

NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
THE
MORTALITY
OF
THE SOUL

BY
DAVID HUME.

Reprinted from the Original Edition of 1789

WITH
AN INTRODUCTION BY G. W. FOOTE.

Price Twopence.

LONDON
PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.

1890.

LONDON:
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTR,
AT 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.

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INTRODUCTION.

BY G. W. FOOTE.

REFERRING to David Hume, in his lecture on the Physical Basis of Life, Professor Huxley speaks of "the vigor of thought and the exquisite clearness of style of the man whom I make bold to term the most acute thinker of the eighteenth century—even though that century produced Kant."* Even Carlyle assigns Hume a place "among the greatest,"† which for a writer like Carlyle to a thinker like Hume is a remarkable tribute. No less clearly is the Scotch philosopher's greatness acknowledged by Joseph de Maistre, the foremost champion of the Papacy in this century. "I believe," he says, "taking all into account, that the eighteenth century, so fertile in this respect, did not produce a single enemy of religion who can be compared with him. His cold venom is far more dangerous than the foaming rage of Voltaire. If ever, among men who have heard the gospel preached, there has existed a veritable Atheist (which I will not undertake to decide) it is he."‡

Hume's influence has been felt through the whole course of philosophy since his day, and the writings of such a man—so lucid, yet so profound; so acute, yet so comprehensive—can never be neglected. Upon religious topics, no less than on political and philosophical, he was singularly penetrative. His *Essay on Miracles* is the starting-point of all subsequent discussions of that most vital element of the Christian faith; his *Natural History of Religion* strikingly anticipates many of the teachings of modern Evolution; and his *Dialogues on*

* *Lay Sermons and Addresses*, p. 141.

† *Essays* (People's Edition), vol. iv., p. 130.

‡ *Lettres sur l'Inquisition*, pp. 147, 148.

Religion turn the arguments of Theism in every possible light, leaving little but elaboration to his successors.

In the ordinary editions of Hume's *Essays* the following reprint is not to be found. This essay was published for the first time after his death, at Edinburgh, in 1789, by C. Hunter, Parliament Square. It was the second of two posthumous essays, the first being a remarkable essay on Suicide. A copy of the original edition has been faithfully followed in this reprint. Not a word has been changed, but such forms as "'tis" have been brought into accord with the sedate fashion of to-day, and the frequent dashes in the midst of long passages have been treated as the marks of fresh paragraphs.

Professor Huxley, whose thoroughness is apparent to all who follow him, gives the title of this essay *On the Immortality of the Soul*, but the word used on the original title-page is *Mortality*, which indicates the author's argument. This is a mere inadvertence, however, for Huxley is well acquainted with the essay, and gives long extracts from it in his splendid little volume on Hume.* He calls it a "remarkable essay," and "a model of clear and vigorous statement." It long remained but little known, but "possibly for that reason its influence has been manifested in unexpected quarters, and its main arguments have been adduced by archiepiscopal and episcopal authority in evidence of the value of revelation. Dr. Whately, sometime Archbishop of Dublin, paraphrases Hume, though he forgets to cite him; and Bishop Courtenay's elaborate work, dedicated to the Archbishop, is a development of that prelate's version of Hume's essay."

Anyone who turns to the first essay in Whately's *Some Peculiarities of the Christian Religion* will perceive the truth of these remarks, at least with respect to the Archbishop. Sometimes he follows Hume step by step, and even uses his very illustrations. But Hume himself had doubtless profited by the arguments of Anthony Collins in his replies to Dr. Samuel Clarke's letters to Dodwell. Clarke argued for the Immateriality of the Soul, and Collins for its Materiality; and, as Huxley elsewhere admits, Collins had by far the best of the discussion. He wrote, says Huxley, with "wonderful power and closeness of reasoning," and "in this battle the Goliath of

* Hume, *English Men of Letters* Series.

Freethinking overcame the champion of what was considered Orthodoxy.*

Some readers may notice one omission in Hume's essay. He does not refer, as Huxley remarks, to "the sentimental arguments for the immortality of the soul which are so much in vogue at the present day," and "perhaps he did not think them worth notice." But he does fence them by anticipation in saying that "All doctrines are to be suspected which are favored by our passions." Nothing but man's overweening egotism could induce him to think that he will live for ever because he would like to; and that such an argument for a future life should be put forward by theologians, only proves what is so obvious on many other grounds, that religion, with all its fine pretences, is constantly appealing to the blind irrationality of individual selfishness.

We must conclude this Preface with a word of warning to the reader. Let him not be misled by the opening and closing paragraphs of Hume's essay into supposing that the great sceptic deferred to the authority of Revelation. They are only his ironical bows to orthodoxy. He indulges in the same gestures in his Essay on Miracles. This has brought upon him, as it brought upon Gibbon, a charge of disingenuousness. But both of those masters of irony were perfectly aware that every sensible man understood them. If they wore a mask, it was transparent, and did not conceal their features; and those who upheld the Blasphemy Laws for the persecution of Freethinkers, had no right to complain when conformity was yielded with an expressive grimace.

