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CONTEMPORARY WARS.

(1853—1866.)

STATISTICAL RESEARCHES RESPECTING THE LOSS OF
MEN AND MONEY INVOLVED IN THEM.

BY

PAUL LEROY BEAULIEU.

LAURÉAT DE L'INSTITUT.

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P R E F A C E .

THE LONDON PEACE SOCIETY has been engaged for more than fifty years in endeavouring to create a public opinion in this and other countries against War and warlike armaments, and in favour of settling international differences by Arbitration instead of an appeal to the sword. In the United States there has been a similar association in existence for about the same period. But in Europe the English Peace Society has, during the larger part of that time, been the only organised body working for that object. Of late, however, there has been a very earnest movement in the same direction on the Continent, which has given rise to several societies who are labouring in various ways for substantially the same ends. One of the most important of these is the International League of Peace, not to be confounded with another association, with a somewhat similar title, which originated in the Geneva Congress of 1867.

The League was founded mainly by the indefatigable exertions of M. Frederic Passy, and numbers among its supporters many distinguished persons, not only in France, but in Germany, Italy, Belgium, and other continental countries. Among other modes of operation

it is issuing from the press, under the general title of *Bibliothèque de la Paix*, a series of small volumes, admirably adapted for popular instruction. Eight or nine such volumes have been already published. One of the most valuable of these is *Les Guerres Contemporaines*, by M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, a translation of which is here presented to the English reader. It is, as will be seen, a work of great labour and research, and so careful has the author been not to exaggerate, that he has in several instances very much understated the cost in blood and money of the wars in which Europe has been engaged within the last sixteen years. These pages must surely be regarded as presenting a melancholy illustration of the civilisation and Christianity of the nineteenth century.

CONTEMPORARY WARS.

THE important legislative debates which for some weeks have kept the country in a state of suspicion and uneasiness, and imbued the public mind with the most painful apprehensions, have imparted to all the circumstances of contemporary wars a prominent reality and interest. Questions of military statistics, which were previously only interesting to a few persons, have suddenly acquired, in the estimation of all, an incontestable importance.

Hence we do not shrink from presenting to our readers a work bristling with figures and facts. We have determined to indicate, with the utmost possible exactness, the material losses, both of money and of men, involved in the great wars which have afflicted mankind from 1853 to 1866, and which constitute, to use the graphic expression of one of our Deputies, *the bill of cost* of each war.

The ground upon which we are about to enter has not been thoroughly explored hitherto. The material losses comprise the losses of men and money—the losses of men are enumerated in the official statistics, and the losses of money are set forth in the respective budgets.

A minute exactness is often difficult to attain. There is an abundance of official documents respecting the loss of men, but they are sometimes contradictory; the greater part of them are issued too soon after the war, and this precipitancy is a cause of much inaccuracy. As regards the two great wars in the Crimea and in the United States, and also as to the Schleswig War, so far at least as Prussia is concerned, we have been enabled to attain complete precision. For these wars have been described in large and comprehensive histories, in which the losses have been studied, enumerated, and classified, systematically and scientifically. The official re-

ports of the Crimean War presented to the British Parliament, the remarkable book of Dr. Chenu, the various memoirs composing "the Medical and Chirurgical History of the American Rebellion," the very recent publication by Dr. Læffleur on the "Schleswig Campaign," are works of scientific exactness. Unfortunately the documents respecting other wars neither possess similar value nor authority.

As regards finances, we have also met with some embarrassing difficulties. There is a means of calculating financial losses, which is in vogue with our statesmen, and which has met with general favour—it is to add together the various loans contracted on account of war, and to take the sum of these different loans for the amount of the expenses of the war. Nothing is more simple, but nothing is less exact. In fact, it often happens that sums of money borrowed in view of a war are only partially expended upon such war. Thus, the loan contracted in 1859 by France was not entirely absorbed by the Italian War, and the considerable portion which was not required by the war was diverted by a special law to works of public utility. Further, it often happens that the sum of the loans is very far from being equivalent to the sum of the expenses of a war. It is necessary to take cognisance of the revival of old imposts, or of the establishment of new taxes, of the use of extraordinary resources, and of important sums which may have been procured by the reduction of civil expenses, or by the transfer of accounts. Thus, the expenses of England for the Crimean War were four times greater than the loans which she contracted during that struggle.

The only rational means of arriving at moderate precision is to study carefully the war budgets during the contest, and to compare these with those of the preceding period of peace. In order to do this, we must know what the budgets are. But there are States which have none, or, rather, which had none. Thus, the expenses of Russia during the Crimean War will always be difficult to calculate, notwithstanding the able researches of MM. Leon Faucher and Wolowski. It also happens that, certain wars being very recent, we do not possess their complete budgets, or returns, of expenditure. In some countries these returns take a long time in their completion. We know that it was only in the

session of 1867 that the French Legislative body voted the law to sanction the financial returns of 1863.

And even when we have been enabled to determine with precision the total expenses of war to the belligerent countries, we are still far from the knowledge of all the expenses, even the public ones, which the war has involved. We must also study the budgets of neutral nations, for war in our day has this particular feature, that it strikes a blow at the finances even of neutral nations, and forces them into an attitude of anxiety, which involves large armaments. Again, in some countries, we must extend our researches still further. Any one who should only estimate as the expenses of the Northern States of America during the Secession War, the expense they incurred as members of the Union, without taking account of those incurred by the separate states and districts, as such, in their preliminary outlay upon the volunteers, and their equipment of every kind, must acknowledge that he has not arrived at the total, and that his estimate would be incomplete. And this is not all. There are some countries, both primitive and advanced, where the initiative efforts of individuals are on a large scale, and where the private contributions towards war are a very important accompaniment of the public expense. The gifts furnished to the Czar by the Russian aristocracy, and all that English and American patriotism so largely contributed as offerings, equipments, or supplies, should also be taken account of. As regards Russia, or England, these private contributions mount up to a hundred million francs ; and as regards America, to a thousand millions.

And at length, when we have made all these calculations, shall we then have accomplished our task ? By no means ! All the private losses, the ravage of the lands, the spoiling of crops ; in case of siege or maritime war, the ruin of cities and the destruction of shipping ; all these losses, impossible to be estimated, must be always kept in view, although they cannot be calculated. And even this is not the whole. For by the side of these losses, which we may term positive ones, and which consist in the material destruction of acquired wealth, we must take account of the losses which we may term negative, and which are involved in the stagnation of business, the dulness of commerce,

and the stoppage of industry. All these ruinous effects, which the curse of war accumulates, escape our statistics; but they are not the least part of that curse.

THE CRIMEAN WAR.

Loss of Life.

The Crimean War is the most murderous of those European wars of which the calamities have been scientifically calculated with some degree of precision.

In the estimate of the loss of men, we shall chiefly take for our guide the report of Dr. Chenu to the Army Board of Health. This valuable document possesses the double merit of being official and scientific; it emanates, in fact, from the Ministry of War, and it obtained from the Academy of Sciences the grand prize for Statistics.

The French army had to struggle against three great dangers—the cholera, the enemy's fire, and the scurvy. In the month of September, 1854, our army had not yet seen the enemy, but it had already lost 8,084 men, chiefly through cholera.—(Dr. Chenu, p. 622.) Throughout the campaign disease carried off four times as many victims as the Russian fire. Here is the exact state of the losses of the French army as given by Dr. Chenu:—

	Received into Ambulances or Hospitals.		Killed or Dead.
Various diseases and cholera, from April 1 to Sep. 20, 1854	18,073	...	8,084
Ambulances in the Crimea and Hospitals at a distance from Constantinople	221,225	...	29,095
Hospitals at Constantinople	162,029	...	27,281
Killed by the enemy, or missing...	—	...	10,240
Died without entering ambulances or hospitals	—	...	4,342
Loss of the <i>Sémillante</i> :—			
1. Troops on board	—	...	394
2. Marines	—	...	308
Coast infirmary and naval hos- pitals	34,817	...	846

	Received into Ambulances or Hospitals.	Killed or Dead.
Died in France in consequence of diseases and wounds contracted during the war, up to 31st Dec., 1857	—	15,025
Total	436,144	95,615

Thus, according to Dr. Chenu's calculation, which cannot be refuted, France lost 95,615 men in the Crimean War; the number of men whom she had sent to the East at different periods of the struggle form a total of 309,268; hence we see that the number of dead are, to those sent out, nearly in the proportion of 1 to 3. It is interesting to investigate the causes of this mortality. The preceding table indicates that only 16,240 men were killed by the enemy; the number of those who sunk in consequence of their wounds was not much greater; there remains, then, about 75,000 men who died of cholera, of scurvy, or of other diseases. We have seen that the cholera carried off, during the first four months of the expedition, on Turkish territory, 8,084 men; and, according to the estimate of M. Jacquot, the mortality attributable to scurvy comprehended one-third of the total loss. The 20,000 men who died on the field of battle, or in consequence of their wounds, had at least obtained a speedy death, accompanied by innumerable glorious associations. But these 75,000 victims of cholera, of typhus, and of hospital corruption, were obliged to undergo all the delays, all the sufferings and miseries of a death of unmitigated horror.

We are bound to make this distinction between the diseased and the wounded, for the amount of the calamities of war can only be really understood when we take a correct account of the sufferings of those unnoticed multitudes slowly and needlessly consumed by disease.

If 95,615 Frenchmen were carried off by death, are we to believe that this is the limit of our losses? Are we to believe that the 214,000 soldiers who escaped death in this disastrous expedition, returned to France in the same condition in which they left it? Are we to believe that those 30,000 wounded men, whose wounds were not mortal, those

10,000 cholera patients who were discharged from the Turkish hospitals, and all those unfortunate beings tainted and emaciated by scurvy, dysentery, and many other frightful diseases, brought back to France, to agriculture, to industry, or to national service, the strength of which they had been deprived? Are we to believe that amongst the 214,000 survivors, who have spent so many days in hospitals, there are not a great proportion—a quarter, at the lowest estimate. probably a third, and perhaps a half—whose health will always remain enfeebled, shattered, and prone to relapse? What an enormous and incalculable loss of strength!

Here follow the losses of the English army:—

	Received into Ambulances or Hospitals.	Killed or Dead.
Wounded	18,283	—
Died in hospitals in consequence of wounds	—	1,846
Killed on the field of battle	—	2,756
Fever patients and otherwise diseased	144,410	—
Died in hospital	—	16,298
Died at sea or elsewhere	—	1,282
Total	162,693	22,182

The effective force first despatched was 97,864 men; hence the mortality was about one-fourth. The immense superiority of the sanitary service and of the general management during the second part of the campaign, explains why the mortality was relatively less in the English than in the French army.

The aggregate losses of Piedmont, out of an effective force of 12,000 men, were, according to Dr. Chenu—

Killed by the enemy	12
Died in consequence of wounds	16
Died of various diseases in the Crimea	1,720
Died in the hospitals of the Bosphorus	446
Died subsequently in Piedmont	?
Total	2,194

Here, again, is a mortality of 18 per cent., although the

Piedmontese army, as is implied by the return of the killed, took no active part in the siege.

The losses of the Turks and Russians can only be conjecturally ascertained. Dr. Chenu estimates at 10,000 the number of Turks who perished by the fire of the enemy before Sebastopol, and during the bloody campaign of Wallachia and of the Danube: he places at 25,000 the number of Turks who died of disease.

