

DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR. THOMAS COOPER AND  
MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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FIRST NIGHT.

On Monday, the 1st of February, a discussion was begun at the Hall of Science between Mr. Thomas Cooper, some time Freethinker, and recent convert, also the well-known author of the "Purgatory of Suicides," and Mr. Charles Bradlaugh, who has, for some years past, acquired a very wide-spread reputation as lecturer under the name of "Iconoclast," and has devoted the time which is not occupied by his professional avocations in the elimination of secular and religious anomalies.

The chair was occupied by James Harvey, Esq. The following was the order of the discussion as stated in the published programme :—

1. Mr. Cooper to state the Argument for the Being of God, as the *Maker* of the Universe, on the First Night—and the Argument for the Being of God, as the *Moral Governor* of the Universe, on the Second Night; and each statement not to extend beyond half-an-hour.

2. Mr. Bradlaugh to state the Argument on the Negative side, each night; and each statement not to extend beyond half-an-hour.

3. Not more than a quarter of an hour to be allowed for reply and counter-reply, to the end.

4. No *written* speeches to be delivered, and no long extracts from printed books or papers to be read on either side.

5. The chair to be taken at seven o'clock, and the Discussion to conclude, as nearly as possible, at ten, each evening.

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THE CHAIRMAN said: I have consented to take the chair to-night, both by request of Mr. Cooper and some friends, and with the consent of Mr. Charles Bradlaugh; and I think I shall have your consent also during the discussion which takes place this evening. You well know that the duty and power of a chairman is very limited, being entirely confined to the preservation of order; and unless he has the support of those over whom he presides, his authority is of little avail. I trust, therefore, that you will listen to the arguments that will be addressed to you to-night. There must, of course, be great difference of opinion on every abstract question,

otherwise there would be no reason for discussion ; so that every lady and gentleman who comes here may be presumed to have formed an opinion beforehand ; but trusting to your forbearance, I have no doubt that we shall be able to get through the business of the evening without any unseemly interruption. I feel it is a very important matter that we have under discussion, respecting not only us who have met to take a part, but humanity in general. It is "Whether there be a God?" And I hope that whatever arguments may be adduced, you will patiently hear the speaker to the end (hear, hear), that a speech shall not be interrupted in the middle of a sentence ; that you will listen thoughtfully and decide candidly. If we act on this principle, if we entertain this spirit, we shall be conscious that we have not lost our evening. I am sure that you will hear both parties fully out, and support any decision at which I may arrive under the circumstances (hear, hear.) Mr. Cooper will occupy half-an-hour in introducing the subject—"For the Being of God, as Maker of the Universe, and for the Being of God as the Governor of the Universe." Mr. Bradlaugh will then state the Argument on the Negative side, and will also occupy half-an-hour. After that each speaker will occupy a quarter of an hour, or as much less time as he pleases. In that case, it is the more necessary that a speaker should not be stopped in the midst of a sentence which the argument may require to be completed ; nor should he be called to time at the exact moment the quarter of an hour has elapsed. I mention this that no gentleman may think I am dealing with one more favourably than the other. I now call on Mr. Cooper, who will take the affirmative of each statement, to state the case on his side, but not to exceed a period of time beyond half-an-hour. (Hear and cheers.)

MR. COOPER then rose, and was received with cheers. He said : Eight years have elapsed since I stood in this Hall. It was on the 13th of February, 1856, when I told my audience that I could not lecture on Sweden, the subject which had been announced. I told them that my mind was undergoing a change. This hall was closed against me. I need not say why. Mr. Bendall was ill, and the Hall in John Street was shut, so I was left without the means of earning bread. After awhile I was allowed to go down into the cellar of the Board of Health and copy letters—seventy words for a penny. It was drudgery, and poor Frank Grant, who is since dead, and a well known person also since deceased, said to me—"Why, it is enough to madden a man like you?" But a man who could undergo two years' imprisonment in the cause of truth, was not to be deterred by drudgery. Mr. Bendall applied to me. It was before he was struck down with paralysis. I did not apply to him, but he came to me, and told me I must come to this Hall. Now, during the years I lectured



here, there were few men whom I respected more than Mr. Bendall, so I recommenced here on the 21st of September, 1856, and concluded on the 13th of May, 1858. I began with the "Design Argument," and continued to lecture in this hall for a year and nine months. An hour was allowed for discussion. For five years and eight months I have maintained my convictions: one year and eight months I was in Scotland, and four years in England. I have lectured in chapels, on platforms, in churches and in pulpits. Owing to the kindness of Mr. Bendall, who has given the use of this hall for two nights—this night and Wednesday night—I am again enabled to address you. I am accompanied by some Christian friends and ministers of the gospel. I assure you I address you in the spirit of kindness, although I think some of you have not said the best things of me, or allowed the best things to be said of me (hear and dissent.) I come, then, out of kindness to you to propose this argument for the being of God. It is an argument carrying me to the very door of the proposition that accompanies it, and one which I have revolved in my mind during the five years and eight months that I have been absent from you. It has been repeated to you so often, it has been talked about so constantly, that there can be no mistake about it. I am. I know that I exist; I am conscious of it. I, a reasoning, conscious, intelligent, personal existence. But I have not had this personal, conscious, intelligent existence very long. I have not long existed, but something must have existed before me. Something must have always existed; for if there had been never anything in existence, there must have been nothing still, and because nothing cannot make something—something alone makes, originates, causes something to exist. Thus far, then, I think we are all agreed. I have said I am a personal, conscious, intelligent existence. Now either this personal, conscious, intelligent existence has always existed, or it began to be. If it began to be, it has had a cause—indeed, if it has not always existed, but began to exist, it must have had a cause, and must have been either intelligent or non-intelligent. But non-intelligence cannot create intelligence. You might as well tell me that the moon is made of green cheese, or the sun of Dorset butter, that an oak leaf is the Atlantic ocean, or that Windsor Castle is London Bridge, as to tell me that non-intelligence can cause to exist a thoroughly conscious, perfect intelligence. Therefore, this personal, conscious intelligence is itself the result or the effect of an intelligence pre-existing, which is the cause from which I derive my existence, the same to which men make reference when they speak of God. But I discern that there is everywhere not only something that has always existed everywhere, I discern also that there is no such a thing as "nowhere;" there never was "nowhere," there cannot be "nowhere."

Do you feel inclined to dispute this proposition? Try, then, to imagine "nowhere." Where will you go?—beyond the great solar system? You may go on for millions and millions of miles, still there is somewhere. If you try to imagine nowhere, you gradually begin to apprehend that there is "everywhere," and that intelligence always has existed everywhere. You say, then, that something has always existed everywhere. Can you conceive of that something having existed for nothing? Then there is no such thing as nothing; there never was nothing; there never could have been nothing. Something must always have been, and been everywhere. If we decide thus, we have a right to say that something is not only everywhere, but on every point of everywhere; and if this chain of reasoning be broken, there is no line of demarcation to separate one part from the other. So we come to the idea of motion. I am gifted with certain senses, and I come to discern motion by a comparison of the relation of different objects to each other. I observe motion to be an attribute of matter. By a conscious intuition, we are able to perceive, and, by the aid of reason, to discern that this personal existence, this preceding cause, is everywhere present, that it is an eternal, conscious, underived, uncreated, uncaused Being whom men worship and call God. (Cheers.) So by this personal, conscious intelligence, men have communication with, and can perceive the outward features of this natural universe. But this material universe is not the something that has always existed, because it is in parts, because it is divisible, and the parts are moveable one among the other, and not only moveable in the sense of motion, but separable in the sense of change. Thus the fleshly clothing of this body is constantly changing. Our bodies are not now the bodies we had in infancy, nor those which we had ten years ago the same as we have now. But by the exercise of the will, which is a part of intelligence, and this will acting on matter—matter is separable and moveable. So that man is not one underived, uncreated, eternal existence. Yet by his intelligent will, with the assistance of his organised body, which of itself cannot move matter, he can mould it into various shapes and perform wonderful results—fitting, shaping, adapting; and although we judge by these results that a man is exercising the power of intelligence, we cannot see him exercising it. You never saw a man contrive. You never saw a man design. You cannot see that. It is only by analogy that you can judge of it. There are three forces by which he acts—knowledge, consciousness, and testimony, and by the aid of these he is constantly designing and contriving. If you come to observe the fashion of an object, although you see no maker, yet when you inspect it and observe the various parts of which it is composed, their suitability and fitness for the purpose they

fulfil, then you presume that intelligence has been at work there, and you recognise its operation, although you could not see it contrive or design. If I come to a piece of a fashion apparently the most complicated, yet more remarkable when you understand it, seeing how simple are the principles of its construction, then is my admiration called forth. And when I look on the curiously wrought body, and mark all its various parts; when I examine this eye with its wonderful lenses and pulleys, when I look over this hand with all its wonderful contrivances of adaptation and fitness, as to render man lord of the endless plain and the wide mountain—even of the universe; and still when I look on the wonderful contrivances in the forms of the animals in creation, and wonder at their entire adaptation to the wants of each—eyes and lungs fitted to changes of the atmosphere, and yet so little change in the atmosphere itself, and when I look at “this brave overhanging firmament fretted with golden fires,” and see their systems extend for millions and millions of miles pursuing their several ends, and going their refulgent round—I am filled with thoughts which make me humble, and I come to the conclusion that this universe has its conscious, personal, and intelligent designer; that he exists, that he is the author of my intelligence, that he is the author of the intelligence of the millions that surround me. He exists. I did not always exist, that, therefore, he is all-intelligent, and must be the author of the universe. Finally, that since my will has such power over matter that he must be uncontrollable, and, therefore, all-powerful, since he has been able to produce this universe, he is over my existence, over your existence, and over every existence; that he is the great uncreated, underived cause whom men reverence, and whom I call God.

Mr. Cooper resumed his seat amidst very warm plaudits.

MR. BRADLAUGH rose and said: Sir, I have listened with considerable attention, and with some disappointment, to the brief address which has been delivered to us in proof of the position which Mr. Cooper has taken upon himself to affirm this evening, which position, if I understand it rightly, is that there is an all-wise, all-existent, all-powerful, underived, uncaused, personal, conscious, and intelligent being whom he (Mr. Cooper) calls God. If saying it amounts to proof, then undoubtedly Mr. Cooper has demonstrated his position; but if anything approaching to logical demonstration be required here this evening, then I shall respectfully submit that it has been utterly and entirely wanting in the speech to which we have just listened. (Cheers and dissent.) Mr. Cooper tells us that something has always existed everywhere—some one thing, some one existence, some one being. All his speech turns upon that. All his words mean nothing, except in so far as they go to support that point. Just notice the conse-



quences involved in the admissions contained in his affirmation that there is only one existence. If God always was one existence, one eternal, omnipresent existence, beside whom nothing else existed, what becomes of the statement made by Mr. Cooper to-night, that the material universe is not that infinite existence, but exists beside it? There are thus two existences—the one everywhere, and the other existing somewhere, although nowhere remains for it. The one infinite is everywhere, beyond it there cannot be any existence, and the finite universe has to exist outside everywhere where existence is not. I will take it to be true as put by Mr. Cooper, that this same one existence, which has existed everywhere from eternity, is without motion, because, as he says, motion implies going or moving from point to point: existence being everywhere has nowhere to go; because it is always everywhere, and it cannot move from point to point anywhere. Just see, then, the lamentable position in which he places Deity. If Deity be everywhere, and Deity, as he puts it to you, made the universe, if made at all, it must have been somewhere, it cannot have been on one of the points occupied by Deity, for Mr. Cooper would hardly argue that two existences can occupy the same point at the same time, from which it would result that it cannot be in everywhere, and it cannot be anywhere else, because there is nowhere else for it. There can have been no making, because there was nothing to be made, everything being already in existence, and there being not the slightest vacuum for anything more. But the difficulty is more apparent when you come to weigh his words. Surely if the word making means anything, it involves the notion of some act; and if so, how can you have an action without motion? I should, indeed, like my friend to explain this. He has evidently some very different notions from those which I have. I want to know how we can have the action of making without motion. I want to know how Deity, which as Deity has been always motionless, has ever moved to make the universe. We will examine the position still further. My friend says that these are arguments derivable from the fact of consciousness, and in illustration of this, he says—"I exist. I am a personal, conscious, intelligent being. I have not been always, and, therefore, there must have been some time when I began to be. I am intelligent, but have not been always, and, therefore, I must have been caused by an intelligent being, because non-intelligence cannot originate or create intelligence." Whether he meant non-intelligence and intelligence as positive existences, it is exceedingly difficult to understand, and it would be worth while, if we are to follow out the argument, that Mr. Cooper should explain that to you, or else you will perhaps make some mistake about it. What does he mean, I ask, by non-intelligence? So far as I understand intelligence, it is a quality of a

mode of existence varying in various modes of existence, and we only know mode of existence as finite. We cannot conceive the quality to be infinite, which we only know as appertaining to a mode—that is, to the finite. I want Mr. Cooper to tell me how I can reason from such a premiss, which only regards intelligence as a quality of mode—of the finite, up to what he puts to you as a quality of the absolute. I confess that on a subject like this some difference may be expected, and my opponent may rely on the authority of great names; but I say that I have not relinquished my right to examine these great problems, and work out the result if it be possible for my reason to attain them. He says, then, that non-intelligence cannot form intelligence. I don't wish to make mere verbal objections, or I might put it to him that I do not understand what he means by intelligence being formed at all. I must trouble him to make this point as clear to my mind as it is to himself—before such an argument will convince me much more is required. I have no doubt that such an argument must have come to my friend's mind in some clearer form before it carried conviction to him. He says, "This personal, intelligent, conscious being had a cause." Yes! I suppose every effect must have had a cause. He tells us that analogy is a good guide in working out a reasonable result. He uses it himself, but he does not mean to say that, by analogy, he argues back from effect to cause, and that, from himself, he would go back to an uncaused cause. "What exists merely as a cause exists for the sake of something else, and, in the accomplishment of that end, it consummates its own existence." "A cause is simply everything without which the effect would not result, and all such concurring, the effect cannot but result." According to these passages from Sir William Hamilton, "that which exists as cause exists for the sake of something else." Effect is thus the sequel to cause, and causes are but the means to ends. The only way of dealing with this question of cause and effect is to put it frankly that every cause of which we can take cognisance, is, at the same time, effect and cause, and that there is no cause on which we can lay a finger, that is not the effect of cause precedent to it—you have an unbroken chain. I defy my friend to maintain the proposition that, without discontinuity, there can be origination. If he does not, his argument falls to the ground. But I really labour under considerable difficulty arising from the fact that my friend has used a large number of words and terms without explaining to you or to me what he meant by them? I really must trouble him by pleading my ignorance as to the meaning which he attaches to the word uncaused cause, for I frankly allow that my reason does not enable me to comprehend the word uncaused as applied to existence. I conceive existence only modal of existence itself—the absolute I cannot conceive. I am not

enabled by my reason to go beyond modes of existence. I am not able by the aid of my intelligence to go beyond phenomena, and so reach the noumenon. Until he has enabled me to attach to these words, which he has used so glibly, a meaning of a definite kind, I must confess my inability to appreciate his reasoning. He would say that there is non-intelligence as well as intelligence. If he does not mean that, his words have no meaning. He has said that non-intelligence could not produce intelligence. That God by his will caused it. But how if intelligence be everywhere—infinite, one, eternal—if you cannot limit its duration in point of time or its extent in point of space, if it is so indefinite that to follow it as far as the faintest trace of it can be observed, it is infinitely intelligent, how can you talk about non-intelligence at all? If intelligence is everywhere, then non-intelligence is not possible. My friend worked up his argument to a strange sort of climax, that the personal, conscious, eternal, infinite, omnipotent, intelligent being was what most men worshipped and called God. I take exception to that, and say that the word God does not, in the mind of any one, express that, and that in the minds of the majority of men it expresses something very different from that. Indeed, so far as I have been able to ascertain, the great mass of human kind have precisely opposite notions when they are using the word God. All their ideas concerning God comprehend the idea of human and fallible action, and are held in connection with creeds involving contradictions innumerable. The word God is the result of old traditions coming from one generation to another, from father to son, from generation to generation. In no case is it the out-growth of the unaided intelligence of the man who makes use of it. To put it further. I say there are no two men who use the word God in the same sense, and that it is a mere term which expresses no fixed idea. It does not admit the preciseness of a definition, nor can it be explained with an accuracy to admit the test of inquiry. The idea expressed by the word bears in most cases some relation to what has gone before, and is useful when appealing to the popular mind to cover deficiencies in the illogical arguments addressed to it to account for the universe. Our friend passed from the argument from consciousness to what is generally known as the argument from design. He said that, having seen the result of man's contrivance, if he met with a piece of work fashioned after a peculiar manner with a view to a particular end, he should expect from analogy some contriver for it. But suppose he had never seen any result of contrivance at all—how much would his argument help him? In that case he must entirely fail, and in this how little does design help him here? To affirm origination from design of already existing substance, and by analogy it is only of this he can give us any illustration, in-



volves a manifest contradiction. The argument distinguishes not the absolute from the material, the conditioned. It is the finite which he tells you is God, and yet cannot be God. There is an utter want of analogy. It is impossible to reason from design of that which is already existing, and thus to prove the creation of that which before did not exist. There is not a particle of analogy between these two propositions. But further, if it were needful to argue on it, if our friend had put before you the design argument, it is still utterly wanting as an argument for an infinite Deity, being one entirely from analogy. Analogy cannot demonstrate the infinite wisdom, or the infinite, the eternal existence of God. It cannot demonstrate infinity of substance, for to reason from finite effects as illustrations, analogy only takes you back by steps each time a little way, and to a finite cause. To assert an origin is simply to break a chain of causes and effects without having any warrant for it, except to cover your own weakness. The argument falls with this; you cannot demonstrate the infinity of Deity; for, admitted a finite effect, how can you from it deduce an infinite cause? Thus the omnipresence of Deity remains unproved. If the substance of Deity cannot be demonstrated infinite, neither can his attributes; so that, so far as the proof goes, his wisdom and power may be limited; that is, there is no evidence that he is either omniscient or omnipotent. When our friend talks about having proved an all-powerful, all-wise self-existence, he simply misrepresents what he has tried to do, and he should not use a phrase which does not, and cannot bear the slightest reference to the argument. So far, then, we take exception to the speech which he has given us to-night. By whatever means my friend has attained his present conclusions, he must surely have gained the convictions upon some better ground than those which he has expressed here to-night, unless, indeed, we are to suppose him to have changed without any reasoning at all. (Cheers.) I wish, before concluding, to point out to you that in the position I have taken up I do not stand here to prove that there is no God. If I should undertake to prove such a proposition, I should deserve the ill words of the oft-quoted psalmist applied to those who say there is no God. I do not say there is no God, but I am an Atheist without God. To me the word God conveys no idea, and it is because the word God, to me, never expressed a clear and definite conception—it is because I know not what it means—it is because I never had sufficient evidence to compel my acceptance of it, if I had I could not deny it—such evidence, indeed, I could not resist—it is for these reasons that I am Atheist, and ask people to believe me not hypocrite but honest, when I tell them that the word "God" does not, to my mind, express an eternal, infinite, omnipotent, intelligent, per-

sonal, conscious being, but is a word without meaning and of none effect, other than that it derives from the passions and prejudices of those who use it. And when I look round the world, and find in one country a church with one faith, in another country, another creed, and in another a system contradicting each—no two men agreeing as to the meaning of the word—but cursing, clashing, quarrelling, and excommunicating on account of its meaning, relying on force of arms rather than on force of reason—I am obliged to suppose that deficiency of argument has left them no other weapon with which to meet the power of reason. In this brief debate, it would be folly to pretend while we may combat the opposite opinion we shall succeed in convincing each other; but let me ask that to which ever side we may incline, we may use our intelligence as free from prejudice as possible, so that we may better understand what force of each other's reasonings. Let us agree, if we can, in the clear and undoubted meaning expressed in the terms we use. There was a time when men bowed before the word God without thought and without inquiry. Centuries have gone by, and the great men of each age have cast light on what was hitherto dark. Philosophy has aided our intelligence, and stripped from the name of God much of the force which it had previously held. It is in the hope that this progress of human thought may be more rapid and of higher use, and that, from out of debate, fresh truths may be gained, that it may teach men to rely upon themselves, and so make their lives better the longer they live. It is with this hope that I have taken the position of to-night.

