ESSAYS TOWARDS PEACE

BY

JOHN M. ROBERTSON, M.P.,
Prof. ED. WESTERMARCK,
NORMAN ANGELL, and
S. H. SWINNY, M.A.

WITH INTRODUCTION BY

HYPATIA BRADLAUGH BONNER

Issued by the Rationalist Peace Society

LONDON:
WATTS & CO.,
17 JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.

Price Sixpence Net

ESSAYS
TOWARDS PEACE

ESSAYS
TOWARDS PEACE

BY

JOHN M. ROBERTSON, M.P.

PROF. ED. WESTERMARCK

NORMAN ANGELL, AND

S. H. SWINNY, M.A.

WITH INTRODUCTION BY

HYPATIA BRADLAUGH BONNER

Issued by the Rationalist Peace Society

LONDON :

WATTS & CO.,

17 JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.

1913

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

As this little volume of *Essays Towards Peace* is the first ever put before the public for the purpose of expressing definitely and explicitly the Rationalist point of view, it is desirable to preface it with some account of the position of Rationalists on this great problem of the proper and effective method of settling international disputes. This is indeed not merely desirable, but necessary, because until the formation of the Rationalist Peace Society in 1910 the work of Rationalists has been merged in that of existing organizations, which are either run definitely in connection with particular religious bodies, or which associate themselves to a greater or less degree with religious influences. As a consequence, Rationalists have found their work not only annexed without acknowledgment, but actually claimed as peculiarly Christian, and have had to hear it repeated *ad nauseam* that Christianity is synonymous with Peace, and that none but Christian peoples abhor

war. This amazing claim, of course, quite ignores the pacific disposition of the Chinese, whose great teachers were all against war. Confucius taught that men ought to live in the service of mankind, and have no enemies ; Lao-Tsze that there is no calamity greater than lightly engaging in war ; while Mencius put aversion to warfare as, above all, the mark of a good ruler. It leaves also altogether out of consideration the Buddhists, who are taught that the true Buddhist must abstain from destroying life, from maiming or killing men, and from plundering villages. It is notorious that the true Buddhist is even to-day extremely unwilling to fight, even in self-defence ; and the Chinese are only now being slowly won over to militarism under the pressure of the Christian nations.

Not only do Christian pacifists put themselves in the wrong by refusing to recognize the aspirations of non-Christians, but Professor Westermarck's essay shows how little real justification they have to claim their religion as an influence for Peace in the world after the first sixteen centuries. Never once during the ensuing sixteen centuries have Christian rulers desisted from war on the ground that it was against the principles of their religion ; while time after time they have gone to

war in order to assert the superiority of their faith, or to spread it into distant lands through the extermination of the heathen or their nominal conversion. Even to this day we find the Church, through the mouths of its Cardinals, its Archbishops, Bishops, and lesser clergy, preaching a patriotism based upon bayonets as its interpretation of the doctrine of brotherly love. There are undoubtedly many individual Christians and one Christian body, the Quakers, who have consistently worked for Peace, sometimes at great sacrifice to themselves; and to these all honour is due. But when we look at the past record of Christian nations and the present condition of Christian Europe—each nation armed to the teeth, looking upon every other as a gigantic footpad, ready for robbery with violence the moment there is any remission of armed vigilance, while all are offering up prayers in their churches, each for the success of its own arms — it is clear that the Christians who really hate war enough to induce them to practise peace are in the very small minority.

Even a minority, however, may influence a majority, provided it is earnest enough and persistent enough; and, in spite of the modern exaltation of the military spirit, we see side by side

with it a slowly growing public opinion in favour of arbitration as the alternative to war. But in so far as this may be due to the labours of this devoted minority it is not in consequence of any appeal to religious sanctions; it is through the appeal to reason—the demonstration of the futility, the brutality, the economic waste, the immorality of war. It is this appeal to reason which characterizes more and more strongly the modern Peace Movement, although its adherents are not always clearly conscious of the fact. This movement may be said to have originated in the eighteenth century with that intellectual activity which culminated with the French Encyclopædists, who were admittedly heretical; and although in the century and a half which have elapsed there have been some individual Rationalists on the side of war, these have been the exception, and include few men of note. The great majority have been openly and strongly against war, not only as an abstract question of ideal morality, but in the concrete cases as they have arisen.

Bayle (1647–1706), the heretical forerunner of the Encyclopædists, in his Dictionary repeatedly stresses his repugnance to war. In his note on Alting, in referring to the taking of the Protestant city of Heidelberg by the Catholics under Tilly in

1622, he says: "They sacked, slew, violated, tortured; in short, omitted nothing that a soldier in his fury, animated by the false zeal of religion, can commit." These outrages, he says, are the common fruits of war, the thought of which ought to make those who advise or undertake it tremble.

Passages from Voltaire (1694–1778) and Diderot (1713–1784), expressing their abhorrence of war as the most terrible of all scourges, are quoted by Professor Westermarck in his Essay. Frederick the Great (1712–1786), known to history as pre-eminently a warrior monarch, nevertheless in his better moments realized the evils of war. In a conversation with his friend de Catt during the Seven Years' War he said: "You must admit that war is a horrible thing. What a life these soldiers lead! On the exercise ground they always get more kicks than halfpence.....and most of them come back from the front plastered all over with ointment or with the loss of one or two limbs. The peasant is even worse off. He is harried and hunted out of house and home, and often perishes from poverty and want. You will agree with me that my obstinacy and the Queen's obstinacy have together brought misfortune to great numbers of people.....Friend and foe alike must suffer."

Thomas Paine (1737–1809), who knew from actual experience in the American War of Independence all that such a war could mean, declared that, "If there is a sin superior to every other, it is that of wilful and offensive war.....he who is the author of war lets loose the whole contagion of hell and opens a vein that bleeds a nation to death." With clear vision he saw the danger of creating a vested interest in armaments. "The jealousy which individuals of every nation feel at the supposed designs of foreign powers fits them to be the prey of Ministers and of those among themselves whose trade is war, or whose livelihood is jobs and contracts." When he wrote, "There are thousands who live by war, it is their harvest, and the clamour which these people keep up in the newspapers and conversation passes unsuspiciously for the voice of the people, and it is not until the mischief is done that the deception is discovered," he might have been writing of Europe in the thirteenth year of the twentieth century, when nations are frenziedly piling up armaments one against the other, ostensibly for their defence, actually for the harvest of those whose livelihood is the manufacture of the machinery of destruction. Over and over again Paine showed that nations gain nothing by war,

that conquest and defeat are the same price, and that the never-failing consequence to both sides is not financial gain, but the addition of new taxes. "War," he said, "can never be to the interest of a trading nation, any more than quarrelling can be profitable to a man of business. But to make war with those who trade with us is like setting a bulldog upon a customer at the shopdoor." There is hardly an aspect of the modern opposition to war that we do not find discussed in one or other of Paine's political works. At Peace Congresses we sometimes hear speakers advocating an armed peace—*i.e.*, a world police which should keep the nations at peace through the compulsion of force; but Paine would have none of that. He believed that the world's peace would be better secured by an unarmed than an armed neutrality. The destructive influence of war upon maritime commerce was carefully considered both by Dr. Franklin (1706–1790) and Paine. Both condemned the idea of protection by great navies; both advocated definite pacific measures for the security of merchant shipping. Paine endorsed and expanded the plan put forward by Franklin, and accepted by the King of Prussia and the Count de Vergennes, to secure the recognition of the immunity of merchant vessels during

times of war. In Paine's day the only navies of importance were those of England, France, and Holland, and he suggested that these three should come to an agreement to limit the number of their ships of war, and in that way effectually impose a limitation on the navies of Europe. At that time —a time of serious international unrest—the cost of the British navy was about £8,000,000. This year the cost is upwards of £45,000,000. And the estimated naval expenditure of the six Great Christian Powers (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and Russia) is upwards of £117,000,000. During the twelve years of the present century these navies have cost fully £1,000,000,000, of which more than three-fifths have been furnished by Protestant Britain and Protestant Germany. It is lamentable to think of the thousands of millions which have been squandered during the past century by these six countries—millions which might have been saved or have been applied to the betterment of the condition of their peoples had Paine's practical suggestion for the limitation of existing navies only been accepted and carried out!

Shelley (1792–1822), in his *Reputation of Deism*, unreservedly condemned both war itself and the manner in which it had been countenanced

by Christianity ; and in his *Queen Mab* he wrote :—

> War is the statesman's game, the priest's delight,
> The lawyer's jest, the hired assassin's trade ;
> And, to those royal murderers, whose mean thrones
> Are bought by crimes of treachery and gore,
> The bread they eat, the staff on which they lean.

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) taught the duty of nations to form one family and cultivate the earth in the service of Humanity.

That Victor Hugo (1802–1885) took an active interest in the movement for international peace is well known ; he welcomed the Second International Peace Congress to Paris in 1849, and in bidding the delegates farewell at the close he made an eloquent speech rejoicing in the hope that, in spite of prejudices and international enmities, they had been sowing in the minds of men the imperishable seeds of universal peace.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), unlike those who believe (or profess to believe) that war promotes virtue, and that all vices grow and flourish during peace, said : " If you have a nation of men who have risen to that height of moral cultivation that they will not declare war or carry arms, for they have not so much madness left in their brains, you have a nation of lovers, of benefactors, of true, great, and able men. Let me know more of that nation : I shall not find them

defenceless, with idle hands springing at their sides. I shall find them men of love, honour, and truth; men of an immense industry; men whose influence is felt to the end of the earth; men whose very look and voice carry the sentence of honour and shame; and all forces yield to their energy and persuasion."

Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899) looked upon war as a barbarous survival of barbarous times; and having the courage of his opinions, in spite of every kind of calumny and violent denunciation from French and German Chauvinists, he went to Paris in 1886 and delivered a magnificent address at the unveiling of the Diderot Monument.

Charles Bradlaugh (1833–1891) made the advocacy of the pacific settlement of international disputes part of his life work. He spoke and wrote against the wars with Afghanistan, Egypt, and the Soudan, the Zulu and Transvaal wars, and our punitive expeditions in India. In 1878, with the Hon. Auberon Herbert, he organized a strong opposition to our intervention in the Russo-Turkish war. Great meetings were held in Hyde Park which were attended mainly by working men, and at which every trade in London was represented. The speakers at these meetings were attacked by gangs of roughs, medical

students, and "young gentlemen" armed with pieces of iron, loaded bludgeons, and other weapons. Several persons were injured, Mr. Bradlaugh so severely so as to confine him to his room for a fortnight.

Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), writing during the South African War on the mitigation of the war-spirit, declared that "Whatever fosters militarism makes for barbarism; and whatever fosters peace makes for civilization."

Lord Hobhouse (1819–1904), in a letter written in the winter of 1899, lamented "the hollowness of those who claim to be special and accredited prophets of peace, love, and divine counsels. At the first blast of the trumpets in a war of ambition they are all for high-handed force and bloodshed. .....It would seem that there are few except the despised Rationalists and Agnostics (Atheists the Church would call them) to maintain that the moral law is the same for nations as for individuals, and that there is no higher and deeper policy than to do as we would be done by."

Francisco Ferrer (1859–1907) in his Modern School taught that militarism and war were the outcome of the bad organization of society, and that with a really high civilization there would be universal friendship and goodwill.

Similar sentiments might be quoted from other great Rationalists of the past; but the foregoing will suffice to show the trend of opinion among eminent non-Christians in Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and the United States. The great ones now living can speak for themselves; and these, therefore, it is not necessary I should quote here. So far as the rank and file are concerned, it may be said of them that, while always ready to work for the promotion of international understanding and international goodwill, never in the whole history of the Rationalist Movement has any body of Freethinkers ever organized a meeting in support of any war, and few have ever taken part in any such meeting. The work which our predecessors have done individually and without recognition we to-day are trying to carry forward as organized propaganda; and these *Essays Towards Peace*, which, as Chairman of the Rationalist Peace Society, I have the honour to submit herewith, cover various aspects of our advocacy.

HYPATIA BRADLAUGH BONNER.

SUPERSTITIONS OF MILITARISM

By J. M. ROBERTSON, M.P.

A SUPERSTITION has been skilfully defined by one lexicographer as "a belief held by hearsay, marked by inconsistency, and on grounds demonstrably insufficient for other people with similar moral and mental standards." It would be difficult to improve on that as an outline of the ground covered by the various current uses of the word; and it is with this justification that I apply it to certain beliefs commonly held by promoters of militarism.

That which we have oftenest to face is contained in the popular formula, "There will always be war." What does it mean, and for what conception does it stand?

Put as a scientific generalization of a powerful proclivity present in all communities at certain stages of culture, it might pass for a truth—under one qualification. To say that war is likely to occur chronically so long as there are human communities in the culture

stages of those who *have* chronically gone to war, would be to make a reasonable forecast. But the man who commonly vends the phrase does not mean this. He means that, inasmuch as our ancestors in all ages have chronically gone to war, we and our descendants for ever will chronically go to war. And this is essentially a superstitious proposition. There is no sound inference from an admittedly irregular occurrence of events in the past to any future recurrence. It is a matter of history that vendettas, tribal feuds, private wars (of persons and of cities) occurred chronically during many centuries of European as of other history; while the practice of duelling, now extinct in Britain, still subsists, under protest, in France, Germany, and other countries. Does anyone, then, dispute that private wars and clan feuds are done with in the leading civilized countries, or assert that duelling—which is now in process of suppression in Germany—will never cease in those countries in which it is still practised? Even the vendor of the superstition about international war will not venture on either of these positions. Yet his own belief has just the kind of tenure that would have been won in the thirteenth century by a belief in the eternal chronic recurrence of private wars, or in the

eighteenth by a belief in the perpetuity of duelling. It is an ignorant inference from past practice.

Scientifically speaking, it would be as justifiable to say "there will always be cannibalism" as to say "there will always be war." At all times in the past there *has* been cannibalism—somewhere. At some time it was practised among all known races; to-day it still occurs in the dark places of the earth. But the rational presumption from all evolution is that it will one day have ceased from the face of the earth as a practice tolerated by any community.

Even among the militarists, by this time, there has emerged the idea that war may be made to cease among civilized nations. There begins to be common among them the old-new formula, "War can be prevented by the establishment of sufficiently large armies"—the old *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. But even that belief is held by a tenure of superstition. Ask the militarist, "Do you then look forward to an eternity of great armaments, constantly prepared for a war that will never come?" and you will find that he has no clear idea on the subject. He will say neither Yes nor No.

And so predominantly superstitious is the

militarist mind that even cultured and thoughtful men who profess to desire universal peace are found vending phrases to the effect that war, after all, has played a beneficent part in human evolution, and hinting that perhaps its total cessation may be harmful. "War," writes one, "has been a great gymnasium for the human spirit." The out-and-out militarist, refusing to hedge, pronounces roundly, with Moltke, that "universal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream." To Moltke, one replies that he is truly a precious authority on beautiful dreams. To Lord Roberts, who holds a similar if less extravagantly worded faith, one replies that his studies have hardly been such as to constitute him an authority on socio-political hygiene. On the "gymnasium" theory, as set forth by men who have thought somewhat more extensively on the process of civilization, one may put this question: During the hundred thousand years, or so, in which the "gymnasium" was in most constant use, was human progress noticeably rapid? Did it avail for moral development in Sparta, in Rome, in Fiji, in Anglo-Saxon England, in early Ireland, in the England of the Wars of the Roses, in France and Germany during the wars of religion? Did the English Civil War of the

Caroline period, or the French wars of the Napoleonic period, evolve either nobleness or wisdom in the nations concerned? When these questions are answered, we shall be in a better position to debate the issue as to the dangers of perpetual peace.

To the present writer it has been a great satisfaction to note, since he began this very paper, that the distinguished man of letters who penned that "gymnasium" formula a few years ago has now spontaneously renounced it. The spectacle of the awful arena of the late war between Russia and Japan has dramatically taught him the nullity of the old doctrine. War, he perceives, trains men only *for* war—the *reductio ad absurdum* of all panegyric of its moralizing value. As other panegyrists have put it, "it teaches men how to die." Precisely. And seeing that they never have the least difficulty in dying, when the time comes, in the civil state, the "great lesson" of war is, for all human purposes save war, the most supererogatory ever taught on this planet.

Curiously enough, the one plausible plea that can be made for war as a moral agent is the one which the militarists most absolutely dismiss. The more thoughtful and the more

thoughtless alike are candid enough not to pretend that, from their point of view, war is good for the beaten side in particular. To take that line would be disastrous to their propaganda. Their theorem presupposes ultimate victory for their own side, in the face of the fact that the other side trains in the same expectation, and that one or other is destined to tragical disillusionment. Yet, while no rational case can be made for war as a means of civilizing the conqueror, it is arguable that *defeat*, in certain cases, has a wholesome effect on the vanquished—provided that he is not reduced to servitude, a relation palpably injurious alike to both oppressed and oppressor. It has thus been frequently argued that in France a moral regeneration followed on the agony and humiliation of Sedan. It is not my thesis. The doctrine of gain from suffering, put in the guise of a guide to conduct, or of a philosophy of the universe, seems to me one of the worst of the self-deceptions set up by the intellectual habits of theism. That disaster sometimes sobers and disciplines us, we all know. Does any one, then, court disaster? That "sickness purifies" is sometimes true. Does any man, then, seek to be sick? It would be brutal to press the point against the

sentimentalists of brutality. The principle of all sane conduct is avoidance of disaster and disease, with vigilant recognition of the fact that the evils which disaster and disease can at times avail to expel are precisely those of heedlessness, the proximate causes or conditions of disease and disaster. No man ever wished, or will wish, to see his country regenerated by lost Waterloos or Sedans. But, that simple fact being acknowledged, the next step in the path of wisdom for the honest man is to realize that not only does "success" in war mean merely a less amount of the more concrete kinds of evil suffered by the loser—immeasurable agony to the stricken and grief to the bereaved—but the moral *sequelæ* of victory, as apart from any checking of oppression, commonly include the worst forms of *in*discipline ever recognized in human societies.

Here, of course, the sentimental militarist will repugn. Lord Roberts, our great example in that species, has for years been preaching the virtue of war as a tonic of character. In 1904 he told Mr. Harold Begbie that "there is a purpose in war. It is true that fighting is a stern remedy; but are we quite sure that frail humanity does not need stern remedies?" Remedies for what?

one asks. The answer of Lord Roberts is significantly ambiguous :—

Without war—*at any rate without the vigilance and discipline which prepare for that stern emergency*—a nation is in risk of running to seed. And where a war is a just one—where it is waged as an act of self-defence, as in the case of the Japanese, who are now fighting for their very life—its benefit to the nation is great. It is an appeal to the manhood and the virtue of a people. It prevents decadence and effeminacy. It *corrects* the selfishness and querulousness which are *inevitably* bred by a long peace. Without the *preparation for* an armed defence of its boundaries or the vindication of its honour, an empire would slip into habits dangerous for itself and dangerous for the whole of humanity. Even in the Anglo-Saxon race, which is as vigorous as any in the world, we find that a long peace breeds a complaining and luxurious spirit, to which every hardship and every little inconvenience becomes an intolerable injustice.

Fortitude and the cheerful bearing of adversity are apt to fall out of the category of human duties in a long and luxurious peace. And since character is tried by sorrow and affliction, *this querulous antipathy to hardship and exertion* is bad for the individual, and consequently for the State. We are all tried by fire, are we not? And the test of a man's character is his ability to bear gallantly the sorrows and afflictions of his life; so, too, I think, *a nation needs to be tried by fire*—needs to be put upon its trial every now and then, and tested by the laws which govern this planet—the law, I mean particularly, that only the efficient survive.

Lord Roberts, it is evident, cannot make up

his mind. In one breath it is the "vigilance and discipline" of army life that are to save a nation "inevitably" from running to seed; in the next, we learn that "a nation needs to be tried by fire"—*i.e.*, by war. Such is the confused messroom philosophy that is still acclaimed by many politicians as sound political science.

Let us take separately the two terms of the contradiction. If the mere "vigilance and discipline" of army drill suffice, no European nation can ever "run to seed," for they all have it. France had it before 1870. Had she or had she not then run to seed? If not, why was she defeated? Russia had it before her rout in Manchuria. Turkey has had it in abundance. Evidently we must resort to the "trial by fire"!

The evil to be cured, we are told, is "effeminacy," "a complaining and luxurious spirit"; and by implication "fortitude" and "the cheerful bearing of adversity" are produced by war. In whom? In the fighters or in the others? And is *defeat*, after all, necessary—*quâ* adversity—to work the cure? Do we go to war *in order* to undergo reverses? And is a "querulous antipathy to hardship and exertion" found to disappear from a nation after either victory or defeat? Or after military drill?

