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THE ITALIAN MOVEMENT AND
ITALIAN PARTIES.

TWO LECTURES

DELIVERED AT THE

PHILOSOPHICAL INSTITUTION, EDINBURGH.

SPEECHES

DELIVERED IN

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND AT THE WAKEFIELD
MECHANICS' INSTITUTE.


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March, 1862,

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TWO LECTURES,

&c.

LECTURE I.

IT is not unusual, I believe, for a Lecturer to commence his address by some prefatory remarks, intended to demonstrate the interest and importance of his subject to his hearers. But my subject needs no such introduction, and if I fail to make it interesting, the fault will be my own.

Nevertheless, it may be well at the outset of what I have to say, to endeavour not to *prove* the interest of my subject, but to ascertain what are the essential elements and the attributes of the Italian Question which make it one of so great interest, of such special import to ourselves.

In the first place then Italy has the greatest past of any nation. She has been mistress of the Pagan and of the Christian world. She has suffered centuries of decay, of disintegration, of what seemed death—and it was death—but death precedes resurrection, and Italy is being born again and to a purer life. How can we then choose but look upon her regeneration with the interest which belongs to so great a past, and with that mingled sense of veneration and of joy, with which we greet the spectacle, with all its wondrous meaning, of a nation's life providentially renewed.

Let us descend from the height of this generality to think of the living human tender interest inspired by a nearer view of the more immediate past. Count, if you could count them,

Italy's martyr heroes in exile, in the dungeon, on the scaffold, or dying on the field; from Silvio Pellico to Petroni, from the brothers Bandiera to Pisacane and Rosolino Pilo, from Joseph Andreoli and Menotti to Ugo Bassi, Ciceroacchio and the Canon Tazzoli. From those times so near us as some twenty years ago, when Joseph Mazzini wrote* "The *shadow* of despotism is cast on the whole land, on virtue as on vice, on life and death; one would imagine that the very steps of the scaffold were clothed with velvet, so little sound do those youthful heads make which roll down from them"—down to these later days when the task of silent martyrdom is over and the struggle is in the face of day.

And yet alas, even now how many are the noble men who suffer death that Italy may be, and we know them not, or their names die from us in the great whirl of time, save for the few with whom the accidental privilege of personal relationship—sad and anxious privilege as it has often proved—has made them rank us brothers. I have been of these few; for this reason I am here to-night, for I may say that this Italian Movement as far as their part in it has been concerned, has been since 1848, a large part of my daily life. No forlorn hope has since then been led—precursor of the successes which now fill us with delight,—that has not numbered personal friends of mine among its bravest leaders. The dungeons of the Pope are still crowded with men whose crimes will rank as virtues when her capital is restored to the Italian nation, amongst whom I could name men of the highest character and of the purest devotion, for whom, those whom I love have been pining night and day for years. Let me recal two names, especially dear to me of those who are no more. I knew Colonel Pisacane the forerunner of Garibaldi, who fell in 1857 in an unsuccessful attempt to raise the Neapolitan provinces against their deceased king. He was a man of great military capacity, of enlightened intellect, of high soul and of an absolute devotion; and it was my privilege to call him friend. Rosolino Pilo too, I knew, and cherish his memory with a peculiar affection. You may remember his name, though I know not,

* "State and Prospects of Italy," *Monthly Chronicle*, May, 1839.

for he died too soon to reap the reward of an extended fame—Rosolino Pilo, the gentle and the brave, without whom the late insurrection in Sicily might have been crushed out at once, he kept it alive in the mountains round Palermo until Garibaldi could come to save it, with his genius and his prestige—and was then wounded to the death. I might almost say that it was from my own threshold that he went forth to buy with his life's blood the redemption of the country which had been his cradle, and which was to become his grave.

But let us turn again to considerations of a more general nature. The Italian movement is above all else one of national reconstruction or rather of national regeneration. A few years ago my first business would have been to prove this, to show that this and not merely some portion of liberty and reform was the goal towards which all Italy was striving, and which she was destined to attain. Now I may start with the assumption of that which all of us believe, and, this brings me to the next attribute of special interest in this Italian movement, which I desire to note. By virtue of its national character, of which it has forced the consciousness upon us, it has opened our eyes to the fact that what we call the question of nationalities, is *the great European question of the day*. The example of *Italy is* contagious and acts directly on the peoples; wherever there is a sense of national individuality unrecognized or oppressed, the peoples are astir. I speak not merely of such well recognized nationalities as those of the Polish and the Magyar races, but of all those various tribes which people the South East of Europe, and which are kept together for the time in unnatural bonds, by the iron rule of Austria or the decaying empire of the Turks. The organization of these minor nationalities is a necessary work, perhaps of the immediate future. Italy tells us so, she heralds and she hastens the advent of the problem to be solved. The fact of Italy's reconstruction has another practical interest for us. She has been for centuries the battle-field of rival ambitions in Europe, and the spoil of the victor. She will now cease to be a cause of war; she should become a guardian of the peace. One great element in the creed of

modern European statesmanship, is what is called the "Balance of Power,"—a phrase dating from Richelieu, who feared or professed to fear the preponderance of the House of Hapsburg, which was often used against France, during the wars about the Spanish succession, and which is referred to in the treaty of Utrecht between England and Spain (February 1713) as "the best and firmest support of a mutual friendship and of a durable understanding."

Now this phrase the "Balance of Power" is beginning to be considered by some as the expression of a rather antiquated doctrine. But the truth is that it is only the old methods, dynastic alliances, or treaties to counteract them, that are becoming out of date. A true "Balance of Power" is still essential to European peace, and to that confidence which should save us the cost and the danger of constantly preparing for war; but it needs to be constructed on some fixed and permanent basis, and to have added to it, as an equally important safeguard, the removal of occasions and temptations which lead to war. Now the principle of the organization of European states according to nationalities, would, as far as the west and centre of Europe are concerned, give us this fixed basis and this additional safeguard,—an united Italy, and an united Germany, would be France for all aggressive purposes disarmed.

An additional source of practical and immediate interest to us in the Italian national movement, is to be found in the influence it has had upon our own foreign policy, an influence beneficial in two ways. In the first instance it has, I might almost say, given us for the first time, a foreign policy based upon an intelligible principle. The principle is that of "Non-intervention;" not the barren fact, without sympathy, or sense of duty, or of right, but the *principle*, to be observed, to be upheld, and as far as reason and prudence may allow, to be enforced in the counsels of Europe. I may say that it is the doctrine of Nationalities which has served to moralize the doctrine of "Non-intervention" and to elevate it to the height of a principle capable of ruling the foreign policy of our country.

A short time ago, some time in September I think, a well

known statesman, and a brilliant writer and orator, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, addressed the Hertfordshire Agricultural Society, on the great political changes which had in the course of the preceding year passed over both the old world and the new. His speech was not a party speech, or I should not refer to it here. He spoke for all Britain, and for statesmen of all parties. He said that foreigners all misunderstood the foreign policy of this country; and he undertook in a few words to explain it. He said that England was a free nation, and that therefore her Statesmen and her Ministers *must* consult popular opinion, *but* popular opinion sided with the free; he said that it was our *interest* that good government should be established everywhere, because under good government the interchange of commerce could be promoted, and the spread of freedom abroad widened the market for English manufactures; that we had an interest therefore not in tyrannies and in revolutions, but in the rise and prosperity of free peoples who would accept our own temperate form of constitutional government; and if we must further explain our policy, he added, it was that in the rise of a free people we might expect an ally in our sympathies for freedom, and a customer in that prosperity which is the companion of free political opinions. "There was the whole key to the great principle of British foreign policy."

Now I not only object to this as a definition of what our foreign policy ought to be, but as a definition of what it is. I don't think that *interest* qualified by popular sympathies, is the key of the great principle of British foreign policy. I am sure that this is not what is at the bottom of the mind and of the heart of Britain in the matter. The leading doctrine of our foreign policy of to-day is, as I have said "non-intervention" and thanks to Italy, non-intervention in the sense in which I have explained it. Now this doctrine was born of the desire of peace. We all desire peace, for we know the cost of war; and England specially desires peace, because if she were to find, in principle or in sympathy, a righteous cause of war, she feels no sufficient assurance that the war would be so conducted or would so eventuate as to serve the cause she might have it at heart to aid. Non-intervention began then as a kind of rule for our-

selves. It was our interest for the sake of peace and it kept us out of mischief's way. But considered simply as a rule for ourselves you will see that it tended logically and inevitably to the negation of all foreign policy; and it has by some been carried almost this length. But this was not what England meant or what she ever would or ever will, I trust, accept. She sought a foreign policy which should be intelligible, abiding and at her own control; for this she had need of a principle, and she found it in the doctrine of non-intervention elevated and moralized, as I have said. And at the bottom of such doctrine so accepted and imposed is I say not the notion of *interest*—that would never lead us to a principle—but the notion of *duty* and of *right*. We say that each people has the right to shape out its own national life, and that no foreign power has the right to interfere to prevent it. We sympathize with a people struggling to liberate itself from domestic tyranny, but we believe that it must effect its own emancipation. Where our consciences point out to us a people dismembered, or partly, or wholly under the rule of a foreign power, we recognise its right to work out or to re-establish its national independent existence, and we say that no other nation has the right to aid such foreign power in forcibly retaining its wrongful rule. And we believe it not only to be our interest but our duty, to do what we can wisely do, to promote an acceptance of this principle and to procure an observance of this rule of public right and wrong. Our statesmen used to talk about non-intervention between the different states of Italy, as if those states could have any rights which were not subordinate to that of the whole Italian people. "Non-intervention" led them some short time ago to the absurdity of saying, that if Venice sought to free herself from the yoke of Austria, she must do so without the aid of that portion of Italy already free. We have widened the basis and raised the level of our idea; we now deny the right of Germany to aid Austria, when Italy shall feel the time is ripe to claim her own.

The Italian question has helped to moralize our foreign policy in another way. It has roused us, the nation, to dictate and to control that policy, and it inaugurates the new era, in

which public opinion and public sympathy assert their superior right to the secret or traditional diplomacy of statesmen or of Courts.

Lastly, the Italian question is deeply, solemnly interesting to us as a Protestant community. I use the word in no narrow or antagonistic sense; I mean to us as a community believing in freedom of conscience as between man and man. We have not to wait for the destruction of the temporal power of the Papacy; the temporal power that now supports the Pope is not that of Papacy; it is that of France. The sham that still remains will ere long be swept away. But what we may with confidence look forward to as a future result of the conflict between Italy and the Papacy, as a first fruit of that new and conscious freedom and responsibility which this national uprising is already calling forth, is a Reformation of the Catholic Church—not our Reformation, for history does not repeat herself, and nothing spontaneous can be a copy of what has gone before, but, nevertheless, a movement of religious reformation pregnant with the most vital consequences to the Christian world, and certainly beneficial in its influence on the spirit of freedom and of faith; and this we shall owe to Italy—born again into the world, *not without purpose* in the evolution of the providential scheme.

We believe in Italy at last. We think that we understand her movement, and that we can no longer be deceived. Indeed since we have mastered the notion of national regeneration as the aim of Italy, we rightly feel that we hold the clue to that movement, the key to any phenomena it may present, the test, largely speaking, of the accuracy of what people may wish to persuade us of in point of facts. And, in truth, since this character of the movement has become patent to demonstration, not only to us, but to Europe, none but a few Ultramontane journals have ventured to dispute the right or the tendency of the Italian people.