As to the Russians, he believes that 30,000 must have been killed on the battle-fields of Turkey and the Crimea: he computes at 600,000 the number of Russian soldiers who died of disease and fatigue. This computation may, at first glance, appear exaggerated, but a little reflection shows that it is founded upon legitimate reasoning. In the first place it is necessary to take notice of the considerable levies called out in Russia during the war. Instead of taking for soldiers 7 serfs out of every thousand, as had been the practice, there were in 1854 two levies, each of 12 serfs per thousand. It was the same in 1865. Thus, in these two years there were raised 48 serfs per thousand instead of 14, which was the normal number; that is to say, there were withdrawn from tillage three and a half times as many men as in preceding years. In an empire so vast as Russia, conscriptions, which in two years take 5 per cent. of the number of serfs, furnish an enormous effective force, and indicate at the same time the magnitude of the losses.

It must be remembered that the greatest part of these recruits, in order to reach Sebastopol from the provinces, whether central, northern, eastern, or western, had to march three, four, or five hundred leagues across impoverished districts and where roads are few. Account must also be taken of the experience of Russia in preceding wars. One of the most distinguished major officers of our time, the Baron de Moltke, has written a remarkable monograph of the war with Turkey in 1828-29 (*Der Russische Turkische Feldzug in der Europäischen Türkei, 1828-29, dargestellt durch Freiherr von Moltke*”).

In six months, says Baron Moltke, from May, 1828, to February, 1829, the Russian army, of which the effective force did not exceed 100,000 men, numbered in ambulances and hospitals 210,108 cases of disease, which was an

average of two illnesses per man within six months, whilst in the French army in the Crimea, during two years, there were only 150 cases per 100 men. Major Moltke adds that during the first campaign alone the Russian army lost the half of its effective force. In May, 1829, 1,000 men per week entered the hospitals; in July 40,000 men, *nearly half of the effective force*, were in hospital; in five months from March to July, 1829, 28,746 died of disease! The mortality *increased* during the following months, and Major Moltke estimates at 60,000 the number of Russians who died of disease during this short campaign, out of an effective force amounting to 100,000 men! He adds that only 15,000 soldiers were able to recross the Pruth and that the Russian army was almost annihilated by disease.

In the absence of the precise statistics, which are not obtainable, relative to the Russian losses in the war of 1853-56, we have thought it appropriate to refer to the above statistics borrowed from a standard work by one of the most able and esteemed writers of the day. They will furnish a base for comparison and justify the calculation given by Dr. Chenu.

These enormous losses are usual in the Russian armies. Those of the Polish campaign in 1831, or of the Hungarian campaign in 1849, were relatively quite as great. It is said that the army of the Caucasus loses 20,000 men per year, and it is estimated that the Russian losses in the Caucasus since the beginning of the contest with the Circassian tribes, has been nearly 500,000 men!—(*Quarterly Review, March 1854.*) According to the admission of an enthusiastic partisan of Russia, Baron d'Haxthausen, half the recruits formerly died of exhaustion, disease, and debility, and this mortality is probably still nearly one third. All these statements, borrowed from one of the most valuable military monographs of our time, the book of Baron Moltke, and from a work pervaded by Russomania, that of Baron d'Haxthausen, are sufficient to warrant the estimate of Dr. Chenu, that 630,000 Russians were cut off by the Crimean War.

He then gives us the following general table of the losses sustained by the whole of the armies brought into the field during the war (Chenu, p. 617):—

	Year.	Killed.	Died of Wounds or Disease.	Total.
French Army ...	1854-56 ...	10,240	85,375	95,615
English Army...	„ ...	2,755	19,427	22,182
Piedmontese Army	1855-56 ...	12	2,182	2,194
Turkish Army...	1853-56 ...	10,000	25,000	35,000
Russian Army...	„ ...	30,000	600,000	630,000
Total Deaths		53,007	731,984	784,991

Hence the Eastern War must have devoured *nearly eight hundred thousand men!*

LOSS OF MONEY IN THE CRIMEAN WAR.

1. *The Allies.*—The loss of capital in the Crimean War was not less enormous than the loss of life.

England had at the head of her finances when the war broke out, a celebrated man whose reputation has increased subsequently—Mr. Gladstone. This financial economist wished to meet the expenses of the war by increased taxation; and taxes were actually imposed to an incredible extent; but it, nevertheless, became necessary to have recourse to a loan; just as in France where our financiers had pronounced in favour of a loan, it was not the less necessary, eventually, to have recourse to taxation, so greatly did the costs of the war exceed all anticipation.

The following is the abstract of the English budgets from 1853 to 1857 :—

	Civil Service.	Army.	Navy.
1853	£7,044,321 ...	£9,685,079 ...	£6,640,596
1854	7,638,650 ...	12,397,273 ...	12,182,769
1855	8,435,832 ...	29,377,349 ...	19,014,708
1856	8,392,622 ...	25,049,825 ...	16,013,995
1857	9,839,325 ...	15,107,249 ...	10,390,000

The budget of 1853 may be considered the normal budget of the time of peace; it is, however, greater than most preceding budgets. If we add to it the four war budgets from 1854, the year in which the war began, to 1857, the year in which the last expenses were incurred, we find a total of £81,931,696! Four budgets of army expenses equal to that of 1853 would only amount to £38,740,316. Hence, in this department alone, the Eastern War cost

England £43,191,380. The same operation with the naval department proves that the addition here is £31,039,088.

The extra charge for the two united services gives a sum total of £74,230,468, or 1,855,761,700 francs: the total expense which the Eastern Expedition imposed upon England!

To furnish these extraordinary costs, and to procure this £74,230,468, England made unprecedented efforts. Her taxation was increased in an incredible proportion. The following are examples of this great increase. The tax on brandy which had been 7s. 10d. in England, 3s. 8d. in Scotland, and only 2s. 8d. in Ireland, was increased by successive stages to 8s. in the three kingdoms; it was then more than double in Scotland and more than triple in Ireland. The tax on malt had been from 2s. and 2s. 7d., according to quality; from May 8, 1854, to July 5, 1856, during the requirements of the war, it was raised to 3s. 1d., and eventually to 4s. This was an increase of 60 per cent.

The increase bore with special force upon the Income Tax. The history of this tax is a curious one. It was created by Pitt to meet the demands of the war against Napoleon. It was abolished in 1816, re-established in 1842 for three years, prolonged for a similar period from 1845 to 1848, imposed for one year only in 1851 and in 1852, and authorised for seven years in 1853. The Act of 1853, which legalised its prolongation, extended it to Ireland, which had always been exempt from it. By the same Act, the exemption from the tax enjoyed by incomes below £150 was limited to incomes below £100. But incomes of from £100 to £150 were only to pay 5d. instead of 7d. in the pound. The Eastern War brought about, after April 5th, 1854, the doubling of these taxes. The next year a halfpenny more in the pound was added to incomes of from £100 to £150, and 2d. for all others, so that the tax stood at 1s. 4d. and 11½d. These augmentations ceased in 1857, when there was a return to the former taxation of 5d. and 7d.

Although these augmentations of taxation had raised the revenue from 50 millions sterling, the average for each of the ten years, from 1843 to 1853, to the enormous sum of 63 millions in 1855, 68 millions in 1856, and 66 millions in 1857; although the year 1853 had left a considerable

surplus, it became necessary to have recourse to a loan, and to augment that debt which there had been so many efforts to reduce.

Crushing taxes, an augmented national debt, and excessive floating liabilities—such was the harvest reaped by England from the Crimean War, which demanded for the British army and navy an increased expenditure of more than 1,855 million francs! (£74,000,000).

France had to make sacrifices almost as great as her ally. This may be judged of by the following table of her total expenses, both ordinary and extraordinary, from 1850 to 1856:—

1850	1,472,637,238	francs
1851	1,461,329,644	”
1852	1,513,103,997	”
1853	1,547,597,009	”
1854	1,988,078,160	”
1855	2,399,217,840	”
1856	2,195,751,787	”

We see that the advance is frightful. Let us examine it in detail. We may presume, as a fair supposition, that the provisional budgets of the army and navy for 1854 represent the normal expenses of these two departments in time of peace. All that exceeds the extent of these budgets, whether in the year 1854 or the following years, we may attribute to the Eastern War.

According to the provisional budget of 1854, the expenses of the army were to be 308,386,046 francs, and those of the navy 116,476,001 francs. According to the budget of 1854, sanctioned by the law of the 3rd of June, 1857, the expenses of the army were raised to 567,245,687 francs, and those of the navy to 175,088,126 francs, in addition to 2,797,301 francs for extraordinary expenses. For the year 1855, according to the special budget, sanctioned by the law of the 6th of May, 1858, the expenses of the army were raised to 865,607,477 francs, and those of the navy to 212,677,474 francs, in addition to 68,821,804 francs for extraordinary expenses. In that year, 1855, the united expense of the two departments of army and navy amounted to the enormous figure of 1,147 million francs!

In 1856, according to the special budget, sanctioned July

6th, 1860, the expenses of the army were 693,153,176 francs, and those of the navy 220,163,567 francs, besides 5,555,146 francs for extraordinary expenses — in all, 918,870,889 francs. In 1857, the year in which the last payments for the war were made, the expenses of the army department still reached 410,919,408 francs, and those of the navy 138,962,467 francs, besides 4,862,431 francs for extraordinary expenses, or 100 millions more than these budgets had required during the peace which preceded the Crimean War.

From these statistics, and reckoning as normal taxation the military and naval expenses of the provisional budget of 1854, sanctioned June 10th, 1853, we find that the Eastern War forced upon France more than 1,660 millions of extraordinary outlay. We do not, however, conceal that this sum is greater than that which is avowed in the ministerial account of the Eastern War; but we feel that we ought to adhere to the figures just given, inasmuch as they result from an attentive examination of facts, and we submit them in full confidence to all critics. The method which we have pursued in obtaining them is as simple as it is natural. The result must be beyond the reach of objection.

Nearly the whole of these expenses were covered by loans, but it was nevertheless necessary to have recourse to taxation. The duty upon spirits was raised from 34 francs the hectolitre to 50 francs: from this source alone a gain of 30 millions was anticipated. The tax upon railway fares was similarly increased, and was expected to produce 6 millions. The freight of goods forwarded at express speed was tithed: this would bring in 1,800,000 francs. Subsequently the second general tax of one-tenth was imposed, and which, as is well known, continued long after the war. This last tax was calculated to increase the revenue by 52 million francs.

Thus taxes were created by the war, which lasted longer than the war. The Treasury was burdened with a permanent charge for the interest of loans. After the special budget of 1853, authorised by the law of June 25th, 1856, the interest of the debt only absorbed 374,484,506 francs 74 centimes; in the special budget of 1856 the interest required

71,709,380 francs additional. The floating debt, which in 1853 was 614,980,562 francs, became 895,281,625 francs in 1857. The deficiencies and reimbursements, which were 98 millions in 1853, amounted to 110 millions in 1854, 121 millions in 1855, 128 millions in 1856; the expenses of administration and of the collection of revenue, which were only 151 millions in 1853, amounted to 164 millions in 1854, and to 179 millions in 1855. Whilst expenses were thus augmenting, receipts remained stationary; thus the product of indirect taxes was just the same in 1854 as in 1853. The worst financial evil of the war, in addition to an increase of 1,660 millions in immediate expenses, was the *permanently* high amount of the army and navy budgets during the subsequent period of peace. These two departments have since involved *much greater expenses than previously*. *It is thus in all wars*: they first produce a sharp attack of disease, more or less dangerous, though temporary; but they always leave behind them a chronic disarrangement, which occasions permanent disorders and an habitual condition of anxiety.

