

CHRISTIANITY AND WAR

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NOTE.—In this paper the term Christianity stands for the full expression of the message of Christ, viz., the code of belief and conduct which He guaranteed should be preserved infallibly by the Catholic Church and taught indefectibly to the end of time.

THE above title recalls two facts. First, that there exists a religious system on earth which claims to have been founded by God Incarnate and divinely endowed with the means of enabling man to reach his final supernatural destiny. Secondly, that from the beginning of history there has been prevalent amongst the nations a practice of furthering their rival claims, whether just or unjust, by actual physical force or the threat of it.

The question therefore arises, How does the system regard the custom? What is the attitude of the Church of Christ, instituted to unite the races of men by the bond of a common belief, towards this age-long practice, the chief effect of which is to perpetuate and intensify racial antagonism? What is the Catholic doctrine on the subject of war? An answer to this question will be attempted in the following pages.

Nowadays there is need of a plain, definite expo-

sition of the Catholic position in regard to war and peace, because that position is so often misunderstood and misrepresented, sometimes by Catholics themselves. The external aspect of war cannot but excite the feelings, consequently there is a certain risk lest judgement should be obscured and a good cause injured by an influx of emotionalism, which has not the support of reason and principle. In the voice of the Church, Catholics are privileged to have infallible guidance in moral matters, and are, therefore, the less excusable if, at the bidding of mere sentiment, they shut their ears to that sure guidance. Dwelling as they do here in the midst of a vast non-Catholic population, which has no fixed and uniform standard of ethical judgements, Catholics in England are exposed to these two temptations : either to hold themselves aloof altogether from the various more or less misguided efforts made by their fellow-citizens to combat abuses and to better social conditions, thus laying themselves open to the reproach of not being thoroughly practical Christians ; or to co-operate so unreservedly in the promotion of good works that they abandon Catholic principle altogether or acquiesce in what is ethically wrong either in aim or method. Under the first impulse they may abstain from joining non-Catholics in measures for the furtherance of temperance, or education, or purity, or social reform, because those excellent objects are apt to be promoted by outsiders on principles or in ways not sanctioned by Catholic doctrine. They feel that they cannot, for

instance, support associations which advocate temperance on the ground that the use of alcohol is essentially evil, or which condemn gambling as in itself unlawful, or which would abolish vivisection because brutes are one in kind with men, or which, again, in their methods as distinct from their principles, unduly interfere with human liberty and responsibility. And thus, not being numerous or influential enough to form similar associations of their own, they seem to be indifferent to abuses which their religion would urge them to be foremost in condemning. Or, if their praiseworthy desire to share the burdens of citizenship leads them to associate in such measures with those outside the Church, they may, through ignorance or timidity, countenance the application of remedies to social disorders which ignore essential rights, whether human or divine. Hence the importance of thoroughly understanding that sound middle course, which, in this matter of the ethics of war, as in all others, the Church is inspired to pursue. It is the privilege of her members to make the leaven of her doctrine penetrate the whole mass surrounding them. We can no longer remain in the detached attitude of aliens, almost outlaws, in our own country. We are an integral part of the State, with civil duties corresponding to our rights. And, as believers in that true Christianity whose message is for the healing of the nations, it is especially incumbent upon us to bring right principles to bear on all social and political questions.

Unfortunately in the consideration of this particular question of war, right principles have often been lost sight of. A very slight acquaintance with non-Catholic "Peace" literature, or with the utterances of pacifist orators, will convince the educated Catholic that this most Christian object is not unseldom recommended on grounds that are not morally or logically sound. For the better understanding of the true doctrine it may be well to enumerate here some of the causes of that unsoundness, which, speaking generally, is the result of allowing mere sentiment to usurp the functions of reason. We find, then, non-Catholic advocacy of peace often disfigured—

1. By want of a clear definition of war itself—a little word which stands for a vast variety of things.
2. By the assumption that all the forms and causes of warfare are radically unjust; ¹ no discrimination, for instance, being made between wars of pure aggression and wars of defence.