I need hardly say that success has had much to do with this; there is indeed nothing which succeeds like it, as the French say. It helped England to the completion of her faith in Italy—it gave to her her faith in Cavour, in spite of his French

alliance and the sacrifice of Savoy and Nice. But the influence of this faith and of this success cannot alone lead us to an *accurate comparative appreciation* of what I may call the *inner life* of this movement, of the action and counter-action of the various parties in Italy, each, in their own way, contributing to the solution of the national problem. Any man, not somewhere behind the scenes, dependent on the daily press alone for his impressions, must, if he endeavours to form precise notions at all, become sadly perplexed by the conflicting views presented to him. Newspaper correspondencies and leading articles, too often like multiplied addresses of counsel learned in the law, skilled in the arts and trained to the habit of advocacy, perplex the mind of the Jury of the nation, if *it has nothing else on which to build its verdict*, until, like common juries, it is apt to take refuge in mere impressions, and almost to resent any appeal to its more careful discrimination. Such task of careful discrimination indeed we cannot undertake from day to day; we cannot *always* keep on guard against the *possibility* of false impressions; and it is for this reason that I think, and that I assume you think it to be of use and of interest occasionally to compare notes, somewhat deliberately, to endeavour again to build up the elementary outlines of our knowledge, to refresh ourselves with a text-book of our own making, and to renew our tests of truth.

In the outline which I shall now give of the Italian movement, I shall naturally, though without any very formal plan, perform this office for myself as for those who hear me. I shall do this *from a certain point of view*, for how can there be opinions of any value without a *certain point of view*? That point of view, I believe, you know. My familiarity is not with the Ministerial but with what is called the National party in Italy; my interest in the question dates from them; you have a right to say that my prepossessions will be in their favour; but I do not think that they have met with such plentiful advocacy of late as to induce you, on that account, to regret hearing me. I shall state their case as I see it, but in doing so I shall ask you to believe me when I say that I have never, in my own mind, confounded retaliation with defence. I do not trace in

myself the slightest predisposition to react against injustice by the like. I have ever felt that true friendship never doubting of itself or fearing doubt, pays its best homage in endeavouring to be just. It is an homage undoubtedly due to the National party of Italy, for, all things considered, it is a generous party, and furnishes instances of the highest self-abnegation, of the truest-minded self-devotion to the country and the cause. What, however, I shall say of and for that party, I shall ask you to depend upon, *as knowledge, not opinion* merely; for I have known that party, and some of its leaders, in the greatest intimacy, for years.

Italy was one under the Romans, and yet it was not Italy but Rome that ruled the world. In those days of universal dominion, the principle of nationality had not yet begun to play its part in the organization of the world. Then came the decay of that mighty empire of the Romans, for its work was done, and a new work was to begin. The northern hordes, migrating *en masse* from northern Europe and from Asia, overran the whole of Europe, sometimes sweeping away whole populations, sometimes assimilating with them, remaking and redistributing the material of European communities; modern nationalities, not even yet all wrought out into an abiding harmony, being their result. Two or three centuries of this work of assimilation sufficed for Italy, and you already find her leading minds, Dante, Machiavelli, with others of less note, dreaming of a NATION to come. The first form of renewed life and progress in Italy was, as elsewhere, municipal. In those barbarous and feudal times industry collected itself in walled cities and organized for defence. In Italy because, on the one hand, of the fecund genius of the people, and on the other of the absence of any great ruling central power, this new life of Europe had the most brilliant results. Italy took the lead at once in commerce and in arts; her merchant princes rivalled monarchs in splendour and ambition, and excelled them in culture; cities became states, aimed at supremacy over their fellows, and indulged in the luxury of war. It has been, until a very recent date, an almost universal habit to cite these wars and jealousies

of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages, as evidences that Italy was not and could not be, even now, ripe to become a nation. We borrowed this notion from M. Sismondi, the great author of the "History of the Italian Republics." The destruction of the republic of Florence, and the peace between Charles V. and Pope Clement VII. in 1530, seemed to him the death of Italy; but we now know that neither Emperor nor Pope, neither Guelph nor Ghibelline, neither foreign or priestly rule, have any hold whatever on the mind or on the heart of the Italian people. It was a question of faith or want of faith in progress and the future. Was Italy, or was she not, at some future time, again to take her place among the nations? Without such faith, the mind naturally dwelt among the divisions of the past—and none more likely to do so than the man who had made of that past his special study—and found in it confirmation of its scepticism. But once given that general faith in the future and a just retrospect of the past tells a very different tale. The life of the Italian republics was not a national but a municipal life, on however splendid a scale; those wars and jealousies were not between incipient nations but dominant municipalities, Milan, Florence, Como, Pisa, Sienna, Venice, Bologna, and so forth. And since those times these very cities have for centuries been joined under successive though varying territorial governments; forgetting their rivalries under centuries of common slavery, or giving a proof of their readiness to unite in a common national life, as when, for instance, Napoleon included them all in the kingdom of North Italy in 1802. A nation wants good boundaries, an indubitable capital, and a greater power of attraction of the whole upon its several parts than any neighbouring national unit can exercise upon them. This (or even less than this) gives you the virtual nation, which once realized in fact, must hold itself together and increase in its cohesive force. Italy has the Alps and the sea for her boundaries, and Rome for her capital; and I confess that from the first moment that I turned my thoughts to the Italian question, it seemed to me clear that the problem was to found the nation, but that once constituted, it would have the elements of a nationality as compact and homogeneous as that of

France herself. Napoleon himself said at St. Helena that "Unity of manners, of language, of literature, must at a future more or less remote, end in bringing her inhabitants under one government." In 1814 Napoleon walking along the sea-shore of the island of Elba, with a young Italian, and looking across to the peninsula, suddenly asked, "What do the Italians think of me?" "They would love your majesty more had you given them unity," was the reply; "they are right," said the Emperor; "I did not think that they would go so far towards that goal. They have exceeded my expectations."

Immediately before Napoleon, Piedmont and Savoy belonged to the House of Savoy, but Genoa was republican, and so was Venice; then all the rest was Austrian, or under Austrian influence; the Pope at Rome, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies reigned over by the Spanish Bourbons, Lombardy Austrian, and the dukedoms of Modena, Parma and Piacenza, and Tuscany ruled by princes of the House of Austria. You will mark here sources of rivalry between Governments, but no element beneath the surface likely to be antagonistic to the reconstitution of the nation. The only indigenous governments were that of the kingdom of Savoy, then a despotism, and the republics of Genoa and of Venice; all other frontier lines marked out simply the possessions or the indirect dependencies of Austria. Then came the period of Napoleon—a step towards unity; after various changes the kingdom of Italy down to Ancona in the Papal States, except Parma in the hands of a sister of the Emperor, Naples and Sicily ruled first by Joseph and then by Murat, all, in fact, Napoleonic, with the nominal exception of Rome.

The downfall of Napoleon and the treaties of Vienna of 1815, brought Austria back in more than her former power. Venice was given with Lombardy to Austria, with the right of garrisoning Ferrara and Comacchio; Tuscany, with the addition of the island of Elba, to Ferdinand of Austria; Parma to Marie Louise, who was Austrian; Modena to the Austrian House of Este; Genoa was added to the territories of the House of Savoy; the Roman states of course went to the Pope; the two Sicilies to the Bourbons again. The Allied Powers seemed to

think only of dispossessing France ; they recognized no right in the Italian people, I will not say to national unity, but to Governments which should at least not be foreign to the soil. And yet they had endeavoured to turn Italy against Napoleon by promises of independence, and at the time of his fall they had the ample evidence of addresses from the army and the national guard, from commercial bodies of men, and from deputies of the kingdom of Italy, sent to Paris immediately on the abdication of Napoleon, to show them that what above all things Italy dreaded and protested against was the being given back to Austrian rule. In the report of those deputies to the President of the Regency at Milan, I find that after fruitless communications with the representatives of Russia and of Prussia, they addressed themselves to our representatives, Lord Castlereagh and Lord Aberdeen. Count Frederick Confalonieri, their spokesman, saying, "Although our country has never tasted the advantage of a political and national existence, she has been taught these twenty years to desire such an existence. The sheer hope, and the bare name of nation have impelled her to sacrifices of all kinds * * * we are not the men of twenty years ago, and it is impossible for us to become so, save by renouncing habits and sentiments grown part of our system and dear to a nation endowed with intelligence, energy, and passions, that has acquired a large experience of political matters, and that has learnt also to war * * *. The best interests of our nation (the Count is here in truth speaking of Northern Italy, which Napoleon erected into a kingdom and which furnished him with some of his best troops), requires and demands a king ; and let this king be even an Austrian, our wishes will be accomplished ; all that we desire is to obtain an existence independent of other states, and a Constitution or National Representation." But it was not to be ; Italy was conquered from Napoleon, and was parcelled out as so much booty in the general spoil. From these iniquities sprang the partial revolutions of 1820, 1821, and 1831 ; the national rising of 1848, and the late war, together with the number of minor or abortive attempts, and the constant conspiracies which have followed each other almost year by year since the Treaties of 1815.

The insurrection of July 1820, took place in Naples, the army bore part in it ; in six days, without resistance or bloodshed, so universal was the movement, the king yielded, and granted a Constitution. In March, of the following year, an Austrian army entered the kingdom and despotism was restored.

The insurrection of March, 1821, was Piedmontese, it was also the work of the army, and succeeded without bloodshed in three days ; on the fourth day the king, Victor Emmanuel, bound by oaths to Austria not to grant a Constitution, abdicated, and a Constitutional system was proclaimed. In April it was suppressed, and despotism and the king restored by Austrian arms.

Both of these movements were the work of the Carbonari, amongst whom were enrolled Prince Francis, of Naples, and Charles Albert, then Prince of Carignano, and heir to the throne of Savoy. The former was a traitor from the first—the latter having approved of the movement on the 8th of March, prepared the next day to prevent it at Turin, but it broke out on the 10th at Alexandria, and he was himself proclaimed Regent on the abdication of the king.

The insurrection of Central Italy in 1831, had its source in a conspiracy dating from the previous year, in Modena, which had proposed to place the Duke of Modena at the head of the Italian movement. But this part of the scheme was afterwards abandoned. The conspirators, with young Menotti at their head, were betrayed ; on the 2nd of February the Duke surrounded his house—the conspirators resisted, cannon were brought to play against them ; at the sound the people rose in all the neighbouring towns, and in three weeks Parma, Modena, and the northern half of the Papal States, embracing some two million and a-half of inhabitants, were in arms. The instinct of the people was already *Italian*, they sought to invade Tuscany and Naples, and to bring about an insurrection at Genoa, and to march on Rome ; but the Provisional Governments of Parma, Modena, and Bologna, opposed and prevented all such movements.