MR. BRADLAUGH resumed his seat amidst general applause, and some manifestations of dissent, which lasted for several seconds.

MR. COOPER: I am very sorry to see all that—I am very sorry to hear it. I do not want any man to clap his hands for me. I came here to reason. I did not come here simply to meet Mr. Bradlaugh. I wished to see appointed representative men. It is to them and to you that I want to speak. I have nothing to do with Mr. Bradlaugh's personal opinions. He says he is not here to take the negative—to prove the non-existence of God. If he reads the bill which I hold in my hand, it will tell him that Mr. C. Bradlaugh will take the negative. But he says he is not here to take the negative—that he is not here to produce an argument that there is no God. He knows nothing about God. (Hear and cheers.) Now, what is the meaning of that cheer? (Cries of go on with your argument.) Now, I am afraid it is of no use: you are not disposed to argue—to reason, but the argument remains, notwithstanding—(cries of question.) This is the question. I want you to be less excited. We are here to form some opinion as to the truth, and not to be crowing over each other. Mr. Bradlaugh said that I said there was only one existence

always—I never said so. Then, according to him, “he talked about millions of existences without motion.” But I said without motion such as matter has. I suppose the meaning of what he said was, “There may be many kinds of motion beside the motion of matter.” Then Mr. Bradlaugh said that I talked of more than one existence being on one point. There may be a thousand existences on one point for anything that I know. I do not know why there cannot be only one existence on one point. I did not say there could be only one existence on one point. Expressions of the kind I never used. Then, he said, action implies motion; but what I said was, that God had no motion such as matter. He was kind enough to tell us what existence and non-existence were—what intelligence and non-intelligence meant—but I thought we all knew these things pretty well before. Then, he says, existence is a quality of a mode. Man, he says, is finite; he cannot perceive that existence can be infinite. That is a kind of Spinozism. I wish he would tell me what he means by “mode.” He says that I said non-intelligence could form intelligence. I never used such a word—(cries of oh! oh!) I never said anything so nonsensical—(loud cries of oh! oh!) I said that non-intelligence could not create—that it could not originate. I never used the word form. Then again, “Analogy was a good guide”—but he said no more about that, and then he quoted Sir W. Hamilton to the effect, that cause was that without which effect would not result. “There is no cause,” he says, “on which you can lay a finger, and not say that it is both cause and effect,” and he defies me to break the chain of causation—cause and effect I suppose he means. He next quotes from Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a passage which says—there is an infinite chain of finite things. Why, it is an utter contradiction. Every man has intelligence enough to perceive that. What we mean by uncognised is that there is something unknown, uncognised if you please. There can be no question about that. He complains of the time being taken up with such words, and he goes on to say—“My reason does not enable me to comprehend the uncognised.” Certainly it don’t. More than that, I am very sorry he cannot comprehend it. But there are many things which we cannot comprehend. The light for instance. We cannot comprehend what it is to be everywhere present, but we apprehend it. There are millions of things which we cannot comprehend, but we can apprehend them. Then, he says, we talk about non-intelligence and intelligence, because he contends God does not exercise any amount of ability. Among men, he says, God means something that is traditional, and which has no reason to support it. That has nothing to do with the question. Suppose, he says, I had never seen the result of design—how could I, by the help of reason, arrive at it? It cannot, he says, be. No cause, he says



can exist without causing a result. The result of design is part of our intelligence and experience. There is a modification of existence only—it is not proved that everywhere existed. But Mr. Bradlaugh knows that existence is being, and he knows, he says, that, unless you can substantiate the assertion that it has always existed, it does not show that he was all-wise. We reason from this personal, conscious intelligence of man, to the fact that God had created millions of conscious, intelligent beings—that he was the author of all existence—that he was intelligent—we do not reason from man's finite nature. We see in the manifestations of his will the type of a higher will, of a nature that is supremacy. The argument is untouched. Something has always existed, as personal, conscious, intelligent beings exist—either intelligence or non-intelligence must have produced them: but non-intelligence cannot create, cannot originate. You might as well tell me that there is no such thing as existence, as to try by sneers, and asking me what I mean by intelligence, to say that God does not exist. I say that I exist—that the world exists—that God made it. We have come here to establish this. We come here to reason for the existence of God. It is of no use to say that there was never nothing to make it out of. Our argument is mistaken. Mr. Bradlaugh has not taken up the argument. The bill is before me in which he is stated to take the negative, but he has not taken the negative; he simply says he knows not whether there is a God or not. (Cheers.)

MR. BRADLAUGH: We want the argument for the existence of God! He (Mr. Cooper) is quite right. We do want it. We have not had it yet. He says I am bound to prove a negative, and relies on the wording of the bill. This is hardly fair. The bill is Mr. Cooper's own framing, unaltered by me. I only tried to have one word different, and that was refused.

MR. COOPER: You should not want to hide your name.

[Some disorder occurred at this point of the debate, when]—

THE CHAIRMAN interposed and said: I beg that no reference may be made to anything which might lead to any wrong feeling.

MR. BRADLAUGH: My friend, if he wishes the argument adhered to, should have himself made no reference to matters which were altogether beside it. Let him remember what is the subject chosen for discussion, and adhere to that alone. He says that, according to the bill, I am to take the negative side. It has been my lot in life to be present at the trial of many issues, but I never heard that the defendant had more to do than rebut the case sought to be made against him. I will take, as example, an instance, such as when a man had stolen any article, or committed some act for which he might incur penalties. It was the duty of the counsel employed in such a case simply to negative the evidence which was brought to support the case. The *onus pro-*

*bandi* to-night lies with my friend, and the only task that lies upon me here is to show that he has not succeeded in performing the duty which he came here to perform. He has declined to explain certain terms used by him, on the ground that everybody knew them. Surely he might have enlightened my ignorance; and, at any rate, he had no right to assume that everybody understood them after my declaration to the contrary. He has used words on the construction of which the whole argument depends, and he has failed to explain to us the meaning he intended to express. He might have enlightened my ignorance as to the meaning of words he used; but, instead of that, he has called on me by way of retort to explain some words used by myself. Now, by "mode," I mean a phase of conditioned existence. This glass is one mode of existence, and the water, which I have poured out of it, is another mode of existence. "Quality" is an attribute or characteristic. It is some characteristic, or number of characteristics, which enables or enable me to distinguish one mode from another. If he wishes any better explanation that it is possible to give, I shall be happy to supply him with it. When he was asked for explanations, he said it was sufficient that he had said it. Now if non-intelligence cannot create intelligence, how do you come to the conclusion that intelligence can create non-intelligence? Why is one less possible than the other, or why is one less reasonable than the other? If intelligence be everywhere, then non-intelligence—where is that? In this kind of argument, by asserting without warranty that intelligence is everywhere, and non-intelligence somewhere, you contradict yourself. Then, my friend says, "create" is a word everybody understands. He confesses that he did not understand me in quoting from Hamilton, or when I urged that creation and destruction were alike impossible. Now we are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has either been increased or diminished—we cannot conceive nothing becoming something, or something becoming nothing. The words creation and destruction are, to me, without meaning. When our friend uses these words, he should not presume that the majority of the audience comprehend the meaning he wished to put upon them, or still less that they apprehended it. He says he does not come to speak to me but to you: but, for such as have elected me to appear on their behalf, I ask for those definitions. But Mr. Cooper says he never did assert that there was only one existence always. Well, then, does he mean that his argument admitted the possibility of two existences occupying the same space? And if one be everywhere, where can the other be? Oh! says my friend, there may be a thousand existences of different natures on one point, though, if one be all-powerful, it is hard to imagine it exercising power

over other existences having nothing of common nature, and with which it can have no relativity. Will he tell me how this can be? He puts the matter thus to you, and he is bound to give you some explanation of it. He says, with regard to motion, that he did not say that one existence had no motion. I must trouble him, when he rises again, to tell me what he means by motion, for I really do not know. I thought I had some notion of it when he began his speech, but now I think he has no meaning for it. I am bound to concede to him that the words represent in his mind some ideas he intends to express; but when I question him on the words he uses, they represent simply confusion of thought. When I ask him the meaning of uncaused cause, he says he cannot comprehend it, but can apprehend it like light and life; and he asserted that you can no more comprehend light and life than you can uncaused cause. If he wished to choose illustrations destructive of his own argument, he could not have adduced one better adapted to that purpose. He says that I cavil with words, but the argument is made up of words. If you knock all these words to pieces, where does the argument lie? If there be your uncaused cause at all, according to you it is substance, which substance I define as being that existence which we can conceive *per se*, and the conception of which does not involve the conception of any thing else as antecedent to it. Life may be defined as organic functional activity. You cannot give any definition of uncaused cause—you might as well say a square triangle, or a triangular circumference, or sweet number three. Now, I am placed in this difficulty, that Mr. Cooper, not prepared to prove his position, calls on me to take up the attack. We want, he says, the demonstration of God's non-existence. There is always a great difficulty in trying to do too much; but I will endeavour to do what is possible—*i.e.*, to demonstrate to you that there is no such being as the God my friend argues for—namely, a God everywhere, whose existence being infinite, precludes the possibility of conceiving any other existence, but in proof of whom is involved the conception of another existence created in addition to everything, and which exists somewhere beyond everywhere—a God who, being infinitely intelligent, precludes the possibility of conceiving existence without intelligence, and yet beside whose infinite intelligence, non-intelligent substance exists. Nothing is easier than to prove the negative of this, if that is what my friend means. I will endeavour, for a moment, to do so. I may be ineffective. Our friend says that God is all-powerful and all-wise. Now either intelligence manifests power and wisdom, or it does not. My friend says that it does, because he seeks to demonstrate power and wisdom from the intelligence he discovers in existence. Surely if it be assumed that intelligence is evidence of power and



wisdom, the lack of or absence of intelligence must be evidence of deficiency of power and wisdom. My friend says there is non-intelligence, and I say that non-intelligence demonstrates want of power and want of wisdom in creating substance without intelligence. Intelligence is either good or bad. Our friend says it is good because it helps him to make out God's attribute of all goodness. If it is good, then the absence of intelligence must be the reverse; and if non-intelligence is bad, it must be that the Creator either had not the will or desire to make existence infinitely intelligent. My friend says that there is non-intelligent existence, and he says that God had all-power and all-knowledge. God must, therefore, have been without the desire, in which case he would not be all-good. Our friend says I have misquoted Coleridge. Coleridge says, without discontinuity, there can be no origination, and my argument is that you are lost in the contemplation of the chain of causes and effects, and that you can have no conception of creation or of origination, and, therefore, must be without the conception of God. (Cheers.)

MR. COOPER: Mr. Bradlaugh has told us that it has been his lot in life to be at the trial of many issues. Now we are not lawyers, and cannot say how far this experience may serve the argument. My friend said there was one word which he had tried to get in the bill. He should never put on a great hat, and put on a great name if he did not earn it. I never called myself by a great name in my life. If I have had a name, I was content to receive it from others. I never called myself either Iconoclast or I fiddlestick—(Cries of order, oh! oh! and cheers.) Well, if you do not like this, you should not have encouraged it. He says I should have enlightened his ignorance. I have often stooped to enlighten him. When he was only a boy here of eighteen years old, I had marked out his course. He asks how we come to the conclusion that non-intelligence does not create. I did not think that Charles Bradlaugh would have asked a question of that kind, I thought he had more sense. I did not suppose that any one in this assembly—any man of common-sense, had need to ask such question. I said I should teach him. I am doing my best to teach him. "Everybody cannot judge well the reason why he contrives." But I should have thought that all reasonable men would have seen that clearly enough. They have personal intelligence. But, then, he says non-intelligence annihilates intelligence which is everywhere. That is not so. He says also that creation is a word without any meaning for him. It means, however, an act of God—of the great existence. But he wants definitions; and, again, he says since there has been that intelligence existing everywhere, there must have been two existences occupying the same space. I never indicated such an argument in the slightest way. I simply spoke of all other

existences being moved, separate from, and derived. I have not spoken those words that have been imputed to me. I never said such words. He wants to know what is the motion of matter. He cannot conceive what matter is and what is motion. But why has he been talking about motion if he does not understand it? He has given us his ideas of motion. He fails to perceive what is matter, and what is meant by the motion of matter. But there is matter enough in this room—there is matter enough before us. If he does not understand what is meant, I go further and ask what it is? I am to understand by a definition which he has given of life, that it is organic functional activity. He has explained to me that this was life. He said the remark that it was uncognised cause, could not be apprehended. Will he define what he means by organic functional activity? He is not bound to believe me, but if he does not give some more precise explanation, it simply comes to nothing. He has not come to any conclusion. He says there cannot be an uncognised cause; that it is as unmeaning as a triangular square, or a triangular circumference, or sweet number three. He has mentioned Sir William Hamilton and others. I should have relied upon such men as Butler, Sir Isaac Newton, Locke, Samuel Clarke. When these great men spoke, I should have thought it might be admitted that it would do. Oh! no. This was certainly a modest way of talking. Well, it was the wrong way. It is the wrong sort of modesty. He says I have endeavoured to prove the possibility of any other existence. I have not. I have proved that something also is in existence—that it must be intelligent, and must exist in part everywhere. Stop. Take the argument—take hold of it—take it to pieces. It convinces my own mind. It has passed through my mind fully and clearly. I said that God was all-powerful and wise. I do not want to misrepresent, but I want to tell you what Mr. Bradlaugh did say, and my reply to it. He says that either there is everywhere intelligence, or that there is somewhere where there is no intelligence. He says that non-intelligence cannot create intelligence. He says that in some part of everywhere, there is non-intelligence. Because I had said that non-intelligence exists, he denies that God exists everywhere intelligent. But he must be intelligent, because he created all the intelligence that exists—because He created every derived intelligence. Now, with regard to the moral argument of God's goodness, we have nothing to do with that to-night. If we come to that, it must be on Wednesday. Then his goodness as a moral governor of the universe comes into question. Now, I did not say that Mr. Bradlaugh had misquoted Coleridge. What I said was, that Coleridge never taught me that an infinite chain of finite intelligences could have existed. I say that Samuel Taylor

Coleridge never maintained any such thing in his life. Coleridge was a great believer in God. (Hear and laughter.) No sneer or laughter, I assure you, disturbs me. I exist; and I have not always existed. Something has always existed. I am conscious of an intelligent existence. If it began to be, it was caused to be by some other existence, and must have been so caused. If any person can persuade himself that non-intelligence can cause existence, intelligent, personal, conscious existence, let him show me that he believes, and that he maintains such a doctrine. I need go no further at present—there are just these steps in the argument. Here is the argument, and if our friend does not give us the argument for the non-existence of God—that is, the negative of the question—I have shown that I exist, and that, having begun to exist, something must have existed before me. I am intelligent, personal, conscious, and so the something which always has existed was personal, conscious, intelligent. It has always been or began to be. If it began to be, it has cause, and the cause must be either intelligent or non-intelligent. I say that non-intelligence cannot be an intelligent creator, an originator, has no reason, will, judgment, can't contrive, cannot be a cause. Therefore, I know that my existence, that personal, conscious, intelligent existence proceeds from that uncaused, underived, uncreated intelligence, whom all men reverence and I call God. I want that disproved. (Applause.)

