

THE MICHIGAN GOVERNMENT  
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divider reads:

"Roberto Escobar  
Garcia

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235163"

Roberto Escobar  
GARCIA

982035(0)

235163 memo.

# Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

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TAGS: OREP, ASEC, ES  
SUBJECT: CODEL MOAKLEY

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE ROOM AND VAN ASSIGNMENTS FOR CODEL MOAKLEY. KEYS WILL BE IN THE DOORS OF THE HOTEL ROOMS. CODEL MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO COMPLETE REGISTRATION CARDS AND TAKE THEM TO HOSPITALITY SUITE.

NAME	ROOM	VAN
JOE MOAKLEY	423	LIMO
BUD SHUSTER	426	LIMO
DAVID BONIOR	411	1
ROBERT DORNAN	409	
DAVID DREIER	407	1
DAN GLICKMAN	410	2
STENY HOYER	412	2
BARBARA KENNELLY	414	3
FRANK MCCLOSKEY	416	3
BILL MCCOLLUM	405	6
JIM MCDERMOTT	418	
MATTHEW MCHUGH	420	4
BOB MCEWEN	422	
GEORGE MILLER	424	4
GERRY STUDDS	428	5
NANCY AGRIS	402	1
CYNTHIA ARNSON	408	2
JOHN DOOLING	401	1
LOUIS DUPART	403	2
JERRY HARTZ	430	3
WILLIAM INGLEE	436	3
-		
JIM MCGOVERN	419	4
MARK MURRAY	421	4
MIKE O'NEIL	415	5
RANDY SCHEUNEMANN	425	5
BILL WOODWARD	427	6
LT. JAMES SHAPPELL	508	1
LTC. RONALD CRUZ	429	6
LTCOM. EDWARD FOX (DR.)	433	3
MAJOR DARRELL MOORE	510	4
ENRIQUE PEREZ	417	5
PATRICIA BUTENIS	514	6
DAVID DWORKIN	516	2

2. WHERE THERE IS NO VAN NUMBER INDICATED, THE REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT ARRIVING WITH THE CODEL. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES MCDERMOTT, MCEWEN, AND DORNAN. PLEASE FURNISH FLIGHT INFORMATION ASAP.

3. PLEASE ADVISE OF ANY CHANGES TO SUGGESTED ROOM/VAN ASSIGNMENTS. MOAKLEY AND SHUSTER HAVE ROOMS FACING EACH OTHER. ROOM NUMBER FOR HOSPITALITY/CONTROL SUITE AND MEETING ROOM WILL BE FURNISHED SEPTEL.  
WALKER

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## Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE #43725 9071

FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE #43725

E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: OREP, ASEC  
SUBJECT: CODEL MOAKLEY: PASSPORT INFORMATION

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

2. PASSPORT INFORMATION:

## A. MEMBERS:

JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY (RANKING MAJORITY MEMBER), PP NO. 90088300, DIPLOMATIC

E. G. BUD SHUSTER, (RANKING MINORITY MEMBER), PP NO. 900852315, DIPLOMATIC

DAVID E. BONIOR, PP NO. 013356156, REGULAR

ROBERT K. DORNAN, PP NO. 012784028, REGULAR

DAVID TIMOTHY DREIER, PP NO. 90005410, DIPLOMATIC

DANIEL ROBERT GLICKMAN, PP NO. 800306843, OFFICIAL

STEVE HAMILTON HOVER, PP NO. 900058649, DIPLOMATIC

MCCOLLUM, BILL, PP NO. 900059941, DIPLOMATIC

BARBARA BAILEY KENNELLY, PP NO. 900058275, DIPLOMATIC

FRANK MCCLOSKEY, PP NO. 800355591, OFFICIAL

JIM MCDERMOTT, PP NO. 80030967, OFFICIAL

MATTHEW FRANCIS MCHUGH, PP NO. 800193619, OFFICIAL

GEORGE MILLER, PP NO. Y2177378, OFFICIAL

BOB MCEWEN, PP NO. 900066250, DIPLOMATIC

GERRY EASTMAN STUDDS, PPHO. 800307001, OFFICIAL

## B. STAFF:

NANCY AGRIS, PP NO. 800214071, OFFICIAL

CYNTHIA JOAN ARNSON, PP NO. 011866610, REGULAR

JOHN JAMES DOOLING, PP NO. 600308611, OFFICIAL

LOUIS HARRIS DUPART, PP NO. 800219929, OFFICIAL

JERRY LEE HARTZ, PP NO. 013018410, REGULAR

WILLIAM B. INGLEE, PP NO. 800306930, OFFICIAL

JIM MCGOVERN, PP NO. 800072330, OFFICIAL

MARK WILLIAM MURRAY, PP NO. 800189189, OFFICIAL

MIKE O'NEIL

RANDY SCHEUEMANN, PP NO. 800307909, OFFICIAL

BILL WOODWARD, PP NO. 012608625, OFFICIAL

## C. MILITARY ESCORTS:

LT. JAMES LOGAN CHAPPELL, USN, PP NO. 800233749, OFFICIAL

LT. COL. RONALD J. CRUZ, USMC, PP NO. 800193111, OFFICIAL

LCDR EDWARD PATRICK FOX, USN, PP NO. 012245467, REGULAR -  
MEDICAL CORPS,

MAJ. DARRELL LEE MOORE, USMC, PP NO. 050178450, REGULAR

## D. STATE DEPT. ESCORTS:

DAVE DWORKIN, PP NO. 900057022, DIPLOMATIC

PAT BUTENIS, PP NO. X215078, DIPLOMATIC

ENRIQUE PEREZ, PP NO. 900078277, DIPLOMATIC

3. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE USE THIS INFORMATION TO  
PRE-REGISTER CODEL AT HOTEL. EAGLEBURGER

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CODEL MOAKLEY

PASSPORTS

<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>PASSPORT #</u>	
DAVID E. BONIOR	[REDACTED]	REGULAR
ROBERT K. DORNAN	[REDACTED]	REGULAR
DAVID TIMOTHY DREIER	[REDACTED]	DIPLOMATIC
DANIEL ROBERT GLICKMAN	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
STENY HAMILTON HOYER	[REDACTED]	DIPLOMATIC
BARBARA BAILEY KENNELLY	[REDACTED]	DIPLOMATIC
FRANK MCCLOSKEY	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
JIM MCDERMOTT	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
MATTHEW FRANCIS MCHUGH	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
BOB MCEWEN	[REDACTED]	DIPLOMATIC
JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY	[REDACTED]	DIPLOMATIC
GEORGE MILLER	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
E.G. BUD SHUSTER	[REDACTED]	DIPLOMATIC
GERRY EASTMAN STUDDS	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
<i>Bill McCollum</i>	[REDACTED]	

<u>STAFF</u>	<u>PASSPORT #</u>	
NANCY AGRIS	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
CYNTHIA JOAN ARNSON	[REDACTED]	REGULAR
JOHN JAMES DOOLING	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
LOUIS HARRIS DUPART	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL
Kevin Vincent O'Leary	[REDACTED]	Regular
<del>RICHARD HENRY GIZA</del>	[REDACTED]	<del>OFFICIAL</del>
JERRY LEE HARTZ	[REDACTED]	REGULAR
WILLIAM B. INGLEE		
JIM MCGOVERN		
MARK WILLIAM MURRAY	[REDACTED]	OFFICIAL

MIKE O'NEIL

RANDY SCHEUNEMANN

[REDACTED] OFFICIAL

BILL WOODWARD

[REDACTED] OFFICIAL

ESCORTS

PASSPORT #

LT JAMES LOGAN CHAPPELL, USN

[REDACTED] OFFICIAL

LTCOL RONALD J. CRUZ, USMC

[REDACTED] OFFICIAL

LCDR EDWARD PATRICK FOX, USN, MC

[REDACTED] REGULAR

MAJ DARRELL LEE MOORE, USMC

[REDACTED] REGULAR

The Speaker's Rooms  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

February 6, 1990

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This will authorize Hon. John Joseph Moakley to lead a Special Task Force on El Salvador on a fact finding mission, February 11-14, 1990.

The following Members of Congress and staff will be included in the delegation:

Hon. David Bonior  
Hon. Daniel R. Glickman  
Hon. Steny Hoyer  
Hon. Barbara Kennelly  
Hon. Frank McCloskey  
Hon. Jim McDermott  
Hon. Matt McHugh  
Hon. George Miller  
Hon. Gerry Studds  
Hon. Bud Schuster  
Hon. David Dreier  
Hon. Bob Dornan  
Hon. Bob McEwen  
Hon. Bill McCollum  
Michael O'Neil, Assistant to the Speaker  
James McGovern, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Rules  
Jack Dooling, Staff Director, Committee on Rules  
Jerry Hartz, Research Director, Chief Deputy Majority Whip  
Bill Woodward, Staff Director, Fish and Wildlife Subcommittee  
Mark Murray, Staff Assistant, Committee on Appropriations  
Nancy Agris, Professional Staff Member, Foreign Affairs Committee  
Richard Giza, Professional Staff Member, Intelligence Committee  
Cindy Arnson, Staff Assistant, Hon. George Miller  
Louis Dupart, Professional Staff Member, Intelligence Committee  
Bill Inglee, Professional Staff Member, Foreign Affairs Committee  
Randy Scheunemann, Policy Analyst, Republican Policy Committee


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Hon. Richard Cheney  
February 8, 1990

The purpose of the trip is to monitor the Salvadoran government's investigation into the murders last year of the six Jesuits and two women -- and other related matters.

It would be appreciated if the Department of Defense could furnish such assistance as is necessary, including an aircraft, to facilitate this mission. Expenditure of funds for the payment of actual and necessary expenses and such transportation, as may be required is authorized by 31 U.S.C. 1108(g).

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,



Thomas S. Foley  
The Speaker

Hon. Richard Cheney  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Hon. Donn Anderson, Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives



JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY  
9TH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

DEPUTY WHIP

COMMITTEE ON RULES  
CHAIRMAN

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, DC 20515

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4 COURT STREET  
TAUNTON, MA 02780  
(508) 824-6676

February 8, 1990

TO: ENRIQUE PEREZ

FR: JIM MCGOVERN / REP. MOAKLEY

As we discussed yesterday, here are some names that Members have suggested to Mr. Moakley as possible people for the group (or part of the group) to see.