They were not men of revolutionary capacity, they did not even take any efficient means to prepare for defence, they sought to *moderate* the movement and to give it an inoffensive

aspect to the powers of Europe, they believed that if they, not the originators of the Movement, but being now placed at its head, proved themselves peaceful and unaggressive. Austria would not invade, and they knew that otherwise they had nothing to fear. They had some plausible reasons for their belief. France had just declared strongly for enforcing non-intervention with a high hand. On Dec. 1, 1830, M. Lafitte president of the Council, anticipating disturbances in Italy, had said in the chambers, "France will not allow the principle of non-intervention to be violated; but she will labour to prevent peace being compromised if possible, and if war becomes inevitable, it must be proved that we had no choice between it and the abandonment of our principles." A note was shown at Bologna, whose authenticity has however been denied, signed by the French Ambassador at Naples, pledging France beforehand "to support Bologna on condition that the government should not assume an anarchical form, and that it should recognize the principles which had been declared in the face of Europe;"—true or not, the provisional governments, on the faith of it, tempered or rather emasculated the movement, and relied on France. It is said that Louis Philippe, to avoid the fulfilment of his promises, and to give time to Austria, kept back from his Minister Lafitte for five days, the despatch of the French Ambassador at Vienna, announcing the Austrian invasion. The Austrian intervention took place first in Parma and Modena, Austria declaring that she did so to protect her reversionary rights—for these duchies you will remember were given by the treaties of 1815, to Austrian princes—and that if Bologna remained peaceful she would be respected. This was in the beginning of March—on the 20th, the Austrians were at the gates of Bologna—on the 26th, the capitulation including an amnesty was signed, to be afterwards violated by Rome; then followed a mass of proscriptions and imprisonments. Young Menotti died on the gallows on March 23rd. He had been wounded on the 2nd February at Modena, taken prisoner by the Duke, and dragged away with him in his flight. *Italy was again at peace.*

I must ask you to note here that with the failure of the movement of 1831 died out, in Italy, the institution, if I may say so,

of Carbonarism. Our notions of Carbonarism have been, in this country, of the vaguest. We have been accustomed to hear of it as of a terrible system of secret societies, democratic in their origin, anarchical in their views, shunned by all decent men and yet hardly now extinct, and with the dagger as their sole weapon and device. These notions of ours have not only been vague, but also about as inaccurate as notions could be.

Carbonarism existed in Italy already in the time of Napoleon. It was a system of secret societies without a positive political programme of faith, and in this it was an offspring of the times; it was an expression of a state of mind whose function is to render impossible an existing state of things and to destroy it; analogous, I might say, to those periods of religious anarchy and scepticism which precede the dawning of a new faith. Italy had not yet begun to formalize the faith of her regeneration, though I have already given evidences of the existence at that date of the germs of such faith. Carbonarism was an unreasoning instinctive creation. Italy conspired *a tout prix* leaving to chance, opportunity, or the discretion of unknown leaders, to decide the time and the aim; at any rate such action could not be for the worse, must in fact, be for some measure of liberty and independence. Then as to the method of conspiracy, this also partook of the nature of the times and the character of the association. It was necessary to ensure secrecy and fidelity, and they were sought for in the modes which had been handed down and familiarized to men's minds by the secret societies of the middle ages, by processes of initiation, by oaths and grotesquely fearful ceremonies, intended to impress the imagination of the adept, and to ensure his blind obedience and his faith. Terrible penalties hung over the heads of those who should henceforth falter or betray; and vengeance followed treason, actual or supposed;—though the love of the terrible and the unknown has undoubtedly exaggerated the number of such instances of vengeance or punishment. On the other hand Carbonarism was not anarchical in its objects, because the spirit of Italy was not anarchical, but was already, though half unconsciously, seeking a new and better, a more stable and orderly as well as a freer life. The movements of 1820 and

1821, which I have described, were entirely the work of Carbonarism, that of 1831 also partially, although it was already on the decline, and in those movements we have seen want of national faith, want of energy and direction, and hence failure, but of the spirit of anarchy, nothing. Lastly, Carbonarism has been laid as a convenient reproach at the door of Italian Democracy. Reproach or not, this is the greatest mistake of all. Its great efforts were the movements of 1820 and 1821, revolutionary but not democratic movements, the heirs apparent of Naples and of Piedmont were its sworn adepts, the army its instrument. The last effort, only partially its own, was the revolution of the centre in 1831. Then it passed away, and then, and not till then, appeared upon the scene the small beginning of that national democratic agitation, which has since played so important and in some respects, I think, so little understood a part in the reconstruction of the unity of the Italian nation.

On the ruins of Carbonarism was founded the society "La Giovine Italia" (young Italy) the work of Joseph Mazzini. Its initiators, with their chief, were all young men, full of the enthusiasm of a national faith, deeply impressed with the illusions and the failures of 1820 and 1831, and professing a republican creed. There was nothing to hope from Italian princes—they had ceased to conspire and betray: nothing to hope from cautious diplomatic courses intended as in 1831, to conciliate Europe, and to ward off the intervention of Austria; everything to fear from the weak leadership of men, who from motives of such sort would be certain to denationalize and to emasculate any movement, the control of which should be entrusted to their hands. No possible salvation save in proclaiming at once their great end, the liberty, independence, and unity of the whole nation, and in setting themselves to the task of arousing the whole nation to its conception and accomplishment. I will give you the creed and the policy of the new association in the words of its author.* "They had examined

* *Vide* "Letters on the State and Prospects of Italy," by Joseph Mazzini, Nos. I. to IV., *Monthly Chronicle*, 1839, from which much of this historical sketch of the movements in which Carbonarism played out its part, is derived.

with care the movements of 1831, and had deduced from this examination, that there was in Italy no deficiency of revolutionary elements but of a guiding spirit * * * they aspired to be not simply revolutionary but regenerative * * * to rouse the different Italian States to revolt was not their object, their sole endeavour was to *create the nation* * * * they felt that at bottom the question was no other than the grand problem of *National Education*, and arms and insurrection were for them only the means, without which, from the state of Italy, it was impossible to accomplish this * * * the Association resolved to disguise nothing and to sacrifice nothing. It presented itself as it was, as the tendencies and exigencies of Italy, it believed, required it to be, an association republican and indivisible. * * * It exposed the errors of 1831 ; it separated itself from the past. It repeated everywhere that the salvation of Italy was in the people, that the grand lever of the people was action ; that it was necessary to act without ceasing, without discouragement, without being intimidated by reverses at first, and always in the name of Italy and for the whole of Italy. "It is possible," it said, "that you will succumb, but even then you will instead of falling basely and without effect, have educated the country ; a great principle will survive you, and the generation which follows you will read upon your tombs the programme of the Italy to come."

I have read to you these words of Mazzini, at some length, because, though written years ago, they continue to be the true key of every movement of his party in Italy from that day to the present. It is a programme so utterly at variance with our ordinary, what we call practical notions, that I believe it to be difficult for many of us even to realize and to comprehend it ; and yet it is of immense interest as the expression of the actual rule of conduct of the Party of Action in Italy for thirty years. It *has* educated the nation to the belief in Unity, and to the needful determination of incessant action to attain it. Not only Italy but Europe knows that there is no peace possible till Italy be one. It is true that the practical accomplishment of this task has passed, not, however, as I shall hereafter show, so largely as is generally believed, into other hands. But

what higher tribute, I would ask, could be paid to the soundness of a principle or a faith, what more conclusive testimony of the hold which it has obtained upon a nation, than that the supposed decline of the party who originated it should date from the adoption, more or less, of their principle and their object by other parties in the state? What is called the Piedmontese or Moderate Party dates its successes from the moment when it also gave itself by its own methods to this nation's work; and to pursue, in some manner, without ceasing, this task, is even now the very term of its power and existence.

You will note that the republican creed of the founders of Young Italy was not, if I may so say, of the essence of their faith. It rather served to define their party; it represented the actual tendency of the young and rising intellect of the day in their country and the popular instincts of those most likely among the people to aid them in their work. It was well to proclaim it, because there was then nothing to hope from monarchy, and because its open avowal would give numbers, enthusiasm, and unity to their ranks. But the object of their faith, and the great aim of all their labours being the resuscitated nation, they could not purpose to impose on it a creed, which it might or might not accept, and it would always be their duty to subordinate their special political views to the accomplishment of the great object to which they had devoted their lives. And I shall show you, I hope, before I have done, that they have not failed in the observance of so clear a duty.

The Giovine Italia was, as I have said, reared on the ruins of Carbonarism. The method of its organization, and of its labours partook of the nature of the ideas on which it was founded. I shall give you here again the very words of its founder:—

“Having principles and reckoning upon them rather than on the power of mystery and of symbols, it rejected all the complete machinery of the Carbonarian hierarchy and all the pomp which was only calculated to hide the absence of real purpose. It had a central committee abroad, and interior provincial committees directing the ‘practical conspiracy;’ having to initiate a work of *education* the Association only decreed

secrecy as far as necessity required it, that is to say for its interior operations ; with respect to its existence, its object, its hopes, its principles, it challenged publicity. The journal, *La Giovine Italia*, was established at Marseilles, another journal in Switzerland ; catechisms of the new faith were printed and clandestinely distributed with great labour, courage, and ingenuity throughout the peninsula. Their circulation was immense and their effect also ; organization commenced at every point, and the first work of propagandism was an immense success."

I quoted from the programme of Young Italy a few moments ago, the doctrine of incessant action, of perpetually renewed revolt. The party of Young Italy, or the Party of Action as they came consequently to be called, have abided by that doctrine ; they have had some brilliant successes. I will instance the republic at Rome and the recent conquest of Sicily and Naples to the new kingdom ; but their career in action has, as a logical and inevitable consequence of their fidelity to this doctrine, been otherwise a succession of forlorn hopes ending in temporary failure. Some of these have, within my knowledge, only just escaped success ; Austria could tell you how nearly the attempt at Milan in February, 1853, succeeded in renewing the five days of 1848 ; but they did fail, and as failures they were judged, and not unreasonably judged by the world at large. But if we, outside of Italy, and only desiring rightly to understand the regenerative movement of the country in all its phases and in all its parts, would look this question more closely in the face, we should have to remember that it is permitted to forlorn hopes, that it is of their very nature to be undertaken in the face of a preponderance of adverse chances, because of the proportionably great results of a successful issue ; and we should recognise that these long series of attempts have, after all, achieved their work of arousing the determined consciousness of the nation, and that the party which in accordance with our naturally *a priori* unfavourable view, ought over and over again, as, over and over again it has been said to have been annihilated, has, nevertheless, gone on increasing in influence and in boldness, and is only now less prominent and less distinct because its preliminary educational task may be said to

be complete, and it has but to share in the work to which all parties in the nation have now set their hands.

The result of the labours of the Giovine Italia and the progress of the Italian idea will be best understood by a short reference to the movements of 1848 and 1849; they constitute, too, the first chapter of the history of the relations of the national party or party of action with the monarchy of Savoy, now beginning to play its part also in the nation's work. You will remember that all Italy was already in a ferment in 1847, before the revolution of 1848 in France which dethroned the Orleans dynasty and gave the signal for the European movement of that year. Pius IX. had ascended the Papal chair in 1846, had granted an amnesty and promised administrative reforms. The instinct of the Italian people seized upon the occasion to further the national design. I will give you the opinion of Prince Metternich of the nature and meaning of the movement in the Roman states—it was afterwards amply verified by facts. Writing to Count Dietrichstein, in a despatch dated August 2, 1847, he says, "Under the banner of Administrative Reform the factions are endeavouring to accomplish an undertaking which could not be confined within the states of the Church, nor within the limits of any one of the states which in their ensemble constitute the Italian peninsula. The factions seek to merge these states into one political body, or at least into a confederation of states, subject to the direction of a central supreme power."

