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Secret of Herbart 6D.

AN ESSAY ON

SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

F. H. HAYWARD, D.Lit., M.A., B.Sc.

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THE SECRET OF HERBART

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AN ESSAY ON

THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

BY

F. H. HAYWARD, D.Lit., M.A., B.Sc.,

Author of "The Critics of Herbartianism," "The Reform of Moral and Biblical Education," "The Educational Ideas of Pestalozzi and Fröbel" etc.

REVISED AND ENLARGED

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1907

TO

PROFESSOR JOHN ADAMS,

FROM WHOM HE HAS LEARNT SO MUCH,

THIS LITTLE WORK IS DEDICATED BY

THE AUTHOR.

CONTENTS

"The half-educated, unskilled pretenders, professing impossible creeds and propounding ridiculous curricula, to whom the unhappy parents of to-day must needs entrust the intelligences of their children; these heavy-handed barber-surgeons of the mind, these schoolmasters with their ragtag and bobtail of sweated and unqualified assistants, will be succeeded by capable, self-respecting men and women, constituting the most important profession of the world."—H. G. WELLS, *Anticipations*.

"Education is the only thing that can do away with those internal evils that disturb the peace and threaten the existence of the nation—labour troubles, saloon politics, haunts of vice, slum-life, and the like. These things exist because a large body of our people, from want of education to open up to them the world of great movements, and noble interests and employments, are condemned to narrow, sordid lives, and petty or vicious interests. We disinherit them of the spiritual treasures of humanity.....and then we wonder why they are vulgar, mean, squalid, discontented, and rebellious. We make all the nobler delights impossible for them, and then we wonder why they take to vulgar delights.....If we would quench interest in the saloon, the pool-room, the dance-hall, the dive, the low theatre, we must off-set them by something rousing a warmer and more enduring interest..... Teachers, of all people, must be endowed with the missionary spirit."—T. DAVIDSON, *History of Education*.

"The individuality must first be changed through widened interest .....before teachers can venture to think they will find it amenable to the general obligatory moral law.....While morality is rocked to sleep in the belief in transcendental powers, the true powers and means which rule the world are at the disposal of the unbeliever."—J. F. HERBART, *Allgemeine Pädagogik*.

PREFACE TO NEW EDITION

THIS work is no treatise, and can never be made into one. It is an essay. Nevertheless, the writer has attempted in this new edition to touch rather more fully than in the first upon sundry educational matters of current importance, so that the reader, by means of incidental hints, if not of detailed treatment, may see such matters in something of their true perspective.

Still, to make teachers interested in the vital issues of their work is a more valuable task than the dropping of any number of useful "hints." The original essay was mainly an attempt to arouse this interest, and it is hoped that the purpose will be equally obvious amid the additions that have been made.

Such faults as are inherent in the book—repetitions, omissions, and what may appear, in the judgment of some, either as extravagances or as affirmations of the obvious—will probably be almost as apparent in the new as in the old edition, though the writer has made some attempt to remove them. The changes, however, are mainly additions, and these take the form of notes and appendices.

It may not be out of place to admit, for the benefit of new readers, that there is nothing absolutely original, nothing that should be a "secret," in Herbartianism or in this book. The most valuable truths are generally the most obvious, though rarely the most regarded. If anyone should doubt that this is so in the present case, he has only to betake himself to representatives of two professional classes—the average priest or preacher and the average teacher or school manager. Of the former he may ask as to the causes of moral evil; the latter he may question about his favourite school subjects, or about correlation, or about the moral value of geography. To both of them he may quizzingly throw out the hint that, after all, secular subjects are only "secular"; and the answer from both will be an assent tempered with a platitude. It is the writer's firm and almost painful conviction that few men realise the ramifications of apperception, or its relations to interest and character; and that, in consequence of this inadequate comprehension, the curricula, methods, and status of our schools suffer incalculably. Herbartianism is certainly original in the sense of Oliver Wendell Holmes[1]: "A thought is often original, though you have uttered it a hundred times. It has come to you over a new route, by a new and express train of associations." Or, as a further test, the reader may study some of the works on education written by men untouched by Herbartian thought, works such as the following (arranged in crescendo order of merit): Mr. H. Gorst's *Curse of Education*, Bishop Creighton's *Thoughts on Education*, Mr. Benson's *Schoolmaster*, and Thring's *Theory and Practice of Teaching*. The omission of almost any reference—even the most untechnical—to

[1] *Autocrat of the Breakfast Table.*

apperceptive interest is most striking, though Thring (to be sure) is sometimes on the verge of the doctrine. What is the explanation? Are we to accuse these authors of blindness to obvious truth, ignorance of a far-reaching educational principle? If apperceptive interest is all that the Herbartians claim, why are not other men than the Herbartians urging it in their educational writings? There is blunder, ignorance, or delusion somewhere.

The writer has the same lurking fear in the present year that there is a strain of fallacy or unsoundness somewhere in this book as he had when it was first published; but as no one has demonstrated this, and as he cannot discover it for himself, he feels no compunction in seeing the book placed before a larger circle of readers. If there is *any* truth in the doctrines here set forward, there is value in emphasising it for the sake of those thousands of teachers whose daily work seems often so dull and insignificant. To be the victim of a few educational fallacies is a small price to pay for an exalted sense of one's own daily calling. The writer's conviction that at the present juncture this should be the main purpose of every book on education is so intense that he proposes to add at this point a few remarks for further emphasis.

In the *Secret of Herbart* a claim is put forward that, as a moral force, apperceptive interest is at least an equal of religion. Recent events in the political world prompt to a further development of the theme. We have a right to ask, "What could religion itself do apart from education?"

Moral triumphs may in a myriad of cases be attributed with fairness to religion; but religion has to depend upon education for much of her authority and fascination. Even the Catholic Church, endowed, as she claims, with supernatural aids and graces, knows them to be futile apart from the purely natural means employed by the teacher. If called to the improbable choice between losing the first of her sacraments and losing the power of educating the young, the Church would choose the former loss, knowing in her heart that the "faith" of a "good Catholic" is not implanted by a baptism of water—as her formularies assert—but by an early and persistent rain of Catholic ideas. And what is true of the first is also true of the greatest of her sacraments. Apart from the faith and the thrills and the suggestions implanted by a Catholic education, the body of Christ would lie disregarded and unknown on every Catholic altar; while, conversely, though the sacramental power were mysteriously to fail throughout the world some fateful morning, switched off to another universe, the heads of Catholic worshippers would still sink at the sound of the consecration bell, and the transubstantiation miracle would still be thought and felt to have taken place.

Thus the power of the teacher, or of the priest as teacher, is immeasurably greater than that of the priest as priest; the latter power depends on the former, and would wither to nothingness without it. When in the Catholic confessional a schoolmistress pours out to some confessor the story of her omissions and peccadilloes, a trained eye can penetrate behind the veil of appearance, and see that to the kneeling penitent, not to her ghostly father, have the real power and authority over Catholic minds been given.

And that is why Churches stir uneasily at every successive Education Bill. Their Genius is rebuked in the presence of this other Genius of education. "In his royalty of nature reigns that which would be

feared." If any teacher of this country craves for the stimulus of compliments to hearten him amid his round of daily duties, none surely is more consoling than this, that pope and bishop and priest admit and parade their impotence without him; and, amid a miscellaneous crowd of physicians, merchants, and military men, kneel beseechingly at his feet. The religion, the health, the wealth, and the renown of the British nation would appear to depend upon him; at the door of his schoolhouse all roads meet. And, as the earnest educationist watches with some curiosity the motley throng, he will confess that, if the loud-voiced claim for dogmatic religious instruction can justify itself by fruitful and blessed lives, his own aversion to dogma must not be cast in the opposite scale. If education means character-forming, and if character-forming is impossible or problematic without dogma, the duty of the educationist is plain. Dogma there must be, at all costs. And this suggests an experiment.

If towns where the Anglican and Roman Churches have had their will can show a markedly high type of youth and citizen—the former more earnest than the youths of other towns, the latter more generous and high-minded than the citizens of other towns—the claim of the two Churches will be established on an immovable basis. There is Preston, there is Torquay, there is many another town where every public school is, and has been, Anglican or Roman. A Commission of six men could determine in as many months whether these towns were superior or inferior in morals and manners to Board School towns of similar type; and the controversy of 1906 would be settled for ever.

In one regard, at least, the clergy are right. Education is no mere process of "drawing-out." It is formative, masterful. The child has to be baptised into a new life; and, though the baptism which the Anglo-Catholic or the Roman Catholic holds technically to be the means of spiritual birth is not the Herbartian baptism of ideas, it has this in common therewith—that the recipient is not the agent, and that the crisis is one of life or death. It is because the educational issues are great, that in the *Secret of Herbart* the writer has constantly, unblushingly, and perhaps sometimes offensively, paralleled them with those of religion. The veil of grey commonplace that hangs before the eyes of ten thousand teachers has to be rent, and the *Secret of Herbart* seeks to rend it.

This, then—the power of apperception—is the message of the present book. And even if there are patent exaggerations and latent fallacies in its pages, the writer believes that the message was worth delivering. In this present age, when the hearts of many are failing them for fear, and sincere men sometimes question whether by opposing credulity they are not doing a positive disservice to mankind, it is good to know that there is work which we need not doubt about; educational work which helps to raise the race morally and spiritually, while adding nothing to the power or prestige of the forces of reaction.

F. H. H.

London, Christmas, 1906.

PREFACE (REVISED) TO THE FIRST EDITION

THE public—whose favourable reception of several recent works by the present writer has moved his grateful thanks—deserve an apology for the appearance of a new book on the old subject. There is nothing here that is positively fresh, nothing that cannot be inferred by any one who chooses to think out the implications of the apperception doctrine. Neither does the work contribute to the department of methodology. The writer feels that others, with more varied experience and more opportunities for observation than have fallen to his lot, can speak with far greater authority than he upon matters of that kind; and, indeed, with such Herbartians as Professor Adams at work upon questions of methodology, there is no need to anticipate any neglect of this department. Instead, therefore, of presenting a system of Herbartian doctrine, he has preferred to expound the one or two central thoughts which constitute its essence, and seem so vitally needed by the education of to-day—thoughts which have a closer bearing upon the character and the destiny of the nation than any other thoughts that he can expound.

Among the immediate causes which have led to the writing of a work following with such unusual haste upon others, these may be assigned :—

(1) Such a growth in the writer's own convictions as to make him distrust the somewhat crude panegyrics of *vielseitige Interesse* in which he has previously indulged. He still believes that the proclamation of the Interest gospel is among the most vital needs of the age; but he feels that the springs of Interest have been inadequately investigated and expounded, not only by others, but by himself. The real "Secret of Herbart" may remain a secret, even though "Interest" be proclaimed on every housetop.

(2) A fear—almost a certainty—that the new Education Committees are likely to apply the wrong remedies to our many educational diseases. There is some probability that England is about to settle down to another thirty years of educational routine; but there is still greater probability that such remedies as are applied will merely accentuate the greatest evil of all by drawing attention from it into other directions. The humble experiment which the writer made has convinced him, more than ever, that Herbart was right, and that the chief key to the educational situation lies in the apperception doctrine.

(3) Lastly, a desire for full, frank, and remorseless criticism. *Is* this doctrine nonsense? If it be nonsense, and Herbartianism a plausible delusion, or if the doctrine be merely commonplace in its importance, the sooner we devote ourselves to humbler things than thinking about the moral regeneration of man by means of education the better for us all. We will then essay to struggle on as of old, using instruments that have lost much of their significance, and performing, in a more humble and contrite spirit, the

commonplace duties assigned by tradition to the schoolmaster. The mystery of life will come back ; the veil will fall again over the springs of conduct. Once more we shall look upon our fellows to see each of them torn by a conflict between the angel and the devil within ; and we shall ask despairingly what it all means. If, however, the apperception doctrine is not nonsense, but sober truth, we shall be driven on to the inference that not in the church alone, but in the school, will the missionaries of the future have to work, equipped, not with Hebrew and Greek, but with psychology, ethics, and zeal.

The present work is thus a challenge as well as a creed. Few as are the men in England capable of answering the questions with authority, the writer deliberately asks them : "Is this apperception doctrine right or wrong, and can apperception be brought about by means of instruction, and if brought about can it pass over into action and character?" He is not conscious of any flaw in his argument, but there may be one. As an educational system, Herbartianism seems to him to have no errors, so far as it goes ; *to the extent of its own message it appears absolutely and faultlessly true ;* at the same time, the writer's experience is not such as to guarantee that he is infallibly right in holding and promulgating views so momentous of result. Already he has come to realise—as a few years ago he had not clearly realised—that Fröbel has a "secret" as well as Herbart ; and the vision of a third "secret" is rising before him, "a synthesis of Herbart and Fröbel."[1] He is, in short, humbled by a consciousness of how much in education is uncertain ; and he therefore asks, with utter sincerity, that critical minds in England capable of the task will do him the honour of criticising this book. It may be "suggestive," and "stimulating," and all the rest ; the writer wishes to know whether it is *true*. This, surely, should not be hard to decide, as the central thought of the book is unmistakable.

One criticism, at least, is easy to offer. If the writer's views are so transitional, why publish them at all ? Because British education needs, above everything else, views of some sort ; at present there are practically none, as is shown by the fact that no teacher dreams of calling himself an Herbartian or a Pestalozzian ; and, though a few enthusiastic lady teachers call themselves Fröbelians, it is very doubtful whether many school managers know what any one of the three terms means. All talk about educational "progress," whether at political caucuses or at teachers' conferences, is unmitigated nonsense until some definite views, theories, or ideals are possessed by the teachers of this country. Once these exist, there is a basis for criticism and progress ; a basis, too—though few teachers seem to realise the fact—for the establishment of professional dignity on firm foundations. But, without views, teachers will be for ever the catspaws of managers and officials no wiser than themselves, and such a thing as a unified and manageable curriculum will not exist. In fact, the doctrine of the curriculum has scarcely ever been seriously discussed in England until the year 1903, such pedagogical progress as may have taken place having been concerned only with methodology. Nay, we even hear of educationists who tell us that "it doesn't matter *what* we teach, but *how*."[1] The "Theory of

[1] Professor Welton's suggestive phrase in a recent number of the *Journal of Education*.

[1] The writer ventures to stigmatise this as the most criminally stupid fallacy at present circulating in the world. Luckily no one really believes

the Curriculum," to which Dörpfeld contributed so substantially, is virtually an untrodden field for English educationists. Yet it is perhaps a far more important field than methodology. There are plenty of teachers—perhaps the writer is one—who, as practical methodologists, would take only a low educational place; who possess little skill in pursuing Socratic or other methods of questioning, or in arranging a lesson according to the five Herbartian steps; and yet are quite capable of being useful and, perhaps, inspiring teachers, in view of the fact that they believe in teaching and have clear views upon the relative importance of subjects. It is to the two matters just mentioned that the present work is a contribution. Certainly, until there exist sound views upon the last subject, education will continue—as the able primary teacher mentioned on p. 34 expresses it—to be regarded as "a dumping ground" for all kinds of subjects and "fads." "A science of education," the present writer has elsewhere said, "would solve the religious difficulty," and also, be it now added, the ever-present difficulty of the overcrowded curriculum. But teachers, though constantly feeling the pressure of the situation, are strangely blind to the only possible source of relief. Let them once convince the nation that they are the expositors of a science, though perhaps an embryonic science, and also the apostles of a gospel, and the nation will cease to harass them with vexatious interferences. But so long as they studiously discount "ideals" and "theories," and rarely spend sixpence upon the philosophy of education; so long, in fact, as they confess themselves to be followers of a trade and not a profession, they must expect to be treated as such by a nation which possesses quite as clear views as themselves. For, after all, the nation has to pay, and teachers are not reticent in urging that fact. Let, then, the nation realise that it pays for clear views and for zeal.

To return. Despite the immensity of the claims put forward in these pages, the writer's attitude is, in large measure, apologetic. Not that he asks any indulgence for errors, or crudities, or inequalities; but he comes forward feeling how immense and untrodden is the field, how provisional must be even the most sincere work, how little he knows, how unbalanced his judgment may be—nay, how unworthy in a score of ways he must appear to those who know him best when compared with many of the men who, though adorning the ranks of secondary and primary education, have never ventured to put forward such gigantic claims as those of the present book. Yet, though he feels all this, he feels also that there are matters of momentous importance which, though some do not see so clearly as himself, yet deserve to be expounded. No one has ever claimed that the messenger who thinks he delivers an important message must himself be immaculate. Disregarding, then, the criticisms which his own mind suggests, the writer gives these pages to the world, convinced that they carry either a message of far-reaching significance, or a plausible delusion which had better be cleared out of the way as soon as possible. In ten years time his judgment may be more mature, his knowledge of education far more extensive. But—a decade more will have gone by; millions more of children may have passed through our schools mentally starved; educational machinery may be moving with such a smoothness that

it, though many *try* to believe it, and think it sounds well.

automata may be directing it; or, possibly, the educational chariot may have begun to travel rapidly at last—in the wrong direction.

Still, though the writer challenges criticism on the central ideas of this book, he does not ask for any petty criticism of the usual anti-Herbartian type. The standard objections to the supposed doctrines of Herbart have little practical bearing on these central ideas. "Interest," someone will say, "is largely dependent on hereditary endowment"; the answer is that though this is true (and was recognised by Herbart), no interest can spring up in a vacuum; the Herbartian element of apperception is vital, at any rate in all the knowledge departments. The real question is: "Given a normal mind (geniuses and imbeciles are not the special concern of the schoolmaster), does Herbart give a true hint of the means by which the mighty protective and directive force of interest can be generated?"

Again, the standard objection to the term "many-sided" as applied to interest is, in the opinion of the writer, partly at least justified. He does not drop the term entirely, but he thinks it will some day *have* to be dropped in place of a better one.

The real crux of the book is found on p. 47. Pages 36–40 expound a subject of vast importance, but one where agreement is fairly easy. If the factor discussed on p. 47 is really vital to the moral life, the main outlines of the primary curriculum begin at once to appear.

One personal matter. It may be said that the gloomy picture drawn in some parts of the book is an unfair one. Primary education in the north of England and in London is in a far better condition than primary education in the rural districts of the south. But the writer has never worked in the north or in London,[1] and only speaks of what he knows at first hand. In so speaking he trusts that he has said nothing to give offence, least of all to those who, amid the appalling conditions which obtain in the less cultured districts (where towns exist which have never, since they came into existence, possessed any educational institution except of the crudest kind), are doing what they can to raise the mental level. One fact is undeniable, and should fill teachers with acutest anxiety and perhaps reproach: *there are whole districts in England where the word "education" is a more hateful word than the word "drunkenness"*; where the best passport to municipal success is to promise to cripple education by financial parsimony; and where the mental life is centuries behind that of Japan (a country in which, as Meiklejohn's *Geography* tells us, "people are eager to learn and very willing to pay well for it"). It is true that the primary teacher has been, in years past, astonishingly efficient from the point of view of the 1861 code: he has performed tasks which one would have thought impossible; he has made, under official pressure, the most unpromising human material capable of reading, writing, and "working sums"—after a fashion. It is a daily wonder to the present writer how country schoolmasters, with their staff of two or three boys and their six score of raw children, can teach anything whatever, and do it on a salary that forbids the purchase of a book. But

[1] From more recent experience the writer would modify some of the statements of this book. But, though much of the educational work done in London schools is of a high order, the doctrine of apperceptive interest is almost as much needed in the metropolis as elsewhere. The many strong points of London schools are not those upon which stress is laid in the *Secret of Herbart*.

though, considering the means at their disposal, our primary teachers have earned their salaries ten times over, the fact remains that our primary system seems to have contributed little to the culture, morals, or ideals of the age. The name "education" is more hated now, in many districts, than it was at the middle of the past century.

Teachers are no longer enslaved to a rigid curriculum, and they will no longer be glaringly underpaid. Social repute they will not acquire for many years, and promotion to official positions will be barred to them so long as, in this country, these remain the monopoly of a certain social class, whose youths "look forward as a matter of course to positions and appointments, for the want of which men of gifts and capacity from other social strata break their hearts, and they will fill these coveted places with a languid, discontented incapacity."[1] But, despite the serious hindrances that will continue to cling about the work of the primary teacher, the fact remains that upon him, and not upon his languid or vigorous "superiors," rests the real educational task; it is in his schoolroom, and not in their bureau, that the forces making the future are mainly at work. The most powerful official in England would not deny that, nor take exception to the writer's remarks on page 20.

But one fetish the primary teacher must finally and scornfully abandon—the fetish that he is, in some specially notable and impressive sense, a "practical" worker. The facts that education is a detested thing in many districts, that the most popular subjects in evening schools are those that have been untouched by the day schools, and that town after town will refuse to support a free library, are sufficient to show that his boast is ill founded. If "practice" has failed to create a taste for books and for education, it is time that "theory" and "ideals" should have a chance. It is time, in short, for the teacher to make a fresh start, and for education no longer to be open to the reproach sometimes brought against the dramatist Euripides—that, though his plays are full of power, full of excellences in detail, he does not seem to know "what he is driving at."

Two final remarks. The writer would have liked to quote, *in extenso*, the recent pronouncements of Sir Oliver Lodge on education and sociology. They serve to show that thoughtful men who are not avowed Herbartians are moving towards Herbart's position on questions of curriculum, interest, and the like.[2]

Lastly, though a reply to Professor James, this work is rather a reply to a single expression used by that great psychologist than to his work as a whole. The *Talks to Teachers* is, in most matters, a strongly Herbartian book.

The author wishes to thank several friends for assistance and advice.

F. H. H.

Easter, 1904.

[1] H. G. Wells, in *Mankind in the Making.*

[2] See Appendix IV.

THE SECRET OF HERBART

THE most eminent of American psychologists complains that "the conscientious young teacher is led to believe that the word 'Apperception' contains a recondite and portentous *secret*,[1] by losing the true inwardness of which her whole career may be shattered.....Now, 'apperception' is an extremely useful word in pedagogics, and offers a convenient name for a process to which every teacher must frequently refer. But it verily means nothing more than the act of taking a thing into the mind."[2]

The following work is intended to show:—

(1) That the word "Apperception" *does* contain a secret which, though not "recondite," is immensely "portentous."

(2) That, by losing or never acquiring "the true inwardness" of this "secret," a teacher's whole career, and a nation's career also, are in danger of being "shattered."

(3) That, though "Apperception" may involve "nothing more than the act of taking a thing into the mind," the things taken in may sometimes be nothing less than "airs from heaven" counteractive of "blasts from hell."

(4) That, in fine, the "Apperception" doctrine has well-nigh incalculable moral, social, and spiritual implications.

[1] Italics ours.
[2] James, *Talks to Teachers*.

From thirty or forty thousand pulpits comes the cry of "Sin—sin—sin." And the louder the cry rises the less does the world seem to listen. In Bethnal Green, as a recent census shows, one person out of eighteen attends Sunday morning public worship; one person out of nine attends on Sunday evening. If the churches, on the present basis, are to be the sole agency for suppressing sin, then sin will never be suppressed, for people would seem to be growing less and less responsive to appeal from that source.

But the schools are filled to overflowing; and he who looks upon them and sees their doors thronged with those who are not, and perhaps never need become, "sinners," is driven to ask whether it is not at these crowded doors, rather than at the portals of the churches, that the problem of evil awaits solution. Would not one-tenth of the devotion now lavished—in great measure ineffectively—upon "missionary" or "rescue" work, or upon the necessary but thankless work of cherishing in a kindly way the useless and infirm, serve, if directed along more rational and scientific lines, to make education into the most powerful of all agencies for the suppression of evil? This is at least conceivable.

But education—as those at least in the southern rural counties know—has not

realised the high hopes once placed upon it. Judged by any test we choose to apply, education has *failed*.