Piedmont affords a proof of this. In the special budget of 1856, which M. Lanza presented to the legislature in January, 1859, the extraordinary expenses of the kingdom of Sardinia, on account of the Eastern War, were reported as follows:—

	Army.	Navy.	Total.
Actual payments in 1855...	19,790,741	2,416,467	22,207,208
Actual payments in 1856...	22,654,659	4,897,180	27,551,839
Expenses reported.....	2,500,928	645,415	3,146,343
Demands recognised, but not liquidated up to the end of 1856.....	2,196	2,196
Total.....(francs)	44,948,524	7,959,062	52,907,586

Thus this little sub-Alpine nation had spent nearly 53 millions for the Eastern War in addition to the ordinary expenses of its army and navy. Further, in 1855 and 1856 it contracted two war-loans, one of £2,000,000, and the other of 30 million francs. It was already marching with rapid strides along that perilous path of loans which was destined to involve it in the perplexities in which enlarged, but young, Italy now finds itself.

Turkey.—It is to be wished that we could ascertain the share contributed by Turkey to the expenditure of the allies; but here certainty and precision fail us. M. Engène Poujade made a calculation, in 1857, of the amount of the Turkish debt, including the loans contracted during the Eastern War, the paper money, bearing interest or otherwise, the old and new bonds, the old and new arsenal debts, and the various other debts, returned or not returned, after the war. The total of these amounts he estimated to be at least 705 million francs.—(*Annual Report of the Public Credit, 1st year, 265-66.*) It is difficult to ascertain exactly how much of this sum should be attributed to the Crimean War; but if we reflect upon the expenses which must have been involved in the autumn and winter campaign in Wallachia and in the Asiatic campaign, the maintenance of troops at Sebastopol, an estimate of 400 millions as the Turkish share in the expenses of the war will be evidently considerably below the general amount.

Then we have as a general total—

1,855 million francs	for England ;
1,660 million	„ for France ;
400 million	„ for Turkey ;
53 million	„ for Piedmont.

In other words, the Eastern Expedition cost the allies 3,968 million francs (or £158,720,000) !

2. *Russia.*—Let us now endeavour to determine, with the utmost attainable precision, the costs of Russia in consequence of this war. “It is difficult to fix the exact amount of the Russian public debt,” wrote M. Maurice Block; “the Russian official return respecting it appears to be compiled with so little attention to clearness that those who seek to receive information from it find its statistics mutually inconsistent.”—(*Puissance Comparée des divers Etats de l'Europe.*) Recent works have thrown more light on this obscure subject, which can be really investigated, provided sufficient discrimination is exercised. The statements published three years ago by M. Wolowski in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, further corrected by the definite information furnished by M. Horn in the “Year-book of Finances,” and the anticipatory calculations of M. Leon Faucher at the

beginning of the war, have combined greatly to simplify the difficulties of this question.

The amount of the Russian consolidated debt, previous to the commencement of the difficulties with the Porte, was 336,219,412 silver roubles, or 1,513 million francs. In 1857 this debt had reached 522 millions of silver roubles, or 185,785,588 roubles more than it was before the war, that is to say, 743,142,352 francs. The amount of bills of credit and paper money before the war did not much exceed 300 million roubles; at the end of 1854 it was 356 millions; in 1855 it was 509 millions; in 1856, 689 millions; in 1857, the year of settlement, it attained 735 million roubles, or 2,940 million francs. But this was not all the cost of the war. The Russian Government recalled 100 millions which it had lent to other nations in 1847, and of which 50 millions were in the French funds. It diverted from their destination a large portion of the funds intended to guarantee the repayment of bills of credit. These funds amounted, in March, 1854, to nearly 160 million silver roubles; in the month of September they were only 146,500,000 roubles. They continually decreased during the war until they fell to about 100 million roubles.

We must also take into account the *voluntary* contributions to the Russian Government. The clergy, at the beginning of 1854, offered 80 million francs; other voluntary contributions were shown by M. Leon Faucher to be about 100 million francs. If we suppose, which is probable, that during the remaining period of the war these voluntary gifts were doubled, that is to say, making, with a sum of 180 millions contributed by the clergy, an amount, according to M. Leon Faucher, of 360 millions, we shall arrive at a total of 3,183 million francs (£127,000,000). We must further take cognisance of the increase of the principal taxes (for instance, by a ukase of December 1, 1854, the duty on salt was raised from 28 kopecs to 44, and all the other indirect taxes shared the same fate). Neither must we lose sight of contributions in kind, which, in a country like Russia, must be very considerable. It must be remembered that requisitions for provender, &c., were made on a grand scale in that immense empire, then traversed everywhere by thousands of men who were marching to the

Crimea, even from the most distant provinces. The requisitions made by the Russians in Wallachia alone are estimated by M. Ubicini at 50 million francs. If all these things are taken into account it will be evident that Russia did not spend less than 4,000 million francs on the Crimean War (£160,000,000)!

FURTHER LOSSES INVOLVED BY THE CRIMEAN WAR.

1. *Austria*.—We have not yet done with the extraordinary expenses which the Crimean War imposed upon the European powers. Even neutrality is sometimes costly. Austria affords an instance of this. The following are the military expenses of Austria for the three years 1855, '56, and '57 :—

	1855.	1856.	1857.
Ordinary expenses	...114,320,715 flor.	109,695,558	106,890,019
Extraord. expenses	...101,720,117 „	14,138,279	11,130,634

The ordinary expenses of the ministry of war for 1857 still continued higher than those expenses were previously to the Turko-Russian conflict. We may, however, take this sum of 107 million florins as the normal rate of military expenses in time of peace; we then perceive that the additional expense which the Crimean War imposed upon Austria amounted to 137,129,000 florins, or about 343 million francs (£13,720,000). It is known that, during the Eastern War, Austria contracted three great national loans (so called) which were professedly needed to liberate the state from its old obligations to the bank, but the greater part of which was otherwise appropriated, and, notably, towards the extraordinary expenses called for by the uncertain neutrality which the nation foresaw would have to be maintained during the struggle.

2. *Prussia, Sweden, &c.*—The same war, and the possible complications which it might involve, determined the Prussian Government to demand of the chambers, in 1854, an extraordinary loan of 30 million thalers (112,500,000 francs) for the ministry of war. At the same time various taxes were increased. It is, however, to be specially noticed that the Prussian Government had the wisdom only to expend a portion of the loan on armaments.

Sweden and Denmark also voted special loans, and the Germanic Confederation made similar preparations.

If we add these expenses to the 343 millions expended by Austria, it must be admitted that, without exaggeration, the total expenditure of the *neutral* powers amounted to 500 million francs (£20,000,000), which, with the 4,000 million francs expended by the four allies, and the similar 4,000 million francs which the war must have entailed upon Russia, gives a total of 8,500 million francs, or £340,000,000!

ADDITIONAL LOSSES OF RUSSIA.

But is even this the whole loss? Certainly not. That which a war costs to the public finances of a country, or that which figures in the budget, only represents a small *portion* of the losses imposed upon the national property, such as *the suspension of industry, the ruin of commerce, the unsettlement of all financial prospects, the bankruptcies, the enforced idleness*—these are exceedingly serious evils. Any one who supposes that the Eastern War only cost Russia 4,000 million francs, can have no idea of the *immense* loss of capital which this war occasioned. Never, since the great Continental Blockade, has a nation been placed under the pressure of a struggle so formidable to all its financial and commercial interests. Its ports being blockaded, permitted neither exportation nor importation; its ships were rotting, at anchor, behind the fortifications. After the month of March, 1854, not a single Russian flag was to be seen in the ports of France or of Great Britain, and those which had been delayed by winter were sold to escape the risk of seizure.—(*Blackwood's Magazine*, April 1, 1854.) The trading vessels which allowed themselves to be overtaken in the Baltic, in the Black Sea, and even in the Sea of Azov (where they appeared to be protected by the fleet) had been destroyed. At how much are we to estimate the value of these ships and their cargoes? And how can we ascertain the value of the injuries and of the loss of interest of capital involved by the rotting of so many vessels in harbour? Even neutral ships did not enjoy full liberty of arrival and departure, if loaded with Russian cargoes, as

which burdened the Turkish people? And, lastly, was it not the case that both France and England were specially inconvenienced by being prevented from having recourse to Russia for provisions to supply the deficiency of their harvests?

Except in Russia, the harvests were at that period smaller than usual throughout Europe. If peace had continued, Russia could have easily supplied her neighbours with 40 million bushels during the two years (stated by M. de Molinari, in the *Journal des Economistes*). But her crops were shut up at Odessa by the allied fleets, which, in order to injure the Russians, starved their own countries. The Tory reviews announced that, for a few shillings more per bushel, a ready supply of wheat could be obtained from the far-west of America.—(*Blackwood's Magazine*, April 1, 1854.) But "a few shillings more per bushel" are sufficient to substitute scarcity for abundance.

Once more, is it not certain that France and England injured themselves permanently by ruining Russia? The amount of business that can be carried on with a nation, just as with an individual, is in proportion to its resources. Everything which impoverishes a nation also injures those who do business with that nation. It is foolish to ruin him who buys from us, or who sells to us, for by so doing we deprive him of the means of purchase or production. In fact it was quite as much to the detriment of English and French industry, as to that of Russian commerce, that our cruisers blockaded the Baltic ports. And the fleet which closed the harbours of the Black Sea were no less mischievous to the hungry populations of England and France than to the Russian corn-growers.

SUMMARY.

We have now endeavoured to ascertain the accumulated losses which were caused by that Crimean War, which was so thoughtlessly entered upon. *Eight thousand five hundred million francs (340 million pounds sterling)* is the *acknowledged* burden imposed by this war upon the public finances of Europe. But it is absolutely impossible to calculate the sum of those *indirect* losses which we have alluded to, or of a multitude of other losses which have not

come under our notice ; it would be presumptuous even to attempt an approximate estimate of these.

THE WAR IN ITALY (1859).

Respecting the losses of the Italian War, we do not possess any such comprehensive works as those which have afforded such valuable aid in our reviews of the Crimean Expedition. Dr. Chenu is now preparing a work on this subject, and, pending its publication, we are limited to a critical study of various official papers which, in too many cases, bear indications of haste and confusion. We shall take for our chief guide the paper read by Baron Larrey to the Academy of Medicine, with numerous corrections from subsequent statistics, furnished either by distinguished statisticians and surgeons, or derived from recent ministerial documents.

The general estimate which has been arrived at as to the total losses in the Italian War, including the number of persons killed, wounded, and missing in the three armies, is as follows, viz. 38,650 Austrians, 17,775 Frenchmen, 6,575 Sardinians ; total, 63,000. These results have been obtained by the researches of one of our most distinguished military statisticians, M. Boudin, editor of the "Journals of Medicine and Military Surgery." This general amount of the losses is, however, only estimated at 61,978, according to the official dispatches collected under the direction of Col. Saget, the head of the historical and statistical department of the Ministry of War. The discrepancy between these two estimates is only 1,022 ; and it should be remarked that in Colonel Saget's papers no account has been taken of a considerable number of missing and wounded men whose recovery has not been notified to the hospitals.

The greatest confusion is indicated in some of these official returns. At Magenta, for example, certain official dispatches return the number of killed and wounded at only 3,223 ; subsequent dispatches raise the number to 4,535, including, it is true, the missing, most of whom were eventually found amongst the dead. It is the same as regards

Solferino, where the first calculation of the killed and wounded in the French army was 8,530, an amount which was increased in later documents to 11,670 private soldiers, and 720 officers in addition. In such cases the larger and more recent returns are the more correct.