The times were, indeed, evidently ripe for a great movement; it was no longer a question of forlorn hopes; events might at any moment precipitate the nation into the arena, and this state of things brought a new party upon the field—the Moderate or Piedmontese party.

We left Charles Albert in 1821 affiliated to the Carbonari; he had been a party to their conspiracy; but with the weakness peculiar to his character, he had sought at the last moment to avert the insurrection. It succeeded, nevertheless, till Austria intervened. Since his accession in 1831 Charles Albert had reigned a despot; he, or those who represented him, for I do not wish to make him responsible for every mean or cruel

act perpetrated in his name, had visited with a refined and ferocious cruelty the insurrectionary attempts of patriots who still trod the path he had once professed to enter,—I allude especially to the arrests of 1833. But the increasing ferment of the Italian mind had taught him to look back upon the ambition of his younger days, and to feel that the time was at hand when he might have, *mutatis mutandis*, to re-enact his part. The idea of the Moderate party was to renew the kingdom of Italy of Napoleonic days, that is a kingdom of the north, to gain Charles Albert to the cause by offering Lombardy and Venetia to be snatched from Austria, as the price of his assistance, and thus at the same time to stem the revolutionary tide which might unmake monarchy in building up the nation. I must ask you to bear in mind this, the leading idea of the Moderate party of a *northern kingdom*, for it is the key to the whole of their subsequent policy. It was their aim in 1848—it ruined that movement, it ruined that campaign. It was the aim again of the compact of Plombières, and of the Franco-Italian campaign of 1859. That the nation went beyond it is due, not to the policy of the Moderate party, but to the true instincts and the single purpose of the Italian people. I shall proceed to illustrate the truth of what I say. On the 18th March, 1848, Milan was in insurrection against the Austrians, on the evening of the 22nd Radetski fled, Charles Albert declared war against Austria on the 23rd. Piedmont was already sharing in the excitement of all Europe responsive to the revolution in France. On March 4th, the king having reigned seventeen years a despot, granted a Constitution; known as the *statute*, now the law, very inadequate to its requirements, for a whole Italian people, for all Italy save Rome and Venice. The king refused the first request of Milan for his aid; on the 21st he offered assistance on *condition* that they should *previously* give themselves to him; on the 23rd the Milanese had triumphed and he declared war; on the same day Mr. Abercromby, our ambassador at Turin, received from the Foreign Minister a despatch stating the causes and motives of the declaration of war. It justified that step on the ground that the whole country was in insurrection, that “after the events in France the danger of the proclamation of a

republic in Lombardy was imminent * * * that the situation of Piedmont was such that at any moment, at the announcement that the republic had been proclaimed in Lombardy, a similar movement might burst forth in the states of his majesty, and that the king thought himself obliged to take measures to prevent such a catastrophe for Piedmont and the rest of Italy.”*

When Charles Albert crossed the frontier the Lombard insurrection was already victorious in every point. To the Austrians remained only the Quadrilateral and 50,000 men, and all Italy was hastening to the war; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Pope, and the king of Naples, were compelled to furnish contingents for the crusade. Now, see the position; every other ruler in Italy save Charles Albert was necessarily an unwilling contributor to the common cause; they had nothing to gain, for if the north were freed it could not come to them, and with the true instinct of self-preservation they feared the national movement which must ultimately sweep them away. The people, with that weak faith in the professions of their princes, which was one of the leading characteristics of the European revolutionary movement of 1848, believed them, in those moments of common enthusiasm, to be sincere, but they did nothing willingly against Austria, and, one by one, withdrew what troops they could when dissension had crept in and the policy of the monarchy of Savoy had chilled the enthusiasm and the hopes of the nation.

Charles Albert, on the other hand, and his counsellors, had a *hope and a fear*; the hope was the kingdom of North Italy, the fear was the republic. It was this foolish fear which ruined the campaign. Because of this fear the volunteers were discouraged, and the services of such men as Garibaldi and Cialdini refused. Garibaldi summoned by Mazzini had already sailed from Monte Video, before the news reached of any Italian or European movement having taken place. When he arrived Charles Albert was in the field, and his offers were refused.

The provisional government of Lombardy, under the in-

* Lord Ponsonby to Lord Palmerston. Vienna, April 10, 1848. Italian Corr. Pt. II. p. 338.

fluence of the King, refused to summon for a war of insurrection in aid of the regular forces of Sardinia, the Italian exiles who had gained their military experience in the insurrectionary movements of Spain and Greece, and many of whom are now to be found distinguished in the service of the present kingdom. They said that no one knew where they could be found, Mazzini insisting, obtained authority to summon them. Among them came Enrico Cialdini; he was refused, and said I "will not have journeyed here from Spain for nothing, before I return I shall seek an Italian wound as a common soldier at Venice"—he went there and was wounded in the ranks. Because of this fear the king keeping near Milan and with his own frontiers and capital protected by his rear, set himself to the siege of the four fortresses, neglected the passes of the Alps, which volunteers alone would have sufficed to seize and guard, and kept altogether aloof from Venetia where the republican flag was unfurled under Manin, even instructing his navy to enter into no hostilities with Austrian men of war. He wanted the courage to feel that if he trusted the nation and did the nation's work, his reward was assured. It was folly to fear that a people which at the moment of a successful revolution had abstained from pronouncing upon its future form of government leaving that to the nation after the successful termination of the struggle, to decide, would have hesitated in accepting a King who should have led them to victory.

The army of Radetsky though reduced to 50,000 was safe within the Quadrilateral, and capable in any case of a prolonged defence. If its communications were allowed to be kept up with its base of operations, and reinforcements to be received, it could only be a question of the time necessary for it to receive sufficient reinforcements, for Radetsky again to take the field with an army superior to any which the limited resources of Piedmont could oppose. It was therefore vital to seize Upper Venetia and the passes of the Alps, to cut off his supplies, and to isolate him within the line of his defences. In that case, in the midst of a hostile population it could again have been only a question of time, how soon he would have been compelled to lay down his arms. These are of the very

elements of strategy which any civilian may comprehend. Charles Albert's fearful policy made time the ally of his enemy—and it was a fatal policy. In the beginning of August, Charles Albert was already in retreat upon Milan, which under a committee of defence of the nomination of Mazzini, accepted by the provisional government, and of which General Fanti was a member, in that moment of supreme danger, was making most energetic preparations for defence. When Fanti and Restelli went on the 3rd to Lodi to see the king and ascertain his intentions, they were informed by General Bava, that the king would march to the defence of Milan. The king entered on the 4th, renewing the promise of defence—on the 5th, he declared that the capitulation was already signed. The population incensed to fury, threatened his life—he declared that, moved by their unanimous determination, he would remain and fight to the death,—in the night he fled in secret and the campaign was at an end.

Of the events of 1849, I can hardly now stay to say a word. We all know how republican Venice under Manin, continued for a year to resist all the power of Austria by sea and land. We can never forget the defence of Rome, whither or to Venice, the republican volunteers repulsed from serving the country in Lombardy repaired—the heroic defence of Rome under the Triumvirate of which Mazzini was the chief—the brightest and saddest page in the history of the Italian Movement. A defence which, hopeless as it proved to be, was the greatest moral victory, the most pregnant with consequences for the future, which Italy has yet achieved. Rome fell after three months siege, to the overpowering force and the matchless perfidy of the French. I say that its hopeless defence was the greatest of all moral victories for Italy. It was so, because it gave to the unaided people a proof and a consciousness of its own dignity and of its own faculties; it was so, because it upheld for three months against the forces of France, Austria, Naples, and Spain, the national flag in Rome, the future capital of the nation, and because it shewed what Italian volunteers could do against all present hope for the future of their country. Twice were the French troops attacked at the point of the bayonet

and repulsed far beyond the walls. The first occasion was on the 30th of April, 1849; within a few days a Neapolitan army of 15,000 men, led by the king in person, encamped at Albano, some 15 miles from Rome, and on the 10th of May the French troops again attacked and were again repulsed. On the 19th of May an armistice was concluded, and negotiations commenced with Lesseps the French envoy, pending which the little army at Rome marched against the Neapolitan king at Velletri, and put him ignominiously to flight; laying the foundation for Garibaldi of that wondrous prestige which enabled him a year ago to free Sicily and Naples, with a handful of volunteers opposed to an army of 100,000 men, to enter the capital alone, and to drive the son of Bomba to seek refuge in an almost impregnable fortress. On the 31st of May the French envoy signed a convention between the Roman assembly and himself, on the ratification of which, by General Oudinot and the French Government, the gates were to be opened to the army of France; with a new armistice to be, in case of non-ratification of the convention, prolonged for fifteen days. The General refused his assent and produced private instructions of his own, but promised not to recommence the attack before the 4th of June. To his eternal infamy, and that of the government which he served, he forfeited his word, attacked by surprize in the night of the 2nd and the defence was at an end. And throughout the whole of this unequal struggle, not only Rome but all the Roman states remained faithful to the Assembly and Government of their own choice, and to the flag of the nation which they had commissioned them to raise and to defend. That unanimity was the downfall of the temporal papacy, the thunders of the Vatican were henceforth to rank as stage tricks to an accustomed audience,—the papal chair must rest on French bayonets or tumble to the ground. And the protest of that sublime defence was more, it determined the nature of her future efforts to all Italy, it rendered impossible at any moment the adoption by Italy of any other goal but *unity*, it bound Italy, without the possibility of being led, or driven, or compelled astray, to its accomplishment. Rome for her capital, the sea and the Alps her frontier lines, were the inevitable future

of the Italian people. And I beg you mark, as if to enhance the value of this protest and this proof, the triumvirate of men who ruled Rome during the defence, was chosen for this special task, on the receipt of the intelligence that Charles Albert's renewed campaign had terminated within a few days of its commencement, with the disastrous and fatal defeat of Novara.

And thus it was that Italy made her experience of Monarchy and Republicanism, as agencies towards the achievement of the national unity. Such were the efforts, and such the failures of 1848 and 1849.

My next theme will be the lessons which Italy thereby learned, and the future action, and the future relation of parties, and of the instinctive nation, to the present time.

LECTURE II.

THERE were certain things made evident to demonstration by the events of '48 and '49. I will clear the ground by stating these results at once.

First, it was made clear that all Italy was, and would continue to be, bent on driving out Austria and on accomplishing her entire independence from foreign rule; and that Austria could never hope to hold Venice and Lombardy save by the sword,—in fine, that she was but encamped upon Italian soil, and that it was a mere question of time and opportunity when the attempt to expel her would be again renewed.

Secondly, it was proved that the tendency, the instinct of the nation was towards unity. To make this assurance doubly sure there was the fact that with the exception of Piedmont, every Italian government was necessarily pro-Austrian and anti-popular, having nothing to hope and everything to fear from the national tendency, bound therefore by the logic of its position to suppress liberty even within its own territories at any risk; and then there was also to be taken into account the fact of the existence of a large, active, and restless popular party, with its ramifications in all parts of the peninsula—the national or republican party, pledged and devoted *ora e sempre* to the accomplishment of the unity as well as the independence of the country.