On Monday night, when the Ambassador hosts a dinner for various "political leaders," Moakley wants to make sure that Ruben Zamora and Hector Silva are invited (they will be returning to El Salvador on Monday afternoon). Also, since Fidel Chavez Mena will be in the United States next week, it has been suggested that Atilio Vieytes be one of those invited for the Christian Democrats. For ARENA, members have suggested Calderon Sol, Vice President Merino and Roberto D'Aubuisson.

Some Members have suggested other people like Jose Roberto Orellan (President of National Reserve Bank), Angela Biguer and Roberto Murray-Meza be made available (perhaps at the same reception? -- whatever you think).

A few of the Members have been told that the Attorney General is planning on leaving El Salvador next week. I do not know whether this is true or not -- but we would like him to know before he leaves the country that Members are interested in talking with him.

Also, when Members meet with the Archbishop, Rosa Chavez and Maria Julia -- it has been suggested that Msgr. Urioste also be present.

One last thing, will you please remind the Embassy's press officer to make the necessary arrangements for Wednesday's 2pm press conference.

Thank you.

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Department of State

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SAN SA 01690 00 OF 02 060254Z

1630 BRIEFING WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS  
1200 BREAK  
1830 DINNER HOSTED BY CODEL FOR COUNTRY TEAM  
2030 DEPART FOR HOTEL

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 12

MORNING: MEETING AT UCA (AS PER REFTEL, EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT MORNING PROGRAM IS BEING ARRANGED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE CODEL AND LOCAL JESUIT OFFICIALS.)

1200 OPEN LUNCH

1300 MEETING WITH LIC. RIVAS OF CIU (SITE TO BE DETERMINED)

1430 - 1600 MEETING WITH COM. POLCE AND ZEPEDA (PROBABLY AT ESTADO MAYOR)

1630 - 1800 TIME AVAILABLE FOR OTHER MEETINGS IF DESIRED BY CODEL.

1900 RECEPTION WITH POLITICAL LEADERS

2100 RECEPTION ENDS; RETURN TO HOTEL

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13

0830 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CRISTIANI

1000 MEETING WITH CRISTIANI ENDS. CODEL BREAKS INTO SMALL GROUPS AND PROCEEDS TO SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH:  
- JUDGE ZANORA;  
- ATTORNEY GENERAL COLOMADO;  
- COL. ELENA ESCOBAR; AND  
- (IF POSSIBLE) COL. BENVENISTE ATTORNEY.

1230 OPEN LUNCH

1400 MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP RIVERA Y DAMAZ

1530 CODEL BREAKS INTO SMALL GROUPS TO MEET WITH:  
- MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL DEB-TE COMMISSION;  
- FOUR DEFECTORS;  
- VARIOUS CHURCH GROUPS.

EVENING TIME SET ASIDE FOR PRIVATE MEETINGS THE CODEL MAY WISH TO HOLD.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 14

0900 PRE-DEPARTURE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

1030 FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH SECURITY

1200 OPEN LUNCH

1400 PRESS CONFERENCE

1515 DEPART FOR AIRPORT

1600 WHEELS UP.

7. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL C, CODEL MEMBERS SHOULD BE ESCORTED AT ALL TIMES BY EMBASSY SECURITY PERSONNEL.

L.O. 17350: N/A  
TAGS: OREP, APER, IS  
SUBJECT: CODEL HOARELY VISIT

REF: A. STATE 31284, U. JACOBS-PEARL TELECOM

1. EMBASSY WELCOMES VISIT OF CODEL HOARELY FROM FEBRUARY 11 - 14. CONTROL OFFICERS ARE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT SUSAN JACOBS 26-7100 EXT. 2401 (O), 26-6725 (O) AND 92-1349 (O) AND POLITICAL OFFICER PHIL CHICOLA 26-7100 EXT. 2305 AND 26-3810 (O). WHEN DEPARTING FROM THE UNITED STATES, ALL NUMBERS SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY 011-503.

2. RESERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AT FAHINO REAL HOTEL, ABOUT FIVE MILES FROM THE EMBASSY. THE ROOM RATE IS USD 45 FOR A SINGLE. CODEL WILL BE HOUSED IN ONE FLOOR AND PART OF ANOTHER. EMBASSY WILL PROVIDE SECURITY TO INSIDE FLOORS ON A 24 HOUR BASIS. IN VIEW OF THE TRAFFIC INVOLVED IN THE CONTROL ROOM, WE SUGGEST THAT CODEL RENT A SEPARATE ROOM IN WHICH TO HOLD PRIVATE MEETINGS. DUE TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, THE CODEL WILL ALSO HAVE TO FIND A ROOM FOR SECURITY GUARDS.

3. EMBASSY WILL BE PLEASED TO HOST A RECEPTION IN CODEL'S HONOR FOR CHIVASORAN POLITICIANS EVENING OF FEBRUARY 12. WE ASSUME THAT CODEL WILL HOST COUNTRY TEAM DINNER ON FEBRUARY 11 SINCE U.S. LAW PROHIBITS THE USE OF EMBASSY REPRESENTATIONAL FUNDS TO COVER DINNERS AT WHICH ALL GUESTS ARE AMERICANS.

4. SHOULD CHIVASORAN TRANSLATION SERVICES BE REQUIRED, EMBASSY HAS 13 HEADSETS. LOCAL EQUIPMENT IS NOT AS COMPATIBLE WITH EMBASSY EQUIPMENT SO IF MORE THAN 13 SETS ARE NEEDED, ALL EQUIPMENT WILL HAVE TO BE RENTED. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TRANSLATORS AVAILABLE WHO DO NOT SPEAK CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATION. IF THEIR SERVICES ARE NEEDED, WE WILL HAVE TO CHECK HOW THEY ARE IN GREAT DEMAND.

5. EMBASSY NEEDS CODEL FUND CITE TO COVER TRANSPORTATION COSTS, MEALS, AND TRANSLATION SERVICES. PLEASE ADVISE IF CODEL WISHES EMBASSY TO PAY FOR THE HOTEL ROOMS DIRECTLY OUT OF THE CODEL'S FUND CITE.

6. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOLLOWS:  
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 11

1300 CODEL ARRIVES; MET BY AMBASSADOR AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS

1415 ARRIVE CARINO REAL HOTEL. CHECK-IN AND DOWN TIME. CODEL MEMBERS WILL BE PRE-REGISTERED.

1500 DEPART FOR AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1520 ARRIVE RESIDENCE

1530 PRIVATE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

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*Department of State*

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EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE, ASAP, CODEL'S READ-OUT OF  
PROPOSED SCHEDULE AND INFORMATION ON ANY OTHER POSSIBLE  
MEETINGS CODEL WISHES TO HAVE. WE ALSO NEED TO KNOW  
WHETHER THE CODEL MEMBERS WILL HAVE DECIDED, BY THE TIME  
IT ARRIVES WHO WILL GO TO WHAT MEETING, IN THOSE  
INSTANCES WHEN THE CODEL WILL BREAK-UP INTO SMALL  
GROUPS. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER CODEL WISHES EMBASSY TO  
MAKE APPOINTMENTS LISTED IN NOTIONAL SCHEDULE OR IF  
CODEL WILL MAKE APPOINTMENTS ON ITS OWN.  
DIETERICH

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ORIGIN OCS-06

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INFO LCG-00 ADC-00 AIC-00 INR-05 EIR-00 SS-01 OIC-02  
DIR-00 AF-00 CIFE-00 EG-00 DINT-05 DODE-00 H-01  
IO-19 HEA-00 ARA-00 INSAE-00 COME-06 SSO-00 NSD-07  
HA-09 AHAD-01 LAB-04 CINE-00 EAP-00 INSE-00 AIT-02  
OPIC-06 PA-02 PPT-01 PC-05 PCH-02 PER-03 CCO-00  
STP-01 SIL-00 HNS-06 INRE-00 AGRE-00 CA-02 FBO-07  
FSI-06 ACDA-13 AS-02 A-00 USIE-00 JUSE-00 FBIC-00  
DOEE-00 H-01 HMP-00 STPD-01 PRS-01 OS-00 OIC-00  
INHC-01 SCT-03 P-02 /139 R

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ARA/GEN:KMHITAKER

P:SWESCHE S/S: JCARRAGHER

CA/OCS/EMR:MMMAHONEY

PA:RBOUCHER

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM

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UNCLAS STATE 038445

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OIRA, CASC, ASEC, ES

SUBJECT: TRAVEL ADVISORY - EL SALVADOR - WARNING

1. SUMMARY: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WARNS UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO EXERCISE CAUTION WHEN TRAVELING TO EL SALVADOR

-- THE GUERRILLAS OF THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL

LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE IN

NOVEMBER, 1989 WHICH LASTED SEVERAL WEEKS. ALTHOUGH THE

GUERRILLAS ARE GENERALLY THOUGHT TO HAVE LEFT THE CAPITAL

AREA AND ARMED CLASHES IN URBAN AREAS HAVE DIMINISHED,

RANDON GUERRILLA ATTACKS STILL OCCUR.

-- TRAVEL IS DANGEROUS AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN THE EASTERN AND NORTHERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THE GUERRILLA INSURGENCY IS PARTICULARLY ACTIVE.

-- TRAVELERS ARRIVING BY AIR SHOULD ARRIVE IN TIME TO BE ABLE TO CLEAR CUSTOMS AND DEPART THE AIRPORT BY 5:00 P.M.  
-- FOR THOSE ARRIVING BY ROAD, THE SAFEST ROUTE IS VIA THE SOUTHERN ENTRY POINTS ALONG THE BORDER WITH GUATEMALA. OVERLAND TRAVEL AFTER DUSK IS DANGEROUS AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

-- ALTHOUGH THE COUNTRY-WIDE CURFEW HAS BEEN LIFTED, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECOMMENDS THAT AMERICANS REMAIN INDOORS AFTER 1:00 A.M.