(1) Morally—using the term in the narrow sense—the failure is unmistakable. We may be less brutally callous to suffering than our ancestors; it is doubtful whether we are more strenuous, pure, or self-denying. Often it seems as if, in place of every evil grappled with or suppressed, some new evil, or some new folly, generates itself out of nothing before our eyes.[1] True, the Church as well as the school must be regarded as responsible, in a measure, for this failure; gambling, intemperance, and foul language (if we may believe the first Mosely Commission) are far less prevalent among American workmen, brought up in "secular" schools and in a country where there is little or no official recognition of religion, than in our own. But for one department—that of "minor morals"—the school is almost alone responsible, and here the failure is overwhelming. So far as the duties of courtesy and decency are concerned, the words of the *Globe* newspaper[2] hold good: "The manners of the rising generation are non-existent."

(2) Take another standard—that of interests awakened or created by the school.

Where, outside a few great towns, can we find intellectual keenness? What subject taught in our schools attracts pupils, disinterestedly, after school days are over?

In one borough of 14,000 inhabitants there were, in 1902, some three or four students, exclusive of primary teachers, studying elementary chemistry.

In another borough, small, but regarded by its 3,000 inhabitants as progressive, not one student, exclusive of teachers who *had* to study the subject, was willing to pay a shilling for a course of lessons in chemistry. A disinterested desire for the subject simply did not exist. "*La république n'a pas besoin de chimistes.*"

Even in the continuation schools of London the attendance for all subjects except those that are purely utilitarian is meagre in the extreme. History, literature, might almost as well not exist.

No; from the point of view of interests roused or created, our schools would appear to be worse than failures. Pupils enter them at six full of inquisitiveness; they leave them full of mental apathy. It is no wonder, therefore, that Harwich and Fareham and Marylebone reject by public vote the offers of Mr. Carnegie. What have Harwich and Fareham and Marylebone to do with books and libraries? "How the London poor should love Dickens! But—with his books always obtainable—they can scarce be said to read him at all."[1]

(3) Take a lower standard yet—that of mere knowledge conferred and dexterity attained.[2]

Questioning the evening school pupils once entrusted to his charge, a teacher known to the writer discovered that none of them could find, by practical measurement, the volume of a wooden cube; that not one knew the distinction

[1] Popular betting on horses is a new evil; slavery to tobacco (as distinct from moderate indulgence) is a new evil.

[2] February 3rd, 1902.

[1] Gissing's *Dickens*.

[2] Things in this respect are probably better, on the whole, than what is here represented, though the statements made are facts. People familiar with our well-staffed London schools can scarcely conceive of rural conditions.

between a planet and a fixed star, or the relation of our solar system to the rest of the universe; and that not one knew the causes of the seasons. In a class for elementary mathematics the question, "What is the difference between twelve and twenty?" or, "If twenty is divided into two parts, one of them being twelve, what is the other part?" gave perplexity to the youths in their teens, who only recently had been pupils in a rural primary school; English literature was positively a sealed book; Jewish prophetic literature, and the immense influence exerted upon it by the Assyrian and other invasions and influences, were unknown.

(4) Take a lower standard yet. Five Dashshire boys out of ten, if asked what school they attend, will answer, "I *goes* to — School"; and scarcely two out of the ten will be able to compose, and to utter so as to be heard distinctly five yards away, a grammatical sentence of moderate length.

The second of these four standards—for reasons that will be still more obvious after the reading of this book—is the one upon which most stress should be laid.

The evening school is as much now the crucial test for the success of educational work as, in years to come, it will be the recruiting-ground for the forces of good. If the day school has implanted a love of knowledge, the evening school will bear its witness to the fact. But it bears none. The day school has failed, and the reason lies partly, at least, in the failure of teachers to realise the immensity of the mission to which they are called. In country districts the failure is almost inevitable; a pupil-teacher—perhaps a boy of fifteen who cannot speak English and has never touched genuine literature in his life—can no more teach anything, even the boasted three R's, than he can build a palace or work a miracle. But in the towns the results are often as unsatisfactory as in the country districts. The primary school in a thousand districts has implanted no tastes at all, and the pupils leave it at the age of fourteen with significant willingness. Like Marius amid the ruins of Carthage, the evening school teacher, surrounded by half-filled copy-books and tattered manuals of arithmetic, is virtually standing in the midst of ruins—the ruins of an ideal.

For there was once an ideal in England, dimly discerned, perhaps, and discerned only by a few; but nevertheless an ideal possessing some promise and possibility. The literature of the middle decades of the nineteenth century shows that there was, on the part of many an artisan, some eagerness to learn; and though primary teachers were fewer than now, and possessed but little training and no pretensions, their eyes were fixed on the future; there was hope and there was openness of mind. Pestalozzi's influence in England may not have been great, but it was present. Education had a spirit of its own; disillusionment had not come. Learning may not have been held in much esteem, but it was not, as now, regarded over whole regions with aversion and contempt. Books of "self-instruction" bear witness to this fact. Adam Bede attended an evening school, and his teacher was an enthusiast.

What has happened to change the fair though homely landscape to one from which colour and life seem absent?

Alas, we know. In 1861 occurred the saddest event, perhaps, in English history—the establishment of the "payment-by-results" system in the primary schools of this country; the official denial to the poor of this land of a humanising culture; the official behest to the teachers of the land to throw every ideal into the dust. The very years in which Ziller was first promulgating a scheme of "educative instruction"—instruction that should humanise and form character — were the years in which England first caught sight of this Gorgon-horror; a horror so intense that to this hour the primary education of England remains, in a measure, frozen and paralysed.[1]

There are men even now[2] who would fain bring back, in a modified form, the methods of those thirty frightful years. Asked what are the most important subjects in the primary curriculum, they will answer, "The Three R's." Nay, even teachers themselves will give this answer, as if fascinated by the vampire that has taken their blood.

Many who hear the pæans raised in praise of German educational thought are tempted to ask whether the pæans are not too loud. Has not *England* contributed something to education? Is not the most distinguishing mark of German educational literature its immense and bitter and trivial verbosity? The answer is that England has contributed noble teachers to the cause of education—men like Arnold, Thring, and Bowen in the secondary ranks; men like F. J. Gould and many another in the primary ranks; a host also of noble women; but to the clear and scientific comprehension of educational ideas and methods she has, until recently, scarcely contributed anything at all. This is illustrated by the disastrous answer above quoted, that the "Three R's" are the most vital subjects in the primary curriculum.

If the Herbartians have any message worth hearing, it is that, *except as means to an end*, the "Three R's" have but the smallest educational significance.[1] Dörpfeld and Ziller are here at one. "Despise 'theory' if you will, ye long-suffering and long-protesting teachers; but, until ye have framed for yourselves an educational ideal, determined the relative value of subjects as measured by the standard of that ideal, and formulated a curriculum in accordance with it, ye will continue to be subjected to the aggressions of officials exactly as fog-bound as yourselves; harassed by that constant multiplication of subjects which ye daily deplore; and humiliated by the sense that ye are not a profession of scientific specialists, but the mere 'cave-dwellers' that Professor Adams has called some of your fellowship."

The Code of 1861 has done its work. Only exceptionally is a primary schoolmaster, in the less favoured districts, a reader of books, a "local light," a man of ideas. "Teachers do not read books on education," was said to the present writer by an experienced

[1] And yet that system was introduced with the best of motives. Primary education was not all that it should have been; so the "practical man," Mr. Robert Lowe, came to the rescue. And the practical man has been coming to the rescue ever since, just because a "Science of Education" has not yet won any measure of popular recognition or esteem.

[2] *Schoolmaster*, February 6th, 1904.

[1] In an appendix the question of the "Three R's" is discussed at some length.

manager of a book store, who, as he said the words, seemed not to realise their frightful import. Nay, further, it is extremely doubtful whether, in the whole of England, there are many members of education committees who have ever heard of Comenius, Pestalozzi, or Herbart; or many who would spend a florin on a book dealing with education *per se;* or many who wish to learn, or believe in the possibility of learning, anything fresh about education. In their hearts, these people, the best in England, believe with Dr. Johnson that "education is as well known, and has long been as well known, as ever it can be;" and even inspectors, who, if any men, should be in the forefront of educational thought, differ widely upon every question of policy or principle. Quite often the official "prizes" of the educational world fall to men who do not even profess to know educational principles, to men of other and alien professions, to clerks in or out of holy orders. The notion that those principles exist—for those who choose to seek them with the sweat of their brow—has not yet dawned upon us. Education is regarded as something between a knack and a nuisance.

And, after all, teachers, managers, and inspectors are not much to blame. Why should they study educational principles when, to all appearance, such principles do not exist? Where can they find—to give an example of our present condition—an authoritative encyclopædia of education? Whom are we to believe, whom to follow? Are there five professors of education in the country exerting any influence outside the circle of their own pupils? Does not London support Herbart, and Edinburgh try to oppose him? Is it true that "there are scarcely three teachers of mark in England who work on the same lines," and that "our study of education is in its infancy"?[1] Are not Commoners at this moment urging, some that "children live on dogma," others that dogma is the last thing that children can grasp? Are not books on the philosophy of education the dullest books that exist?

Now, the truth is that education is one of the most illimitable, untrodden, and promising fields of research that can anywhere be found. Instead of there being nothing, there is almost everything for us to learn. Instead of having well-nigh reached its perfection and climax, it has scarcely yet entered upon the career that is bound to be ultimately so victorious. It is for this reason that the indifference of teachers, inspectors, and managers appears so strange. But time is on the side of education. The stars in their courses fight on its behalf. No human prediction is so scientifically reliable as the prediction that, sooner or later, the immense significance of education—a significance not only intellectual and economic, but moral and spiritual also—will be recognised, and that with this recognition will come a vast increase in the esteem bestowed upon those who choose (or chance) to adopt it as a profession. Even now, despite the obvious failure of recent years, one hears at times wistful panegyrics of what education might accomplish, though they who panegyrise it most are far from having consciously arrived at the standpoint to be set forth in this book. However small, indeed, may have been the educational progress of this nation when estimated by an absolute standard, it has

[1] Professor Findlay.

been superficially phenomenal and momentous when the last few years are alone taken into account; when, above all, the fact is remembered that the best men have never been attracted to the cause. In Britain alone four professorship of education have recently been filled—let us hope by men who know the "nation's need" and have a message.

"*Superficially* phenomenal and momentous." Yes, the progress is almost wholly on the surface, a progress in externals; in such things as buildings, salaries, organisation; in the complexity (almost the unwieldiness) of the curriculum; it is hardly a progress in ideas, in ideals, or in devotion. Our public educational bodies pay their best salaries to men who, though once perhaps good teachers, have been persuaded to be teachers no longer, and are now administrative officials destined by the nature of their new work to contribute only indirectly to teaching power; splendid salaries to architects who, though they may inspect every school chimney in existence, will leave education just where they found it. Our public bodies spend much on fine buildings—forgetful that, however desirable such buildings may be, the greatest educational experiment of modern times was performed by Pestalozzi in the poverty-stricken outhouses of a convent; disregardful, too, of the strange fact that, if Pestalozzi were at this moment working as a schoolmaster in England, he would not receive a quarter of the salary of some inspectorial superior. Nay, one asks, curiously, whether Pestalozzi — once a revolutionist and always an unbusiness-like dreamer — would not be wholly ignored alike by committees and by Whitehall.

There are two ways in which education may come to a revival. The first way is to *pay* for a revival; to offer high rewards, in the form of exceptional salaries, to all men who will contribute substantially to educational thought. This plan might ensure that some of the ability now drawn off in other directions would be devoted to the work where the need is greatest of all. In fifty years' time we should then, perhaps, have fifty educational thinkers, and in five hundred years' time a "Science of Education."

Unfortunately there exists no demand —or very little demand—for ideas; scarcely any conception that it is just in the absence of ideas where one of the greatest dangers lies; certainly small willingness to pay for ideas. Though we may, therefore, rightly contend that the ideal schoolmaster should be regarded and remunerated as a professional man, and even a man of research—the architect of the mind being regarded as at least equal to the architect of bricks and mortar, the physician of the mind equal to the physician of the body; though we may rightly urge that a Science of Education—co ordinate with a Science of Medicine and a Science of Architecture, and twenty times as significant as either —is to come into existence, yet, unless we can find some other and more powerful lever than this, we must dismiss all hope of solid or early educational progress.

As a profession, education has never yet had a chance; yet it is infallibly and demonstrably the calling of the future, the one that will attract, in coming decades and centuries, many of the most original and devoted minds. But it must first discover for itself some

standpoint from which it will appear as a truly "portentous" and vital matter; more portentous and vital than weary details of church ritual, or the faith-healing ecstasies of an American neurotic. Religion—nay, superstition herself—can experience revivals; we read of the rise of Methodism, we read of the Oxford Movement, we read of the Christian Scientists. Why, then, should not education have her revivals too? Was not Comenius the equal of Wesley, Pestalozzi as great as Newman, Herbart greater than Mrs. Eddy? A revival, indeed, is not only possible, but—*if only education can discover a standpoint for herself*—quite inevitable. Is there such a standpoint, or must educationists continue to pursue their calling with divided aims and cold hearts? *There is such a standpoint;* occupying it, teachers, as a class, will catch a glimpse of an ideal that has never yet, save to a few of their keener-eyed fellows, revealed its stately proportions. And why, indeed, should education be without millennial dreams; or why call them dreams that are so well based on scientific necessities?

The Rev. R. J. Campbell, a "popular preacher" who is a genuine thinker as well as a preacher, has been recently predicting a "great revival" in evangelical religion.[1] Is this, then, to be all that the new century has to offer—a repetition of paroxysms, which, once passed, will leave mankind but little changed? Is there no new ground to break up? Is evangelical Protestantism to hark back, as Anglicanism is harking back, to vanished centuries; seeking to animate old forms with a new spirit, or to dress the old spirit in new forms? The task may be a worthy one, but there remains yet a finer, more promising, and more original task still—one that, in England, has never been attempted at all; the task of animating *new* forms with a *new spirit;* the task of bringing about an *educational revival*, of moving along lines never before trodden by English feet. With twenty men of Mr. Campbell's calibre as leaders, this task might be attempted; but education has scarcely any leaders at all, and those that she has, scarcely realise that well-nigh every moral and social current of the age is setting slowly in their direction, and that they, if wise and far-seeing, can direct those currents to mighty ends.

"Scientific," yes; we will never forget that some day there will be a "Science of Education," even though we may question whether educational revival will have its origin solely in systematised scientific thought. Such a "science"—ever before the minds of those educationists who have been influenced by German thought—will be a body of principles based securely on psychology and kindred studies, consequently possessing authority and adding dignity to its exponents. The notion is a fine one, and will some day—if more men of the stamp of Professors Adams and Findlay are raised up—be gloriously realised; for in the writings of men like these we see the coherent outlines of a new science already beginning to appear. But, in the belief of the present writer, this scientific standpoint, taken alone, is not the one that will effect any immediate transformation, though it will do much; solving many of the perplexities and contradictions of present-day effort, and lifting those who follow education as a

[1] The prediction has since been realised, but England seems much the same after all. Perhaps the reason is not far to seek. See p. 61.

calling some inches out of the professional gutter in which they now lie.

Our leading educationists almost without exception—even those who are "scientific" in spirit, nay, even those who, at times, catch a noble Pisgah view of the future—speak with bated breath and modest diffidence. They seem to have but little faith in their subject and their profession. They feel, perhaps rightly, that a "Science of Education" in its completeness is still a far-off ideal; accordingly, they hesitate to suggest an aggressive forward movement; they question whether the resources for it exist; their policy remains slow, cautious, tentative.

Their motives may be good, but the policy is fatal. There is no need to wait for a completed "Science of Education" before inaugurating a forward movement. The scientific standpoint pure and simple is probably not the one, be it repeated, from which the movement will start. There is another standpoint. In ten years' time education may be revolutionised—if a few hundred teachers choose to occupy this standpoint.

The whole case may be summed up in a few words; and if these words can be justified, they will convict almost every educationist in the country—even the most "scientific"—of working, partly at any rate, on the wrong lines. *Education must be regarded primarily less as a science than as a gospel.* Instead of there being a "Logical Basis of Education"—to use Professor Welton's terminology—there must first be an "Ethical Basis." If this is "scientific" too, so much the better.

Wonderfully coherent will the whole subject become when once this standpoint is occupied. Wonderful the change in the status and the spirit of teachers. Wonderful, also (to mention a minor point), the change in our way of regarding the function of educational journals, the best of which are now devoted to the discussion of matters which, though frequently of real importance, fail somehow to reveal this importance—fail, in fact, to force themselves on us as vital. We ask, somewhat sceptically, whether articles on "Individuality" or the "Culture Stages" possess, after all, much real significance. "Is education really a very momentous matter?" we seem to hear our professors asking as they post their manuscripts. "Some more words—words—words," we seem to hear editor and readers say, as the article stands before them. In the highest as in the lowest ranks of the educational hierarchy, men look at each other as the ancient augurs looked—with an ever-present inclination to laugh. Now and then there comes a man seeing dimly or clearly the unrealised possibilities that lie in education; but, on the whole, educationists, "scientific" or "empirical," do not appear to be very much in earnest.

There exists a view of things, an attitude, a standpoint, which will change all this. Sooner or later teachers will come to realise that *they have a great part—the chief part—to play in battering down the ancient fortresses of evil.* Those ancient fortresses still stand, defying all puny present efforts to reduce them to ruins. The mightier artillery of education has yet to be brought up, and, when brought up, it will be found to be, in the truest sense, "scientific."

Sin, *Vice*, *Moral Evil*. But is there, after all, any weapon by which this monster may be slain? Perhaps none. Is there any weapon by which it may be reduced to comparative impotence? There are two, and probably only two, if we except weapons like criminal law, used by the State for its own purposes. Two weapons, one consecrated by centuries of use, the other well-nigh—in a sense—fresh from the armoury, lie before us. Used in conjunction, they will effect much; either, alone, will effect something.

The first, and the more ancient, is religion. So great are the claims put forward on its behalf that the mere whisper of the existence of other weapons, perhaps equally or still more potent, will be heard with disfavour in many circles. Nothing but the Catholic Church, in Newman's belief, was able to baffle and withstand "the fierce energy of passion,"[1] and non-Catholic writers tell the same story of the "impotence of men in dealing with sin."[2] Preachers of all creeds, in fact, will tell us that without religion there can be no true morality; and even the atheist seems at times willing to admit that some forms of religion are powerful allies to virtue. Yet, after all, there is no *necessary* connection between the two. Some religions, like that of the ancient Phœnicians, were provocative of vice. Moreover, they who tell us that there can be no true morality without religion will tell us at another time—all unconscious of self-contradiction—that *mere* morality avails nothing, thus implying that there can be *mere* morality—morality apart from religion. The facts of the case are not really difficult to ascertain. Religion, in many of its forms, is a powerful ally of morality, but it is not the sole ally, nor, considering the prestige and the resources at its disposal, has it proved itself a very constant or able ally. There may exist other allies whose value has been hitherto underrated, perhaps even ignored altogether.

This is implied in the words of Dr. G. A. Smith: "Sin is the longest, heaviest drift in human history.....Men have reared against it government, education, philosophy, system after system of religion. But sin has overwhelmed them all."[1]

"Overwhelmed them all"—even religion—even Christianity itself, as we shall see in a moment. The confession is a true one, though presently the question will be asked, legitimately enough, whether the second of the barriers mentioned by Dr. Smith—education—has ever been reared *in earnest*; whether the erection of this barrier has not been left to the despised ones of the earth; whether, in fact, the resources of education, as a moral agency, have ever been seriously and designedly and intelligently called into play. But for the present let us abide by Dr. Smith's confession; and it amounts (among other things) to this, that *religion, though a barrier to sin, is not an invincible one. It may appear in the end that sin cannot be wholly suppressed by religion;* therefore, to neglect the other great force or forces by which this suppression may be, in part, accomplished is well nigh a criminal procedure. What the force or forces may be will appear later on. Here we have mainly to

[1] *Apologia.*
[2] Rev. R. E. Welsh, *In Relief of Doubt.*

[1] *Isaiah*, vol. i.

realise the significance of the statement just made, because, if that statement is true, it is indeed immensely significant. *Perhaps evil cannot be wholly suppressed by religion alone.*

Proof of this comes from the most conclusive quarter — religious people themselves. There is no need to use the common, and not altogether reputable, argument that an examination of these religious people shows their lives to be no better than the lives of others. The argument—all things considered—is not wholly fair, though fair enough when used against those who claim religion as the *only* moral panacea. No; the best argument of all is found in the Prayer Book, especially in the General Confession and the Litany. Sin, we there discover, rages still in the bosom of the believer. Evil, in varied forms, still strives for mastery. Nay, the most intensely "religious" people — those devoted wholly to an ascetic or "religious" life—daily confess to sins of thought at least, which some more prosaic people, engrossed in wholesome "hobbies" and "secular" interests, in politics, in book-reading, and so forth, commit perhaps less or not at all.

Evidence from outside — evidence adduced by observant schoolmasters and others who have been face to face with intense forms of juvenile evil—bears out this conclusion. And be it here remembered that, though religion has been often neglectful of the civic and intellectual virtues, she has never failed to hold up a high standard of sexual morality. Let us take her, then, on the ground where she is strongest.

"Emotional, and sometimes preciously religious, boys are found to be in sad trouble from" one particular moral foe.[1]

The evil here referred to "is not necessarily the indication of a coarse nature. It is observable in refined, intellectual, and even pious persons."[2]

"The boys whose temperament specially exposes them to these faults are usually far from destitute of religious feelings; there is, and always has been, an undoubted co-existence of religiosity and animalism; emotional appeals and revivals are very far from rooting out carnal sin; in some places they seem actually to stimulate, even in the present day, to increased licentiousness."[3]

In view of facts like these there is some temptation to take up the extreme and probably unwarrantable position that the function of religion is to give consolation and rest rather than character and conduct; "that by the doctrine of forgiveness of sins, consequent on repentance even in the last moments of life, Christianity often favours spirituality and salvation at the expense of morals";[4] that the humble function of training character and conduct falls to education and similar agencies; that "mere morality"—as preachers have before to-day insisted—is something different from that of which they are the guardians. The standpoint is, be it repeated, unwarrantable, because one-sided. What is true and safe is this: *that religion is one barrier against sin, but it is not the only one, nor is it invincible.* "Religious faith," a great educator has said, "instead

[1] Rev. the Hon. E. Lyttleton, in *Training of the Young in the Laws of Sex.*
[2] Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell, in *Counsel to Parents.*
[3] Archdeacon Wilson, in *Essays and Addresses.*
[4] Cotter Morison, in *The Service of Man.*

of being the only source of goodness, seems only one of many."[1]

If anything in this book should be thought to be a slight on the power, in the human heart, of true religion, the author would regret that the book existed. Evil is too great a foe for any weapon to be rejected. Happy the man who has heard not only the message of Herbart, but any message which, coming from the unseen, serves to lighten the burdens of life and solve the problems of existence. But exaggerated praise of religion is as nauseous as unjust depreciation; it is *not* true, it has never been true, no professor of ethics and no observer of human life can claim as true, that morality is solely dependent on religion. Probably not more than one moral act out of three springs from a motive which can be called, in any strict sense, religious. Goethe directed those who were without art or science to go to religion; and the advice (as this book will show) might be equally well reversed, without disrespect to art, or science, or religion.

> What keeps a spirit wholly true
> To that ideal which he bears?
> What record? not the sinless years
> That breathed beneath the Syrian blue."[2]

Here the argument may pause for a moment. One "cure for sin" has been found to be but a partial cure. Religion, though sometimes powerful, is not omnipotent. Would it not be well, before asking what other cures for evil exist, to ask after the origin of evil itself? Or is it so inexplicable that its origin (or origins) cannot be traced? Is it something mysterious, unaccountable; a devouring Minotaur which refuses to explain or to justify its voracity; a chasm in the forum of human life ever remaining open, even though many a Curtius throw himself, with his hopes and ambitions, into the gulf? Or is it not rather an intelligible *effect*, with definite causes of its own?