I can imagine a working man, familiar all his life long with hardship and exertion, giving Lord Roberts a very plain opinion on this tissue of simple sentimentalism. Millions of men and women bear hardship and exertion daily, over all the earth, in the ordinary course of peaceful toil; and the spectacle of Lord Roberts, the man who is always in a state of apprehension, prescribing drill or fighting for them in the name of a prophylactic against querulousness, is enough to move them to Homeric laughter. It may be that some men of Lord Roberts's caste need hardship to rouse them to a serious realization of life; but the solemn assertion that the wholesale slaughter of private soldiers (who can have a sure sufficiency of hardship and exertion all their life long in peace) will alone supply the required conditions, is sufficient to evoke the question whether Lord Roberts is capable of a serious realization of life under any conditions. His allocution is a fitting confutation of the doctrine that "only the efficient survive"—in the matter of moral propaganda.

I can conceive a reader asking why such simple folly is to be dignified by the title of "superstition." But I adhere to the characterization. Men develop superstitions to

explain and justify their lives when these are irrationally led ; and a man dedicated to life-long "preparation" for war must either irrationally glorify his trade or confess that it is one which wastes the life of one set of citizens to give the others a sense of security. Not unnaturally, Lord Roberts wants to make the waste universal, modestly implying, either that he and his fellow-soldiers have been raised by their profession to a height of moral greatness unattained by the rest of us, or that we all alike need to be "tried by fire" to be made capable of decent fortitude under the trials of peace !

The "fire" theory is but a quasi-moral variant on the other familiar superstition that war makes nations great in the arts of peace. War, so the old falsism runs, is the nurse of great literature. As if any great literature followed on the Crusades, on Bannockburn, on the Conquest of England by William, or of France by Henry V ; on the victories of Charles V, on those of Alexander, or on those of Napoleon. There are men capable of deriving Shakespeare's plays and Bacon's works from the defeat of the Armada, which meant a few days' fighting for a few thousand men. We have but to ask what became of Greek literature after the supremacy of Alexander

and his successors, or of Roman literature after Trajan; and the superstition stands exposed. But the vendor of superstitions does not ask himself such questions, or heed them when put by others.

The more need to follow him up incessantly with a challenge to those to whom he has appealed. There is no other way of wearing down superstition of all kinds. It is an age-long process; and this must be the consolation of those rationalists who, after all the hopes of the nineteenth century, see with chagrin a far higher military and naval expenditure in the twentieth than they could have supposed possible. Men are not likely, in mass, to rationalize their instincts any faster than they do their beliefs: the process in both cases is one of gradual enlightenment, and then of adaptation of conduct. And even as in the case of religion, so in that of wars and armaments, economic interests buttress and fortify error, making the process of eviction doubly difficult. It seems to be always by way of a recoil from intolerable evil in practice that human error on a large scale is ever rectified. Not till the nations of Europe had been bedevilled for more than a hundred years by wars of religion did they begin to see that "a peace with two religions is better

than a war with none," as the case was put in the dialect of the time. And after toleration in the larger political sense was reluctantly accepted on that score, there had to begin the purely intellectual campaign for toleration in social and individual relations which is still far from being completely victorious.

The social evils entailed by militarist superstitions will first be generally realized, perhaps, on the purely financial side, to which Mr. Norman Angell is directing so persuasively his powerful propaganda. Recent years have brought some lessons on that score. When Japan declared war against Russia there were not wanting English publicists who hounded on the Japanese with assurances that they would be able to make Russia pay the costs of the war. The least reflection might have shown anyone that this would be possible only if Japan could invade Russia and hold her capital, as the Germans did Paris in the Franco-German war. Japan has had victory and glory, with an immense burden of debt and consequent impoverishment. But the superstitious militarist still harbours the hallucination that modern war can be made to pay; and not till the nations in mass fully realize the folly of that dream shall we have concerted national action for the restriction of armaments

all round. It may be that they must suffer much more than they have yet done from the burden before the lesson is fully learned. In the meantime it is idle to blame Governments, which do but reflect and express the trend of common opinion. The nations make their Governments; and they must change their minds before the policy of their rulers can change. The most we can hope for is a Government which shall be slow to obey popular demand for expenditure, and ready to anticipate more enlightened tendencies, whether by overtures for neighbourly policy or by moderation in outlay. Let the rational lover of peace, then, make it his business to rationalize the opinion around him.

CHRISTIANITY AND WAR

By EDWARD WESTERMARCK, Ph.D.

CHRISTIANITY introduced into Europe a higher regard for human life than was felt anywhere in pagan society. The early Christians condemned homicide of any kind as a heinous sin. And in this, as in all other questions of moral concern, the distinction of nationality or race was utterly ignored by them.

The sanctity which they attached to the life of every human being led to a total condemnation of warfare, sharply contrasting with the prevailing sentiment in the Roman Empire. In accordance with the general spirit of their religion, as also with special passages in the Bible, they considered war unlawful under all circumstances. Justin Martyr quotes the prophecy of Isaiah, that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they

[1] Abridged for these "Essays" by Professor Westermarck from his great work on *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, with the kind permission of the publishers, Messrs. Macmillan. The notes to c. 15, v. 1, give exact references to all the authors and works quoted.

learn war any more," and proceeds to say that the instruction in the word of God which was given by the twelve apostles "had so good effect that we, who heretofore were continually devouring each other, will not now so much as lift up our hand against our enemies." Lactantius asserts that "to engage in war cannot be lawful for the righteous man, whose welfare is that of righteousness itself." Tertullian asks, "Can it be lawful to handle the sword, when the Lord Himself has declared that he who uses the sword shall perish by it?" And in another passage he states that "the Lord by his disarming of Peter disarmed every soldier from that time forward." Origen calls the Christians the children of peace, who, for the sake of Jesus, never take up the sword against any nation; who fight for their monarch by praying for him, but who take no part in his wars, even though he urge them. It is true that, even in early times, Christian soldiers were not unknown; Tertullian alludes to Christians who were engaged in military pursuits together with their heathen countrymen. But the number of Christians enrolled in the army seems not to have been very considerable before the era of Constantine, and, though they were not cut off from the Church, their profession was looked upon as hardly

compatible with their religion. St. Basil says that soldiers, after their term of military service has expired, are to be excluded from the sacrament of the communion for three whole years. And, according to one of the canons of the Council of Nice, those Christians who, having abandoned the profession of arms, afterwards returned to it, "as dogs to their vomit," were for some years to occupy in the Church the place of penitents.

A divine law which prohibited all resistance to enemies could certainly not be accepted by the State, especially at a time when the empire was seriously threatened by foreign invaders. Christianity could, therefore, never become a State religion unless it gave up its attitude towards war. And it gave it up. Already, in 314, a Council condemned soldiers who, from religious motives, deserted their colours. The Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries did not altogether disapprove of war. Chrysostom and Ambrose, though seeing the difficulty of reconciling it with the theory of Christian life which they found in the New Testament, perceived that the use of the sword was necessary to preserve the State. St. Augustine went much farther. He tried to prove that the practice of war was quite compatible with the teachings of Christ. The

soldiers mentioned in the New Testament, who were seeking for a knowledge of salvation, were not directed by our Lord to throw aside their arms and renounce their profession, but were advised by him to be content with their wages. St. Peter baptized Cornelius, the centurion, in the name of Christ, without exhorting him to give up the military life; and St. Paul himself took care to have a strong guard of soldiers for his defence. And was not the history of David, the "man after God's own heart," an evidence of those being wrong who say that "no one who wages war can please God"? When Christ declared that "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword," he referred to such persons only as arm themselves to shed the blood of others without either command or permission of any superior or lawful authority. A great deal depends on the causes for which men undertake war, and on the authority they have for doing so. Those wars are just which are waged with a view to obtaining redress for wrongs, or to chastising the undue arrogance of another State. The monarch has the power of making war when he thinks it advisable, and, even if he be a sacrilegious king, a Christian may fight under him, provided that what is enjoined upon the soldier personally is not

contrary to the precept of God. In short, though peace is our final good, though in the City of God there is peace in eternity, war may sometimes be a necessity in this sinful world.

By the writings of St. Augustine the theoretical attitude of the Church towards war was definitely settled, and later theologians only reproduced or further elaborated his views. Yet it was not with a perfectly safe conscience that Christianity thus sanctioned the practice of war. There was a feeling that a soldier scarcely could make a good Christian. In the middle of the fifth century Leo the Pope declared it to be contrary to the rules of the Church that persons after the action of penance—that is, persons then considered to be pre-eminently bound to obey the law of Christ—should revert to the profession of arms. Various Councils forbade the clergy to engage in warfare, and certain canons excluded from ordination all who had served in an army after baptism. Penance was prescribed for those who had shed blood on the battlefield. Thus the ecclesiastical canons made in William the Conqueror's reign by the Norman prelates, and confirmed by the Pope, directed that he who was aware that he had killed a man in a battle should do penance for one year, and that he

who had killed several should do a year's penance for each. Occasionally the Church seemed to wake up to the evils of war in a more effective way; there are several notorious instances of wars being forbidden by popes. But in such cases the prohibition was only too often due to the fact that some particular war was disadvantageous to the interests of the Church. And, while doing comparatively little to discourage wars which did not interfere with her own interests, the Church did all the more to excite war against those who were objects of her hatred.