¹ "The greatest evil of the world is war," says one "Peace" pamphlet, to which the Christian may aptly reply, "The only evil in the world is sin." The pamphleteer fails to prove (1) that all forms of war are sinful, and (2) that the deprivation of natural life, which is the worst feature of war, is worse, for instance, than the killing of the soul or grievous sacrilege or the crimes of the heresiarchs. Again, "The crime of war is inherent," said Mr. Carnegie at the Guildhall on May 24, 1910; "it awards victory, not to the nation that is right, but to that which is strong." To argue the inherent criminality of war from an accidental effect, is characteristic of the sentimentalist. He does not apparently consider the possibility of a nation being both right and strong.

3. By a confusion between moral and physical evil, the former affecting man's soul and eternal destiny, the latter only man's body or goods, things wholly temporal.
4. By a confusion between what binds the conscience under pain of sin and what is merely recommended as the better course, *i.e.*, between precept and counsel.
5. By a confusion between what is forbidden to the individual who has a superior on earth, and the sovereign State which has none.
6. By a confusion between the abuse of a thing and its right use.
7. By a confusion between cause and occasion.*
8. By undue insistence on man's temporal welfare, to the practical neglect of his eternal destiny.
9. By misreading of the history of the past, due to the want of discrimination indicated above.

The Catholic view will best appear by a discussion of these several points. It is of the utmost importance that everything unsound should be cut away from the arguments adduced to support the cause of peace. That cause is overwhelmingly strong without them; on the other hand, arguments logically weak, or at variance with experience, or palpably exaggerated, only serve to discredit it. Let us start then by analyzing the idea of war.

* This confusion is so embedded in English speech through loose usage that a word of illustration may be helpful. The cause of the daylight in a room is the sun, the occasion (or condition) is the window. Occasion may be necessary, as in this example, or accidental, as when the agent is free.

To avoid unending qualifications, we shall consider war only in its fully-developed condition, viz., as an armed conflict between two sovereign States. The aims of such war is to enforce the will of one State upon the other, the method consists of inflicting such damage, each upon other, that one of them may consider submission a preferable alternative to further resistance. When appeals to reason, or to duty, or to interest fail to bring two discordant wills into harmony, the appeal to physical constraint is the only resource left, for only on the physical plane is the ultimate trial of strength possible, at any rate in the case of corporate natures such as ours. Accordingly, when two independent States fall out on a point of importance and are unable (or unwilling) to compose their differences by peaceable means, they instinctively have recourse to physical violence, the object of each being to make the other feel that giving-in is, on the whole, preferable to holding-out.

Now, the first point of difference between Catholic and non-Catholic teaching lies in the moral aspect of this appeal to physical force. War, the violent destruction on a large scale of life and property, is essentially a physical calamity of the worst sort, like earthquake and fire, pestilence and famine. But as, unlike these latter, it is a calamity brought on by human volition, it has a moral aspect as well, and its character, good or bad, is determined by the motives and methods of those that will it. The taking of individual human life is similarly a physical

calamity, which may be either a crime or an act of justice according to its moral circumstances. The Catholic doctrine is emphatic on this point, that there are in this fallen world circumstances which may necessitate, and therefore justify,¹ war, as an instrument to attain certain desirable ends. To declare it, then, *sans phrase*, a thing essentially unlawful, is to fly in the face both of reason and revelation. Reason justifies the expedient of war on the part of a State on the same grounds as it justifies defence and prosecution of personal rights on the part of the individual, and to a less qualified extent. The possession of rights implies the lawfulness of defending them, by force if necessary, against unjust aggression. Otherwise, there would be no stability in society and much less security for the world's peace than at present. The individual's power to assert his rights is limited by the fact that he is living under the protection of authority, to which he can appeal in order to obtain justice. He can use violence only when the need is imminent and the appeal to law is in the circumstance unavailing. But the sovereign State, *ex hypothesi*, has no higher earthly authority to which to appeal, and must, therefore, vindicate its position by its own efforts. Thus reason justifies the use of physical might to enforce moral right : it is just

¹ Herein the Church but echoes and confirms the dictate of reason, excellently expressed by the pagan historian, Livy, in the words of the Samnite general—"Justum est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes" (*Hist.* ix 1).

because it is necessary, and necessary because otherwise, as things are here below, the moral law itself would lack its most palpable support. That law not only forbids injustice but also enjoins that just claims should be protected and outraged justice vindicated—processes that ordinarily call for the use or display of force.

