

See. This is important to read —

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To: Members, Speaker's Task Force on El Salvador
From: Task Force staff

This memo is intended to provide a summary of selected information, issues and questions for use during the Task Force visit to El Salvador.

Although the primary emphasis is on the Jesuits case, some other issues are outlined.

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1. Ambassador Walker and President Cristiani could be asked about the status of the investigation and about efforts to investigate the potential involvement of D'Aubuisson and other ARENA leaders. For example, has Salvadoran right wing leader Orlanda de Sola been questioned about his presence in Guatemala shortly before the killings? What efforts have been made to investigate the charges made by Cerezo and Gramajo about ARENA's alleged assistance to Guatemalan terrorists?

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

Most recent positions on the status of negotiations:

Central American Presidents agreement, December 12:

The Presidents...support the Government of El Salvador in its repeated proposal to find a solution to the Salvadoran conflict through peaceful and democratic means, and in that sense, repeat their vehement appeal that the FMLN immediately and effectively cease its hostilities in that fraternal country and that it join the process of dialogue which has already begun. They energetically demand in addition that the FMLN publicly renounce all types of violent actions that may directly or indirectly affect the civilian population. The five Presidents decided...to ask the Secretary General of the United Nations...to take the necessary actions to renew a dialogue between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN and thus contribute to its successful development... "

President Cristiani: Supports UN mediation; recently met with UN Sec. Gen. Perez Cuellar to discuss modalities. In negotiations last fall, the government said that the FMLN should cease hostilities as a precondition to serious negotiations.

FMLN: Also accepts UN mediation. In recent statements, the FMLN

HECTOR OQUELI

Hector Oqueli, an opposition political leader of the same party as leftist Presidential candidate Guillermo Ungo was murdered in Guatemala January 12th. His case is important because Oqueli was among those threatened by name in broadcasts on Salvadoran radio shortly after the guerilla offensive began. Moreover, close links have long existed between right wing extremists in Guatemala and ARENA party leader Roberto D'Aubuisson:

- o D'Aubuisson associate Denis Moran presently serves as Salvadoran military attache in Guatemala City. Moran is widely believed to have particated in death squad activities, under D'Abuisson's direction, in the early 1980's.
- o Guatemalan Defense Minister Gramajo told reporters recently that ARENA has provided Guatemalan extremists with two safehouses in San Salvador.
- o In addition, Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo recently accused D'Aubuisson and other ARENA members of arming Guat. paramilitary groups, which conducted a series of attacks against human rights and opposition groups in Guat. beginning in August, 1989.

Guat. Int. Min. Gen. Carlos Morales Villatoro said on Jan. 14 that Oqueli was killed by 'foreign commandos' operating in his country. Morales said that the identity of the foreign commandos had been known for weeks and was responsible for many terrorist attacks. He said the group has killed several people and carried out bomb attacks.

On January 27, Guatemalan authorities arrested six Guatemalans found with a cache of weapons and accused them of the crime.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS.

himself, made to investigate the charges.

3. The Ambassador, other Embassy officials and military leaders could be asked explicitly whether the type of death squad operation described by Martinez was, in fact, carried out by the First Brigade.

CESAR VILEMAN JOYA MARTINEZ

Joya Martinez met with Task Force members on January 31st. He is a 28 year old, former intelligence officer of the First Brigade, which is stationed in San Salvador.

According to Martinez, he was assigned to a specialized unit whose function, in addition to normal intelligence work, was to kill suspected subversives. In the course of his work between the end of 1987 and July, 1989, he claims to have participated in operations that assassinated more than 70 people, and that he personally killed 8. These actions were carried out under direct orders from his superiors, who included unit commander Major Diaz Hernandez, and First Brigade Commanders Col. Orlando Zepeda (until June, 1989) and Col. Elena Fuentes. Zepeda is now the Deputy Minister of Defense.

Throughout this time, two Americans, code-named "William" and "Major" were assigned to the unit. The Americans provided expenses for unit operations and regularly received reports of unit operations, excluding the killings. Martinez says that the Americans rebuffed efforts on his part to inform them that the killings were being done.

The staff delegation was told by one Embassy officer that the charges made by Joya Martinez were "credible" and by another that the charges were "worth looking into".

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS.