"The statistics of the dead," says Dr. Larrey, "appear to be more difficult to ascertain than those of the wounded. Whilst giving, in the first place, from the official returns, a total of 8,084 men as killed on the field of battle alone, in the armies of France, Sardinia, and Austria, those statistics include, so far as the French army is concerned, the number of persons who, throughout the campaign, died of wounds or of disease. But how large a number died subsequently, and how many, who were reported as missing, may have been drowned in rivers or have perished in some other way!"—*Larrey*, page 61.

During the campaign itself, disease exercised but little influence on our army; but during the subsequent occupation of Italy and the return to France it made many victims. *The mortality then caused "appears to have exceeded, in the French army, the number of men killed on the field of battle."*—(*Larrey*, page 62.) "We are dropping our men at all the hospitals along the route!" exclaimed a regimental doctor, on the return of the army.

A publication, emanating from the General Statistical Board of France, gives us the following information respecting the deaths in the French army in 1859:—

	In France.	In Algeria.	In Italy.	In Rome.	Total.
Died on the field of battle					
or in ambulances... ..	32	54	5,872	0	5,868
Died in hospitals	5,835	2,361	4,360	84	12,640
Suicides	112	24	31	0	167
Totals	5,979	2,439	10,263	84	18,675

The 10,263 soldiers who died in Italy were, certainly, not the only victims of that war; to these must be added the number of those who, after the campaign, entered the French hospitals to sink under the wounds and diseases received during the expedition; and these must have been very numerous, if we receive the statements of Dr. Larrey. And, if we follow the plan adopted by all military statisticians, by Dr. Chenu, Dr. Læffleur, and by the authors of the English reports on the Eastern War, we ought also to

add the number of those who, in the year following the close of the campaign, perished from its consequences. We cannot, then, hesitate to admit that the Italian War cost the lives of at least 15,000 Frenchmen.

Then, as to the other combatants, we must bear in mind that, for several reasons, such as the greater precision of our weapons, the larger calibre of our projectiles, and the disorder inseparable from defeat, the mortality from wounds must have been incalculably greater in the Austrian army than in the French. The deaths from disease must also have been far more numerous in the enemy's camp than in ours, from the more excessive fatigue of the troops and the deficiency of provisions. After the battle of Solferino the overcrowded hospitals of Verona were swept by typhus and contagious corruption.—(*Larrey*, page 57.) Turning our attention to the Italian army we find, from the observations of Dr. Cazalas, that, from several causes, there was comparatively a much greater mortality from wounds amongst their troops than in the French army.

Considering all these circumstances, we may legitimately conclude that, inasmuch as the number of our troops killed by the fire of the enemy and by disease was 15,000, the total loss of life in the three armies from those causes, and from deaths through fatigue and privation, must have amounted to 45 or 50 thousand!

LOSS OF MONEY BY THE ITALIAN WAR.

From losses of life we turn to losses of money. We shall not here meet with those formidable lines of figures which encountered us in our investigation of the Crimean War. But we shall enter into certain details relative to the disastrous expedients, to which an empire in extremity was obliged to have recourse, in order to meet the ruinous expenses in which it had been involved by its unwarrantable pride. We shall analyse closely those burdensome contrivances which the evil genius of Austrian finance suggested to her. We shall see the abyss of paper-money and of national deficit open before us and become deeper and deeper, and shall perceive that the war in Lombardy was, both as regards Austria and Italy, if not the first and only cause, at any rate the principal source, of the economic

and financial confusion which continues to arrest the commercial and industrial progress of two great nations, and which still deprives them of the spirit of enterprise, and condemns them to inaction and wretchedness. We shall also witness the counter-stroke of war upon the neutral Powers; we shall watch loans and extraordinary credits drawing successively within their deadly coil all the German States, and the contagion of armaments and foolish military expenditure spreading itself even amongst those whose situation should render them safe from any fear of war.

FRANCE.—So far as France is concerned, the debts authorised at first, by the Budget Law, for the Ministry of War, in 1859, amounted to 337,447,500 francs. Successive imperial decrees added the following supplementary debts:—

	Francs.
Decree of July 2, 1859	850,000
„ July 14, „	131,360,000
„ Aug. 17, „	24,470,000
„ „ „	23,500,000
„ Dec. 11, „	26 380,000
„ Feb. 18, 1860	9,380,000
Total	215,940,000
From this there must be deducted the debts annulled by the decrees of Feb. 18 and 28, 1860	30,122,000
Balance of debts sanctioned by decrees	185,818,000
Two former debts, authorised by special laws March 31 and June 4, 1859, amounted to	90,158,691
	276,018,691
This gives, with the Budget, a total of	613,466,191
To this must be added for closed accounts	7,350,475
	620,816,666
Making the Army Budget of 1859 amount to	620,816,666

This amount was never before surpassed, except in two instances, those of 1855 and 1856; when in the first case the expenses of the army budget rose to 865 millions, and in the second to 693 millions. The total expenses in the navy budget of 1859 were 213,800,000 francs, and those for Algeria and the Colonies 39,600,000. This is 92 millions more than in the preceding years of peace. The

Ministry of War, on its part, had required 283 millions more than the normal amount in time of peace.

We are thus enabled to estimate the expenses of France for the Italian War at 375½ millions (£15,020,000). It is evident that the loan of 500 millions was far from being absorbed. The special budget of public works, voted June 26, 1860, authorised the application, to great works of general utility, "of the funds of the loan then remaining unabsorbed."

AUSTRIA.—This Italian War imposed still greater sacrifices upon Austria. On the very day of the crossing of the Ticino (April 29) the *Vienna Gazette* announced to the Austrian people that a decree, dated April 11, had authorised the Bank of Vienna to refuse specie payments for its notes and to enforce its paper currency. The Bank repaid this favour by a loan of 134 million florins (£13,400,000) on the security of a public debt of 200 million florins to be contracted on the first suitable occasion. But this was merely an initiative measure, as a commencement of the business.

The impossibility of having immediate recourse to a public loan necessitated the levying of heavy duties. The accumulation of taxation was pushed to its utmost limits and extended to every source of revenue. The decrees in the month of May embraced every province. Hungary which had hitherto been exempted from taxes on wine and butcher's meat, was now assessed for these articles. Throughout the empire the taxes on articles of consumption were increased 20 per cent. In the economy of nations as in that of individuals, in proportion as the development of general wealth is diminished, the greater is the extent to which the expenses of consumption, strictly so termed (the consumption of food), encroach upon the total income of individuals or communities. These excessive taxes upon butcher's meat, corn, wine, and beer, weigh much more heavily on the people of Austria than they would on the populations of France or England. The duty upon salt, largely increased since 1850, was again raised by the decree of May 7. The poorer classes of Austria were already paying an annual average of 33 million florins upon salt; they were henceforth required to pay 38 million florins (£3,400,000).

The decrees of May 7, which so rigorously taxed articles of consumption, also extended to business matters, and increased the charges on all fees, stamps, entries, and registration. The increase varied from 15 to 40 per cent., and this at a time when the stagnation of business and the depreciations and changes of currency already rendered transactions so difficult and hazardous.

A decree of May 13 equally increased the direct taxation, not only for the whole continuance of the war, but also during "the extraordinary state of affairs brought about by the events of the war." The tax on cultivated land, already ranging from 12 to 16 per cent., was augmented one-sixth, as was also the duty on rentals. The tax on country residences, or class-tax, was raised one-half. The industrial taxation, laying burdens upon manufacturers, traders, and artisans, and also the income-tax, were increased one-fifth. What suffering and misery were thus laid upon the people for the presumed honour of the House of Hapsburg!

But nothing equalled the grievance of paper-money and the sufferings springing from this source. It has been appropriately remarked that the depreciation of paper-money appears to be subject to a law analogous to that which regulates the rapid descent of a mass of rock falling from a mountain. It proceeds according to a geometrical progression. The paper of the United States, during the Secession War, was maintained for a long time at a loss of a fifth or a fourth. Then it rapidly descended to a depreciation of one-half, and still more rapidly to a depreciation of two-thirds. If the South had been less exhausted and could have continued the war one year longer, the loss upon "greenbacks" would probably have been five-sixths. —(Michael Chevalier in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, of June 1, 1866.) Austria, in 1859, was in a similar position. She was compelled to procure effective resources; in other words—gold and silver. On the 25th of May, 1859, she forced on the Lombard and Venetian people a specie loan of 75 millions. The city of Venice could only pay the first instalment by increasing taxation on income and industrial occupations 85 per cent. and by adding several additional kreutzers (halfpence) to the already extreme

burden of the tax on rentals. *Every imaginable expedient was had recourse to, to gain possession of all the gold and silver in the empire.* The State, which only paid in paper, demanded by a decree of the 29th of April that the custom-house charges should only be paid in specie. This was the ruin of the foreign trade. The merchant, who was already paying an exchange rate of from 30 to 50 per cent. upon the price of goods bought abroad, now had to pay a similar rate upon the specie required for fees at the custom-house. The last of these ruinous decrees was to involve *bankruptcy*. The State was irresistibly borne on to it. On the 11th of June, a decree suspended the payment of metallic currency throughout the period during which the extraordinary circumstances, involved by the war, should continue. It was indeed time that the Peace of Villafranca should be conceded.

On the return of peace the Bank was, more than ever, unable to resume payments in specie. *With a specie total of 79 million florins, it had circulated notes for 453 millions!* The augmentations of taxation, terrible as they were, were maintained indefinitely by the decree of December 1859. The army budget had become immoderately swelled. It was 106 million florins in 1858. In 1859 it rose to 292 millions, this was an increase of 186 million florins (£19,200,000). But this was only to meet the expenses of 1859. The army budget of 1860 shows 138 millions of ordinary, and 36 millions of extraordinary, expenses—in all more than 174 millions; consequently it exceeds by 68 million florins the army budget of 1858. The budget of 1861, on the contrary, manifestly approaches the budget of 1858, which may be considered the normal budget of the army department in time of peace. The special expenses of Austria for the Italian War are therefore 186 million florins spent in 1859, and in addition 68 millions which were not paid till 1860—a total of 254 million florins (or about £26,000,000).

But these figures afford no correct idea of the burdens of the population. The interruptions of trade and industry, the taxable resources devoured by the treasury, the variations of currency, the disadvantages of exchange—all these disasters were to become *chronic maladies* for Austria. Such was the cost of a false plea of honour! To estimate the

been raised to nearly 1,000 millions, and notwithstanding, also, all the increased taxation, there resulted, as in Austria, a considerable deficit. According to the report presented by M. Galeotti, on behalf of the commission which had been appointed to consider a demand for the authorisation of a new loan of 150 millions in 1860, the financial account of 1859 had left a total deficit of 104,399,956 francs. The war of 1859 had cost Piedmont 255 million francs, in addition to the increase of 10 per cent. upon all taxation, and irrespective of the incalculable evils of paper-money.

France spent 375½ millions (£15,000,000); Piedmont, 255 millions (£10,200,000); and Austria, 650 millions (£26,000,000); making a total of 1,280½ millions (£51,200,000). But this is by no means the sum of the expenses occasioned by that war. We must also take into account the outlay of Germany upon special armaments.

GERMANY.—It is well known that the war of 1859 aroused a great excitement in Germany, that suddenly old animosities were revived, and that a convulsion of anger agitated all the Germanic populations throughout the territory of the Confederation. Hence originated extensive warlike preparations which necessitated supplementary credits and loans.