It has been suggested that the transition from the peaceful tenets of the primitive Church to the essentially military Christianity of the Crusades was chiefly due to the terrors and the example of Islam. "The spirit of Mohammedanism," says Mr. Lecky, "slowly passed into Christianity, and transformed it into its image." Until then "war was rather condoned than consecrated, and, whatever might be the case with a few isolated prelates, the Church did nothing to increase or encourage it." But this view is hardly consistent with facts. Christianity had entered on the war-path already before it came into contact with Mohammedanism. Wars against Arian peoples had been repre-

sented as holy wars, for which the combatants would be rewarded by Heaven. The war which Chlodwig made upon the Visigoths was not only undertaken with the approval of the clergy, but it was, as Mr. Greenwood remarks, "properly their war, and Chlodwig undertook it in the capacity of a religious champion in all things but the disinterestedness which ought to distinguish that character." Remigius of Reims assisted him by his countenance and advice, and the Catholic priesthood set every engine of their craft in motion to second and encourage him. In the Church itself there were germs out of which a military spirit would naturally develop itself. The famous dictum, "Nulla salus extra ecclesiam,"[1] was promulgated as early as the days of Cyprian. The general view of medieval orthodoxy was, that those beyond the pale of the Church, heathen and heretics alike, were unalterably doomed to hell; whereas those who would acknowledge her authority, confess their sins, receive the sacrament of baptism, partake of the eucharist, and obey the priest, would be infallibly saved. If war was allowed by God, could there be a more proper object for it than the salvation of souls

[1] "No salvation outside the Church."

otherwise lost? And for those who refused to accept the gift of grace offered to them, could there be a juster punishment than death? Moreover, had not the Israelites fought great battles "for the laws and the sanctuary"? Had not the Lord himself commissioned them to attack, subdue, and destroy his enemies? Had he not commanded them to root out the natives of Canaan, who, because of their abominations, had fallen under God's judgment, and to kill man and beast in the Israelitish cities which had given themselves to idolatry, and to burn all the spoil, with the city itself, as a whole offering to Jehovah? There was no need, then, for the Christians to go to the Mohammedans in order to learn the art of religious war. The Old Testament, the revelation of God, gave better lessons in it than the Koran, and was constantly cited in justification of any cruelty committed in the name of religion.

It was thus in perfect consistency with the general teachings of the Church that she regarded an exploit achieved against the infidels as a merit which might obliterate the guilt of the most atrocious crimes. Such a deed was the instrument of pardon to Henry II for the murder of Becket, and was supposed to be the means of cure to

St. Louis in a dangerous illness. Fighting against infidels took rank with fastings, penitential discipline, visits to shrines, and almsgivings, as meriting the divine mercy. He who fell in the battle could be confident that his soul was admitted directly into the joys of Paradise. And this held good not only of wars against Mohammedans. The massacres of Jews and heretics seemed no less meritorious than the slaughter of the more remote enemies of the Gospel. Nay, even a slight shade of difference from the liturgy of Rome became at last a legitimate cause of war.

It is true that these views were not shared by all. At the Council of Lyons, in 1274, the opinion was pronounced, and, of course, eagerly attacked, that it was contrary to the examples of Christ and the Apostles to uphold religion with the sword and to shed the blood of unbelievers. In the following century Bonet maintained that, according to the Scriptures, a Saracen or any other disbeliever could not be compelled by force to accept the Christian faith. Franciscus a Victoria declared that "diversity of religion is not a cause of just war"; and a similar opinion was expressed by Soto, Covarruvias a Leyva, and Suarez. According to Balthazar

Ayala, the most illustrious Spanish lawyer of the sixteenth century, it does not belong to the Church to punish infidels who have never received the Christian faith, whereas those who, having once received it, afterwards endeavour to prevent the propagation of the Gospel may, like other heretics, be justly persecuted with the sword. But the majority of jurisconsults, as well as of canonists, were in favour of the orthodox view that unbelief is a legitimate reason for going to war. And this principle was, professedly, acted upon to an extent which made the history of Christianity for many centuries a perpetual crusade, and transformed the Christian Church into a military power even more formidable than Rome under Cæsar and Augustus. Very often religious zeal was a mere pretext for wars which in reality were caused by avarice or desire for power. The aim of the Church was to be the master of the earth rather than the servant of heaven. She preached crusades not only against infidels and heretics, but against any disobedient prince who opposed her boundless pretensions. And she encouraged war when rich spoils were to be expected from the victor as a thankoffering to God for the victory he had granted, or as an atonement for the excesses which had been committed.

Out of this union between war and Christianity there was born that curious bastard, Chivalry. The secular germ of it existed already in the German forests. According to Tacitus, the young German who aspired to be a warrior was brought into the midst of the assembly of the chiefs, where his father, or some other relative, solemnly equipped him for his future vocation with shield and javelin. Assuming arms was thus made a social distinction, which subsequently derived its name from one of its most essential characteristics, the riding a war-horse. But Chivalry became something quite different from what the word indicates. The Church knew how to lay hold of knighthood for her own purposes. The investiture, which was originally of a purely civil nature, became, even before the time of the Crusades, as it were, a sacrament. The priest delivered the sword into the hand of the person who was to be made a knight, with the following words: "Serve Christi, sis miles in nomine Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, Amen."[1] The sword was said to be made in semblance of the cross, so as to signify "how our Lord God vanquished in the cross the death of human lying"; and

[1] "O servant of Christ, be thou a soldier, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Amen."

the word "Jesus" was sometimes engraven on its hilt. God himself had chosen the knight to defeat with arms the miscreants who wished to destroy his Holy Church, in the same way as he had chosen the clergy to maintain the Catholic faith with Scripture and reasons. The knight was to the body politic what the arms are to the human body: the Church was the head, Chivalry the arms, the citizens, merchants, and labourers the inferior members; and the arms were placed in the middle to render them equally capable of defending the inferior members and the head. "The greatest amity that should be in this world," says the author of the *Ordre of Chyualry*, "ought to be between the knights and clerks." The several gradations of knighthood were regarded as parallel to those of the Church. And after the conquest of the Holy Land the union between the profession of arms and the religion of Christ became still more intimate by the institution of the two military orders of monks, the Knights Templars and Knights of St. John of Jerusalem.

The duties which a knight took on himself by oath were very extensive, but not very well defined. He should defend the holy Catholic faith, he should defend justice, he should

defend women, widows, and orphans, and all those of either sex that were powerless, ill at ease, and groaning under oppression and injustice. In the name of religion and justice he could thus practically wage war almost at will. Though much real oppression was undoubtedly avenged by these soldiers of the Church, the knight seems as a rule to have cared little for the cause or necessity of his doing battle. "La guerre est ma patrie, Mon harnois ma maison : Et en toute saison Combatre c'est ma vie,"[1] was a saying much in use in the sixteenth century. The general impression which Froissart gives us in his history is, that the age in which he lived was completely given over to fighting, and cared about nothing else whatever. The French knights never spoke of war but as a feast, a game, a pastime. "Let them play their game," they said of the cross-bow men, who were showering down arrows on them ; and "to play a great game," *jouer gros jeu*, was their description of a battle. Previous to the institution of Chivalry there certainly existed much fighting in Christian countries, but knighthood rendered war "a fashionable accomplishment." And so all-absorbing became the passion for

[1] "The battlefield is my country, my warharness my house, and in all seasons, To fight is my life."

it that, as real injuries were not likely to occur every day, artificial grievances were created, and tilts and tournaments were invented in order to keep in action the sons of war when they had no other employments for their courage. Even in these images of war—which were by no means so harmless as they have sometimes been represented to be—the intimate connection between Chivalry and religion displays itself in various ways. Before the tournament began, the coats of arms, helmets, and other objects were carried into a monastery, and after the victory was gained the arms and the horses which had been used in the fight were offered up at the church. The proclamations at the tournaments were generally in the name of God and the Virgin Mary. Before battle the knights confessed, and heard mass; and, when they entered the lists, they held a sort of image with which they made the sign of the cross. Moreover, "as the feasts of the tournaments were accompanied by these acts of devotion, so the feasts of the Church were sometimes adorned with the images of the tournaments." It is true that the Church now and then made attempts to stop these performances. But then she did so avowedly because they prevented many knights from joining the holy

wars, or because they swallowed up treasures which might otherwise with advantage have been poured into the Holy Land.

Closely connected with the feudal system was the practice of private war. Though tribunals had been instituted, and even long after the kings' courts had become well-organised and powerful institutions, a nobleman had a right to wage war upon another nobleman from whom he had suffered some gross injury. On such occasions not only the relatives, but the vassals, of the injured man were bound to help him in his quarrel, and the same obligation existed in the case of the aggressor. Only greater crimes were regarded as legitimate causes of private war, but this rule was not at all strictly observed. As a matter of fact, the barons fled to arms upon every quarrel; he who could raise a small force at once made war upon him who had anything to lose. The nations of Europe were subdivided into innumerable subordinate states, which were almost independent, and declared war and made treaties with all the vigour and all the ceremonies of powerful monarchs. Contemporary historians describe the excesses committed in prosecution of these intestine quarrels in such terms as excite astonishment and horror; and great parts of

Europe were in consequence reduced to the condition of a desert, which it ceased to be worth while to cultivate.

The Church made some feeble attempts to put an end to this state of things. Thus, about the year 990, ordinances were directed against the practice of private war by several bishops in the south of France, who agreed to exclude him who violated their ordinances from all Christian privileges during his life, and to deny him Christian burial after his death. A little later, men engaged in warfare were exhorted, by sacred relics and by the bodies of saints, to lay down their arms and to swear that they would never again disturb the public peace by their private hostilities. But it is hardly likely that such directions had much effect as long as the bishops and abbots themselves were allowed to wage private war by means of their vidames, and exercised this right scarcely less frequently than the barons. Nor does it seem that the Church brought about any considerable change for the better by establishing the Truce of God, involving obligatory respite from hostilities during the great festivals of the Church, as also from the evening of Wednesday in each week to the morning of Monday in the week ensuing. We are

assured by good authorities that the Truce was generally disregarded, though the violator was threatened with the penalty of excommunication. Most barons could probably say with Bertram de Born: "La paix ne me convient pas; la guerre seule me plaît. Je n'ai égard ni aux lundis, ni aux mardis. Les semaines, les mois, les années, tout m'est égal. En tout temps, je veux perdre quiconque me nuit."[1] The ordinance enjoining the *treuga Dei*[2] was transgressed even by the popes. It was too unpractical a direction to be obeyed, and was soon given up even in theory by the authorities of the Church. Thomas Aquinas says that, as physicians may lawfully apply remedies to men on feast-days, so just wars may be lawfully prosecuted on such days for the defence of the commonwealth of the faithful, if necessity so requires—"for it would be tempting God for a man to want to keep his hands from war under stress of such necessity." And in support of this opinion he quotes the First Book of the Maccabees, where it is said, "Whoever shall come to make battle with

[1] "Peace suits me not: war alone pleases me. I care not for Mondays or Tuesdays. Weeks, months, years, all are alike to me. At all times I would destroy those that injure me."

[2] "Truce of God."

us on the sabbath day, we will fight against him."

