And what can be grander than his majestic figure when he was a target for the bullets of the royal soldiers, and exclaiming to his volunteers "Non fate fuoco?"

I must say I rejoiced to see that in judging this attempt, public opinion in England, after vibrating for a few days, took the nobler side. Let a man conquer, thousands glorify his name, be his cause divine or devilish; but most among us visited with our sympathies the conquered, the wounded, the imprisoned. We told the down-fallen that he was still a hero for all who love a righteous cause.

Under the Government of the Italian kingdom—a kingdom brought into existence by the movement for unity—a Government identifying itself by its professions with this principle—we see the two men who have been the Apostle and the Warrior of the movement; one an exile, the other wounded.

And in my opinion, the policy of the Government, or the moderate party, is as unwise as it is ungenerous. The national movement is from its nature essentially democratic in every country; it is the first great step on the true path of democratic progress in Europe; but when Mazzini, after the peace of Villafranca, invited the King to identify himself unreservedly with the national aspiration; when Garibaldi a year afterwards dragged him into connexion with it, by coupling the name of Victor Emanuel with that of Italy in all his proclamations in Sicily and Naples, they were drawing him into the only path for the safety of his throne. Mazzini told him the truth when he said:—"If you have a soul capable of loving or understanding the Italian people, you know you may trust to their gratitude for your reward,"

I imagine your sympathies have been raised during this narrative in favour of the party of action ; and this, not merely because in this party has resided the whole initiative of the movement, but because it includes all that is most generous and manly among the Italians ; all that gives hope of the uprising of that people to a nobler character and a better life. And this party in Italy is but the type of such parties which exist elsewhere. In Poland, it has suffered as in Italy ; in Hungary too ; wherever this national aspiration exists, or is growing up, such a party is formed or forming. Its members are the three hundred of Thermopylæ ; the forlorn hope of the movement.

In every country the *many*, high or low, rich or poor, are incapable of sustained devotion to an unselfish object. For the poor, there are daily wants, and daily wants are selfish counsellors ; the rich are often frivolous, corrupt, and sensual. The many may be roused from time to time into enthusiasm and heroism, but they sink again into intervals of apathy and inertness. The party of action represents in each country the sustained, unflagging, active devotion to the cause. Theirs is not merely the courage of the warrior, which has led them often, few in number, badly armed, undisciplined, to confront numerous and disciplined legions ; but the courage of the apostle ; the devotion to a cherished faith, which has led them to encounter imprisonment, exile, death—and death called ignominious—by the executioner or the hangman, even before their cause was thought noble by the many. When unsustained by applause or sympathy, they suffered, supported only by the conscience, and by the glorious faith, that the truth they proclaimed, however condemned it might be then as a folly or a sin, would one day triumph ; the seed they died to sow, sooner or later, would bear fruit.

In regard to the future prospects of the Italian struggle, it would, of course, be idle to speculate beyond the anticipation of certain general results. I have no doubt, however, that the party of action will, before long, succeed in producing a movement in the Venetia and the Italian Tyrol, which will drag the government into war with Austria. A war so initiated, would be a war by the Italian people, not for themselves alone, but in the name of the principle of nationality ; and would necessarily be carried on in alliance with what is called the revolution. There would be insurrection in Hungary ; perhaps in other parts of the Austrian Empire. The movement in Poland would revive ; and the three nationalities which are preparing to rise upon the ruins of the Turkish Empire, would probably begin the struggle. These three nationalities are—the Greek, which would extend beyond the limits of the present kingdom ; a Roumaine nationality, forming round the Danubian principalities, and which ought to take in some territory belonging now both to Russia and to Austria ; and a Slave nationality of which Servia would be the nucleus.