But why in that case is the Gospel of Christ full of exhortations, both against the employment of violence and resistance to it? Surely revelation, at any rate, supports the view that war is unlawful. Did not Christ proclaim, "Resist not evil," "Love your enemies," "Turn the other cheek," "Give to every asker," "They that use the sword shall perish by the sword," and a host of other similar injunctions? Is not His whole spirit one of meekness, patience, and love? Certainly, our Lord said those things, and, as certainly, He inculcated a spirit of forbearance and mutual charity, which, if universally adopted, would render war impossible and unthinkable. We cannot doubt that He set up an ideal to which the notion of war is utterly abhorrent. If His divine purpose in establishing His Kingdom on earth—a purpose all Christians should have at heart—were perfectly fulfilled, all the causes of war would be done away with. Our Divine Lord set in the clearest light and taught with an emphasis impossible to ignore, the great doctrine of the universal Fatherhood of God and its necessary consequence, the common brotherhood of men. From the first, the religion He instituted aimed at

transcending all natural barriers, whether of race or nationality, age or sex or condition, and at uniting all rational creatures in the harmony of one great family, by the bonds of a common origin, of common duties and interests and a common destiny—a family wherein “there is neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor incircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free, but where Christ is all and in all.”¹

But this glorious ideal was to be realized only by means of the free co-operation of man, and man, as a matter of fact, has very generally refused his co-operation. As a consequence, the vast bulk of the race is still outside Christian influences, and even among Christian peoples the principles of the Gospel, rarely practised perfectly by the individual, still less completely affect international relations. Indeed, the struggle that every one experiences in his own breast when he tries to live up to the Christian ideal, is a sufficient indication of the small likelihood of that ideal being fulfilled in the race at large. Of course, God Incarnate foreknew how free-will would operate to frustrate His designs, and, therefore, under what conditions His followers would have to exercise the Christian virtues, and He framed His injunctions in the light of that foreknowledge. He could not have meant any command of His to make human progress impossible. And in any case His directions are not all imposed under the same sanction. To attain Christian per-

¹ I Cor. iii 2.

fection in this fallen world necessitates the exercise of moral heroism, but Christ does not exact heroism or perfection under pain of sin. Beyond what is of obligation in His service, He leaves a wide margin for generosity. In the practice of every virtue a certain degree is enjoined under penalty, but beyond this we are free to advance or not as we choose. If we do not choose, we shall of course lose merit and reward proportionately, but we shall not be positively punished.¹ On the other hand, to confuse counsel with precept and to make perfection obligatory under sin is an error into which many non-Catholic sects, in bondage to the letter of the Scriptures and cut off from the Christian tradition, have frequently fallen. By promulgating His ideal of perfection, in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere, our Lord does not bind us to follow it perfectly; what He *does* bind us to is to acknowledge it to be the ideal and to give it at least our praise and admiration. We must hold that, *ceteris paribus*, the better part, is, after Christ's example, not to assert our rights against those that infringe them, not enter into the obligations of marriage, not to labour for the acquisition of wealth, and so forth.

¹ This eminently reasonable doctrine, we may notice, is expressly denied by the fourteenth of the Thirty-Nine Anglican Articles, which says that works of supererogation "cannot be taught without arrogance and impiety," and cites our Lord's words in proof of its assertion—"When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say, 'We are unprofitable servants'"—thus plainly begging the question by assuming that we are commanded to do all that we can do.

These self-negations are all means to perfection. Still, they are not essential means, for His Church sanctions the natural right of private ownership and blesses the state of matrimony and supports the vindication of all just claims, whether individual or national.