MR. BRADLAUGH: Were the Danes and the Germanic forces on either bank of the river Eider to turn their backs to each other and fire, they would stand in about the same relation as Mr. Cooper and myself. He will not give definitions, and he attaches different meanings to the words he uses to those which I attach to them. How are we, therefore, to arrive at any conclusion that will be instructive or useful? He says that he has often been able to teach me, and if this is so, he should not have relinquished the office of teacher to-night; but I confess that if he has taught me, it has been at the greatest possible distance between himself and myself. The opportunities have certainly been often sought by myself for instruction at Mr. Cooper's hands, but I have only been favoured once or twice. My friend urges that he does not put himself forward under a name he has not won, and though these topics have but little to do with to-night's debate, I can say that I have fairly won the right to use my *nom de guerre* Iconoclast. I have won fame for it with difficulty, and maintained my right to use it despite many a pang. My opponent, though but one consequence can arise from his stipulation, has compelled me to print my name—that consequence is an increased difficulty in my business life. But for this I do not care. Though, unfortunately, placed in this disadvantage, I print my name and answer for myself, although I am really



surprised that a man with the love of God and strength of truth, with ability, with learning all upon his side, cannot allow me my poor folly, if folly it be, and bear with me and my *nom de plume*. He says, "I will not give definitions." I say, in reply, you cannot—that you do not know the force and relevance of the words you use, and you simply don't tell us because you do not know. I tell you in the clearest manner that, from your last speech, you have no notion of the accurate meanings of the words you used—you talk about "other and separate, and derived," and seem not to know that the words are contradictory. Derived existence must be relative, cannot be separate in substance. At least a teacher in using philosophic language to a scholar ought to have put it more clearly. Let us see. He says there is one existence, infinite, intelligent. He says everybody knows that it is more possible for intelligence to create non-intelligence, than for non-intelligence to create intelligence. I say this has no meaning. I defined intelligence as a quality of a mode of existence, and cannot understand quality creating substance. He has not told us what was meant by uncaused cause; and if he will not take intelligence to be a quality of a mode of existence, he has not told us what it is. He says there is intelligent existence now, therefore its cause is intelligent. You might as well tell us for our information that this glass is hard, and, therefore, its cause must be a hard existence, and then you might as fairly say that because that glass is hard, its cause is eternal hardness. There is no relevance whatever between arguments founded on phenomena and the noumenon which it is sought to demonstrate. It is no use my friend denying the truth of any one definition, unless he is prepared to give us a better, so that you can compare the one with the other if you please. Our friend says that intelligence can create non-intelligence, but this involves a contradiction of the most striking character. For if intelligence is infinite, non-intelligence is impossible, and for infinite intelligence to create non-intelligence is for it to annihilate itself. My friend appeals to everybody's knowledge, but the whole force of his appeal lies in his confusion of existence and its qualities. Intelligence is a quality of a mode—mode is neither infinite nor eternal, and the attribute cannot be greater than the mode it pertains to. You can have no knowledge of existence other than by mode, and can have no knowledge whatever of different existences of which one is all-powerful, all-wise, and everywhere present; and the other is, or others are, somewhere where this one is not. My friend calls on me to prove that different kinds of existence do not exist at the same time upon the same point. I think it is for the man who talks about these existences, and not for me, to show what he means. By creation Mr. Cooper says he means an act of God; if this is what "create"

means, and if he explains it to you in such terms, then is every act of God a creation? Our friend surely won't say that, and if he means some one particular act of God, he must enable me to identify it. I am not dealing with the moral argument as to God as Governor, but if the argument on design as manifesting intelligence is relevant, so far it strikes at the want of power, want of wisdom of God. Is it not an illustration of the poverty of my friend's logic, and the weak efforts that are made to sustain a weak case, when an argument is attempted to be conveyed in such terms as I fiddlestick (cheers), although a pretty tune might be played on it? He says he does not know what I mean by organic functional activity, and asks me to explain. Well, suppose I could not tell, that would not explain what is an uncaused cause, I will, however, try to show that I have not given an improper definition of life. By organic functional activity, I mean the totality of activity resulting from or found with the functions of each organism. My friend comprehends that which I term organism in the vegetable and animal kingdom. If he tells me that he does not know what I mean by organism, I can only refer him by way of illustration to the organism of a tree or of a man; and by organism I mean the totality of parts of such tree or man. It is possible that a better versed man than myself might make this more clear; but it is not for my friend to shelter himself under my want of knowledge, and to say he will not give definitions while he requires them from me. Well, he says, "I exist; something has existed. It has not existed always. It has been originated." I take exception to the word. I do not understand the word origin in reference to existence. He says he will not define it. I do not know whether he means by origination coming into existence where it was before. If so, I tell him that the conception of this is impossible, that the apprehension of it is impossible, that he has used a form of words which convey nothing of meaning either to you or to me. But when we tell him that we do not understand an uncaused cause, he says he don't understand a scholar without modesty. Well, then, Locke understood it, he says, and a great many other great names understood it. Will he tell us how they understood it? Surely I have a right to ask him how they apprehended it. He uses the phrase, and I have surely a right to assume the *onus* of proof to be with him. When he does not or will not give us a definition, I believe it is because he cannot. If he has a great lesson to teach, I cannot suppose that he would be guilty of the folly of withholding from you all the information that he had, or could obtain; but I am bound to suppose it is from his utter inability to give you any, that he is wholly unprepared, either with facts or arguments. If intelligence be a quality of mode, then in so putting it you have entirely overridden the question of

intelligence as existence, or as infinite attribute of existence. It is for my friend to make clear his position to you. I know that to many of you it may seem mere word play, but it is word play which strikes at the root of the question. What does he mean, when he says there may be a thousand existences beside God? Does he mean that there may be a thousand existences scattered and separate? What does separate mean? It means clear from, and distinct, and having no link in common with. If there are a thousand such existences separate, then God is not infinite; and if not, our friend's argument comes to nothing. I find it difficult to see how my friend can understand that he has proved his case. I find it more difficult still to conceive how holding at one period other opinions, he could have been carried away from those other opinions by such arguments as these. Surely we have a right to ask him to make this matter as clear to us as it is to himself. The argument which convinced him, should convince us, each individual here. God is personal? What does this word personal mean in relation to the infinite? God conscious? Conscious of what? Has he an immutable consciousness? Was he always conscious of the existence of the universe?—that is, did he know it to exist before it was created, or has his consciousness been modified by the creation? Was God conscious of the material universe when it yet was not? If yes, how could he know a thing to be which was not yet in being? If God's consciousness was once without the fact of the universe, and if God's consciousness is capable of change, what becomes of the immutability of God? Tell me how it was supplemented since; tell me how something has been added since? You dexterously play with terms which you cannot explain, and hope to affirm by assertion what you cannot demonstrate by argument. (Cheers.)

MR. COOPER: I have a note about teaching Mr. Bradlaugh. Well, I am teaching him now, I cannot help it. He did not care! Well, a queer word that for young lads. I do not wonder that he is unfortunate. Most people are unfortunate who do not care. He is unfortunate, now where is the worst misfortune, I cannot say. One does not like to talk about these things. Well, he wants to know why he should be compelled to believe in God, and why his little folly should not be granted to him? Well, he will find that out some day (cheers and hisses), he must expect it (renewed expressions of dissent); now do not get into a bad temper; he complains that he cannot demonstrate, that I do not know the use of the terms I use. Then he says derived from, and separate cause. Really, I thought I saw a great many persons separate from one another before me, and we separate from them. I cannot understand this curious kind of definition. I cannot. Then again, intelligence is a quality of personal, conscious existence. Well, I spoke of it so. You may call it an attribute,



or use the word how you please. Why did I say that God could create? Because his will must be all powerful. I was talking of our intelligence, of our will. We have intelligence. I talked about the power of man's will as a part of his personal, conscious, and intelligent existence. It is therefore a power in God, and must be uncontrollable. That power, therefore, must be all powerful. I have not confused the quality of existence. I never did. But I want Mr. Bradlaugh to answer the arguments adduced. The question, he says, is an attribute or mode, and not of existence. What is the meaning of that? I said it was not an argument for to-night. For the moral argument, the right time will be Wednesday night. I said we must not bring it on to-night. I said it is impossible for a thing to come into existence when it was not before. Has he not come into existence, and have not millions of people come into existence where they were not before? Now, I do not know what you mean by this:—"Is it reasonable to suppose something separate over which no power can be exercised? That glass is separate from me, and yet I can exercise power over it." (Cries of prove it, cheers and dissent). I wish you would reason and would not clap your hands. If you do, I can only say it is sheer nonsense. What does personal, eternal, infinite consciousness mean? Has God's consciousness ever changed? All things are present to his mind, and always must have been present to him from his very nature. But I must ask my friend what life is. He has not made me to comprehend what life is, although he defines it as organic functional activity. There is no man can comprehend life. What is man's life? What is angel life?—it is in vain to tell me about organic functional activity—what is vegetable life? And now, since you twit me with absence of duration where it was never before, am I to understand that intelligence is a quality of mode, and not a quality of substance, or that separate means something over which no power can be exercised? Where is the sense of it? How am I to understand it? I believe now I have mentioned every thing of importance.

MR. BRADLAUGH: My friend's last question is, where was the sense of it? If it applies to his own speech, I will tell him nowhere—it really displayed none from beginning to end. Our friend must have ability to know the difference between unconditioned existence and modal existence; or if he has not the ability he is not justified in championing the cause for which he is arguing. What he argues for, is not conditioned existence, but for God, the absolute. If he does know for what he is arguing, or knows and will not explain—or if he has not the ability to define my terms, he should not have come here to teach you. In other words, he should not, if wise, pretend to an ignorance which sets before us incoherent statements like those he has made in lieu of the proof he was bound to furnish. I will show you presently

how little he was able to take the part as affirming the being of God as maker of the universe; and how much he attempts to conceal in taking that part. He says that God is immutable, and all things are now present to him, and ever have been present to him. He says this must have been according to God's very nature, but he did not trouble us with a word of reason for this startling statement. His affirmation is, that God was as equally conscious of the universe before the creation, as after. But to say there was a time when the material universe did not exist, and yet that at that time God was conscious of its existence—is absurd, and an utter contradiction. How could God be conscious that the universe was when it was not? The phrase is so ludicrously self-contradictory, that my friend could not have thought at all when he uttered it. If God were at any time without consciousness of the material universe, and afterwards became conscious of the new fact of the origination or creation of the universe, then there was a change in God's consciousness, which could not be immutable, as my friend contends. It would be supplemented by the new fact. I cannot understand what he means when he talks of the immutability of God's consciousness being a necessity of his nature. Surely such a word as nature implies the very reverse of immutability. And if not, I should be glad to know in what meaning my friend used a word which in common acceptation implies constant mutation. In dealing with the question of separate existence, Mr. Cooper says, that you and I are separate from each other. We are separate modes of the same existence, but are not separate existences. Does he mean that the universe is separate from God in the same way that we are from each other? If not, this is a subterfuge. He does not seem to know himself where the sense of his argument lies. Then he says, "I am separate from this glass, but I can exercise power over it." Here is the illustration of mode—of mode, in which there is common substance, common existence, but it is not an illustration having any analogy. It is only because he will not think that there is a difference between relative and absolute terms, or see that we are each using words in opposite senses. This discussion is degenerating into talk on one side, and repetition on the other. He says again he is an existence, I say he is a mode of existence. I have already defined existence as identical with that substance, which is that which exists *per se*, and the conception of which does not involve the conception of any other existence as antecedent to it. Mr. Cooper has not disputed this definition. He claims for God such existence, and yet says he himself is an existence. If he means that he is a separate existence from God—if he says that he is separate and exists *per se*, then I do not, I repeat, understand his meaning. I want an explanation from him. He cannot exist *per se*, for he says

that he did not always exist. He cannot urge that he came into existence from himself, or he would argue that he existed, and did not exist at the same time. His existence can only be conceived relatively as a mode of existence, such existence being in truth before its mode, and existing after this mode shall have ceased. He is not existence, but only a condition of existence, having particular attributes by which he is distinguished from other conditions of the same existence. He says that it is nonsense when two men stand on the same platform to discuss an important matter, and use the same words in a different sense. It is undoubtedly nonsense, when one of the disputants passes over all the definitions of the words without disputing them, or supplying others. Does he mean to say that he admits the definitions I have given? If he does, the way he speaks of them clearly shows that his arguments are based on, and prove only modes of existence, and do not prove existence absolute, so that he has admitted the whole point for which I am contending (cheers). He says separate existences can exercise power over each other. I ask him to show me how, because I have told him it is impossible to think of two existences distinct and independent of each other—that it is equally impossible to conceive that two substances having nothing in common, can be the cause of or affect one another. He says then that man's will has furnished him with the basis for arguing for God's power. He reasons up to the will of God from the will of man. But if man's will be, as I declare it to be, the result of causes compelling that will, and if God's will is to be fairly taken as analogical to man's will, then God's will also results from causes compelling his will. But in this case, the compelling cause must be more powerful than God, and thus the supremacy of God's power is destroyed (cheers). I know that in this it is possible I may be arguing beside the question, because our friend does not take reasonable pains to make any explanation as to the value which he attaches to the meaning of his words. Let us see how his demonstration breaks down:—God's will and consciousness are identified by my friend. God's consciousness, according to him, has never changed, and never can change. God before creation must have been conscious that he intended to create, but if his consciousness has never changed, he must have been always intending to create, and the creation could never have commenced. Or, God must have been always conscious that he had created, in which case there never could have been a period when he had yet to create. He must either at some time have been conscious that the material universe did not exist, or he must have been conscious that it always existed. In the last case, there could be no creation; and in the first, if God's consciousness were unchanged, the universe would not yet exist to him. I am not responsible



for the peculiar absurdity of this sentence. God either always willed to make, or he never willed to make. But he could not have always willed to make, because otherwise there would have been some time in existence preceding the act of making, which there could not have been, because God is immutable, and could not have changed—there could never have been making without change—without change there never was intention preceding act, nor act preceding intention, and there could never have been manifested that power which he argues for as demonstrating Deity. I appeal to the audience to think for themselves, and I ask them whether our friend has adduced any reasonable evidence for God as the maker and creator of the universe? I ask whether he has not put before you an unintelligible jumble of words without any relation to the question? I ask you whether he can fairly be regarded as presenting the united intellect of that muster-roll of names which he has given as arguing from design in favour of Deity. How can he claim to be a teacher, who cannot explain words he uses, or does not know the meaning of the words his opponent uses? I simply claim to be a student. I admit I have not that confidence in myself that enables Mr. Cooper to regard himself as impreguably entrenched and encamped, so secure that nobody can touch him. When one sends a stone through the window of his argument, he says it is not broken, and when the doors are battered down he declares that they still stand. I admit so far he is better off than I am. If he can convince you, and if that conviction be worth anything, I can only ask when he taunts me about the trial of issue, whether this is not the most momentous issue that man can have to try? I ask not as a lawyer, but as a man. He must meet the question fairly and honestly, and without a taunt, or before I have done he will have full payment for all the taunts he gives. (Loud cheers.)

MR COOPER: When Mr. Bradlaugh says that the doors have been battered down, and a stone sent through the window—I say I never said a word about doors or windows. When he says I will not teach—I say he will not learn. (Cheers and confusion.) When he says I wish he would not fling such big words at me—I say his words are so big they split my ears, as they make such a terrible noise. (Cheers and hisses.) I hardly know what he was saying when he was talking—(loud cries of question) Now we are all to the question. (Laughter and oh! oh!) Who is that silly man that says question? You should have brought your brains in here, and not come without them. (Hisses and confusion.) Mr. Bradlaugh says I ought to know there is a difference in condition. That is what I argue for. He says I have not the ability to discern it, and, therefore, should not have come here. He says I know it all or I conceal it. I have never

been in the habit of concealing things in my life. "All," he repeats, "is present to the mind of God, that is his consciousness." I said it was present to his mind because he is always. If my friend tries to show that it is not, let him show it. Present to his consciousness! He asks—How can it be present to his consciousness when it has not existed—how can anything be present to my conscience that has passed away from existence? There is memory, and he knows that must exist to all eternity—that is how it is present to his consciousness, so that his immutability and his consciousness are essential, he being perfectly wise. Show me how that can be, says Mr. Bradlaugh. We are separate modes of the same existence; that glass is a mode of existence. What is separate?—the mode? A jumble of words—indeed, I call this gibberish. What is this gibberish that tells us that intelligence is a mode, or rather a quality of existence? Show what is mode? How are we the same existence as that glass? Please to enlighten me. He talks of those listening to mere talk from me. I really do not know what he is talking about sometimes. Then he says it is nonsense for two men on the same platform to use two words in a different sense. Why there is no debate if we can agree. I don't want to use words in the sense that myself and a glass are the same substance. If there are two existences, one acting on the other, you say it is an affirmation and was not proved. Well, but it did not follow, he says, that God was always creating because his conscience was immutable. "It don't show that he should do anything; acts of will are not tied to the proof of his consciousness; that can be consciousness something else, not will, that may be done." Why that is playing with words. Then, again, he says because conscience is immutable—make affirmation that his will is immutable. Now I want my argument answered. (Cheers and hisses.) He asks what we mean. Why, if he cannot bring forward a better argument than he has afforded us to-night, he cannot argue it. I exist; but something must have always existed. I am a personal, conscious, intelligent existence. You know what it is, or you could not ask such a question. You did so for a puzzle, perhaps. It is an act of intelligence to ask the question. Oh! but I am asked to define what intelligence is, and when I define it, then to define the definition. Organic functional activity, he repeats. I have no explanation of it. Did you define that definition? (Cries of yes, yes, and no, no.) Well, you know there is a personal, conscious intelligence—either there was always existence, or it began to exist. Then whatever has come into existence must have a cause. Non-intelligence can't create intelligence. Conceive it, if you can. That which can't be needs no proof. Just as if one could perceive than a thing can't be, and yet it necessarily exists. So non-intelligence cannot create intelligence. "Our friend has not

shown that it can." He says he does not know the meaning of the word create. "He has not shown what he means," Mr. Bradlaugh says, "by personal, conscious, intelligent existence." That it has always been, that it is derived from some personal, conscious, intelligent always existent being. Well, I mean that, if you like. (Cheers.)