The leaders of the national parties in all these countries are in communication with each other, and a general and simultaneous movement has been for some time in contemplation. It was the knowledge that such a movement was preparing, which induced the Russian government to order the forced levy in Poland in the beginning of last year, which drove the party of action in that country into a premature and separate insurrection. Many circumstances combined with the want of prepara-

tion to prevent the example of Poland from being followed at the time. Among these were the slowness of Garibaldi's recovery, which made it impossible for him, last summer, to take part in a campaign; and the prudent attitude of neutrality assumed at first by Austria towards Poland, which assisted the moderates of Hungary in checking insurrection in that country.

The result of such a war by the Italians against Austria for the Venetia, can scarcely, I think, be doubted. Austria is strong in a contest with any great military power; in such a contest her armies will hold together, and the question of success becomes little else than a dry calculation of mere material elements; the comparative strength of the artillery, and the numbers of the men, who are influenced on one side by no higher motive than on the other, and are scarcely less machines than the muskets that they bear. But Austria is weak against insurrection of her own subjects: *then* there are moral elements at work, which give enthusiasm to one side and paralyse the other. For evidence of this, we need but compare the power she displayed, in 1859, against France and Piedmont, with her feebleness in 1848, in the contest with popular insurrection in Hungary and the Lombardo-Venetian provinces. But, besides all the power of revolution, of volunteer forces, and popular insurrection, there is now a regular force of three hundred thousand soldiers at the disposal of the Italian Government; and, large as is the army of Austria, still, from the extent of her dominions, no part of which can be denuded of troops, she never has been able to bring more than one hundred and seventy or one hundred and eighty thousand men into Italy.

Perhaps it may be asked;—If the Italian Government disposes of an army capable of carrying on war successfully for the Venetia, why should it be assumed that the initiation of the war will come from the party of action, instead of from the Government? The answer to such a question may be found in much I have already said, but, at the risk of repetition, I reply:—The Italian Government, by postponing any advance for four years, has not only shown that it has not the desire to advance, but may be said to have lost the right to do so. The king is bound by his relations with other governments, and it is only under manifest pressure from his subjects that he has a right to act. Without such pressure, it would be but a war of aggression, and a violation of treaties on his part; and the government of Victor Emanuel has now contrived to keep his subjects tranquil for four years without either Rome or Venice. In the meantime, it has accepted—and with rejoicing, too—the recognition of his dominions, *as they are*, from France, Russia, and other Powers; this recognition being given, professedly, on the supposition that the government would not attempt to extend those dominions. The attitude of the moderate party, which holds the reins of government, is now what it has always been. It opposes every attempt to advance, but whenever insurrection succeeds and an advance is made, it advances too, in order to secure what is gained to the monarchical interest; then its opposition is directed against the next step. And now both the practical and moral requirements of the problem demand that a fresh initiative of action should come from the people.

Of course the result of such a war would depend much upon the

neutrality of the Emperor of the French. But so long as the Italians made no attack on Rome, he could scarcely find a pretext for acting against them; and Austria once driven out of Italy, or weakened by internal revolution, they might turn to Louis Napoleon, and treat with him on a footing of equality for the evacuation of their capital. Let the Italians but have a chance of taking their two enemies in turn, and if they do not win their national existence, they do not deserve it. The power of either France or Austria to retain its hold on Italy, is derived from the presence of the other in the country.

My sketch of the Italian question would be incomplete, did I not devote a few words expressly to an estimate of the past and present attitude of Louis Napoleon towards Italy. And whether I look to the past, or endeavour to raise the veil of the future, the Emperor of the French appears always to me the worst enemy of Italian unity, independence, and liberty. The Emperor of Austria and the Italian Princes inherited their positions in Italy. In struggling to maintain their power, they have been defending what they considered rights. They have been the necessary and open enemies of the national movement, which grew up among the Italians always with a knowledge that these enemies must be encountered and overcome. But Louis Napoleon created his position in Italy for purposes of his own ambition: he came, a new, unexpected, unprovoked enemy.