It seems that the main cause of the abolition of private war was not any measure taken by the Church, but the increase of the authority of emperors or kings. In France the right of waging private war was moderated by Louis IX, checked by Philip IV, suppressed by Charles VI. In England, after the Norman Conquest, private wars seem to have occurred more rarely than on the Continent, probably owing to the strength of the royal authority, which made the execution of justice more vigorous and the jurisdiction of the King's court more extensive than was the case in most other countries. In Scotland the practice of private war received its final blow only late in the eighteenth century, when the clans were reduced to order after the rebellion of 1745. While, then, it is impossible to ascribe to the Church any considerable part in the movement which ultimately led to the entire abolition of private war, we have, on the other hand, to take into account the encouragement which the Church gave to the warlike spirit of the time by the establishment of Chivalry, and by sanctioning war as a divine institution. War came to be looked upon as a judgment of God, and the victory

as a sign of his special favour. Before a battle, the service of mass was usually performed by both armies in the presence of each other, and no warrior would fight without secretly breathing a prayer. Pope Adrian IV says that a war commenced under the auspices of religion cannot but be fortunate; and it was commonly believed that God took no less interest in the battle than did the fighting warriors. Bonet, who wrote in the fourteenth century, puts to himself the question, why there are so many wars in the world, and gives the answer, "que toutes sont pour le pechié du siecle dont nostre seigneur Dieu pour le pugnir permet les guerres, car ainsi le maintient l'escripture."[1]

Similar opinions have retained their place in the orthodox creeds both of the Catholic and Protestant Churches up to the present day. The attitude adopted by the great Christian congregations towards war has been, and is still, to a considerable degree, that of sympathetic approval. The Catechism of the Council of Trent brings home that there are on record instances of slaughter executed by the special command of God Himself, as when

[1] "That all are on account of the sin of the age, for the punishment of which our Lord God permits wars, for so the Scriptures maintain."

the sons of Levi, who put to death so many thousands in one day, after the slaughter were thus addressed by Moses, "Ye have consecrated your hands this day to the Lord." Even quite modern Catholic writers refer to the canonists who held that a State might lawfully make war upon a heretic people which was spreading heresy, and upon a pagan people which prevented the preaching of the Gospel. Again, when the Protestant Churches became State-Churches, their ministers, considering themselves as in the service of the State, were ready to champion whatever war the Government pleased to undertake. As Mr. Gibb observes, the Protestant minister was as ready with his Thanksgiving Sermon for the victories of a profligate war as the Catholic priest was with his *Te Deum;* "indeed, the latter was probably the more independent of the two, because of his allegiance to Rome." The new Confessions of Faith explicitly claimed for the State the right of waging war, and the Anabaptists were condemned because they considered war unlawful for a Christian. Even the necessity of a just cause as a reason for taking part in warfare, which was reasserted at the time of the Reformation, was subsequently allowed to drop out of sight. Mr.

Farrer calls attention to the fact that in the thirty-seventh article of the English Church, which is to the effect that a Christian, at the command of the magistrate, may wear weapons and serve in the wars, the word *justa* in the Latin form preceding the word *bella* has been omitted altogether.

Nor did the old opinion that war is a providential institution and a judgment of God die with the Middle Ages. Lord Bacon looks upon wars as "the highest trials of right; when princes and States that acknowledge no superior upon earth shall put themselves on the justice of God, for the deciding of their controversies by such success as it shall please Him to give on either side." Réal de Curban says that a war is seldom successful unless it be just; hence the victor may presume that God is on his side. According to Jeremy Taylor, "kings are in the place of God, who strikes whole nations and towns and villages; and war is the rod of God in the hands of princes." And it is not only looked upon as an instrument of divine justice, but it is also said, generally, "to work out the noble purposes of God." Its tendency, as a theological writer assures us, is "to rectify and exalt the popular conception of God," there being nothing among men "like the smell of

gunpowder for making a nation perceive the fragrance of divinity in truth." By war the different countries "have been opened up to the advance of true religion." "No people ever did, or ever could, feel the power of Christian principle growing up like an inspiration through the national manhood, until the worth of it had been thundered on the battlefield." War is, "when God sends it, a means of grace and of national renovation"; it is "a solemn duty in which usually only the best Christians and most trustworthy men should be commissioned to hold the sword." According to M. Proudhon, it is the most sublime phenomenon of our moral life, a divine revelation more authoritative than the Gospel itself. The warlike people is the religious people; war is the sign of human grandeur, peace a thing for beavers and sheep. "Philanthrope, vous parlez d'abolir la guerre; prenez garde de dégrader le genre humain."[1]

In order to prove the consistency of war with Christianity, appeals are still, as in former days, made to the Bible—to the divinely-sanctioned example of the ancient Israelites, to the fact that Jesus never prohibited those around him from bearing arms, to the instances

[1] "Philanthropist, you talk of abolishing war: beware of degrading the human race."

of the centurions mentioned in the Gospel, to St. Paul's predilection for taking his spiritual metaphors from the profession of the soldier, and so on. According to Canon Mozley, the Christian recognition of the right of war was contained in Christianity's original recognition of nations. "By a fortunate necessity," a universal empire is impossible. Each nation is a centre by itself; and, when questions of right and justice arise between these independent centres, they cannot be decided except by mutual agreement or force. The aim of the nation going to war is exactly the same as that of the individual in entering a court; and the Church, which has no authority to decide which is the right side, cannot but stand neutral and contemplate war forensically, as a mode of settling national questions which is justified by the want of any other mode. A natural justice, Canon Mozley adds, is inherent not only in wars of self-defence; there is an instinctive reaching in nations and masses of people after alteration and readjustment, which has justice in it, and which arises from real needs. The arrangement does not suit as it stands; there is want of adaptation; there is confinement and pressure; there are people kept away from each other that are made to be together, and parts separated that were

made to join. All this uneasiness in States naturally leads to war. Moreover, there are wars of progress which, so far as they are really necessary for the due advantage of mankind and growth of society, are approved of by Christianity, though they do not strictly belong to the head of wars undertaken in self-defence. A doctrine which thus, in the name of religion, allows the waging of wars for rectifying the political distribution of nationalities and races, and forwarding the so-called progress of the world, naturally lends itself to the justification of almost any war entered upon by a Christian State. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible to find a single instance of a war waged by a Protestant country, from any motive, to which the bulk of its clergy have not given their sanction and support. The opposition against war has generally come from other quarters.

There have been, and still are, Christian sects which, on religious grounds, condemn war of any kind. In the fourteenth century the Lollards taught that homicide in war is expressly contrary to the New Testament; they were persecuted partly on that account. Of the same opinion were the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century; and they could claim on their side the words of men like Colet and

Erasmus. From the pulpit of St. Paul's Colet thundered that "an unjust peace is better than the justest war," and that, "when men out of hatred and ambition fight with and destroy one another, they fight under the banner, not of Christ, but of the Devil." According to Erasmus, "nothing is more impious, more calamitous, more widely pernicious, more inveterate, more base, or in sum more unworthy of a man, not to say of a Christian," than war. It is worse than brutal; to man no wild beast is more destructive than his fellow-man. When brutes fight, they fight with weapons which nature has given them, whereas we arm ourselves for mutual slaughter with weapons with nature never thought of. Neither do beasts break out in hostile rage for trifling causes, but either when hunger drives them to madness, or when they find themselves attacked, or when they are alarmed for the safety of their young. But we, on frivolous pretences, what tragedies do we act on the theatre of war! Under colour of some obsolete and disputable claim to territory; in a childish passion for a mistress; for causes even more ridiculous than these, we kindle the flame of war. Transactions truly hellish are called holy wars. Bishops and grave divines, decrepit as they are in person, fight

from the pulpit the battles of the princes, promising remission of sins to all who will take part in the war of the prince, and exclaiming to the latter that God will fight for him if he only keeps his mind favourable to the cause of religion. And yet how could it ever enter into our hearts that a Christian should imbrue his hands in the blood of a Christian! What is war but murder and theft committed by great numbers on great numbers! Does not the Gospel declare, in decisive words, that we must not revile again those who revile us; that we should do good to those who use us ill; that we should give up the whole of our possessions to those who take a part; that we should pray for those who design to take away our lives? The world has so many learned bishops, so many gray-headed grandees, so many councils and senates, why is not recourse had to their authority, and the childish quarrels of princes settled by their wise and decisive arbitration? "The man who engages in war by choice, that man, whoever he is, is a wicked man; he sins against nature, against God, against man, and is guilty of the most aggravated and complicated impiety." These were the main arguments of reason, humanity, and religion, which Erasmus adduced against war. They

could not leave the reformers entirely unaffected. Sir Thomas More charged Luther himself and his disciples with carrying the doctrines of peace to the extreme limits of non-resistance. But, as we have noticed, these peaceful tendencies only formed a passing phase in the history of Reformation, and were left to the care of sectarians.

Among these the Quakers are the most important. By virtue of various passages in the Old and the New Testament, they contend that all warfare, whatever be its peculiar features, circumstances, or pretexts, is wholly at variance with the Christian religion. It is always the duty of Christians to obey their Master's high and holy law—to suffer wrong, to return good for evil, to love their enemies. War is also inconsistent with the Christian principle that human life is sacred, and that death is followed by infinite consequences. Since man is destined for eternity, the future welfare of a single individual is of greater importance than the merely temporal prosperity of a whole nation. When cutting short the days of their neighbour and transmitting him, prepared or unprepared, to the awful realities of an everlasting state, Christians take upon themselves a most unwarrantable responsibility, unless such an action

is expressly sanctioned by their divine Master, as was the case among the Israelites. In the New Testament there is no such sanction; hence it must be concluded that, under the Christian dispensation, it is utterly unlawful for one man to kill another, under whatever circumstances of expediency or provocation the deed may be committed. And a Christian who fights by the command of his prince, and in behalf of his country, not only commits sin in his own person, but aids and abets the national transgression.