It is *not* intelligible, if we may believe theological books. Be he orthodox or heterodox, Catholic or Protestant, the theologian gives up in despair the task of explaining or accounting for sin. Once admitted, he can seek, and does seek, to fit it into schemes of salvation or justification; but the thing itself baffles him at every point. Now, the reason why theologians should fail ignominiously where Herbart succeeds gloriously—for Herbart's explanation, even if not a complete one, is magnificently true so far as it goes—is that they begin with the absolute, while, educationally, he began with man.[1] If a hundred observers, with a psychological equipment, would do likewise, and make a point of investigating every case of moral failure that comes under their observation—every case, at any rate, that is capable of being investigated—this mystery would probably be found to be no mystery at all. Strange that this has never been done! Strange that, except from the medical side, the idea of such a task has scarcely occurred to mankind! Strange, above all, that men who are ordained to wage war against evil should be the most prominent of all in confessing it to be unaccountable!

[1] Rev. R. H. Quick, in *Life and Remains.*
[2] *In Memoriam*, LII.

[1] In educational circles there is an impression that Herbart "deduced" his educational ideas from his metaphysics. In point of fact, he started from the educational standpoint. Largely, it was his experience with a difficult boy, Ludwig Steiger, that forced him onward. See the writer's *Critics of Herbartianism*, Appendix.

Yet these men are zealous against their ghostly foe; they, like Curtius, will often throw themselves into the gulf that, nevertheless, remains mysteriously open, despite the sacrifice of the nation's bravest. Perchance the most acceptable sacrifice of all has never yet been made. Perchance *this* chasm, unlike the one which opened in ancient Rome, asks—not for mere heroism, but—for scientific thought. Throw that into the gulf, and maybe it will begin to close. "If, for the fall of man, science comes to substitute the rise of man, it means the utter disintegration of all the spiritual pessimisms which have been like a spasm in the heart and a cramp in the intellect of men."[1]

In plain words, we have to treat sin as a scientific problem is treated. Having once so treated it, having once traced it to some at least of its causes, we may then, with all the devotion and heroism at our command, aim at its cure. But mere heroism and devotion are things wasted. We want a gospel; this book is written to urge the need of one; but it must be a scientific gospel. An ounce of scientific thought is worth a ton of ignorant zeal. And such zeal, on their own confession, is the chief tribute that the Churches are paying; for well-nigh every theological book avows that sin is a mystery in the universe, something to be treated in much the same way as primitive man treated disease; something, in fact, quite unaccountable, baffling, diabolical.

Or—to change the thought—as medical men, till recently, treated phthisis. Unconscious that the most deadly foe to the consumption germ was the free air of heaven, physicians secluded their patients in rooms from which that free air was scrupulously excluded. And we, too, physicians for a moral phthisis, would fain kill the germ by hot-house remedies, all unconscious that, by placing our patient amid a more bracing atmosphere, the task could be performed with immeasurably greater prospect of success. What is the atmosphere which saves from moral phthisis?

"Lust and brutality are generated as certainly as scrofula and typhus"[1]—given definite conditions. They follow from these conditions with well-nigh the inevitable certainty of the lightning flash. The glory of Herbartianism is that it knows the conditions—one, at least, of them; and, knowing the conditions, can also point to the cure.

To treat moral failure as really unaccountable, as a baffling immensity, mysterious in its origin and exhaustless in its resources, as a bolt from the blue, as a *diabolus ex machinâ*, is to treat the universe as finally and almost utterly unintelligible. Holding such a view, man can but wring his hands in hopeless anguish. Of little use the incantations offered up, Sunday by Sunday, for deliverance from the formidable catalogue of sins contained in the Litany. If evil exists as an entity, and not merely as an effect, the human heart may plead, but will plead in vain, for complete deliverance. Throned in the universe, regal mid clouds and mysterious darkness, evil will never fail of subjects and servants. The best we can then hope for will be that the forces of good will be

[1] O. W. Holmes, in *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table.*

[1] Sir Leslie Stephen, in *An Agnostic's Apology.*

ever found sternly marshalled against those of evil, fighting a hopeless but endless battle.

The moment, however, that evil appears as an effect, the battle is seen not to be hopeless. When the causes have been discovered the cure may soon be discovered too.

No pretence will here be made that all those causes, racial and other, have been discovered. Until they are sought for in a scientific spirit they cannot be. For centuries men regarded disease as something unintelligible by natural laws, and the Church, trusting to shrines and relics, discouraged the study of medicine, or, more compromisingly, gave efficacy to a physician's drug by saying a prayer over it; for a still longer period men regarded poverty as similarly unintelligible, to be treated only by doles at the monastery gates; and probably for a yet longer period they will prefer to regard moral evil as unintelligible also. But medicine is tracking disease to its origin; sociology is tabulating the causes of poverty;[1] and, sooner or later, the causes of moral evil will be finally revealed to the patient investigator. Already some of those causes are open to the light of day.

Strange that men should refuse or dislike to look at evil in this scientific way! Strange the fascination exerted by the unaccountable! Yet the fascination exists. Even when, momentarily occupying a pseudo-scientific standpoint, men make one feeble attempt to assign to sin its causes, almost the only cause[2] they discover acquires the mysteriousness and unaccountability that has been transferred from the thing itself. That cause is nothing less than Free Will, a something which, though inexplicable, seems to flatter our conceit, and to remove from us the trouble and obligation of penetrating farther into the springs of conduct.[1]

To deny man's prerogative of "freedom" would be a bold and probably a mistaken step—certainly a step likely to be misunderstood and to do harm. The supreme moments of life, when consciousness is at a maximum, and when great moral crises occur, are moments of apparent "freedom" and of mysterious import. Often it seems impossible to predict the result of thoughtful deliberation at such solemn moments as these, deliberation whether of our own or of others. We can say of our Will what Antonio said of his sadness:—

> "How I caught it, found it, or came by it,
> What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born,
> I am to learn."

We are in the position of the individual who has never seen iodine and phosphorus spontaneously ignite to form a new and different substance. Such moments are moments of—apparent freedom; and here "apparent freedom"

[1] *Vide* Mr. Rowntree's *Poverty*, quoted from below.

[2] There is also the bad angel of "original sin," and there is the good angel of "grace." But the theology of both of these is hopelessly chaotic. If "original sin" meant heredity, and if "grace" included all kinds of educational influences, there would be helpfulness in the Church formulæ. But such a reconciliation with modern thought is difficult, and neither doctrine is *easily* to be adjusted to the third doctrine of Free Will. Heredity is *not* washed away at baptism; and the dyslogistic talk about "secular subjects" forbids us to identify the illuminative power of these subjects with the power of "grace," or of the "Holy Ghost," though Miss Mason half suggests such an identification *(Home Education)*.

[1] See how one of our greatest writers plays with the subject. Prof. G. A. Smith's *Isaiah*, vol. i.

performs all the functions of "real freedom," inasmuch as it imparts a sense of responsibility, acts as a motive, and may turn the balance to this side or to that.

One great British writer on education, perhaps our greatest writer, lays ceaseless stress upon this supreme prerogative.[1] Education, according to him, must ever keep in view the fact that man is not a machine, not even an enormously complex psychical machine, but rather a being in whom a free rational principle, unaccountable by explanation from below, has its seat.

True, the question may be asked even here, whether, when a few more centuries or decades of scientific research have passed, this residuum of unaccountability may not be accounted for. May not, some day, even the remotest springs of action be exposed to view? This is possible. When psychology and sociology have advanced far beyond their present standpoint, they may be able to assign causes to "pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy," and the rest of the catalogue, with as much precision as that with which physical science is able to assign causes to "lightning and tempest, plague, pestilence, and famine." Our mediæval Litany places all these on the same level of unaccountability; our coming sciences may some day place them again on the same level—that of accountability. In other words, every sin that has ever been sinned by a sinner may, without, let us hope, any weakening of moral responsibility, be as securely traced to its causes in heredity, variation, and environment (including education) as the lightning flash can be traced to definite atmospheric conditions. Life may become tamer when thus deprived of its mysteries and surprises, but it need not be essentially unhappy; indeed, most of the springs of present-day misery will have been diverted or removed, though, perchance, new springs may have welled up.

But at present the admission must be made that there is an unaccountable element in human nature—an element of Free Will; and that this, whether an illusion generated by our ignorance of psychical causes, or, as is more probably the case, a reality due to the actual presence in man of a superior spiritual principle, is an element which should not be neglected in any complete theoretical account of human nature.

Yet—and this is the main point in the present discussion—nine-tenths of human conduct are practically independent of this "superior spiritual principle." Man may not be wholly a machine, but he is largely, mainly, a machine. The man of culture, reflecting calmly upon alternative courses of action — *any* man, indeed, at the moment of some great moral crisis — may, in an intelligible sense, be "free"; but even the man of culture, and, still more emphatically, the man devoid of culture, act, through the greater part of their lives, in a way that is largely if not wholly mechanical. Now, most if not all of our great educational writers—we have a few—know education mainly in its higher grades, and amid the atmosphere of the traditional culture. Naturally, then, they lay stress upon the "higher" aspects of mental life. The voice of the primary teacher, working amid the slums of our

[1] Dr. Laurie.

great cities or the intellectual deserts of our agricultural counties, is silent, or too Doric for the ears of our university professors. But if that teacher were questioned as to the applicability of the "superior spiritual principle" to the work of educating his pupils, he would —however painful the confession may sound — smile somewhat sardonically. *His* pupils, he suspects, are virtually machines. *Their* conduct, though occasionally inexplicable, owing to his ignorance of their nature, does, on the whole, follow as logically from their past as the motion of the billiard ball follows upon the nature of the blow it receives. The "freedom" principle sounds well in university class-rooms, and may, indeed, represent a fundamental philosophical truth; but as an educational maxim it is singularly useless.

If the medical man, in treating his patient for phthisis or diphtheria, had to face the possibility that Powers, divine or diabolical, were ever on the watch, aiding or counteracting his own efforts, he would be reduced to comparative and ludicrous helplessness. There would be small need or use for lengthy medical study; the most conscientious attentions to his patient might at any moment be rendered vain by diabolical interference; his grossest blunders neutralised by divine assistance. A Science of Medicine would cease to exist. It is for this reason that medicine refuses to speak of "Vital Force"—a mere name for whatever is at present physiologically unaccountable.

So, also, if the educationist, in seeking to build up the moral life of his pupils, concedes that "Free Will" may, at any moment, reduce his best efforts to impotence or his greatest blunders to means of grace, he may advisably change his profession at once for one in which he can, with some certainty, count upon effecting results. He may, from the standpoint of a metaphysician, admit the existence of a "superior spiritual principle"; he may, from the standpoint of a psychologist, admit that human conduct is sometimes unpredictable (owing to the complexity of man and the imperfect condition of psychology); but he can never, as an educationist, admit that the highest law of education is lawlessness. He must believe in education, or he has no right to expound it; he must believe that effects follow causes, and that, however complex human nature may be, however unknown at present many of the springs of conduct, he, as an operator upon his pupils, can help to mould their lives. Sin he must regard as an effect, not wholly as a mystery; and Free Will he must regard as a deity to be worshipped by the lips rather than by the heart. "The theological doctrine of grace and the metaphysical doctrine of the freedom of the will.....both presuppose an unknown factor whose presence or absence cannot be foreseen, and whose action cannot be measured. It is here, it is there, it is gone, and no one can tell why. It at once upsets prevision of the future, and cancels all record of, and inference from, the past."[1]

Herbart's attack, or supposed attack, upon Free Will is a puzzle to many. But the reasons for the attack will be now not far to seek. He seems to have had a deep-rooted dislike for the shadowy phraseology of the idealistic

[1] Cotter Morison, in *The Service of Man.*

school—the appeals to the agencies of some mysterious background inaccessible to influence, unintelligible to the scientific reason. "Self-activity," "transcendental freedom," and all similar terms standing for a celestial or abysmal principle which no one can claim genuinely to understand—Herbart would have none of these. A "self-activity" rooted in "presentations"; an "inner freedom" identical with "insight"—such things he would admit, but a mere *diabolus* or *deus ex machinâ* ever ready to appear upon the stage without notice or justification, dislocating every homely arrangement, and throwing his weight, without rhyme or reason, into the scale of good or evil—*this* Herbart refused to recognise as a factor worthy of being considered in a Science of Education. "Not the gentlest breath of transcendental freedom must be allowed to blow through ever so small a chink into the teacher's domain. If so, how is he to begin to deal with the lawless marvels of a being superior to natural laws, on whose assistance he cannot reckon, whose interruptions he can neither foresee nor prevent?"

Not that Herbart ever denied a real "Inner Freedom." He spoke of "the noble feeling that virtue is free"; of "the judgment to which the desires bend amazed." It was "transcendental freedom" which he attacked, on the ground that "nothing could be built on it." And, educationally, nothing ever has been built upon it, except that tens of thousands of teachers have been kept in professional servitude because, through this doctrine, their "secular" work has never been seen in its true significance. Admit a miraculous "Will," and a score of other miracles—conversions, sacraments, and the like, in which the humble teacher plays no part—seem the only hope for the moral health of the world. But admit that, though there is something of mystery, there is nothing of miracle in the will, and the work of the teacher suddenly appears in its immeasurable power and promise. To deny the primacy of the will is to assert the primacy of the teacher.

There is much that is unaccountable in man; but surely education should base itself—so Herbart seems to have felt—upon those elements that are accountable rather than upon those that are the opposite. To glory in the mysterious may be the best of qualifications for the future priest; it is the worst of qualifications for one who seeks to build up a Science of Education. Conduct must have its causes: if those causes are unknowable, the teacher's work is reduced to an absurdity; if they are partly knowable, it is the teacher's duty to keep close to them so far as knowable; if they are wholly knowable, a Science of Education is not far off, and the teacher's work lies plain before him. "Ministers talk about the human will as if it stood on a high look-out, with plenty of light, and elbow room reaching to the horizon. Doctors are constantly noticing how it is tied up and darkened."[1] And what doctors notice teachers must notice too.

There is, no doubt, a charm about the mysterious. But to build a system of education, or a code of morals, upon a foundation of mysteriousness is surely a strange and dubious procedure—an impossible procedure, one would think, did not facts show that it has been

[1] Oliver Wendell Holmes, in *Elsie Venner*.

attempted, and is defended in every theological work that deals with sin. *If education is ever to grapple seriously with the problem of evil, we must assume that evil can be grappled with*, that it is an effect, and that its causes are knowable. In other words, we must be, in so far as we are educationists, determinists. Herbart knew from the first that he "would never be understood by those to whom the co-existence of determinism and morality was still a riddle"; and his prediction has turned out true.

It is a riddle, and yet not a wholly baffling one. Any day of our lives we can see taking place the manufacture of moral good and evil; the thread is spun, and goes to the loom. True, in the recesses of one's own consciousness may sometimes move a seemingly disturbing force; unaccountable phantoms may cross our path; we may feel

> Obstinate questionings
> Of sense and outward things,
> Fallings from us, vanishings;
> Blank misgivings of a creature
> Moving about in worlds not realised,
> High instincts, before which our mortal nature
> Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised.

We may experience all this; we may even regard the experience as "the fountain light of all our day"; but we cannot build a system of education upon "worlds not realised." If we are Herbartians, at any rate, we shall prefer to deal with the world of ideas which *can* be realised.

In so preferring, the Herbartian looks upon the pupil before him not as a duplicate being, half angel, half devil, largely or wholly outside the range of any influence that he can exert, but as a starving soul doomed to perish unless the bread of life and the water of life are freely brought. And the history of education shows that the Herbartians actually try to bring the mental and moral bread of life and water of life; that they are zealous in so doing, and that they realise, as no other educationists seem to realise, how pressing is the need. If, then, determinism makes educationists zealous—as the Puritans were made zealous under the influence of their denial that "the act of conversion depends upon the concurrence of men's Free Will"—it cannot be the wholly bad and paralysing thing that its opponents assert. The Herbartian himself, faced by the awful precision of his own principles, may feel in danger of becoming a spiritual automaton; but his pupils, at the least, will have no reason to regret the hour when those principles became his rule of life. There is thus an infinite mercifulness about Herbartianism. Unless he assume that Divine grace can miraculously change the vilest character, the Herbartian sees no fate but perdition before a soul that is mentally starved; and seeing no other fate—realising, as no other educationists realise, that "stupid men cannot be virtuous"—he comes himself to the rescue, determining that, should starvation take place, the fault shall not be his.

One recent writer, appearing as champion of the "angel and devil" theory, condemns Herbartianism for looking upon a child who has committed this or that fault as being "a piece of apparatus, an imperfect organisation of apperceptive systems, which we must endeavour to patch up"; evil, in fact, being "a form of disease or imperfection."[1] Yes, that is

[1] Prof. Darroch, in *Herbart: A Criticism.*

how we regard it; and, dark though our view may sometimes appear, it has the glow of heaven itself upon it when compared with the view promulgated by the champion of "Self-activity," "Self-determination," and "Reason"; the view that the "child and the criminal can deliberately, and with full intent, set up their private wills against the common or moral will of the community." "The child—with full intent!" And these are the corollaries from an idealistic philosophy! Surely the grossest materialism is tenderness itself compared either with an "idealism" which believes that in the breast of children—of whom, in the view of one religion, the kingdom of heaven consists—there can be not only an "intent," but a "full intent," to take the downward road; or with a system of evangelical religion that can describe a child of seven as under "conviction of sin";[1] or with a system of Catholic religion which packs him to the confessional at the same age. No; dim though our sight may be, hard though the task of discovering in every case the sought-for causes, we nevertheless prefer to regard sin as ultimately due to imperfection rather than devilry; we nurse our philosophical tenderness, and leave to others the nursing of philosophical severity; we believe that we are nearer to the truth than they, and that our principles will be recognised when theirs have been long forgotten. If we were given the choice, we should prefer even a rigid, mechanical, and one-sided presentationalism that made an attempt at explaining evil, to an idealism that, giving up all explanation in despair, calls up from the shades some spectre of "Self-activity" which, when scrutinised, is found to possess the lineaments of Sathanas himself. Firmly, albeit with modesty, we would fain believe and assert that "*tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner.*"

[1] Dr. Torrey.

We refuse to discuss unmeaning remedies for evil; every hour devoted to such discussion is an hour taken from more solid work. In the tremendous words of Herbart: "While morality is rocked to sleep in the belief in transcendental powers, the *true* powers and means which rule the world are at the disposal of the unbeliever." We will not burrow for some deep principle that, because of its very depth, has no applicability to the life of man on the surface of this earth; we do not burrow for coal below or amid the sterilities of the Old Red Sandstone. To talk of the Divine "self-realisation" of a child in our slums or hamlets is but to reveal our inexperience of life. What "self" is here beyond a few animal impulses and a vast echoing emptiness of mind?

"Man," says Tennyson through the lips of the aged speaker in the second *Locksley Hall*, "can half control his doom." But Tennyson, too, like those philosophers and educationists who lay stress on "Free Will" and "Self-activity," was not a teacher in city slums or country desolations. He who labours beneath the cloud of mental poverty incumbent over the primary school and its inmates will look about him for a system based, not on a morally aristocratic principle like this, but for a system which takes account of that cloud of mental poverty.

And thus he alights upon Herbartianism, which, instead of panegyrising a "Freedom" practically non-existent except at mature stages of development,

and therefore singularly useless as a principle for the training of children, frankly recognises "mental poverty" as a fact, and one of immense import; "the stupid man cannot be virtuous." And the more he contemplates Herbartianism the more he recognises, not in its details, but in its supreme categories and its spirit, something immensely portentous, something that may revolutionise education by making it a living thing—something, indeed, that has already begun to effect this in more countries than one. He begins to see in it a force which, allied with religion and with economic and hygienic progress, can accomplish all for the human race which the dreaming optimist pictures for himself in prophetic vision—a force which, even if divorced from religion and from such progress, can accomplish much.

To the schoolmaster Herbartianism comes as something sacramental, conferring upon him a dignity and an importance second to none possessed by other professionals. Does the medical man save life and cure disease? The schoolmaster is called upon to make the life worth living, and to cure, or to inoculate against, the moral diseases of the soul. Do others urge—though without the most modest of proofs—the possession of baptismal powers, vital to the spiritual welfare of the child? The schoolmaster can prove, on scientific grounds, the possession of saving powers by himself, and he believes that he can create, within the soul of his pupil, such a ramifying and interlacing network of ideas that the surging of sensual passion may well nigh cease to be possible amid the close-knit fabric. Say, if you will, that the claims of Herbartianism are exaggerated; the claims of other priesthoods, possessing not one-tenth of the scientific justification possessed by this, may be exaggerated too. Education, be it said again and again and again, has never yet had a chance. The best men have never thrown themselves into it; public sympathy has never yet been fully on its side; it has never yet discovered a standpoint or a standing for itself. This standpoint and this standing Herbartianism can supply.

Exaggeration! No. The present writer believes that if education, in the Herbartian sense, had ever had *one-tenth* of the chance that religion has had for centuries, had ever attracted to its cause men such as religion has attracted, had ever possessed the prestige and authority that religion has possessed, moral wonders would long ago have been effected. With all her prestige and all her authority, Protestant religion has to confess to half-empty churches, to a widespread and grotesque ignorance of the Bible even among believers, and to a moral tone in the community distinctly, and perhaps increasingly, materialistic; while Catholic religion has every year to admit that the highest relative proportion of prisoners in English gaols are Catholics by education and name. But give religion the chance that education has had; staff your churches with children in their teens, snatched from the plough or the washtub; destroy the prestige, the subtle suggestion of the heroic, which etherealises the most unimpressive cleric into the idol of cultured ladies; bid your congregations assemble in barns instead of in buildings hallowed by centuries of suggestion; treat your ministers as you treat your village schoolmaster, and then, unless the writer is wholly mistaken, religion, too, would

have to confess to a failure far greater than that charged against education. Already it is doubtful whether her failure has not been equally great.

Education has failed; we have to admit it. Not without reason is the disrepute of the schoolmaster. Sinned against by society he may have been; but he has sinned in return. He has often refused to learn. His bigotry has sometimes been more stupid and more impenetrable than that of any priest. Too often "he is content to practise an art the principles of which he does not understand, and he haughtily resents any attempt to enlighten him." Too often he is "an arrogant and intolerant empiric."[1]

There is another side to the question. The writer could tell of primary school teachers, working patiently without reward or recognition, guardian angels amid the haunts of devilry, springs of refinement in arid deserts of degradation. He could tell of places in which the schoolmaster is "the only man of culture," "a reader of James's Gifford Lectures, Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, James Ward, and Martineau";[2] he could tell of Edinburgh slums to which, after a life spent in their midst, a lady-teacher bequeaths her savings for the purpose of founding a kindergarten; he could turn to his own experience and narrate how, for the first time, he learnt in untechnical language the Herbartian distinction between culture-studies and other studies, from the lips of the distinguished schoolmaster who was recently the President of the National Union of Teachers. But though, happily, much of this kind could be said, he has sorrowfully to avow that, taken as a class, the primary teacher is not fully interested in his own work, and often fails to see its significance.

"The present race of teachers have shown their devotion to their work by rising to the highest ideal of the extreme faddist." No man who knows primary education in the less fortunate districts will admit for a moment that words like these, quoted from the address of an able primary schoolmaster known to the writer, are much more than the platform verbiage of an exceptional man. "Ideals" do not exist in the average primary school; works on educational "ideals" do not exist on the bookshelves of the average schoolmaster; debates on educational "ideals" do not take place at professional conferences. Forty years ago "ideals" were officially suppressed; and though some schoolmasters—like the one from whom the above words are quoted—have retained their enthusiasms, many have become "arrogant and intolerant empirics," who "haughtily resent any attempt to enlighten them." Over many a country town an observer would imagine an avalanche of desolation to have passed—so dead is the prospect; a schoolmaster—more powerful in his ultimate influence than clergyman or landed proprietor—has been there for forty years; the very attitude of the boys in the street, the public life, manners, and interests of the adults, tell their tale. Yet five or twenty miles away all perhaps is different; there we find keenness, manners, and culture, for there the schoolmaster has culture, zeal, and a sense of responsibility. Inspectors and other officials who visit a multitude of schools testify to facts like these, the truth being that the difference between

[1] Professor Adams, in *Herbartian Psychology*.
[2] *Journal of Education*, September, 1903.

the good and the bad schoolmaster is far greater, both in itself and in the immensity of its consequences, than between the good and bad in any other profession. A schoolmaster can revolutionise a town in twenty years; Girard did this at Friburg.