Those among the Italians, whose policy it has been, of late years, to persuade their countrymen that he is at heart not unfriendly to the Italian cause, generally assert that he is not altogether responsible for the restoration of the Papal Government, in 1849; they say, too, that Austria might have restored it if he had not; and then they point triumphantly to Solferino and Magenta. These views have even sometimes found an echo in England. Now, the expedition to Rome was sent in consequence of an agreement entered into with the Pope by the French Government—Louis Napoleon being President of the Republic—that the Papal sovereignty should be re-established. The Roman Republic was destroyed as a preliminary step to the destruction of that of France; French soldiers were to be taught at Rome to fire upon a republican flag; and Louis Napoleon was sagacious enough to foresee that the Papacy, restored by him, would be for ever dependent on him for its existence at Rome; and might become a great power in his hands, both to forward his designs on the French crown, and for future influence in Europe. Nor was there in Italy, at the time of the French invasion, any power that was capable, as far as we can judge, of overthrowing the infant republic of Rome. You may remember, I told you that the Romans, so far from fearing Austria, were making preparations, before the French invasion, to take the offensive against her, and to send an army to act in concert with the Venetians, and with renewed popular insurrection in Lombardy. Even during the armistice with the French, the triumvirs appealed to Oudinot to make the armistice certain for fifteen days—it could be broken at twenty-four hours' notice—that their forces might go out from Rome and give battle to the Austrians. "If you will grant this," said the triumvirs, "we are convinced we shall as easily drive the Austrians from our territory as we have driven the Neapolitans." And there can be little doubt but they would have done

so. We must bear in mind that the Austrian armies always dwindled as they approached Central Italy; every city taken had to be garrisoned, and the force was but small which was advancing in the Roman States. Oudinot, however, refused, and a few days afterwards received an order from Louis Napoleon to put an end to the armistice and take possession of Rome at once.

Nor was Louis Napoleon more a friend of the Italians in 1859, when he declared war against Austria in the name of Italian independence—why did he not make them independent of himself?—and received gravely and self-complacently the acclamations of the people, hailing him as their “Magnanimous Liberator,” than he was in 1849. There is a fable, perhaps familiar to most of you, of a wolf and a shepherd. The wolf, feeling disposed to vary the mode of his depredations on the sheepfold, took an opportunity, when the shepherd was asleep, to steal his hat and cloak, and, putting them on himself, in this costume gained easy access to the sheepfold. This wolf, I think, must have been at a school kept by a fox, he was so cunning. But the wolf, though he had on the shepherd’s cloak, was the wolf still, with all his wolfish instincts; and when Louis Napoleon, in 1859, put on the hat and the cloak of a “Magnanimous Liberator,” he was the same Louis Napoleon, with the same instincts and interests of a despot, as when, in 1849, he sent word to Oudinot to put an end to the armistice and enter Rome.

The national movement never incurred a greater risk of having its course perverted or arrested for years, than it did in 1859, through that scheme for a federation of States under the Presidency of the Pope, and with a Buonapartist Prince on some Italian throne. It would have been a condemnation to perpetual feebleness and dependence upon Louis Napoleon. And he now holds the capital of Italy, keeping the country in confusion and the movement in suspense, stimulating discord, and striving to keep the Italians in both moral and material weakness.

Connected with the subject of the French occupation, there is a question which occurs to the minds of most people:—What will become of the spiritual authority of the Popes in Italy, when the temporal power falls with the retirement of the French?

It was always evident that with the realisation of unity, the temporal sovereignty of the Popes must cease; it did not necessarily follow, however, that the spiritual authority would fall too. But the spiritual power, as an influence on the religious feelings and the minds of men, has long been dying in Italy, whatever may be its prospect of duration in other countries. If, however, it had any vitality remaining a few years since, it certainly received its death-blow by the French invasion, and restoration of the temporal sovereignty. Oudinot took Rome at the cost, not merely of the blood of three thousand of the noblest, bravest hearts of Italy, but at the cost of the last chance for the continuance in that country of the spiritual authority of the Popes.