-- AMERICANS TRAVELING TO EL SALVADOR ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO SEEK THE LATEST TRAVEL INFORMATION AND TO REGISTER WITH THE CONSULAR SECTION OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SAN SALVADOR UPON ARRIVAL. END SUMMARY.

2. SECURITY: THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR IS WORKING TO CURB THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FMLN WHICH OFTEN UNDERTAKES INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS. COMBAT AND SABOTAGE CAN OCCUR ALMOST DAILY IN ANY REGION OF THE COUNTRY. WHILE IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT UNITED STATES CITIZENS ARE SINGLED OUT FOR ATTACK, THERE IS RISK DUE TO THE INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF THE VIOLENCE.

-- TRAVELERS SHOULD KEEP A SAFE DISTANCE FROM MILITARY VEHICLES WHILE ON THE ROADWAYS AND FROM ARMY AND SECURITY FORCE PATROLS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN ORDER TO AVOID ACCIDENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN COMBAT ACTION. BEFORE VENTURING OUTSIDE OF MAJOR URBAN AREAS TRAVELERS SHOULD FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE LIKELY SECURITY SITUATIONS IN THE REGIONS WHERE THEY WISH TO TRAVEL. INSURGENT LAND MINES POSE A SIGNIFICANT DANGER IN BACK COUNTRY REGIONS AND HAVE CAUSED NUMEROUS UNINTENDED CASUALTIES.

3. CONFLICTIVE ZONES: THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR HAS DESIGNATED SOME SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY AS CONFLICTIVE ZONES. INDIVIDUALS SEEKING TO TRAVEL TO THOSE ZONES MUST OBTAIN A PRIOR CLEARANCE FROM BOTH THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND AND THE DEPARTMENTAL MILITARY COMMANDER BEFORE ENTERING SUCH ZONES. MANY AMERICANS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED FOR NOT ADHERING TO THIS REGULATION. PERMISSION ONCE GRANTED TO ENTER THESE AREAS CAN LATER BE RESCINDED OR MODIFIED. THE LOCATIONS OF CONFLICTIVE ZONES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE. FOR UP TO DATE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE ZONES, TRAVELERS SHOULD CONTACT THE U.S. EMBASSY.

4. INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE SALVADORAN CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS FOREIGNERS FROM PARTICIPATING IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR CONSIDERS SUCH INVOLVEMENT TO BE A VIOLATION OF THE PARTICIPANT'S TOURIST VISA STATUS. ALTHOUGH DEMONSTRATIONS IN SAN SALVADOR SINCE MARCH 1987 HAVE BEEN SMALL, THEY OFTEN TURN VIOLENT.

5. VISAS: PRIVATE U.S. CITIZENS ARE REQUIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR TO HOLD A VALID PASSPORT AND TO OBTAIN A VISA BEFORE TRAVELING TO EL SALVADOR. U.S. CITIZENS SHOULD CONSULT WITH THE NEAREST EL SALVADOR CONSULATE OR THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR THE MOST CURRENT INFORMATION.

6. FOR INFORMATION: ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS VISITING EL SALVADOR ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO CONTACT THE CONSULAR SECTION OF THE U.S. EMBASSY UPON ARRIVAL IN EL SALVADOR. THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED AT 25 AVENIDA NORTE NO. 1230, SAN SALVADOR, TELEPHONE: (503) 26-71-00.

7. EXPIRATION DATE: AUGUST 1, 1990.

8. THE TRAVEL ADVISORY CONTAINED IN 89 STATE 373718, DATED NOVEMBER 22, 1989 IS HEREBY CANCELED. EAGLEBURGER

NOTE: POUCH ADDRESSEES PROTECTED

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TELEGRAM

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1 /005 W  
2 38

U. 12356; N/A  
TAGS: OREP, ASEC  
SUBJECT: THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR VISIT OF CODEL MOAKLEY

REF: A) CHICOLA/PEREZ TELCON  
- B) STATE 033304

1. FOR SECURITY REASONS. FLIGHTS MUST BE SCHEDULED TO ASSURE THAT THE PASSENGERS WILL ARRIVE IN THE CITY OF SAN SALVADOR PRIOR TO 1800 HOURS AND THAT THEY WILL DEPART THE CITY AFTER 0600 HOURS. ALLOW 45 MINUTES TRAVEL TIME FROM THE AIRPORT TO THE CITY.

2. THERE IS A PUBLISHED TRAVEL ADVISORY IN EFFECT RECOMMENDING CAUTION IN TRAVELING TO OR IN EL SALVADOR. PARTICULAR CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED TRAVELING BY LAND OUTSIDE URBAN AREAS. TRAVEL NORTH AND EAST OF THE CAPITAL IS HAZARDOUS BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF GUERRILLA INTERDICTION.

3. ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE, HARRASSMENT/PROBING ACTIVITY OCCURS FREQUENTLY ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN SECTION OF THE CITY. URBAN TERRORISM OCCURS ON A DAILY BASIS. WITHIN THE LAST WEEK, THERE HAVE BEEN THREE ATTACKS ON THE RESIDENCES OF PROMINENT GOVERNMENT, MILITARY AND PRIVATE OFFICIALS, ALONG WITH BOMBINGS OF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS, POWER POLES AND PUBLIC BUS BURNINGS. APPROXIMATELY 50 PCT OF THE CITY IS OFF-LIMITS TO MISSION PERSONNEL.

4. DUE TO THE SIZE OF CODEL, DURATION OF VISIT, AND EXPECTED CONTINUED TERRORIST INCIDENTS, POST STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT CODEL LIMIT TRAVEL AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. POST ALSO RECOMMENDS CODEL MEMBERS TRAVEL IN EMBASSY ARMORED VEHICLES ACCOMPANIED BY SECURITY PERSONNEL AT ALL TIMES.

DIETERICH

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**STAFF REPORT ON EL SALVADOR TRIP  
JANUARY 8-10, 1990**

**Overview**

Chairman Moakley sent a delegation of five staff to El Salvador on January 8-10 to gather relevant information pertaining to the Salvadoran government's investigation of the November 16 murder of six Jesuit priests, their cook and her young daughter.

Based on a series of interviews with government, embassy and church representatives, it appears that substantial progress has been made in identifying those who were responsible for the murders. There are concerns, however, that the possibility of a coverup still remains. It is unclear whether the investigation will go much beyond identifying those who actually committed the killings to include, as well, those who ordered or otherwise consented to the crime.

The staff delegation was also informed of an incident involving a U.S. Embassy officer withholding, for a period of at least 10 days, relevant information concerning the murders before passing it on to his superiors -- who then themselves mishandled the information in a way that could have complicated the task of identifying army higher-ups involved in the crime. The incident (explained in detail in this memo) raises a number of questions concerning the Embassy's overall handling of this case.

In addition, the staff delegation was made aware of the deep rift that currently exists between the United States Embassy and the church -- the Jesuits, in particular. The Jesuits believe very strongly that the Embassy has been a negative force in the investigatory process.

Since the trip, much of what the staff delegation has learned is now public due to announcements by President Cristiani and other sources. What follows is a brief summary of the delegation's findings.

**Actual Investigation**

Although the office of the Attorney General has, in theory, an investigative role, the only serious investigation in the Jesuits case has been carried out by the Special Investigative Unit (SIU). The SIU is an AID-trained and funded unit, composed of selected military officers, located within the Ministry of Justice and directly answerable, in this case, to President Cristiani.

The staff received a thorough briefing from the head of the SIU, Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio Rivas Mejia. Rivas recited the chronology of SIU actions taken in the case beginning with the gathering of

physical evidence on the day of the crime. The U.S. Embassy in El Salvador has promised to forward to the Task Force the SIU's full report on the investigation thus far.

During the first stages of the investigation, the SIU sought information about, and took depositions from, a number of units of the armed forces that were known to have been in the vicinity of the University on the night of the crime. In late December, however, the investigation narrowed to a unit of the U.S. - trained Atlacatl Battalion. The reasons for this are unclear. According to Lt. Col. Rivas, the SIU focused on the Atlacatl after a meeting by the SIU with Jesuit leaders caused the Jesuits to lend their full cooperation to the inquiry. Jesuit leaders had called attention to the Atlacatl from the beginning because soldiers from that unit had searched the University on November 13th, two nights before the killings took place. It is also possible, however, that Lt. Col. Rivas focused on the Atlacatl following the conversation with Col. Benavides (described below) in which Benavides, who had operational command of the Atlacatl unit on November 16th, admitted responsibility for the crime.

At the time of the staff's trip, the evidence gathered to implicate the Atlacatl unit was as follows:

- 1) the unit was stationed at the Salvadoran military academy on the night of the killings, only a short distance from the University;
- 2) the unit had searched the university, including the Pastoral Center, where the priests lived, two nights earlier;
- 3) ballistic tests indicated that weapons belonging to members of the unit had been fired at the scene of the crime (although there was no match, at the time, between the bullets that actually killed the priests and weapons belonging to the Atlacatl); and
- 4) the handwriting on a sign left at the University for the purpose of implicating the FMLN in the killings was found to match the handwriting of a member of the unit.

The SIU interrogated and interviewed members of this unit of the Atlacatl Battalion and found contradictions in their stories. On Sunday, January 7, President Cristiani announced that 47 members of the battalion were held in 3 separate groups and Colonel Benavides, the operational commander, was confined to quarters (Cristiani did not publicly identify Benavides).

On Wednesday, January 10, President Cristiani informed members of the staff delegation that 4 people had been specifically identified as participating in the murders and had been formally arrested. He predicted that by the end of the week the others involved in the case -- including those who ordered the killings -- would be identified.

On Saturday, January 14, Cristiani announced in a nationwide



television broadcast that an army colonel (Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benavides), two lieutenants (Lt. Yuzi Rene Mendoza and Lt. Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra), a sub lieutenant (Sub-Lt. Gonzalo Guevara Serrito), two sergeants, a corporal and one other soldier had been arrested in connection with the Nov. 16 killing of the six Jesuit priests and would be turned over to the courts for prosecution.