MR. BRADLAUGH: My friend, in conclusion, said I had not shown that non-intelligence could create intelligence. Considering that I have repeatedly declared that I do not know the meaning of the word create, I think my friend must be rather sanguine to suppose that I would undertake to enlighten him upon this point. It does not lie upon me to prove that non-intelligence can create intelligence, but on my friend, who affirmed a contradiction in terms, to prove it. This statement of my disinclination does not help his inability. If I am lame, it don't prove that he can walk without crutches. But Mr. Cooper says that in representing to you God's consciousness as immutable, I do injustice to his views; that, although all things are perpetually present to God's consciousness—God need not, and does not, he says, always will to create. But surely such a declaration is entirely without evidence, and nowise improves Mr. Cooper's position. If there was any period when God did not will to create, then he must have changed when he varied his will to the act of creating. But I want to know how a thing can be present when it is non-existent? If all things were always present to God, all things must have always existed. To God there never could be a time when they did not exist. There never was to him a time when it was necessary to create—he could not have created that which to him had ever existed. He said, he did not understand what I meant, when I talked of intelligence being quality of mode. He said it is a quality of existence, a quality of substance, and therefore God, who created substance, must be intelligent, his intelligence was a quality of all existence. Not all, for he says there are some existences, or some parts of substance that are not intelligent. Then intelligence is a quality of existence, and it is not! Because existence, according to Mr. Cooper, may be, and is with it and without it. Now, I say that intelligence being a quality of mode of existence, that in various modes we find varying qualities. All intelligence is not of the same degree, but varies as the modes differ. They differ as by their various characteristics. It is by difference of quality that you distinguish the one mode from the other. If intelligence be infinite, there can be only one kind of it, and of one degree; it can never be lesser or greater. But intelligence varies according to mode. You find different degrees of intelligence manifested in different organisations. (Hear, hear). It must therefore be, if Mr. Cooper's logic be worth anything, that one kind of intelli-



gence creates like ; then, seeing that no two men are alike organised or intelligent, there must be as many different Gods to create as there are different intelligences. I am driven to this line of argument by the absurdity of my friend's speeches. I cannot believe but that he must know better ; if he does not, little indeed can he have read the elaborate essays of modern thinkers—little can he have examined the terms used by great men from whom he professes to quote. Little indeed can he have read either the volumes of Hamilton or Berkeley, or of the men whose ideas he professes to put before us. Surely the philosophy of the unconditioned has formed, at some time or other, a reading lesson for my friend. He declares that he has the ability of teaching one so ignorant as he believes myself to be ; but when he uses words so irrelevant and so void of meaning, I am obliged to assume that he uses them ignorantly, or he would be more heedful of giving their meaning. He says that the glass and himself are different existences : he cannot understand their being different modes of the same substance. His understanding must be sadly deficient, if he cannot distinguish between the characteristics of this mode and that one and that each mode has more or less different qualities with the same substance. Here, then, in each quality my friend will have something by which he can in thought separate modes, but he cannot in thought give a separate existence to the substance of each mode, because he well knows that the same substance as this glass, in another mode, might have gone to form an intelligent being at some period of existence. If he says he does not know what he means by his own words, then, by obtuseness of intellect he is incapacitated as a public teacher, or it is evident he dare not use the plain meanings of technical language, because he is afraid of its logical consequences. Then he says that God, who is everywhere present, yet besides whom there is somewhere where he is not—that he has a consciousness of existence passed away. I deny that there ever was existence which has since passed away. I take a firm stand on this, and I submit that the two phrases, "creation," and "existence or substance passed away," are utterly without meaning. Our friend, surely if he meant anything, cannot have meant existence that had ceased to be—that something could never become nothing, yet he talks of existence passed away—he speaks of existence as no longer existing. If he means that God's range of observation is limited, and that it did not come within his range of observation, then I can understand it ; but if he means this, then he abandons the attribute of omniscience for Deity. It is difficult really to guess what interpretation he wishes to be put upon his words. If there is anything which does not exist always to God, it can never have existed, as my friend denies the possibility of anything

becoming n thing. Therefore, to speak of anything which has passed out of existence, is to use words without sense or relevance. (Laughter and cheers.) Our friend says that he did not know that the window was knocked out and the portal carried away. I am afraid he is the only one in this room in so blissful a state of ignorance. He complains of my loud voice. I am always desirous to limit my voice to the place in which I speak, and not to give offence. But I am apt to remember my subject rather than my voice. I am apt to remember alone the cause in which I am speaking rather than the manner of speech. I know that there is much in my address capable of improvement; and if my friend wishes to reprove me, let it be by the contrast between us. His better chosen phraseology, courteous and patient demeanour, quiet and kindly bearing, will, coupled with his calmness while I am replying, be more effective than any verbal rebuke. (Loud cheers.)

It was now a quarter to ten, Mr. Cooper begged to be informed by the chairman as to a point of order. He said that, in his discussion with Joe Barker, the order was that the person who opened the discussion for the night closed it.

THE CHAIRMAN, in reply, said:—I think that the best way is to adopt a rule. I understand from the paper, the order of speaking is to be alternate speeches of a quarter of an hour each. I think it best that the person opening should not speak last. There will be two more speeches. Mr. Cooper will speak for a quarter of an hour, and Mr. Bradlaugh will speak for the following quarter of an hour, when the discussion will terminate to-night.

MR. COOPER: I told you I came here in a friendly spirit, but as this is the last time I shall have to address you, I must say I have been grieved to observe a contrary spirit in you. I wish that you could behave not like an audience of bagmen, and could sit without clapping hands or making ejaculations, and crying up some person, whether he has sense or not. (Cheers, hisses, and confusion.) Why need you come here? You say you want truth, then why can't we discuss truth with all proper patience and kindness, and not be clapping each other, with jeers, because I suppose our friend understands sarcasm, which you Londoners like so very much? I am old and used to you. I used to see all that thing before. (Cheers, shouts, and hisses.) Well, I will sit down if you do not want to hear me. (Cries of sit down, go on with your argument.) I discovered that sauce for goose was not sauce for gander here. (Cheers, hisses, and laughter.) Do not be so very hard on a poor man. "He cannot understand a word of Greek," I thought every body knew that. "But it was wrong to bring into existence that which had no existence before." Mr. Bradlaugh cannot understand, and as he does not, he wants a definition. I did not say that God was always willing. I did

not say there never was a period when he did not will a certain thing. He may will something at one period, and something at another period. But, then, we are told it did not follow that he either should or did exist always. I repeat, that things may have been present to his conscious intelligence before he created them. It happens not to be mine, but Plato's universe, that is, Plato's language—"all things are present to his conscious intelligence before he created them." Our friend goes on, "I am an old fashioned reader of old fashioned men." He tells me "if it be a quality of existence, it is a quality of all existence." There are different qualities of the same existence, there is only one intelligence; but, says Mr. Bradlaugh, if God be infinite, there must be different Gods. If there be different men and different intelligences, if he can create them anywhere, does it follow that they do not understand? Does he not understand this logic? He must know better than I speak that it must be so. (Hear.) Some poor man said "hear." Well, I came to you as friends, I came maintaining your sincerity. I never called you infidel, because that term is generally used to signify blackguard. I never spoke ill of you, I never questioned your sincerity, I do not question Mr. Bradlaugh's sincerity. We come with the belief that God exists. We believe it to be a most important belief, and most important it is if it be true. I see no reason for calling this glass and myself different modes of the same existence. There may be some men here who think otherwise, but that is not proving they are modes of the same existence. Well, existence that has passed away may yet exist somewhere, although it is not present to my vision. It is in my conscious intelligence, everything I have been acquainted with. That is my meaning. I think it is clear enough, but before I sit down, I will re-state my argument. I am told that I argued inconsistently and unmeaningly. I will try again, while I am in possession of the time, as it is the last opportunity I shall have to-night. I exist. I say it for yourself now. I exist. I have not always existed. Something must have always existed. If there never had been a period when nothing existed, there must have been nothing still. I am conscious of a personal, intelligent existence, which must have always existed, otherwise it began to be. It must have had a cause, and that cause must have been intelligent or not; non-intelligence cannot create intelligence. Show me how it was. "Show me how you can infer the possibility of intelligence," &c., is what I have been asking every time I rose to speak to-night. But he has not done it. I cannot see how he can perceive that non-intelligence could bring intelligence into existence. Since there was that always in existence, I must have belief in another act of consciousness that I have exercised, for I am certain from the observation of my own intelligence, that something has always existed everywhere, in every part of



everywhere. Therefore, there are no lines of demarcation—it has no motion such as you affirm of matter. I do not say that it has no motion at all. It don't need to move to one point of everywhere, that is already in every part of everywhere, and there is everywhere. And now I have clearly arrived in my own mind, at the knowledge of an uncaused existence. It has become clear to my perceptions that as this existence was everywhere, it was omni-present, all-powerful, uncreated, underived, personal, conscious, reasonable existence. Then, I turn even towards this material universe. It cannot be the something that always was. I know that I exist now. I know that at two years old I existed. I recognise change, and I know that I have changed; that this universe changes, and therefore it can't be that which has always existed. I said I could move, mould, shape, fit, and design matter. I can recognise the results of design, although I cannot see the act of the mind. I reason by analogy, from my personal, conscious existence, that men are contriving and designing; if I find their composition to consist of parts and peculiar fashions adapted and fitted for the purpose it fulfils, and if the principle on which it worked were simple, I should admire it, and by the aid of reason, conclude that it had a personal, conscious, and intelligent existence for its designer and contriver. Then, I look at this curiously formed body, the bodies of animals; and I remember the power of this hand, and when I look through a telescope at those shining bodies in the heaven, and see their immensity, and recognise them by the light of reason to be themselves the suns of other systems, I then say he is all-intelligent, since all-intelligence must have come from him—he only existed from all eternity—he is the author of all things. Whatever exists must have been by his will, and by his power, therefore he is uncontrollable by any other will, and therefore he is maker of this universe. I have said that he is not the mode, but that he exists simply by his will, and in him we live, move, and have our being—therefore, in him is my being and your being, and the being of every animal, and that they can be kept in existence only by One Almighty, all-wise, and everywhere present, self-existing, self-created, underived, uncognised, personal, conscious, intelligent being, whom I worship, and men call God. I have re-stated my argument. If any one seeks to overturn it, let him go through it step by step. No person has done so here. No person can do it. It is an argument that shall not pass away, but must come every day before your eyes, and possibly to your minds. (Cheers.)

MR. BRADLAUGH: Our friend says something exists, that the universe exists. I reply, that if something now exists, you cannot conceive when it did not exist. The supposition that there ever was a period when the universe began to be, is introduced and assumed without the slightest warrant for such an assumption.

You cannot limit its existence, you cannot limit its duration. He says something is everywhere, but that the universe is finite in extent, as it is, according to his view, finite in duration. He cannot in thought put a limit as to how long the universe has existed, or how far it extends. The duration and extent of existence are alike illimitable. Then, he says that substance is not naturally intelligent, and that the intelligence we find must result from infinite intelligence. I have endeavoured during this argument to explain to him that intelligence was a word that could only be properly used in the sense of a quality of a mode, in the same way that you would use the word hardness, broadness; and that as you could not say it was all broad, or all hard, no more could you say it was all intelligence, or without intelligence. I must confess that I have never listened to any argument more pretentiously and less ably put, than that of my friend to-night. There was only one part of it that would, if complete, have deserved any reply, and that he took imperfectly from Gillespie, where you may see what his argument ought to have been, for it is there put as clearly and comprehensively as possible. He says, he comes here to talk to us in a friendly way. He would assume that we had imported into this debate that which lacks friendliness. If it be so, I regret it. But, when he is asked the meaning of one term, he says he was not bound to tell us that, and when a definition is given by me, and the argument is approached on that basis, he says he meant no such thing. He has said he will not reproach you as infidels, for that infidels are identified with blackguards. Infidel does not mean blackguard. It means without faith, outside the faith, against the faith. Mr. Cooper is infidel to every faith but his own. I am but in one degree more an infidel, and surely we are none the more blackguards because we are opposed to the faith which he preaches. I am not ashamed of the word infidel. Nobler men than ever I can hope to be, truer men than I in my highest aspirations can pretend to be, have been content to be classed among those who had that name applied to them, and they have won it proudly in the age in which they lived. There have been heroes in every age—infidels, if you please—but I declare them heroes in the mental battle fields who have been able to hold their own in life, assailed though they were by calumny when the grave had received them. Our friend says that he cannot tell why I speak of a glass and myself as different modes of the same substance, but in my first speech I took pains to define what I meant by substance. If he had a better definition, he should, in justice to his subject, have presented it to us; it was not for him to say he would not give it, and then to say "I don't understand my opponent." But he says that "something could never have been produced from nothing. Intelligence exists, and must therefore have been created by an all-wise intelli-

gent Deity." "There is either no existence without intelligence, or there is existence without intelligence." My friend declares all existence is not alike intelligent, but that some is unintelligent, and in this I urge that he contradicts himself. If Mr. Cooper is right in declaring that there is any substance non-intelligent, then it can only be (on the hypothesis that God is infinite intelligence) by supposing God in such case, and so far, to have annihilated his intelligence. But, if there is any substance non-intelligent, then intelligence is not infinite, and the God my friend contends for does not exist. If God brought into existence that which was not himself, but something different from himself, he must have brought something not out of himself, but something out of nothing! He contradicts his own argument, and indulges in the strangest assertions. The universe is moveable, God is not. He does not give us the slightest reason for this statement. He declares that God is the master of the universe, but does not even show you that he understands the relevancy of the argument addressed to him. When he used the phrase, he must have meant either that what God created was the same as himself, or different from himself. It could not have been the same as himself, otherwise there would have been no discontinuity, no break—there would have been nothing to distinguish the creator from the created—no break of continuity to enable us to conceive creation possible. Nor could that which God created have been different from himself, unless my opponent is prepared to contend that things which have nothing in common with each other can be the cause of, or affect one another. This shows that Mr. Cooper has not well considered the terms he employs. If our friend bases any argument for God's existence upon his intelligence, let him explain what he means. It is not enough for him to take cognisance of the universe, and so cognise certain effects. All those finite effects do not aid him one step towards the infinite. His design argument was a structure without a foundation. You have seen how little our friend can understand the meaning of his own words. He has talked about his trials, and yet he asked how I could talk about my misfortunes. I have not yet talked of them. I have not said how men, when I was yet at an early age, for these opinions drove me out from home, and from all that I loved and was dear to me, and threw me within sight of the truth, where I have had since the happiness of striving for that truth—lifting up the banner of our cause, showing that true men may be made truer, and the world be better worth living in than it was before the struggle. (Cheers.)



## SECOND NIGHT.



### ON GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR OF THE UNIVERSE.

AT seven o'clock precisely Mr. Harvey, the Chairman, accompanied by Mr. Cooper, Mr. Bradlaugh, and several representative friends, came upon the platform, and were received with loud cheers. The Hall was not quite so crowded as on the first night, but was well filled in every part.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have to announce that the discussion will now commence. With your permission I will read the subject from the printed programme. The argument on the first night was as to the Being of God, to-night it is for the Being of God as Moral Governor of the Universe. As before, each speaker will occupy half-an-hour and no more for his first speech, or as much shorter a period as he may think proper, and afterwards a quarter of an hour each. I must again ask the audience to give me their confidence. I hope they will abstain from unnecessary cheering or calls of time. If either speaker should get out of order, I will remind him of it. I have no doubt, if you will listen to the speakers till they have concluded, you will have an evening of instruction, and be able to appreciate their arguments.

MR. COOPER: If there is one word of more importance to me than any other that could be mentioned—one word of more importance to me—to human beings, than any other, that word is duty—duty, a word, I say, that is all-important to me. We are not talking of the duty of pigs, of dogs, of rabbits, weasels, snails, butterflies, bullocks, or elephants—duty belongs to man. Creatures have no duty. We never talk of the duty of a snail, of a horse, of a cat, of a bullock. Duty belongs to man. (Cries of yes, yes, and question.) Well, the parties of your side who profess a philosophic duty, seem to think that there is no such thing as duty connected with religion. Who told them so? We believe that there is a duty of religion, though we ought to obey our own convictions. Well, but you say we are as moral as you are on the other side—we follow duty. My question is to a person who talks about moral duty as a result of philosophy. Is he a perfect man? Is any of you a perfect man? If you are, send your name to the *Times*, and be sure you have it put in the second column, where they put all the curious advertisements—

indeed, you might take a house in Belgrave Square, and people would come to see you if you were a perfect man. But no; really I am not a perfect man, nor you. There are none of you perfect men. Then, I say you, each of us, breaks his sense of duty again and again. You get out of temper with your wives and children—you ill use them very likely—you say something that grieves them very much. Oh, it's all right—you were out of temper! You wonder at yourself for striking her; well, but whenever any one has struck, or ill used, or trampled on you, you come to a conviction of another kind. In two or three days, perhaps, after you have been guilty of this misconduct, you are sorry. You say, "what a scandal to have used my wife so." I should not have done so. But you have done this often. You say, I must not do these things again. You accuse yourself, you threaten to flog yourself. What is all this? But perhaps you are a shopkeeper; no matter what the article is that you sell. A person comes into your shop: perhaps he is fastidious. You think he has come in to get something as cheap as he can. There is nothing doing. You show your articles. You say to yourself, what am I to do with this man? He has spent a quarter of an hour in your shop, you seem to have had some time waiting upon him. Something begins to say to you, "rent and taxes must be paid." He seems to want the article. Yes, it's a very well manufactured article. Yes, is the reply, what will you take for it? You hesitate; you say to yourself, "I must, I will have as much as I can get for it." He pays you your price, and you are struck with wonder. So off he goes. You have charged him pretty well. It comes up in your mind that day. You say to yourself, I have to support a family—it is very difficult to support a family, also to pay rent and taxes. So you reason against rates and taxes—wife and children—it beggars you—and so on. Again, you fall into habits of drink. Some sensible fellow said to you one day—Turn teetotaler. Depend upon it he was a sensible fellow who said that—gave you that advice. You thought it was rather hard at first; you tried it, however, and you found how effectual it was. When you got up in the morning you said, "How light I feel—how comfortable I am. I am not a slave to drink, I do not wallow in the sty, a sleep does not oppress me now as it did before. One day last summer, when it was very hot, there was an excursion to Gravesend. You wanted relaxation. Young people are rather fond of that, so you went on the excursion, and you stopped now and then to see the country. At last you saw somebody take a glass of porter. You were thirsty. He asked you to have one, as you were one of the party. Well, you are over-persuaded. You take one. You felt it was wrong, a bad step. But why, how could this be? I need take no more. But