The Papal Church in the Middle Ages, as a religious agency, helped the nations of Europe in their moral development, awoke in the soul a feeling of human dignity, protected the humble and defenceless, and fostered the noblest creations of the human mind in that age; but its temporal power acted always in an opposite sense. A struggle gradually ripened between the liberty which the Church herself had fostered in

the hearts of Christian peoples, and the local temporal despotism for which she strove; till at length, in the sixteenth century, she abandoned and sacrificed her religious mission for the sake of this local political power; she sought foreign aid to prop it, and the alliance then commenced between the Papacy and European despotism for mutual support. From that time, the influence of the Church upon the Italian people began to decay, and, in 1848, the truth became at once apparent, that the Papal power in Italy had no hold on the sympathies or real religious sentiments that were in the hearts of the multitude. Never did revolution express more clearly the will of an entire people. No arm among the subjects of the Pope was raised to support his government. In a population of less than three millions, three hundred and forty-three thousand men voted in the elections for the Assembly, though knowing that excommunication hung over the heads of all who voted; and the abolition of the temporal power of the Popes was decreed by this Assembly with only five dissentient voices. Yet there are living elements of religious life among the Italians, and perhaps some new organisation of the Church will arise from the links of charity and goodwill which bind the people to the parochial clergy in contradistinction to the Roman Hierarchy.

Let us now, in concluding, return to a consideration of the Idea which produces and regulates these attempts—the great Thought that floats over Europe.

The sketch I have given you of the Italian movement has been presented chiefly to illustrate the nature of this Idea, and throughout the narrative I have taken pains to show that the movement has arisen from no artificial impulse given from without, and that the Government has exercised no real leadership, for here lies the whole question of the nature of the motive-power at work. The probable vitality of the movement, the grandeur of its results, its being a movement of creation introducing a new system and a new era, all evidently depend upon the fact that it represents a force coming from within, and is the expression of feelings and ideas in the people's hearts. So I have taken pains to place in their true light the respective positions held by the moderate party and the national party, or party of action; and to show clearly the parts played in the great drama by Cavour on one side, and by Mazzini and Garibaldi on the other; for while the former represents only the influence and action of the Piedmontese Government, the two latter represent the aspirations and the action of the Italian people. As often happens at any great crisis, before a great coming change, there rose up in Italy the representative man—the genius who penetrated the secret of the future, and with his breath wakened into life and into flame the smouldering fire. Then by his side there gradually appeared the yet more dazzling figure of the warrior; the two together incarnating the force, grandeur, and devotedness of the popular aspiration.

The definition which I gave you of the national idea towards the opening of my first lecture, corresponds, as you may have observed, with the general views concerning it expressed by Mazzini more than thirty years ago; and you have seen how his views have been confirmed by the course of events. He who could discern the coming movement

while yet preparing in the world of thought, before it had shaped itself into facts which all can see ; who could detect, so long ago, what was real and living, and contained the germs of the future, in the political agitation of the time, and, identifying himself with it, become instrumental in the fulfilment of his own predictions, ought now to be accepted as an authority for the real signification and future tendency of the movement. And those who for so many years were accustomed to call him prophet in derision, because he foretold the rising up of nationalities, and declared there was an instinct of national unity in the hearts of the Italians, which needed but to be awakened,—now, that they can no longer dispute the truth of his predictions, ought in fairness to hail him prophet in another sense.

I believe all that vague feeling of love of country, which throughout history we find manifesting itself almost like an instinct in the heart, and which has led so often to sublime acts of heroism and self-devotion ; which gives a sense of wrong and degradation under a foreign rule, and makes each man feel himself a participator in the greatness or glory of his country,—I believe all these feelings, to which we give the general name of patriotism, are developing into a purer and higher sentiment, and taking a more definite form, in this great idea of nationality ; this idea raising the conception of the nation by connecting it with the sense of a duty owing by the nation to humanity. And those populations, which are agitating to break through the arbitrary and artificial arrangement of states created by conquest or diplomacy, in order to define and constitute their own collective or national lives,—whether they are forming according to race, language, religion, historical traditions, or geographical boundaries which sometimes mark a country as by the hand of nature for the abode of one people,—are guided above all, in the groups they form, by an instinctive sense of having common tendencies, and a common aim or mission, at which they are to work together in the organisation and division of human labour.