Further, however weak and wavering might have been the policy of Charles Albert, Piedmont stood alone as an Italian state which had fought for Italy against Austria, and which could be relied upon as hostile to Austria, which could afford to be

faithful to the constitution which the events of '48 had induced it to accord to its own subjects, and which might have hopes for the future in allying itself again with the nation's cause. Charles Albert had abdicated after the defeat of Novara, and died broken-hearted in exile. His son, Victor Emmanuel, reigned in his stead, a soldier of undoubted courage, loving danger and the field, not indeed a man of high intellect or character, but without special kingly faults, and eager to avenge the reverses which had brought his father to the grave. Then there was the fact of the great emigration, especially from Lombardy and Venice, of the youth who had fought as volunteers, and who, establishing themselves in Piedmont, made that state the home of the most eminently Italian element in the country, and which constituted, or might be made to constitute, a new link between Piedmont and the Italy which was to be. All these were capabilities for Piedmont, and moving causes in the direction of a national career.

There was another cause likely to induce constitutional Piedmont with more or less of decision towards some sort of active national policy. If Piedmont should refuse in any manner to lend herself to the national cause, the nation would inevitably throw herself into the arms of the republican party pledged to action. Piedmont had to choose between abandoning Italy to the republican party and ranking herself with the other doomed princedoms of the centre and the south, or endeavouring, by a possible active policy of her own, to draw the people to herself and to centre their hopes upon her alliance.

Piedmont was bound, therefore, to some sort of Italian national policy; and considering how much Italy has already accomplished of her unity, so much so, indeed, that no policy save that of an absolute completion of the task is any longer to be dreamed of or suggested, and considering, too, how predominately the credit and the practical fruits of that success have, in the opinion of the world and in the possession of power, enured to the benefit of the Moderate party, it would seem natural to imagine that they, too, must have had the unity of their country long in view, and that they can have differed only from the National party as to the policy best adapted to

the attainment of a common object; and yet I believe the acceptance of the idea of Italian Unity, as an object of practical statesmanship, by the leaders of the Moderate party, must be admitted to be of a very recent date.

I will go back to Gioberti, who was the founder of that party: in the Sardinian Chambers on the 10th of February, 1849, on the eve of the short campaign which ended in the defeat of Novara, Gioberti said—"I consider the unity of Italy a chimera. We must be content with its union." And if you look to the writings, the speeches, the acts, of all the leading men of the Moderate party until a very recent period, you will find them all, without exception, not only not propounding or advocating unity, or directed to its accomplishment, but explicitly directed to a different solution. You will find the proof of what I say in Balbo's "Hopes of Italy;" in Durando's "Essay on Italian Nationality," advocating three Italies, north, centre, and south; in Bianchi Giovini's work entitled "Mazzini and his Utopias;" and in Gualterio's "Revolutions of Italy." Minghetti, Ricasoli, Farini, each and all have been the advocates of a confederation of Princes rather than of a united Italy.

Let me come to Cavour. An attempt has recently been made to claim for him the credit of having since the days of his earliest manhood conceived the idea of making himself the minister of a future united Italy. In an article in the July "Quarterly," by a well known pen, a letter of Cavour, written about 1829 or 1830, is cited in implied justification of this claim. He had been placed under arrest a short time in the Fort de Bard, on account of political opinions expressed with too much freedom. In a letter to a lady who had written condoling with him on his disgrace, he says:—"I thank you, Madame la Marquise, for the interest which you take in my disgrace; but, believe me, for all that, I shall work out my career. I have much ambition—an enormous ambition; and when I become minister I hope to justify it, since already in my dreams, I see myself Minister of the Kingdom of Italy." Now this is, I need not say, a most remarkable letter, and of the greatest interest, as showing the confidence in his own future, at so early an age, of one of the greatest statesman of our

times. But no one acquainted with the modern history of Italy, and familiar with its recognised phraseology, could read in this letter the prophecy of that unity which is now coming to pass. The "Kingdom of Italy" is a well known phrase, borrowed from the time of Napoleon, and has always meant, until facts have enlarged its significance, that kingdom of Northern Italy whose precedent existed under Napoleon, which was the object of Piedmontese policy in '48 and '49, and one of the explicit terms of the contract of Plombières in '59. It is rather a curious inconsistency in the article in question that it itself furnishes ample evidence that the unity of Italy was no part of the practical programme of the Moderate party. "Cavour," we are told, "founded in 1847, with his friends Cesare Balbo, Santa Rosa, Buoncompagni, Castelli, and other men of moderate constitutional views, the *Risorgimento*, of which he became the editor, and the principles of the new periodical were announced to be 'independence of Italy, union between the princes and peoples, progress in the path of reform, and a league between the Italian States.'" Again, after saying that it was Ricasoli and the leaders of the Constitutional party who recalled (in '49) the Grand Ducal family to Tuscany, and that Gioberti himself proposed that the Pope should be invited back to Rome, the writer goes on to say:—"It was an immense advantage to the restored Princes to have been thus brought back by the most intelligent and moderate of their subjects. It rested chiefly with them to render the reconciliation permanent. The occasion was lost through distrust and fear of those they governed (not an unusual accompaniment of restorations), and by a reckless disregard of their rights and feelings. A moderate, conciliatory, and just policy might at that moment have united princes and peoples. All that the wisest and most influential men in Italy asked was a federal union of the different states in the Peninsula upon a liberal and constitutional basis, from which even the House of Austria was not to be excluded. But concession was obstinately refused. The Italian States again brought under the direct influence of Austria, were governed in a jealous and severe spirit, and some of them with a cruelty which aroused the indignation of Europe. In their

bitter disappointment the hopes of the Italians were turned to Piedmont, and that kingdom necessarily became the rallying point for Italian freedom; so that the position which she has since held was made for and not by her."

I must trouble you with one more quotation. At the conference of Paris in 1855, after the Crimean war, Piedmont was represented by Cavour, who brought before the assembled statesmen the condition of Italy; but unable to enter fully into the Italian Question at the conferences, he addressed two state papers on it to Lord Clarendon. "In them he proved," continues the writer, "by indisputable facts, how impossible it was for Piedmont to develop her material resources, or her free institutions, whilst hemmed in on all sides by Austrian bayonets, exposed to endless intrigues, and compelled for her own safety to make a constant drain upon her finances. It is evident by his language in the Congress, and by those documents, that Cavour still looked to a solution of the Italian difficulty in the withdrawal of the French and Austrian troops from the territories of the Pope, and in a reform of the Italian Governments themselves. His plan—at any rate for the temporary settlement of the question—was a confederation of Italian States with constitutional institutions, and a guarantee of complete independence from the direct interference and influence of Austria; and the secularization of the legations with a lay vicar under the suzerainty of the Pope. At that time he would have been even willing to acquiesce in the occupation of Lombardy by Austria, had she bound herself to keep within the limits of the treaty of 1815. Had Austria shown more wisdom and moderation, there can be little doubt that the excuse for French intervention would have been removed, and that the great struggle which has since taken place in Italy might have been deferred for many years." *

Now, you cannot, I think, have failed to note the glaring inconsistency of these praises of what is called the moderation

* Letters of Cavour recently published in the *Rivista Contemporanea*, and referred to in the Turin correspondence of the *Times* of February 11th, 1862, are quite inconsistent with the view of Cavour's policy and ideas in 1855.

of Cavour, with the assumption to him and to his party of the whole credit of Italian unity, and the theory, now too prevalent, that no other party has contributed anything but follies and excesses, impediments, not aids to the accomplishment of the great task. I believe such ideas to be as profoundly ungenerous and unjust as they are evidently self-contradictory, and I believe that they will be adjudged by history to be, so far as they are in any degree in good faith, superficial, partial, and utterly incapable of serving as any explanation of the method of the evolution of the great problem of Italian nationality.

I can tell you something about the origin of these ideas—they take their rise in the very nature of the policy of the Moderate party.

The policy of that party, dating from 1848, was based on a necessity, a hope, and a fear. It was necessary for Piedmont to play some part for the nation, or the nation would march over Piedmont to its goal. It was possible to play that part and to reap the reward of so doing. But it must either be played boldly as a national revolutionary policy, or it must be played in some sense, from the first, in opposition and in antagonism to the policy of the national party. It would indeed have been a grand and an inspiring spectacle could we have seen the counsellors of the monarchy of Savoy, on the very morrow of its great discomfiture, taking heart from the very depth of their defeat, and giving themselves unequivocally to the service of the entire nation. They would assuredly have met with their reward, in the unquestioned and undivided leadership of a national movement far higher than anything we have yet seen in its moral meaning, and pregnant with infinitely grander consequences to the civil and religious progress of the world; but I am not idealist enough to tax men or parties with not accomplishing a miracle of self-transformation or of faith. Another method was their inevitable choice; without absolutely defining their ultimate aim, they had to bid against the national party for the sympathies of the Italian populations, and above all they had to secure the initiative for themselves.

This policy once entered upon begat unavoidably antagonism and distrust, and made it more difficult than ever—though mistakenly, as events have shown—for them to believe that they could rely on the nation to accept monarchy when the nation was once roused to arms. Choosing not to rest absolutely on the nation they—or I should rather say Cavour (for from the moment he laid his hand to the work it became his own) turned to Europe—to its constituted powers and its diplomacy, and sought there to strengthen Piedmont for eventualities which must sooner or later arise. He concluded treaties of commerce, he cultivated diplomatic relationships, and by his successful home and foreign policy, and the general vigour of his administration, he created a new feeling of confidence in Piedmont as a well-governed, compact, constitutional government, the one bright spot in the otherwise sombre picture of the foreign and domestic misrule of the peninsula.

But, in carrying out this vital portion of his policy, he came to play a double part. And I ask you to note this, for it is the key of that which I have now to explain. In Italy it was necessary to suggest hopes, however carefully undefined, which should keep in check the influence of the National party; abroad he had to protest not only against that party but against those very popular aspirations which at home it was necessary that he should be supposed to serve. Hence two languages; one for the secret agencies, discrediting the National party, yet whispering the same hopes—and one for state documents and diplomatic communications, ignoring any thought of Italy save as her condition imperilled or embarrassed the monarchy of Savoy, and here again repudiating the National party, and building up upon the fact of their existence and their restless and troublesome activity, the most cogent arguments in his own favour which could be addressed to the representatives of existing monarchies in Europe.

Thus we may understand how it became literally a part of the system of business, if I may so say, of the Moderate party to discredit, in every way, the objects, the means, the doings, and even the personal character of the leaders of the party of action. If you think of the subsidizing of the press in which foreign

governments delight, of the influence of the salons and the ante-chamber on some purveyors of news, and of the instinctive fear and hatred, of the prejudice devoid of conscience and the enmity without law, with which anything linked with the names of democracy or republic is regarded in the high places of despotically monarchical Europe, you will not wonder when I say that a measure of injustice has been dealt out to a deserving party in Italy of which I have never known the parallel, and which history will condemn as a calumny and a disgrace.