1. Ambassador Walker could be asked to describe his efforts to investigate Martinez' charges, which were highly publicized at the time of Martinez' escape from El Salvador. Were two Americans assigned to the unit? In what capacity? Have they been questioned? Who are they? Could the Task Force interview them?
2. President Cristiani could be asked about any efforts he has,

witness in the case, and Archbishop Rivera y Damas accused the Embassy of participating in an effort to "brainwash" her.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS

1. Ambassador Walker could be asked whether he has ordered Embassy personnel to refrain from making any statements, formal or informal, that could be interpreted as "anti-church", whether those statements refer to individuals or to institutions.

2. Both military and church officials could be asked about their willingness to increase personal contacts, and to participate in joint discussions, especially about social issues and about the prospects for successful peace negotiations.

3. President Cristiani and military leaders could be asked to explain the rationale for raids, searches, detentions and arrests of church workers. What standard of evidence is used to prompt such a search? Are these merely fishing expeditions, or is some sort of concrete evidence required before a search is made?

4. Ambassador Walker could be asked what efforts he has made to persuade the government not to undertake searches or detain people for questioning without concrete evidence to justify the action.

In addition, Attorney General Mauricio Colorado publicly urged Catholic leaders to leave the country and called on senior church officials to investigate Archbishop Rivera y Damas and other church officials, saying "if the people do not support the FMLN, then why do Monsignor Rivera y Damas and Msgr. Rosa Chavez give the impression that they do?"

In January, the Task Force's staff delegation asked the Army High Command to discuss the issue of church involvement with the FMLN. Deputy Defense Minister (and former Chief of Intelligence) Orlando Zepeda replied by saying that no one can deny that those at the University of Central America have had some kind of advisory role to the FMLN. As a University, it is a center of information inclined to the left, and a certain concept of the revolutionary struggle was generated there. But UCA leaders did not have any direct armed participation. Even though soldiers were fired on from inside UCA during the offensive, those firing were probably not UCA people.

Colonel Ponce told the staff delegation that it is wrong to believe that the military is anti-church. He pointed out, for example, that there are chaplains in all the military cuartels.

The staff delegation also raised this issue with President Cristiani, who agreed it was serious, but who also said that the climate could not be changed in a single day. He said that he had personally sought to improve the situation by asking Monsignor Rosa Chavez to offer a prayer prior to a meeting that Cristiani had with military leaders. Unfortunately, Rosa Chavez was booed and whistled at and the experiment did not go well.

A related issue concerns the state of feelings between church leaders and the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. Although Ambassador Walker has made a vigorous effort to maintain good relations, serious problems did arise in the aftermath of the Jesuits case. Jesuit leaders told the staff delegation that they were misled by one Embassy officer about the treatment of Lucia Berna, the

THE ATMOSPHERE OF THREATS AND INTIMIDATION

Church officials and human rights organizations point to the prevailing atmosphere of threats and intimidation in El Salvador as an obstacle to any assurance that incidents like the murder of the Jesuits will not be repeated.

Since the late 1970's, there have been periodic incidents of harassment and sometimes violence perpetrated against church officials and workers, often by the military. A highly-publicized example of this was the murder of four American churchwomen by a unit of the National Guard in December, 1980.

During the months leading up to the murder of the Jesuits, specific threats were made on several occasions against Father Ellacuria and other Jesuit leaders. On July 3, in a paid ad, a group called the "Crusade for Peace and Work" attacked Segundo Montes and Ellacuria by name, calling them 'commanders' of the 'terrorist hordes bringing violence to our country.'

According to a Danish press report in October, "Col. Orlando Zepeda averred that the Jesuit Univ. of Central America is a stronghold for urban guerrilla groups."

During the five days between the start of the guerrilla offensive and the murder of the Jesuits, a military-controlled radio station broadcast numerous personal threats against the Jesuits, other church leaders, and opposition political leaders Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo.

After the crime, many church leaders complained about searches, harassment and expulsions of foreign workers from their offices. Colonel Ponce responded to these complaints by saying that: "There's no persecution of the church. There's persecution of subversive terrorists. Unfortunately, some of them hide in the skirts of the religious workers."

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:

1. Given the importance of the alleged conversation between Rivas and Benevides to any assessment of the integrity of the investigation; and given the fact that an American major has been accused of lying about this conversation; why haven't the two people who could confirm the truth of the American major's story been polygraphed: Lt. Col. Rivas and Lt. Col. Lopez y Lopez.