In *Prussia*, the law of May 21st, 1859, which provided for the possibly necessary contingency of calling out the army during the course of the year, authorised the Minister of Finance to increase, to the extent of 25 per cent., the income tax, the land tax, and the corn and timber taxes. The Cabinet Council of June 14th, which ordered the calling-out of six battalions, was immediately followed by the above increase of taxation, which continued long after the end of the war. A second law, also passed on the 21st of May, authorised the government to incur every expense which might be rendered necessary by the "Kriegsbereitschaft" (readiness for war). According to this permission, the government might borrow money to the extent of 40 million thalers (£6,000,000). A royal order, of May 26th, immediately prescribed the negotiation of a loan of 30 million thalers (£4,500,000).

The expenses of the smaller German States were, in proportion, much greater than those of Prussia. In the *Grand Duchy of Baden*, the special military expenses, in conse-

quence of the "Marschbereitschaft," amounted to 4,257,000 florins (£364,400). This was provided for by the appropriation of money raised for the construction of railways, the completion of which was accordingly postponed. On the 7th of June, the Chambers of *Hesse Darmstadt* unanimously voted a loan of 4 million florins (£333,333). *Electoral Hesse* had voted a loan of 700,000 thalers (£105,000), which was exhausted by the end of June, 1859, and the government then demanded a fresh loan of 1,300,000 thalers (£171,000). *Wurtemberg* raised by loan 7 million florins (£583,333). In *Hanover*, the special military expenses amounted to 11½ million francs. In *Saxony*, subsidies were voted of 5,636,725 thalers (£845,508). In *Bavaria*, the loans for special armaments reached to 80 million francs. Hence, for these seven secondary States, we have an expense of 152 million francs. If to this we add the expenses of Prussia and those of the other smaller States, respecting which latter we have not been able to procure positive information, the costs of the three belligerent Powers are found to be 1,280 million francs, and the total expenses of both belligerents and neutrals 1,500 million francs (£60,000,000).

We have then, to sum up, a cost of 60 million pounds sterling imposed on the finances of Central Europe; heavy taxes, temporarily levied at first, *but ultimately rendered permanent* by the course of events; the augmentation of war-budgets which never completely returned to their previous level; the commercial and industrial disorganisation of Italy and Austria—these constitute the penalty paid by Europe for that very short war, which, by the exercise of a little good feeling on the part of the government at Vienna, might have been so easily avoided.

THE AMERICAN WAR.

Of all the instances of the squandering of human life caused by war, this is the most frightful. In four years the North called to arms 2,656,000 men. To stem this tide of manhood rolled against her, the South opposed a dyke, long

insuperable, of 1,100,000 human breasts. And before the South could be conquered these 1,100,000 soldiers, many of whom were youths of sixteen or old men of sixty, were to be violently swept aside, and more than half of them were to sink under the force of the struggle.

This gigantic strife involved a carnage previously unheard of, and which should obtain the attention of philanthropists and be recorded by a faithful historian. We have before us a remarkable work, the Report, prepared for general circulation, by Major-General Joseph K. Barnes, surgeon-general of the United States army. (*Report on the Extent and Nature of the Materials available for the Preparation of a Medical and Surgical History of the Rebellion.*) This medical and surgical history is not yet completed, but the published materials furnish most valuable information.

The monthly reports issued from rather more than one half of the regiments in the field, during the first year, give 17,496 cases of wounds by fire-arms. The monthly reports issued from three-fourths of the regiments, during the year ending June 30th, 1863, present 55,974 cases of wounds. The lists of wounded persons carried off the battle-fields in 1864 and 1865 include more than 114,000 names. But we are informed that these returns still await completion by additions from the reports of general hospitals, where many wounded persons were received whose names had neither been registered by the hospital clerks on the battle-fields nor by the regimental surgeons. There should also be added the names of those who were killed during the conflicts. There would thus be given a total of 221,000 wounded, without reckoning those killed on the field. This enormous amount of wounded far surpasses the total of similar cases in all the armies engaged in the Crimean War.

To understand clearly the gigantic and unprecedented features of this American War, it is necessary to enter into special details, and to compare the respective number of cases of particular injuries or important operations in the Union army with those in the French and English armies in the Crimea. If we take, for instance, fractures of the femur by fire-arms, we find that in the French army in the Crimea there were 459 injuries of this description and 194 in the English army, whilst more than 5,000 similar cases were registered in the United States army. If we take some

important operation, as the point of comparison, for example the amputation of the upper portion of the humerus, the Crimean reports mention 16 of these amputations in the English and 42 in the French army, whilst in the American army we find reported 575 operations of this nature. (*Recueil de Médecin et de Chirurgie Militaire*, vol. xvii. pp. 390, 391.) Such details are characteristic, and indicate the extent and horror of the massacre.

If we pass on from wounds to diseases, we find a result more satisfactory to humanity. Two distinguishing features of the American War are the considerable comparative increase in the number of victims under the enemy's fire, and a similarly great diminution in the number of persons visited by diseases. This demonstrates that the means of destruction have made gigantic progress, but also that superior measures for the restoration and maintenance of health are being extensively adopted. During the first year of the war, with an effective force of 290,936 men, 14,183 died of disease. In the second year, with an effective of 644,508 men, the number of deaths from disease was 42,010. During the whole continuance of the war about 97,000 men, in the Northern armies, were killed under fire, and 184,000 died of disease; in all 281,000 men.

The losses of the South were much greater; but on this subject we do not possess any scientific work. In the following statistics furnished to us, the number of dead is not distinguished from that of the wounded:—

	Enlisted.	Killed or Maimed.
Alabama	120,000	70,000
Arkansas	50,000	30,000
Florida	17,000	10,000
Georgia	131,000	76,000
Louisiana.....	60,000	34,000
Mississippi	78,000	45,000
Missouri	40,000	24,000
North Carolina ...	140,000	85,000
South Carolina ...	65,000	40,000
Maryland.....	40,000	24,000
Tennessee.....	60,000	34,000
Texas	93,000	53,000
Virginia	180,000	105,000
Total	1,074,000	630,000

We have here a total of 630,000 killed or maimed out of 1,074,000 enlisted, or 60 per cent.! If, now, we compare these losses with the total amount of the white population in the South, we see that they form more than 10 per cent., or 20 per cent. of the male population.

It may be said, then, that *the American War swept off nearly all the youth of the Southern States*; and this is no metaphor, but a literally true statement.

If to these 630,000 men, lost to the South, we add the 281,000 who were killed in the Northern armies, we have a total of more than 900 thousand men. But it must not be overlooked that, in the return of 630,000 men, many maimed are included. If we consider that the immense majority of the Southern losses were occasioned by disease and fatigue, by the poor constitution of the army which embraced youths of sixteen and elderly men of sixty, and by the almost total absence of rest for want of reinforcements, we may estimate that four-fifths of these 630,000 men as killed and one-fifth as maimed, we shall then obtain, in the two armies, a total of nearly 800 thousand dead! *

FINANCIAL LOSSES.

The financial losses were still more unprecedented. "The North expended upon this war 14,000 million francs," says M. Vigo Roussillon (*Puissance Militaire des Etats-Unis*, since the Secession War.) He states further that it cost the South nearly as much, and that altogether the civil war entailed upon the United States of America more than 25,000 million francs (£1,600,000,000) in actual military expenses, and fully *double* this sum if account is taken of the loss of productive power and the value of the property and crops destroyed.

It is our opinion that M. Vigo Roussillon and the public generally form too low an estimate of the actual expenses of this war. To say that the American War cost the Northern States 14,000 million francs (£560,000,000) is to mistake the amount of the debt contracted for the actual sum of the costs. We have previously protested against this defective mode of calculation, which takes no account of the taxation, the increase in which was enormous during the years of the

* *Vide* Note at the end of this work.

Secession War. The very exceptional nature of this high taxation is indicated by the fact that, on the return of peace, it was found practicable to pay off an extraordinary proportion of the debt. The following are, in round figures, the budgets of the army and navy, from 1860 to 1866:—

1860-61	35 million dollars		
1861-62	437	"	"
1862-63	662	"	"
1863-64	776	"	"
1864-65	1,153	"	"
1865-66	327	"	"

(*Moniteur of Nov. 3, 1866.*)

The budget for the army and navy had already required, in 1860-61, a sum much greater than those of previous years, which had never exceeded 25 million dollars. We may, however, take the sum of 35 millions, reached in 1860-61, as the normal amount for the army and navy budgets in time of peace, and may assume that, if the struggle had not broken out, this sum would not have been surpassed in the subsequent annual expenditures. The total amount of the five military budgets from 1861 to 1866 would then have been 175 million dollars. But its actual amount, on the other hand, was 3,355 million dollars, that is, 3,180 million dollars for extraordinary war expenses.

Now 3,180 million dollars are about 17,000 million francs (£636,000,000). Thus a very simple calculation has furnished us with an estimate of extraordinary war expenses surpassing, by about 2,000 millions, the amount of the American debt.

But to these 17,000 millions must be added the amount of *voluntary* contributions. According to the *New York Herald* and Dr. Evans, these contributions exceeded, at the commencement of 1862, 1,000 million francs. According to M. Elysé Reclus, they had reached 1,144 millions by the 1st of March, 1864. The Sanitary Commission and auxiliary or similar societies spent 120 millions in drugs, maintenance, clothing, and hospital expenses. We thus obtain the amount of 18,264 millions, which is fully conceded, and from which there is nothing to abate.

But we have not yet reached the complete amount. We should add the expenses of states, counties and districts, in armaments and in bounties to volunteers. The bounties

were very considerable; they amounted to 2,000 dollars (10,700 francs) per head, certainly the half of which was paid by the states, districts or counties. M. Vigo Roussillon gives us the total of these payments to the army, from July 1, 1865. This sum is only 5,145,000,195 francs, which would only be 1,938 francs per head per each volunteer. It must surely be admitted that the states, districts, or counties furnished a sum at least equivalent. The expenses of the North would amount to 23,500 millions! (940 million pounds sterling!) *As to the expenses of the South, it is impossible to estimate them.* We venture to say that the whole of the circulating, or portable, capital in the rebel States was almost entirely absorbed by the war; and as to representing statistically an amount which can in no wise be calculated, we shall not have the presumption to attempt it.

And how shall we estimate, even approximately, the *indirect* losses and ruin? To say nothing of the *immense number of estates* in the richest parts of the Union, in Virginia, Tennessee and Missouri, *constantly traversed and ravaged*, for four years, by innumerable armies; to say nothing of *three million labourers transformed into soldiers* and so depriving agriculture, and other industry, of their powerful co-operation; *all the crops destroyed; all the plantations neglected* for want of workers; *all the manufactories closed* for want of capital and security; *all the rich stocks of cotton, for which Europe was so anxious, devoured by flames*; these incalculable losses we pass by because *we cannot compute their value.*

But there is a further loss which does not evade calculation. In consequence of the war, what became of that *superb mercantile navy* which constituted the glory of the United States? To how many millions did the Northern losses from *privateers* amount? The injury caused to Northern commerce by the *Alabama* alone, in her short career, is estimated at 80 million francs (£3,200,000). How many fine ships and rich cargoes became the prey of Southern corsairs, which, being unable to bring them into European ports, burnt them in mid-ocean! Then, again, what general confusion ensued in all the *commercial relations* of the United States, and what a high rate of insurance! The Northern States were obliged to sell to England,

at a loss, the greater part of their ships, and to denationalise their mercantile navy.