It must be added that views similar to these are also found independently of any particular form of sectarianism. According to Dr. Wayland, all wars, defensive as well as offensive, are contrary to the revealed will of God, aggression from a foreign nation calling not for retaliation and injury, but rather for special kindness and goodwill. Theodore Parker, the Congregational minister, looks upon war as a sin, a corrupter of public morals, a practical denial of Christianity, a violation of God's eternal love. W. Stokes, the Baptist, observes that Christianity cannot sanction war, whether offensive or defensive, because war is an "immeasurable evil, by hurling unnumbered myriads of our fellow-men to a premature judgment and endless

despair." Moreover, those who compare the state of opinion during the last years with that of former periods cannot fail to observe a marked progress of a sentiment antagonistic to war in the various sections of the Christian Church. Yet, speaking generally, the orthodox are still of the same opinion as Sir James Turner, who declared that "those who condemn the profession or art of soldiery smell rank of Anabaptism and Quakery"; and war is in our days, as it was in those of Erasmus, so much sanctioned by authority and custom that it is deemed impious to bear testimony against it. The duties which compulsory military service imposes upon the male population of most Christian countries presuppose that a Christian should have no scruples about taking part in any war waged by the State, and are recognized as binding by the clergy of those countries. With reference to the Church of England, Dr. Thomas Arnold asks: "Did it become a Christian Church to make no other official declaration of its sentiments concerning war than by saying that Christian men might lawfully engage in it?"

The protest against war which exercised perhaps the widest influence on public opinion came from a school of moralists whose ten-

dencies were not only anti-orthodox, but distinctly hostile to the most essential dogmas of Christian theology. Bayle, in his Dictionary, calls Erasmus's essay against war one of the most beautiful dissertations ever written. He observes that the more we consider the inevitable consequences of war, the more we feel disposed to detest those who are the causes of it. Its usual fruits may, indeed, "make those tremble who undertake or advise it, to prevent evils which, perhaps, may never happen, and which, at the worst, would often be much less than those which necessarily follow a rupture." To Voltaire war is an "infernal enterprise," the strangest feature of which is that "every chief of the ruffians has his colours consecrated, and solemnly prays to God before he goes to destroy his neighbour." He asks what the Church has done to suppress this crime. Bourdaloue preached against impurity; but what sermon did he ever direct against the murder, rapine, brigandage, and universal rage which desolate the world? "Miserable physicians of souls, you declaim for five quarters of an hour against the mere pricks of a pin, and say no word on the curse which tears us into a thousand pieces." Voltaire admits that under certain circumstances war is an inevitable curse, but

rebukes Montesquieu for saying that natural defence sometimes involves the necessity of attack, when a nation perceives that a longer peace would place another nation in a position to destroy it. Such a war, he observes, is as illegitimate as possible: "It is to go and kill your neighbour for fear that your neighbour, who does not attack you, should be in a condition to attack you; that is to say, you must run the risk of ruining your country, in the hope of ruining without reason some other country; that is, to be sure, neither fair nor useful." The chief causes which induce men to massacre in all loyalty thousands of their brothers, and to expose their own people to the most terrible misery, are the ambitions and jealousies of princes and their ministers. Similar views are expressed in the great Encyclopédie: "La guerre est le plus terrible des fléaux qui détruisent l'espèce humaine: elle n'épargne pas même les vainqueurs; la plus heureuse est funeste.....Ce ne sont plus aujourd'hui les peuples qui déclarent la guerre, c'est la cupidité des rois qui leur fait prendre les armes; c'est l'indigence qui les met aux mains de leurs sujets."[1]

[1] "War is the most terrible of all scourges which destroy mankind; it spares not even the conquerors; the best is lamentable.....It is not the people who declare war to-

It is said that, though Christianity has not abolished war, it has nevertheless, even in war, asserted the principle that human life is sacred by prohibiting all needless destruction. The Canon, "De treuga et pace," laid down the rule that non-resisting persons should be spared; and Franciscus a Victoria maintained not only that between Christian enemies those who made no resistance could not lawfully be slain, but that even in war against the Turks it was wrong to kill children and women. However, this doctrine of mercy was far in advance of the habits and general opinion of the time. If the simple peasant was often spared, that was largely from motives of prudence, or because the valiant knight considered him unworthy of the lance. As late as the seventeenth century, Grotius was certainly not supported by the spirit of the age when he argued that, "if justice do not require, at least mercy does, that we should not, except for weighty causes tending to the safety of many, undertake anything which may involve innocent persons in destruction"; or when he recommended enemies willing to surrender on fair conditions, or uncondition-

day; it is the greed of kings which makes them take up arms: it is poverty which puts them in the hands of their subjects."

ally, to be spared. Afterwards, however, opinion changed rapidly. Pufendorf, in echoing the doctrine of Grotius, spoke to a world which was already convinced; and in the eighteenth century Bynkershoek stands alone in giving to a belligerent unlimited rights of violence. In reference to the assumption that this change of opinion is due to the influence of the Christian religion, it is instructive to note that Grotius, in support of his doctrine, appealed chiefly to pagan authorities, and that even savage peoples, without the aid of Christianity, have arrived at the rule which in war forbids the destruction of helpless persons and captives.

WAR AS THE FAILURE OF REASON

By NORMAN ANGELL

In the question of War and Peace we find non-Rationalists on both sides of the fence—that is to say, those who advocate peace on instinctive and emotional grounds, and those who declare that man's fighting temper will always stand in the way of the settlement of political quarrels otherwise than by force.

The first of these—those who may be termed the emotional Pacifists—defend their position in a curious way. They imply that advocacy must be either what is termed "moral" or "material"; and sometimes, perhaps, are apt to infer that the more modern case for Pacifism is more sordid and less ideal than the case as presented by the older school. But the real difference between the old and the new school—if we can make such a distinction—is not that the one is moral and the other material, but that the modern school attempt to show the process,

the why and the how, while the older school were content to appeal to a somewhat indefinite ideal.

Writing some time ago of the work of a rationalist pacifist, Jacques Novikov, of Odessa, too little known in England, I had occasion to point out that, if the history of human progress revealed anything, it surely revealed this: that some of the best human emotion had been expended upon some of the worst possible objects. Not only do we find an incalculable amount of endeavour and suffering and self-sacrifice expended upon futile things—a life passed upon a bed of spikes, or at the top of a pillar, eaten by vermin—but we are continually confronted with facts such as that millions of men, through thousands of years, were persuaded that it was their bounden duty to enforce a given religious belief by any means whatsoever—force, cruelty, torture. It was from no defect of morality or good intention that humanity went astray on these matters so long; the more moral the man, the greater often was the futility of his life and the cruelty of his acts.

Now, much good work in the cause of peace has in the past been nullified by overlooking the truth which lies at the bottom of the phenomenon just indicated. It has too often been

assumed that what is needed in order to clear up the difficulties of international relationship is a better moral tone—greater kindliness, and so forth—oblivious of the fact that the emotion of humanity repelling from war may be more than counteracted by the equally strong moral emotions we connect with patriotism. War *may* occasion suffering, says the patriot; but men are, and should be, prepared to endure suffering for their country. That men are called upon to suffer for an ideal may be the very fact which constitutes its attraction to them. The pacifist appeal to humanity has failed because the militarist believes that he, too, is working and suffering for humanity.

The difference between the pacifist and the militarist is not, at bottom, a moral one at all (assuming that we take the best statement of each case), but an intellectual one; and if we are to bring about that political reformation in Europe which is to liberate us from the militarist burden, as the religious reformation liberated Europe from religious oppression, the processes will have to be intellectual. Just as men grew out of the absurdity of futile self-torture because the ideal it represented, when tested in the light of reason, was seen to be, even on moral grounds, unsound, so, in like manner, will men see when they apply

their reason to the task, and not before, that the ideals represented by war are unsound alike on grounds of morality and self-interest (you cannot, of course, in reality separate the two, though our thought does continually separate them).

There was as much good intention, as much readiness and self-sacrifice, in the Europe of the fifth century as of the twentieth; there is, perhaps, as much to-day in Hindustan or Arabia as in England; but what differentiates the twentieth from the fifth century, or Arabia from England, is a difference of ideas, due to hard mental work. The prime, if not the sole, factor of progress is hard thinking.

And nowhere do we need it more than in the science of international politics. The very foundations of that science have been vitiated by the survival of a terminology which is in reality the legacy of Roman or feudal conditions, but which woefully distorts things when applied to modern conditions. Absurdities which do not stand the test of the very first analysis are still persisting as unchallenged axioms, because the fundamental notions which underlay them have not been tested in the light of changed conditions.

The point that I am driving at can best be made clear by an actual instance.

The other day Lord Roberts made a speech in which he justified the case for war on certain fundamental grounds, the principle of which was this: That, unless we have more power than our rivals in the trade of the world, we carry on our trade merely by their sufferance, and so long as they care to permit us to do so; and he regarded it as obvious that that trade could be brought to a stop the moment that in their interest they cared to put a stop to it.

Now, this assumption goes to the root of the whole matter on its material side, and if it is true much of the panic which the public from time to time exhibits is justified. That this is not an isolated expression of opinion is proved by the fact that exactly the same thought was expressed by Mr. Winston Churchill previously, and shortly after by Mr. Frederic Harrison, who added the inevitable conclusion of the premise—namely, that the moment the Germans were preponderant at sea our trade would be transferred from us to them, and half the population of these islands would have to emigrate or starve to death.

Now, if these assumptions are correct, I see no hope for international peace. On the contrary, panic, fear, the hatred which grows from fear, the determination not to surrender

the bread of our children without a fight—all this becomes inevitable. But, as readers of *The Great Illusion* know, I hold this fundamental assumption to be a monstrous absurdity—just the type of those monstrous absurdities out of which grows the whole miserable conflict of nations. And not only do I hold it to be an absurdity, but a quite demonstrable absurdity.

Now the point to which I want to direct attention is this: That neither on the morrow of Mr. Churchill's speech, nor that of Lord Roberts, nor on the morrow of Mr. Frederic Harrison's pronouncement, *has there been one single notable protest*, either on the part of journalists, critics, or any eminent public men, either Conservative or Liberal, against this fundamental assumption that I have indicated. All three pronouncements have been criticized in violent terms; but you will hunt in vain throughout all these criticisms, not merely for a demonstration of the absurdity of that fundamental assumption, but even for a passing inference that the assumption could be challenged. This monstrous thing has been left undisturbed apparently as one of the self-evident axioms of the whole discussion, and it remains in the minds of the thousands who have heard these people, and

the millions who have read them, as an elementary truth of the problem.

I am aware, of course, that fully to rebut the case of the Intuitionists I should have to wander into all sorts of philosophical fields; but when we have studied all our psychology and all our Bergsonian philosophy, this fact remains, that we do not know what is instinctive, and what is a habit of reasoning—a mode of thought. One remembers the dogmatic declaration of the Catholic of the fourteenth century, that it was impossible for a Catholic to sit at table with a heretic, not merely because of the man's being a heretic, but because all heretics gave forth a distinctive and overpoweringly repulsive odour, which the Catholic could not stand. Now, one would have said that this quite honest pronouncement on the part of the Catholic was something instinctive, with which his reason was not concerned; but it is a curious thing that, when a few men had written books and discussed and argued on this question, the special odour of the heretic disappeared.