But I have no desire to retort injustice. It were an easy task to oppose the diplomatic professions of Count Cavour to the claims of an exclusive patriotism set up on his behalf and on that of his party, and to leave the matter there. But I and you are interested in arriving at a just appreciation of the policy and of the man, and this is what I now proceed to attempt. First then, I believe that Cavour had from his earliest days the idea of independence firmly rooted in his mind, and that he never wavered in the intent of driving Austria beyond the Alps. Any expressions, any proposals of his to the contrary, at any time, were mere diplomacy—into the morals of which I do not now enter. If in 1855, he did, as the *Quarterly Reviewer* says, profess “a willingness to acquiesce even in the occupation of Lombardy by Austria, had she bound herself to keep within the limits of the treaty of 1815,” I am not therefore disposed to infer that he ever contemplated, much less accepted the possibility of the struggle which has ensued, being “deferred for many years.” Cavour knew too well that there was no real danger to the speedy accomplishment of Italian independence in any such professions. I will take another case, and shall quote from the official correspondence published by the French government. On the 10th September, 1860, after the invasion by Garibaldi of the Neapolitan States, Cavour wrote to Baron Talleyrand, “If we are not at the Cattolica before Garibaldi we are lost; the revolution will invade central Italy. We are forced to act.” Again, in a circular of M. Thouvenel, of October, 1860, I find these words:—“Signor Farini (sent by Cavour) has explained to the Emperor (at Chambery) the very embarrassing and dangerous position in which the triumph of

the revolution, to a certain extent personified in Garibaldi, threatens to place the government of his Sardinian Majesty. Garibaldi was on the point of freely traversing the Roman States, raising the populations as he went; and had he once passed that frontier, it would have been utterly impossible to prevent an attack on Venice. The Government of Turin had one mode left open to it in order to prevent that eventuality, and that was to enter the Marches and Umbria as soon as the arrival of Garibaldi had produced disturbances, and re-establish order without infringing on the authority of the Pope, and if need were to give battle to the revolution in the Neapolitan territory, and request a congress to immediately decide the destinies of Italy." Now, certainly these professions of motive cannot be said to be very creditable to Cavour, and they look as unlike as possible to the arguments of a patriot having the accomplishment of his country's unity above everything else at heart. And yet I do not, therefore, argue that Cavour did not willingly take advantage of that mighty step of Garibaldi, which gave half Italy to the new kingdom, and which enabled him, despite his own past professions, to lift his policy at once to the height of an openly declared national policy. On the other hand, I believe that neither he nor any other statesman actually in power, in his own country or elsewhere, believed in Italy being as prepared for unity as she has proved herself to be. And although his faith in Italy must have grown with the growth of his own policy, and although he may from time to time have had visions of its possible ulterior development, yet I also believe that up to the close of the campaign of 1859 (and indeed after its close and until, on his retirement from office, he saw the people of Italy in the Duchies and in the Romagna, with a singleness of purpose and strength of will which, under the influence of a national faith, made them as one man, better his own policy at the moment of its apparent defeat) his practical idea was a kingdom of the north.

Now, I think there is abundant evidence in support of these views. Cavour's sense of personal mortification and of failure, as well as his indignation at the peace of Villafranca, are well known—he had no conception that Italy was in a mental condi-

tion to take up the diplomatic game at the very moment of that seeming checkmate, and by the passive resistance of an absolutely unanimous population, to defeat the purpose of their too powerful ally. A curiously-worded telegram has lately been brought to light, I think, by Guerazzi, in which Cavour notified to Ricasoli the conclusion of the peace. If its curt picturesqueness be not quite suitable for ears polite, you will forgive me, for the interest which attaches to it as part of the *res gestæ* of the time. This, then, is the telegram:—"Cavour to Ricasoli, —Peace with Austria. I resign. Dukes back. All to the devil." Fortunately, Cavour was wrong in the direction in which all was going, as he soon discovered, returning then with greater energy, and, can we doubt it, with greater confidence than ever to his task.

But we have better evidence than this. *We know the terms of the compact of Plombières.* You will think, perhaps, that I speak with too great confidence in saying that we *know* the terms. I will tell you the grounds, then, of that strength of assertion. You will remember when, on January 1, 1859, the Emperor Napoleon spoke those words of startling import to Baron Hübner, which first gave the alarm of war in Europe. Already before that day particulars of the compact and the general plan of the campaign had reached this country from two different but most reliable sources; they were essentially the same particulars as those which were first published, as a revelation in the columns of the *Times* sometime not earlier than the following month of March; and everything that has since happened or come to light has only tended to confirm their accuracy. A cause of war was to be sought with Austria, she was to be tempted to take the offensive, the campaign was to be a short one—if necessary peace on the Mincio. If Venice and Lombardy were gained to Piedmont, Nice and Savoy were to be yielded to France. Napoleon, the cousin, married to the king's daughter, was to find a kingdom in Tuscany.

And now mark, all these particulars reached here, as I have given them, not as conjectures or beliefs, but as the reports, coming from two different sources, of what had been actually agreed upon between the Emperor and Cavour. I need hardly

tell you that Napoleon, Jerome's son, with his separate *corps d'armée* operating across the Duchies, found that there was no hope for him; I need hardly remind you that peace was made upon the Mincio, and that Venice not being gained, Nice and Savoy did not become, by virtue of the bond, the due of France, but were claimed because the Duchies and Romagna persisted in giving themselves to the king.

I ask then, first, is this not sufficient evidence that a kingdom of Northern Italy was the limit of the practical conception of the great statesman of the Moderate party; and in the second place, I would also ask whether the complete success of the programme of Plombières in its original entirety, would not, in establishing a northern Italy, and interposing a French Prince between it and the centre and the south, have rendered more distant and more difficult the attainment of a united national existence? And if the partially defeated programme has been made to be more fruitful than could have been the whole, once again I would ask you whether there is even common honesty or common sense in persistently heaping the whole merit of Italian unity upon one party and one man, and in refusing to the true instinct of the nation and to the self-abnegating fidelity to their great aim of the National or so called Republican party, the credit of having contributed to a result greater than was the aim of the Moderate party itself, and higher than the limits of its faith?

Let me borrow an illustration from the science of Dynamics. The Italian problem may be likened to that which in Dynamics is explained by what is known as the parallelogram of forces. Cavour's policy alone would carry the question to A, the end of the shorter side,—A being a kingdom of Northern Italy for the House of Savoy; the national instinct and the National party would carry it the longer side to B—the nation indivisible perhaps republican. By the resolution of forces, the diagonal is taken to C, national unity, monarchical, and Piedmontese. Now it is not unreasonable to think the diagonal the safer course, or if you will the only possible course to unity, but it is not allowable to ignore the existence of a force without whose contributed impulse that point could not have been attained.

But we are not dealing with unreasoning forces ; such has not been the force of the Republican party. This party announced itself as republican at a time (in 1833) when there was nothing to hope from monarchy, when the necessity, in an educational sense was felt, of a definite unitarian programme. I do not mean to say that this was the only cause of the republicanism of the party ; but it was the justification of inscribing the republican motto on their national flag. But the Republican party have never for a moment been guilty of the inconsistency of even desiring to force their creed upon an unwilling people. Their aim was to constitute the national sovereignty, and the sovereign nation must decide upon the form of its own future. And thus it is that the royal House of Piedmont, always the only possible Italian monarchy, has had but to give itself to the nation to have the certainty of being accepted by the nation ; for who could dream that the nation ever would refuse the crown to the soldier king who should unite his fate with theirs, and with them achieve the independence of his country ? Is not the instance of Garibaldi enough ? Does not the monarchy know, has not the monarchy always known, that at the moment of action it might ever rely upon him to lead the youth of Italy, call them republican or not, to die for it and Italy upon the battle field ?

But I will not leave the matter here with Garibaldi, the man of instinct and action rather than the man of thought. I will speak of the organized party not upon the field of battle. What has their course of action been ? I assert then, and I speak here what is matter of my own knowledge, that there never has been a time since the movement of 1848 inclusive, in fact, since Piedmont, an exception to all other Italian governments, became constitutional and ceased to be the bounden tool of Austria, that this party has not been ready practically to accept monarchy, provided always that monarchy committed its fortunes to those of the unity of the country. And further, I say that from the moment when it became possible—after the peace of Villafranca—by a mere act of adhesion so to commit monarchy, such act was accomplished with an active aid from them, which should have been held convincing proof of the

singleness of their devotion to the one great aim of a reconstituted nation.

I will give you irrefutable proof of what I say. There is a man whom I have named as the founder of this party, and who, though continuing in exile, or traversing Europe or even revisiting his own country at the risk of his life, has still remained its acknowledged head. I speak of Joseph Mazzini, long my revered friend, whom I, in intimate daily life, know perhaps better than any other living man, English or Italian, knows him, of him whom calumny the most unscrupulous and systematic, so long continued and so incessant as to have deceived many of the most liberal minded and justly meaning of my own countrymen, has made it suffice to name, to suggest ideas of anarchy and civil war, of ruin to all wise counsels, and to Italy's best or only hopes. I will show you his part towards monarchy, in the pursuit of that which is now, but only now, a common aim.

During the Lombard campaign of 1848, before the Decree of Fusion, proposals were made to Mazzini in the name of Castagneto, the king's secretary. It was proposed that he should constitute himself patron of the monarchical fusion, that he should endeavour to draw over the republicans; that he should have in return as much democratic influence as he could wish in the construction of the Articles of the Constitution which would be given, and an interview was suggested with the king. Mazzini replied that to assure the independence and unity of the country he would sacrifice not his republican faith, but all action for it, and that already the republicans were silent upon it for the sake of independence and the war. But, he said, that they regarded the "Italy of the North" as a fatal conception, too ambitious for their princes and diplomacy, and not sufficient for the people of Italy. Thanks to this, popular enthusiasm was beginning to be extinct, the governments were already showing their hostility, and the chances of war were turning against them. To turn them in their favour Charles Albert must dare all, raise the banner of Unity, and call the nation to arms. When asked what guarantees the king

must give of his devotion to unity, he hastily drew up the terms of a proclamation containing these words :—

“*I feel,*” the king should say, “*that the time is ripe for the unity of our country*; I hear the shudder which thrills and oppresses your souls. Up, arise! I lead the way! Behold, I give you as the gage of my good faith the spectacle, hitherto unknown to the world, of the priest king of the new epoch; an armed apostle of the *idea-people*; architect of the temple of the nation! In the name of God and Italy, I tear the ancient treaties which kept you dismembered and which are dripping with your blood! I call upon you to overthrow the barriers which still separate you, and to group yourselves into legions of free brethren around me, your leader, ready to conquer or to die with you!”

How magnificent a trumpet call to a revolutionary war! I cite it not, however, you will understand, as showing what monarchy might then reasonably have done. I fear that at that time it was already too late for such a policy; but I adduce it as evidence of the truth of what I said that Mazzini and his party had always been ready to act with monarchy for unity.

My second proposition was that as soon as monarchy was, or rather as soon as she could be, by the people's act, committed to unity—the National party helped to accomplish that act, and for the sake of unity gave themselves to monarchy.

I will call into court the testimony of deeds, not words alone.