These are good things, even though there are things better. So far, then, from condemning warfare as a thing always and essentially evil, Christian teaching supposes cases which justify and even necessitate it. War is doubtless the direct cause of very great physical evils, such as loss of life and health and property, but physical evil must often be tolerated in order to prevent moral evil, such as the spread of injustice resulting from the wrong-doer going unpunished. And, if it be pointed out that many moral evils accompany war, however just, we reply by recalling the important distinction that war is not the cause but merely the accidental occasion of such evils. The conditions of fighting and campaigning certainly give greater scope for the weak to fall and the depraved to exercise their depravity, but the good man owns the obligation of the moral code on the battlefield as elsewhere. The common epithets "brutal and licentious" have no necessary connection with the soldier, but there is a necessary connection between lawlessness and neglect to enforce the law.

Another consideration, which further vindicates the apparent setting aside of the counsels of our Lord by communities of men engaged in mutual

warfare, is the following : The Gospel Counsels are addressed to individuals, and have primarily in view their spiritual perfection, the acquisition by their souls of greater grace here and higher glory hereafter. Now although those organized societies, which we call States, are as much bound by the Commandments of God as are individuals, because the Commandments are the expression of the eternal law, and their observance is necessary for civil well-being, they stand in a different relation to the Counsels. States exist for temporal ends alone : they have no grace to acquire nor glory to hope for ; they have no hereafter, and must reach their perfection in this world or not at all. And thus, though an individual may lawfully and reasonably forgo his rights or neglect his physical and temporal interests in view of the reward to come, the State as such must insist on the recognition of its just claims, whether by its own members or by external communities. If in any matter of importance it condoned disobedience to its laws, it would fail in one chief object of its existence—the maintenance of order. And, again, it would fail in a primary function, if it passed over without effective remonstrance any serious violation of its rights by another State. Thus the same action—“turning the other cheek”—is a point of perfection in the individual, and a dereliction of duty in the community, because of the difference of their *raisons d'être*.

And so the Catholic position—that war may be justified—accords with reason and is not at variance

with revelation. Nowhere does our Lord condemn war in itself, and the counsels He addresses to the individuals are not always applicable, even as counsels, to the State. To the assertion Christianity is opposed to war, the Catholic reply is, Christianity is certainly opposed to all that is evil in war, to the injustice in which it often originates, to the methods in which it is sometimes pursued, to the excesses of passion of which it is always the sad occasion, but Christianity does not oppose war as the sole means of vindicating moral right, for it is preferable that these incidental evils should occur than that wickedness should triumph unchecked in the world. And hence the divinely guided Church does not hesitate to countenance war on due occasion; she blesses weapons and consecrates banners to be used in a just cause. Her rulers in the past have invoked war as a means to some good end—whether, for instance, to protect Christendom from infidel foes or to secure the integrity of the Holy See. She has even canonized soldiers like the warrior-maid, Blessed Joan of Arc, showing that she considers heroic sanctity not incompatible with the profession of arms. And her recognition of the fact that the moral law may require war for its enforcement or vindication on earth, makes it easy for her to understand how God Himself could have not merely permitted, but commanded wars, even wars of aggression and extermination, all throughout the history of His chosen people. Neither time nor other circumstances can alter the intrinsic

nature of a thing ; if war is essentially evil, then those who profess that doctrine have to face the fact that the God of Righteousness constantly compelled the Jews to commit abominable wickedness.

It is sometimes urged that the early Christians at any rate did not so learn Christ. We have seen a catena of passages from early Christian writers, selected from a tract published by Thomas Clarkson, the Emancipationist, in 1817, which is supposed to embody the teaching and practice of those who lived in sub-Apostolic times, and were therefore most likely to have caught the true spirit of Christianity. A more uncritical, untrustworthy, and misleading document it would be hard to find. Apart from the initial objection that Christianity, early or late, could not have taught the essential evil of war, because Christianity teaches truth and war is *not* essentially evil, nothing is said of the circumstances, within and without the Church, in which these early Christians were placed, and which readily explain the views they took of war as they found it. We know, but not from the pamphlet, that the counsels were much more extensively practised then than in later times, that a general expectation of the second coming of our Lord made His followers less inclined to follow worldly pursuits, and that the dividing line between the Church and the world was much more clearly drawn. And on the other hand, military service meant mingling with pagan comrades, serving under pagan officers, being in constant danger of being involved in pagan observances or employed in duties

unbecoming a Christian. It is strange that under these conditions any Christians were found in the army at all, yet Tertullian, who is one of the chief witnesses cited against the lawfulness of military service, also bears testimony that there were many believers in the imperial armies.¹