If, then, we study the signs of the times and the doctrines of Herbart, we shall find that it will be the schoolmaster, at present so despised and often so apathetic, to whom will fall the solution of many of the moral problems now pressing upon us. But he slumbers—a sceptre lying disregarded by his side, and the brightest crown that the coming century can award waiting, not to be competed for (there are no possible competitors), but to be taken up. His profession demonstrably contains within itself the promise and the potency of almost infinite advance. Some day it will need no patronage and accept no alien domination. Some day our residential training colleges will be no longer governed by retired missionaries, nor our educational bureaus occupied by accountants. Nay, this great profession need not forget that in the eighteenth century the clergy were as despised as the teacher is now, "their social position being somewhat lower than that of the nursery governess in the establishment of a vulgar millionaire,"[1] and it may therefore look forward to rejuvenescence with conviction as well as with hope.

Why these claims, *prima facie* so preposterous? Because, alone among professions, education calls simultaneously for scientific thought and for moral devotion, and may therefore be expected to attract to itself both the scientific experimenter and the reforming enthusiast. The enfranchised eye sees an imperial and unique spaciousness about this profession. Medicine demands science; the Church demands devotion; education will demand both. The science she will demand will deal with the most baffling, fascinating, and vital questions of the day — questions of biology and psychology. The kind of devotion she will demand will be seen when the Herbartian standpoint has been expounded in the following pages.

Go through the whole series of professional callings, and seek for one which demands these things in equal measure. There is absolutely none. This alone combines, or will some day combine, the heroic with the scientific standpoint. "Is there any art like it—any which can so attract the finer spirits among men, any which can so engage in its service that enthusiasm which fills the moral atmosphere to-day? Is there any, the wise practice of which brings such personal reward.....? Surely an art so great, so full of great issues for the individual and for society, is worth thinking about in its principles, its rules, its history, its aims—in brief, its philosophy."[1]

And yet both standpoints, the former especially, have been almost entirely ignored. Statements like that of Prof. Findlay, that "there is an immense field of exploration awaiting teachers who have psychological equipment,"[2] or like that of the late Mr. Rooper, that "all teachers are missionaries by profession,"[3] simply awaken incredulity, even among teachers

[1] Froude, *Short Studies*, vol. ii.

[1] Dr. Laurie, in *The Training of Teachers.*
[2] *Principles of Class Teaching.*
[3] *School and Home Life.*

themselves. But both statements are true and unexaggerated. It is mainly the second which the author proposes to expound in the following paragraphs, and he will do so even at the risk—so unusual and dangerous a risk in the case of a writer on education—of being dubbed an "enthusiast."

Everyone admits that the schoolmaster does necessary work in conferring knowledge, and in trying to equip each coming generation for the battle of life. But hardly anyone realises that the moral reforms of the future will have to begin—largely, at any rate—in the schoolroom; that the stolid irresponsiveness to appeal which preachers bewail is in great measure due to the failure of the school; that the generally low level at which men live, and the humdrum, unworthy, sometimes vicious, tone of society, are, to an immense extent, the results of our neglecting—the Secret of Herbart!

And let it here be said that what is expounded in the following paragraphs is not a merely bookish and theoretical Herbartianism, but one borne in upon the writer's mind amid practical work in a neglected educational district. At the centre of that district is a town of some few thousand inhabitants, with eight or nine places of worship; a town where every prospect pleases, and every physical inducement to a high and worthy standard of living exists, but a town which, owing to the neglect by its citizens of the standpoint we may call—though in no exclusive sense—the "Herbartian," would fill the reformer with serious apprehension. It is now time to expound this vaunted "standpoint."

We have seen that religion is not an infallible protection against moral evil, not an infallible weapon for the slaughter of what theologians call "sin." It has been affirmed that there is a second weapon. Two quotations—one from the work of our greatest eighteenth-century novelist, the other from a recent important work on modern poverty—may serve to introduce more formally this second and momentous agency.

Though Captain Booth's father "designed his son for the Army, he did not think it necessary to breed him up a blockhead.....He considered that the life of a soldier is in general a life of idleness; and thought that the spare hours of an officer in country quarters would be as well employed with a book as in sauntering about the streets, loitering in a coffee-house, sitting in a tavern, or in laying schemes to debauch and ruin a set of harmless, ignorant country girls."[1]

"Shut out, to a great extent, from the larger life and the higher interests which a more liberal and a more prolonged education opens up to the wealthier classes, it is not surprising that, to relieve the monotony of their existence, so many artisans frequent the public-house, or indulge in the excitement of betting."[2]

To Fielding, at any rate, there was a connection between being a "blockhead" and becoming a debauchee; while, conversely, a taste for books was a protection against the temptations of debauchery. Vice, sin, moral evil, was an effect, not a mystery. And to Mr. Rowntree, also, "intellectual tastes" and the "power of applied reading and study" appeared, he tells us in the

[1] Fielding, in *Amelia*.
[2] Mr. Rowntree, in *Poverty*.

context of the above passage, as important auxiliaries of virtue; the absence of these involved, as consequences, drunkenness and betting. Again, evil was an effect, not a mystery.

Thackeray has gone even further than this, and has assigned it as an *inevitable*—not merely a *possible*—effect of certain causes. In one brief sentence he has indicated that it results not only from the cause which the Herbartians emphasise—the absence of wholesome interests—but from another cause which they recognise, but concerning which they do not profess to teach us anything. This second cause is bad habit.[1] His words are among the boldest and even the most scientific in our language. "Starve me, keep me from books and honest people, educate me to love dice, gin, and pleasure, and put me on Hounslow Heath with a purse before me, and—I will take it."[2]

Somehow, Fielding, Thackeray, and Mr. Rowntree, all seem to forget Free Will. They trace evil to its causes, and imply, Thackeray especially, that, given these causes, sin inevitably follows. Free Will, in fact, is at a discount in modern sociological works, the reason being, as already indicated, that a principle of mere lawlessness, even if a true principle, is one incapable of being made use of. In Herbart's educational works, as we have also seen, Free Will—so far as mysterious—is likewise at a discount, and for the same reason; it is a principle of no use for the educationist; "nothing can be built on it." He says, quite frankly, that "the stupid man cannot be virtuous,"[1] just as Fielding tells us that a "blockhead" is likely, if not certain, to become a debauchee. And elsewhere Herbart uses words which are equally momentous, though less contentious in form. "If intellectual interests are wanting, if the store of thought be meagre, the ground lies empty for the animal desires."

We are getting on the scent of the "Secret of Herbart." Somehow, education (of the proper kind) is beginning to appear "portentous." Interest, or (to use Herbartian terminology) many-sided interest, is seen to be a weapon capable of wounding, perhaps of slaying, this Briareus-handed or Hydra-headed monster of moral evil. The Herbartian Ziller calls many-sided interest a means of protection against passions, as well as a help in daily life and amid the storms of fate. Another Herbartian speaks of it as a "moral support and protection against the servitude that springs from the rule of desire and passion."[2] A third describes as a true benefactor of the race him "who awakens in each man an enduring interest in anything whatever.....Such an interest is a universal medicine."[3] Still another Herbartian, this time hailing from America, declares interest to be "a protection against desires, disorderly impulses, and passions.....A many-sided interest, cultivated along the chief paths of knowledge, implies such mental vigour

[1] If little or nothing is said, in this essay, on the subject of habit, or if the relation of habit to apperceptive interest is ignored, the reason is not that the writer under-estimates such matters. He is only too conscious of the omissions that may be charged against the present work.

[2] *Esmond.*

[1] It is useless for readers or writer to worry over the mere form of this expression. Its substance is explained in the pages that follow.

[2] Kern: quoted in De Garmo's *Herbart and the Herbartians.*

[3] Scheibert, 1906.

and such pre-occupation with worthy subjects as naturally to discourage unworthy desires."[1] Language like this, almost or quite evangelical in fervour, will be said to be open to the charge of exaggeration. But are we sure of this? Has the moral value of many-sided interest ever been adequately realised, and many-sided interest itself ever been given the chance it deserves? Admitting, however, for the sake of peace, that the language is exaggerated, the truth it embodies is, nevertheless, a great one. Interest *helps*, at any rate, to suppress moral evil. Now, which profession, amid the hierarchy of the professions, is called upon to awaken many-sided interest? The educational only. Thus the schoolmaster stands in the same rank with archbishops, bishops, and all ministers of religion. While they are baptising with water he is baptising with many-sided interest.[2]

This is crude Herbartianism, but, as we have already seen, it is not precisely a new discovery. Most people will admit — will sometimes even urge — that "counter-attractions," "hobbies," and the like, are useful moral agencies. The Churches seek, more or less energetically, to supply these counter-attractions; clubs, recreative and educational, are opened, and hopes are expressed that even hooligans may in this way be reclaimed. If Herbartianism had nothing more to tell us than this, that we must try to suppress evil by awakening positive interests, it would be of immense value, not only to the schoolmaster, but to the moralist and the philanthropist also. Already, as we look steadily at it, evil is beginning to appear less mysterious; already a desolating stream is being traced to its poisonous source.

There is many an indication that the moral efforts of the future will take, at any rate in large measure, the direction indicated in these paragraphs. Men are beginning to see that in the cultivation of wholesome interests, rather than solely in the denunciation of vice and the provision of neurotic remedies, lies the key to the moral situation. The growing importance of the "Institutional Church" is significant. Nay, the centre of gravity is moving from the church to the school.

"A man drinks, not only because his brute nature is strong and craves the stimulus, but because he has no other interests, and must do something."[1]

"The spread of education and the extension of a cheap literature adapted to the wants and requirements of the people, aided by the establishment of lectures, reading-rooms, and schemes of rational recreation, have done much to withdraw the operatives from the public-house."[2]

"Ignorant and untrained minds, weary and unhealthy bodies, gloomy and demoralising environment, monotony and weariness of life: out of these evils spring the seeds of vice.....

"What culture have these poor women ever known? What teaching have they had? What graces of life have come to them? What dowry of love, of joy, of sweet and fair imagination? Think

[1] McMurry, *Elements of General Method.*

[2] This is neither a joke nor a sneer; there is a real parallelism. Herbart regards interest as only a portal to character—but a neglected portal. It is for character-forming what Baptism is claimed to be for Faith—an early *but not the only* sacrament. See p. 46.

[1] The *Times*, October, 1873.

[2] Royal Commission (Scotland), 1860.

what their lives are, think what their homes are, think of the darkness and confusion of their minds, and then say, is it a marvel if they take to gin?"[1]

"At bottom the temperance question is largely an 'entertainment of the people' question.....Pictures, books, good music, clear laughter, heart-fellowship: are not these true aids to life? Is it not worth while to bring them within reach of the docker, the coalheaver, the artisan, and the common labourer?..... Never will the evil spirits be permanently cast out until the empty house is tenanted by such as these."[2]

"I am disappointed at the moral taste of the public after thirty years of compulsory education. It is a vital social need that has to be met, and a publican meets that need, caters for it, and, in a sense, satisfies it in attractive and alluring, but defective, ways. If we leave the publican alone to satisfy that need, temperance workers may talk till the crack of doom, for he has the people in the hollow of his hands.....Let us utilise the schools in the city as evening institutions."[3]

"People must acquire interests unless they are to live by appetite alone. Rational interests and hobbies are the best antidotes to 'hooliganism' in every rank of society."[4]

"No one would sit and drink in a public-house if he knew how delightful it was to sit and think in a field; no one would seek excitement in gambling and betting if he knew how much more interesting science was."[1]

"If people realised the intense enjoyment of reading, there would be very little pauperism, extravagance, drunkenness, and crime.....Ignorance costs more than education."[2]

Criminality and drunkenness are not quite such mysteries as Mr. Wells would suggest.[3] True, there may be something too optimistic in the words last quoted; the man of culture who uttered them may not have realised the immense difficulties which face the carrying out of the constructive policy he foreshadows amid the degenerates of our great towns. Still, there is enough truth in his words, and in the others that have been quoted, to justify the claim that a system of education, capable of implanting elevated tastes, is a weapon with which to fight moral evil successfully, and a means of hastening the day when, in the words of the hymn, mankind will be

Saved to sin no more.

Literally and demonstrably—unless all the above quotations are wrong—a system of education which creates a love of good books, a love of nature, and so forth, is a system which helps to "take away the sin of the world."

Philanthropic and missionary work in this country may be arranged in three grades.

[1] Robert Blatchford, in the *Morning Leader*, September 2nd, 1898.

[2] Rev. Will Reason, in *University and Social Settlements*.

[3] Dr. Paton, September 30th, 1903; Midland Temperance Conference, Birmingham.

[4] Mr. Ritchie at Aberdeen, October 29th, 1903.

[1] Lord Avebury, July 25th, 1902; Nature Study Exhibition.

[2] Lord Avebury, February 27th, 1902; Home Reading Union. In Mr. Rowntree's *Betting and Gambling* the same standpoint is adopted. The word "interest" comes up continually and almost automatically in the consideration of remedial measures for this vice. "We have confined our people in the dark, and they are gambling to break the tedium."

[3] *Mankind in the Making*.

The lowest grade is mere rescue work. This work is noble, and will probably be necessary for generations to come. Whoever seeks to save the slum child, reform the drunkard, and lift the fallen, is engaged in work of this kind. But it is crude, and contributes nothing to the pulling up of evil by its roots.

The next grade—a higher one—may be represented by such preventive work as that carried on by the United Kingdom Alliance, which aims at the removal of temptations to debauchery. Work like this goes closer to the roots of evil than the last. But still it is purely negative.

The highest grade of all is that which seeks to implant wholesome interests. The only profession in existence which is called as a profession to positive work of this kind is the educational.

If, therefore, the preceding and succeeding arguments are sound, the smallest educational reform may, perchance, be of more permanent influence than the sermons of every bishop and every popular preacher; just as no political or religious controversy has done one tenth of the good or the harm that was done by the fatal proposal of 1861. Indeed, the strangest feature about the educational apathy of the modern Englishman is that he himself has been, in large measure, made what he is by good or bad teachers; they have influenced him more than the clergyman, the doctor, or the lawyer; and yet, though his mind and character were committed to their keeping, he cares little about the work which our teachers perform upon the new generation now growing up.

It is clear, however, that the doctrine of many-sided interest, regarded by Herbart as the immediate aim which the schoolmaster should place before himself, is coming to be recognised—even by many who have probably never heard of Herbart—as a working aim for social and moral reformers. The programme sketched out by Royal Commissions and private philanthropists was sketched out—though in a more technical form—by a German educationist exactly a century ago. The only difference is that, whereas Royal Commissions and private philanthropists see the evil and see the need for interest (or many-sided interest) as a remedy, Herbart investigated also the conditions under which this interest could spring up. Whereas our unphilosophical moderns urge, as Herbart himself urged, that interest is a moral guide and a moral protection, *Herbart, the philosopher, saw that interest depended upon apperception,*[1] *and that, apart from efficiency in the apperceptive mechanism, interest could not be aroused.*

Even, however, if we paused at the present point, much, let us repeat, would have been gained. We have seen that evil springs, in some measure at least, from absence of wholesome interests; seeing this, we are on the true road along which moral effort may legitimately and successfully travel. We have learnt reasons for connecting mental deficiency with moral deficiency, and have thus realised, as all the Herbartians realise, how great a *unity* the mind is, and how false to most facts is the "faculty doctrine." "The stupid man," we have learnt from Herbart, "cannot be virtuous"; starve mentally a Thackeray, and—as he tells us himself—he will steal the first purse on Hounslow Heath; suffer

[1] This is true of *much* interest, but there may be practical or Fröbelian interests, of which the germs are implanted before birth.

the existence of an "ignorant and untrained, dark and confused mind," "a monotonous and weary life," and the result will be, in the opinion of Robert Blatchford, a "taking to gin."

All this is true, but it tells us nothing except implicitly about "apperception," with its "recondite and portentous secret." Is "apperception" the same as "many-sided interest," and is Herbartianism merely a gospel of "hobbies" and "counter-attractions," with Dr. Johnson's words as a motto, "I am a great friend to publick amusements, for they keep people from vice"? By no means.

Accept the Herbartian doctrine of "many-sided interest," or, to simplify your task, drop the phrase "many-sided," and seek, amid the slums of your cities and in the emptying hamlets of your country districts, to arouse interest in *anything*. You will, in large measure, fail; and, if you consult clergyman or philanthropist, you will hear that they, too, have noted a strange and baffling irresponsiveness among the people they seek to elevate. There seems no point of contact between the saviours and those they would seek to save. Device after device is employed, and fails. What was true in David Stow's time is largely true now. "The mass are as impenetrable as the nether millstone. No motive awakens their consideration."[1]

Even religious journals, faced by this problem, are beginning to use bold language. "The people of the slums need the Gospel truly, but the preacher who goes into the slums merely to preach wastes his breath. He might just as well preach to the east wind swirling along Commercial Road."[1] But where is the explanation of this irresponsiveness to appeal? In what infernal armoury is forged this impenetrable carapace?

In the experiences about to be narrated there was nothing unusual, nothing more dramatic than is constantly occurring in the records of humble educational effort. Nothing, at least, more unusual than this, that the narrator saw his experiences in the light of the Herbartian doctrines of apperception and many-sided interest.

The situation was a simple one. A country borough with a few thousand inhabitants possessed, among those few thousand, quite an unusual number of the youths and young men upon whom admittedly rest, in great measure, the future destinies of this Empire. Their characters were in the making. They stood at the moral cross-roads. Transplanted into a great city, they would well-nigh instantly fall into evil courses unless possessed of some powerful internal principle of moral preservation. Religion had had its chance; there was a place of worship for every three hundred inhabitants. The theatre or music-hall did not exist in the town, and the moral problem was correspondingly simplified. There was but little poverty of a degrading kind. The chief characteristic of the human life of the town was emptiness. It was an ideal spot for awakening among its younger inhabitants something of the many-

[1] *The Training System.* There is pathos in reading a book like Stow's. He had his dreams of "providing an antidote for the exposed condition of youth and the demoralising influence of large towns"; and we in these days have our dreams too.

[1] *Christian World*, June 11th, 1903.

sided interest that is such a protection against the immensely severer temptations of larger places—the temptations which many of those younger inhabitants would have, sooner or later, to face.

Judged by the low standard that prevails in this country—in the southern counties especially—the writer was successful. With a single exception, everything that was started weathered the session—a record somewhat unusual amid the disappointing records of evening schools in Britain. The one exception fails almost everywhere; the British nation, with all its seriousness and "patriotism," does not, for reasons that will soon be obvious, wish to learn about the "Life and Duties of a Citizen." Judged by numbers, judged by duration, judged by any ordinary test, the writer's work was at least tolerable in its success; judged by his own standard, it was a failure.

What was his standard, what was his wish? He purposed to arouse in the breasts of the several hundred young men whose lives were tame, colourless, and unworthy (not necessarily vicious), an interest in one or more of those subjects which have the power of giving richness, colour, and worthiness to life. He knew that, when emptiness of mind joins forces with facility for vice, vice follows as an almost inevitable result Religion, he saw, did not influence more than a fraction of the individuals before him. He believed that a few healthy interests would, to say the least, be a valuable preservative. A curriculum accordingly was drawn up. The ordinary classes were opened, and, in addition to them, classes for English literature, for the reading of Dickens, and, as an experiment, for the study of that great crisis when Assyria was gradually strengthening her hold upon Judea, and when a prophet-politician arose to guide the tiny State.

The curriculum, one may admit, was one-sided; deficient in the important practical subjects that call for skill or dexterity and attract many individuals; deficient, in fact, on the Fröbelian side. Such subjects, it may here be remarked, are not those upon which the apperception doctrine bears;[1] in other words, they are not subjects upon which the Herbartians have much to tell us.

Deficient though the curriculum was, it was at least a far richer curriculum than is usual in small country towns. At any rate, the experiment was made. But before its results are narrated something should be said concerning the conditions under which interest—so saving a power—is aroused. This, indeed, is the crux and the climax of the whole problem. Everyone will admit—willingly or reluctantly—that interest is a moral stimulus, a moral guide, or at the very least a moral protection; the practical problem is, "How can it be aroused?"

Interest, say the Herbartians, is based on apperception, and apperception is the process of interpreting some new fact or experience by means of our previous knowledge. We are rarely

[1] This is open to criticism. In a wide and untechnical sense we could say that Fröbel discovered "apperception centres" in the young, and directed teachers to make use of them. But this is to give an extension—perhaps a useful extension—of meaning to the term "apperception."

interested in that which is absolutely strange, alien, foreign, unintelligible, devoid of personal significance. The boor blinks wearily at a fine Gothic arch; the Chinaman is unmoved at the mention of Alfred. The engineer is interested in a new machine—for he knows something about machines already; he is not interested in a machine with which he is already over-familiar, nor is the poet, as a rule, interested in machines of any kind. Two things are fatal to interest: over-familiarity and total ignorance.

It would be no difficult task—experimental psychologists have done it time upon time—to prove how, on the mention of this or that name, there follows a rush of blood to the brain or a heightened rate of breathing; while on the mention of a third name there is none of this. The medical man would thrill at the name of Vesalius; the Catholic at the name of St. Antony; the bookmaker at the mention of Ascot. And while the instruments were measuring the physiological changes, great or slight as the case might be, an Herbartian onlooker would tell of another side to each process—the psychical side—and would speak, not of a rush of blood to the brain, but of a rush of ideas to the mind. And he might, if so inclined, sound the name "Herbart" itself in someone's ears; and the instruments would record infallibly whether that name was a meaningless one or whether it summoned up a wealth of interpretative associations.

But though volumes—too many, in the opinion of Professor James—have been written on the *psychology* of apperception, little or nothing has been written upon the *ethics* of apperception. This little work has the ethics of apperception for its subject, and the writer's own simple experience, viewed in the light of the doctrine, for its immediate occasion.

Picture the announcement of a set of "Dickens Readings." Who would be likely to attend them—the individual already acquainted with the works of the novelist, or the individual to whom even the name of Dickens was unknown? It was the second individual that the present writer wished especially to attract; he whose life was palpably and distressingly empty; who had no sources of pleasure beyond the crudest; who, as a consequence, would probably fall at once before the assault of severe temptation. But, as a matter of fact, *this was exactly the individual who stayed away.* He who came, and received pleasure from hearing and discussing the works of Dickens, was precisely the one who was already partly acquainted with those works.

In this fact there lies an immense and tragic significance. "To him that hath (mental possessions) shall be given." By some law of nature—almost a malign law—it seems that the mentally starved soul is prevented from desiring the very food that will save it. Though you offer to the uncultured and empty-minded man a whole world of entrancing and elevating pleasure—such a world is contained in the works of Dickens—he will never take the initial step unless some favourable chance or accident open his mind to the world he is losing.

He who is "interested" in Dickens is he who has learnt something about the novelist's early struggles, or has read one

or more of his works and wishes to go farther, or who, in some other way, has acquired a certain number of ideas concerning the novelist. The announcement of a "Dickens Reading" attracts such a one immediately. The old ideas lay hold of the new announcement; a simple kind of apperception takes place; interest is aroused, and following in the train of interest comes moral protection, if not moral stimulus and guidance. The man is penetrable, he is open to influences; above all, he has something in his mind that is worth having: he has an interest.

He who is *not* "interested" in Dickens is probably the man who is wholly ignorant of him; whose life would be invigorated, purified, and rendered happier and more worthy by an interest in the novelist; who may, indeed, be sinking to moral perdition owing to the lack of such interests as these; and who, unless such interests are aroused, or unless saved by some intense and perhaps unwholesome form of religious belief, is fated so to sink. "The stupid man cannot be virtuous." He is impenetrable; he cannot be influenced; he has nothing in his mind that is worth having: he has no interest.

"Dull fools," in Milton's terminology, may regard not only "divine philosophy," but the novels of Dickens and every fascinating book that has been written, as "harsh and crabbed." And yet it would seem to be a possible task, if this apperception doctrine is no fiction, so to build a mental structure into the minds of the young as to render these books

> Musical as is Apollo's lute,
> And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets
> Where no crude surfeit reigns.