* *Critiques and Adresses*, "The Metaphysics of Sensation."

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The Mortality of the Soul.

BY DAVID HUME.

By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the *Immortality* of the *Soul*; the arguments for it are commonly derived either from *metaphysical* topics, or *moral* or *physical*. But in reality it is the Gospel and the Gospel alone, that has brought *life and immortality to light*.

I. *Metaphysical* topics suppose that the Soul is immaterial, and that it is impossible for thought to belong to a material substance. But just metaphysics teach us that the notion of substance is wholly confused and imperfect, and that we have no other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular qualities, inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what qualities inhere in the one or in the other. They likewise teach us that nothing can be decided *a priori* concerning any cause or effect and that experience being the only source of our judgments of this nature we cannot know from any other principle, whether matter by its structure or arrangement, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of fact or existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be dispersed throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire of the *Stoics*, and to be the only inherent subject of

thought, we have reason to conclude from *analogy* that nature uses it after the same manner she does the other substance *matter*. She employs it as a kind of paste or clay ; modifies it into a variety of forms and existences ; dissolves after a time each modification, and from its substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may successively compose the body of all animals, the same spiritual substance may compose their minds. Their consciousness, or that system of thought which they formed during life may be continually dissolved by death. And nothing interests them in the new modification. The most positive assertors of the morality of the Soul, never denied the immortality of its substance. And that an immaterial substance as well as a material, may lose its memory or consciousness appears in part from experience, if the Soul be immaterial.

Reasoning from the common course of nature, and without supporting any new interposition of the supreme cause, which ought always to be excluded from philosophy, what is incorruptible must also be ingenerable. The Soul therefore, if immortal, existed before our birth ; and if the former existence no ways concerned us, neither will the latter.

Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than men ; are *their* Souls also immaterial and immortal ?

II. Let us now consider the moral arguments, chiefly those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to be farther interested in the farther punishment of the vicious and reward of the virtuous.

But these arguments are grounded on the supposition that God has attributes beyond what he has exerted in this universe, with which alone we are acquainted. Whence do we infer the existence of these attributes ?

It is very safe for us to affirm that whatever we know the Deity to have actually done, is best ; but it is very dangerous to affirm, that he must always do what to us seems best. In how many instances would this reasoning fail us with regard to the present world ?

But if any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm, that the whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the present life. With how weak a concern from the original inherent structure of the mind and passions, does he ever look farther ? What comparison either for steadiness or efficacy, betwixt so floating an idea, and the most doubtful persuasion of any matter of fact that occurs in common life. There arise indeed in some minds some unaccountable terrors with regard to futurity ; but these would quickly vanish were they not artificially fostered by precept and education. And those who foster them ; what is their motive ? Only to gain a livelihood, and to acquire power and riches in this world. Their very zeal and industry therefore is an argument against them.

What cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to confine all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to the present life, if there be another scene still waiting us, of infinitely greater consequence ? Ought this barbarous deceit to be ascribed to a beneficent and wise being ?

Observe with what exact proportion the task to be performed and the performing powers are adjusted throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives him a great superiority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him ; his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, passion, find sufficient employment in fencing against the miseries of his present condition, and frequently,

may almost always, are too slender for the business assigned them.

A pair of shoes perhaps was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection which that commodity is capable of attaining. Yet it is necessary, at least very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists, even some geometers, poets and philosophers among mankind. The powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to *their* wants, and to their period of existence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore obvious.

On the theory of the Soul's mortality, the inferiority of women's capacity is easily accounted for. Their domestic life requires no higher faculties, either of mind or body. This circumstance vanishes and becomes absolutely insignificant, on the religious theory: The one sex has an equal task to perform as the other; their powers of reason and resolution ought also to have been equal and both of them infinitely greater than at present. As every effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first cause of all, which is the Deity; everything that happens is ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or vengeance.

By what rule are punishments and rewards distributed? What is the divine standard of merit and demerit? Shall we suppose that human sentiments have place in the Deity? How bold that hypothesis. We have no conception of any other sentiments.

According to human sentiments, sense, courage, good manners, industry, prudence, genius, etc., are essential parts of personal merits. Shall we therefore erect an asylum for poets and heroes like that of the ancient mythology? Why confine all rewards to one species of virtue? Punishment without any proper end or

purpose is inconsistent with *our* ideas of goodness and justice, and no end can be served by it after the whole scene is closed. Punishment according to *our* conception, should bear some proportion to the offence. Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail a creature as man? Can anyone approve of *Alexander's* rage, who intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his favorite horse Bucephalus?*

Heaven and Hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and the bad ; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and virtue.

Were one to go round the world with an intention of giving a good supper to the righteous, and a sound drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find that the merits and demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to the value of either.