Col. Benavides has been the commander of the General Gerardo Barrios Military School and previously served as head of Salvadoran intelligence. Except for Benavides all those arrested were members of the Atlacatl Battalion. The Atlacatl Battalion was not assigned to the UCA the night of the murders but Col. Benavides was given operational command of 45 members of the Atlacatl as a reserve force, after the November 11 FMLN offensive began. This 45 member unit was stationed at the military school.

U.S. Embassy officials seemed somewhat surprised that Benavides might be capable of carrying out this operation. Col. Milton Menjivar, head of the U.S. Military Group, said, "Of all the Colonels -- he's the last guy who would incite violence." Janice Elmore, an embassy political officer, who is monitoring this investigation with Richard Chidester (legal officer) and who is an expert on the Salvadoran military, described Benavides as "lackluster" and a "non-player." His nickname is "the poet."

The new rector of the UCA, Rev. Francisco Estrada, stated that Benavides had "no history of anti-church activities." Only the Auxiliary Bishop of the Archdiocese of San Salvador, Msgr. Rosa Chavez, gave the impression that Benavides might be capable of this by saying, "Benavides was the head of military intelligence...and these intelligence types never say much in public. But the mentality of these officials is that priests are communists."

An Honor Board has been named by President Cristiani and the High Command of the military to review the case and decide which members of the military will go before the civilian courts. President Cristiani stated that the Honor Board was comprised of officers from all ranks -- and that it would work closely with the SIU on the investigation (the delegation has requested a list of the members of the Honor Board but, to date, hasn't received it from the Embassy). From discussions with U.S. Embassy officials and President Cristiani, it is still unclear as to what its role will be in the continuing investigation. Will it simply function to arrest those who actually killed the Jesuits? Or will it also look into who participated in the crimes in a less direct way?

Other questions remain with respect to the actual decision to murder the Jesuits:

- \* What orders were given the Atlacatl, by whom, when?
- \* If Benavides gave the order, what was it and what prompted it?
- \* With whom would Benavides ordinarily communicate on the general Staff (this question was never clearly answered)
- \* What investigatory efforts have been made or are being planned with respect to the chain of command questions? (the SIU

- appears to have done little in this regard to date)
- \* Given the circumstances of the crime, it is appears that more than eight people had to know. Have those at military check-points between the Military School and the UCA been interviewed? Were there others who knew that the Atlacatl was deployed that night but failed to notify the appropriate authorities, after being asked to provide information on all units deployed near the UCA that night? Are these issues being explored by the SIU or the Honor Board?

### **U.S. Embassy/Col. Benavides Controversy**

According to Ambassador Walker, a United States major (Major Buckland) in the U.S. Milgroup was informed by Colonel Carlos Armando Aviles, head of the military high command's psychological operations and a former head of the SIU, that Colonel Benavides was supposed to have mentioned to another member of the military that he (Benavides) felt "somehow responsible" for the murders of the Jesuits. According to Walker, the U.S. major did not mention this to anyone in the Embassy until January 2 -- approximately 10 days after the major learned of the information.

On January 2, (at least 10 days after first learning of this information ) Major Buckland told his superior, Col. Hunter, of his conversation with Aviles. Hunter immediately brought the story to the attention of Colonel Milton Menjivar, commander of the U.S. military group.

Menjivar's version of Buckland's story was more detailed than the one Ambassador Walker relayed. He said that Buckland was informed of the story by Aviles, who was informed by Colonel Lopez y Lopez (another former head of the SIU), who was informed by Colonel Rivas (the head of the SIU), who was informed directly by Colonel Benavides. He said that Benavides, himself, supposedly communicated the story to Rivas -- and said that Benavides had said that "I am responsible... I sent the group in there...what are we to do?" (Richard Chidester, legal officer at the US Embassy, stated that when he asked Rivas directly about this scenario, Rivas denied any knowledge).

Also on January 2, Menjivar, along with Janice Elmore of the US Embassy, decided to bring this information to the attention of Colonel Ponce, the Chief of Staff of the Army. Menjivar told the staff delegation that he "assumed Ponce already knew." Menjivar did not make any attempt to inform U.S. Ambassador William Walker, who was traveling in the United States, or Jeff Dietrich, who serves as the DCM at our embassy, of any of these developments.

Menjivar and Elmore met with Ponce and told him Buckland's story. Menjivar cited Aviles as the source of the information. Ponce said he knew nothing of Benavides's involvement and called Aviles in for questioning. Aviles denied telling Buckland anything. He was then given a polygraph test, which he failed ("badly," according to

Ambassador Walker).

Major Buckland was also given a polygraph test, which he failed. However, Ambassador Walker said that an expert polygrapher at the Embassy indicated that the manner in which Buckland failed the test showed that he was "nervous" and "felt guilty...perhaps for betraying a friend's (Aviles) confidence." Buckland was sent back to the United States and was scheduled to take another polygraph test in "friendlier surroundings" on Wednesday, January 10. We have no information about the results of this test.

On Sunday, January 14, the New York Times and the Washington Post reported that there were questions as to whether Buckland may have been warned about the plot to kill the priests prior to the actual murders. The staff delegation has no information on that possibility.

Clearly, questions about what Buckland knew, when he knew it and why he hesitated, for at least 10 days, in passing the information along to his superiors still remain. The U.S. Embassy account of what Benavides actually said is imprecise: Walker says Benavides "felt he was somehow responsible" --- Menjivar said that Benavides said, "I am responsible..."

Walker and DCM, Jeff Dietrich, both expressed displeasure at not being informed of this entire episode early on. However, Menjivar insists that he acted properly and, in retrospect, would probably react the same way.

Another question is why did Benavides talk to Colonel Rivas? Did Rivas initiate the conversation as part of the SIU's investigation? If so, why didn't Rivas report this information to Ponce or Cristiani? Was this conversation indeed the triggering factor in Rivas' decision to focus virtually all of his attention on the Atlacatl, as Col. Menjivar indicated to the staff delegation? Would Rivas ever have gone to Cristiani or Ponce directly if discussions between Aviles and Buckland had not taken place? Did Rivas encourage Lopez y Lopez and/or Aviles to pass the information concerning Benavides to the US Embassy? If so, why? If not, what was Aviles' motivation -- did he fear a coverup on the part of Rivas?

### **The Church**

The delegation met with Father Francisco Estrada, Rector of the University of Central America and with Msgr. Gregorio Rosa Chavez, the Auxiliary Bishop of San Salvador.

Rosa Chavez stated that a successful resolution of the Jesuit case would be extremely important "so that people can have confidence in the justice system... and that would help promote peace." But both men warned that the current political climate has resulted in repression and threats against the church.

Rosa Chavez reported that on the day the delegation met with him a story appeared in the Salvadoran newspaper El Diario de Hoy accusing Maria Julia Hernandez, Director of Tutela Legal, of planning a trip to the United States to propose a total cut-off of US aid. If ARENA - proposed reforms in the Salvadoran penal code are approved such actions would be illegal. Rosa Chavez said that no sources were given for the story and that it was absolutely untrue. But, he emphasized that such stories were not uncommon and threatened the security of the church.

Another incident occurred on the afternoon of November 16th, approximately 12 hours after the Jesuits were murdered. Rosa Chavez said " we heard a voice over a loudspeaker (a megaphone) from a military vehicle. The voice thanked the people for their help during the offensive...and then mentioned something about communists and accomplices of the FMLN that were in El Salvador...the voice then said 'Ellacuria and Martin-Baro have fallen...we will continue killing communists.'" Rosa Chavez said a few moments later the same voice was heard saying "we are the soldiers of the First Brigade."

Rosa Chavez said he communicated this incident to the secretary of President Cristiani. Some time later, the Commander of the First Brigade, Col. Elena-Fuentes, called Chavez's superior, Archbishop Rivera y Damas, to complain. Elena-Fuentes told the Archbishop that Rosa Chavez had made a false accusation and that everything that had been amplified had been recorded. The Archbishop responded, "If everything had been recorded than this statement (about Ellacuria and Martin-Baro) must be there --- because I, too, heard it."

One common theme was the church's problems with the United States Embassy. The Jesuits, in particular, have strong negative feelings about the U.S. Embassy's behavior with regard to this case and have singled out Richard Chidester, the Embassy's legal officer and the man in charge of the investigation for the embassy.

Father Estrada stated that the Jesuits felt "tricked" and "misled" by Chidester. Specifically, Father Estrada mentions the handling of the "witness" -- Lucia Barrera de Cerna -- as the main cause of their distrust for the embassy. Estrada said, "It was our understanding that Lucia would be taken to the United States where she would be turned over to the Jesuits. If we would have known how she would have been treated, we would have sent her to Spain -- and not the US." Chidester accompanied the witness to Miami, where she underwent extensive questioning and polygraphing.

Estrada stated that the Jesuits were unaware that the witness would be interrogated by the FBI or that she would be subjected to polygraph examinations.

Rosa Chavez stated that "we have a respectful relationship with the U.S. Embassy." But, he also singled out Richard Chidester as a problem.

Estrada welcomed Cristiani's announcement of Sunday, January 7 - in which the Salvadoran President singled out the military as the prime suspect in the murders. He said it was a sign that the investigation was progressing. He complained that there was "nothing new" in the statement -- because the Jesuits and Tutela Legal knew all along that the military was involved.

The SIU briefed the Jesuits --Father Estrada and Father Tojeira (the Jesuit Provincial)-- on its investigation on December 21, 1989. Also present at the meeting were Col. Rivas, Col Lopez y Lopez and Col. Aviles, all directly involved with the SIU's investigation. Richard Chidester also appeared at the meeting without the prior knowledge of the Jesuits. The Jesuits asked him to leave the meeting -- which he did.

Estrada also indicated that the Jesuits knew of other witnesses who were too frightened to come forward or too frightened to tell all that they saw. Though, he added, there was "no key witness."

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

(1) The technical aspect of the investigation appears to have gone well and to have resulted in a significant breakthrough in the case. The public announcement of military responsibility for the murders, and the eight arrests, are very positive developments.