The marvellous thing about the transformation of the mind of Europe, which took place at a period somewhere between the beginning of the Thirty Years' War and its close, was not that the Catholic should cease to massacre

the Protestant and the Protestant the Catholic, but that each should cease to want to do it. Again, it was a process of rationalization, in which the instinctive part of man was very visibly affected.

However true it may be, therefore, that patriotism is an instinctive thing, we do not know how far a clearer perception will not modify that "instinct." All we know is that clearer thinking is certain to modify it; and that is enough to indicate our clear duty on the subject.

RATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHTEOUSNESS

By S. H. SWINNY, M.A.

The advocates of peace in the modern world have appealed to many and various considerations; but for the most part it is the consequences, rather than the causes, of war that have provoked their protest. The horrors of war, the loss of life and treasure, the suffering, not to the combatants only, but to women and children and to animals, the reckless passions engendered, the interruption to steady industry, the abeyance of the hopes of intellectual and social progress, are put forward in all their power. It is proved easily that in such contests conqueror and conquered lose alike, and suffer a common degradation. Nay, it is shown that the very fear of war may have as ill an effect as war itself, if not in loss of life, at least in material waste, in suspicion, in envy, malice, and all uncharitableness. Some there are who go back further, who base their opposition on

some absolute dogma and proclaim it as the highest duty to turn the other cheek to the smiter. To these latter the mass of mankind has always refused to listen. Christianity in its days of greatest strength could never persuade the Western world that resistance to evil was a sin. Rightly or wrongly, this has seemed the consecration of oppression and the charter of the oppressor. Nor, in spite of the growing breadth of sympathy with suffering, have the miseries of war been found conclusive in bringing about its condemnation. Mankind have ever been ready to brave great sufferings in a good cause—in the cause of national independence and civil and religious liberty. It is not by calling on the innocent and guilty alike to lay down their arms, and confounding both in an equal condemnation, that wars can be stopped. The path of righteousness is the only path of safety. Wars do not begin with the firing of cannon, or even with the drilling of armies, but with the first deviation from justice and fair dealing. The nation that aims at Imperial aggrandizement, that flouts the just claims of other peoples, that grows rich by the exploitation of weaker races, is sowing the seeds of a harvest of shame, whether it be reaped in peace or in war. Sooner or later the settled

habit of iniquity will pass the bounds of prudence, and those who seek their profit by attacking the weak will find that they have miscalculated their enemies' strength. Unrighteous policy is the true parent of war.

The modern period has seen a marked advance in two directions. It is improbable, or at least it remains unproven, that there has been any considerable advance in intellectual capacity or in goodness of heart within historical times. It may be that, in other periods of the world's history, men have had the same brain-power, the same readiness to do their duty as they conceived it. But it is in the modern world alone that we have seen the continuous development of science and the widening of the moral sphere, the recognition of the brotherhood of all mankind. An idle question has sometimes been raised: Is it more important for the welfare of humanity that men should have the desire to do right, or the knowledge of what should be done? Is brain or heart, love or intellect, the more important? But for right action we must have both knowledge and goodwill, the desire to serve our fellow-men and the knowledge of how to serve them. Never was there a sphere in which this truth was more obvious than in the international rela-

tion of mankind. Modern science, if it is the great bond of human unity, the destroyer of old divisions and animosities, the necessary basis of a human ethic common to all peoples, is also a powerful weapon of destruction and exploitation. Unenlightened sentiment may easily be turned to evil, the spread of civilization or the protection of the weak becoming the cloak of many crimes. What could be a more dangerous situation than that in which a body of men, with large interests in the exploitation of a backward people or their land, and with the means of enlisting capable advocates in the Press, can persuade their fellow-countrymen that the prosperity and power of their own country, and the happiness and progress of the weaker race, will both be enhanced by a policy of aggression? Selfishness and ignorance by themselves are feeble antagonists to meet. Our task is not so simple. We have to separate the closely-woven strands of good and evil, light and darkness.

Indeed, if we look back to the time when the old medieval world begins to decay, and our modern civilization to take shape, we see how painfully, amid the general tendency towards peaceful activity, each step has been gained. Look at the last five centuries, and

how great has been the progress. Look at each generation, and how many have been the lapses and the deviations. Every advantage has had some corresponding disadvantage. It is only on a larger view that the real tendency is seen. The conception of Christendom—the union in one Church—if it accentuated the hostility of the Christian to the Moslem world, gave the West a standard of public morality which, however defective, could be appealed to by all the nations within the fold. The Reformation, by dividing Christendom, perhaps decreased the animosity against those who were not Christians, but inaugurated the long series of religious wars. Meanwhile, on the temporal side, the consolidation of nationalities with strong central governments, especially in Spain, France, and England, while it put an end to the local wars of feudalism, made possible the great campaigns of modern times. But, above all, on the debit side, there were the discoveries in Africa and America, the sea-passage to India and the islands of the Eastern seas. Here Europe found itself opposed, not to the rival power of Islam, but to peoples in various degrees of civilization, yet all inferior in military skill, and therefore an easy prey to exploitation. These peoples were heathen,

and so outside the bounds of the comity of Christian nations. They were in danger of eternal damnation, and therefore it was a duty to bring salvation to them even by force. Rich cargoes of spices, of ivory, of slaves, would reward the enterprising merchant. Mines of silver and other metals invited conquest. The temptation could not be resisted. The peoples of the New World and in part of Africa were subjected, converted, and, if they escaped annihilation, enslaved ; and the morality of Europe, public and private, rapidly deteriorated. So far, then, it would seem that the modern era, as it advanced, had only increased the moral degradation. But the end was not yet. There were slowly growing up new conceptions of Man and his environment, out of which a new morality was arising.

The modern world is distinguished from the ancient by two conceptions—that of the organic unity of mankind and the continuity of its development, of human brotherhood and human progress. The first, indeed, had appeared often as a moral aphorism, enunciated in wide terms, but in practice confined to particular sections. In the teachings of Confucius, of the Stoics, of Saint Paul, in the vast aggregates of China and of the Roman

Empire, under a government that comprised all Western civilization, within a Church that claimed to be universal, we have the occasional assertion of the great principle; but in the world of action the distinction between Roman and barbarian, between Christian and infidel, remained. Still less was the conception of human progress attained. If in the increase of Roman power some could see a steady growth of human peace and well-being, the decline of the Empire seemed an evidence of retrogression. Science had ceased to advance. The public burdens were outstripping the increase of wealth; the barbarians were destroying the peace and order that had been so laboriously created. The Christian alone could take comfort in the growing strength of his Church; but even the Christian, though he believed in progress up to the advent of Christianity, thought that henceforth the most that could be hoped for was a nearer and nearer approximation to an ideal already complete, and long since formulated. Even when the Church began to lose its power, the belief in human progress did not at once arise. The Protestant aimed at a return to what he believed to be primitive Christianity. The Humanist was overpowered by the superiority of classical

antiquity in science and art. But in each case this preference of the past gave way. The endless controversy as to what primitive Christianity taught gradually broadened out into a discussion of the basis of Christianity and the truth of theology. The reverence for Greek art was weakened by the appearance of the great modern poets and painters. The discovery of America, the advances in the industrial arts, and, above all, the continuous growth of modern science, showed that modern civilization was to surpass that of the ancient world. This conception of progress does not necessarily imply that in every succeeding generation there is more happiness than in the preceding. If the strong enjoy the forward march, the weak will be happier at those moments when there is the closest harmony between organism and environment. It is sufficient that, as the ages pass, the knowledge of man, and therefore his power over his surroundings, continually increases, and his sympathies continually widen, so as in the end to embrace all the races of men. That many of those eminent as scientific discoverers or renowned for their devotion to the good of Humanity have been adherents of the old creeds does not make the movement any the less a product of energies that

have grown up outside of Christianity. Science, even where it is not antagonistic to Christianity, is at least independent of it; and the very conception of Humanity has only become possible with the growth of science. To the Rationalist, man and his welfare are not secondary and derivative, but the end and object of his highest thought and service.

It remains true, however, that even when the goal is recognized it is difficult to keep a straight course and an even keel. Now one aspect, now another, of the evil to be extirpated or the good to be attained strikes the public imagination, and many deviations result. For long the most enlightened minds were divided between the claims of Country and Humanity. It is true that this was no new difficulty. At a much earlier period of human development men had had to face the dilemma of contradictory obligations between family and country, private engagements and the public advantage. Yet, in spite of this possible antagonism, few have been found willing to destroy the links of family affection. So mankind is coming to see that it is not necessary to destroy the conception of country; that national devotion, directed into right channels, is a valuable moral asset; that

Humanity is best served, not by reducing all the nations to a barren uniformity, but by fostering in each nation the best of those peculiar qualities it has derived from its history and its environment, so that each may bring its special contribution to the common stock. The sacrifices which many a small nation has made to preserve its individuality have not been made in vain. The very existence of the sentiment of nationality is a sign that there exist some special attributes in the nation which will increase the varied riches of that great whole of which all nations and peoples are the component elements.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to point to the evils that flow from an exaggerated patriotism; but it may not perhaps be recognized so readily that an exaggerated patriotism is never so dangerous as when it is combined with an exaggerated cosmopolitanism. The belief that national differences are a noxious obstacle, and national sentiment a mere superstition, is quite compatible with the belief that the desired uniformity may be best obtained by the forcible expansion of the civilization of some one country; and we all of us have enough of the old superstition remaining to decide that that one country is our own.

Thus there arises a zeal for spreading "civilization." The Englishman sees salvation in the extension of the Empire, or perhaps he dreams of an Anglo-Saxon world. Some years ago there was even talk of a Teutonic world, united in the glorious task of bullying all other nations; but some differences between the component parts have apparently reduced the apostles of this grand idea to silence.