And here, be it observed, the question is not one of natural intelligence. The rustic who stayed away from a Dickens meeting might have been endowed with congenital abilities equal to those of anyone who came. The question is one of *acquired ideas*, and ideas are "acquired" in the first instance, not from the abysses of the soul itself, but from nature and human nature around. Once acquired, they possess an assertiveness of their own, often slight, but never entirely or finally negligible; and the power of forming alliances among themselves, dissoluble or eternal with the dissolution or eternity of the soul itself. One-half, at least, of education consists in thus providing the soul of each child with masses of related and articulated ideas. Education is more—far more—than "drawing out."

Scarcely one working man out of ten has made the discovery that there can be *pleasure* in books. Not only nine-tenths of the thought of the age, but also of the humour of the age are unmeaning to the ignorant. "The person who can learn easily (and who wishes to learn) is he who already knows much."[1]

The writer's experience with "Dickens Readings" was repeated with his other ventures. The vast majority of Englishmen, he discovered, are not "interested" in English literature or English history; owing to a limited and non-humanistic education, their minds have never accumulated a sufficiency of ideas to generate the apperceptive process. Life is all the poorer; hell, if there is a hell, all the richer. Still more emphatically is the English nation devoid

[1] Mill, in *Essay on Nature*. The words in parentheses are added by the present writer.

of interest in the great historical characters to whom we owe the Jewish prophetic literature. This field of study is wholly unknown except to a microscopically minute portion of the nation. The lack of interest here is the more ludicrous because of the immense claims put forward on behalf of this literature, the immense amount of talk concerning "Biblical teaching," and the immense possibilities of inspiration and consolation which Biblical literature possesses. The writer has put the matter to the test; under the most favourable conditions (absence of counter-attractions, etc.) not thirty persons out of three thousand are interested in Isaiah—less than one per cent.[1]

Yet, in each of the three subjects that have been mentioned there exists vast power of inspiring, thrilling, and elevating man; but before this power can come into play a certain sufficiency of ideas must be accumulated; a fairly wide outlook must be opened out—and it must be done for most people early in life.

A curriculum which is defective in this respect will win no praise from the Herbartians. The two greatest followers of Herbart—Dörpfeld and Ziller—devoted their best powers to "concentrating" the curriculum around those subjects which confer ideas, convinced that only if the mind is well supplied with mental food can mental and moral health—manifested, for example, in interest and ultimately in character—be present. There may be danger here: the Herbartian may easily become a mere lecturer who pours forth in reckless abundance his extensive stores of knowledge; his pupils may become passive recipients of these ill-digested stores. But, however great this danger may be, there is another danger greater still—that the curriculum of the school may be so defective in subjects which confer ideas and enrich the mind that interest in the great facts of the universe may never be kindled at all. No interest in science can flourish in a vacuous mind; no interest in history, in literature, in moral conduct.

Ziller's basis for "concentration" was narrower than Dörpfeld's, the former choosing humanistic subjects only (fairy-tales, biography, history), the latter including nature-knowledge also. But the principle from which they started was the same; the mind needs ideas as much as the body needs food. Deprive the mind of its legitimate mental food, and the springs of interest will dry up. The curriculum must not confine itself to conveying mere skill in writing, reading, or Latin versification, or lay main stress upon formal studies like grammar or mathematics. Important though these may be, the "knowledge" subjects are more important still; it is they that possess significance for the moral life; it is therefore for them that the Herbartian is specially solicitous; it is in connection with them that apperception takes place.

Mentally and morally man cannot live in a vacuum. A deficiency in ideas means a deficiency in everything that is

[1] No Roman Catholics can be more ignorant of three-quarters of the Bible than English Protestants. Note that the question is not one concerning the skill of any particular teacher or lecturer. People are not "interested" in such things: they can scarcely conceive of them being *made* interesting. And therefore they refuse to waste time in putting the matter to a test.

worthily distinctive of man; it means "dulness and impenetrability." Ignorance is "a vacuity in which the soul sits motionless and torpid for want of attraction."[1]

There are writers, presuming themselves to be critics of the Herbartian system, who so misunderstand the maxim, "Stupid men cannot be virtuous," as to imagine that it refers to ignorance of the *means* by which a virtuous end can be attained.[2] The stupid man, they seem to say, may see the virtuous goal, but knows not how to set about reaching it. Surely no great system could rest its reputation on a principle so trite as this. Herbartianism, alone among educational systems, has recognised the momentum of ideas. Apart from ideas there are no ideals; an ideal, in fact, is an idea. The morally stupid man may not only fail to see the means, he fails to see the end; or if he see it, he is too mentally pauperised to do so with any vividness or force—to see in it any significance. The currents of his mind set in other directions; no *vis a tergo* has been enlisted in the cause of moral progress. Appeal to your rustic, seek to thrill him with what thrills *you*, and you will discover, as never before, how vitally important a certain degree of richness of mind is if a man is ever to attain more than the humblest heights of character. Without this certain degree of richness you may as well appeal to a block of Dartmoor granite.

Herbartianism, again, is often confounded with a colourless "culture" gospel, and great discredit is thrown upon it in consequence. Many a "cultured" man—many a Master of Ballantrae, with a "love of serious reading"—is a scoundrel; many a comparatively uncultured man is, to say the least, decent and respectable. But the objectors—small blame to them for being objectors, seeing that even Herbartians often fail to know how immensely vital their own doctrines are—do but affirm what Herbart himself affirmed: "many-sided interest is far from virtue." Nay, though interest provides for the "adjustment" or "rightness" of character, it does not fully provide—Herbart tells us—for its "firmness, decision, and invulnerability." Accordingly, after devoting one book of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* to "Many-sidedness of Interest," Herbart proceeds (much, doubtless, to the surprise of his "critics") to devote another to "Moral Strength of Character." The facts are obvious. The man with keen interest in books, or nature, or politics, may not be morally perfect or religiously complete; certain of his interests may, indeed, open up possibilities of evil—for example, the evil of reading pernicious literature; but, nevertheless, his interests are, on the whole, a mighty protection for him; the sensual cannot wholly or greatly engross his attention; he is left with little time for vice. He may fall, but he has latent powers of recuperation in himself. The teacher has blessedly inoculated him "before the hot desires for sensual pleasures have so infected blood and veins as to make virtue and wisdom impossible."[1] All things of the moral life are possible to such a man; few things are possible to the boor. And, even were this not true, culture is desirable for its own sake if vice

[1] Johnson's *Rasselas*.
[2] *Journal of Education*, March, 1903.

[1] Pestalozzi, in *How Gertrude Teaches her Children*.

itself "loses half its evil by losing all its grossness."

The standard objection to Herbartianism, that scoundrels may be men of culture, is of no validity whatever unless we can prove that their scoundrelism is the result of their culture. This has never been done. Here and there history presents us with prominent cases of the unholy alliance, and we wonder as we read; our very wonder being a mute testimony to the fact that culture does not, as a rule, conduce to immorality; it is the strangeness of the case that attracts our attention. Here and there, too, the short and simple annals of the poor present us with unlettered men or simple girls who are morally heroic; and again we wonder, our wonder testifying afresh to the same fact. Other things being equal, *culture conduces to morality, at least to any morality that is above the crudest and simplest.*

And why is this? For a reason that scarcely any English writer—at any rate, any English educationist—seems to have put in precise form, though the reason itself, no doubt, has been vaguely manifest to all thinkers. *Virtue is a more complex thing than vice*, more dependent upon ideas, less dependent upon sensual excitement. The drunkard's vice is not the result of ideas, though, of course, an *idea* of drink has to be present; the vice draws its strength from a lower source. Sensualism, again, draws its strength from the body, not the mind; and the gambler's vice, once more, is largely a matter of physical excitement. Contrast with every vice a virtue; in each case a greater complexity of structure, a greater richness of design, a greater wealth of mental constituents, will be manifest. Contrast cruelty with tenderness; the love of gambling with the love of knowledge; drunkenness with patriotism.

Virtue, in fact, rests on wholesome ideas. "The limits of the circle of thought," says Herbart, "are the limits for the character." Bigotry, cruelty, impurity, intemperance, selfishness — there is normally in each of these failings an element of mental deficiency; for we may ignore extreme cases, in which the whole character is in the grip of a devouring passion or prejudice—such cases are pathological, and concern the physician rather than the moralist. The vicious man is, in large measure at least, a man whose mind does not re-echo to moral appeal, who has no apperception masses ready to give the appeal any meaning. Virtue, on the other hand, is largely a matter of apperception, and is thus immensely more complex than vice. It is not everyone who can respond to moral appeal or rise to moral heights, but any fool can sin.

No; culture has never in itself conduced to vice.[1] Culture combined with a crude atheism may seem to conduce to vice; so may the absence of culture. Culture combined with cerebral or spinal disease may seem to conduce to vice; so may the absence of culture. If it could be proved that the unspeakable profligacy of Rome in the early years of the sixteenth century was the result of the Renaissance culture, the doctrines of Herbart would receive a

[1] "Brain-workers provide the most hopeless cases of dipsomania." (Canon Horsley, *Prisons and Prisoners*.) After allowing for disease of mind or body, the present writer questions gravely whether this statement has much general significance.

severe, though not a fatal, blow. It cannot be proved. "Between the moral enfeeblement and the æsthetic vigour (of the Renaissance times) there existed no causal link."[1] There is, on the contrary, every reason to believe that, other things being equal, the man of culture can rise to moral possibilities that are not possibilities for the boor; he can apperceive moral situations which remain purely unintelligible to the boor; he sees twenty moral duties where the boor sees one. Without ideas there can be no virtue; with few ideas there can be few virtues; with many ideas all things in the way of virtue are possible. "The temptations of intellect are not comparable to the temptations of dulness."[2]

Every idea is a potential tendril by which a man may touch and be touched; through which he may be influenced in the direction of good. "And of evil, too," an objector suggests. "No," again replies the Herbartian; "ideas are less significant for vice than for virtue; the latter is complex; the former is simple. Ideas work more for virtue than for vice, for virtue is more spiritual than vice."

Virtue, in short, can be "taught." It depends largely upon teaching, upon the possession of a wealth of ideas, more especially of ideas concerned with human life in the past and present. The "present," maybe, is even more powerful than the "past," and the example of the present more powerful than that of the past. To live amid heroes and gentlemen would be a finer thing than to study the lives of those who are dead. But living heroes and gentlemen are not found in every dwelling-house, and the children who come to us will perhaps never learn nobility at all unless they learn it from us or from the historical examples we hold up before them.

But, it may be said, what about those spotless souls which have grown up amid squalor? What about "Little Nell"? what about "Jo"? what about "Lizzie Hexham"?

The answer is, that amid absolute squalor and crime no pure soul can grow up. There must be influences for good if the soul is not to take the downward path. To dogmatise would be foolish; to set limits to the influence of good, even amid unpromising conditions, would be foolish; but—unless this book is fatally wrong in its essential doctrines—there can be no virtue in a soul that has never seen or heard of morality. None of the genuine examples of purity and heroism springing up amid unpromising surroundings contradict this statement; and to picture unreal examples of such purity and heroism is "morally mischievous."[1]

Let us admit that all the springs of virtue are not known; that heredity plays strange freaks at times; that this man is by nature unreceptive, this one by nature receptive. The writer gives no guarantee that, granted all he asks, virtue will spring forth—Minerva-like—equipped at every point. But he will stake the truth of this book and the

[1] J. A. Symonds.
[2] Arnold of Rugby.

[1] As George Gissing called it, with direct reference to Lizzie Hexham. See his *Dickens*.

truth of Herbartianism upon the converse; that a mind deprived from birth of all noble examples, whether in the present or in the historic past, will grow up without moral sensitiveness. "In the way of virtue," said the *Guardian*, reviewing a little work of the present writer, "'the wayfaring man, though a fool, shall not err.'" "But," the writer replies, "is this true if he is an absolute and complete 'fool,' one deprived of all moral examples, one whose mind, apperceptively, is a blank?"

It is with good reason that the Herbartians lay such stress upon the teaching of the "humanities"—good literature, biographies, history. It is these subjects —*and these only*—which store the mind with such apperception material as makes a man morally sensitive. Without the possession of such material he cannot be successfully appealed to. He is urged to be heroic; he does not know what heroism means; Curtius, and Alfred, and Livingstone are unknown names. He is urged to become a worthy citizen; he does not know what citizenship means; the annals of his native town are a sealed book to him. He is urged to be courteous; he does not know what courtesy means: the classic and historic examples of graceful considerateness are as wholly strange to him as, perchance, living examples among the companions he meets. And so with the whole series of virtues. They rest largely upon teaching, and if they are not taught—if the virtues incarnated in living persons or historical examples are not presented to the minds of the young—the young will never grow up virtuous.

Preachers tell us that there is, in these days, a "lessened sense of sin." It would be truer to say that our views of sin are changing and becoming—be it observed—not only more scientific, but also far more conformable with the ideas which the ancient Jews, the men who have taught the world what sin is, formed ages ago. "I have sinned," said Saul; ".....I have played the fool and have erred exceedingly."[1] "The notion of sin" among the Jews "is that of blunder or dereliction, and the word is associated with others that indicate error, folly, or want of skill and insight."[2] The word "insight" brings us on to Herbart, and the word "folly" reminds us that "stupid people cannot be virtuous."

If all this is really a "secret," it is time that the curtain should be lifted. And it verily seems to have been a "secret" to educators and to preachers. "Virtue cannot be taught" is on the lips of many, and as the lips utter the amazing falsehood, the Herbartian asks: "What refined virtue exists under the sun that is *not* the result of teaching?" Brutal necessity, acting through natural selection, can teach much, *has* taught much in the past centuries; but the virtues that necessity can teach are the cruder and more selfish virtues. Every grace of life has been taught to us; and, unless we teach them to others, they will never be acquired at all. From two sources only do we learn to love nobility, self-sacrifice, self-control; from the living examples around us, and from the examples that the historic past can bring. To a child in a slum or in an agricultural wilderness the former come scarcely at all; even to the most favoured among us they come but rarely. How immensely

[1] 1 Samuel, xxvi., 21.
[2] W. R. Smith, in *Prophets of Israel*.

important, then, is the work of presenting to mankind—and especially to the scholars of our schools—the inspiring biographies which history has to offer! Such biographies, presented in an historical setting, and preceded by fairy-tale and legend, constitute the "Gesinnungsstoff" of the Zillerians, the material for "Gesinnungsunterricht"—character-forming instruction. In such material must be included, of course, the priceless biographies which the Bible[1] can suitably provide the school; *unless such material*, biblical, national, and cosmopolitan, is presented in rich abundance to the youth of England, *we must expect, well-nigh with astronomical certainty, that the youth of England will grow up barbarous, uncultured, and immoral.* It is such material, and such material alone, which enables a human being to "apperceive" moral truth; it is an educational bread of life.

But yet—but yet—"Virtue cannot be taught!" Far more true would it be to say "genius cannot be taught," "originality cannot be taught," "talent cannot be taught," or, in the words of Goethe, to confess that "the older one grows the more one prizes natural gifts, because by no possibility can they be procured and stuck on." A thick veil still hangs over heredity and variation; and the child comes to us with a physical and mental endowment for which God, or fate, or his parents, not we, are responsible. But only a thin veil hangs over this other region where virtue lives in eternal wedlock with apperception. There is less of mystery here. If the teacher can

> Nourish imagination in her growth,
> And give the mind that apprehensive power
> Whereby she is made quick to recognise
> The moral properties and scope of things;[1]

if it is possible to "give" the mind this power, then it may be possible to vitalise or renovate the moral universe by means of education. *Something* can be "stuck on," even if "natural gifts" can *not*. Virtue, though mysteries may yet remain to baffle and confound us, can be "taught."

The message of Herbart is interest; the "secret of Herbart" is apperception. Interest in almost *anything* is good—interest in nature, in art, in politics; and many interests are *apperceptive*, dependent upon previous knowledge. But if there is one interest which is *above all others* important, and *above all others* dependent upon apperception, it is interest in moral goodness; and this will never be aroused in a living soul—even though the trumpet of judgment be heard and hell burst open at men's feet—unless the soul has known, in concrete forms, what moral goodness means. Hence the immense importance of the work undertaken in the face of national prejudice by the Moral Instruction League.

The several years during which that League has existed have been years of momentous and rapid progress. Professors of education have stood aloof; ecclesiastics, nervous at an apparition that threatens doom to their predominance in the school, have expressed a contempt they cannot wholly feel; the new reformers, conscious that their work has more significance, promise, and potency than any work of the past

[1] Expurgated *possibly*, though not necessarily, but certainly put forth in a more attractive form than at present, with larger print and with illustrations.

[1] Wordsworth.

century, are resolved, though deserted by the supposed representatives of the psychology and the ethics of education, "to save the nation alone."

Even, indeed, if the proposals of the Moral Instruction League were in the direction of a dry and abstract formulation of moral truths—a "stamping-in of maxims" such as Herbart condemned—those proposals would not merit the contempt of the community; for a bald and perfunctory enunciation of such truths is better than a complete ignoring, or the fragmentary and wholly insufficient treatment which is the rule rather than the exception in the British primary school. It is doubtful whether *any* idea, or maxim, or exhortation, however abstract, is entirely ineffective in building up the structure of morality; for conduct comes home more closely than many things to the "business and bosoms" of children. Still, there are good ways and bad ways in every art. The League starts with the concrete, well knowing that an abstract principle is the result of thought directed to this.

Herbartianism—repetition is needful in this domain—has a double message. Its *exoteric* message is that of many-sided interest; cultivate interests, even in humble subjects, and you give life a certain momentum which will carry it past the dangerous points where temptation lurks. Its *esoteric* message is that of apperception; men are blind to moral as to other truths unless there has grown up or been built up within them a sensitive retina composed of thousands of minute elements. In Herbart's words, there must be "points of contact" between the soul and the world of nature and human nature. The chief or the first work of education is to give this *Aesthetic Revelation of the World.*[1]

Tolerance, generosity, magnanimity are impossible for a mind that is vacant of ideas; it is too deficient in imagination to "make allowances." The miser is deaf to appeal; no part of his nature goes out towards the ideals that others seek. The gambler listens unmoved to the story of higher things; the story awakens no echo in him. And so with the entire list of vices; apart from those to which an individual may be congenitally inclined, or into which he has slipped through blind habit, his vices are almost wholly the result of his mental deficiencies, of an absence of moral sensitiveness, of an impenetrability, of a lack of such elevated ideas as are able to move into the focus of consciousness when an appeal is made from without; in a word, of failure in apperception.

"A kind heart, coupled with a narrow mind, cannot conceive the higher forms of duty to the State, to humanity, to unpopular causes. Culture and mental force combined regulate the quality of the duty paid. The difference between abject superstition and lofty piety depends on the intellect, not on the heart, of the worshipper."[2] And as with man so with woman. Gissing may, for a moment, abandon in despair the explanation of the shrewishness in Dickens's women, and ask: "Do you urge that Dickens should give a cause for this evil temper? Cause there is none. It is the peculiarity of these women that no one can conjecture why they behave so ill. The

[1] The name of one of Herbart's earliest and most important writings is *The Aesthetic Revelation (or Presentation) of the World (or Universe) as the Chief Work of Education.*

[2] Cotter Morison, in *The Service of Man.*

nature of the animals—nothing more can be said." But more *is* said elsewhere. "Sheer dulness and monotony of existence explains their unamiable habits. They quarrel because they can get no other form of excitement." "'Dolly Varden' is totally without education, and her mother's failings are traceable, first and foremost, to that very source."[1]

When J. A. Symonds attributed to the study of science "an extension of the province of love," he was scarcely guilty of exaggeration. Ignorance, that draws a veil over the causes of human action, sees the diabolical everywhere. The Gospel of Love sent myriads of witches to the stake in the Middle Ages, not because the Infallible Church was malicious and cruel, but because she was ignorant. And the Church of the Gospel of Love still mourns for "sin," and still hears, though remotely, the rustle of the Devil's wings, because she has never adequately realised, with Herbart, that "the will is rooted in the circle of thought."

Vice is less appreciably based on apperception than virtue. The soul may be transparent to every influence of the former kind, opaque to everything that is subtler; just as fog and mist, through which the sun's radiations force their way with difficulty, are more transparent than the clearest air to the coarser vibrations of sound.

At a recent educational conference the question of moral education was raised by Mr. F. J. Gould. A succeeding speaker, after discounting excessive "teaching" of morals, claimed that the great need was "reverence." A strange reply! How, then, is "reverence" to be generated in the school? What is the magic key to unlock this portal? Precisely—*the teaching of history and literature.* It is only through familiarity with characters which *deserve* reverence that we *learn* reverence. "'Men will not accept the gospel,' we are told. But why should we expect them to feel the historical meaning of any great world-tragedy, if history and literature—the 'humanistic' studies which make us sensitive to nobleness, to pathos, to martyrdom, to divinity—have been kept afar off? Why should they reverence Christ if they are never taught to reverence Alfred or Sidney? The thing is absurd. We exclude the 'humanities' from the school, or, what is worse, we teach them soullessly, or, what is worse again, we confuse them with dates, and grammar, and construing—and then we complain that the 'gospel' is neglected."[1]

"Cultivate reverence—cultivate reverence—cultivate reverence." Exhortations like this are unmeaning until directions are given how "reverence" can be "cultivated." And when the directions are given—if ever they are—they will amount to this: "Place before your pupils historical characters *worthy of reverence.*" It shows how wholly unscientific are our ways of regarding moral education that the exhortation, "Cultivate reverence," could be applauded as an exhortation of an opposite kind to the exhortations of the Moral Instruction League. "Reverence" is an effect—not a mystery; every virtue we possess, every aspiration that moves us, is an effect—not a mystery.

[1] *Dickens*, by George Gissing.

[1] *The Critics of Herbartianism.* By the writer.

And if it be asked, "Where, in available form, is this humanistic material to be found?" the answer must be, "In works like the *Penny Poets* and the *Books for the Bairns* and the *Children's Plutarch*." If in every school of England, day and evening, books like these were known, read aloud, talked about —parts of them even learnt by heart —and if this were done not soullessly, "reverence," and many another grace and virtue, would have a chance. "Vacuity of mind and pettiness of motive would no longer be the sore affliction they now are."[1]

Vast, then, as is the importance of apperceptive power, especially vast is its importance in one realm—that of history and literature. An interest in natural science—a readiness to see the significance of a material thing or event—is a priceless thing, essential indeed to the dignity and progress of man, and a valuable protective against the assaults of evil; but immeasurably more important is an interest in the past deeds and thoughts and creations of the human race. Such an interest is a chief means by which character can be built up, and practically the only means by which it can become sensitive and morally progressive. "The dead generations are, in truth, our dead selves, from which we rise to higher things. By the past we live."[2]

One individual at least—the writer—has sadly to confess to the apprehension and misgiving which he feels when looking upon some of the most promising present-day reforms in educational procedure, not because these are in themselves unimportant, but because they are likely to draw off the attention of teachers and the public from the spot where the greatest educational weakness of all is to be found.

There is much that is encouraging in the spirit and ideals of education; there is probably an increase of intellectual life in all our schools. Every year some hundreds of teachers are found attending laborious holiday courses on the continent of Europe and elsewhere; perhaps no other profession can show such signs of interest and zeal. There is now existent at least the germ, the presage, of a future Science of Education.

But such teachers as these are being led rather to cultivate an interest in formal subjects than in those subjects through which alone the school can be rejuvenated and the nation regenerated. The study of phonetics, and of modern languages generally, is awakening more and more interest every year. There was need for this, and the writer has learnt much, and hopes to learn more, from the pioneers of the reformed method. But—the greatest need of all is being forgotten in the meanwhile.

Again, there is much that is promising in the new methods of teaching mathematics. Many an artisan will willingly attend a class in "practical mathematics," and profit by his attendance, who will never be attracted by abstract Euclid. But—the greatest need of all is being forgotten.

Again, there is much that is sound and suggestive in Professor Armstrong's plea that we should make our science-teaching "heuristic," and encourage the self-activity and inventiveness of our

[1] Professor Armstrong, in *The Teaching of Scientific Method.*
[2] Dr. Laurie, in *The Training of Teachers.*

pupils. This is one of the educational needs of the age. But—the greatest need of all is being forgotten.