2. Why did Col. Menjivar act without permission from senior Embassy officials? Who, other than Col. Ponce, was present when Menjivar and Elmore went to the High Command? Why did Ponce demand that the accusations be put in writing? Can the Task Force obtain a copy of the written statement taken back to the High Command by Menjivar?

3. Was this sequence of events the triggering factor in the SIU's production of evidence to implicate the Atlacatl?

4. What were the results of subsequent polygraph tests of the American Major?

5. Why did Col. Aviles confide in the American major?

6. If, in fact, Benevides told Rivas of his involvement--when did this conversation occur? What actions did Rivas take as a result of this knowledge? More basically--if Rivas was aware, at an early date, of Benevides' guilt, why did it take until early January before this information went public and then only as the result of Menjivar's willingness to confront Ponce?

conversation between Benevides and Lt. Col. Rivas in which Benevides apparently took responsibility for the crime (see discussion below).

6. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to describe the potential obstacles within the Salvadoran judicial system to a conviction of those presently charged with the murders.

THE MENJIVAR-AVILES AFFAIR

(note: this information is based on staff, and some Member-level discussions with U.S. Embassy personnel)

On January 2nd, U.S. Mil. Group leader Col. Milton Menjivar was told that an American Major in his unit had been told some ten days previously of a conversation between the Col. Benevides and SIU head Lt. Col. Rivas in which Benevides admitted at least some responsibility for killing the Jesuits. This information was passed to the Major by Col. Aviles, a friend, who said he had obtained it from Lt. Col. Lopez y Lopez, a former head of the SIU, who was then providing assistance to Rivas.

Acting without the permission either of the Ambassador or DCM Jeffrey Dietrich, Menjivar and political officer Janice Elmore immediately confronted Col. Ponce and unspecified other members of the high command with the information. Ponce responded by telling Menjivar to put the accusation in writing.

Menjivar returned to the Embassy and prepared the statement and returned to the High Command. Col. Aviles and Lopez y Lopez are brought in, both deny they said anything to the American Major. Both Aviles and the Major are polygraphed, both fail.

Five days later, SIU has produced evidence from ballistics tests that prove Atlacatl involvement in the murders. Cristiani makes the announcement of military involvement and arrests follow soon thereafter.

3. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to respond to the circumstantial evidence that exists to indicate that the crimes were ordered by individuals senior to Col. Benevides. This evidence includes:

- o Col. Benevides reputation as a relatively non-political officer, with no history of anti-clerical attitudes;

- o the fact that the Salvadoran military system and structure would seem to make it unlikely that Benevides would have taken an action as serious as murdering the Jesuits without the approval of his superiors; and

- o the virtual certainty that members of the Atlacatl unit would be identified as the killers unless other military officials cooperated in a coverup (see below).

4. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be questioned about direct and circumstantial evidence that a cover-up occurred. This evidence includes:

- o the fact that the trucks carrying the Atlacatl unit from the military school to UCA on the night of the murders would have had to pass through at least one military road block. Why was this not reported? Were the officers at these roadblocks questioned?

- o El Salvador has a very extensive military intelligence system. Were senior intelligence officers questioned to ascertain any information they might have had about the crime? How did the captain who reportedly interrupted a meeting of the National Intelligence Directorate on the morning of the crime learn that it had been committed?

5. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked detailed questions about the alleged conversation between an American major and Salvadoran Lieutenant Col. Aviles about another alleged

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS.

1. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to comment on the press reports concerning the alleged meeting of the High Command on November 15th. Did such a meeting occur? Who was present? What was discussed? Have participants been questioned in detail about the nature of the discussion and the relationship between the meeting and Benevides' subsequent actions? If not, why not? Wouldn't any serious inquiry into the source of orders to kill the Jesuits have **begun** with this meeting? What is the full extent of U.S. knowledge about the discussion that took place during this meeting?

(Note: according to the press reports, the High Command decided, at the meeting, to go after rebel leaders in each sector of the capital. Benevides, according to one of lieutenants arrested in the case, said that night that "inside the sector of ours we have the university and there is Ellacuria.")

2. It might be useful to ask what the movements of the Atlacatl unit were following the murders. Were they transported somewhere away from the military school? If so, where and why and by whose orders?

inside the sector of ours we have the university and there is Ellacuria."

1/21 -- Archbishop Rivera y Damas says "It is known that the archbishopric was right to point out where it believed the murderers were. This position was confirmed by President Alfredo Cristiani who, by fulfilling his promise to get to the very bottom of the case through investigations, has become worthy of worldwide recognition."