(2) However, since no senior military officer has ever been successfully prosecuted for human rights violations in El Salvador, it is necessary to remain vigilant until the judicial process is completed.

(3) The staff delegation continues to question whether all those involved -- including especially higher-ups who knew or consented or gave orders -- have been identified. Remarks attributed to President Cristiani, that he thinks everyone responsible has been identified, seem premature. It is important for the task force to keep the pressure on until every possible avenue involving Col. Benavides's superiors has been pursued.

(4) One of the contributing factors in this murder appears to be the attitude of the military and its view that certain religious groups and officials are communists and accomplices of the FMLN, as reflected in the incident cited above in the section on the church. Until this attitude is rooted out of the military, religious figures will remain at risk.

(5) The role of the Embassy raises many questions. First, at the very time the Ambassador, in a meeting with the task force Chairman in Washington, stated that there was no hard evidence to confirm the conclusion that the military was responsible, it was known to one of his Embassy officers that the military had been implicated.

Second, the use that Embassy personnel made of that information, once it was finally reported, was so clumsy as to call into question, at best, the judgement and competence of those involved.

Third, the staff delegation would highlight the seemingly dismal state of the Embassy's relations with the Jesuits, the Archdiocese, and other religious institutions and groups. The staff believes that it is essential for the Embassy to repair these relations.

(6) The task force visit to El Salvador should be timed so as to achieve maximum leverage over the next stage of the process.



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## U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE  
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WASHINGTON, DC 20515-8415

January 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR CONGRESSMAN HYDE

VIA TOM SMEETON

SUBJECT: Staff Del Trip to El Salvador to Investigate Killing of  
the Six Jesuit Priests

On 8, 9 and 10 January 1990, five professional staff members of the House of Representatives, one Republican and four Democrats, traveled to El Salvador to review the status of the investigation into the deaths of six Jesuit priests on the night of 15/16 November 1989. The delegation met with representatives of the U.S. Embassy, including Ambassador Walker, with President Cristiani and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Colonel Ponce, as well as other military leaders. The staff delegation also met with the chief of the Special Investigative Unit, Lieutenant Colonel Rivas, who is charged with investigating the crime and who reports directly to President Cristiani, and with representatives of the Catholic Church and the nongovernmental human rights organizations in El Salvador.

Significant progress has been made in the investigation into the deaths of the Jesuit priests. On the night of 7 January, President Cristiani announced in a televised broadcast that 47 members of the Atlacatl Battalion had been identified as being involved in the crime and that this unit had been sequestered and was being questioned. The President was hopeful that additional progress would soon be made in the case, and indeed, there was during the three days that the staff was in El Salvador.

Systematic interviews are currently being conducted with the members of the Atlacatl Battalion, two of whom have been identified as being at the university on the night of the 15th through ballistic tests of their weapons. No one, however, has confessed to being involved in killing the priests or the housekeeper and her daughter, who were also killed at the same time. President Cristiani believes that the initial phase of the investigation will be completed by the end of the week, 12 or 13 January, which will permit him to make a follow-up announcement concerning the investigation.

The Salvadoran Government should be commended for the quality of the investigation which it has conducted to date. The Special Investigative Unit, under the command of Lt. Col. Rivas, has conducted a thorough and painstaking



investigation of the technical evidence surrounding the crime. The SIU is a U.S.-funded organization that was set up in the early '80's to investigate high profile crimes. It is funded by the Agency for International Development and trained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The unit reports directly to President Cristiani. When the bodies of the Jesuit priests were discovered on the morning of the 16th of November, President Cristiani immediately dispatched the SIU to seal off the area around the crime and begin the investigation. Since that time, Lt. Col. Rivas has reported directly to President Cristiani about developments in the case.

The thorough technical investigation conducted by the SIU led to the first breakthrough in the case. The SIU conducted ballistic tests on weapons owned by the units of the Atlacatl Battalion that is alleged to be responsible. Evidence to date indicates at least two weapons possessed by soldiers in the Atlacatl Battalion were fired at the scene of the crime. Further, fingerprints, bootprints, writing samples, and other investigative techniques have been brought to bear to add to the technical evidence which may implicate members of the Atlacatl Battalion. A writing sample from a member of the unit has been matched with a handprinted sign found at the scene of the crime. The investigative techniques used by the SIU have been described to investigators from Spain, the FBI, Canada and Scotland Yard, all of whom are satisfied with the scope and quality of the investigation as described to them. Furthermore, it was the staff's clear impression that the technical investigation was thorough and complete and was instrumental in the first breakthrough in the case.

President Cristiani and the high command of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) are committed to a thorough investigation. The staff met with both President Cristiani and Colonel Ponce, both of whom repeatedly assured the staff that they are committed to take the investigation to wherever it leads, including senior colonels in the ESAF, if they are implicated. According to both Ponce and Cristiani such an investigation has never been done before. While it is very difficult, there is no question in either Ponce's or Cristiani's minds that it must be done quickly and thoroughly even if morale temporarily suffers.

Both President Cristiani and Colonel Ponce stressed that there is no evidence of institutional involvement, but rather, it appears to have been a renegade activity conducted by people who had no authority to do so. The investigation is currently designed to ascertain who may have ordered and sanctioned such an activity, and once they're identified, they will be turned over to the proper authorities. With the determination of the complicity of the Atlacatl Battalion, an Honor Board comprised of a general, colonel, major, captain and lieutenant, as well as two civilians, began interviewing members of the battalion to complete the investigation. These interviews have been very productive and have provided additional information that will be used in the judicial proceedings that will follow. The Honor Board is modeled after the investigation which took place into the San Sebastian murders of 10 Salvadoran peasants on 21 September 1988. The San Sebastian investigation has led to a trial, scheduled to begin next week, of a Salvadoran major and lieutenant who were involved in the killings.

By way of background, the following information has been learned to date regarding the crime and the events which preceded it. On the night of the 11th of November 1989, the FMLN launched a broad, countrywide offensive designed to take over the Government of El Salvador. Simultaneous attacks were launched against the President, Vice President, the offices of the Chief of Staff, military facilities and other targets in San Salvador and other key cities throughout the country with the objective of decapitating the country's leadership. In the following days, there was heavy fighting throughout the city of San Salvador.

On the night of the 13th of November, there was again heavy fighting in the area of the University of Central America where the Jesuit priests lived and worked. During that evening, a unit of the Atlacatl Battalion, based at the military school, received hostile fire from the University of Central America (UCA). Upon receiving fire, the unit commander requested permission to enter the university grounds to try to find the snipers and neutralize them. Prior to entering, however, the request to enter the campus was run up the chain of command. It was Colonel Ponce who authorized the Atlacatl unit to go onto the campus. While on the campus, they found evidence of firing from snipers but found no snipers themselves. They also entered the residence of the Jesuit priests, including Father Ellacuria, the Rector of UCA. They conducted a search of the rooms of the priests. They found nothing. Apparently, in some documents that were reviewed afterwards, Ellacuria said that they had conducted the search in a very professional manner.

On the night of the 15th/16th of November, the unit again went back. There was again heavy fighting throughout the city of San Salvador. Through forensic and pathological evidence it has been determined the killings took place between 2:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning. According to one report, the Atlacatl unit went there to break up a meeting of UNTS, a Salvadoran labor organization known to be a front of the FMLN, which was reportedly being held on the university campus. Apparently, the Atlacatl unit went onto the university grounds. During the search something happened, and it is unclear at this time what triggered the killings of the six Jesuits and the woman and daughter.

The technical investigation reveals that seven weapons were fired, five M-16's, one AK-47, one M-60 machine gun, and a light anti-tank weapon (LAW). Four weapons were actually used in the killings, three M-16's and one AK-47. The woman and her daughter were probably killed as the unit exfiltrated from the building, discovered them, and killed them because they were potential witnesses to the crime.

The SIU has conducted interviews of many people in the area, including the husband and father of the woman and daughter who were killed. This man was within 30 to 40 meters of the actual firing site. He said that he heard heavy firing but never went to investigate it. It is believed by many that he actually saw something but is too afraid to say so. The same is true of many residents whose homes abut onto the back of UCA and would have had a clear view of the soldiers in the area.

The site of the killings has been unoccupied since. The building suffered some fire damage. Money and electronic gear were stolen from some of the rooms. For the time being, the building will not be used.

There has been much controversy over the testimony of Lucia Barrera de Cerna. She is a housekeeper who worked for the Jesuits whose house abutted the university grounds. She alleges that on the night of the killings she woke up hearing gunfire and looked from her window and saw much of what took place. The staff del members were able to visit the actual site of the killings as well as Lucia's home. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for her to have clearly seen what took place in the killing zone, which was more than 40 to 50 meters from her house. But more importantly, her house sits below a small rise. Please see the photographs that are attached to get a sense of the view from Lucia's house.

Nonetheless, investigations by the SIU reveal that at least 90 percent of what she said was actually true, but there is disagreement over whether she saw men firing and where they were. The real problem with Lucia's testimony arises from allegations that she was systematically abused when she was brought to Miami during a four-day interview by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Lt. Col. Rivas, who flew from El Salvador to talk to Lucia. During this time she took three polygraphs, as did her husband, who offered some limited testimony on the killings as well. There was evidence of deception in the polygraphs, and several statements she made varied, one from another. She attributes this to fear of retribution from the FBI.

She was never physically abused, but the grueling interviews that she went through caused her to be very fearful for her own personal safety. The Jesuit priests in El Salvador, however, believe that the embassy mistreated Lucia when she was in Miami. This misunderstanding has exacerbated bad relations between the embassy and the Jesuit priests. This has caused difficulties in conducting the investigation and bringing it to a swift conclusion. Sadly, Lucia's testimony itself really does not add anything substantive to the investigation. She did not provide I.D.'s of either the unit or any of the personnel involved because she could not see very well, even though it was a bright, moonlit night.