you do drink another glass, and your thirst is not slaked. Then somebody said to you, take a drop of something short, that will quench your thirst. And so you do, and your senses come short. You get into bed. You have burning; a great drum thundering through your head. But conscience comes up, and then you say—"I am a brute again. I have gone into drunkenness again." How was it that you felt condemnation? How was it you felt condemnation as a husband, a father, or a man—all that condemnation? I am sure you could not help it. I do not care whether you call yourself Atheist, Deist, Sceptic, Freethinker, or whatever you call yourself, you could not help it. It is a part of your nature, of a moral nature that you have different from the inferior animals, that you should have remorse for doing wrong. You threaten to flog yourself, to lacerate yourself for it. A man may continue to offend against this something. Stop, what do you mean by a moral nature? We talk about defining words. It is quite necessary to define this word. I remember Robert Cooper being present here so long ago as March, 1856, about the time that I was avowing a change in my opinions, and another time in John Street. He did not reply to me in a speech, but he did so in a pamphlet. In that pamphlet, he showed that he did not understand what I have said. "Man has an immoral nature, and, therefore, he has a moral government where he has an immoral nature." If that was the amount of his acquaintance with the form of moral philosophy, it showed he knew nothing about the matter in the philosophic sense. Man has not an immoral nature, but a moral nature. It is called "moral sense" by Shaftesbury, "moral reason" by Reid, consciousness by Butler, and is a power within man which warns him of what is right and what is wrong. It don't matter where he is—where he lives—what land he possesses—what language he speaks, or what colour he is—he is sure to ask of it, and the reply is infallible, What is right and what is wrong? Oh! but that is not consciousness, says the other side. We say there is no such power." It is a thing of education. You say. It depends on how a man has been instructed. "Your conscience is not my conscience, one man's conscience is not another's." The conscience of a Jew is not that of a Christian; the conscience of a civilised man is not the same as that of a savage. "It is a thing of education." To be sure! Well, but somebody says I cannot understand what conscience is. What is this moral nature? Let us try to understand. It is a faculty in man that discerns that there is right and wrong, and testimony is infallible—a faculty, no doubt, that needs to be educated. You cannot educate it in animals—it is not there. There must be a right for a man to do right, a wrong to do wrong, each of which his spiritual nature recognises and distinguishes. I shall,



of course, contend that we have in this Christian country the highest moral teaching in Christianity itself; and if this were denied, a high moral sense, which some of my friends would attribute to the discernment of reason. Moral sense, I say, is the clearest and strongest discernment of moral nature—it discerns to practise what is right; that virtue, truth, honour, and so on deserve praise, and in their very nature confer their own reward; that the practise of vice, error, which we call wickedness, sin, and transgressions deserve punishment. Man has this moral sense. He has not an immoral nature, which says that virtue deserves punishment and error reward. Robert Cooper, therefore, did not know what he was talking about. There is this faculty in man—it is part of his intellectual nature. Conscience responds to it more or less; and as he is a free agent, so he can resist and sin against it, which he does easily, so that he sears it as with a red hot iron, and he may sin on till he is steeped to the lips in vice; still there it is. For instance, a man meets another who looks very hard at him in the street. He bolts down the next entry. He says, "that man knows me." He wishes it was dark so that nobody would know him, and when it is dark, and he is in bed, he pulls down the sheet over his face. Criminals have made these confessions. Oh! says somebody, you don't call that conscience; didn't Palmer, that Rugby fellow, die as hard as iron; he could not have what you call conscience? Now, I wish you would listen to a person of extreme credibility, who had it from that criminal himself—viz., Mr. Goodacre, the clergyman who attended Palmer every night in the gaol. When Palmer went back to the gaol after the trial, he was as hard as iron. But the last night came—he was in the condemned cell. The chaplain spoke to him, but it was, so to speak, like pouring water upon a duck's back. There was no conversion. The clergyman goes to his lodgings, and prays to bring the unhappy criminal to a sense of his situation. He felt also that he could not go to bed; doubt pressed upon his mind as to whether he had said all that he ought to have said, for before eight o'clock the next morning all would be over. "I may not," said this gentleman to himself—"I may not have said all that I ought to say—I must say all that I can." He went back and knocked at the prison door—by law the chaplain can get admission into the gaol at any hour. This is the relation given by the gentleman, which exactly illustrates the case in point. He entered the cell where the wretched man was. "I am come to speak to you," said the chaplain. "I must come and speak to you. You are a great sinner. I am come to say that there is pardon for you," and he alluded to the thief who was pardoned on the cross. "Will you try," he exclaimed, "and confess your sin, and you may yet find pardon." It had such an effect on Palmer that he asked—"How pardon? If I should confess about

my wife, I should have to confess about my brother too." Why, returned the chaplain, and did you murder your brother also? And Palmer clung to the bed stock with both hands, and groaned as if he would rend his soul. That groan was the voice of conscience. He had sinned against his conscience. But you say this was not remorse for crime, for this was not in his character. Just imagine to yourself an old lion who entered into a corner of the wilderness, and groaning because he had killed so many antelopes, or a cat into the chimney corner, because she had killed so many mice! How does this happen but because we have this moral nature? What does it tell us that vice and wickedness are wrong, that untruthfulness, tyranny, despotism, sensuality, all deserve blame and punishment—that virtue, honour, goodness, self-denial, benevolence, deserve praise and reward—in a word, it is a dictate of the mind of man? How comes this to be, but that there is a moral governor to whom we are accountable? We cannot get rid of the responsibility. Deny it as we please, it is there; it follows the moral governor exists. We look on his moral government. We see organic law punishing man for sin. We sin; punishment fearfully suddenly overtakes the wicked. Men speak and talk about it. We see vice triumphant, men wading through blood and gaining a throne; kings grasping liberty by the neck, and as each moment rolls on dishonesty, violence, and weakness successful. Well, say you, is it part of the moral government that we see the rich getting wealth and the poor growing poorer, and virtue and poverty suffering together? You look on the great man. There is happiness, you exclaim, and you say, "this is not right according to the principles of your moral government." You can only come to this conclusion at last, and that is my conclusion, that he could only resist the sense of moral conviction, he could only disobey this sense of responsibility, because God's moral government has only begun, and is not completed. There must be a state where wrong will be righted—where no four millions of black slaves shall be lorded over by white men—no bad men sit on thrones, no good men be imprisoned. There must be a state of equality. What we see in progress here must be worked out finally. We see in all these things around about us proof that man is a being of progress, and which shows that he cannot be limited to this state of existence. This cannot be the be-all and the end-all. I conclude that this is only the beginning, and that we are going on; that this life is not the conclusion of our existence—that a moral governor exists, that his moral government has begun progressing towards perfection. We cannot deny that it is here. You say there is no moral government. Then why are you punished: has not sin its penalty? Why this discontent, this uneasiness, if there be no hereafter, no accountability? When you see a throne

like Louis Napoleon's, who will say there is no hereafter? If there were not, why not act like great Cæsar himself? Cato could have aided him, and Cæsar drove him to suicide. Why is all this if there be no moral government? What does it prove? This, that a moral governor exists. (Cheers.)

MR. BRADLAUGH: I am delighted to be able to pay the speaker who has just sat down, the only compliment that has seemed his due during the time he has spoken since the commencement of this discussion. It is that he has occupied, with a degree of skill which I am utterly unable to imitate, a large portion of your time, but without the slightest relevance to the question which we are met to discuss. It says a great deal for the presence of mind of any speaker, seriously to address an audience not in the spirit of comedy, but in all solemnity, for so long a period without touching the subject. It says a great deal for his tact when he can get through twenty-eight minutes of the time in talking altogether beside the question, and put into the last two minutes a sort of preface to the topic for debate in lieu of a serious argument. Last evening we had but little approach to discussion, and were I content to leave the question where my friend has left it this evening, we should have no discussion at all. There has not been a particle of evidence adduced by him for the existence of a moral governor of the universe (hear, hear, and cheers). In all that he has said there is not a scintilla of evidence, but in lieu we have some hopes, but however patent his hopes, and however certain his prophecy, the facts he has stated are evidence only to himself and not to me. I fancied that my friend was to state the argument for, and affirm the being of God, as moral governor of the universe. If he has done anything at all, the most that he has effected was to allege, without evidence, that there was such a person or being as he called moral governor of the universe; some such thing as that which he called a moral nature, and that is some evidence for the existence of some being who gave that moral nature to the individual possessing it. That is the fullest possible extent to which he has carried his argument. He was obliged to qualify it, such as it was, with numerous admissions. He admitted that this faculty which he called moral sense or conscience, was a faculty requiring education; but then he says—"It is a faculty which discerns that there is right and that there is wrong." I submit, on the other hand, that a man has no separate faculty, but that his conscience is the result of the education of the whole of his faculties—that man has no separate conscience other than is the result of the condition in which all his faculties may be at any one time of his life, none certainly that would enable him to judge right and wrong independently of his education. I submit that a child newly born is without any such faculty, that it is entirely destitute of any faculty that



would enable it to judge right and wrong, and that that which my friend calls moral nature, I repeat, is but the result of the education of all the faculties in man—further, that what he calls man's moral nature, if any one chooses to examine the matter closely, will be found to vary with tribes, countries, and climates, vary even with the same individuals at various periods of their lives, and from such a varying, shifting standard you are to produce the evidence of an immutable Deity as moral governor of the world. If it be possible to effect such a demonstration, my friend will have to display a talent for logic which he has not manifested during this debate. Let us see whether his facts were correct. I submit, even if they were, they were worth nothing, as being irrelevant; that if everything he said were true, from Alpha to Omega, then it is not worth anything. But I submit that what he alleged as facts, are not so. "Did you ever hear," asks my friend, "of a lion that was stricken with remorse over the numerous animals he has slaughtered?" Did you ever hear of a Thug who, having committed murders by the score, felt joy rather than remorse for his conduct? What conscience taught him that he was more sacred to his deities for the skill displayed in his murders? Our friend, who certainly manifested a more philosophic conception of words than he was able to manifest on the last night of discussion, might have given us a novel definition of conscience had he read some essays on the practices of Thuggee, which he might have found in some of our old review—I have several of these passing through my mind at the present moment—he would have also found some extremely serviceable evidence taken before a parliamentary commission, upon the terrible practice of strangling prevailing among the Thugs of India. He would have found how faithful wives and good mothers to their children could regard the taking away human life as a positive virtue, and a matter deserving praise and reward, and that the more murders they committed, the holier the devotees of Bowanee regarded themselves. So far from being like Palmer, groaning as though he would rend his heart, these Thugs regarded murder as matter of absolute virtue, making them better men and women than, according to their belief, they could be otherwise. If this stood alone it would be enough to at least neutralise all that our friend put before you, but we shall be able to deal with this question of the moral governance of the universe hereafter more effectually than this. The whole of our friend's argument was founded on what he calls man's moral nature. I submit that if his facts had been true, they would not be much evidence on the subject. But he has cleverly tried to turn the tables on myself. He said, if there were not this remorse, this uneasiness, this misery, what inducement would you atheists have to be virtuous? But suppose I showed this was not the subject for debate—sup-

pose I should urge, as I might have done, that it was only to introduce an excuse for the occupation of time, that this point was urged, and suppose I did not choose to take up the question, how much would that advance my friend's case? He was to prove the existence of a moral governor for the universe. And as he has not chosen to battle on his own ground, he requires that I should breach his fortress, and storm it for him. I will therefore accept the issues that he has laid before you. But before doing so, permit me to point you to one or two matters that seem to strike against the moral governance of God. Is there a moral governor rewarding virtue. How then is vice in luxury while virtue is starving? How can you account for this, that when two thousand women kneel in one church, that he permitted them to be burnt and suffocated there? If you cannot deal with these two thousand, I will put before you millions instead of thousands. Instead of these women dying in sudden anguish, rushing round the church, and crying out to God for mercy, who showed them none, I will point to millions in the world dying slowly from poverty, that strikes them down in lingering misery, and whom God pities not. This great fact meets you in the face, that if there be a governor, he allows human beings to come into the world faster than food for them, and that starvation and misery strike myriads down to die of disease amidst squalid misery. You may tell me that poverty constituted a crime; it is a disgrace to the world that it is so. God the moral governor of the universe! When in the square of Warsaw women and children prayed to God for help, for life, for moral strength, when they besought him to hear their prayer for liberty, and to alleviate their sufferings, you will hardly tell me that God was moral governor of the universe when he permitted the Cossack's lance point to drink the blood from their breasts as answer to their praying. You will not say that God is governor, and yet that this happened without punishment on the guilty. But you say that because these wrongs are not redressed here, they will be hereafter. Who made you prophet for kingdom come? Who gave you the right to require us to look mildly and contentedly upon all evils here, on the ground that they will be put right in another world? You tell me that when a man is starved to death in this world, he will be fed in the next, when he can eat no longer; or that if he is unjustly put here in the prison cell, that it is what God pleases, and that God will set all this right at some future time. Set it right! How can you hope that? He it is, if governor, who causes the child to be born in poverty and misery, and without power to extricate itself, and helpless to contend against the woe surrounding it. He kept its parents starving, that they might give the unfortunate babe a wretched *physique*. It was he who made the only instructor of the child, the police or the magistrate. He brought the child

from the cradle to the gallows, with a hempen cord round its neck—he who initiated it into the world helpless to avoid the crime—he who ended its career there, helpless to escape the retribution. You make God do all this ill, then you tell me I am a blasphemer (loud cheers and hisses, which were protracted for some time). It is you, and not I, who is blaspheming—you, when you affirm that God rules and that innumerable wrongs result; it is you and not I who affirm that God rewards vice with imperial purple, virtue with threadbare fustian; it is you, and not I, who affirm that God deals thus unfairly with his people. And when the earthquake—as that at Lisbon—comes, when it rends not merely the mansion of the rich but the hovel of the poor, and when after rending these, it leaves thousands dying from plague and starvation in the streets of a great city whose inhabitants it thus steeped in ruin and misery, by that which you say is the act of God—don't tell me of one or more acts apparently beneficent as illustrating his goodness and sense, until you deal with these acts so clearly malevolent. Do not tell me that God punishes the wrong-doer here, or if you do, I will ask you why you drag another world of punishment out of the future? Don't tell me of some wicked men stricken down in the streets to die by God's decree, for if you do, then do I say, that God is unjust in smiting a few and sparing the majority. Your argument for God's moral power is at an end unless you can explain why the imperial murderer is spared and the ragged wretch is stricken. (Cheers, hisses, and confusion). If you want to hiss, wait till I have said something better to deserve it.

The Chairman: I beg that you will keep order.

Mr. Bradlaugh: You shall have enough to hiss for when I shall have said what I wish to say against your threadbare theology, and it is indeed that which I impeach. (Cheers, and cries of question and time).

The Chairman: If gentlemen will be quiet and not cheer so or cry question, all will be able to hear. I will call time when it is proper to call time (Cheers)

Mr. Bradlaugh: You ask me why I do not steal; why I do not lie; why I do not, like a neighbouring scoundrel, aspire to a kingdom, breaking oaths and shedding blood to gain my point. I will endeavour to tell you why, but to do this, I must take up your position that vice must be punished and virtue rewarded in some future state. I will say that from the Atheist's point of view that is not so. All mere punishment for crime past is in itself a crime, a wrong, and is only to be defended in so far as it goes to the prevention of crime future, but not in so far as it can be regarded as vengeance for crime past. The Atheist view is not that crime should be punished by some overlooking judge, but that it carries with it its own punishment in limiting



man's present happiness and increasing his present misery. The Atheist does not argue that virtue will gain him Heaven hereafter, but declares that it spreads happiness around the virtuous doer here, and makes happiness for him because it makes happiness amongst his fellows—honesty, truth, manhood, virtue, work their own reward in rendering happy the doer of them, and in spreading pleasure in the circle in which he moves. You admit that God suffers rascals to climb into thrones, and permit his clergy, who at least should know his will, to pray to him to keep them there. You who know that God has permitted a great country to be heavily taxed for the support of a clique of rascals who perpetrated the *coup d'etat*, and inaugurated the reign of the imperial scoundrel who now rules in God's name, and as God's anointed. You say he is going to punish in the next world the man who thus climbed into a throne in this, when we know, if your argument be true, he could not have climbed there without God's help. God knew beforehand the designs of the man who broke his solemn oath to the young Republic; but this man could not have perjured himself without God's permission, if he be the omnipotent governor you say, any more than he could have climbed to a throne without his aid. God then, according to you, must have helped this criminal here in order to punish him some other time. Is that so? If these are your views of God as moral governor of the universe, I give way at once. They are unanswerably absurd. But does this dispose of the question? I do not think it does. I should like our friend, when he pleases to deal with the question in what he calls its philosophic sense, to be a little more profuse of his explanations than he was inclined to be during the discussion of last evening. As to the moral teaching of Christ, he will find no one more ready than I am to consider that question. But we have nothing to do with Christ here to-night, any more than we have to do with Mahomet, Moses, or Zoroaster. If he wants to tell me that Christ has given us a moral system without reproach, I will reply that under no system of morality which can pretend to be without blemish, is so much vice permitted. Christianity is a system which teaches submission to injury; courting wrong, and volunteering yourself for oppression. I will tell him, that at present I pass it by, because it is not the subject of our argument; it is no part of the argument, and is at least a mistake, unless he introduces it for the purpose of evading the real question, as also the question arising on his allegation of man's free agency. If he would discuss to-night Christian morality, he might have put it forward fairly as a subject for discussion, when I should be ready to meet him. He tells me that he is a free agent. He had much better have supported his argument on both evenings