1/27 -- Cristiani tells news conference in Honduras, "I think we've been able to get the investigation down where we have those who directly were involved in the assassination and, with their testimony, those who gave the order to commit the crime. But during the judicial process, there might be new testimony coming out that has new leads, and the investigation would follow those leads to see if there is any more involvement."

2/4 and 5 -- Washington Post, Boston Globe and Baltimore Sun report that a meeting of the High Command was held on the evening of November 15th, after which Benevides returned to his command at the military school and ordered the murders. The reports also indicate that a meeting in the National Intelligence Directorate on the morning of the killings was interrupted by a captain whose statement that Ellacuria had been killed was greeted by cheers and applause.

corporal and a soldier. Another soldier deserted the Army in December.

Col. Aviles is restricted to headquarters. Designation as new military attache to the United States is put on hold.

1/14 -- Judge Zamora rules that sufficient evidence exists to arrest and provisionally charge the nine. Both sides now have 90 to 120 days to examine evidence, after which the judge can dismiss the case if there is not enough evidence for a trial.

According to the Judge's statement, the soldiers admitted under questioning that they were taken to the university campus in two beige Ford pickup trucks with 35 other soldiers and orders to kill the priests and leave no witnesses, and that "at the moment of withdrawal, there would be a flare and later a simulation of a confrontation would take place."

Sgt. Avalos testified that Amaya Grimaldi and Perez Vazquez shot the priests after being ordered to by Lt. Espinoza Guerra.

Avalos admits ordering the murder of the housekeeper Elba Ramos and her daughter. He found the two women "hugging and weeping" in a dark corner of the women's room, and ordered Sierra Ascencio to kill them. He "fired about ten shots at the bodies of the women until they stopped crying." Sierra Ascencio has since deserted.

Two of the lieutenants testified that Col. Benevides gave the order to kill the Jesuits, but claimed they carried their orders out only after first refusing to do so.

According to 2nd Lt. Guevara Cerritos, Benevides said "Well, gentlemen, we are betting it all. It is either them or us. They have been the intellectuals who have led the guerrillas for a long time."

According to Lt. Espinoza, Benevides said "this is a situation where it's them or us; we are going to begin with the leaders,

between Benevides and Rivas is not known.)

12/24, as of this date, the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) had administered 14 polygraph tests (two to members of the Atlacatl unit--both passed; one from the military school--also passed), taken 385 ballistics samples (45 from the Atlacatl) and checked the fingerprints of 385 individuals (45 from the Atlacatl).

1/2 -- Major Buckland tells superiors of conversation with Aviles. Embassy officers Menjivar and Elmore confront Col. Ponce with information. Ponce calls in Aviles who denies conversation with Buckland.

1/2 -- Ambassador Walker, in D.C., briefs Chairman Moakley and Task Force staff on investigation.

Between 1/3 and 1/7 -- SIU matches ammunition found at the scene of the murder with weapons belonging to Atlacatl unit.

1/7 -- Cristiani, in televised address, says the armed forces are responsible. Orders members of the Atlacatl unit and Col. Benevides held for questioning. Appoints military honor board to determine whether those being held should be turned over to civilian courts for trial.

1/8-10 -- Task Force staff delegation visits El Salvador

1/8-12 -- SIU/Honor Board continues investigation and questioning. Matches handwriting on sign found at the scene of the murders with that of a member of the Atlacatl unit. Some of the Atlacatl members apparently confess to the murders.

1/13 -- Cristiani announces the arrest of Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benevides, the head of the General Gerardo Barrios Military Academy. Benevides is a former chief of military intelligence.

Also arrested were Lt. Yuri Rene Mendoza, Lt. Jose Rocardo Espinosa, sub. lt. Gonzalo Guevara Serrito, two sub-sergeants, a

approximately five individuals in uniform...She also heard the shooting, the closing of doors, and the breaking of glass in various parts of the facilities. The witness said the five individuals entered the servants' entrance of the Jesuits residence. Other individuals entered the residence by the door in the northwestern end of the building, the area where the priests have their rooms.

The scene of the crime is located inside an Army control and security area...the Army maintains permanent military surveillance posts at the Democracia building, the Manual Jose Arce military neighborhoods, the northern UCA entrance, the various UCA schools, and at La Ceiba de Guadalupe and Jardines de Guadalupe neighborhoods. All those areas are well guarded by soldiers.