From 1858 to 1860, the average number of vessels sold by the Americans to the English was 40, measuring altogether 16,000 tons; in 1861, it was no longer 40, but 126, and of a tonnage of 76,000; in 1862 it was 135; in 1863 it was 320, of 252,579 tonnage. The statistics are wanting for the years 1864 and 1865, which were the most terrible years for the commerce of the Union. *In 1860, two-thirds of the exports of the United States were conveyed in American vessels; in 1863, two-thirds were conveyed in foreign ships; (Langel, "Les Corsaires Confédérés," Revue des Deux Mondes, July 1, 1864).* We have quoted this particular statement because it presents some exact figures. But it is a matter of merely secondary importance amid the immense exhibition of the sufferings, ruin and catastrophe which afflicted the United States during those four years.

EUROPEAN LOSSES BY THE AMERICAN WAR.

And they were by no means the only sufferers who were involved: the manufacturing population of Lancashire, of Alsace and the Lower Seine, were also deeply affected by the war. This fearful Cotton Crisis, with its disasters and reactionary effects, that for several years disturbed Europe, is a wound that must be probed, in connection with the influence of the American War. The following explanation of the subject is given by M. Pouyer-Quertier in his report on the proposal to the Legislature for the authorisation of a loan of 5 million francs in aid of the localities affected by the depression of the cotton-industry:—

"The cotton-industry is one of the principal employments in the world. Taking Europe only, the imports and labour connected with this manufacture, within the last few years, have been of the value of at least 4,000 million francs per annum (£160,000,000) viz. 2,000 millions for England, 800 millions for France, and 1,200 millions for the remainder of the Continent. Of this amount the raw material (of which four-fifths were derived from the United States) represents a value of 1,200 millions; the dyes, grease, oils, machinery, &c. make up 800 millions, whilst the wages paid (in Europe) for labour at this branch of industry are about 2,000 millions (of francs).

"From these summary statistics it may be easily comprehended how much trouble must have been occasioned in the

cotton-manufacturing countries by the scarcity of the indispensable material. England, which is, unquestionably, the greatest consumer of raw cotton, was the first to diminish the regular course of its manufacture. From the month of August, 1861, this industry began to fall off in Lancashire. The American War having broken out in the spring of 1861, and the blockade of the Southern ports having been almost immediately made effectual, the price of cotton rose rapidly. In consequence of this sudden rise in the raw material, the hours of labour were further shortened in the manufactories; and from the month of July, 1862, nearly all the factories in Great Britain were working on short time. From that date to the 31st of December, 1862, the pressure continued to increase, and hence extreme distress spread throughout the cotton districts.

"In France the supply of the raw material on hand was comparatively much greater. Hence a serious diminution of labour did not commence in Normandy until about August or September, 1862, and in the Eastern manufacturing district of France not until December.

"In 1860 Europe had attained a weekly consumption of 90,000 bales of cotton, and it was estimated that new sources of production would raise the amount to at least 100,000 bales per week in 1861, the period when the American War broke out. The actual stock on hand for all Europe was then only 360,000 bales of American cotton. For two years the value of American cotton had been from 70 to 80 francs per 50 kilogrammes. At the beginning of September, 1862, it had reached 350 and even 360 francs. In November it sunk to 275, but again rose in December to 300 francs."—(*Moniteur*, January 27, 1863.)

We have quoted the above from the words of an eminent manufacturer; they are, however, open to criticism, and doubtless contain some exaggerated statements on certain points, especially as to the reduction of wages in the cotton-working districts of France and of Europe generally.

But the distress occasioned in the Old World by the American War is not the less immeasurable, as the following statistics will show:—

"The imports of cotton into England, for the year 1863, cost three millions of pounds sterling more than those of 1861, although not amounting, even as to quantity alone, to one-half the ordinary value of the latter."—(*Journal des Economistes*, January, 1864, p. 118.) There were, it is true, additional supplies of cotton from India and Egypt, but of a very inferior quality to that produced in America.

This very necessity of having recourse to Egypt and India created much embarrassment in European countries. "The heavy purchases of cotton from countries which hitherto had only exported it in small quantities, and which had consequently not acquired the habit of a corresponding consumption of European products, occasioned in 1863 large exportations of specie, from which the Continent has been suffering, especially during the last three months. The Bank of England, which began the year with a rate of interest of 3 per cent., reached 8 per cent. in December."— (*Journal des Economistes*, p. 119, January, 1864.)

Thus it is evident that a great war can import a multitude of disturbances into our industrial and financial progress. The year 1863 was a specially terrible time to pass through. "This winter," wrote the *Journal des Economistes*, in January, 1864, "will, happily, not be so difficult to undergo as that of 1863. Calculations, which appear to be correct, have shown that the average value of the French cotton manufactures is 530 million francs (£21,200,000), of which a fifth part, or 106 millions, represents wages, and that there will only be half the amount of work done this year, that is to say, that our operatives will lose about 53 million francs. The importation of cotton has increased in the past year about 50 per cent., and it will follow that the loss of wages will be diminished one third. But the loss will be actually much less, because a considerable number of operatives have taken themselves to the manufactures of woollen and linen and hemp, which have profited by the rise in cotton."

The calculations of M. Paul Boiteau appear to be more correct than those of M. Pouyer-Quertier. But a loss of 53 millions in wages, at an average rate of 3 francs per day, or 1,000 francs per annum, implies 53,000 operatives without the means of existence. Even if this loss and this number be reduced one half, and if we consider that the French manufactories only furnish about the fifth part of all the cotton fabrics of Europe, it will follow that *at least 100,000 of the working population of Europe were, in consequence of the American War, left almost continually, for nearly three years, without employment, and that three or four times as many had to suffer a considerable diminu-*

tion of wages. How many deaths must have been occasioned by this terrible "holiday!" But such is war. Its nature is so homicidal that it slays thousands of victims even at thousands of leagues distance from the battle-fields!

But, again, if America overthrew our industry by ceasing to furnish us with the raw material, she gave us further trouble by no longer buying our manufactured produce. "It is evident that a customer so exhausted can only be a poor customer to us, and that, when the war is over, the effects of the past cannot immediately disappear. Hence it appears from the Customs Returns that French exports to foreign parts, especially as regards silk and woollen goods, have undergone an important and significant diminution." (*Journal des Economistes*, vol. xlvii. p. 306.) The operatives of Saint Etienne were scarcely in a better condition than those of Mulhouse and Rouen on the conclusion of that war.

It would be in vain to adduce a multitude of additional statistics; they would not enable us to estimate all the calamities of the war. And yet, says M. Horn, "4,000 million francs (£160,000,000) would have sufficed to abolish slavery by purchasing every slave at the general average rate of 1,000 francs (£40) each, taking young and old, men and women, the infants and the aged, uniformly." What economy this would have been! But, as was remarked by M. Michael Chevalier, to have exercised this wise and self-denying foresight, America should have possessed, in the crisis of 1861, men as great as those who directed the crisis of the last century,—a Franklin in the North and a Washington in the South. Yet even this should not have been necessary. For a truly-informed and virtuous people knows how to act, irrespectively of its great men, and will adopt useful and right measures from the prompting of its own intelligence and virtue.

THE SCHLESWIG AND GERMAN WARS.

(1864—1866.)

The very recent occurrence of the two wars of 1864 and 1866 presents an unfavourable condition for judging with accuracy respecting even their material results. In par-

ticular, we have no precise information as to the financial expenditure involved. For the European governments have not acquired the prompt and practical business habits of the government at Washington, thanks to whose despatch the financial situation of the Union is as readily ascertainable as that of a large loan association.

We possess a valuable and quite recent work upon the human losses in the Danish War (*General Report on the Medical Service in the Campaign against Denmark*, by Dr. Læffleur, Physician in Chief to the Prussian Army). This book, which has just been issued, has afforded us useful information.

On the 1st of February, 1864, the allied army crossed the Eyder; it was then composed of 60,000 men, of whom one-third were Austrians and the remainder Prussians. The Austrian contingent was not increased throughout the campaign; the Prussian force, on the contrary, was raised to 63,000 men. Out of this considerable force the following losses in the Prussian army took place:—

Killed in action, or died of wounds	...	738	men
Died of diseases or various accidents	...	310	„
		<hr/>	
Total	...	1,048	

The number of dead in the Prussian army is therefore only $1\frac{2}{3}$ per cent. of the effective. This very small proportion of deaths is very surprising; and yet the engagements were very sanguinary, relatively much more so than even those of the Crimean War; and, in proportion to the numbers engaged, the assault of Duppel was as terrible as that of the Malakoff. There were returned, in the Prussian army—

At Missunde (February 2)	206	wounded,	59	dead
At Duppel (April 17 and 18)	1,780	„	550	„
At Alsen	...	354	„	104

And what is most striking in this campaign is the very small number of those who died from disease. There were only 26,717 diseased, of whom only 310 died. This low rate of mortality is chiefly owing, as Dr. Læffleur acknowledges, to the philanthropic efforts of private associations for the assistance of the soldiers.

It is more difficult to ascertain correctly the losses of the Danish army. But it is certain that, for various reasons,

and, amongst others, on account of the inferiority of its armaments, it suffered much more than the Prussians. We may fairly estimate the Danish losses, under fire, at double those of the Prussian army, or about 1,500 men.

The Danish army was much more severely visited by disease than its adversary. On this point we can borrow some exact details from Dr. Læffleur. There were 31,575 cases of disease; typhus made considerable ravages, and the losses of the Danes from disease were 756 men, or much more than double the Prussian losses from the same cause. The Austrian losses must have been very inconsiderable; for, being less numerous than the Prussians, they took a smaller part in the action.

To sum up,—the Prussians lost 1,048 men; the Danes certainly lost more than double as many, and the total loss, including that of the Austrians, must have been about 3,500 men.

The financial losses are more difficult to ascertain. As regards Austria and Prussia they were covered by the indemnities of the war. The Danish budgets are not before us, but we have, at least, the state of their debt before and after the war:—

Before the War.

	Rixdalers.
Ordinary debt of the Danish monarchy ...	98,261,793
Special debt of the kingdom	1,289,780
Holstein debt	666,000
	100,217,573

The debt of the kingdom, on the 31st of March, 1865, was 132,110,802 rixdalers; so that the war cost Denmark at least 30 million rixdalers. To this must be added the war indemnities paid by the Duchies and the share of the Duchies in the debt of the monarchy previous to the war. We thus obtain an approximate amount of 180 million francs (£7,200,000). 180 million francs and 3,500 men are a terrible loss of capital and of human life; and the more so, when it was so easy to have retained for industry and useful labour all this money and all those vigorous limbs.

THE WAR BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA IN 1866.

We now come to the great war of 1866. The statistics relating to its loss of life are found to vary, particularly as regards *Prussia*. An early official statement, dated December, 1866, has been greatly exceeded by the most recent returns from the Statistical Board of Berlin. It is probable that even the latter do not afford exact statistics, and that when Dr. Læffleur prepares, as we hope he will do, a work on the campaign in Bohemia, similar to that which he has just published on the Schleswig campaign, it will be seen that the amount of loss has been even greater than is already admitted.

The number of wounded men in the Prussian army is, according to the first report, 15,554; but according to the later ones, 16,177. The first returns only indicate 2,910 killed; the corrective dispatches place the number of the dead, within forty-eight hours, at 2,931; and of those who sank afterwards in consequence of their wounds, at 1,519—a total of 4,450. The first returns are silent as to diseases, but the later ones announce 6,427 deaths from typhus and other diseases. This makes in all, 10,877. It is evident, from this illustration, that the corrective returns give higher numbers than the provisional reports, and that still further additions may be expected when the finally-corrected reports are issued.