All the three reforms referred to lie in the realm of formal studies and dexterities. Correct phonetic pronunciation; practical mathematics; the scientific spirit—none of these things contribute with absolute directness to human culture. They may contribute much indirectly, for an interest in such things is of priceless value, apart from the dignity they add to existence by contributing to efficiency and power—this in itself is a moral factor. But moral sensitiveness and advance are dependent on humanistic studies that feed the soul.

And now, perhaps, there is some possibility of estimating aright the relative moral values of Religion and Many-sided Interest.

That moral evil is tameable only by religion can no longer be asserted, if this other agency possess the vitality here claimed. And Newman himself, who at other moments saw no power but the Catholic Church capable of conquering "the fierce energy of passion," goes far in the Herbartian direction. Since the time when St. Paul enumerated the fruits of the flesh and the fruits of the spirit, no writer has tabulated a more impressive list of the vices than the one drawn up by this man—vices attributed by him to absence of secular culture. "Cultivation of mind," he tells us, "is not the same thing as religious principle; but it contributes much to remove from our path the temptation to many lesser forms of moral obliquity. Human nature is susceptible of a host.....of little vices and disgraceful infirmities, jealousies, slynesses, cowardices, frettings, resentments, obstinacies, crookedness in viewing things, vulgar conceit, impertinence, and selfishness. Mental cultivation, though it does not of herself touch the greater wounds of human nature, does a good deal for these lesser defects."[1]

Now, if it appears, after all, that many-sided interest is a foe, not only to these "lesser forms of moral obliquity," but to such of the "greater wounds of human nature" as drunkenness and gambling, we have a right to claim that this is an agency equal to religion herself in the very province that religion regards as her own. And if even drunkenness and gambling are not sufficiently crucial tests; if the vice of impurity—most abhorred of all vices by the Church—is the one Newman has especially in view when he speaks of the impotence of all agencies except the Catholic Church; then surely there is significance in the fact that study—the study of the Hebrew language—was recommended by St. Jerome as efficacious in "keeping away unholy thoughts."

It is true that culture cannot successfully compete with religion in the deeper crises of life. The penitent thief and the God-intoxicated monk are not her trophies. It is true also that culture cannot lift the veil and solve the mystery of things. She is more impotent than religion when facing the problems of death, and storm, and earthquake; for religion, with her Lamb Slain from before the foundation of the world, can find some meaning in these calamities, or seek a meaning where none is obvious.

[1] Newman, in *The Present Position of Catholics*.

But the concern of this book is with moral potencies. If moral evil is so desolating to mankind that a propitiatory sacrifice has daily to be offered on modern altars, the confessional to be set up for the minutest scrutiny of the conscience, and every form of hope and fear enlisted on the side of virtue; then surely culture, which wars not unsuccessfully against this same relentless foe, has a place by the side of religion. Nay, when we ponder on what might be if ever culture and education came to their own and were valued aright, all the resources of the school being directed to the humanisation of the race, we begin to doubt whether the claim to equality is not too modest; and whether, if the world once realised the possibilities lurking in the doctrine of apperceptive interest, the revivals of the Protestant world and the sacraments of the Catholic would not appear morally feeble in comparison. If any enhanced kindliness, charitableness, sympathy, and public spirit distinguish this century from the tenth, it must be attributed not to religion—whose doctrines were known as well then as now, and were believed in more implicitly—but to the march of culture and the increase of apperceptive power.

What, then, from the educationist's standpoint, is the practical conclusion and the summary of the matter? What are we to learn from the preceding reflections and experiences?

A simple thing—a thing so simple, indeed, that when stated in these pages many a reader will wonder that there was ever need to state it at all. *The school must nourish the souls of its pupils*, and the only nourishment possible is ideas. There may be other tasks—there are; the soul must be exercised and trained as well as fed; but the feeding is the first and essential thing; and the richest food of all—that which best of all builds up moral fibre—is the humanistic food that comes down to us from the past in the form of fairy-tale, biography, history, and literature.

There may be difficulties in the teaching of such subjects as these; and the difficulties are increased tenfold by the disrepute in which these studies are held, and the increased attention now given by teachers to matters of a wholly different kind. Even Herbart, seeing the immensity of the problem, came to shrink from presenting history too freely to the undeveloped, unappreciative minds of his Swiss pupils. The problem remains immense, but mainly because so few are working at it.

The battle on behalf of humanistic subjects will be a stubborn one. It is these very subjects that have been neglected in the education of most of our school managers and teachers; and in accordance with the whole teaching of the present work such a neglect must spell want of appreciation for the neglected subjects. We cannot, therefore, expect either school managers or teachers to be enthusiastic over them until the supreme value of these things has been clearly demonstrated; especially as there are rivals whose claims are warmly championed on economic and other grounds.

> Lives of great men all remind us
> We can make our lives sublime,
> And, departing, leave behind us
> Footprints on the sands of time.

If Longfellow is right, such "lives of

great men" are of supreme value in the school.

We live by admiration, hope, and love.

If Wordsworth is right, any system of education which fails to supply the humanistic material which kindles admiration, hope, and love is an education for death, and not for life.

"Children," said the late Mr. Rooper, "must be assisted to admire heroism in all its forms." "An intelligent study of the Bible and Shakespeare, and of classical English writers, is incomparably more important" than other things in the curriculum. "The epitome of educational studies is *Nature* and *Human Nature;* the latter is the more important." Pupils must be made acquainted "through literary studies with the best side of human nature."

If Mr. Rooper is right, the most important task of the school is to teach children to admire the "best side of human nature."

"There are no fairy-tales like the old Greek ones for beauty, and wisdom, and truth, and for making children love noble deeds."

If Kingsley is right, these and other "fairy-tales" should be taught to the younger children in every school.

Every Herbartian, in Germany, America, and elsewhere, believes that humanistic material—fairy-tales, legends, Bible stories, historical biographies, literature, history itself—is of supreme moral value. If they are right, the inference is plain. Calvary is nearer to Parnassus than world and Church have ever thought.

With these words the writer might have closed the present essay. But the educational world is dominated by false or misleading formulæ, and two of these need further notice.

Amateur educationists — professional educationists also, to an extent that is a striking commentary upon their own educational ideals—are in the habit of using a phrase which, though *negatively* not without value, is, from the constructive standpoint, undiluted nonsense. They tell us that the teacher's main task is not "instruction," but "training," or "character-forming." No Herbartian will deny that "character-forming" should be the true aim of all education, except of that kind which is narrowly technical and professional; though even in the latter kind there are moral implications. Moreover, no Herbartian will deny that the "instruction" given by the primary schools of England has failed to form character. But to imagine that there can be character-forming apart from instruction; to imagine that instruction is a comparatively unimportant thing, is, indeed, not only undiluted nonsense, but indicates well-nigh criminal ignorance. Herbart, at any rate, "had no conception of education without instruction," and this instruction, let us observe, was not exclusively the instruction which goes in England by the name of "religious," and which, though professedly formative of character, is by no means superior in this respect to other kinds of instruction. Herbart, brushing aside the idle prattle which talks of character-forming as something separate from the feeding of the mind, enunciated a doctrine and invented a phrase which has already infused life into the educational work of two continents, and is, perhaps, destined to rejuvenate educational work

in this country. Instruction, he said, should be "educative instruction"—instruction that makes for character.

Instruction, that is, which creates powerful and dominating interest in nature and in human nature, especially in the latter; instruction which makes life superior to animalism by drawing off the attention elsewhere; instruction which, by the creation of an apperception organ, replaces sensualism by a sensibility to higher things.

This sensibility depends upon apperception, and apperception depends on instruction. It is impossible in a vacuous mind.

To regard the creation of elevated interests as something distinct from the formation of character is foolish and disastrous, if the message of this book has any validity; and Herbart rightly placed "many-sided interest" before the teacher as the proximate goal of his work. But it was not the final goal. Moral culture and training—the "subjective" side of education—was to crown and supplement the building up of an "objective" system of wholesome impulses and interests. Herbart protested against an illegitimate and pernicious divorce of will from intellect, of sacred from secular, of character from interest, of training from instruction. He is the one educator in all history who is lucid and categorical without failing to be synthetic.

To oppose "instruction" to "character-forming," as many do, is thus only legitimate if our instruction is hopelessly non-formative of elevated interests—as our primary education is, too few of our pupils acquiring any taste for reading, for history, for mathematics, or for the Bible. But to imagine that there can be character-forming apart from instruction; to imagine that instruction is a comparatively subsidiary matter—this, as already suggested or demonstrated, is perilous nonsense, and is revealed as such the moment we realise the meaning of the apperception doctrine. Character is so closely rooted in *ideas* that a deficiency in these latter is fatal to any richness of the former. Elevated interest cannot exist; apperception of moral truth cannot take place.

At another point also the writer has to hold in doubt much that is promising in the advanced educational thought of the day. From every side we hear that our schools have not taught the modern youth to "think"; they have not aroused "self-activity." In the struggle for existence, we are told, it is this "heuristic" attitude that will determine survival; accordingly, unless our pupils acquire something more than "mere knowledge," their education will be a failure. In very similar language, Sir Thomas Acland emphasised, a year or two ago, the need for "thoroughness," and protested against an evening school teaching too many subjects.

Literally, this is *some of the best and most authoritative educational thought* in England; it is good thought, and springs from the recognition of a real need. It has only one fault: *it is fifty years too early in many of our towns and counties.*

The most *immediate* need of the pupil who attends our primary school *is not that his mind should be exercised, but that it should be fed with a rich repast*

of imaginative and culture-giving material —of historical and biographical ideas.

It is no good to attempt gymnastics on an empty stomach. It is no good, as in Dickens's novel, to urge a dying person to "make an effort." It is no good to dream that the Englishman will ever acquire the power to "think," or any interest in "thinking," so long as he has no ideals. Now, ideals are much the same as ideas. In historic ideas—in knowledge of the Bible, the history of the world, the history of his own land—he is appallingly defective; and until this defect is supplied he will have little zeal, little genuine patriotism, little devotion to any high cause whatever. Feed his soul first, and then will be the time to teach him to think.[1]

Thus the primary school—any school, indeed, that is not merely "technical"—should at times take for its motto, "Cast thy bread upon the waters, and thou shalt find it after many days." New impressions cannot always be apperceived at once. "Very often the teacher must introduce ideas into the mind of the pupil, not so much for their immediate importance as for the use to be made of them at some future lesson,"[2] or (shall we not say?) in some future year or decade. Somehow—this is a part of the "Secret" of Herbart—ideas, colourless to-day, help to colour the whole of life when they meet kindred ideas to-morrow; the new and the old rush together, and, at the moment of union, as at the union of two chemical elements, heat is generated and a new product appears. We call it "Interest." Why should a little knowledge of Alfred the Great, received years ago at school, endow *this* poor mechanic with the power of experiencing elevated delight when yonder orator tells a story about the Wessex King? We cannot precisely say, though we know that it is a fact, and that yonder *second* mechanic, wholly devoid of the initial knowledge, listens to the orator unmoved. We know that there is a chance, though perhaps a remote one, of attracting the former to an evening school or a literary guild, where, provided the teacher or the conductor is not a hide-bound pedant, new vistas may be opened up and new inspirations be felt; we know also, with a sense of bitter disappointment, that the second mechanic will never sight those vistas or feel those inspirations. All the harmonies of music depend, not on the power of single notes, but on the support which notes, perhaps poor and tame in themselves, give to each other. No harmony can be generated out of a single note, and the school should not attempt to generate it; but the school may, legitimately enough, sometimes sound these single notes in the ears of the pupils, in the hope that, though apperception may not spring up now, some day it will; and that the notes, feeble and isolated at present, will then be heard, with others, reverberating in a mighty harmony through all the passages and crannies of the soul.

And as these notes reverberate, as old ideas apperceive the new, Interest is generated, and baser attractions begin to lose their charm. Thus, set free in part from the slavery of the lower passions, the soul can pursue, with increased energy, the better things that the world

[1] That the latter need is not ignored by the writer will be seen in his remarks on arithmetic, Appendix I.

[2] Professor Adams, in *Primer of Teaching.*

of thought has to offer, discovering in the pursuit ever fresh links of association between the old and the new. Again and again leaps up the apperception flash; again and again is felt the interest thrill. Character takes on, if not stronger, at any rate nobler, tints. The colours of life change. The things that once delighted, and perhaps degraded, delight and degrade no longer. More and more tendrils are thrown out above; feebler and feebler becomes the hold of those below. No law of parsimony, no principle of conservation, applies to the delights of apperception. Here, if anywhere, is a spontaneous generation—among the "dead" ideas. Unlike the more material pleasures on which man lavishes time and wealth, the pleasures of apperception cost nothing; their store is illimitable; replenished, like the emanations of radium, as if by an unseen hand. Age cannot wither them, nor custom stale their infinite variety.

In more prosaic language, we may say that, by a suitable presentation of rich and varied knowledge early in life, we are giving our pupils the chance of being protected from sin and passion by possessing interests of an elevated kind—interests which grow by what they feed on, and will only cease if sanity or existence cease.

Meanwhile, how fares the soul which, though unfed of ideas, has been exercised on grammar, perchance, or declensions, or "sums"? The springs of apperception have been drying up. The doors of many-sided interest have been slowly closing on their hinges. But "Sin" has tempted and conquered; for she, wily siren, has attired herself in rainbow hues, while her rival, Learning, has appeared in sober grey. Passion within and facility without combine to confer on evil a delirious fascination; no need of any rich complexity of ideas to make attractive mankind's eternal foe. Though appeals may come from without, they echo less and less loudly in the chambers of the mind, and at last cease to enter at all. The man is now impenetrable. Starved, in his early years, of saving ideas, his mind has no inner resources when a voice has been heard calling to higher things. The voice may call, but to deaf ears; the light may shine, but upon an atrophied retina. Deprive him of ideas, and you deprive him of the only means by which the Christian Gospel, or any other Gospel, can be interpreted or assimilated. Deprive him of ideas, and he encases himself, sooner or later, in a carapace of impenetrability. Evil habits may hang like chains upon that carapace; they gall him not. Appeals may beat against it; they penetrate not. Martyrs and redeemers die at the stake or at the cross because those they would fain save do not possess apperceptive resources. In one or two passages of Holy Writ which tell us of ears that hear not, of eyes that are holden, of hearts that are hardened, this grim doctrine seems to be suggested; and appalling indeed is the doctrine on its negative side, though full of hope when once its positive message is heard and understood. The application of that positive message is the work for educators, and for them alone.

In the scheme of formal stages of instruction worked out by the Herbartians, the first stage is "Vorbereitung," or Preparation. Ideas have to be summoned up in order to meet and interpret the new material about to be presented.

In a wider sense may we not now say that the school itself represents, in a large measure, the stage of "Vorbereitung"? It is here that are laid the foundations for the future interests of life; it is here that should be developed that receptivity towards moral appeal, "that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour which feels a stain like a wound"—in short, that apperceptive readiness without which no virtue above the crudest is possible. It may be said that the task is too great for education to accomplish. In that case the outlook is ominous, for, if the task is too great for education, it is a hundred times too great for any other agency.

An American theological writer of some eminence says that one immediate need of the present age is "the establishment of the missionary motive among the vital thoughts" of man.[1] In speaking of the evangelisation of ungrateful China and other lands, he goes on to say—as if taught the apperception doctrine by Herbart himself—that "a mere utterance of something unintelligible to the hearer is waste of time.....Understanding of such a message comes slowly. .....Christianity cannot do as much for the first hearers of its message as it can for the next generation."[2]

The main object of the present work is to divert this solicitude, and the apperception doctrine which Dr. Clarke expounds in untechnical language, to the heathen population of another land than China. It is time that England and education should have a chance. That chance England will have when education becomes a missionary profession. If the inspiring creations of English literature are not too good for Asiatic colleges and students, they are not too good for the British artisan or labourer, who, in many of our districts, is at a stage of development no better than the Chinese. If zeal and devotion sanctify evangelisation failures in China and India, zeal and devotion—nay, the spirit of true educational science too—may sanctify scholastic successes at home. Once this standpoint is reached by a few hundred of the teachers of Britain, we may expect that Dörpfelds will arise here, as in Germany, willing to become and remain primary teachers though other callings may allure by gold or renown; and that more Edward Bowens will arise, choosing rather to be assistant masters for a lifetime than to become educational nonentities by treading the primrose path to—"promotion."[1]

Yes, a "revival," as Mr. Campbell urged, may be coming. But, unless it is a revival springing from deep views and wide thought, it will leave as little permanent effect behind it as the wind that ruffles a field of corn. Mr. Sheldon's books may sell by thousands, but England remains, in the long run, unchanged; paroxysms may come and go, but man will never be thus regenerated, though their intensity reach the heat of fever. Such, at least, is the belief of the Herbartians, who steadily discount the value of unreasoning emotion as a character-forming agency. It might appear at first, Herbart tells us, that such an agency was a powerful one, though

[1] Dr. Clarke, in *A Study of Christian Missions*.
[2] *Ibid.*

[1] The writer believes it to be the case that His Majesty's Inspectors are practically debarred from taking up educational problems in any earnest way.

inoperative upon the circle of thought. "But it will appear quite otherwise if we interrogate experience. At least, whoever has noticed into what an abyss of pain and misfortune a human being may fall, yes, even remain in for long periods, and yet, after the time of trouble has passed, rise up again, apparently almost unchanged, with the same aims and opinions, even the same manner—whoever, we say, has noticed this will hardly expect much from swaying of the feelings.....How temporary is the whole reaction which follows the action." Rightly or wrongly, the Herbartians believe that the *idea* is ultimately of more potency than the *feeling;* or, rather, that a unified mass of ideas is of more potency than anything that is narrow and intense. They have faith that such ideas as have penetrated into the inner sanctuaries of the soul may, sooner or later, re-emerge as apperceptive interest; that from the seed thus sown will spring a greater harvest than any hothouse can yield; that there are richer possibilities here than yonder. Does an intense emotion, not rooted in a mass of ideas, make a man better? Do the raptures of the devotee brace him for the battle of life? Has he been the man to see most clearly the moral problems of the age—the woes of the artisan, the temptations of the drunkard, the horrors of war? Notoriously he has not. "Great moral energy is the result of broad views, and of whole, unbroken masses of thought." The truth is that many a man and many a woman who claims to be exalted at times into the tenth or the hundredth heaven is often appallingly obtuse to the moral problems and duties around. The most delicate analyses of moral duty—the keenest sensitiveness to moral distinctions—are not uncommonly found in connection with men who have no visions or raptures to diversify the even tenor of their way. From the point of view of moral truth and moral progress, the idea is a hundred times as important as the emotion.

The time may come when all pretence—and it is a pretence—of teaching "religion" to babes and sucklings may be abandoned by the schools of England. The time may even come when the Bible itself—which has rarely yet in the primary school been taught intelligently or in accordance with psychological laws—may be excluded, and when primary education will be in name, as it has always substantially been in reality, "secular." The moral possibilities of the school will not then be exhausted; on the contrary, the removal of hoary delusions may be the beginning of a portentous vitalisation. A new thing may come forward to take the place, in primary schools, of the excluded "religion," for the programme sketched in the preceding pages is one sufficiently great and sufficiently attainable to attract all men—and women—who face realities dauntlessly, and determine to dream of none but possible millenniums.

Yes, women; for to women will fall much of the work of vitalising education. Every year as it passes increases their relative importance in this divine work and this imperial profession. They realise better than men the possibilities of the situation; they feel a keener interest in it; their culture is often greater and their intolerance less. Education, moreover, is almost the only profession in which some honour and distinction await them.

Three tasks—each of immense moral

significance — education can essay to perform. It can prevent or check the formation of bad habit; this at present it does not adequately do. It can give moral instruction, arraying in its service historical and biblical examples, and pointing to their moral import; this at present it does imperfectly. Lastly, it can seek to arouse many-sided interest—interest at the very least; conscious that the arousal of this means the slow atrophy and death of what is base. This it scarcely does at all.

For the second and third tasks the conferring of a wealth of organised ideas is an essential requisite. Without this wealth there can be but feeble apperception; and the absence of free and vigorous apperception means impenetrability, even to religious appeal. The ideas within are too few or too feeble to co-operate with those presenting themselves from without. We rightly say that the man is "stupid." And "the stupid man cannot be virtuous."

You may go into the streets of your cities or the lanes of your villages, you may seek to elevate the vicious and rouse the lethargic. You will fail, save in one case (much trumpeted) out of ten. You may wring your hands and bewail the power of "sin." But you will be wiser if you take the sinner's child and begin to create in its mind—using every one of the educational instruments which the past has ignored, but the wiser future will not ignore—a rich circle of thought. Without this apperception will fail; without this there can be little or no interest; without this there can be no assured safety. The parent is impenetrable. No earthly power can save him. His "apperception masses" have no momentum. "Here and there some small omission may be supplied; but an all-round human development, missed and neglected in boyhood, can never be recovered."[1]

This standpoint is the only one that will ever make education honoured among the professions; the only one that will ever make it a profession worth our study and our devotion. The only standpoint—except, perhaps, one other—that can give any unity of motive to educational effort. What is that other?

Some day—millions of years, let us hope, from now—the life of this old earth may begin to ebb away, and the chill of the coming ages settle upon her. Man, or man's modified descendants, may enter upon the final and most desperate stage of the struggle for existence. Unless Divinity interpose His fiat, or human prevision and speculation be here deceiving us, every faculty, ideal, and system may disappear that does not help in this last contest. Then may vanish the ideal of a humanistic education. Survival, rather than character, may become the goal of the struggling units that will watch the slow extinction of the world's life.

But even for the geologist the world is still young; man still has moral possibilities before him. An education that makes for character is the only one for us, though room may be found—*is* being found by all enlightened educationists—for the legitimate claims of individuality and practical life. Yet an education that makes for *mere* material survival, a utilitarian education, would fain insinuate

[1] Fröbel, in the *Education of Man*.

itself, even now, into the body-politic. Teachers should beware of it. Not that way lies any possibility of progress. So corpselike an apparition coming beforetime from the grave of the world should have no attractions for us. Let us turn from the chill and the darkness of the charnel-house to the light that shines out steadily, though here and there flecked with solemn bars and shadows, from the pages of Herbart.

If education is "the science of improving the temper and making the heart better," and if "he who should find out one rule to assist us in this work would deserve infinitely better of mankind than all the improvers of other knowledge put together"[1] then this high praise is his who, in 1806, first proclaimed the central significance of Interest. And though just one hundred years have lapsed since then, the law that links Interest with Apperception still remains so generally unrecognised or unknown as to merit the designation, "The Secret" of Herbart.

[1] Bishop Butler's words, quoted in the Education Code of 1906.

APPENDICES

I.—The Primary Curriculum.

The weakest point in our educational system has perhaps been adequately discussed—or at any rate indicated—in the preceding essay. But there are other weak points, far more than can here be dealt with; these weaknesses, however, are of a different kind from the one which Herbartianism can remedy. To mention them is to deal with questions other than the "Secret of Herbart."

For, be it observed, though Herbartianism cannot be seriously charged with the neglect of any important school subject (Herbart himself was much interested in the teaching of mathematics, and modern Herbartians are writing and thinking upon every subject in the curriculum), yet its distinctive message is concerned with the "knowledge subjects." How to feed the soul with rich and suitable food, so that mental health may become moral health—this is the thing that Herbartianism can teach us well; the other task, how to exercise the well-fed soul, though not a task ignored by the Herbartians (witness their doctrine of the "formal steps," their interest in mathematics, and so on) is a task which others can teach us also.

Professor Welton, a year or two ago, spoke of a "Synthesis of Herbart and Fröbel." Synthesis is indeed required, and the following supplementary remarks will perhaps serve to indicate how we should treat our finally synthesised curriculum. Education is more than apperception, just as health is more than assimilation.

For health, indeed, we require not only food, but shelter and exercise. Shelter is clearly a more external thing than food and exercise—a necessary thing, and yet not a thing that enters vitally and operatively into man's nature. We may, perhaps, parallel with it, in our educational discussion, the art of *Writing*—a necessary art, and yet not one in which we can see much further significance. Far more important are those arts and pursuits which provide genuine exercise for the soul.