Despite...the curfew, the extended and heavy firing...(and) the detonation of explosives for an extended period of time...the Armed Forces did not react."

12/19 -- Wash. Post. " (U.S. Ambassador William) Walker said that polygraph exams have been administered to between 200 and 300 Salvadoran soldiers who were in the vicinity of the murder scene. "We're going to try to polygraph all the commanders and all the commanders' commanders."

12/19 -- Col. Ponce and Col. Aviles meet privately with Jesuit leaders Fr. Estrada (new head of UCA) and Fr. Tojeira (the Jesuit Provincial) to pledge the military's support for finding the killers and to ask for Jesuit cooperation.

12/21 -- Jesuit leaders briefed on investigation by SIU. SIU says it received full cooperation from Jesuits thereafter.

(approximately 12/22 -- U.S. Major Buckland told by Col. Aviles of alleged conversation between Col. Benevides and SIU head Lt. Col. Rivas in which Benevides admits responsibility for the killings of the Jesuits. The date of the alleged conversation

not dismiss' the possibility that those who instigated the assassination of the Jesuits could have been military."

11/24 -- AG Colorado says his office has not determined whether any gvt. troops were near the university campus when the priests were killed and had not questioned any soldiers. Also says that the witnesses "are not conclusive, nor have they shed any light" on the identity of the killers.

11/30 -- Archbishop's Human Rights office Tutela Legal releases a 38 page report saying that "all the evidence and the indicators establish that those responsible for the murder of the 6 Jesuit priests and their two domestics were members of the armed services."

First week of December -- Witness Lucia Barrera de Cerna, after giving a statement in San Salvador, is transported to Miami, where she undergoes four days of questioning from two FBI agents and from SIU head Lt. Col. Rivas. Catholic leaders, both in the U.S. and El Salvador, subsequently claim the witness was subjected to unduly harsh questioning and to threats that she would be deported if she did not change her story. Allegations of mistreatment are denied by U.S. Embassy officials.

12/11 issue of Newsweek--"Citing a CIA report, US officials told Newsweek last week that on the night before 6 Jesuit priests were murdered in El Salvador last month, Roberto D'Aubuisson said something had to be done about the priests and specifically mentioned Ellacuria."

12/15 Tutela Legal issues statement to support contention that the Armed Forces were responsible:

"The operation...lasted longer than one hour. During all that time, the perpetrators fired their weapons and set off explosives. This was proved by the many shell casings found near the Jesuit residence. The number of individuals who committed the crime was large. They were wearing Army uniforms. The witness saw

CHRONOLOGY OF THE JESUITS CASE

11/11 -- FMLN begins major nationwide offensive. Heavy fighting in San Salvador

11/13 -- unit of the Atlacatl Brigade searches UCA in response to alleged firing on troops from inside the UCA campus. Search is authorized personally by Chief of Staff Ponce and President Cristiani

11/15 -- evening, High Command holds meeting in San Salvador. Among those present are Col. Ponce and Col. Benevides. The decision is made to respond to the guerrilla offensive with the Air Force and the artillery. Ponce and Air Force Commander Bustillo (since transferred) discussed the need to go after rebel leaders in each sector of the capital and to target rebel command centers. After the meeting, Cristiani was asked--and agreed to authorize use of the Air Force and artillery. (this is according to press reports).

11/16 -- early morning, Atlacatl unit, operating under orders from Col. Benevides, returns to UCA, murders the 6 Jesuits, the cook and daughter. SIU investigation begins. Case assigned to Ricardo Zamora, Judge of the 4th criminal court in San Salvador.

o According to church officials, a unit from the First Army Brigade drives by the Archbishop's office in San Salvador, saying through a bullhorn that the Jesuits have been killed and that other terrorists will meet the same fate.

11/18 -- Archbishop Rivera y Damas says there is a strong indication that the Army was responsible for the deaths. AG Mauricio Eduardo Colorado charges that rebels are plotting to kill Catholic leaders and warns them (the Catholic leaders) to leave the country.

11/19 -- Cristiani says that "the armed forces high command 'does

actions of a few renegade military and political figures operating at the margins of Salvadoran society, or do they stem from attitudes and actions that go to the very heart of the armed forces and ARENA as institutions?