The investigation continues through the interviews that are being conducted by the Honor Board. President Cristiani is being informed of the developments in the case as they occur, but he is monitoring it very closely, as is the U.S. Embassy. The thrust of the probe now -- given that the Atlacatl Battalion has been identified as the likely perpetrators -- is to determine who in the unit actually killed the priests, who ordered the unit to go to the UCA on the night of 15/16 November, who if anyone, on the general staff, knew about the deployment of the troops to the UCA, and whether there has been any cover-up of the investigation by the general staff or other Salvadorans.

With this in mind, there's been a second track developed in the case about which we learned from Ambassador Walker upon our arrival. Apparently, a Colonel Aviles, who is a member of the general staff, reported to a U.S. Mil. Group major that he had heard fourth-hand that Colonel Guillermo Benavides was implicated. Benavides, commander of the military school which is located in the immediate area of the University of Central America, had operational control of the Atlacatl unit. The American major held the story for approximately 10 days, troubled by the significance of what he had been told, and also by the fact that in revealing this confidence from Colonel Aviles, that he would be betraying a friend and a fellow military officer. Ultimately, the major went to the Mil. Group commander, his superior officer in the embassy, who immediately went to the general staff to talk to Colonel Ponce about the Aviles revelations.

The Milgroup Commander believed that Ponce already knew about Colonel Aviles information. When confronted with the information, Ponce said, "I don't know anything about it, but let's bring in Aviles." They did bring Colonel Aviles in, and Aviles denied ever having said it. As a result, polygraphs were performed on both the U.S. Major, as well as Colonel Aviles. Both polygraphs showed some deception. The Major has been removed from El Salvador and is currently being interviewed in Washington. Aviles remains adamant that he did not talk with the Major. The investigation continues. The SIU and the Honor Board are developing additional facts with which they plan to confront Colonel Benavides. Among these is the accusation that he was, in fact, involved in some manner in ordering the Atlacatl Battalion to the university.

As a side issue but an important one, the U.S. Major has stated that the chain of information was that Benavides told Lt. Col. Rivas that he was involved in the Jesuit case and that he needed his help. Rivas told his deputy, Colonel Lopez, who then told Colonel Aviles, who then told the U.S. Army Major. When Richard Chidester, the embassy officer in charge of the Jesuit investigation, confronted Rivas with this statement, Rivas said that this was absolutely untrue. If Rivas had been approached by Benavides, he would have gone directly to Cristiani. Further, in his own defense, he stated that he had been aggressively investigating the Atlacatl Battalion before Benavides ever was alleged to have come to him. In fact, he refused to yield pressure to investigate the other units. If he were trying to protect Benavides and to cover something up, he would never have investigated the Atlacatl. This explanation, on its face, is satisfactory. However, it needs to be further reviewed. Moreover, the spectre of a cover-up within the military is something that clearly will be reviewed more heavily in the follow-up Codel visit which is planned for later this month. There is no evidence, however, of any cover-up at this time.

The investigation proceeds apace, and the fact that Cristiani came out and made a very forceful and courageous statement concerning the involvement of the military has, to some degree, satisfied the Jesuits who were very suspicious of the Government's willingness to investigate the crime.

Nonetheless, there is a deep mistrust of the institution of the military and the government and their willingness to bring senior officers to trial, if indeed they are implicated. The Church and its auxiliaries, such as the Tutela Legale, have very good information on the status of the investigation. In fact, they had reached the conclusion that the military was responsible and had issued a report prior to President Cristiani's statements on the 7th of January. It is very important that the U.S. Embassy and the government take whatever steps are possible to improve the dialogue between the Church, the Government of El Salvador, and the U.S. Embassy.

# The Washington Post

## Salvadoran Killings Cited

*Deserter Links U.S. Advisers to Army Unit*

By Douglas Farah and Don Podesta  
Washington Post Foreign Service

A member of a Salvadoran army intelligence unit who fled the country following his participation in the torture and killing of suspected leftists says elite army troops routinely carried out such killings as recently as this summer.

Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, who is sought by Salvadoran authorities, said in an interview in Washington that he deserted from the army after carrying out the torture and murder of two peasants last July. He said the intelligence department of the army's First Brigade, whose day-to-day operations were carried out with the knowledge of U.S. military advisers, secretly tortured and killed suspected leftists under orders from the commander.

Joya Martinez said two U.S. of-

ficers worked daily in the headquarters of the First Brigade's intelligence unit, frequently writing checks for the unit's operating expenses. They were shown copies of arrest reports signed by superior officers, but Joya Martinez said that the Americans were not shown copies of reports listing convictions of suspects and that the advisers often seemed anxious to avoid hearing about details of clandestine operations.

"The allegations are very sensational and very serious," said U.S. Ambassador William Walker in an interview in San Salvador. "Since we first heard about it, we have been encouraging the government and armed forces to get to the bottom of them."

Walker denied that any U.S. advisers were aware of any torture or killings. "I know that is not true,

See EL SALVADOR, A26, Col. 1

# Salvadoran Cites Killings By Army Unit

EL SALVADOR, From A1

and it makes me question the rest of the allegations," Walker said. The key is the basic truthfulness of Joya Martinez. If he is truthful, it is very serious, and if not, we are just dealing with someone trying to save his own skin."

The accusations come as Congress is considering controversial police aid to El Salvador and as human rights workers and those close to the Salvadoran army say there has been a sharp increase in credible reports of torture by the security forces since the beginning of the year.

In recent months, assassinations by El Salvador's Marxist-led rebels have risen, as the insurgents have turned to a campaign of urban terrorism in their efforts to overthrow the government. The guerrillas have killed senior government officials and attacked family members of top military officers.

Right-wing death squads, often operating in conjunction with the military, killed thousands of civilians in the early 1980s, but the killings have dropped dramatically in recent years, and the army has greatly improved its human rights record.

Joya Martinez's charges are the first in recent years to directly link a military unit to systematic killings.

Salvadoran military leaders say Joya Martinez did work in the intelligence unit of the First Brigade. But they say his charges are false, aimed at smearing the armed forces and persuading Congress to cut off U.S. aid. They say the fact that he was investigated by the military for

drop of 300 to large rocks jutting from the ocean.

Sources in El Salvador with access to intelligence said a U.S. adviser specializing in intelligence and another U.S. adviser work in liaison with the First Brigade, and that the CIA routinely pays expenses for intelligence operations in the brigades, including money for informers and office supplies. The United States, which gives El Salvador about \$1.5 million a day in economic and military aid, has about 55 military advisers in El Salvador. A CIA spokesman said that as a matter of policy the agency neither denies nor confirms reports about intelligence matters.

The sources said an intelligence adviser sometimes takes cash to the brigades, although they said it was seldom more than \$1,000. Joya Martinez said he saw the U.S. advisers write checks for as much as \$3,000 for expenses such as office equipment and gasoline.

The sources said that, unless an adviser asked about a special case, he was not informed of arrests, and that the advisers never participated in interrogations.

The U.S. military in El Salvador said through an embassy spokesman that the embassy "exchanges information with the Salvadoran armed forces on a regular basis, but does not regularly or systematically receive photocopies of military reports on captured guerrillas."

"In cases where the embassy has been made aware of captures, there is no routine follow-up, since Salvadoran law requires that a military detainee be passed to police custody and remanded for proceedings in the civil legal system within 72 hours or released with no charges," the spokesman said. "The embassy does of course follow up any specific reports of human rights abuses by either civilian or military authorities."

The Salvadoran military has confirmed that a unit of the First Brigade beat and killed suspected reb-

els in early July. According to accounts by family members, Joya Martinez led a patrol of soldiers that rounded up eight civilians near the hamlet of Tres Ceibas and savagely beat them.

Lucio Parada, 20, was killed by shots in the head after being beaten by a group of soldiers after they tied his thumbs behind his back and

**"In cases where the embassy has been made aware of captures, there is no routine follow-up."**

— U.S. Embassy spokesman

his ankles together, according to family members who witnessed the arrest. The relatives said the troops told them they were under orders to carry out the arrests and torture.

"They accused him of being a guerrilla and told him to turn over his guns," said Sebastian Parada, his father, at his mud house near Nejapa, 20 miles north of the capital. "He said he had nothing, but they took him to the cane field and started beating him."

Parada and his wife said that they recognized Joya Martinez when local television aired a video of his accusations last week.

"We were terrified," said Parada. "We feel a great resentment, because there he is alive, and our son is dead. He is the one who held a gun to Lucio's head, and beat him the most."

Joaquin Miranda Marroquin, 20, was badly beaten and died in a hospital in the capital after being turned over to the First Brigade. The other six were freed after 14 days, although under Salvadoran law they should have been released after 72 hours.


Col. Rene Enrique Ponce, military chief of staff, said in an interview that abuses such as the Tres Ceibas killings persisted, but that they were isolated acts, not institutionally sanctioned or part of routine killings.

But there are flaws in the army version of the Tres Ceibas killing, according to diplomats and human rights monitors familiar with the case, that demonstrate the continuing inability of the military to investigate itself.

Col. Elena Fuentes' original version, when asked about the two deaths, was that the men had fallen off a truck and died. A later National Guard investigation into the killing said Joya Martinez acted almost alone, and the investigation did not seek to trace the chain of responsibility or why the other six remained illegally detained, according to one person who studied the report.

"They defined everything as narrowly as possible," the source said. "Joya Martinez is to be the scapegoat. The question is, after 10 years, why can't the military do better on things like this?"

*Special correspondent Farah reported from San Salvador.*



Joya Martinez poses at army's First Brigade headquarters in El Salvador.

two killings in July and escaped from arrest proves he is only making the statements to gain political asylum.

In Washington, Joya Martinez's attorney, William Van Wyck, said Joya Martinez was planning to apply for asylum in the United States today.

"He is an assassin, a deserter and a thief," said Col. Francisco Elena Fuentes, commander of the First Brigade. "He fled when he found the high command was seriously investigating him. What he says is false."

Joya Martinez said he participated in seven or eight "operations" in which he killed people and gave a detailed description of where the bodies were thrown into the ocean.