On the eve of the campaign of '59, leaving and even desiring the bulk of their youth to give themselves to the war under Garibaldi, Mazzini, with certain of the party, stood professedly aloof, exposing and protesting against the scheme of Plombières, the details of which he knew and published, and preparing the mind of the country to defeat when the time came, so much of the compact as opposed itself to the unity of the nation. The time did come, with the peace of Villafranca. Was a single voice raised to say “royalty has betrayed us, away with royalty?” Was that moment, when Cavour despaired, seized upon to undermine his party, and sow dissension in the camp? I will tell you. Immediately after the peace of Villafranca on the 20th of July, in the *Pensiero ed Azione*, Mazzini wrote,

“Liberty and National Unity. Let this be the sole cry that bursts from those who will not allow Italy to be a dishonoured slave. * * * What was the aim of those who separated themselves from us, and gave themselves to the French alliance? Their aim was like ours, one free Italy independent from all foreigners * * * Now circumstances point out the same ground for us all; now there is no hope left save in the people. Let all disputes cease. In the name of the honour of Italy let us unite. Accursed be he among us who cannot cancel the memory of all mutual reproaches and accusations in the great principle that by uniting we may and ought to save our country.”

And he and his party have remained absolutely true to this programme; they co-operated in those acts of adhesion, deeds not words alone, by which the Duchies and the Romagna persisted in giving themselves to the king, who had to play the part of an ungracious unwillingness to accept this adhesion—they planned, and urged, and discussed with members of the government—I speak of Mazzini himself—Garibaldian expeditions upon Naples. These expeditions were ultimately forbidden and prevented for the time; but they were bent on that union of the south which, while it gave Italy to the monarchy of Piedmont, would conclusively Italianize the policy of that monarchy, enlarge its dimensions, and be another step tending to emancipation from the thralldom of a too subservient alliance with France. It was Mazzini himself who planned the Sicilian insurrection in the following year. Rosolino Pilo, of whom I spoke before, kept up that movement until Garibaldi could arrive. It was the same party who prepared the way for Garibaldi's entrance into the Neapolitan capital alone—the same party who furnished and organized and despatched the greater part of those volunteers who gained Naples and Sicily to the new kingdom.

And all this they did for monarchy, or rather, through monarchy, for Italy. Truly it has been a wonderful and an unaccustomed spectacle to see a party called revolutionary and republican, heaping provinces upon a kingdom, and giving to a policy which was not their own, a success and a justification which it could not have earned alone. It has been a miracle of

devotion to a great aim. Each fresh triumph for their great principle and aim has been cutting ground from under their own feet for their rivals to stand upon. And on the day of complete emancipation they, the first teachers, the great martyrs, the incessant agitators, the forlorn hope of Italian unity, before fortune's smiles were won, will disappear and merge into the common nation.

There is a curiously interesting estimate, though not from a favourable point of view, of the two rival policies which I have been discussing, and of the remarkable men with whom they are identified. It is in M. Guizot's recent work on *Society and the Church*. He says:—"The Italian movement * * * has only burst forth and is only being accomplished under the impulsion and with the alliance of the republican and democratic party, which has been pursuing in Italy an end much more advanced, a revolution much more profound, than the mere expulsion of the foreigner and the reform of established governments * * * It is the republican party which has been in Italy the first patron and the ardent propagandist of Italian unity; it is by the incessant action of M. Mazzini and his adherents that this idea has been spread and has been accepted. * * * Cavour—had he from the first a preconceived determination in favour of Italian unity? Has he constantly desired and constantly pursued, as his aim, Italian royalty, one and constitutional, as M. Mazzini has desired and pursued the Italian republic, one and democratic? I know not; but it matters little, for if Cavour did not premeditate all that he has done, if he has been drawn on to more conquests than those he sought, he has at least resolutely accepted the impulsion, and if he has only reached the end impelled by his rival, he has at least conquered his rival by robbing him of his arms."

There is much in this passage of keen and true perception, but M. Guizot fails to see that the arms were not stolen, but were heaped upon the victor that he might have no choice, accepting them, but to conquer in the common cause.

There is then now but one great aim, one common cause in Italy—henceforth no party, no man, can be permitted to intrude a less or a divergent purpose—and that purpose is the nation

reconstituted in its entirety, from the Alps to the sea. The question of policy, of method of accomplishment, alone remains. The Moderate party, in power, naturally desire to keep the control of the movement in their own hands, and to go to Venice and to Rome only when and how they may think good policy allows. And in this desire they are justified, and more than justified, for if they are not capable of exercising such supreme direction and control, they are no fit government for renescent Italy. But, in endeavouring to exercise it, they are, as I think, under two influences, which have tended to enfeeble and to lead them astray. The first is their old fear of the so-called Republican party—now a foolish fear but still fed by the always exaggerated antagonism of parties in a revolutionary era, and by the jealousies and petty personal ambitions which belong to a successful political coterie. Secondly, they are hampered in their policy and confirmed in their antagonism to the National party, by their alliance with France. The National party naturally chafes, as Garibaldi is known to chafe, under the policy dictated by that alliance. Rome is still held by the French, and Italy is kept from the easy conquest of her natural and necessary capital, by her own ally. How can you expect the Italian people in a revolutionary time—how especially can you expect that southern population which does not owe its liberty either to France, or to Piedmont, but to Garibaldi and his volunteers, and which only gave itself to Piedmont in order to give itself to a united Italy,—to be content that the destinies of its country should hang expectant on a policy dictated from Paris through Turin?

But enough of these differences and these difficulties, through which Italy has yet to work her way, and in spite of which she will, it is my profound conviction, conquer her salvation. These are not the features of the great whole, on which I care to dwell, or on which I shall ever speak *unless it be to defend men who have wrought, and suffered, and accomplished, and merited far more than the world will yet acknowledge, for their country.*

There are men—but few I am proud to say in our own country, who, not loving Italy as I do, would, if the temper of the times allowed, gratify their despotic instincts by easy

criticisms on the morality of the policy of Cavour, and who would like to see, and to make us see, nothing in this great Italian movement but the ambition of a dynasty and the rivalries and jealousies of parties and of public men. But for me, when I look, endeavouring to raise myself—as it is the grand merit of some leaders of the National Italian party to have raised themselves—above all such considerations, when I look at the grand and glorious outline of this mighty movement, when, resolutely closing my eyes to all that is petty and personal and transitory in the immediate present, I seek to penetrate to the very soul of this great argument,— I see not the ambitions of dynasties, not the rivalries and jealousies of parties or of public men—these are but the exhibition of human passions and human interests working in subservience to a great and a providential aim ; but I do see, and Britain sees, with joy and with reverence she sees, the grandest, the most hopeful, the most inspiring spectacle which this earth can furnish forth—THE REGENERATION OF A PEOPLE.

MR. STANSFELD'S SPEECH

ON THE ITALIAN QUESTION, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS IN THE DEBATE OF JULY 19TH, 1861.

Sir,—If this discussion were one which had been, or which could be confined to the question which has been directly raised by the hon. member for Bridgewater (Mr. A. W. Kinglake), I should not propose to myself to take any part in it. Not that I doubt the importance of the question ; on the contrary, I think it would be difficult to exaggerate its importance ; for, if the fears which the hon. member entertains—if the possibilities which he suggests—were unfortunately ever to be realized in fact, it might well be no less than the shipwreck of that great policy of non-intervention which we have done so much to uphold in Europe, in the cause of peace. Nor is it, Sir, that I can pretend to say that I have been entirely reassured by the statements of the noble Lord, for I fear that I must still attach some credit to those sources of information which revealed in this country—and here I can more than confirm the statement of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell)—the compact of Plombières, and the very plan of the Lombard campaign, even before those memorable words were spoken to Baron Hübner, which first roused Europe from her dream of peace. But, Sir, the truth is that the question cannot so confine itself—the truth is that it could not even arise for discussion, were it not for the existence in Italy of a fact and of a policy which it is of the deepest interest and moment for us, not only as well-wishers of Italy, but as Englishmen and as members of the European community, to take into account. Sir, the *policy* is that which has hitherto obtained too exclusively in

Italy, of too absolute and too subservient a dependence on one foreign alliance; the *fact* is the long standing and anomalous fact of the occupation of Rome by the troops of the French empire. Sir, I will address myself to the question of this policy, which so deeply concerns us. What ought to be, what ought we to desire to be, the policy of Italy at the present time? Sir, Italy has recently lost a great statesman. I have not been one of his indiscriminate admirers, but this is not an occasion on which I ought to enter upon any lengthened criticism of his policy. Suffice it for me to say that, after his great labours and his great successes, he is gone, and that with him perhaps we may be permitted to hope are also gone personal engagements or at least personal entanglements which it would be well for the honour and welfare of Italy, for the welfare and peace of Europe, that they should be buried in his grave. What should be the policy of his successors? Italy must have Venice and she must have Rome, nor can she pause or dally long upon the road which leads to Venice and to Rome, at the risk of fatal internal dissensions and of national suicide. In pursuit, then, of these objects which she cannot relinquish, and which her ministers explicitly avow, what is the policy which it is for us a matter at once of the highest interest and of the strictest duty—for I hold that in this matter the interests of Italy, of England, and of Europe are identical—to induce, and, if we may, enable her to pursue? Sir, there are but two policies open to the counsellors of the new kingdom:—The first is the policy of Plombières. Sir, I have to confess that that policy—thanks to the indomitable spirit of unity of the Italian people—has so far been productive of beneficial results which at the time of its inception I did not anticipate as possible. But this I think I may safely say, that not a single member of this House will be found to rise in his place to night and to recommend us to approve a repetition of that policy. Well, then, what is the only alternative policy before the kingdom of Italy? Is it not, I ask, simply a truly national Italian policy, resting in absolute dependence on no single alliance, but, supported by the sympathies and the moral aid of all free peoples, multiplying and organizing its own forces, so that in due time Italy may suffice to her-

self for the completion of her emancipation? Sir, there are great dangers to Europe in a Franco-Italian war of independence—dangers of cessions of territory, suggested in the speech of the hon. member for Bridgewater, which might sweep away that last poor remnant of confidence, on which, as on a slender thread, hangs suspended the peace of Europe—dangers of Germany being brought into the field, and of our witnessing an active alliance between Italy and France, not only on the plains of Lombardy, but on the banks of the Rhine. But, Sir, there are also great dangers to Italy, and therefore to Europe, in an exclusive Franco-Italian alliance, things remaining as they are. We all know that Rome, in the occupation of the soldiers of the Empire, is the focus of all reactionary intrigues and attempts. But this is not all. There is some truth in the statements of disaffection in the south, which have come from the other side of the House to-night—disaffection on the part, not of the adherents of the exiled dynasty, but amongst the ranks of the patriots themselves, and which all the absolute fidelity to the cause of Italian unity, and all the unexampled self-abnegation of their leaders has not sufficed to dispel or to prevent. Sir, I do not desire to criticise in a hostile spirit the faults of judgment or of intention on the part of the ministers of Turin which have caused this disaffection. I wish simply to indicate the sole remedy, which consists—I say it without fear of contradiction—in the pursuit of a truly national and independent policy, in trusting and not fearing the people, in rallying them to the aid of the Government, and not, in obedience to the exigencies of an exclusive and subservient alliance, refusing to utilize and to organize the immense willing force of a nation which desires to be free. Sir, there are three practical bases on which such policy should rest. The first is friendly and open negotiations, in the face of Europe, with the French Emperor for the withdrawal of his troops from Rome. Secondly, in order to dispel the feeling in the south, that whereas of their own will and by volunteer force alone, they freed themselves and gave themselves to Italy, they find themselves treated as provinces of Sardinia; for such purpose, a clearly expressed understanding that, her capital once regained to the Italian nation, a national

assembly seated at Rome shall revise in a national sense the laws of the country, in order that the "statute" of Piedmont, borrowed for a time, may not permanently remain without revision and modification the law of the reconstituted nation. And lastly, the multiplication and the organization of the armed forces, regular and irregular, of the country. At present, spite of protestations and declared intentions, Italy, with already twenty-two millions of inhabitants, with nothing to live for, or to dream of, or to make sacrifices for, but the completion of her own independence, can place no more armed men in line than the little neighbouring republic of Switzerland, with less than one-eighth of her population; and of the 150,000 men she can so place in a line, 60,000 are required to restore order in the south; while of the volunteer element there is no organization whatever at all worthy of the name. And thus it comes to pass that Italy is kept in absolute dependence—in wrongful, foolish dependence—whatever confidence her ministers may have in his intentions—on the will and the power of her great ally. Sir, before I sit down, I desire to say something of a party in Italy of which I have some special knowledge—the party originally known as the party of Young Italy, then as the Republican, then as the National party, and now as the party of Action. Sir, I have never known, I have never heard or read of any party in any country or in any time which has been so persistently misrepresented and maligned. In the ranks of that party was born the idea of Italian unity; by them that idea was nurtured into a faith. It was their faith, I may say that it was my faith, when not a single English statesman could be found to believe in the possibility of its realization. But, Sir, that party not only created the idea and nursed it into a faith, but they supplied also the motive power without which its realization so far would have been impossible. Trace back step by step the policy of Count Cavour, and at each of such steps, whether in argument before the assembled diplomacy of Europe, or in act upon the field of Italy, eliminate the element of the existence, of the determination, of the restless enthusiasm of this party—and you will find the step in argument would have been impossible as it would have been abortive in point of fact.