by some facts, instead of relying on naked allegations. I will endeavour to show him the most convincing testimony of free agency that could be required. He says that man is a free agent, for he can sin against his conscience. I say that he cannot sin—man cannot resist the circumstances that result in volition. As to this he has had no freedom of selection. What are these circumstances? First his organisation, then the education affecting that organisation to the moment of volition. I say that no man is perfectly free to choose his education, or the organisation educated up to the moment of volition. To talk, therefore, of man sinning against his conscience—itsself the result of education—is to tell you the grossest absurdity that could be put before you. Well, Samuel Taylor Coleridge says that any act to be a sin must be originated in the will entirely apart from and independent of all circumstance extrinsic to the will. I say there is not this volition preceding any act resulting from the will, but that all volition is the result of various circumstances conducing to the will. Then our friend somewhat abruptly refers to the thief on the cross who got into paradise. I will admit, if he wants to try the question according to Bible Christianity, the greatest rascals on earth are the most likely to be rewarded in heaven; and if that establishes anything in favour of moral governance of the world by God, then the New Testament, corroborated by the Old, shows that those who have been liars, thieves, and murderers, have got into heaven by God's grace, while some of those who have been especially truthful and honest became the others' victims on earth, and were kept out of heaven. If any of you doubt that, however, I will abandon it, as the only evidence is that of the Bible, which for me is indefensible, though for him it is unanswerable. God is an immutable being, our friend says, and yet declares that his moral government is begun but not completed. He urges that because vice is triumphant here, that this must be set right hereafter, that God the immutable will change his mode of governance, that slavery he is to be compensated by eternal freedom hereafter. If this is to be taken as evidence of future and more complete moral governance, it must also be taken that the moral government is at present incomplete, and therefore is no evidence of ability in the governor to govern more perfectly. He either lacks desire or ability. One supposition denies his goodness, the other his power. Then you say, "that the wicked who escape here shall be sent to hell fire hereafter." I am obliged, you add, to admit that the moral government is incomplete, but these rascals will be punished by and by, though before this takes place, though before this retribution comes, they will be dead. Good men will be rewarded in the next world who have starved in this. Have not men who made the world resound with the fame of their intellect and utility

of their philosophy, died in garrets neglected and uncared for! Have they not been villified and calumniated for centuries—men whose brows were bound with laurel, the fruit of their own self-reliant genius in this world, and oh, by-and-by, God will reward them. The men who have struggled for liberty have been stricken down, and have died despairing, while you have been obliged to admit vice triumphant, despite the moral governor. What, I ask, is the object of the war that is raging only a few hundred miles from where we stand? Does it rage for the rights of man, for his liberties, for any great principle, or for the purpose of setting up one piece of state tinsel against another? Who is it that keeps this strife up—who starves to pay for this—the people, those whom you tell me are God's people, whom God cares for, whom God helps? Never till they help themselves—never till they are able to strike for themselves—never till they upraise themselves. For those who tell me of a moral government by God, I will turn to them the whole map of the world, each page of its history, and I challenge you to show me any people whom God ever helped until they helped themselves. (Cheers.) Amongst the tribes of uncivilised people, or even amidst more favoured nations, where there was the more ignorance the people were more on their knees praying and less on their feet thinking. It was there where men were more trodden down, were more serfs, more slaves; there was always a priesthood to help the king, but never the people. Where then is the moral government of the universe? Not by God. Where even the governance of society? Not by God but man, by human intellect; not by Church edict, but by human thought; not by a moral government outside the world, which teaches right and wrong according to a standard that can never be altered; but rather by the advancing knowledge of each hour which, with better information, discovers evil to-morrow where it is yet unseen to-day, and finds truth to-day where yesterday belief had found no trace of it. Mankind must be saved by the development of its common humanity, and we strive in this to advance with certain steps to the great truths scattered in the depths of the mighty unknown around us. We seek to gather not pearls, sapphires, rubies, and diamonds, but truths, that we may build them into a priceless moral diadem, and therewith crown the whole human race. (Loud Cheers.)

MR. COOPER: (Cries of "go on, Tommy.") I will be very much obliged if you will never clap your hands any more when I rise. I feel really tired of complaining thus, and I might as well not occupy your time in this matter, for I am tired of this childish sort of work, and if anything could disgust me more it would be this silly laughter. Thomas Cooper is not a man to be laughed at. I have been a long time on this platform; I was never a disgrace to it (nor any other) when I was on it. I never deserted a good prin-



ciple that once impressed me; I do not know why you are to treat me in this manner. I think a man of fifty-nine years of age ought to have some reverence. You have (turning to Mr. Bradlaugh) just complained before sitting down that every speech delivered by me as yet was beside the mark—as if a man could live fifty-nine years and then argue as if he talked nonsense whenever he opened his mouth. I have not heard an argument—not a fragment of an argument, in answer to what I have stated. Mr. Bradlaugh says the most I have done is to affirm that man was not a moral nature. There are many faculties, he says, but the child has no faculty. That is no argument. In answer, I say the child has faculties, but does not display them, that everybody knows, and no one can deny it. Then “God cannot be immutable because he creates mutable creatures. He must be mutable because the creatures must be mutable.” Where is the contradiction? Then he proceeds, “If what I said were facts, they were not facts.” How has that been shown? Because something was done amongst Thugs. I have not heard about the Thugs. I know nothing about these young women who were glad they had committed more murders than others. They exulted in it. Now if any man says there is no moral sense in Thugs, I should like to have some conversation with him before I believed him. I appeal to you and not to Thugs. He said, I cleverly tried to throw my friend off, to turn the tables on him, and some person immediately said “hear.” Do you mean to call me a liar? I never had Mr. Bradlaugh in my thoughts. I will re-affirm that he said that I would introduce anything to occupy the time. He commenced by stating that I had manifested something like a philosophic apprehension of the meaning of words which had no meaning, and that I was trying to keep your attention from the question. Well, there are only the Thugs before us at present. There is only an appeal to persons’ nature—we are talking of acts; we are going to what our friend says appears to be complete disproof of the moral government of the universe. He has not dealt with that fact, that great fact, which you must feel to be fact yourself. I mean conscience. Can any one of you tell me that he does not feel when he is sinning against his conscience? Why then do you read with such zest the confessions of criminals, the workings of the human mind, the convictions of a man that he is a scoundrel, a bloodthirsty villain? “Oh, sinning against conscience is the greatest absurdity that can be mentioned.” Is it? Strange proclamation this in the middle of the 19th century. If this is philosophy, I do not know what the world will say to it. Abolish all the laws of government! What is the use of them? Well, a man cannot sin against conscience. Do you see what it is you defend (hear, hear). Will you have the kindness not to cheer a sentence of that sort without thinking? Then we heard about

2,000 women whom God shut in and delivered up to the most terrible of deaths. Then again, I was esteemed a person who had pretended to look into the future. Will our friend say that God showed them no mercy? That is a very large undertaking for my friend. Then there is the poverty of millions born into the world and no food to support them. I say plenty of food, but men are bad one to another. Man is an enemy to man. What sort of government would you have? Had you rather that man had been a moral agent and have no choice? But you know that you have a choice, you feel that you can choose, you are sensible of it. "God cannot make us free." Indeed. And you say, "subject at the same time." You allude to the punishment which is inflicted upon men by God in conformity with the organic formation of their bodies. "Millions in poverty." Yes, indeed, many of them suffering deeply. Some, however, are poor by their own fault. Some men are idle and will not work, others spend their wages, others beat their wives, and others are dishonest. Among the rich there are dishonest also, so there are dishonest among the poor, and so suffering comes by a man's own fault, folly, or vice, as the case may be. But, says Mr. Bradlaugh, there were 2,000 women burnt out of existence. The attention drawn to that topic was something extraordinary to be addressed to men's judgments. He says, did moral government exist then, but then 12,600 persons have died since we came into this room, 84,000 odd, or 32 millions every year. Men die in suffering and great pain. Those 2,000 left children, brothers, relatives, so have the 2,000 that die hourly. But who complains of the order of life? Can you tell me of any particularly good son that would like his father to live for ever? How can we believe in a world constituted as this is of men and animals—who will say that life should be perpetual? Now think of these 2,000 poor women, they were free beings, those priests also, whom they say acted so cruelly, delivered them over to the Virgin, and all that sort of thing, but God is not to force man to be good if he be a free agent. I am asked who made me a prophet of the moral nature as well as of God's declaration? I feel this condemnation, and I know by it what is wrong. I feel some great constitutional disease. In the progressive nature of men there must be moral disease. They would not be governed without it. God does not train up children to be slaves. I am not to talk about blasphemy, for there was a hiss when it was mentioned, and you cheered Mr. Bradlaugh in his sallies against Deity, so that I should not wonder to hear a hiss when you hear it affirmed that God trains up a child for happiness. I say God has a moral government, and that he makes free beings. Men act on each other's circumstances. The mere talk about they could not choose where they were born, that they could not choose their food, that they were under the control of circumstances, is mere talk and

nothing more. Circumstances do not altogether control me. I have trampled on circumstances a hundred times. Men do right and wrong, we are actuated by it. We sin against our conscience, where should be the absurdity of God's government being begun and not completed? If God exists, he exists from all eternity, and he has made millions of beings who exist also. Is it to be denied that one object of his government is that he purposes these beings for a higher state? This higher state stands before them an eternity of happiness if they will conduct themselves properly in this state of trial. I may here take notice that I have been faithful to my part of the engagement. Mr. Bradlaugh has sometimes spoken so loudly I never thought I had a right to say that has nothing to do with the question. But I see my time is gone by, and I must reserve what I have to say.

MR BRADLAUGH: I frankly and unreservedly retract the compliment I paid my friend for his ability in evading the subject. It would be improper in me to persist in tendering him a compliment which he repudiates. I also frankly confess I now do not know for what purpose the first speech was delivered at all, and this the more because the second speech has not improved the position. Our friend has been kind enough to express his opinion, that it is hardly fair towards a speaker to urge that his speech has nothing to do with the question. Surely my friend wants me to offer my opinion on his speech. I have done so; and if any of the audience agree with my view, so much the worse for the speech, because it would show that it produced on the mind of more than one person an impression, that our friend had not proved anything which he had proposed to affirm. As to the moral faculty in a child, Mr. Cooper says the child has no faculty for some years. I ask whether children up to a certain age are without aid from the moral government, and whether they are not in more need of it than men with matured faculties? I ask him whether his argument does not altogether break down when needed most? He says that I based an argument on the fact of man being mutable, whilst God is urged to be immutable. This is not so. Our friend had urged that men were imperfect—and I put it to you that we could hardly expect an imperfect result from a perfect creation and a perfect creator—a being with ability to make perfect if he pleased. If I have not made this clear to you before, I hope I have done so now. Mr. Cooper declares that he has not heard much about the Thugs hugging, and that I must bring this hugging business closer to you. My friend boasts that this argument is very wide and without effect. I cannot very well oblige my friend by dwelling at any great length on this phase of human error and crime; for I cannot do him the injustice to suppose that, in his endeavours to judge fairly of moral nature, he should purposely have left out the



history of a large portion of mankind when generalising on the whole, so that he might make out an argument for the moral government of the world. "The Thugs," he says, "are a long way off." So was Jesus Christ a long way off. If any adverse argument is implied in being a long way off, I retort that they are not so far away as Moses, so distant as David, so far away as Jonah or Jeremiah. I am not quite so far off as these, and I must tell him if he will dispute the fact of Thuggee strangling, he must do so boldly. I will undertake to affirm it. If he does not know whether the facts he talks about are facts, he ought not to challenge them by inuendo. The audience will be able to judge for themselves, whether my friend did not leave them with an equivocal sort of denial which may mean either admission of their verity or allegation that they are not correct. Say you do not know anything about these facts, or that you do not believe; if you say you do not believe them, I will undertake to prove them. It may fairly be that, however well a man may be read, he cannot be presumed to know everything, and your ignorance is no weapon in my hand. Does he take pains to tell you what he means by the word sin, or what he means by the word conscience? He has not done so, yet persists in speaking of morality, as though it always and everywhere had one meaning. Here it is immoral to have two wives. In Turkey it is not immoral to have two wives. The consciences of the men who commit polygamy in Turkey, do not burthen them with remorse, because they have committed what we here should term a crime. I object to the word sin, because theologians have attached a cant meaning to it which I deny. My friend has not told you his definition. He uses it as though it conveyed a meaning in which you are all agreed. An act which a man could not help committing, is not a sin. The wretch who steals a loaf of bread because starvation, ignorance, poverty, misery, squalor, and degradation have surrounded him, is not even in your eyes so guilty as a person of better education and better circumstances. I will put it to you further, that there are many cases in everyday life, when the same act condemned in one instance, so far from being regarded as culpable, finds precisely the contrary verdict in another. If this be so, our friend's discernment of the moral government of God is exceedingly short-sighted. How, then, does he speak of a common standard for judging right and wrong? I will take you to a great many decent men and women who would rather prefer stealing to being atheists, and who would regard it as a greater crime to entertain such opinions as I hold than to be guilty of theft. To me it is no sin against my conscience. It reproves me not; on the contrary, the mode in which my faculties have been educated makes me believe it an honour to hold and avow these views. He is not dealing with

you fairly when he puts it that men have a common standard of right and wrong. He said, why deal with the two thousand so sadly burned, and not with millions dying around us? That was what I did. It was only in one or two short sentences I referred to the Chili catastrophe, in a few words that I dealt with the two thousand, and then especially commented on the millions killed by poverty and disease. My friend replies—the case of the two thousand poor women startles us from the relief in which it stands out from the great picture of millions that are stricken down, that are crushed by poverty—which poverty, he says, only exists by men's misdoings, but which I say exists, if there is a moral governor of the universe, because he keeps it there. For whose misdoing is a poor child born of weak parents, for whose misdoing are the parents starving in an unhealthy home with insufficient clothing, wretched surroundings, squalid, and with teaching worse than none? On whom are we to charge all this? On the father, on the mother? This cannot be, because both father and mother are but a part of the squalor, wretchedness, and misery that existed before them. Then does God the moral governor of the universe allow all this, never stopping the pain—never checking the evil? Our friend has made a most extraordinary admission. He says these things result from man's misdoing. We will take it that a man does wrong—sometimes—he does it, then, in spite of God or by his permission, or by his instigation; but he cannot do it in spite of God, for Mr. Cooper says that God is omnipotent, therefore it is impossible to do anything against his power—against his will. The wrong doer must either be instigated to the wrong doing by God, or permitted by God to do it; but God being infinite in his will to permit, would be to compel. It is the same to instigate as to leave the path for a man to do wrong, who without this could not help but do right. All wrong and misery exist by God's wish or against it. But it cannot exist against God's wish if he be all-powerful; nor does Mr. Cooper think evil exists against God's wish, for he makes God remedy hereafter that which he might prevent here. God, all-powerful, has the ability to prevent misery; God, omniscient, knows how to exercise this ability; and God, all-good, would desire to exercise it. The population problem, which would take too long to fairly examine in this debate, is pregnant with weighty arguments on this head. Poverty exists; and God's existence, or his power, or his wisdom, or his goodness stands impeached by it. It would take many evenings to debate this point fairly, but he does not go beyond bare assertion, or advance one word of argument about it. He could not conceive how a good son could wish his father to live for ever. If I understand the meaning of this aright—it would be that all who wished their fathers to live for ever must be bad

sons. (Hear and laughter.) He says, this life is a probation for some other state. Which other? What has he to say except that the present state is so terribly wicked, so full of treachery and bloodshed and evil, that he is not heard to express a hope to make it better, but is obliged to go to some other world as an escape from this? (Laughter and cheers.)

MR. COOPER: So in spite of all I have said about the impropriety of it, the want of wisdom of the thing, the decency of doing it, Mr. Bradlaugh commences again in the same manner. He must retract his compliment. He is utterly at a loss to account for the first speech; he passes on to say that he must chastise me. I should say, that that was consummate impudence. Seeing that he approved of the hisses, he must have great confidence in his powers of effrontery in conduct like this. (Cries of no, no, he told you to be less excited)—and he turned round and told this person who cheered me that he was wrong. (Cries of no, no). I did not say the child had no moral faculty. I said he did not display that faculty. He said that an imperfect man was hardly to be expected from an imperfect maker. If he could conceive God at all, he must be a perfect God, and he could not wish any other God, but if he saw anything bad, he would say that he was not competent to be the framer of the universe. I say there is only one framer of the universe, God invisible, everywhere present, all-wise, existent always, an almighty, all-holy being. He knows that that all-wise and holy being cannot make a being as perfect as himself. You might as well expect him to make a triangular circumference. "All-being," he says, "would be perfect." Why waste time on words of this sort? Our friend then said, he would make it clear what he meant, when he said, there was no sinning against conscience. Then he told me about men having two wives in Turkey; that men had no sense of morality, and that there were men in England who had two wives and did not think it immoral. We think they do wrong. He says an act which man cannot help committing is no sin. If I were disposed to indulge in humour, I should exclaim, a Daniel come to judgment. A man cannot commit a sin in doing what he cannot help; if it is no law to him, he cannot transgress the law. It is no sin to commit an act. (Cries of question). I did not say that all men and women in England had the same standard of judging of right and wrong. I said no to that, and I said the moral faculty had to be educated. Every faculty has to be educated. I was not talking about the millions who suffer death through poverty. I was talking of the millions that die naturally in an hour. There is such a thing as memory. I did not attribute evil to God because he never limited or checked it. He talked of weak parents and the injustice of punishment of sin. Do we not see reasons in the organic punishment for moral crimes that man can bring disease



on his children and on himself? You say why does God do that? Does not vice visit itself? What do you do with that fact? You say you cannot take a fact out of the world. Well, it is there. God says that sin is sinful, that it is abominable in his sight, it is unholy; he gives it strong punishment here and everywhere. If man will not regard himself, he may as regards his children. Give me an idea whether or not there can be any moral government where there is no freedom, no will, no possibility of transgression. Show me that. I cannot understand it. I understand moral government to mean a government of moral agents by a moral governor. Moral government means that there are laws to observe, he must have special rules, that is, the governed must know he has a government, that is to say, there must be law. What is the sanction of law?—punishment. Abolish punishment, and you abolish law virtually. Just conceive that the Queen abolished all punishment for crime. Let recognised justice go on. Well, there is a trial to-night, there is the judge in his scarlet robes, the barristers in their wigs and gowns, the jury in the jury box. It is a murderer that is to be tried. He is convicted—what follows? The judge puts on his black cap, and sentences the murderer to death. The keeper then lets him go into the street. A robber is sentenced to ten years, or twenty perhaps; he rushes out of the box and joins his companions in the streets. Then at *nisi prius*, it is a horse case, lying seems inseparable from a horse case. Throughout the whole case there is lying, sticking to your falsehood throughout. You are convicted of perjury, and there is no punishment. How long will this go on? There is law then, and there is a penalty which is the sanction of law. Then there is a governor, good government if there is a law, and if you abolish law you abolish government. For God to permit suffering and wrong is not for him to will or to wish it. I may permit several things, I do not will them. The father does, the mother does, the wife does—in all relations of life we often permit that which we do not will in the active sense. If we come to the philosophic nature of things, yes; and in the broad sense of language we permit many things that we do not will. So it is from the moment that life commences, and for ever. Mr. Bradlaugh knew very well what I meant. (Cheers.) Why do you clap your hands at my saying this? Is it a dignified way to come here? I expected to have something like reasonable discussion, and I have to complain that the argument was never touched. (Hear, dissent, and cries of “not by you.”) If any one of you will tell me where the argument was touched, I will be much obliged to him. (Cheers and hisses.) What is the use of encouraging all this vulgar stuff? (Hisses.) It is not like reasonable men that want to come to the truth. There was something that Mr. Bradlaugh said before, that I meant to touch upon, but had not time. He said, that from the

**Atheist's stand-point,** vice should not be punished or virtue rewarded. Punishment was only to be inflicted so far as it is preventive. It is to be remedial. May it not be so when he visits the sin of the parents upon the children? Is there not a warning? But then we are told that vice works its own punishment and virtue its own reward. Why then complain of Louis Napoleon? Should he not be punished according to that theory? I cannot see that vice works its own punishment there. I love Mazzini with all my heart. He is the greatest man I have ever known in my life. Is virtue rewarded in his mournful life? Tyrants on thrones and clergy to help them! What does Louis Napoleon care about clergy?—he makes instruments of them. He does not believe them any more than did the first Napoleon. There was also some observation in a former speech about the ignorant being oftener on their knees than on their feet. The Kaffirs and the lowest races in the world. But that is not in the round of my reasoning even if it were true.