In almost all English books on school management, subjects follow each other in no scientific order whatever. A teacher, asked point-blank what are the most valuable subjects of all, will either hesitate in sheer helplessness (the question having never occurred to him), or, as pointed out in the preceding essay, will answer at once, using the words of the man in the street, "The three R's." To any Herbartian such an answer falls like the death-knell of educational progress; the reason has been seen, and will become clearer in a moment.

There is no need more pressing than that we should discover the relative importance and the relative function of the various subjects of the curriculum. Since the time of Pestalozzi educationists have devoted much attention to the department of methodology—*how* to teach; Dörpfeld, the greatest and wisest of Herbart's followers, was one of the few who contributed to a more neglected department, the *theory of the curriculum*—*what* to teach. There are, he tells us, two groups of subjects in addition to the one great and priceless group that feeds the human soul. The second includes those practical dexterities which every one admits must be taught—speaking,

reading, writing; while the third group includes formal studies like arithmetic and grammar.

There is, of course, no absolute line of demarcation between the second and the third groups, nor, indeed, between these and the first. Even the "passive" assimilation of food involves digestive activity. Writing and drawing are "formal" in one sense, giving training in proportion, symmetry, and so forth; in another sense they are dexterities, allowing the motor energy of the nerve-centres to find vent. However, the distinction between the second and third groups is far less definite than between them and the first. Broadly, we may say that the first group feeds the mind, while the second and third groups provide exercise either for the mind or for the members.

Test the "Three R's" by this classification. Reading and writing, *as such*, are mechanical dexterities, doing nothing whatever to build up the "circle of thought." Arithmetic is a "formal study," and this again does little or nothing to build up the circle of thought, though it may bring an element of precision into that circle. *Not one of the "Three R's," as such, aids apperception; not one of the Three R's, as such, feeds the soul; not one of the Three R's, as such, makes man morally sensitive or morally progressive.*

For these reasons, therefore, Dörpfeld, and indeed all Herbartians, place the centre of gravity elsewhere than among the "Three R's." John Morley, many years ago, hinted at the same need when he spoke of "those extra subjects which are, in truth, the part of instruction that gives most life and significance to the rest."[1]

And yet an intelligent teaching of the "Three R's" is immensely important. Consider the first and greatest—Reading. If by this were meant *a love of good books, a taste for good books, an interest in reading good books*, then, certainly, the subject would be of incalculable value, even, or especially, in the eyes of the Herbartians; for out of such a love, such a taste, such an interest, may come all those things for which the Herbartians contend. Reading, in this sense, would supply the soul with the very food which is a prerequisite for apperception, interest, virtue, and moral progress. As a rule, however, teachers, officials, and documents mean something else than this when they speak of "Reading"; they mean correctness, fluency, ability, and vigour of utterance. In this sense it is a dexterity, and is so classed by Dörpfeld.

Let us now ask whether our primary schools—once the strongholds of the "Three R's"—have succeeded in teaching reading *in either of these senses. The answer must be an emphatic "No."* The average pupil who leaves our schools has neither a taste for reading—that taste which, in the opinion of Lord Avebury, would destroy most of the "pauperism, extravagance, drunkenness, and crime" which exist in modern England—nor has he the power of reading aloud with correctness and force. This, at any rate, is the result of the writer's observation in a country district; if the verdict is too unfavourable, he can only rejoice in the fact.

The first count of this indictment is, however, confessedly justified; the second is justified to at least an appalling extent. Country schools, each controlled by a head teacher who may or may not love books and speak good English himself; this teacher assisted by two or more pupil teachers who may care nothing for books, and may speak and teach to their pupils—or mumble to them—the worst provincialisms of their grandparents—it is in such schools that we "teach reading" to the triumphant democracy of England.

Fortunately, the better training of these young "teachers" is being taken up in earnest. One of their greatest needs (they have been, in many cases, cut off from all educated people, cut off

[1] *National Education.*

from literary societies, even from libraries and reading circles; for such are, as often as not, wholly absent from our country towns)—one of their greatest needs is to be drilled by educated men and women into the correct and dramatic rendering of the English language. Few people seem to realise what an immensity of practice—practice *in public*—is necessary to make a good reader or speaker. The new pupil-teacher centres will have to devote not merely one hour a week, but *many* hours a week, to this task.[1] The lesson need not be called "reading" in every case: it may be "English" or "history," or what one chooses; but the person in charge must insist daily and hourly upon correct phonetic pronunciation, and upon dramatic delivery—exaggerating, if need be, this latter point. Many of us have never been "taught to read" at all, and cannot read even now.

Our young teachers "find Shakespeare dull." The reason is that there is scarcely one adult out of a thousand who is possessed of the requisite imagination and the requisite freedom of utterance to interpret and enunciate the poet's work. The Englishman, even when capable of reading correctly, can rarely read forcibly. He labours, in fact, under a triple defect: self-consciousness, which prohibits him or discourages him from giving expression to the emotions of the piece he is reading; sluggish imagination, which prevents him from seeing what those emotions are; and an enunciation which is probably worse than that of any other nation of Europe. It is no wonder that "Shakespeare is dull."

Great, then, must be the failure of the primary schools if, though regarding the "Three R's" as their chief work, they fail to teach even the most important of the three.

The second of the "Three R's" is writing, and here little need be said. The primary schools teach it fairly well and would teach it still better if they could finally make up their minds as to the best style. An official edict settling the angle of slope and similar matters would do, perhaps, but little harm and a great deal of good in this region. The subject is a humdrum one, with scarcely any significance *of its own*. "Were it not that writing and reading are necessary as instruments.....we should not think of wasting time over them."[1] Still, there is no reason why we should not teach the subject better than we do. Schools should be specially on guard against allowing the writing to degenerate as a result of copious "note-taking" in upper classes. Notes on science, history, and the rest, should be entered in good though not laborious style; just as the *reading* of science, history, and the rest, should be articulate and phonetically correct. The talk about a "crowded curriculum" would have little or no justification whatever if teachers would correlate their subjects better; not artificially separating history from geography;[2] science, etc., from composition;[3] the learning of facts from their correct expression by voice; and so on. With regard to writing, though care should be insisted on, we need not worship too exclusively the goddess of neatness. A good practical style is all that is required.

The third of the "Three R's" is arithmetic. No Herbartian will despise arithmetic; he sees in it one of the few

[1] In the regulations for the King's Scholarship Examination this question has at last been taken up in earnest. To fail in reading is to fail in the whole examination.

[1] Prof. Laurie, in *Institutes of Education*.

[2] I have known repeatedly of teachers teaching about King Alfred *without a map*, Isaiah *without a map*, etc.

[3] A boy may be marked "very good" for a "composition" paper; turn to his science notes, history notes, etc., and his "composition" is atrocious. Too few of us realise that speaking and composition, as "efferent" subjects, should be closely connected with "afferent" or knowledge subjects like history, geography, science. The knowledge "received" has to be given out again. It is a question whether in the upper classes "composition" need be retained at all as a special subject. During the years from eight to twelve mechanical and technical difficulties should have been conquered. Then will come two years—precious years—when the school can win conquests of another kind.

"gymnastic" subjects suitable for the primary curriculum; and though, in his view, it is even more vitally important to feed the soul than to exercise it, the latter is really quite indispensable. [If in this book they are distinguished too sharply, that is only from necessity or policy.] Judge, then, of his disappointment when he discovers that arithmetic has been mainly taught as a mechanical dexterity (Dörpfeld's second group); as a body of maxims, not a system of principles; as a subject which, instead of being used for the purpose it is so pre-eminently fitted to perform, that of training thought, has only given opportunity for the application of rules of thumb. This, of course, is the direct and predicted result of the plan of 1861.

Between them, Pestalozzi and Fröbel have reformed the teaching of arithmetic in the infant school. Concrete numbers are now invariably used in the early lessons. One form of the concrete, indeed, is daily receiving—and rightly—an increased amount of attention; pupils are being practised in making measurements with ruler, balance, and the like, and using these measurements for purposes of calculation. Such practice in the concrete will prove the salvation of mathematics *in the evening school;* and it is time for the primary day school to give practice of the same kind. But, apart from this very necessary and promising reform, the chief need of the primary school, so far as mathematics is concerned, appears to be *increased stress on the abstract principles of arithmetic.* We can then safely drop two-thirds of the "rules" which loom so large in the "upper standards"—bills of parcels, percentages, stocks, etc.; in view of the "coming of the kilogram" we can also safely drop some of the "weights and measures," which devour time and teach nothing.

Such trivialities as these will take care of themselves if our pupils understand the properties of numbers. Most of us never learnt that, "if equals be taken from equals, the remainders are equal," until we began the study of Euclid, or of simple equations; in reality, such a principle is as important in arithmetic as in the other branches of mathematics. Decimals, fractions, factors, proportion—possibly, too, in upper classes, squaring, etc., and the reverse processes (tables of logarithms, even if not fully *understood*, could surely be made use of)—if our pupils have sound views on these questions, and know, in addition, the axioms which lie at the basis of arithmetical work, and have plenty of practice in the mensuration of the kind mentioned above, we need no longer reproach the primary school for its failure with regard to this subject. If there is room for any further subject, "simple equations" should be given the chance; they are far easier than much of the ordinary "arithmetic," arouse a good deal of zest, and increase immensely a pupil's resources. The rigid line of demarcation between arithmetic and algebra will disappear as soon as officials and teachers will permit the disappearance.

A word or two upon another "formal" subject which, after being the bane of the primary schools of England for a good many years, is likely to be so no longer. Anyone desirous of exposing what is well-nigh the maddest phase in English educational history would do well to study the teaching of English grammar in the nineteenth century. Of course the most gigantic error of all—an error whose moral results for the English nation have been inexpressibly disastrous—was the neglect of literature; Shakespeare has been known mainly as a *corpus vile* for pupils to dissect grammatically; while most poets and writers have not been honoured even to this extent. But, apart from this neglect, the teaching of English has taken the strangest of courses. One might almost say that a favourite relaxation of many men, ambitious of literary distinction, has been to write a grammar-book in which could be found the maximum possible number of errors; those that

had been handed down by previous writers, together with a few invented by each fresh author. At the present moment there are some books in extensive use full of the most grotesque and misleading doctrines. These doctrines, imbibed by hundreds of pupil teachers, who, knowing nothing of Latin or any other language than their own, cannot detect the errors involved, are handed down to their pupils, who, in their turn, frequently become pupil teachers, and thus transmit, further, the legacy of absurdity. Beyond the splendid books of the late Mr. Mason, there was, until recently, scarcely any work on this subject that could be relied upon. The subject as taught in many schools is essentially dishonest. Pupils learn phrases about "governing the objective case" or "agreeing with the nominative" without really understanding them. The writer, at any rate, never understood them until he learnt something of another language than his own. The worst of it is that both "rules," when applied to English nouns, are practically false.

The following are some of the doctrines probably taught, explicitly or implicitly, at this moment, in many of our primary schools:—

That intransitive verbs are of the active voice.

That verbs in the passive voice are intransitive.

That indirect objects are as plentiful as blackberries in autumn.

That "if" is the sign of the subjunctive mood.

That "and" and "but" are the only two conjunctions.

That there is a rigid distinction between the parts of speech: thus, a noun cannot be also a verb, a verb an adjective, or a conjunction an adverb; that an adverb cannot "modify" a preposition, or (despite the Athanasian Creed) a noun.

While the teaching of English composition involves the giving of such rules as—

Never begin a sentence with "and."

Always use short words and sentences;[1] and the reading of poetry (to mention a kindred subject) has to involve the suppression of all rhythm in the interests of "preventing singing."

If other needs had been adequately supplied, there might have been a place in our curriculum for "grammar"; but, as things stand, the subject had better be banished from the primary school, or, at the most, be represented by quite incidental teaching in connection with our literature lessons. It is the teaching of literature and kindred subjects—in other words, it is the reading lesson interpreted broadly—upon which we should concentrate our attention. The chief problems in connection with this humanistic study are (1) correlation of its parts, (2) the use of high-class and first-hand materials. In both respects our schools are almost criminally conservative. The writer has *never* known, for example, of Wordsworth's sonnets being correlated with the history of the Napoleonic Wars. No text-book seems ever to have proposed it, no teacher to have thought of it. The lack of correlation in Biblical teaching is ludicrous, and has been dealt with in the writer's *Reform of Moral and Biblical Education.* "Composition" is, of course, necessary and valuable, and can be easily taught in connection with other things. It should be more oral than at present, and might thus substantially contribute to the improved enunciation already advocated in connection with reading.

Singing.—The only suggestion here proffered by the writer is that in the singing lessons some further attempt at teaching the great national and classic songs of England should be made than has hitherto been the case. The average Englishman is wholly unable to sing or even to recite the verses of "Rule, Britannia," and his musical tastes are so

[1] Mr. Wells's protest is timely *(Mankind in the Making).* Clever pupil teachers have, to the knowledge of the writer, been criticised by their "correspondence tutor" for using a fairly rich vocabulary.

unspeakably low (this is shown by the music-hall songs prepared for his edification) as to testify to the partial failure of the primary school in this domain. Connected, as the Herbartians recommend, with the literature and history taught in the school, singing ought to become one of the best auxiliaries to the sweetening of the national life of England.

Art and similar subjects.—In this important department of educational work there is much to learn, mainly, perhaps, from the Fröbelians. Clay modelling, brush work, as well as the more usual kinds of artistic activity, are winning much favour, and seem, indeed, a necessary supplement to the intellectualism and the bookishness into which, without them, we might be landed. But the author does not profess to give advice or offer criticism where (as here) he feels incompetent to do so, and will but suggest that the artistic subjects be correlated, as far as possible, with the rest of the curriculum, so that pupils may use their constructive powers upon materials they understand. Art for art's sake is no motto for primary schools.

II.—"Teachers do not Read Books on Education" (p. 18).

Some reasons for this are given in the text; one of them may here be emphasised. Absolute chaos rules in the educational world, the most diverse and opposite opinions being gravely put forward year by year; hence such teachers as would, in normal circumstances, be interested in books on education regard them with utter scepticism and distrust. Thring's works are full of brilliance; but there is much doubt whether anyone is able to extract more than about three unmistakable and unambiguous maxims from them. Spencer's *Education* consists of two useful chapters and two dubious ones. From Matthew Arnold's various books an industrious teacher would be able to extract a fairly comprehensive system of educational philosophy; but—there is the "extraction" to do first. Bain's book is somewhat dull, and, belonging as he did to the same school of thought as Spencer, he has Spencer's defects.

All things considered, Dr. Laurie has probably come nearer than any other British author to putting forth a comprehensive system of educational philosophy. On all essential matters of practice he agrees with Herbart, as the present writer showed in *School*, 1904; and the agreement is the more striking as Dr. Laurie objects emphatically to Herbart's psychology. But there is just the lack in Dr. Laurie of what distinguishes Herbart—the power to formulate his philosophy in a way so categorical and lucid (with the interest doctrine shown in its relations on the one side to instruction, and on the other to character) that the student finds his educational work flooded with a new meaning. Herbart's *dicta* ring in our ears; Dr. Laurie's do not.

In the present note the writer would like to add Dr. Laurie's confirmatory words with respect to the reading of educational literature. Speaking of the secondary teacher, he says: "My answer is, he does *not* read. A return of the books on education, not looked into, but carefully read, by the masters of public schools, would surprise.....Ask the publishers of books on education how many sell among the 50,000 teachers of England."[1]

III.—Herbart and Fröbel (pp. 40, 42).

There is an impression abroad in certain circles that Herbart and Fröbel are at opposite educational poles. This is far from being the case.

Herbart is certainly clearer and more systematic than Fröbel. At the sound of his formulæ, education appears before us clothed and in its right mind. Teachers discover the meaning of their

[1] *The Training of Teachers.*

work. Old rivalries between "formal" studies and "real" studies, between "secular" subjects and "sacred" subjects, between an "intensive" and an "extensive" curriculum, lose most of their virulence, and the babel of distracting war-cries suddenly dies down to a murmur. Probably no other educationist possesses anything like Herbart's power of revealing the meaning and scope of education, and of placing its various problems in a true and illuminating relationship. He opens his *Æsthetische Darstellung der Welt* with a clear, almost dogmatic, definition of the "aim" of education;[1] and, when he proceeds to write his *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, he "deduces" it from that "aim."[2]

Fröbel has none of this clearness and precision, but possesses in its stead an almost infallible "feeling" for what the child is and needs at each stage of its existence.

Apart from this, there is mainly a difference of stress between the two writers.

Herbart sees clearly enough that the teacher's work of "instruction" — of giving or presenting new ideas in a suitably arranged order—is one of immense formative importance. Facts, information, ideas, knowledge—these are not comparatively negligible factors, as many amateur "reformers" of education would have us believe. They are not negligible —they are vitally important, for, as shown in the *Secret of Herbart*, they become built up into "apperception masses," which, in the process of taking in *more* facts, information, ideas, knowledge, give rise to "apperceptive interest," this latter being itself of first importance in the character-forming process. What Milton said of books may, on the Herbartian principle, be also said of ideas: they are "not absolutely dead things, but do contain a progeny of life in them." What was passively, or *almost* passively, *taken in* may become a spring that *gives out* freely; the afferent becomes the efferent; "facts" become "faculty."

"Instruction," then, is important in Herbart's view because it adds to the apperceptive resources of the child, and thus enhances the possibilities of many-sided interest. Now, interest is a moral force of the highest value, even if it extends only to the realm of physical nature, for it is an enemy to that great multitude of vices that spring from idleness of mind or body. If interest should extend also—as Herbart in his sixfold classification demanded—to the realm of human nature (the realm of moral ideas), it is not only an enemy to the aforesaid vices, but to the other multitude that spring from sheer impenetrability and callousness of mind.

But Fröbel might ask, in the common jargon of the hour, "Where do I come in?"

Herbart shows how the germs of a rich harvest of interest may be implanted or sown in the soul. But lo! some germs are present at birth—already implanted by a nature or a providence that, here at least, may fairly be called "benevolent." The child, as the Fröbelians show, comes to us already equipped with a score of latent or rudimentary interests that need nothing but stimulus to launch them forth on their career of blessed activity. The powder is laid; the spark alone is wanting. That spark the watchful parent or teacher can readily supply.

Nature and nurture, the innate and the acquired, have been the two decisive factors in the education of every human being. Herbart stresses the second factor, though without ignoring the first. He says, though in other words: "We, acting from without; we, providing the child with ideas, can actually build up the soul of the child." Fröbel says: "Yes, but each child has innate and predestined interests, fondnesses, and aptitudes; let us use them." Evolution reconciles the two standpoints completely. Herbartian interests are acquired in

[1] "The one and the whole work of education may be summed up in the concept—morality."

[2] *Allgemeine Pädagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung Abgeleitet*—"General Pedagogy Deduced from the Aim of Education."

the child's lifetime; Fröbelian interests were acquired by the race, and are now handed down to the child by heredity.[1] Is there anything fantastic in speculating whether the passion for making mud pies and sand castles is not a relic of early ancestral experiences? The fascination of the Fröbelian occupations (plaiting, etc.) suggests such problems irresistibly.

Fröbel says, in effect: "Do not let us waste the rich treasure of human faculty with which each of us is endowed at birth." Herbart says, in effect: "Do not let us waste the opportunities of adding to this treasure."

It would be no hard task, however, to show that Herbart recognised the value of occupational work such as that stressed by the Fröbelians. He recommends the giving of "freer scope for children's activity.....Pleasant and harmless occupations.....provide an outlet for restlessness which cannot be pent up."

Can "faculty" be created? Perhaps this is the place to discuss Professor Adams's statement, that "Herbartianism cannot create faculty, but it gives the best means of utilising faculty."

It would be folly to dispute over the use of the term "create" in this connection, and no doubt "faculty" cannot be created in any absolute sense. We cannot confer a "faculty" of imagination or of reflection upon a stone or a tree—there must be a latent or potential something from the first. But, with this qualification, Herbartians have a perfect right to say that "faculty can be created," if by "faculty" we mean all the various possibilities and powers involved in apperception and interest. One boy has a passionate interest in football, another in books, a third in cigarettes, a fourth in nothing. These differences need not necessarily be the result of initial differences of mind or body; they may be the result of differences in the mental atmosphere of the four boys—in the ideas that have been raining upon them for years. Similarly with adults. Conduct a party through an historical building, or a waxwork show, and one will learn that interest largely depends on apperception masses, and not merely — sometimes scarcely at all—on native endowments of a special character.

Professor James's remarks on interest and apperception are mainly Herbartian in tone, though not to the neglect of the Fröbelian factor. "An adult man's interests are almost every one of them intensely artificial; they have slowly been built up." "An idea will infect another with its own emotional interest when they have become associated together into any sort of a mental total. As there is no limit to the various associations into which an interesting idea may enter, one sees in how many ways an interest may be derived." "If you wish to insure the interest of your pupils, there is only one way to do it, and that is to make certain that they have something in their minds *to attend with*. That something can consist in nothing but a previous lot of ideas." "Our professional ideals and the zeal they inspire are due to nothing but the slow accretion of one mental object to another, traceable backward from point to point till we reach the moment when, in the nursery or in the schoolroom, some little story told, some little object shown, some little operation witnessed, brought the first new object and new interest within our ken by associating it with some one of those primitively there. The interest now suffusing the whole system took its rise in that little event, so insignificant to us now as to be entirely forgotten."[1]

[1] This assumes that acquired characters are transmitted. If that assumption is false, the above would have to be stated in other terms.

IV.—The Faculty Doctrine (p. 40).

Hobbes, Leibnitz, Condillac, Hegel, and many other thinkers, have attacked the doctrine which divides up the mind into a number of more or less independent

[1] *Talks with Teachers.*

faculties (imagination, memory, reasoning, etc.). Spinoza, in his bold statement that "will and intellect are one and the same," and Herbart, in his emphatic assertion that "the will is rooted in the circle of thought," are perhaps the most pronounced opponents of this faculty doctrine.

It is true that brain research has revealed the existence of certain cerebral localities devoted to special functions; but the latter are motor or sensory, and do not correspond to the supposed "faculties" of the phrenologists and older psychologists. The modern tendency is to lay stress on the *unity* of the mind rather than on its multiplicity.

Apart from these speculations, there are three very practical reasons for holding the faculty doctrine in suspicion.

First, it leads educationally to such dislocation of the curriculum, with consequent inefficiency and waste of time, that almost all educationists are agreed in regarding it as practically "pestilent."[1]

Second, it leads to exaggerated stress on "hard pedagogy"—that is, on demanding of children mental efforts of too toilsome a character, on the ground that such efforts are a good "discipline" for the mind. [Here comes in the "fallacy of formal education," which the Herbartians have repeatedly exposed.] In other words, it leads to a depreciation of "interest" and "involuntary[2] (spontaneous) attention" in favour of "effort" and "voluntary[2] (dogged) attention."

Third, it is a fruitful source of uncharitable, or at any rate erroneous, judgments upon conduct. Its exaltation of will or of free will as a faculty almost independent of intellectual and other conditions, and "driving itself through them" (as Dr. Laurie says), tends to make us see devilry or saintship where we ought to see merely ignorance or enlightenment. In other words, the influence of culture on character is under-estimated, owing to the artificial separation of will from intelligence.

I.

With regard to the first effect of the faculty doctrine:—

Certain subjects and lessons and methods are supposed to help the "faculty" of observation; others the "faculty" of memory; others the "faculty" of will. At one moment too much value is attributed to "information" (when the memory faculty is being cultivated); at the next moment information is undervalued as not helping the will in its solitary struggles. Almost every educational fallacy—such as the notorious "Virtue cannot be taught"—is traceable to this faulty psychology of faculties. Teachers too often despise "theory"; it would be no exaggeration to say that a wrong theory of the mind has done far more harm to education than low salaries, professional disrepute, and sectarian quarrels.