The latest is the most brilliant and the most convincing illustration of the truth of what I say. The House should know, if the House does not already know, that by far the greater part of the volunteers who under Garibaldi won Naples and Sicily—half Italy—to the new kingdom, sprang from the ranks of this party—men called republicans, led by one of themselves to die upon the battlefield that monarchy might rule the future destinies of a united Italy. Sir, this party—I know it well—has a policy and programme of its own, to which I invite the attention of the Government and of the House. It is a policy consistent with the declarations of the present first minister of the king. He has but to do, what he has not yet done, to carry out his words in acts, and he will rally this party round him; he will have with him all the active forces, all the vital elements of the country, and the moral unity of Italy will be at once and for ever assured. And, Sir, this programme and policy is neither more nor less than that truly national and independent programme and policy, good for Italy and good for Europe, which I have endeavoured to lay before the House.

MR. STANSFELD'S SPEECH

DELIVERED AT THE ANNUAL SOIREE OF THE WAKEFIELD
MECHANICS' INSTITUTE, ON THE 31ST OCTOBER, 1861.

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The most natural topic for discussion upon an evening like the present, is evidently the practical progress of the institution whose anniversary we are met together to commemorate; and the persons most likely to be able to address you with interest and advantage to yourselves upon such a topic, are those who have been practically concerned, during the past year, in the work of that Institution. But it has come rather to be the habit of Mechanics' Institutes, upon these anniversary occasions, to summon to common council with themselves those also without their own body who are locally connected with themselves, or who may be known as taking an interest in all subjects bearing upon the question, and ask them to address them on such occasions as these. Now when that is so, it follows, as a matter of course, that those who have not been practically acquainted with the working of the institution are obliged to fall back upon generalities. They talk to you of the necessity of education, of the duty of self-education, of the duty of assisting in the education of your fellow-men, and they, perhaps, lay before you the statistics of education in this and other countries. But information and arguments of this description, although very true and very well worth hearing, have become by repetition somewhat trite, and hence we have seen of late years, as

your chairman has already said, in meetings of this description, as well as in agricultural meetings, that speakers are apt to wander to any kind of subject, however remote it may appear to be from the objects or institution in connection with which they were assembled, but which they think may prove interesting to those whom they may have to address. Now your chairman has referred to a question in which he has been kind enough to say that I have taken considerable interest, and with which I have perhaps some special means of familiar acquaintance. And with reference to that remark of your chairman I have to note, and I think you must have noted, that of all those questions of general interest which have of late years been brought to the attention of public meetings of this description, no questions have been found more universally interesting than what we call foreign questions. I think it is not difficult to understand why this should be so. You have heard from your chairman a very eloquent and very accurate description of the foreign question now so deeply interesting to us as a manufacturing people—the American question, and I would ask you what have you there? You have there what I might call an agglomeration of States—a kind of partnership of populations not having the natural unity of purpose and of character which belongs to an old and well-established nationality like our own—having, on the other hand, causes of dissension within its bosom amply sufficient to rend the strongest nation, and at the bottom of them all that great question of negro slavery,—a question which I trust, will meet with some solution consistent with the liberty of men, be they white or be they black, before the war now commencing between the North and the South shall be completed. Then, there is another vast nationality in the East of Europe to which reference is not so often made—not so often as it appears to me it would be well to make it—I allude to the mighty empire of the Russias. There is no grander spectacle, no more magnificent subject for our consideration in these recent times than that which has been taking place in Russia. You have there an internal revolution—you have the emancipation of a serf-nation—you have Russia, thrown back upon herself after her conflict and defeat in the Crimea, seeking

to raise herself towards the same level of civilization as that on which we stand in the west of Europe, and to hold her part with us in the common progress of the civilized world. Then, turn to Italy; what have you there? You have a nation which has been greater than any other nation—you have a nation which has suffered more than any other nation—which, perhaps, has been more degraded than any other nation—but which is now rising to a unity and to a national life which promise to be second to the nationality and to the life of no other nation in the world. I need not ask you whether subjects of this description are not of the deepest interest to all reasoning and thinking men. What indeed can be more interesting to us in these days of extended sympathies and of wider views, than what I may call the biography of nations? But these questions are not only of interest to us—I am entitled to say that if, upon these occasions, we venture beyond the sphere of what we might strictly call educational questions, there are no questions of general interest more akin to the purposes of your Institution, more fitting as subjects for your consideration and your study. For what are all these questions of national movements, properly considered, but educational phenomena upon the grandest scale—what are they all but phases and steps in the life and progress of nations—what are they all but partial evolutions in time and in space of that great problem of all problems—the problem of the education of humanity, which in its complex unity contains the whole progress of individual and collective man. Now, if I take a view,—perhaps you may say so general, but I say so true of this class of questions,—I ask whether it does not justify me in saying that they are subjects for consideration and for study, not only upon these anniversary meetings, but in the night meetings of the members of your institutions. What subjects can be more elevating, or more interesting, or more instructive than those great national questions? I would not deal with them as I would deal with questions of party politics. I would have you address yourselves to such questions as students, and endeavour to seize upon their great outlines and to penetrate to their very core. If you do so, one of the very first conclusions you will come to, and a conclusion fitted to inspire you with

confidence and courage in all the labours and sacrifices of life, will be this—that the great law of humanity is the law of progress. I will take even the case of America—with respect to which, as your chairman has said, there are many in this country ready enough to say that it is the bursting of the bubble of Republicanism. If you will look at that question in the student-like truth-seeking aspect which it demands, I ask you whether you will not say there must be deeper causes there than any question as to the form of government at stake; and whether—the North be entering upon a war with the South blindly and foolishly or not—it is not evident that they are at least instinctively endeavouring to cut the Gordian knot of that past relationship between the South and the North, which rendered the progress of liberty and which made national dignity impossible in the United States. Now, let me turn again for a moment to Italy. How interesting to look back upon the Italian movement, and to trace its character from former times down to this very day. How interesting to ask ourselves what it is that Italy and the Italian movement have of late years done for us as a nation! Why, all those who are actively concerned in political life, and who deal at all with the foreign policy of this country must know that the Italian question has given us I might almost say a foreign policy. It has taught us a new code of the rights and duties of nations—it has done more than that, it has compelled us, somewhat slow as we are to take any ideas from abroad, to become conscious of the fact and to take cognizance of the fact, that what is called the question of nationalities is one of the greatest, if not the most important question which is likely to occupy public councils during the remainder of our lives. Then what is Italy doing and hoping to do for herself? Is it a question, however great that question may be, simply of liberty or internal reforms, which is being worked out; is it simply that the Italians prefer the Constitutional government of Cavour to the government of the Pope; or is it simply a question of independence—independence from all foreign influence, whether that influence be the influence of despotic and hostile Austria, or the influence of a perhaps too powerful French ally? If you look closely into

the Italian question, and if you study its history, you can only come to one conclusion, which is this—that the Italian question is not simply a question of liberty—is not only a question of independence, but that it is really a question of existence. “To be, or not to be; that is the question.” I could trace to you, did time afford, the history of Italy from former ages, and show you the march of the nation towards the conception and the realisation of its unity;—I could take you back to the days of ancient Rome, and then on to the time of the Papacy, when the Papacy had yet a mission to fulfil in Europe, and show you Italy mistress of the Pagan and the Christian world; I could bring you down then to the days of the municipal republics of the middle ages—that bright period brilliant in arts, in war, and in commerce; I could tell you that in those days and from those days downwards, Italian minds, from Dante and Machiavelli, to the present time, have dreamt of the unity of their country; I could bring you next to the days of the Great Napoleon and show you how, under his mighty despotism even Italy had a foretaste of nationality, and began to feel her strength upon the field;—I could tell you then of the treaties of Vienna—those treaties to which it is a disgrace to us that we were a party—I could tell you of their blasphemous dividing of God’s heritage and of His people amongst the scions of their different houses—I could tell you of the futile protests of the representatives of the North Italian kingdom— I could describe to you the revolution of 1821 in the North and the South, and of 1831 in the centre—the institution of “the Carbonari,” and that other institution much more potent, much more pure in its objects and efforts—“La Giovine Italia;”—I could tell you of the forlorn hopes which were led, and of the campaigns and movements of 1848 and 1849. I could show you that even twelve years ago Italy was ripe for unity, and that the people of every Italian state rose and proclaimed the independence and unity of their country—I could explain to you how the jealousy of the different states of which Italy is composed frustrated the accomplishment of that idea,—then I could show you the growth of that idea, and the fixity of purpose with which the Italian people have adhered to it down to

the campaign of 1859,—I could explain to you the compact of Plombières and the peace of Villafranca, and how the steadfastness of the Italian people snatched from a peace which disappointed their fondest hopes, the unity of their nationality—and having done this, you could come to no other conclusion than that the object of Italy, that which they think of by day and dream of by night is the existence of a free, a great, a united and an independent people. If you were to go into such a course of history you could not fail to feel as deeply as I feel that unity is the great object of the Italian people, and that from that unity would result advantage to Europe—the advantage of that balance of power of which your chairman has spoken, which ought to find its reality in the natural distribution of nationalities—and that in the resuscitation of a people, which has been great and which would yet be greater, there must be involved a future hopeful and useful to humanity at large. For if you look beyond the field of the immediate present—if your eyes could pierce the intermediate haze of mere party questions, the war of statesmen and the rival ambitions of contending dynasties, or if a master-hand in historic and philosophic art could trace it to you, believe me, that no fairer or more immortal form could be revealed unto your gaze than that of “*Italia risorta*,” crowned with the Capitol, girded by the Appenines, with the blue waters of the Mediterranean smiling at her feet, and holding in her hand the Book of Life, inscribed with a new and higher moral code of a nation’s duties and a nation’s rights !

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