**MR. BRADLAUGH:** Our friend puts it that he did not say the child had no moral faculty, but he said the child did not display it. I am sorry I misunderstood him. I will wait for the present till the report comes out, but I fancy that my comment upon the old man as upon the child did not misapply. How do you know that the child has got this faculty before it is manifested? By what fact do you discover what is not displayed? You certainly have not displayed that faculty of putting things clear, or you would have tried—

**MR. COOPER:** That is your impudence.

**MR. BRADLAUGH:**—Tried to give us some reasons for supposing that a child has what you call the faculty for judging what you call right and wrong, and yet having this faculty displays it not. You said that God cannot make another being as perfect as himself, because you say he is infinite—and he cannot make another infinite. If that is a fair argument, it destroys the doctrine of creation altogether. If God cannot create another infinite, neither can he add to his own infinity. To add a finite universe to infinity is equally as absurd as to add an infinite. If God's ability to create a being as perfect as himself is limited, then he is not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent, there can be no such limitation. You say that sin is a transgression of law; law has two meanings, one scientific as expressing invariable sequence, and the other moral, as command. You cannot transgress the one and the other; you can the right or duty to disobey; command depends upon who gives the command—with what sanction it is given—whether it be good or bad to obey or not to obey. There are many statute laws at the present time which it is perfect virtue to break, and no sin to disobey.

**MR. COOPER:** That won't do.

MR. BRADLAUGH: Then my friend says vice visits itself on children, and asks, How does the Atheist deal with that? He finding, whether there be a God or not, a moral governor or not, that children begotten of diseased parents are born in a diseased state; strives to educate the parents to observe physical laws—to know the sequences on which health depends, and to carry out this law so as to ensure health as the result of the physical law. As an Atheist, he knows that where there is a child born into the world and the conditions of health have been known and observed by its parents, the child is more healthy, whether there be a God or not. You say that moral government implies that there are special rules established by the moral governor. If a man break these rules unconsciously, is there a penalty? My friend contends, as I understand him, that those who sin not knowing the law, escape the penalty. The rules of God—do all know them? Yes or no. If all do not know them, what becomes of this special government? Some are ignorant. Again, is God able to make all know them? If yes, and he only teaches partially, he is unjust, for He requires from one a higher duty than from another. You say there is a difference between permitting error and willing it. The illustration of the father or mother permitting without willing has no analogy. No argument founded on man can conduct you to a demonstration for the character of Deity. If your assertion of God's will as infinite be true, there is no permission without his will, and the will of any other cannot be in opposition, because he is omnipotent. If all things be from God, is it not a fair query how aught can exist except by God's will? He says the good are to live for ever: did he say where or how? Is it to be in the moon for ever, or in the sun for ever, or where? My friend simply appealed to your prejudices, the prejudices created by your religious education, when he spoke this. He knew that he meant nothing by it—he did not know anything about living for ever anywhere. When he says that his moral nature leads him to hope that when he finds that this life is imperfect—that God is able to make another, which he hopes will be better, but he don't know how it is to be, where it is to be, or indeed whether it is to be at all, he has not given us a particle of information about it. Now, however, he finds it convenient, having said that he was going to take the broad view of the question, to take you abroad altogether—and he desires to take you into the next world, which he would have you examine in preference to the subject, but we have not that before us, but to judge of his Deity as moral governor. He could not have been more unfortunate than when he went to the Kaffirs in his speech, who have no knowledge of this moral government which he sets up. There are the Kaffirs, the Dyaks of Rajah Brook, and many other nations of the world, who have no conception of a



future state of existence, who have no conception of God as separate, apart, and distinct from the universe, and who, therefore, they do not pray to. He has used such a defence to-night as will rather defeat his argument for the existence of God. It is either good or bad that men should know of God's existence. If it was good, then God should give all men that knowledge; if he did not, he himself was not all good—that is, was not God. I admit that my friend is right when he says I did not hit his argument. I tried as hard as I was able, but it is hard to hit nothing. (Cheers.) Why blame Louis Napoleon, and praise Mazzini? I complain of him whom I hold to be a scoundrel, because I hope to make the rest of the world avoid his vices—and because I dare to wake up a nation to a desire for liberty, whom God lets sleep in political slavery. Mazzini, whom I love and honour as much as you can—whose truth I have learned to revere as much as you have learned to revere it—when you ask me what reward this man has, I say that his reward is in his own honour, in his honest truthfulness, in the love for humanity he expresses, which makes thousands love him. He has no fears such as possess that man, that vagabond of the Tuileries, with his hand against every man; but this exile, almost prisoner, this recluse, this man shut out from the world, his life of truth gives me the highest hope, for he gains and gives sympathy forth to the world and to the noblest in the world. You tell me of your God. Why does he allow one to be hunted by police, and keep the other in a position to drive Europe before him with the edge of his sword? Why does God permit the armies of this crowned scoundrel of France to protect those Roman bandits, who keep daily open the bloody wounds of wretched Italy? I did not bring Napoleon or Mazzini into the debate, but if you want an argument against God's moral government, take that sink of vice and crime, Rome, the birthplace of your Christian faith, and source of all your Christian frauds; Rome, the cancer in the womb of Italian liberty. You shall have my sympathy with liberty and truth wherever needed, but we rather forget in this the subject for debate. We come here to discuss one theme which our friend has entirely neglected. We ought to have some evidence of God's moral government of the world. So far as our friend is concerned, every theme has been selected but this, and except reading from his memorandum book the pencil notes which he has made, my argument he has met by simply saying that "he cannot understand." He cannot understand the meanings of the words he uses himself, any more than the argument which he heard used against him. And he tells you of my weakness and my impudence, but each man has the right to say his best in his own way. Age carries with it no respect here, other than it warrants by matured thought. Mr. Cooper's past service carries

with it no respect here, unless he continues it by present duty. The speech which must not provoke laughter is sober and earnest utterance, and the service which finds respect is sterling honest work. Let our friend rely not on the past, not on old certificates of respect, but on the services he performs now, in bringing truth before you, speaking to your hearts and educating your brains, developing your intellects, and enlarging your humanity. When he does this he will have done something entitling him to reproach you if you fail in respect, and he will save himself the need of reproaching you at all, for he will win, as I do now, your warmest sympathy. (Loud Cheers.)

MR. COOPER: I go on to follow the plan which I suppose to be the right one. He claims to do the same thing. I think this the right plan to take up every sentence uttered, and to show that they are not to the point, that they are instead, great nonsense, and don't bear on the argument, and are simply false conclusions. I suppose that to be my plain duty. I come here to argue for the being of God as moral governor of the universe; Mr. Bradlaugh comes here to argue that there is no moral government. I spoke of children having a faculty. He asks how I know that children have a faculty? I say by watching its development. He says sin is not transgression of the law, for law consists of command and sequence. What has that to do with the position? I know that law is command, and there is sequence, which is punishment, if you do not obey. But how does that overthrow the truth of sin being a transgression of the law? If children are born without a faculty, how come they to ever discern whether there is a God or not? Indeed, that is the question between us—whether there is a God or not. Do not all men know God's laws? If he says we see this inequality of punishment, he would ask what is God about? I say that all human beings know more or less of God's law. He says that of some, more than others, God requires duty without reason. I say no: where precept has not been given to man, God does not expect him to fulfil. There is no teaching of any sort that I am aware of against this. I never learned among any class of persons any other belief in God, but that he dealt with all alike. In that sense, there was no such inconsistency of philosophy. But Mr. Bradlaugh said I was not to talk of myself. When I was talking of permission, I did not mean instigation. I did not mean any such thing as "to will it." I was not also to talk of analogy between men's nature and God's, between the intelligence of man and that of God. I say again that permission does not mean instigation. He says it does. I say it don't. He said something about "living for ever." Why does he affect not to know what every one else knew, why affect to be so stupid? "How did I know that there was an hereafter?" Because life is not so

perfect as my moral nature. I call will choice, and my moral nature is so strong on these points that I am obliged to attend to them. All men are aware of this hereafter, and their conscience in regard to it troubles all. But then he says, "Where is this future life to be? Is it to be here or elsewhere?" I am not anxious about that; I know that the judge of all the earth will do right. I am sure that the God who made me will do right; I am, therefore, not anxious. I am sure that it will be right. I cannot speak to what will be appointed to me. I may particularly call your attention to the strange remark made by Mr. Bradlaugh, when he instanced what he called a fact, that the Kaffirs had no hope of a future state, and that all ignorant people are oftener on their knees than on their feet. He says he has proved such a deficiency as will overthrow my argument for God's existence. I showed that man is forgetful, and he says that overthrows my argument. I said that the argument had not been met, and he said he had nothing to meet. Here are those representative men on this platform. Is the argument to be dismissed in this manner? Is that to go forth from this platform as an argument? And then what he says about the glass being of the same existence as that of man. (Cries of no no.) I cannot help being surprised at all this gibberish. (Cries of question, hisses, and cheers.) Why, you are not fit to listen to the question. (Hisses, and some confusion.) I am appealing to representative men. What is the use of argument, if this is argument? He treats the question as he likes. He tells us that he had a mission, and he said that all precognition was an utter absurdity. But the argument of the moral sense was the greatest argument that could be brought for the existence of a moral government. It has convinced others, and it has convinced me. That was the way in which such men as Clark and Gillespie, to whom Mr. Bradlaugh referred, arrived at the knowledge of moral governance. He said "that I said what I said before was there, only that it was not there." But if these great men held those doctrines which I defend, if thousands of other great men have held them; if these arguments have passed through the strongest minds of Englishmen, men who have done such mighty things in mathematics, men of such disciplined intellect, that there is a God as maker and moral governor of the universe, I am compelled to remind him that the argument was neither touched nor answered, and that all this "flibertigibbet" is not argument. Is this to be the close? Can you offer no further argument? Are you who assemble here to accept that as argument? Will you try to argue the question out or—(Cries of hear and hisses) Thank you for nothing. He complains of the order of moral government, and he talks of Louis Napoleon as having been successful while Mazzini is hunted by police, and he says the reason he does so is to rouse the



nation. It is a queer nation that—when one reflects on its meanness, its littleness, its lickspittleness, one feels contempt instead of admiration for a Frenchman at this time of day. (Cheers and hisses, which lasted for some seconds). Show me any six men whom you talk about—you may tell me that I am talking of the body of Frenchmen in the streets of Paris, but I say that they are unworthy as a nation to enjoy liberty. But in reply to my question, how is Mazzini rewarded? You say by his own sense of honour and truth. Why do you then say that he is neglected? What is there to complain of that things were not right? Why, according to this, it is right after all. But no, says my friend, it is not right. My friend blows hot and cold at the same time. Either the conscience of such men is guilty, and that things are not right in this world, or they are. Which will he have? He has chosen to take the latter conclusion with respect to these two cases. Why do such things exist, but because there is a moral government and we are moral agents? Then he talks of Rome, or rather he says, "We can talk about Rome." That is not my religion, that is not where I am. I always hated her for her bigotry and her tyrannies, and if I were a Roman Catholic and wished to put down Free-thought, I should perhaps have to arrest you first. But that is not my religion. I do not come from Rome. He then complains of my reading notes. But please come to this fact, that you have a conscience. I say you know it, and that you cannot conceal the fact from yourselves, that when you do wrong there is an inward chiding; you cannot shake it off. How came you to have it there? and for the future if there is no moral government, all will soon be over. "Men reasoned," and we are told further, that all sensible men laughed at the notion of immortality I professed. But he was sure that he would enjoy this world and everything that he could have in it as well, whether there was no future, and he referred to broad history. But whatever he may say, I say you sin against conscience, and you are rebuked by your moral sense. Oh, but he says "There is no such thing." I say there is, that if you do harm to your wife and children, or to your neighbour; if you commit dishonesty, you know that you blame yourself—the faculty, the moral faculty blames you. How could you have it if there were no accountability—no moral government? How comes it there? It has not been esteemed so very ridiculous by some of the greatest men that ever lived. It was said that when arguments would not convince Pascal, the moral feeling did. It is on record of Emmanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, that when the design argument, and the argument *a priori* failed to convince him, the moral sentiment convinced him. It was the testimony of Liebig that he was convinced by the moral argument when nothing else could convince him. "I feel this moral power within me," he said; "I cannot destroy it, I cannot see it, it

impels me, it controls me, it blames me. Why is it so, if this be the be-all and end-all, and there is no moral government?" (Hear, and cheers.)

MR. BRADLAUGH: It is not true that it convinced Locke, Newton, or Samuel Clarke. They take lines of argument opposed to each other. The illustration is not a fair one, any more than the quotation from Plato was a correct one. I am surprised at Mr. Cooper's lamentable blunder as to laws, as denoting invariable sequence, telling me that law means command, and that the sequence follows the breach as punishment. Now, with fifty-nine years of experience, to make such a sad blunder when his distinction of law as command and law as sequence were put before you in my speech, is at least most extraordinary. I cannot believe that he has been serious. He surely cannot be so ignorant of the commonest terms with which thinkers deal; or, if he is so ignorant, I am justified in standing up in this debate and saying that he has no right to discuss these subjects at all. If he does not understand the argument, if he does not understand the meaning of words, then I say that he is unfit to argue; and if he does understand them, his speech is worse than worthless, because wilfully evasive.

MR. COOPER: I do not know what you are referring to.

MR. BRADLAUGH: I will do him the justice to say that he did not, in his last speech, refer to the subject we have met to discuss. I think I will also do him the justice to say that it was the strangest and most incoherent speech I ever heard, and I am free to add that in his attempts to demonstrate Deity he has broken down lamentably. (Hear, and cheers.)

MR. COOPER rose, and was understood to say that this was downright impudence.

MR. BRADLAUGH: I did not interrupt when he was talking about gibberish. I have a right to comment on his speech in my own way—in the way that seems to me best. I asked him how he knew that the moral faculty existed in children. He says by watching its development. He took no pains to tell you what he meant. I will try to do so. The basis for this so-called faculty is organisation, differing in each individual—that organisation is educated, and this education also varies with each. Therefore this so-called faculty is ultimately resultant from development of organisation. That basis must be limited and varied. It varies perceptibly in different races of mankind. There is a different development to each individual, and this education of organisation helps to make up what we call conscience, this conscience varying in its exercise in different spheres, and by different individuals. Faculty I say it is not, it is only a condition, the result of all these circumstances, but is never independent of them. This alleged moral faculty never

existed without these, either in children, men, or women, at any age. Then our friend said that all human beings knew more or less of God's laws—some knew more, he says, some knew less. Well, if that is so, if some had abundance, and some were deficient, then God has been unkind either to them to whom he has given but little knowledge, or to those to whom he has given much. The knowledge of God's laws must be either good or bad. If it is good for all to have a complete knowledge, then there is injustice in giving to some more, to some less: if it is bad to have the knowledge, then there is injustice in giving it to any. In either case you have an argument against the moral government. Then our friend goes on to say, "The future does not trouble me." He knows what kind of service will be allotted to him by God or by any one competent to make the allotment. I can tell him one kind of service which will certainly not be allotted to him, and that is, the task of proving that there is a God—or the moral character of his government. (Cheers.) That duty will never more be allotted to him. (Cheers.) Our friend was good enough to tell us that it was the strongest effort of his mind this demonstration of moral sense, and that he had made it so clear that there was hardly any use in his arguing the question with me about it. I will wait till the report shall be in print—that will speak for itself. I did not refer to last night till he took the opportunity of introducing it. I would not have brought it forward because there remained no point needing comment. I can well conceive a man lamenting during the day over a defeat, and trying again to-night to talk it into a semblance of victory. You referred to Mazzini, and asked why I complained. You say—"Oh, but it is right or it is wrong." Why use this term right or wrong? If you use them, the one as conducing to happiness, the other as producing a state of pain, I can understand what you mean. It is a state of happiness for a man to work for good—to work for truth—the development of truth amongst his fellows; he finds happiness in so doing. But it is a source of pain to him to know there is so much evil yet to be undone. You can believe the man more happy who does right than he who commits a wrong, and this whether there be a God or not. But God, my friend says, is all-good—that which results from him is therefore all-good—it must be all-good, as no evil can come from an infinite God. Atheism is in the world, and it must come from some source, as out of nothing nothing can come. God is the source of all, it must therefore come from God, therefore Atheism is from God; but God is good, therefore Atheism is good. And now for the French. They are a queer nation, says our friend. He has been told so perhaps, but those who have been among them think otherwise. Queer they are, but the men who are most queer amongst them are the men who are most under the domi-



nance of theology, and least under the influence of Freethought. I have found that men who are least under the influence of the priest are the men who have been best disposed to bring about a better state of things for their country. These are not the men who speak of in such unwarrantable language. There are men who bend before the rising sun, who bow before the crown, but these are not the men developed by thought and truth. There are men who have been mi-developed by the misgovernment of kings and priests ordained by God, who left them without moral thought, and destitute of manhood. Those men whom you call lick-spittles—men in Paris, men at Lyons, men at Bourdeaux, in the North and in the South—are men speaking for their country, men working for liberty, hoping to attain it for their own country and for others. Men are now striving for liberty again in France. (Cheers.) Then you come to Rome. Is that so far from your religion that you can afford to attack it? Rotten branch, you do well to shun the stem from which you spring (Loud cheering.) Matricidal son, you do nobly to plant the dagger of calumny in the breast of the mother church which bore you. How well pleased her son should be to cover her with odium; but where would be your church without its early gospel forgeries—where your Christian establishments, your bishoprics, your evidences, your prisons, your revenues, all things that go to make up your faith, if they had not been treasured up, garnished, furnished in Rome? You say you are not Roman Catholic, and that Roman Catholics will burn men—so will Protestants. Protestants have burned Roman Catholics. There is a place not so far as Caffraria, there is Newgate, where Protestant Christian noblemen piled up stones on men of the Romish faith until the blood gushed from their forehead and finger-ends because they would not plead before judges who had pre-determined to condemn them. You tell me you do not—I answer, you do not, because you dare not do such things now. It is within the brief span of your own lifetime, when you were but little older than I am now, that dissenting clergymen sentenced Richard Carlile and Robert Taylor to Oakbam, Giltspur Street, and Newgate, and harassed Carlile's family with starvation for holding such opinions I now hold. (Loud cheers.) You could not do all this to-day, because the stream of human thought is rushing onward, and would drown your fires if you dared kindle them. You are only losing time in advocating the past, because new thought is more powerful than old faith—it has trampled out your faggots. Make not a boast over Roman Catholics, both fruit of one tree—rotten fruit I admit; both are laden with poison, both have given to the world a heritage—slavery, tyrants, and chains. It is left for the republic of human intellect to erect a better state of things. (Loud and protracted cheering.)