To suppose measures of approbation and blame different from the human confounds everything. Whence do we learn that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from our own sentiments?

What man who has not met with personal provocation (or what good natured man who has) could inflict on crimes, from the sense of blame alone, even the common, legal, frivolous punishments? And does anything steel the breast of judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity but reflection on necessity and public interest? By the Roman law those who had been guilty of parricide and confessed their crime, were put into a sack along with an ape, a dog, and a serpent and thrown into the river. Death alone was the punishment of those who denied their guilt, however fully proved. A criminal was tried before

* Quint. Curtius lib. vi., cap. 5.

Augustus and condemned after a full conviction, but the humane emperor when he put the last interrogatory, gave it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a denial of his guilt. "You surely (said the prince) did not kill your father."* This lenity suits our natural ideas of *right* even towards the greatest of all criminals, and even though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufferance. Nay even the most bigoted priest would naturally without reflection approve of it, provided the crime was not heresy or infidelity; for as these crimes hurt himself in his *temporal* interest and advantages, perhaps he may not be altogether so indulgent to them.

The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interest of human society. Ought these interests so short, so frivolous, to be guarded by punishments eternal and infinite? The damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than the subversion of a thousand millions of kingdoms. Nature has rendered human infancy peculiarly frail and mortal, as in were on purpose to refute the notion of a probationary state; the half of mankind die before they are rational creatures.

III. The *Physical* arguments from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul, and are really the only philosophical arguments which ought to be admitted with regard to this question, or indeed any question of fact.

Where any two objects are so closely connected that all alterations which we have ever seen in the one, are attended with proportional alterations in the other; we ought to conclude by all rules of analogy, that, when there are still greater alterations produced in the former, and it is totally dissolved, there follows a total dissolution of the latter.

* Suet. *Augus.* cap. 8.

Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended with a temporary extinction, at least a great confusion of the soul.

The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned, their vigor in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable ; their common dissolution in death. The last symptoms which the mind discovers are disorder, weakness, insensibility, stupidity, the fore-runners of its annihilation. The farther progress of the same causes increasing, the same effects totally extinguish it. Judging by the usual analogy of nature, no form can continue when transferred to a condition of life very different from the original one, in which it was placed. Trees perish in the water, fishes in the air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference as that of climate is often fatal. What reason then to imagine, that an immense alteration such as is made on the soul by the dissolution of its body and all its organs of thought and sensation can be effected without the dissolution of the whole? Everything is in common betwixt soul and body. The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the other. The existence therefore of the one must be dependent on that of the other.

The souls of animals are allowed to be mortal ; and these bear so near a resemblance to the souls of men, that the analogy from one to the other forms a very strong argument. Their bodies are not more resembling ; yet no one rejects the argument drawn from comparative anatomy. The *Metempsychosis* is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can hearken to.

Nothing in this world is perpetual, everything however seemingly firm is in continual flux and change,

the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and dissolution. How contrary to analogy, therefore, to imagine that one single form, seemingly the frailest of any, and subject to the greatest disorders, is immortal and indissoluble? What a daring theory is that; how lightly, not to say, how rashly entertained! How to dispose of the infinite numbers of posthumous existences ought also to embarrass the religious theory. Every planet in every solar system, we are at liberty to imagine peopled with intelligent mortal beings, at least we can fix on no other supposition. For these then a new universe must every generation be created beyond the bounds of the present universe, or one must have been created at first so prodigiously wide as to admit of this continual influx of beings. Ought such bold suppositions to be received by any philosophy, and that merely on the pretext of a bare possibility? When it is asked whether *Agamemnon*, *Thersites*, *Hannibal*, *Varro*, and every stupid clown that ever existed in *Italy*, *Scythia*, *Bactria* or *Guinea*, are now alive; can any man think, that a scrutiny of nature will furnish arguments strong enough to answer so strange a question in the affirmative? The want of argument without revelation sufficiently establishes the negative.

“*Quante facilius (says Pliny*) certius que sibi quemque credere, ac specimen securitatis antigene tali sumere experimento.*” Our insensibility before the composition of the body, seems to natural reason a proof of a like state after dissolution.

Were our horror of annihilation an original passion, not the effect of our general love of happiness, it would rather prove the mortality of the soul. For as nature does nothing in vain, she would never give us a horror

* Lib. 7, cap. 55.

against an impossible event. She may give us a horror against an unavoidable event provided our endeavors, as in the present case may often remove it to some distance. Death is in the end unavoidable; yet the human species could not be preserved had not nature inspired us with an aversion towards it. All doctrines are to be suspected which are favored by our passions, and the hopes and fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very obvious.

It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative. If the question be out of the common experienced course of nature, this circumstance is almost if not altogether decisive. By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen? Who will repose such trust in any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony the reality of so marvellous a scene? Some new species of logic is requisite for that purpose, and some new faculties of the mind that may enable us to comprehend that logic.

Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations which mankind have to divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth.

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