Reporters, following Joya Martinez's directions, found the purported dumping ground—an isolated spot on the coastal highway where the protecting fence was cut at a spot where there is a sheer

UPI WIRE

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U.S. ambassador seeks probe into army involvement in death squads@  
@^By DANIEL ALDER@=

SAN SALVADOR (UPI) - The U.S. ambassador to El Salvador Friday called for an investigation into allegations El Salvador's armed forces are involved in death-squad activities. (

"We take any allegations of human rights abuses very seriously," Ambassador William Walker told reporters. "We will be looking into these allegations. What is more important is that the government of El Salvador investigate these charges, and we expect that they will." (

The allegations were raised by Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, a deserter of the Intelligence Division of the First Brigade of the Salvadoran Infantry. The charges were denied Friday by the brigade's commanding officer, Col. Francisco Elena Fuentes. (

The U.S.-backed Salvadoran government had made no official statement as of Friday afternoon. (

Right-wing death squads have routinely carried out nighttime abductions and mutilation-murders of civilians since the beginning of the 10-year civil war between the rebel Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN, and government troops. The war has cost the lives of more than 70,000 people, most of them civilians, thousands at the hands of right-wing death squads. (

In recognition of the high level of death-squad activity, the U.S. government in the past has threatened to cut off aid to El Salvador if the human rights situation did not improve. (

U.S. economic and military aid to the Central American nation of about 5 million currently amounts to about dlr 1.5 million a day and has totaled some dlr 3 billion in this decade. (

On Thursday, a Salvadoran non-governmental human rights organization showed foreign correspondents in the capital a videotaped interview where Joya Martinez detailed an elaborate network of clandestine prisons, houses and graveyards he said were maintained by the First Infantry Brigade. (

Elena Fuentes acknowledged Joya Martinez had been a soldier in the brigade's Intelligence Division. (

But Elena Fuentes characterized Joya Martinez as "a deserter, an assassin and a criminal" who fled El Salvador to avoid arrest in two civilian deaths during a military operation July 2-3 near Nejapa, 9 miles (14 km) north of the capital. (

"Due to the existence of abuse of authority on the part of this individual (Joya Martinez), naturally he believed that everyone was guilty. A summary was made and it has been seen that he was the only one responsible" for the death of the two civilians, Elena Fuentes said. (

"There are not any death-squad groups (within the First Brigade). ... We are professionals and we do not have that type of dark forces," Elena Fuentes told reporters. (

An internal report by El Salvador's National Guard says civilians died after the suspect beat them with a club and held them under water during interrogations. (

CONT.



UPI WIRE (CONT)

In the videotaped interview, Joya Martinez acknowledged he participated in the operation at Nejapa, but said the interrogations were only the latest in a string of officially sanctioned clandestine operations that often ended with the victims being murdered and their bodies "dumped by the seashore."

Joya Martinez said he had knowledge of 75 "clandestine arrests" by members of the First Brigade.

On Thursday, Celia Medrano, of the non-governmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, told reporters that Joya Martinez' testimony was proof that "the armed forces and the death squads are one and the same."

Private human rights groups, such as the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, say death squads are responsible for a majority of the civilian deaths during the civil war.

Both national and international human rights organizations have accused El Salvador's ruling right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance Party, or ARENA, of having ties to the death squads.

Former Salvadoran army Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, a founder of ARENA, has been linked to death squads that murdered thousands of suspected leftists in the early 1980s. D'Aubuisson denies the charges.

Joya Martinez said the "clandestine assassinations" he attributed to the military were usually carried out by clubbing, decapitation or suffocation rather than automatic weapon fire that would suggest military involvement.

Medrano said the human rights commission she helps run has gathered evidence of 1,640 politically motivated killings occurring during the first nine months of 1989.

Medrano's commission, which is characterized as a "front group" for the FMLN by government officials, gathers its information through press reports and eyewitness accounts. The commission also has counted 158 politically motivated disappearances and 1,256 arbitrary arrests from January to September.

Former President Jose Napoleon Duarte, in the weeks leading up to the March 19 presidential elections said he feared an increase in repression would occur if ARENA won.

Alfredo Cristiani, the ARENA candidate, defeated Fidel Chavez Mena of Duarte's ruling Christian Democratic Party, and was sworn in June 1 to succeed Duarte, who suffers from terminal cancer and was prevented by law from succeeding himself.

Cristiani, a wealthy businessman, has pledged to talk with the FMLN to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the war, but other ARENA leaders have said an ARENA government would step up the war before negotiating.

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# Confessions of an Assassin

**W**ith expertise in slitting throats, Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez is skilled also in slicing wordy rhetoric. "My job was only to kill," the former Salvadoran death squad assassin tells me during a two-hour interview.

Joya Martinez, 28, was a member of the intelligence department of the 1st Infantry Brigade of El Salvador's army, leaving last July. As he speaks in a monotone through a translator, his face is expressionless. His dark eyes show fear, as well they might. He is in the United States as a whistle-blower, offering Americans, whose government gives the Salvadoran regime about \$1.5 million a day in military and economic aid, the blood-drenched details on where part of the money goes.

It went to ~~and~~ and other military goons, Joya Martinez reports. Claiming to have tortured and killed eight of his countrymen in the year he served the 1st Brigade, he explains that cutting throats or strangulation was more effective than shooting because bullet wounds leave ballistic evidence. Joya Martinez, a low-ranking night stalker who carried out orders from his military superiors who themselves were counseled by U.S. advisers, estimates that more than 70 killings of suspected leftists or rebel sympathizers were carried out in the first six months of 1989 by his 1st Brigade unit.

In July, Joya Martinez fled. After providing details of his work to human rights organizations in Central America, he turned up in Washington. In late October, his story was told on the "CBS Evening News" and in The Washington Post. In the last two weeks, he has been getting into congressional offices to speak with foreign policy staff. The core of his message is that U.S. advisers, two of whom had desks in Joya Martinez's office and were writing checks to support the operation, were aware of the Salvadoran military's lethal methods of controlling dissent.

"I have come here to appear in any forum," Joya Martinez says, "to have my accusations tested against anyone else's word or the evidence. I have only the truth. I could have settled somewhere else and forgotten this. But I want to stop this planned, organized murder. I do not believe the U.S. advisers could not have known what we were doing. . . . They funded everything we did."

Who's to be believed?

The commander of the 1st Brigade has labeled Joya Martinez a liar who acted on his own in killing people. The State Department denies that U.S. advisers knew or sanctioned the brigade's operations.

On the other side are those Americans who agree with Oscar Romero, the martyred archbishop who begged the U.S. government in 1979 not to send military aid to El Salvador, that no good would come of it. Ten years, \$4 billion and 70,000 deaths later, the archbishop's forecast has had accuracy beyond anyone's worst fears.

One of those befriending Joya Martinez and showing him around Washington is his translator, Allen Frankovitch, a California filmmaker whose 1987 documentary, "The Houses Are Full of Smoke," is about the death squads of Central America.

"I think his story is utterly credible," Frankovitch says. "It checks out with what the heads of Salvadoran intelligence agencies told me about how they operate. By speaking out, this man is risking his life. He could have just faded from view and said nothing."

This view is shared by a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with whom Joya Martinez spoke: "We found no reason to doubt his information."

My initial reaction when interviewing Joya Martinez was one of disgust. Here was a thuggish, self-confessed killer speaking dispassionately of his war crimes. But, slowly, the monstrosity of his past actions became less the issue than the courage of his present ones—showing up in the United States to tell Americans what he had done to earn the money we had sent him. Our 55 military advisers in El Salvador aren't there to water burros in town squares. They are counselors in violence, educating El Salvador's poor in the arts of annihilating other Salvadoran poor.

Joya Martinez, in the lowest ranks, was one of them. He slit throats, dumped bodies at night, had the proper papers to get through roadblocks and worked next to two U.S. advisers. "One of them," he says, "was from Texas, and had a desk a few meters from mine. We provided them with copies of all the reports from our agents on clandestine captures, interrogations. . . . But we did not provide them with the reports on the executions. They did not want to hear of the actual killings."

Days before a death squad killed Archbishop Romero in 1980, he called on young Salvadorans to lay down their weapons and refuse orders to slaughter each other. Ten years later, Joya Martinez heeded the message.

WASH POST

11.19.89

**BACKGROUND: CESAR VIELMAN JOYA MARTINEZ**

CESAR VIELMAN JOYA MARTINEZ joined the First Infantry Brigade in San Salvador in 1987. He was recruited into the intelligence unit, Department 2, in the brigade headquarters in San Carlos garrison in the capital.

The Brigade Commander at the time, Col. Orlando Zepeda, is currently the Deputy Minister of Defense of El Salvador. The Executive Officer at the time, Col. Carranza, is now commander of the Belloso Battalion.

Joya Martinez was assigned the pseudonym "Alex", and was given three months' training as a case officer. American advisors and the Army General Staff trained him how to recruit and handle confidential civilian agents, how to read maps, use small arms, and evaluate intelligence received from "human sources." He also underwent special psychological training.

Joya Martinez's position in the intelligence unit was publicly confirmed on October 13, 1989 by Col. Francisco Elena Fuentes, current Commander of the First Brigade, who denounced Joya Martinez at the same time as a "liar" and "murderer."

Joya Martinez admits direct participation in the killing of eight people--killings which involved cutting the throats or strangling the hooded and tied victims. His superiors specifically ordered that they usually not use firearms, which might identify the execution as having been carried out by the military. For each execution he received specific written orders from the Brigade Commander himself, signed off by the other officers in the chain of command.

"When I was seven, I was not a monster," he says. "They made me a monster."

Besides receiving written orders to carry out their executions, the commandos also received cooperation, clearance, and logistical support from other units within the intelligence unit and throughout the military. Counter-intelligence agents would reconnoiter the area where the killing was to be carried out and the body dumped. Then the commandos would leave the compound in a civilian vehicle late at night, passing military roadblocks without having to stop for inspection.

Two civilian vehicles (with 30-40 different license plates between them) were kept inside the restricted area of Department 2 inside the First Brigade garrison.

After a secret visit to the intelligence unit by President-elect Alfredo Cristiani three days before his inauguration, Joya Martinez was informed that the covert actions of the intelligence unit would be increased. His superiors met with Cristiani and

requested an additional vehicle, and they received it immediately.