MR. COOPER: I am returning to the affirmation with which he sets out. He says that Locke, Newton, and Clark oppose each other upon this question. I say they don't. He said what I quoted from Plato is not in Plato. I say it is. What use in trying to persuade people that I do not understand my own argument? I said I did not understand what Bradlaugh said about command and sequence. He knew he said that I did not understand my own argument. He asked me how did I know that men in this world in various nations and situations had more or less knowledge of God's law? I said I knew it by their acts, and then he said it was unkind that God did not reveal to them the law. He could not; and only when this great moral world should be destroyed, would there be justice done. If men transgressed the law, says Mr. Bradlaugh, they should not be punished for it in this state, he will have no doubt about it in the next state. So my friend will argue that the virtuous are more happy even in this world, and yet nothing is right. Can you understand this reasoning? He asked me not to blow hot and cold. It is the most stupid talk I ever heard in the world. He first tells me that it is right, and then that it is wrong. I cannot understand all this. The men in France and the priests are so and so. Yes. Why? Because they bowed to the dominance of the priests, and not because of theology in general. I have it on the testimony of a gentleman who went to live in a house in Bordeaux to commence an undertaking as an agriculturist. He commenced by giving some books to the peasantry on his estate. They bowed as they received them, and appeared thankful. In three days, however, they came back to him, and politely requested that they might see the governor of the farm. The *Peré* [Mr. Cooper pronounced this word with accent on the last syllable, a circumstance which caused some laughter and surprise, which it is necessary to explain, that a portion of the following speech of Mr. Bradlaugh's may be understood.] The *Peré* was a priest in the village, who, he said, told him that they did not read such books because of their religion, and they very seldom made acquaintance with anything beside theology. The great mass of them bow to the domination of the priest; and so these lickspittles exist in France, and are, according to my friend, made under God's moral government. Has he shown that any other government will account for the various arguments that have been adduced? As this is the last time I shall address you, I will simply appeal to your consciences again. You have a conscience, every man has a conscience, to which he is responsible in the first instance. You need not smile—it will not be a smiling matter if, on your death-bed, your conscience tells you that I am right and that you are wrong. We will all have to meet it. Every one of us. I have talked before of death-beds, and there was no indisposition

to listen to me then. If morality is not taught in this room now, it ought to be. It used to be. You have a conscience which has dictates, and which, if you do not obey it, flogs you. If you violate conscience, on your death-bed it will not be a happy one. You say there is no future. You may contrive to allay the gnawings of conscience in some degree—you will not kill them. They will be there up to the last. You had better listen to conscience before it is too late. The more you ponder on this fact, the more you will begin to see that there is a moral nature, and the more clearly you will apprehend that there must be a moral governor. I wish I had pondered more on this fact in my early life. It began with that point of government—it began in John Street in a discussion upon one of Mr. Owen's propositions, that man is the creature of circumstances. He was laughed at when he said there was no praise or blame. In the controversy, I began to blame myself and praise others. Why, I began to ask, do you praise such men as Louis Blanc, Mazzini, and Kossuth when their name is mentioned, and execrate Louis Napoleon? Praise and blame! We cannot help it. It is no use telling me there is no such thing as sinning against conscience—there is something which you cannot get rid of, which cannot be got out of the mind, which cannot be got out of the heart. You go about with this conscience, with the certainty that it is there perpetually—a tribunal within you. If you reflect on it, the more you will feel convinced that moral government exists. I reflected, and I said, what I have ever since maintained, that there exists a moral government for man, whose head is the Governor and Creator of the Universe. (Hear, hear.)

MR. BRADLAUGH: It would be impossible to demonstrate to-night that my remarks, in reference to Locke, Newton, and Samuel Clark, were well founded. A quarter of an hour will not suffice for that purpose. But I will take occasion to say something in respect of what has been said to come from Plato. It is very curious that, in the "Timæus" which I hold in my hand, there is a passage precisely the opposite to that which my friend quoted, and I have not been able to find any thing like the sentence he quoted from Plato. What I do find is in opposition to what he has attributed to Plato. I take pains to be moderately correct before I challenge an assertion made in this way. (Mr. Cooper here interrupted) He tells me the passage is there, and when I discover a passage having an opposite meaning, he asks me where it is. You first quoted the passage which you say is in Plato, and it is for you to point it out.

MR. COOPER: I don't know what you are talking about.

MR. BRADLAUGH: You soon will know what I am talking about if you are indecent enough to continually interrupt. If you do not begrudge me this last speech, at least keep quiet. If



fifty-nine years have not taught you the advantage of imitating younger men by listening patiently to opposite opinions, such a lesson may be taught you here to-night.

MR. COOPER: Hold your impudence. (Loud cries of "Keep your temper.")

MR. BRADLAUGH: With regard to the agricultural population, that of England would be as little likely to preserve and read the works of Paine or of Cobbett, as were the agriculturists of the South of France to read works that were not recognised by the Roman Catholic Church. I submit that no greater illustration in favour of my friend could be drawn from the conduct of the agriculturists in France, than I could draw, on the contrary, from the agricultural population in this country, and even in the counties of Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, where the people are ignorant in the extreme, many of them in these enlightened days being unable to read or write. They have plenty of clergymen—take Harwich and for miles round, it is a place where you will find an agricultural population as ignorant, as pious, and as poor as any in England. Our friend again appealed to conscience, without having devoted one thought to the way in which he accounted for conscience. Never having permitted himself to explain one of the points challenged by me, he talks about conscience as if it had never been referred to in my speeches. Feeling that his position was weak, and knowing that he had made nothing of it, he comes to the old and oft-tried death-bed argument to frighten those whom he cannot convince. (Cheers.) I ask you, will you think yourselves the better men that you are frightened into this conscience dogma, which you could not reasonably believe, and which you are asked to accept from fear, though you rejected it when you said there was not evidence enough to convince you? When he thus deals with death-beds, is it, does he think, to have some effect on the conclusion of the debate? If he search for death-bed arguments, he may find enough for his own refutation. He has appealed to the cross, and I accept his challenge, and ask him what were the dying words of Christ himself? "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?" If he who claimed to be God and man was so deserted in his dying moments, what hope have you? Better recommend salvation by your own manly thought—your own efforts for the development of human happiness. My friend says that morality used to be taught in this room when he was here, and implies that the reverse is now the case. What call you morality? Is that a moral act which tends to the greatest happiness of the greatest number according to the knowledge of the actor? No other definition can you give. I challenge all of you who stand before me whether in every lecture, teaching, or preaching by me—if you will have it so, whether the burthen of my lecture has not been the inculcation of morality?

The Freetinkers have not fallen away from the cause of truth and morality. When you presume to deal with myself and my audience here, as if we were schoolboys still and you teacher, you should be prepared with solid instruction as justification for your presumption, and when you wish men not to laugh at you, you should have some reason better than your age—something more argumentative than impudence. You should, at least, know better what you are talking about. (Loud cries of question, question, hear, hear, and cheers.) When the construction of terms is referred to, and you tell me more than twice that you do not understand the difference between sequence and command, I am obliged to tell you that you do not understand the commonest rudiments of language, and are unfitted to conduct a grave discussion; and when you say you “never did say so and so,” that you have a short memory. I can only add that you are either unable to argue at all, or you are disingenuously concealing what you know would be fatal to your position. (Cheers.) There has not been, I repeat, an attempt by you at logic or argument. How is it that the friends whom I saw around Mr. Cooper last night have this evening fled from his flag? I saw last evening, and I was pleased to see sitting on that side, men of intellect, men of talent—equal to the task of weighing the force of an argument addressed to them, and knowing the exact value of words. How is it that they were brought here to wait on victory, but have not returned here to witness the fray, now the hope for victory has become defeat? Is it because there was not on the part of the Christian advocate even the shadow of a pretence of having advanced anything in favour of his side the question? It is because they came here seeking in me one who was, as you have declared, too ignorant to meet you, but notwithstanding I am now here to fulfil my part, and show that even my ignorance transcends your knowledge.

MR. COOPER: Is that argument?

MR. BRADLAUGH: I know it is not argument, but it is as good argument as “gibberish;” it is as good argument and quite as forcible as the “impudence,” or that you did not come here to meet Charles Bradlaugh; that you are not to be answered because you are fifty-nine years of age. It would have been better for both of us to have discussed carefully, and to have reasoned together step by step till we reached the height of this great argument which deserves great discussion; but when an attempt is made to override discussion, I am obliged to turn round, and to show the cause of such hardness which lies either in his utter inability or his desire to avoid the question altogether. (Cheers.) I leave the matter in your hands. I admit that I am not the ablest or the fittest representative the Freethought party might have put forward. But although I am not the best I have honestly upheld the principles

of those who trusted their cause to me, and if I have failed, I have failed in consequence of the weakness of the advocate; but you, with the cause of God on your side, and boasting of your great intellect, you thinking you had only a poor piece of ignorance to combat—I say you have only made a shadow of a defence. On your side has been all the pretence. I remember when at the Wigan Hall, at the U. P. Kirk, Glasgow, at Manchester, and here you refused to meet me. (Loud cries of question, question, cheers, and hisses) Why, there is not a shred of the question left. (Great cheering.) I say again it was in the public Hall at Wigan, it was in the U. P. Kirk, Glasgow, in this Hall of Science, in the chapel at Manchester, that you told me I was too ignorant to be met, that I could not understand the meaning of words. We have to-night an illustration of your learning when, in the language most commonly spoken throughout Europe and the world, we hear the word *père* (father) pronounced pary (laughter), proving the extent of your erudition. It would have been improper for me to deal with this stupid blunder if he had not been used to boast of the acquisition of fourteen languages, and summoned the world as scholars to hear his champion lectures. Are you then the Christian who placards the walls of cities professing to meet all Freethinkers in England with a view to convert their doubts? Are you *par excellence* the person who has read every book carefully to find evidence and argument for the existence of God, who claim to be teacher and preacher of Christian doctrine, bridging over centuries of history with irrefragable evidences? It is to be hoped that when it is necessary to find a champion for the tottering orthodoxy and an argument in favour of a blind belief, some abler representative will be found by the Christian body to whom to trust the marshalling of its forces for another defeat.

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Mr. Bradlaugh sat down amidst loud cheering, which was renewed again and again. This concluded the discussion, and a formal vote of thanks having been passed to the chairman, the meeting separated.



A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.

GILLESPIE says that "an Atheist propagandist seems a non-descript monster created by nature in a moment of madness." Despite this opinion, it is as the propagandist of Atheism that I pen the following lines, in the hope that I may succeed in removing some few of the many prejudices which have been created against not only the actual holders of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully suspected of entertaining such ideas. Men who have been famous for depth of thought, for excellent wit, or great genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists, by those who lacked the high qualifications against which the spleen of the calumniators was directed. Thus, not only has Voltaire been without ground accused of Atheism, but Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley himself, have, amongst others, been denounced by thoughtless or unscrupulous pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the accusation being that they manifested an inclination to improve human thought.

It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favouring immorality, and of Atheists as men whose conduct is necessarily vicious, and who have adopted atheistic views as a desperate defiance against a Deity justly offended by the badness of their lives. Such persons urge that amongst the proximate causes of Atheism are vicious training, immoral and profligate companions, licentious living, and the like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his "Instructions on Christian Theology," goes so far as to declare that "nearly all the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely debauched and vile conduct." Such language from the Christian advocate is not surprising, but there are others who, professing great desire for the spread of Freethought,

and with pretensions to rank amongst acute and liberal thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, and its teachings cold, barren, and negative. In this brief essay I shall except to each of the above allegations, and shall endeavour to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possibility for human happiness than any system yet based on Theism, or possible to be founded thereon, and that the lives of true Atheists must be more virtuous, because more human, than those of the believers in Deity, the humanity of the devout believer often finding itself neutralised by a faith with which it is necessarily in constant collision. The devotee piling the faggots at the *auto da fé* of an heretic, and that heretic his son, might, notwithstanding, be a good father in every respect but this. Heresy, in the eyes of the believer, is highest criminality, and outweighs all claims of family or affection.

Atheism, properly understood, is in nowise a cold, barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion and action of highest humanity.

Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned—its defence unheard—on the *ex parte* slanders of the professional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage is bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but whose valour becomes tempered with discretion when a free platform is afforded and discussion claimed; nor misjudged because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best policy against all prejudice is to assert firmly the verity. The Atheist does not say "There is no God," but he says, "I know not what you mean by God; I am without idea of God; the word 'God' is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because I cannot deny that of which I have no conception, and the conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me." If you speak to the Atheist of God as creator, he answers that the conception of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished, much less can we conceive an absolute origination of substance. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something,

or on the other, something becoming nothing. The Theist who speaks of God creating the universe, must either suppose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he produced it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify Universe and Deity, and be Pantheism rather than Theism. There would be no distinction of substance—in fact no creation. Nor can the Theist regard the universe as created out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him, necessarily eternal and infinite. His existence being eternal and infinite, precludes the possibility of the conception of vacuum to be filled by the universe if created. No one can even think of any point of existence in extent or duration and say, here is the point of separation between the creator and the created. Indeed, it is not possible for the Theist to imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not possible to conceive either an absolute commencement, or an absolute termination of existence; that is, it is impossible to conceive beginning before which you have a period when the universe has yet to be; or to conceive an end, after which the universe, having been, no longer exists. It is impossible in thought to originate or annihilate the universe. The Atheist affirms that he cognises to-day effects, that these are at the same time causes and effects—causes to the effects they precede, effects to the causes they follow. Cause is simply everything without which the effect would not result, and with which it must result. Cause is the means to an end, consummating itself in that end. The Theist who argues for creation must assert a point of time, that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist. At this point of time either something existed or nothing; but something must have existed, for out of nothing nothing can come. Something must have existed, because the point fixed upon is that of the duration of something. This something must have been either finite or infinite; if finite, it could not have been God, and if the something were infinite, then creation was impossible, as it is impossible to add to infinite existence.

If you leave the question of creation and deal with the government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are by no means lessened. The existence of evil is then a terrible stumbling-block to the Theist. Pain, misery,



crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness, and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good; nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would not be all-powerful. Evil must either have had a beginning, or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it cannot be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it have had a beginning, for if it had it must either have originated in God, or outside God; but, according to the Theist, it cannot have originated in God, for he is all-good, and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist, God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or beyond infinity.

To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but not a result from God or Devil. He affirms that by conduct founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge increases, to prevent its future recurrence.

Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder, lie, or steal without fear of any consequences. To try the actual value of this argument, it is not unfair to ask—Do Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft, the belief in God and his power to punish has been inefficient as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or murder? If yes, the same remark has further force—hell-fire failing against the lesser as against the greater crime. The fact is that those who use such an argument overlook a great truth—*i.e.*, that all men seek happiness, though in very diverse fashions. Ignorant and miseducated men often mistake the true path to happiness, and commit crime in the endeavour to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching mankind the real road to human happiness, it is possible to keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error. Atheists would teach men to be moral now, not because God offers as an inducement reward by and by, but because in the virtuous act itself immediate good is ensured to the doer and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve

man from lying, stealing, murdering now, not from fear of an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make this life itself a course of misery.

While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor of the universe, hinders and checks man's efforts by declaring God's will to be the sole directing and controlling power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be in accordance with natural laws—that is, happening in certain ascertainable sequences—stimulates man to discover the best conditions of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements to morality. While the Theist provides future happiness for a scoundrel repentant on his death-bed, Atheism affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does his best to live here so well as to have little cause for repenting hereafter.

Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theist as visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meekness and content. Atheism declares that physiological knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing our infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not as the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated dwellings and workshops, bad and insufficient food, excessive toil, mental suffering, exposure to inclement weather, and the like—all these finding root in poverty, the chief source of crime and disease; that prayers and piety afford no protection against fever, and that if the human being be kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.

ICONOCLAST.