As regards *Austria*, we are still dependent upon the merely provisional reports. The 13th annual report of the Statistical Commission of Vienna, contains a series of authentic results which indicate the strength and the losses of the Austrian army during the war against Prussia. The returns are merely based on the state of the army at the end of August, 1866, from which it is evident that they must be very defective and much lower in amount than the reality. For who will tell us how many men have died of their wounds since the month of August 1866? All military statisticians, as for example, Dr. Chenu, Dr. Læffleur,

and the English author of the Reports on the Crimean War, prolong their investigations for at least eighteen months after the commencement of peace. Further, the Austrian returns appear to take no account of the number of the sick and diseased.

The Austrian army, at the beginning of the struggle, was composed of 646,636 men, of whom 407,223 were then arrived at the two great scenes of conflict. The total number of *avowed* losses is 10,994 killed, 29,304 wounded, and 43,743 missing. We are assuredly far from the truth here; and we do not hesitate to say that the number of killed must have been *double*. Out of these 29,304 who were still living in the month of August, 1866, experience authorises us to assume that several thousands, at least four or five thousand, must have died subsequently from their wounds. We have seen, from Dr. Chenu's Report on the Crimean War, that those who died in France, in consequence of injuries received during the expedition, amounted to 15,000 in the eighteen months after the war. Similarly, those who died in Austria, either in hospitals or at home, during the period of eighteen months after this contest, must have been very numerous.

Further, there is not the least allusion, in the Austrian returns, to diseases, which, amongst the Prussians, carried off more than 6,000. It is not likely that the losses of the Austrians, under this head, were less considerable; their fatigues were as great, their diet was inferior rather than otherwise, and the thorough demoralisation of the Austrian troops was a powerful auxiliary to epidemics. We have, then, still to await a complete work on the losses of Austria in 1866, and a revision which will be at the same time a supplementary addition to the present insufficient returns. It is, at least, certain that such rectifying statistics will raise the total losses of the Austrian army to 20 or 25 thousand men.

We have not accurate accounts of the losses of the *Germanic Confederation*, properly so termed. We have only before us the *Saxon* returns published almost immediately after the war; and they present indications of the greatest confusion. We have no statistics respecting the *Bavarians* and *Hanoverians*, although they were engaged in bloody

encounters. We may, without any exaggeration, admit an amount of 3,000 killed from the smaller states.

A supplement to the *Florence Gazette*, quoted by the *Moniteur*, of July 9, 1866, contains the following calculation of the *Italian* losses at Custozza:—951 killed, 2,909 wounded, 4,252 prisoners. The number of dead only includes those who expired in the first few days after the battle. It must, therefore, be considerably augmented—almost doubled, in fact—to include those who died from their wounds in the year following the battle. For the day's conflict at Lissa, the *Nazione* claims to have received information of a total loss, to the Italians, of 743 killed, and 155 wounded.—(*Moniteur* of July 29, 1866.) We have no details of the losses of the Volunteers, which must have been extensive. We may calculate at 3,000, at least, the number of Italians who perished from the enemy's fire at Custozza, at Lissa, and in Garibaldi's campaign. Notwithstanding the short duration of the war, this estimate of mortality should evidently be doubled, if we are to take account of the deaths occasioned by disease, fatigue, poor food, and all other sufferings, physical or moral.

To sum up—the number of Prussians killed or dead was about 11,000; we consider the probable amount of Austrian losses as varying from 20 to 25 thousand; those of the smaller states of the Confederation at from 3 to 4 thousand; and those of the Italians as nearly 6,000. This makes a total of from 40 to 45 thousand killed or dead. We believe that this amount is not exaggerated, and we hope that a systematic and scientific history of this war will furnish us, in two or three years, with the exact figures, which may be greater than ours, but which will certainly not be less.

FINANCIAL LOSSES OF THE WAR.

The financial losses of the war are difficult to ascertain with rigorous exactness; they are certainly not liquidated, and we cannot obtain the true amount.

Austria, as early as November 23, 1865, had negotiated a loan at Paris. It was not a war loan, but was applied to reimburse the advances of the National Bank. Immediately the war broke out, in the early part of the month of May, recourse was had to various expedients. The Government

issued notes of from 1 to 5 florins, for forced currency: this issue reached the amount of 150 million florins. A law passed July 7 authorised the minister to obtain a further 200 million florins, either by a voluntary loan or by an increased issue of Government notes. The Bank of Vienna advanced, temporarily, 60 millions in bank-notes. An imperial decree of the 25th of August authorised the Minister of Finance to issue 50 million florins in 5 per cent. bonds and 90 millions in Government notes. This was the completion of the 200 millions which the law of July 7 permitted. In addition to these resources, the Government had intended, early in June, to impose on Venetia a forced loan of 12 million florins. This made a total of 362 million florins which it had sought to obtain. We cannot believe that this enormous sum, which amounts to nearly 900 million francs (£36,000,000), was wholly absorbed by the war. It appears doubtful whether the forced Venetian loan was ever obtained; and out of the 150 million florins levied in addition to the previous costs of the war, we believe that only a portion can have been absorbed by its special demands. Nevertheless, the expenses of Austria, for this war, may be estimated at 600 millions, at least, without reckoning the indemnity which she had to pay to Prussia.

The expenses of the latter country are much more difficult to calculate. The cash balance, or reserved fund, of *Prussia*, amounted, before the war, to 21 million thalers. After the beginning of May, these resources being absorbed, the Government began to have recourse to various expedients. For what was the creation of the mercantile loan Bank but a Treasury expedient? This bank was authorised to issue 25 million thalers in paper money (*Darlehnskassenscheine*), which were rendered a compulsory currency, at par, in all public banks. Then again, throughout the war, the Prussian troops subsisted upon the enemy. And after the war, the contributions imposed upon the vanquished amounted to nearly 200 million francs (£8,000,000). In the Legislature, on the 13th of August, 1866, the Minister of Finance made a demand for extraordinary loans to the extent of not less than 60 million thalers (£9,000,000). Of this amount, however, 21 million thalers were devoted to liquidate outstanding balances, and another portion was not

expended. But, altogether, the expenses of this war, to Prussia alone, must have amounted to 400 million francs (£16,000,000). (Vide *Moniteur*, Sept. 3, 1866.) Of this sum, nearly one half was reimbursed by the contributions of the conquered States.

As to *Italy's* share of expenditure on this war, it commenced on the 1st of May, 1866, by the decree of an enforced paper currency, and by a loan of 250 millions from the National Bank. In pursuance of a decree, dated June 28, 1866, she imposed a general tax upon all moveable property, a source of many subsequent difficulties. Finally, she had recourse to a compulsory loan of 350 millions. Although the total amount of these resources, which exceeded 600 millions, was not absorbed by the expenses of the war, there is no doubt but that the latter reached at least 400 million francs (£16,000,000).

We are unable to state accurately how much was the cost of this war to *Hanover, the Hessian States, Wurtemberg, Saxony, &c.*; but when we remember that in 1859 the special expenses of these secondary States, as set forth in their respective budgets, were 152 million francs for the seven principal States alone, although they did not then fire a single gun, and were merely put into a condition of readiness for war (*Kriegsbereitschaft*), it is difficult to believe that the smaller States can have spent less, during the war of 1866, than 250 million francs (£10,000,000), at any rate, and without including the indemnities paid to Prussia.

The sum of the *official* and *immediate* expenses of the war of 1866, may be therefore reckoned at about 1,650 million francs (£66,000,000) for the respective governments in Germany and Italy.

But in this war, as in every other, the expenses indicated in the public budgets, were the less considerable ones. What a commercial and financial catastrophe was produced in Italy by this inopportune war, with its triple plague of paper money, forced loans, and the vexatious and inequitable tax on moveable property! It was a deadly blow from which she will, probably, take twenty years to recover. There had been debates on economy and it appeared that some effectual steps would be taken in that direction, just before the war broke out which demanded an unsparing in-

crease of expenditure. How can young Italy struggle successfully with the pernicious consequences of the absorption of its circulating capital by the forced loan, the annihilation of legitimate profits by the tax upon moveable property and the losses and unsettlement of currency involved by the paper money? These losses were especially disastrous to a country whose imports had, for several years, far exceeded its exports, and which was now to suffer, in its foreign commercial transactions, the very heavy expenses of a disadvantageous and exceedingly variable rate of exchange.

Austria was placed in a similar situation. She was truly in a pitiable state. She had barely got over one crisis, and was but beginning to remove the evils occasioned by that crisis, when she voluntarily plunged herself into another similar one. In 1858 she had just terminated the compulsory currency which had been so disastrous to her for ten years. In 1859 she re-established it. In 1866 she was repaying the advances made by the bank and there was a prospect of the second termination of the forced currency, when she threw herself, of her own free will, into new dangers. By her mistakes and faults she became the prey of paper money, continually increased taxation, commercial disorganisation and industrial stagnation.

And even Prussia, so powerful and prosperous, had to suffer, for six weeks, a suspension of all business. At the beginning of the month of May, 20,000 of the working men of Berlin found themselves out of employment, and, on the declaration of war, mechanics, professors, bankers, labourers and traders were all taken away from their usual avocations. The Government proclaimed a universal holiday, as it were, for two months throughout the kingdom, on account of the war. During this time workshops and schools were closed or empty. *Thus we have the spectacle of a great nation dead to labour and study for two months! What an arrest of civilisation!* In the public catastrophe how many individual and obscure or unnoticed calamities were involved! Failures took place to an incredible extent: they occurred in Berlin at the rate of twenty or *twenty-five per day*, or about the usual weekly number in ordinary times.

The smaller German States, roused abruptly from their peaceful and industrious life, also expiated, by many losses,

the general folly. All the public works which were being so energetically pushed forward were checked. Thus Baden had just contracted a loan for her railways; the war absorbed it. A similar exigency had already occurred in that State in 1859. All the other minor States which, except in the moment of delirium in 1859, had only contracted peace-loans were now compelled to rush into war-loans. To these burdens must be added the various military requisitions, ravages and arbitrary contributions, the six million florins which General Vogel de Falkenstein extorted from Frankfurt, and the 25 million florins which General Manteufel also extorted from the same city the very next day. We must also remember the condition of Bohemia, desolated, laid waste, and almost ruined by the quartering and conflicts of 600,000 men.

The blow struck in Germany influenced all Europe. This unforeseen catastrophe, this sudden folly which had overspread the centre of Europe, affected, by contagion, the adjacent countries. In every direction men thought of nothing but new rifles, strange guns, huge or small, and gigantic armies. It was deemed necessary to have new conscription-laws, new loans and new taxes. Countries which had just been reducing their armies now only thought of increasing them as much as possible.

In short, this German crisis raised the war-budgets of every European nation. It inscribed 1,650 million francs (£66,000,000) on the budgets of the belligerents alone; it resulted in 45,000 deaths, in the ruin of Austria and Italy, and in the universal and permanent increase of burdens and public anxieties. Such is the balance-sheet of the campaign in Bohemia!

Whence comes it that even two years after this war our industry is languishing and our commerce suffering? Whence comes it that our money capital remains idle in our banks, instead of supporting our manufactures and creating new enterprises? It is because war, even when dead, leaves its spectre behind it, which long continues to terrify the people afresh and to make them apprehensive of further misfortunes.

DISTANT EXPEDITIONS.

We now come to those disastrous Expeditions which have involved so heavy an expense to the European Powers, and especially to France. Unfortunately here statistics fail us, especially as respects the losses of human life. We shall hardly venture even any conjectural estimate. We shall content ourselves with a mere reference to the great distance of the scenes of conflict in China, Cochin China, Mexico, and St. Domingo; the variations of climate, the yellow fever, typhus and marsh fever, the fatigues of a war of incessant skirmishes, the obstinate resistance of the enemy in Mexico and Cochin China, the insufficiency of communication, of hygienic assistance, and, at times, even of provisions. We leave it to the reader to form, in view of these disadvantageous circumstances, a more or less accurate idea of the number of victims which these deplorable Expeditions must have swept off.