The cosmopolitan ideal, like the national, if it may be misunderstood and turned to evil, yet contains this abiding truth: that even because we are each of us citizens of some one nation, we also have a duty towards that great commonwealth which is made up of all the nations; and that just as each individual citizen must subordinate his own private good to the good of his country, so must each nation avoid offence against the peace and prosperity of the whole world. The cases, indeed, are not entirely analogous, for the laws of each country and the public forces of the State aim at giving a protection to the individual which no international tribunal gives to the nations. But though this may justify resistance to aggression, it can afford no excuse for the aggressor. It would be a disgrace to the private citizen only to be

honest from fear of the policeman. It is equally disgraceful to a State to set all moral laws at defiance because they cannot be enforced by public authority. The doctrine that ethic has no place in the relation of civilized states is one that few would care to avow, and that many in practice abandon when, as even the worst offenders so often do, they publish appeals to the world in justification of their conduct.

But if this is now generally admitted in theory, though not always in practice, as regards civilized nations, it is very far otherwise in the case of those peoples who are described as "uncivilized." This term, indeed, is used vaguely enough. Sometimes it is applied to nations of ancient tradition and complex institutions, whose only fault is that they are non-European. Sometimes it merely implies that the missionary, the trader, the slave-driver, covet a new field of activity. But let the meaning be what it will, the "uncivilized" race is held to be outside of the comity of nations. What does this mean? It means that these peoples are deprived of the protection, such as it is, which the rules of war give to non-combatants, that their villages may be burnt to strike terror, their crops destroyed to force them into submission

by starvation, and often that they will be punished for every lapse from that code of civilized warfare which their powerful antagonists themselves disregard. And what is the result? The blessings of civilization are thenceforward associated in the minds of the vanquished with the loss of freedom and the ruin of cherished institutions; with famine and slaughter. The old code of morals which they understood is discredited, and the missionary by his precepts or the trader by his practice teaches a new code, the beauty of which is obscured or the ugliness intensified by the circumstances accompanying its introduction. The development of the indigenous community along its own lines is summarily stopped, and in many cases the community itself is reduced to an aggregation of atoms dependent on the will and pleasure of the conquerors. The men and women become instruments of exploitation—creators of wealth for distant speculators. It is a sad fate. But is it so much happier a fate that the inheritors of the highest civilization—the peoples of the free nations of the West—should become the parasites of backward races; that the proud Spaniard of the sixteenth century should devour the lives of the Indians worn out by the labour of the silver mines of Peru; that

the citizens of the great American Republic should so long recognize negro slavery as an institution of their country; that Englishmen, even in the twentieth century, should make their profit by the forced labour of the collectors of rubber? America wiped out its wrong-doing in blood and tears. Spain has paid a heavy price for those possessions beyond the sea which now are only a memory. England may or may not suffer a like penalty. But of this we may be sure: Tyranny and unfair dealing abroad are incompatible with freedom and justice at home.

One word more. General exhortations in favour of peace, declarations against aggression and the enslaving of free nations, protests against the ill-treatment of backward races, meet with wide acceptance; but it often happens that those who are ready to condemn the public crimes of other countries take refuge in a guilty silence, if they do not actually approve, the crimes of their own. The Englishman, after reading of deportations without trial in India, declaims against imprisonment by administrative order in Russia; the American, on hearing of the lynching of a negro in the next State, joins a society for the reform of Russian prisons; the Russian editor assures the world that his

country is only interfering in Persia for the Persians' good. It is true that, if protests against international wrong could come only from nations with a clear record, all protest would be silenced; and none have a better right to condemn the faults of other countries than those who have not failed in their duty even when their own country was concerned. But that duty—the duty of pointing out the faults of our own country—must not be shirked. Few nations will listen to outside criticism if their own sons are silent. Sir George Trevelyan, in his recent work, *George III. and Charles Fox*, referring to the opposition of Burke and his friends to the American War, well says:—

> They argued against the passing madness of the hour, and they were stigmatized by their detractors as unpatriotic and un-English—that taunt which is, of all others, the most suicidal to the true interests of England. For a high-minded people such as ours will not consent to learn their national duty from the criticisms of foreigners; and therefore, if it be un-English for Englishmen to speak their minds, the country will never hear the truth at all.

It was Edmund Burke who most trenchently exposed the fallacy that the first duty in case of war was to strengthen the hands of Ministers. As he said:—

> On the principle of this argument, the more mischiefs

we suffer from any administation the more our trust in it is to be confirmed. Let them but once get us into a war, and then their power is safe, and an act of oblivion passed for all their misconduct.

And, referring to the time of the Dutch War in Charles II.'s reign :—

The people of England were then.....called upon to make government strong. They thought it a great deal better to make it wise and honest.

Those who have exposed at all hazards the cruelties and oppressions so often practised on the borders of civilization have been accused of taking sides against their own countrymen ; those who have denounced the unjust wars in which their country has been engaged have been called the friends of every country but their own. Yet, just as true friendship does not consist in flattering the vices of those we love and honour, so true patriotism is best shown by the endeavour to keep our country in the paths of righteousness and peace.

And if these duties are incumbent on all, whatever be their general views on human destiny and the foundations of ethic, they are especially so in the case of those who do not profess to follow in the paths traced out by their fathers, but who claim to have found a more excellent way ; who set before themselves a higher standard ; who, full of confidence in

the future of mankind, put their trust in the victories of human reason, and seek their highest aim in the service of Man. Whoever else fails, let them be constant. They have cast off the superstitions of the past, they have set out on the great quest, they have already perceived the promise of victory. What a degradation would it be if they had only cast off the beliefs of the old world, to enter upon a new world in which the power of the strong and the cunning of the wicked should be as unbridled and as baleful as before; in which greed should have taken the place of naked force, and human dignity and fraternity be as far away as ever! It is for those who are in a special sense the guardians of human reason to show themselves the defenders of the brotherhood of Man and the steadfast supporters of human unity.

WATTS AND CO., PRINTERS,
JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET,
LONDON, E.C.

RATIONALIST PEACE SOCIETY.

Affiliated Societies:

Hampstead Ethical Society,
Kingston Humanitarian Society,
Sheffield Ethical Society,
South London Ethical Society,

President:

J. M. ROBERTSON, M.P.

Honorary Associates:

ARNOLD BENNETT
OTTO KARMIN
EDEN PHILLPOTTS
GEORGE BRANDES
GASTON MOCH
ED. WESTERMARCK.

Chairman:

MRS. H. BRADLAUGH BONNER

Executive Committee:

G. F. ANDERSON
ALFRED COX, M.D.
G. W. FOOTE
S. A. GIMSON
MISS JOSEPHINE GOWA
F. J. GOULD
J. F. GREEN
G. G. GREENWOOD, M.P.
W. HEAFORD
S. H. SWINNY, M.A.
MISS KOUGH
MISS E. ROBERTA REES
JOHN RUSSELL, M.A.
H. SNELL

Hon. Sec.:

EDWARD G. SMITH,
38 Cursitor Street, London, E.C.

RATIONALIST PEACE SOCIETY.

THE RATIONALIST PEACE SOCIETY was formed in 1910 to carry on a propaganda in the interest of International Peace on essentially and avowedly Rationalist lines, without reference to religious sanctions of any kind.

On this basis its special objects are :—

(*a*) To promote International Peace by the advocacy of International Arbitration ;

(*b*) To oppose militarism in all its forms ;

(*c*) To promote friendly understandings between the various nations.

It is not intended to act in any way antagonistically towards any existing Peace organizations ; rather to co-operate with them, on the lines laid down, on every possible occasion.

The annual subscription is fixed at a minimum of One Shilling, and all subscribers receive the *Rationalist Peace Quarterly*. Funds are urgently needed for work of propaganda, and Rationalists are warmly invited to become members.

CONWAY MEMORIAL LECTURES.

These Lectures are the outcome of a meeting held in October, 1908, when it was decided that a lecture should be given annually to keep alive the memory of Dr. Moncure D. Conway; and the following four have been delivered and issued in booklet form:—

THE TASK OF RATIONALISM.

By JOHN RUSSELL, M.A.

Boards, 6d. net, by post 7½d.
Cloth, 9d. net, by post 11d.

PEACE AND WAR IN THE BALANCE.

By HENRY W. NEVINSON.

Boards, 6d. net, by post 7½d.
Cloth, 9d. net, by post 11d.

ART AND THE COMMONWEAL.

By WILLIAM ARCHER.

Boards, 6d. net, by post 7½d.
Cloth, 9d. net, by post 11d.

WAR AND THE ESSENTIAL REALITIES.

By NORMAN ANGELL.

Boards, 6d. net, by post 7½d.
Cloth, 9d. net, by post 11d.

London: WATTS & Co., Johnson's Court, Fleet Street, E.C.

Each about 160 pp., cloth, 1s. net, by post 1s. 3d.

THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE SERIES.

"These splendid handbooks at a shilling each belong to an age of wonders."—*Birmingham Gazette.*

THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY.
By PROFESSOR GEORGE FORBES, M.A., F.R.S., M.Inst.C.E.

THE HISTORY OF CHEMISTRY. In two vols.
Vol. I.: 2000 B.C. to 1850 A.D. Vol. II.: 1850 to Date.
By SIR EDWARD THORPE, C.B., D.Sc., F.R.S., Director of the Government Laboratories, London; Professor-Elect and Director of the Chemical Laboratories of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, South Kensington, etc.

THE HISTORY OF BIOLOGY.
By PROFESSOR L. C. MIALL, F.R.S., formerly Professor of Biology, Leeds University, 1876–1907; Fullerian Professor, Royal Institute, 1904–5.

THE HISTORY OF GEOLOGY.
By HORACE B. WOODWARD, F.R.S., F.G.S.; late Assistant-Director of Geological Survey of England and Wales.

THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY.
By A. C. HADDON, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S.; Lecturer in Ethnology, Cambridge and London.

THE HISTORY OF OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM.
By PROFESSOR ARCHIBALD DUFF, Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Theology in the United College, Bradford.

THE HISTORY OF NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.
By F. C. CONYBEARE, M.A., late Fellow and Praelector of Univ. Coll., Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy; Doctor of Theology, *honoris causa*, of Giessen; Officier d'Academie.

THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.
By A. W. BENN, author of "The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century," etc.

THE HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
By A. W. BENN.

THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY. Two vols.
By PROFESSOR J. MARK BALDWIN. *In the Press.*

THE HISTORY OF GEOGRAPHY. *In the Press.*
By DR. JOHN SCOTT KELTIE, F.R.G.S., F.S.S., F.R.S.

London: WATTS & Co., Johnson's Court, Fleet Street, E.C.