One word now as to our own attitude and the policy of our Government towards the movement.

With this grand European problem before us ; this immense hope of national existence fermenting in the minds of European peoples, and the soil of Europe upheaving with the germs of young nations bursting into life to replace the old empires that are dying,—with all this before us, let us no longer dream that there is only a malady that may be cured by some doses of constitutional liberty, or local concessions of semi-independence. Those who always counsel moderation, or gradual and prudent change, may give *us* excellent advice. Ours is a normal state of healthy existence and pacific progress ; there is no question of *our* national existence, or of defending or recovering our independence ; but while moderation may be wisdom or virtue in one case, it may be folly or cowardice in the other. If you are satisfied from what you have heard, that the movement corresponds with the wants of the age, and that it must advance by revolution ; that is, by the efforts and struggles of the populations themselves ; then revolution in those countries ought to be for us a subject not of apprehension but of hope.

We are ready enough to applaud or sanction accomplished revolution, revolution that is successful ; but this is not enough, it is revolution yet

to come, and attempts at revolution, we should approve. The movement is in its infancy. That which is right when achieved, it is right to endeavour to achieve ; yet think how apt we have been to condemn the actors in unsuccessful attempts, as silly or wicked disturbers of the public order ; but, let success once crown their efforts, we have hailed them as wise, and virtuous, and heroic. This acceptance of the accomplished fact is but the cowardly and atheistical worship of success ; it is the very spirit which on Mount Calvary would have joined in the cry :— *Crucify Him ; Crucify Him !* and a few centuries later, would have bowed down to kiss the foot of the representative of Christianity, when he sat in royal robes upon a gilded throne. In the everlasting battle of good with evil, truth with falsehood, failures precede success ; martyrdom paves the way to victory ; and the martyr is as great as the conqueror.

Among the great Powers of Europe, our Government is the only one which can at all be said to represent the people, or to be the expression of their collective thought and feeling. Hence, ours is the only one from which any good will towards this movement might be expected. The principle of non-intervention has often been proclaimed by England : this principle is susceptible of two interpretations. If it means an isolated policy, adopted by ourselves alone, it is simply indifference to all that may be going on in Europe, which does not touch our own immediate interests ; in effect, neutrality between good and evil. But, if it means a principle of policy to be recognised in common by the great Powers, as binding upon others as ourselves, and which would give us the right to say,—“ If you interfere for evil, we will interfere for good,”—it is the best general principle we could support in favour of the movement. Hitherto, apparently, we have scarcely understood it in this sense. The Austrian empire was saved, and the national movement arrested in 1849, by flagrant violations of the principle ; by the intervention of Russia in Hungary, and France in Italy. And during the war with Russia, we seemed rather to repudiate than to support it : we might have said to Russia,—“ Let the elements of dissolution the Turkish empire contains within itself, work as they may ; we will not suffer intervention on your part, either to hasten her dissolution, or replace her domination by your own.” Instead of this, we proclaimed the existence of the Turkish empire to be necessary to the balance of power. It was a policy calculated to help the designs of the Czar, by making the young nations which are preparing to rise upon the ruins of that empire, look to him as their protector ; for let the slave once despair of freedom, and he may accept a new master only from hatred of the old.

The policy of our Government has generally been little else than making head against the necessities of the day : but if, once comprehending where there is life and where death in Europe, it should rise above the political combinations of the day, and extend its views to the future ; it might, without plunging into any revolutionary crusade, create for itself the sympathies of those peoples destined to rise, win a moral supremacy in Europe, and prepare a wreath of new and true alliances for England's brow.