School "time-tables" have had a good deal to answer for. Used slavishly, they lead to the same consequences as those of the faculty doctrine, for the same fallacy is operative in the two cases. A teacher is forbidden by H.M. Inspector to deal with the subject-matter of a reading lesson during the lesson itself, even a map being banned though a "geography reader" is being used. "Reading is reading." Thus an artificial separation is effected between the reception of ideas (or the comprehension of a subject) and expression in words. This is perfectly ruinous; reading becomes a "dull" lesson just because we, in our ignorance of educational psychology, will insist on an artificial divorce of things that should be kept in natural relationship. Conversely, during a geography lesson a child answers some question in a slipshod fashion (*e.g.*, "There ain't no rivers there"); the teacher refuses to insist on a grammatical or clearly expressed

[1] Miss Mason's word, in *Home Education*.

[2] The words "involuntary" and "voluntary," though generally used by English writers on Herbartianism, are very misleading. The words in parentheses may help to prevent mistake.

answer because *now* is the time for geography, not grammar or composition.

Time-tables have their place; but when they result in things of this kind they are pernicious to a high degree.

II.

With regard to the second point:—

Except among Herbartian educationists and a few others, there is an excessive confidence in "disciplinary" subjects. If a subject is hard, it is supposed to arouse "effort," make a child "self-reliant," make him "think," etc. If he is able to conquer one set of difficulties, he is supposed to be able to conquer every other set. The logical consequence of this view is an exaggerated devotion to mathematics, grammar (Latin, Greek, French, English), and other subjects that demand great concentration of mind; while subjects that confer new ideas and feed the imagination and the moral life are despised.

The Herbartians attack this view because (1) they do not believe that power over one subject necessarily gives power over another, unless it is a subject closely akin to the former. To make a boy a good mathematician does not necessarily make him capable of becoming a good chess player or a good statesman. (2) They see that there is immense moral danger in depreciating the nutritive subjects, because of their close connection with culture, apperception, interest, and character.

A recent passage-of-arms neatly sums up the two sides. "A master's business," said Mr. Benson in the *Nineteenth Century*, "is to see that there is mental effort." "Not a bit of it," replied Sir Oliver Lodge; "a master's business is to supply proper pabulum."

The writer sees that in the recent official report on Higher Elementary Schools the committee record, with apparent approval, that "it is the way you teach rather than what you teach that matters"—another form of the "faculty doctrine." How unspeakably dangerous all this is! No teacher, short of positive genius, can help being led astray.

It is commonly asserted that Herbartianism tends to ignore the bracing effect of hard mental effort, and thus weakens the character of children. If it does do so, the fact is deplorable; but Herbart never intended or prescribed anything that would have this effect. One writer, indeed, says that he "made a much larger use of compulsion, both in forcing attention to study and in controlling the conduct, than Fröbel."[1] "The theory of interest," as Professor Adams says, "does not propose to banish drudgery, but only to make drudgery tolerable by giving it a meaning." Herbart never denied that hard, dogged effort was sometimes called for; but he saw more value normally in the free, happy, "involuntary" attention that springs from real interest in a subject than in the "sheer dead lift of the will"[2] resulting in "voluntary attention."[3]

To any person who brings to the study of other educationists a certain familiarity with Herbartian thought, nothing is more striking than the widespread support rendered to Herbart by many who do not avowedly call themselves by his name. This is illustrated by their treatment of the present question. No man in England has done more to discourage the study of Herbart than the late Rev. R. H. Quick, not by positive depreciation, but by omitting him from his widely-read book on *Educational Reformers*. Yet this is how he writes: "It is wonderful how insignificant a part the will plays in the lives of most of us. When we have no interests to guide us, we fall into inanities." His whole treatment of the interest question, of the value of "involuntary" (or spontaneous) attention, and the comparatively

[1] Hughes, in *Fröbel's Educational Laws*.

[2] De Garmo's expression, in *Interest and Education*.

[3] Note again the misleading use of the words "voluntary" and "involuntary."

small *rôle* played by "voluntary" (or "against-the-grain") attention, is Herbartian. "Buffon has said that genius is nothing but a power of taking pains, and interests give this power. Certainly the chief characteristics of a man are his interests, and he is strong in proportion to the strength of his interests, and wise according to their directions. Interests lead to all kinds of involuntary action. But some people have an innate energy prior to interest, and, though, of course, taking its direction from interests, capable of working without them."[1]

Miss C. M. Mason has expressed some very similar opinions with regard to the will. "It is habit" (under which Miss Mason includes intellectual habits of apperception) "which will govern ninety-nine hundredths of the child's life. He *is* the mere automaton you describe..... And then, even in emergencies, in every sudden difficulty and temptation that requires an act of will, why, conduct is still apt to run on the lines of the familiar habit."[2]

III.

The third point stands in close relation to the last, but deserves some attention of its own.

It will be seen that the ultimate question of free will is left unsolved in the text—unsolved and probably insoluble. It would be unprofitable to enter minutely into a hopeless discussion. But the more obvious aspects of the question must be emphasised.

Herbart would have had no sympathy with the Rev. J. R. Illingworth's references to the will. "When we have traced an occurrence to the intervention of the human will, we are at once content. It is fully accounted for. We know not merely how it began, but why, and have therefore reached its absolute beginning." Such a standpoint would be the ruin of all educational thought. When we see two men separating at a street corner, one to go to a library and the other to a public-house, it does not satisfy the Herbartian to be told: "The human will explains everything. You should be 'at once content.'" Mr. Illingworth's treatment of motives (apparently, after all, the will is not "fully accounted for" without motives!) is equally unsatisfactory in Herbartian eyes. "We can frame our own ideals .....choose which of many suggested motives we will make our own.....We can initiate events of which our own will is the veritable starting-point.....Our will is an agent whose reason for action is contained within itself."[1] Think of a Hoxton child "framing his own ideals." As if every, or almost every,[2] "ideal" that is his was not once borrowed from his environment. Mr. Illingworth's attitude illustrates what is meant on p. 32 by a "morally aristocratic principle." Contrast it with Herbart's "All action springs out of the circle of thought." "If.....intellectual interests are wanting, if the store of thought be meagre, then the ground lies empty for the animal desires." "The whole inner activity has its abode in the circle of thought. Here is found the initiative life, the primal energy.....In the culture of the circle of thought the main part of education lies.....The limits of the circle of thought are the limits for the character."

Reverting to the general question, the writer is inclined to say that almost all pedagogical errors have sprung from the "faculty doctrine," and that almost all the protests of "educational reformers" have been directed against one or other of its forms. One or two examples, chosen almost haphazard, will illustrate this statement.

[1] Quotations from the *Life and Remains.*
[2] *Home Education.*

[1] *Divine Immanence.*
[2] A little hesitation here. There is a generative power in ideas that makes the writer chary of admitting fully that "no one can beget an idea by himself" (Miss Mason). If we deprive the will of primacy and originality, we must be careful lest we leave the universe with a fixed amount of psychical energy. Then there is genius, too. But for educational purposes Miss Mason's dictum is important and valuable.

Mr. Morley is really protesting against the faculty doctrine when he says :—

"'Few, I suppose, will deliberately assert,' Mr. Spencer says, 'that information is important and character unimportant.' But surely this antithesis is as unreal as Dr. Magee's opposition between freedom and sobriety. The possession of information is an element in character."[1]

Matthew Arnold was protesting against the same doctrine when he spoke of "Our notions about culture, about the many sides of the human spirit, about making these sides help one another instead of remaining enemies and strangers."[2]

"We are called to develop ourselves more in our totality, on our perceptive and intelligential side as well as on our moral side.....Hebraism strikes too exclusively upon one string in us. Hellenism does not address itself with serious energy enough to morals and righteousness. For our totality, for our general perfection, we need to unite the two."[3]

V.—The Moral Instruction League (p. 50).

Far more quickly than the members of this League ever expected, its aims have received official approval. In the Education Code of 1906 moral instruction is prescribed as an essential part of the elementary curriculum, and a strong preference is expressed for such instruction to be direct and systematic, not merely incidental.

The League is only a few years old. From the first, its propaganda for the introduction of moral and civic lessons has been directed to the educational bodies of this country; and the feeling has been that as these, one after another, fell into line, the solution of the "religious controversy" would come appreciably nearer.

The first education authority to be influenced was that of Leicester. Mr. F. J. Gould, whose books of moral lessons are the most valuable of the kind that have been written in English, visited a number of Leicester schools, in order to ascertain how much "moral instruction" was given in connection with the "Scripture lessons." He found, of course, that, while there were occasional stray hints of a moral nature, most of the lessons were purely historical, geographical, or doctrinal. Even if it were admitted that such lessons were interesting and valuable, it was clear that, from the standpoint of instruction in the practical duties of modern life, they were a failure.

The same inference is to be drawn from the fact that various educational bodies have, at different times, added to the curriculum lessons in temperance, courtesy, kindness to animals, citizenship, and the like—a clear proof that such moral duties are not taught adequately in the course of the Scripture lessons.

One after another, and with a rapidity that is in itself eloquent, various education authorities have adopted the proposals of the League, thus tacitly admitting that the present system of "religious instruction" is inadequate for moral purposes. At the present moment no less than thirty-three bodies have taken this course. The Surrey, Cheshire, West Riding, and other authorities have adopted the Graduated Syllabus of the League almost without change. There is reason to believe, however, that in the present state of the curriculum, and with teachers who have always been told that morality and civics are the only subjects that cannot be "taught," the work of the organisation has only begun. It is one thing to prescribe a subject; it is another to see that it is taught well.

The Moral Instruction League may become a Moral Education League; already it is directing its attention to the general question of making the whole work of the school significant for character-forming. Meanwhile the

[1] *National Education.*
[2] *St. Paul and Protestantism.*
[3] *Ibid.*

League has every reason to congratulate itself upon having convinced the Board of Education and so many educational authorities that "virtue can be taught," while most of our professors of education have been reiterating that it cannot.

This last phenomenon is puzzling. Why should the men who have been appointed to teach the most advanced educational thought to student-teachers have become convinced that "virtue cannot be taught," and have left the work of converting the nation to a small organisation whose average income is less than the salary of an assistant master? And why, on almost every platform, should an educationist who desires a reputation for wisdom warn against "tacking a moral" on to a story? Who are the creatures that are constantly "moralising"? Are they elementary teachers? Are they secondary teachers? The present writer has heard or read these warnings many times, but has never yet known to whom they are addressed. But he does say: "Better a thousand times to 'tack on a moral'—clumsily, even brutally—than to allow a child to grow up with no moral instruction at all. The moral *does no harm* to any child, and *may* do good to many."

No doubt our professors mean well. They think that plenty of good fairy-tales, history, and literature will produce a moral effect, even though no general moral maxim, like "You ought not to be cruel to animals," be employed to sum up that effect. Very true. Apperception-material of a moral kind is good in moral education, just as apperception-material in the form of class experiments is good in teaching science. But why on earth the general moral maxim should be regarded as unsuitable for school, while the general maxims of science (*e.g.*, that bodies weigh less in water than in air) are admitted, passes the understanding of the present writer. And it must be also remembered that by "moral instruction" is not meant merely a system of maxims, but a system of illustrations leading up to those maxims. In fact, the method of moral instruction is precisely the same as the method of all synthetic instruction: "The teacher must pass from concrete to abstract." But it is better to violate this principle a little than to act on such absolute and wicked nonsense as that "Virtue cannot be taught."

There is very little doubt that the popularity of this maxim, though due partly to the *good* psychology above described, is mainly due to the *bad* psychology of "faculties." *Of course*, if will and character are independent of the rest of the mind, they cannot be influenced *viâ* the mind. The only hope is in supernatural means.

And that brings us to the third reason for the popularity of the maxim. Every ecclesiastic, *quâ* ecclesiastic, believes that "Virtue cannot be taught."

Meanwhile, despite the good psychology and the bad psychology of our professors of education and theology, the hero of the situation is Mr. F. J. Gould. When the next professorship of education in England falls vacant, and the committee of selection ask, not for safe conventionalism, but for merit and power and achievement, they will turn to the man who, in the East End of London, developed or discovered the same principle of Anschauung in moral teaching that Pestalozzi, years before, had developed or discovered in teaching other things. For the two achievements are identical in origin and in essence. The squalor of Stanz and the squalor of Limehouse drove each teacher to the concrete. If only those men who moralise to us about "moralising" would come from the altitude of those social conditions where good books and good example and good traditions render moral teaching less urgent, down to the regions where blank moral ignorance prevails, they would be less glib in giving utterance to bad educational philosophy.

When one travels on a London omnibus or a workmen's train, and notices numberless little acts of annoyance (spitting, putting dirty boots on

cushions, allowing sparks from a cigarette to blow into fellow-travellers' eyes, etc.), one is driven to ask whether these acts spring largely from thoughtlessness or not. The writer believes that they *do*, and that simple systematic moral instruction would be of much use even in these comparatively trivial matters. Mr. Paton, moving amid middle-class boys, is amused at the inclusion of "cleanliness" in the Syllabus of the Moral Instruction League; no one who knows what the slums are will smile at it. These critics cannot justify their attitude; there is no real philosophy behind them; they cannot answer in the negative the question, "Does evil, partly, at least, spring from ignorance?" Nay, they implicitly give away their case, as Mr. Paton did in his College of Preceptors lecture of November 14th, 1906, by tracing sin to "delusion." The thing is inexplicable — this strange prejudice against direct moral instruction, this strange sympathy for a mythical boy who has been ruined by it.

The writer would ask this plain question: Is there no intellectual element in good conduct? Was Sidgwick wrong when he declared that "the obstacles to right conduct.....lie partly in the state of our intellect, partly in the state of our desires and will.....Let us suppose that our notion of justice suddenly became clear.....suppose this, undoubtedly there would be much less injustice"? If Sidgwick was right, *even the baldest and most abstract teaching of "morals"* must *be of some value as destroying moral ignorance.*

VI.—Science and the "Humanities" (p. 54).

There is little doubt that our boys' schools are weaker on the "humanistic" side than on any other. The present writer's observations in London go to confirm what has been his conviction for many years—namely, that, while the average class-master in England can probably teach drawing, writing, arithmetic, and several other subjects as well as any teacher in the world, he cannot, as a rule, do quite the same justice to literature or history. These last subjects are taught better in girls' schools.

In London, too, there is still a slight excess of emphasis on "science," though the problem of how to teach this subject is far more difficult than the parallel problem of how to teach literature and history. Almost any teacher with a liking for literature and history can teach it fairly well. Much depends on the "liking"; but neither knowledge nor liking will necessarily make a successful science teacher. It is interesting to note that our greatest scientists admit the supreme value of humanistic study. "A training in science and scientific methods, admirable as it is in so many ways, fails to supply those humanising influences which the older learning can so well impart. For the moral stimulus that comes from an association with all that is noblest and best in the literatures of the past, for the culture and taste that spring from prolonged contact with the highest models of literary expression, for the widening of our sympathies and the vivifying of our imagination by the study of history and philosophy, the teaching of science has no proper equivalents. .....You will find in literature a source of solace and refreshment, of strength and encouragement, such as no department of science can give you."[1]

VII.—The Bible in Schools (p. 61).

Judging from the trend of affairs, the Bible seems likely to be excluded, sooner or later, from primary schools. It is a pity. Poor, perfunctory, and unreal though the teaching has sometimes, if not frequently, been, many men who have but small sympathy with militant Bible-worship regret that Anglican and Roman ecclesiastics seem determined to drive education on towards the "logical" solution of secularism. To say

[1] Sir A. Geikie, in *Landscape in History, and other Essays.*

that the Bible is a "Nonconformist" book, and that the use of selections from it in the school is an "endowment of Nonconformity," strikes a mere educationist with amazement, especially in view of the fact that Nonconformists, during the last thirty years, have practically done nothing to make Bible teaching really educational. The writer in 1902 carefully examined the syllabuses of Biblical instruction issued by leading School Boards, and found that not more than one had any claim to the respect of an educationist; even the claim of the one was by no means obvious.

The chief faults of these syllabuses can be readily indicated.

Scrappiness. Instead of substantial pieces from each suitable Biblical work, a chapter or two, quite divorced from the context, would be prescribed. The idea that a great poetical or historical work loses three-quarters of its effect when dissected in this fashion had not dawned upon our syllabus-makers; indeed, even in the ordinary teaching of "secular" literature the idea is only just winning recognition. The bearings of the apperception doctrine are obvious. Apperception and interest are less likely to spring up in connection with a series of scraps than in connection with a mass of closely related material.

Selection of unsuitable passages. An extraordinary passion for the plagues of Egypt, the conquest of Canaan by Joshua, and the miracles of Elijah and Elisha, had seized syllabus-makers. There is no denying that portions of these graphic narratives have considerable interest for children, and *might* be treated in a very profitable manner, the unsuitable portions being replaced by a brief narrative of the teacher's. But, speaking broadly, these three stories are about the worst that could have been selected in the whole Bible, and how anyone could expect the cause of "religious education" to be furthered by them is unintelligible to the present writer. In addition to the immense difficulties, critical and theological, involved in these stories, their ethical content is much poorer than that of many others; nay, one may say that the ethical element is frequently perplexing in the highest degree.

Omission of most valuable material. While obviously and stupidly unsuitable portions of the Bible were forced year after year into the schools, the very best portions (of the Old Testament, at any rate) were entirely ignored. Magnificent lessons in patriotism and righteousness could have been based upon certain of the prophets, especially Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, and Jeremiah; and if, in addition, the work of these men had been put into its proper historical and geographical settings, the humanistic and culture value of the lessons for upper standards would have been enormous. It is almost maddening to think of the wasted opportunities of the last thirty years. While opposing religionists have been wrangling over "religious education," educative material of the very highest value —poetry and literature and history more ancient and precious than the vaunted culture-giving classics of Greece and Rome—has been under the very noses of School Board members, Church of England managers, and school teachers —*and it has been ignored.* None of our public education authorities, until quite lately, and very few even now, seem to have ever thought of exploring this rich mine of prophetic literature. One after another the syllabuses have prescribed the weary round of plagues of Egypt, etc.

Just at the point where the Hebrew Bible presents us with first-hand documents, substantially contemporary with the events they describe, and possessed of the highest literary merit, *the syllabus leaps over to—Daniel!* Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, and Jeremiah—men who dealt in a practical and wonderfully modern manner with vice, social tyranny, crooked politics, and shoddy patriotism, and put their protests into immortal forms—these were unanimously ignored.

It may be admitted that the problem of teaching the prophets has not yet been solved; but that the mere idea should have occurred to scarcely one responsible person in all England is an amazing fact.

Absence of correlation. While in secular subjects some slight attempts are being made to correlate history with geography, literature with history, etc., and thus to call forth apperceptive interest more abundantly, little or nothing of this kind was done in connection with Biblical teaching. Cross references from Psalms and Prophets to historical books like *Kings* were unheard of; equally so was the idea of showing Jewish history in its relation to the great empires of the East, Assyria, etc. No "syllabus" encouraged these things, and few teachers had authority or time or inclination to depart widely from what was prescribed. Given intelligently, the Old Testament lessons would be some of the finest for humanistic purposes in the whole curriculum, opening children's minds to historical periods and names otherwise unknown, and providing a splendid array of material for the formation and improvement of the moral judgment. But by the adopted policy of isolation, the awakening of apperceptive interest has been almost an impossibility. The results are patent. How many people, orthodox or heterodox, "Church" or "Chapel," have any real *interest* in nine-tenths of the Bible?

Biblical teaching has also had to struggle against difficulties unknown to other subjects. Every teacher in England would have protested scornfully against using a reading book with the size, print, heterogeneity, and utter absence of pictures that characterise the Bible. *Nowhere* in England, to the knowledge of the writer, has any attempt been made to put the printed Bible before children in an attractive form. What feeling but one of contempt for all the rival religious parties can an educationist possess?

The writer would have been glad to quote from two little books which, better than any others, put the case for Biblical teaching *on educational grounds alone*—Matthew Arnold's *Great Prophecy of Israel's Restoration*, with its splendid preface (Macmillan, 1s.), and the Rev. Stewart D. Headlam's *The Place of the Bible in Secular Education* (Brown, Langham, 6d.). The amusing thing is that both of these men stand at the opposite pole to Nonconformity.

In 1902 the present writer wrote *The Reform of Moral and Biblical Education*—a very impertinent and flippant book, doubtless. The writer regrets some of the things there written. But the significant fact is that all recent improvements in Biblical curricula (and great improvements *have* been made by some authorities—*e.g.*, those of Hertfordshire, Newport [Mon.], Hornsey, Bristol, Aberdare—especially the first)—are all in the directions outlined in 1902.

It is the present writer's conviction that, sooner or later, there will be a discovery of the humanistic value of the Bible. The Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the ancient classics of Greece and Rome appeared before men's astonished eyes in all their charm, will be repeated—with a difference. We shall learn, all of us—Churchmen, Nonconformists, and Secularists—that most of the Bible stands apart from sectarian and credal differences, and that, even if Christianity perished to-morrow, the Bible should still have a place in our schools.

But the question is whether, through the wrangles of the sects, the Bible will have to be excluded for half a century first? Maybe. And then we shall be driven, as the American teachers have been, to teach the secular "humanities" better than at present.

One final remark. Modern child-study is throwing light upon the problem of Biblical teaching. "Boys of this age (up to twelve) prefer the Old Testament to the New. There are sound reasons why it should first be taught them."[1]

[1] Forbush, in *The Boy Problem*.

The educational tension will be relieved as soon as educational amateurs (bishops, parsons, and platform orators) are plainly told that they are ignorant of the elements of modern pedagogy. For most of them are.

VIII.—Some Prevalent Errors about Herbartian Teaching.

A reviewer in *School*, January, 1904, says that Herbart was "indifferent to natural science"; and even Miss Dodd remarks that "the Herbartians place history as the centre of all subjects to be studied."

In point of fact, Herbart was advocating the teaching of science long before the scientific revival of the middle of the nineteenth century. His sixfold classification of interest (as empirical, speculative, æsthetic, sympathetic, social, and religious) is fairly comprehensive, if not complete and logical. The first three sub-divisions fall under the head of "Interest in Nature," and will thus include interest in natural science; the last three under that of "Interest in Human Nature"; and a man who is developed along all six directions will possess that æsthetic presentation of the universe which, as early as 1804, Herbart declared to be the chief task of education.

The blunder has arisen from the predominant influence of Ziller. He, as Miss Dodd says, "placed history as the centre of all the subjects to be studied." But it is erroneous to identify such a policy with Herbart himself, or with the more rational of his followers, such as Story and Dörpfeld.

Another common misapprehension is that Herbart identifies interest with morality or goodness. Many and many an attempt has been made to show that a man may possess interests of a varied and powerful character, and may yet be morally contemptible.

In point of fact, Herbart admits that interest is far from virtue, and the third book of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* (following the second, which deals with "many-sided interest") is devoted to "Moral Strength of Character." What can safely be asserted is (1) that, though a character without intellectual and other "interests" can be negatively "moral," and even heroic "according to its lights," nine-tenths of the realm of moral conduct will remain, to such an individual, a *terra incognita*; many moral claims (*e.g.*, love of abstract truth, of civic duty, etc.) will simply fail to be "apperceived"—they will be meaningless and unintelligible; (2) that in the vast majority of cases there will not be even "negative" morality. The soul that is inadequately supplied with "interests" is almost certain to succumb to the temptations of the world or the flesh.

But, when all this is admitted, there still remains the necessity for express moral training, which will take such forms as discipline in good habits, the possible use of rewards and punishments, the enunciation of abstract moral maxims, and the like. It is a strange fact that because Herbart, in a lightning-flash of genius, perceived the intimate relationship between interest and character—a relationship which, say what one likes, is still unknown or ignored or depreciated by the majority of professional educationists—he must therefore be blamed for identifying these two things, when, in point of fact, he most expressly distinguished them.

The present writer has made a somewhat special study of the criticisms directed against the Herbartian system, and he would like to add that he does not recollect a single practical criticism which has any real force as directed against Herbart as an educationist.

The latest British writer on Herbartianism, Dr. Davidson, in his *New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology and Educational Theory*, has done good work in defending Herbart on certain philosophical grounds untouched by the present writer.

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