The process of establishing the possible justice of the act of war has incidentally cleared away many of the other misunderstandings introduced into the question by those who, having broken with the Christian tradition, have endeavoured to reproduce the Christian spirit, as it were from the outside. Physical evil, not being commensurate with moral, must often be caused or permitted to prevent the latter. The individual is allowed by God's law to assert and enforce his rights with the moderation defined by his position and destiny, even though in cases it might be more Christian to forgo them. The State existing wholly for temporal ends and supreme in its own sphere, has a much wider range of rights and much greater scope to vindicate them. We may insist on these points, without denying that many wars are unjust, that horrible excesses are committed on the battlefield, that war at best is a desperate expedient and often ineffective of its purpose, for none of these circumstances alters our contention. If even good things may be abused, much more may things which have no moral colour

¹ See the well-known passage, *Adv. Gentiles*, c. 37, beginning "Hesterni sumus, et vestra omnia implevimus."

of themselves. And we cannot denounce things merely because they are the occasions of evil, otherwise our human natures, our senses, our passions and instincts, our very free-will should come under the ban. In the interests of truth and the moral law itself, we must insist on the fact, based as it is on the consentient witness of reason and experience, history and tradition, and finally the records of God's dealings with man, that the organized communities we call States have a right and a duty under certain conditions to assert or protect their rights by force of arms.

However, despite this recognition of war as sometimes inevitable in this fallen world and consequently lawful, the spirit of Christianity has always been opposed to it. If it is sometimes a necessity, it is always a hateful one, to be used with reluctance and promptly abandoned as soon as its reason ceases. It should only be undertaken to avoid worse evils, and there are not many evils which are worse. It is, moreover, not unfrequently a useless remedy, for the big battalions may not be on the side of justice. The resistance of weak States to the encroachments of their stronger neighbours, though valuable as a moral protest against the pernicious doctrine that Might is Right, has from time to time resulted in their more thorough subjugation. So the Christian has no love for war, but regards it as one of the curses of humanity, one of the worst fruits of original sin, always implying on the one side or the other, injustice committed or contemplated, opposed altogether to

God's original design and to the perfect Christian ideal which is the restoration of that design, justifiable, because in itself a physical evil only, for certain high ends and under certain clear conditions, and destined to grow more rare as the international conscience, the public opinion of civilization, grows more Christian. Only as an act of justice has war the support of Christianity. In the ideal our religion connotes the absence of all injustice, the recognition of all rights, the harmony of all interests, but in fact it has to take account of a world where injustice of every sort is prevalent, and where moral considerations are frequently too weak to restrain the wrongdoer. Thus is explained the apparent contradictions of a Church, founded by the Prince of Peace and standing everywhere for the rule of justice, still on occasion giving her sanction to the bloody expedient of war with all its attendant horrors. It is not that she thinks that there should be one moral code for the individual and another for the nation. The unchanging law of God holds everywhere, and what is unjust as between man and man is equally unjust in the relations of sovereign States. Murder and robbery, jealousy and envy, slander and pride and hatred, do not surely cease to be crimes, because practised by a community and on a colossal scale.¹ But—and this is a distinction ignored by many non-

¹ This was not Othello's thought: cf.—

“the big wars
That make ambition virtue.”

Othello, iii 3.

