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TO: Jim and Bill
FROM: Heather
DATE: May 27, 1991
SUBJECT: El Salvador Trip

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY

A few quick notes in follow up to my and Jim's conversation last week...

1. The businessman who might have some insights on current day military -- and who could be gently tossed the "hot potato" to take initiatives on the Jesuit case -- is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] As mentioned to Jim, the best route is through [REDACTED]. He should remember my name from our August 1990 conversation at his office. Describing himself to me as "not a liberal" and not pro-Jesuit, he said he believed a serious line was crossed in the killing of the Jesuits. (My supposition is that [REDACTED] is less conservative and more religious.) He has intervened with the military (both Salvadoran and U.S.) on this case in an earlier period, but seemed dejected and cynical when I spoke with him. (When he spoke to U.S. military about pushing on the Jesuit case, they said, "we can't because we're not Salvadoran. Why don't you?" Also, military-sanctioned car theft was picking up again around then, despite Ponce's promises to him previously that it was under control. [REDACTED] said he thought the U.S. would ditch El Salvador, slashing military aid but leaving the military with significant political power.) He said at the time that the Cristiani government had changed for the worse, and was listening to ultra-conservatives (military and civilian) who were visiting El Salvador and telling the Salvadoran military and Cristiani they didn't have to worry. (Deborah? Council for Inter-Amer Security?) You would need to start immediately on arrival with Sandra to get this appointment. Should she not be in town, you could call Moakley's office from there, have them let me know and I could set up the appointment by calling down.

2. For background, Doug Mine at Associated Press (Camino Real) knows a lot about helicopters, and Salvadoran pilots' thoughts and talk on Cobras and training, etc.

3. It is worth pursuing a conversation with Mons. [REDACTED] about possible priest approaches to the accused men's families and to them individually. This would be an accepted channel (assuming some or all are Catholic!). Urioste--likewise with Rosa Chavez--might know if priest(s) had approached the families or men, and if not, if this is contemplated. While priestly endeavors of this sort are obviously confidential, some new information might be "shaken loose" to someone important. And the two mentioned above need to know that you think that additional initiatives beyond the

MT (Moakley team) are particularly important at this point. [REDACTED] is very well connected to all sorts, though you might be put off by his lack of zeal (he doesn't believe there will be justice in this case). [REDACTED] likewise--though differently--had good Catholic channels which could/should be tapped.

4. On parallel questions to various appointments re negotiations as related to the Jesuit case, the following issues might be raised (perhaps with Iain Murray, Mark Hamilton, Tom Gibb, [REDACTED] and ICRC rep if you could get him to talk).

a. Which are the most important (military) (judicial) (electoral) reforms not addressed by the constitutional changes which will require decisions/compromise in the weeks/months ahead?

b. What are the most important differences in what the GOES and the FMLN believe are the next steps ahead? (For GOES, cease-fire before a second Assembly vote, and, for FMLN, concrete moves towards reforms as a pre-condition for its demobilization and participation in the 1994 vote.)

c. What is the role of the Commission on Truth vs the Ad Hoc group on military impunity? How do their roles differ, what is the timing for their activities and what would happen if one or the other became politically problematic? [This relates to the concern that the former will move ahead more rapidly than the latter, possibly building the argument for some that the latter is unnecessary. Hamilton mused with me in February as to "whether we wouldn't just come out in the end in the same place with self-purge."]

d. What do you see as the FMLN political agenda in the two-and-a-half years before the 1994 elections? How would you rank the following as factors in influencing their flexibility at the negotiating table: ideological core beliefs; strategy/political disagreements among selves; need to demonstrate political gains to rank-and-file; distrust of military and possible actions toward disarmed combatants; dwindling source of outside political/military support; need to build conditions for pre-elections political activism; the irreversibility of a cease-fire.

e. What are the factors which separate/unite Cristiani, his government and the ARENA party in positions toward negotiations at this time? What are the most important non-ARENA anti-negotiations forces on the right? How does the Jesuit case relate to these?

f. Where do FMLN and Cristiani converge/differ in their approaches to terms of cease-fire? (location, duration, timing, arms, political access, etc)

All the best to my two very favorite almost FBI investigators!