Related to that are questions of whether or not there was a coverup in the Jesuits case, and whether the murders were ordered by the Army high command or others not presently charged.

Also related is the question of whether ARENA officials ordered the murder of Hector Oqueli (see discussion below), and whether Joya Martinez (also see below) is correct in alleging that death squad operations were carried out, on an institutionalized basis, in the First Brigade and elsewhere.

2. What factors contributed to the murder of the Jesuits and how do these factors relate to the prospects for success of U.S. policy? Possible factors include:

- o the long-held perception by military and ARENA that church leaders like the Jesuits are, by the very nature of their teachings and values, a subversive force;
- o the military's continued sense of being above the law;
- o the inability of civilian leaders, such as President Cristiani, to exert authority over the military; and
- o the lack of institutional reform in the judiciary and in placing security forces under direct civilian authority.

(SIU)

Head of Special Investigations Unit: Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio RIVAS Mejia

Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benevides, director of the Army Military School until Feb. 1 -- arrested for ordering the murder of the Jesuits. (replaced by Col. Ricardo Alfonso Casanova)

Judge, 4th District, San Salvador, Ricardo Zamora (has jurisdiction in the Jesuits case)

JESUITS

victims of the murders of November 16

Dr. Ignacio Ellacuria, rector of the University of Central America (UCA)

Dr. Segundo Montes, director, UCA, human rights institute

Ignacio Martin-Baro, academic vice-rector

Amando Lopez Quintanilla

Joaquin Lopez y Lopez

Juan Ramon Moreno

Julia Elba Ramos (cook)

Celia Marisette Ramos (daughter of cook)

U.S. EMBASSY

William Walker, Ambassador

Jeffrey Dietrich, DCM

Head of Military Group, Col. Milton Menjivar

Legal Officer, Richard Chidester

Political Officers, Phil Chicola, Janice Elmore

Human Rights Officer, Francisco (Paco) Palmieri

CENTRAL QUESTIONS

1. Are the human rights problems in El Salvador a result of the

CAST OF KEY CHARACTERS

SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- o President Alfredo CRISTIANI
- o Vice-President Jose Francisco MERINO Lopez
- o Minister of Justice Oscar Alfredo Santamaria
- o Minister of Defense Gen. Rafael Humberto LARIOS Lopez
- o Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo COLORADO
- o Pres. of the Assembly Ricardo Alberto ALVARENGO Valdivieso
- o Majority Leader of the Assembly Roberto D'AUBUISSON

ARMED FORCES

- o Vice-Minister of Defense Col. Juan Orlando ZEPEDA
- o Chief of Staff Col. Rene Emilio PONCE

- o Commander, National Guard, Col. Juan Carlos Carrillo Schlenker
- o Commander, National Police, Col. Carlos Mauricio Guzman Aguilar (recently transferred to Costa Rica?)
- o Commander, Treasury Police, Col. Ciro Lopez Roque (replaced Col. Hector Heriberto HERNANDEZ on Feb. 1)
- o Commander, Air Force, Gen. Rafael Antonio Villamariona
- o Commander, Navy, Col. Humberto Pineda Villalta

General staff

- o C-1 Col. Nelson LOPEZ (personnel)
- o C-2 Col. Ivan DIAZ (intelligence)
- o C-3 Col. Ramon Alfonso BARRERA (operations)
- o C-4 Col. Francisco LOPEZ (logistics)
- o C-5 Col. Carlos Armando Aviles (psy. ops) (due to be transferred to new assignment, formal status unclear)
- o C-6 Col. Jose FUENTES

- o Commander of First Brigade Col. Francisco ELENA Fuentes

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has emphasized the difficulty of reaching an agreement with the government in the midst of continued human rights violations and called for discussions that would involve a broad range of Salvadoran society--not just the two armed groups.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:

1. Opposition leader Ruben Zamora has said that the reason the FMLN launched its offensive was because it felt that the military did not consider it (the FMLN) a strong enough threat to require serious treatment in negotiations. In other words, the armed forces believe they can win the war, and therefore they have no interest in negotiating. If true, this would lead one to conclude that the FMLN will keep fighting to prove its strength, and the military will keep resisting negotiations because it considers them unnecessary.

-- Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to comment on the above analysis, both as the rationale for the November offensive and as an ongoing obstacle to serious talks.

2. Salvadoran leaders could be asked whether they believe any preconditions should be placed on negotiations with the FMLN.