Catholic peace advocates—there is an essential difference between the condition of a sovereign State and that of a private person. The latter, as we have seen, is not allowed to avenge himself or to do more, in self-defence even, than the exigencies of the moment demand. He cannot, as the phrase is, “take the law into his own hands.” Recourse to violence in pursuit of right becomes unjust, precisely when it becomes unnecessary. But from the nature of the case there is no supreme earthly authority to which States can have recourse. Whether, if God’s designs has been fully realized and the whole earth become practically Christian, the Papacy might not have been such an authority, whether in the growing tendency towards methods of arbitration such an authority may not even yet arise, we can only conjecture. The point is that no such authority does exist to enforce the moral law in disputes between independent communities, and if one party is resolved to push its claims in defiance of that law, nothing remains for the other, but to resist aggression by force. Nor is injustice necessarily all on one side. Although, theoretically, one party in a contest must be in the wrong, or at least more in the wrong than the other (since rights of the same character cannot really conflict, except in regard to priority, and rights lower in nature ought, generally speaking, to yield to those superior), still it is often possible for a state of affairs to arise in which it is extremely doubtful on which side is the preponderance of right, and both parties may

proceed to the arbitrament of the sword, reasonably confiding in the justice of their cause and the uprightness of their motives. In default of any higher authority established by Providence, independent States have generally preferred to be judges in their own case, and all the Church can do is to insist upon the necessity of at least a subjective conviction of justice in each belligerent.

Accordingly, until some international tribunal is set up, invested by mutual agreement with the power of finally settling international disputes, no State can be compelled in justice to submit what it holds to be its rightful claims to the decision of its equals. If it really thinks that it can secure those rights more effectually by war than by arbitration, then it may lawfully choose the former desperate means. Christianity cannot forbid it, but it can and does lay down very definitely the only conditions which make it lawful. They have been mentioned incidentally, but we may summarize them here.

The first is, War should be undertaken in the interests of justice. The injury received or the danger to be averted must be genuine, and moreover must bear some proportion to the evils that war necessarily involves. Thus, the end in view should not only be good, *sc.*, the assertion or defence of some real right, but it must be an occasion of great consequence to the nation, such as a grievous violation of the country's honour or material interests, serious breach of treaty obligations, assistance given to the nation's enemies, or

again, a duty imposed by considerations of humanity, as the giving help to another nation unjustly oppressed.¹ This condition excludes a host of evil motives, which, as human history shows, have prompted innumerable wars, such as the mere lust of conquest and extension of territory, or ambition of military glory, or rivalry of commerce, or false zeal for religion, or fear of the growing power of a neighbour²—in general, all the purposes which are rightly reckoned unjust and immoral in the relations of man with man.

Secondly, to escape the Christian's condemnation, war must really be, as it has often been called—*ultima ratio regum*: the final argument when all

¹ This latter point is worth careful attention, for it is directly opposed to that un-Christian development of nationality which declares in effect that the different members of the family of the nations have no concern with each other's doings, except when the rights of each are severally involved. This error, under the name of "Non-Intervention," was condemned by Pius IX in the Allocution, *Novos et ante* (1861).

² One may justly endeavour to preserve whatever excellence or supremacy one's particular nation possesses, but this must be done within the limits of the moral law. The providential preponderance of any special State in the world has not yet been divinely revealed, although it is commonly assumed by the "Jingo" press of many nations. Yet we find a presumably Christian writer, in the *April Nineteenth Century*, 1910, claiming that Great Britain *has a right* to pick a quarrel with Germany and destroy her growing fleet simply because Britain's naval supremacy is menaced thereby! On what grounds, we wonder, does he deny Germany a right claimed by him for Britain? By strict parity of reasoning a tradesman, threatened with ruin by the competition of a rival, would be justified in destroying that rival's goods.

others have been tried and have failed. If the same ends, therefore, can be obtained by arbitration or diplomacy of one sort or another, or if even there is a reasonable prospect of success by those means, then, Christian principles forbid the use of the terrible instrument of war. Nothing but its practical necessity, as the only means to secure lawful ends of vast importance, can excuse it. Happily the growth of arbitration, as a recognized means of settling disputes between nations, tends to make this condition more and more difficult to fulfil.