Although we are enabled to form a less vague conception of the financial losses involved, an exact result is not attainable. The expenses of most of these Expeditions are not yet liquidated. The Legislative Assembly voted, as recently as 1867, the settlement of the accounts of 1863. The accounts of 1864, 1865, and 1866 are not yet known with precision. Another difficulty in these calculations is that the expenses of distant Expeditions are returned in the several budgets under different headings, and are sometimes confounded with expenses of another description. A state of very great confusion characterises all these matters, and the time for putting an end to it does not appear to have yet arrived.

These exceptional expenses have eventually become so habitual that they have passed from the extraordinary into the ordinary budgets. A proof of this is afforded by the publication of the accounts accompanying the law of assessment for the expenses and receipts of the year 1863, presented to the Legislative Assembly, May 6, 1862, by M. Vuitry, as Commissioner. The ordinary Navy Budget bore an increase of 18,773,501 francs (£750,940) over the preceding one; and M. Vuitry accounted for this increase in the following manner:—"For several years in succession the various budgets, each copying the preceding one, repeated

the same number of ships as being requisite for the reception of marines, namely, 152 ships for a force of about 26,000 men, although different circumstances had obliged the Department of Naval Affairs either to form new stations or to increase the capacity of some of the existing ones. Consequently, special loans were needed to meet these expenses, which, although appearing to be merely casual and temporary at first, eventually partook of a normal and permanent character. The ordinary budget used to provide for 152 armed vessels; in 1859 the number of these was 300, of which, however, 123 were required for the Italian Army and for the Indo-Chinese Expedition. In 1860 the number of effective war-ships was raised to 275—77 of which were for the Indo-Chinese and Syrian Expeditions. In 1861 the number would probably be nearly the same. Under these circumstances, the Government had found it expedient carefully to determine what proportion of the special armaments of preceding years should henceforth be regarded as indispensable for maintaining the service of our naval stations, whose number and importance have increased in consequence of the new establishments of the kind being formed in distant seas by the French nation.”—(*Moniteur*, March 12, 1862.)

These distant Expeditions had, in fact, terribly augmented our Naval Budget. In 1857 it was only 121,865,000 francs (£4,872,600); in 1859, without reckoning Algiers and the colonies, it rose to 213,800,000 francs (£8,552,000); and in 1861 (as admitted in the Exchequer Bill of June 8, 1864), it required more than 230 millions (£9,200,000). Thus the Navy Budget had increased, in consequence of distant Expeditions, about 100 millions (£4,000,000), and this augmentation had almost come to be regarded as a permanent one. The Army Budget also suffered from the influence of these Expeditions. In 1861, a year of peace, it demanded (as is admitted in the Exchequer Bill of June 8, 1864) 400,975,814 francs, an excess of 55 millions over the anticipated amount of 345 millions (£13,800,000).

Hence one of the most vexatious results of these far-off wars has been the immeasurable expansion of our ordinary budgets. The supplementary loans will cease with the Expeditions themselves, but the *augmentation* of the Army and Navy Budgets, caused by these wars, has been declared by Government to be *normal and permanent*; and it has, in

point of fact, been subsequently so recognised as being normal and permanent.

As to the total expenses of these Expeditions, M. Larra-bure estimated them, even four years ago, as already amounting to 270 millions (£10,800,000) for the Mexican and Cochin China Expeditions only. In a Legislative discussion at the same period, M. Calley Saint Paul calculated at 450 millions (£18,000,000) the costs of the wars in China, Cochin China, Mexico, and Japan. M. Vuitry (Government Commissioner), in reply, admitted expenses of 17 millions for the Syrian Expedition, 11 millions for that to the Kabyles (in North Africa), and 166 millions for that to China and Cochin China; and at the time of the Treaty of Miramar, the French Government announced that it had spent 270 millions in Mexico. However, it has subsequently retracted this statement as an over-estimate.

According to the Report of M. du Miral on the Budget of 1868, the expenses of the Mexican Expedition were as follow:—

Year.	Army. Francs.	Navy. Francs.	Finance. Francs.	Totals. Francs.
1861	3,200,000	3,200,000
1862 ...	27,119,000 ...	35,502,000 ...	379,000 ...	63,400,000
1863 ...	72,012,000 ...	24,606,000 ...	1,001,000 ...	97,619,000
1864 ...	51,732,000 ...	15,667,000 ...	1,675,000 ...	69,074,000
1865 ...	29,342,000 ...	10,583,000 ...	1,480,000 ...	41,405,000
1866 ...	41,792,000 ...	13,798,000 ...	9,567,000 ...	65,157,000
1867 ...	9,993,000 ...	13,117,000 ...	200,000 ...	23,310,000
Total ...	231,990,000 ... (£9,279,600)	116,873,000 ... (£4,674,920)	14,302,000 ... (£572,080)	363,165,000 ... (£14,527,000)

According to another table, extracted from the same Report, the receipts, more or less available, during the Expedition, consisting of repayments and Mexican bonds, amounted to 61,975,000 francs (£2,479,000); whence the excess of expenditure would be 301 million francs (£12,040,000).

It is needless to remark that this official return is excessively below the actual cost. M. Berryer offers to prove that the Expedition has absorbed 600 millions (£24,000,000), but this is impossible. However, inasmuch as the Government itself avowed an actual expenditure of 270 millions at the time of the Convention of Miramar, that is to say, when the war was not half completed, it is difficult to con-

clude otherwise than that the further expenses, after allowing for deductions and repayments, must have swelled this amount to *at least 400 millions* (£16,000,000).

As regards the Expeditions to China, Cochin China, and the Lebanon, we cannot estimate them at less than 300 millions (£12,000,000). This sum represents, almost exactly, the unforeseen augmentations of our Army and Navy Budgets in the years of peace, 1860, 1861, and 1862, when the Mexican Expedition had, as yet, cost but little. As we are aware, the Expedition to Cochin China still continues, and forms a constant increase of our budget.

If we add to these officially recognised expenses the losses of capital diverted from productive employment sunk, without return, in Mexican loans, it will be found that *these distant Expeditions have cost France at least a thousand million francs* (£40,000,000), in addition to the *permanent* increase which they have imposed upon our naval establishments.

SUMMARY OF LOSSES BY RECENT WARS.

I.—LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE.

Number of men who were slain on the field of battle, or who died through wounds and disease:—

	Killed by War.
Crimean War	784,991
Italian War (1859)	45,000
War of Schleswig Holstein	3,500
American Civil War—	
Northern Army	281,000
Southern Army	519,000
War of 1866, between Prussia, Austria, and Italy	45,000
Distant Expeditions and various wars, Mexico, Cochin China, Morocco, St. Domingo, Para- guay, &c.	65,000
Total	1,743,491

* *Understated*—*vide* Note at the end of this work.

HERE IS A TOTAL OF ABOUT 1,750,000 MEN SWEEPED OFF BY WAR FROM CIVILISED NATIONS BETWEEN 1853 AND 1866, THAT IS TO SAY, IN THE SPACE OF 14 YEARS.

This is a number equal to the whole male population of Holland. It is also a number equal to that of all the working men employed by the industrial or commercial classes in France. (Audiganne, "Les Ouvriers d' à present," page 405.) And yet this immense amount of human life, strength, and intelligence, has been devoured by war in the RECENT 14 YEARS of this century, so distinguished by its civilisation, industry, and popular liberty !

SUMMARY OF THE FINANCIAL LOSSES BY RECENT WARS.

Crimean War, 1853-4 ...	340 million pounds sterling.		
American Civil War, 1861-5—			
The North ...	940 million	”	”
The South ...	460 million	”	”
Italian War, 1859 ...	60 million	”	”
War of Schleswig Hol- stein, 1864 ...	7 million	”	”
War of 1866, between Prussia, Austria, and Italy ...	66 million	”	”
Distant Expeditions to Mexico, Cochin China, &c. ...	40 million	”	”

Total ... 1,913 MILLION POUNDS STERLING !

Even these are only the immediate and positive expenses of the wars ; and some of the struggles are not yet ended. Complete returns cannot be obtained respecting the expenses of Spain in the Expedition to Cochin China, nor of those of Peru, Chili, and St. Domingo. We are not in possession of the costs of recent conflicts between the Republics of South America and Spain, or of the still continuing war between Brazil, La Plata, and Paraguay—a persistent and furiously devastating struggle. Nor have we full returns

from Mexico as to its war for independence against France. And yet, irrespective of all these unfurnished expenses, we have accounted for the frightful amount of nearly 48,000 million francs (or £1,913,000,000), which, if employed in works of peace, would have *entirely transformed* the social and financial condition of civilised nations. *But the evil genius of War has devoured the whole of it in fourteen years, IN ORDER TO SWEEP FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH NEARLY 1,800,000 MEN.*

NOTE.

A GENTLEMAN at New York, after reading "Contemporary Wars," has written to Mr. Henry Richard, M.P., London, to say that M. Beaulieu's work *greatly understates* the losses of life and property caused by the late Civil War in his country. He says:—

"M. Beaulieu's work is an able one, and generally correct; but, instead of 281,000 men killed in the Northern armies, the total loss is known to be 1,100,000 by *all causes* up to 1867 inclusive.

"By the census of 1860 the *whole* property of the United States (exclusive of slaves) was valued at 14,183 million dollars, and the loss of capital during the war (also exclusive of slaves) is known to be over 5,000 millions, or fully one-fifth of the whole property of the country in 1860. We look upon the present prosperity, therefore, as merely fictitious, and destined to a tremendous collapse, which is only a question of time."

The same writer complains of the terrible amount of vice and immorality occasioned by the habits formed during the war, and forwards the following statement on the subject, extracted from the *New York Journal of Commerce*, one of the highest class newspapers in the United States:—

"THE 'MORAL' EFFECT OF THE LATE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

"The prevalence of bold, wanton crime throughout all parts of the country cannot be denied. It is not this city or the large centres of population generally that are chiefly infected, although some, for selfish purposes, encourage this idea. Many causes have conspired to produce this outcropping of evil, *but the chief cause, beyond question, is the demoralisation produced by the war.* Some enthusiastic writers and orators claimed that the conflict would be like "*a purifying furnace,*" from which the nation would emerge cleansed and sanctified, like gold from the crucible. We

pointed to all history in refutation of this theory, and urged the adoption of every possible means to mitigate the evils that must inevitably follow and grow out of the long and bitter contest. Recklessness of life—disregard of the rights of person and property—the disposition to take by strategy, and still more by the strong arm, any coveted good—a contempt for laws, so often violated or silent in the presence of armed force—a sense of the might of physical power in the presence of restraints purely moral—familiarity with deeds of blood, rapine, and cruelty, deadening the conscience and blunting all the finer sensibilities of the soul—these and many kindred associations suggest themselves to every careful observer who studies the demoralising effect of war upon the nation at large. They are peculiar to no age or race, and they operate on man as man in every community and by every fireside. There is probably as great a ratio of difference between the past and present condition of the most moral and virtuous community in the country in the debasing effect of the war, as between the criminal classes, once partially restrained, but now rendered more brutal, daring, passionate, and reckless, as the result of this national experience. We might safely appeal to individual consciousness to sustain this assertion, if men were willing to examine and judge themselves impartially; but its truth is capable of demonstration.”