Thirdly, a just war must be the act of the whole community represented by the supreme authority in the State, precisely because it is a matter affecting the interest of the community as a whole, not those of any particular person or group.¹ In every sovereign State the right of the sword, whether to repress internal disorder or to resist and punish external aggression, belongs by natural law to the chief power in the State. Subordinate communities, or classes in the same community, must refer their disputes to superior authority, and therefore, so long as there exists a competent superior to have recourse to, war ceases to be necessary. To embroil the whole State in conflict, in the interests of any particular person, or family, or class, or trade, is against Christian teaching, unless the interests are of such moment as to be practically national in import.

¹ This primarily refers to offensive warfare: just as the individual, so any section of the community may defend itself against unjust attack without further authorization.

A fourth and last condition regards the method of prosecuting a war, which circumstances have made necessary and therefore justified. This method is determined partly by natural and partly by positive law. Natural law requires that the party at fault should first be afforded the chance of giving satisfaction: otherwise, the necessity of the war is doubtful and also its lawfulness. If adequate satisfaction is offered, the injured party is bound in justice to accept it. By positive law, a certain amount has been done to limit in extent and mitigate in effect the horrors of war. In "civilized" warfare nowadays the lives and persons and property of non-belligerents are supposed to be respected, captives are not killed or made slaves of, certain weapons of destruction, such as chain-shot and explosive bullets, are excluded, and ambulance-parties are regarded as neutral—improvements which must be ascribed to the influence of Christian principles.

The application, by the Church's teaching, of these principles to the circumstances of war is much more detailed than we have space here to indicate; but, judged even by these four requirements for legality, it must be owned that flagrant injustice has characterized the vast majority of the wars recorded in history. Many have originated in personal pride, or ambition, or lust of gain. Many have been prosecuted by heartless methods of barbarism. Before the rise of democracy, the consent of the nation was not even asked; since the rise of democracy, the passions of the nation have ever been played upon by un-

scrupulous politicians through press, platform, and, alas! pulpit—in a word, if ever a method of securing justice has been discredited by constant misuse, it is the method of war. The true Christian, then, and the true patriot as well, must hold war in abhorrence, and labour with all his strength to abolish it. But not by wrong methods. He must seek to promote peace by rooting out the causes of war, racial enmity, lust of territory, commercial greed—all springing from that bastard nationalism which is the mere extention of personal pride, with all the ugly concomitants of that vice—hatred and contempt and jealousy of other nations, unwillingness to oblige or to own obligations, insularity of outlook, and inflated self-esteem: a spirit which unfortunately exists in all nations and flourishes in proportion as the spirit of Christianity is absent. That spirit alone can effectually make head against the causes of war. Unless the peace movement is Christian, it is doomed to failure. Let Catholics, then, take their due place in it.¹ In addition to the traditions of the Church, they have the warmest exhortations from their chief Pastors. Both the late and present Popes have raised their voices eloquently to plead for peace amongst the nations, and, nearer home, we cannot forget the stirring appeal, uttered on Easter Sunday, 1896, by Cardinals Gibbons, Logue, and Vaughan, in favour of a permanent Tribunal of Arbitration, “as

¹ A “Catholic Peace Association” has lately been established, particulars as to which may be obtained from the Hon. Sec., (*pro tem.*) 194 Battersea Park Road, S.W.

a rational substitute among the English-speaking races for a resort to the bloody arbitrament of war."

"Others [they say] may base their appeal upon motives which touch your worldly interests, your prosperity, your world-wide influence and authority in the affairs of men. The Catholic Church recognizes the legitimate force of such motives in the natural order, and blesses whatever tends to the real progress and elevation of the race. But our main ground of appeal rests upon the known character and will of the Prince of Peace, the living Founder, the Divine Head of Christendom. It was He who declared that love of the brotherhood is a second commandment like unto the first. It was He who announced to the people the praise and reward of those who seek after peace and pursue it."

According to those principles we must think and work, for the Peace of the World, if it is to be, will be finally secured, not by Socialism, which is universal tyranny, nor by Hervéism, which is universal anarchy, but only by practical Christianity, which is universal brotherhood, the establishment on earth of the Kingdom of Christ.