Two U.S. advisors were attached to Joya Martinez's unit, working in the same room as he did on a daily basis.

"One of the advisors was from Texas, and had a desk a few meters from mine. We provided them with copies of all the reports from our agents on clandestine captures, interrogations, the results of interrogations, other operations. . . but we did not provide them with reports on the executions. They did not want to hear of the actual killings."

Once when Joya Martinez tried to discuss a death-squad execution with an American advisor, the advisor stopped him. The advisor did not want to know.

The case officer unit was funded with U.S. money. Joya Martinez himself went to the U.S. advisors' compound located behind the Military School to pick up the monthly budget of 19,000 colones. Another time he helped a U.S. advisor transport small arms ammunition from a U.S. facility at Ilopango Air Base just outside the capital.

Joya Martinez was not involved in interrogations. "My job was only to kill." But interrogation rooms and clandestine cells were located in nearby rooms in the restricted area where Joya Martinez and the U.S. advisors worked. Corporal "Elvis," one of the interrogators, was especially known for his brutality.

In May or June, 1989, a problem arose because the civilian vehicles frequently entering and leaving the restricted intelligence area were becoming conspicuous. In his office, Maj. Diaz Hernandez (head of the intelligence unit), met with Lt. Majano (commander of the case officers), and with the U.S. advisors and the case officers, including Joya Martinez, and decided to acquire a safe house. The Americans agreed to fund it, but said they did not want to know what it was to be used for.

The safehouse is located on the extension of Avenida Cuba, which becomes the road to San Marcos, in front of the last Esso station, the only house there with steps in front. Lt. Majano and Joya Martinez rented the house, posing as an engineer and his assistant. The case officers had strict orders not to take prisoners there, but it was a base of operations.

From early 1989 to July, when he escaped the special forces of the intelligence unit, Joya Martinez knew of more than 70 separate "death squad" killings by the First Brigade. His own involvement increased this year when Maj. Diaz Hernandez replaced Capt. Martinez Martinez. Joya Martinez believes, however, that these covert operations had been going on throughout the entire

period he had been in the intelligence unit, although he himself had not been personally involved earlier.

Capt. Martinez was transferred to work directly in the U.S. advisors' compound behind the military school. When Joya Martinez visited that compound, he noted some 30-40 civilian-dressed advisors there, armed with short-barreled AR-15's and Colt .45 pistols.

Although he had shot at and killed other combatants during the war, Joya Martinez was repulsed by having to kill a tied-up victim in cold blood. "Have you ever seen the look on the face of someone as you cut their throat? I know I cannot bring back the dead, but I can stop [the intelligence system] from continuing to operate in the same way."

Joya Martinez was himself targeted for execution when he was scape-goated for a botched operation--a supposedly covert action carried out jointly with the Atlacatl Battalion which had come to light, and was being investigated by human rights organizations. After he escaped the Department 2 "death squad," he acknowledges that he could have simply "gotten lost" in Central America or Mexico. But he chose instead to reveal the inner workings of the "death squad" structure of which he had been a part, hoping that further victims might be saved by his speaking out.

"I accuse Col. Orlando Zepeda, Deputy Min. of Defense; Col. Elena Fuentes, current Brigade Commander; Major Diaz Hernandez; and Lieutenants Majano, Castro, and Vega Pleitez. I invite the press and Congree to visit the First Brigade, enter the restricted intelligence compound and ask to see these officers and Corp. Moreno Escobar and 'Elvis.' I have come here to appear in any forum, to have my accusations tested against anyone else's word or the evidence. I have only the truth. I could have settled somewhere else and forgotten this. But I want to stop this planned, organized murder. I do not believe the U.S. advisors could not have known what we were doing... and they funded everything we did."

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OCTOBER 31, 1989

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NEWS ADVISORY

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**DEFECTOR INDICTS SALVADORAN ARMY COMMAND AND  
U.S. ADVISORS IN ESCALATION OF DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY**

On Wednesday, November 1, 1989, at 10:00 a.m. in the Main Lounge of the National Press Building, CESAR VIELMAN JOYA MARTINEZ will provide a detailed account of the escalation of extrajudicial executions conducted by the Intelligence Department of the First Infantry Brigade of the Salvadoran army. He will also tell of the extent and nature of the support provided by the U.S. advisors attached to the unit.

"When I was seven, I was not a monster. They made me a monster."

Joya Martinez, 28, joined the First Infantry Brigade based in San Salvador in 1987. He was recruited into Department 2 (intelligence) in the Brigade headquarters in the San Carlos garrison and was assigned the pseudonym "Alex." Trained as a "case officer," he gathered information from informants and participated in clandestine captures disguised as a civilian.

Early this year he was made a commando of a special forces unit within the intelligence section. Acting on direct written orders from the Brigade Commander and signed off down the chain of command, the special forces commandos executed prisoners after they had been interrogated by the counter-intelligence unit of the First Brigade, and disposed of their bodies in a way that would hide the military's involvement. They were provided with civilian vehicles, and were given special clearance to exit the military compound and carry their "merchandise" to designated dumping grounds without interference from police or other military units.

"My job was only to kill."

The commandos executed prisoners by cutting their throats, strangulation, or toxic injection. Joya Martinez admits he

(cont'd, p. 2)

participated in eight killings and estimates that the unit he was attached to carried out more than 70 such executions from the beginning of 1989 until July. The First Brigade's counter-intelligence unit closely monitored the executions to guarantee compliance with the orders.

"I do not believe that the American advisors could not have known what we were doing. . . and they funded everything we did."

After a bungled operation which publicly implicated the First Brigade and the Atlacatl Battalion into which he had been infiltrated, Joya Martinez himself was targeted for execution in order to provide deniability to his superiors. Upon discovering that he himself was the objective of a clandestine operation to which he had been assigned, he threatened to blow up himself and the other commandos with a hand grenade, and escaped.

"Have you ever seen the look on the face of someone as you cut their throat? I know I cannot bring back the dead, but I can stop them [the intelligence units] from continuing to operate in the same way."

Trained to fend for himself, Joya Martinez could have hidden his identity after leaving the country and lost himself in the flood of refugees abroad and quietly started a new life. Instead, he felt compelled to testify before human rights organizations in Belize and Mexico about the structures behind the recent escalation in human rights abuses in El Salvador, hoping to save future lives. He made his way to the United States in order to reveal the "death squad" activities within Department 2 of the First Brigade, and the financial and logistical support provided daily by two U.S. advisors attached to the unit.

"I accuse Col. Orlando Zepeda, Deputy Minister of Defense Col. Elena Fuentes, current Brigade Commander Maj. Diaz Hernandez, Lieutenants Majano, Castro, and Vega Pleitez. I invite the press and Congress to visit the First Brigade, to enter the secure intelligence compound, and to ask to see these officers."

Law Office of  
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NOVEMBER 1, 1989

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

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SALVADORAN DEATH SQUAD DEFECTOR  
SAYS TWO U.S. ADVISORS OPERATED  
WITHIN DEATH SQUAD STRUCTURES

SALVADORAN PRESIDENT VISITED  
SECRET DEATH SQUAD HEADQUARTERS

Until July 1989, CESAR VIELMAN JOYA MARTINEZ operated out of Department 2 (Intelligence) of the First Brigade. By day he was a "case officer"; by night he was a death squad commando conducting secret executions. He shared his office on a daily basis with two U.S. advisors whom he knew as "William" from Texas and "the Major." The civilian vehicles were fueled with gasoline bought by Americans. The bullets were American.

Joya Martinez and other commandos were ordered to dispose of usually hooded prisoners by cutting their throats. When Joya Martinez started to discuss one of these secret killings with "William," Joya was cut off mid-sentence and told not to talk about that.

Three days before his inauguration as President, Alfredo Cristiani made a secret visit to the intelligence unit of the First Brigade. There Cristiani was briefed by Major Diaz Hernandez and other intelligence officers who routinely signed off on execution orders. After the briefing, commandos like Joya Martinez were informed that the number of their special operations would increase. Right after Cristiani's visit, the Brigade's death squad received a new vehicle.



To: Members and Staff of El Salvador Task Force  
From: David E. Bonior  
February 7, 1990

Attached is a report distributed by Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief which documents a pattern of intimidation and harassment against the churches in El Salvador by Salvadoran government forces during the recent rebel offensive. It was compiled from press accounts, and by church and human rights workers.

During the period from November 13 - December 15, 1989 there were at least 54 searches of 40 different church facilities and homes of church workers. Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, and Episcopalian churches and their workers were involved, as well as church-affiliated organizations such as the Mennonite Central Committee, Lutheran World Federation, Caritas, and Lutheran Legal Aid. Churches, offices and homes were ransacked, money and equipment was stolen, and personnel were arrested.

International church and development workers from the U.S., W. Germany, Canada, Spain, Columbia, and Guatemala were also arrested during this period. As of December 8, 1989 only 44 of the original 88 foreign lay workers were still in El Salvador. 11 were deported and 23 left voluntarily.

According to this report, Salvadoran security forces involved in these actions included:

First, Second, and Third Infantry Brigades  
Air Force  
National Police  
Treasury Police  
National Guard  
Atlatl Batallion  
Arce Batallion  
Bracamonte Batallion  
Civil Defense  
Artillery Regiment

ATTACKS AGAINST CHURCHES  
IN EL SALVADOR

NOVEMBER 13 - DECEMBER 15, 1989

Churches in El Salvador, during and after the urban offensive launched by the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) on November 11, 1989, experienced a pattern of systematic threats, intimidation, and harassment by Salvadoran government forces. The attached chronology describes a series of incidents, the most publicized of which was the murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter. It also documents 54 searches of 40 different church facilities and homes of church workers by Salvadoran military and security forces over a 32 day period (November 13 through December 14).

As a result of the situation described in the chronology, a number of Salvadoran church leaders--some of them mentioned here--have been forced to flee El Salvador and are now living in exile. A significant number of foreign church workers also have left the country. Seventy-eight of the 88 foreign lay workers living and working in El Salvador were actually in the country when the offensive began. Eleven of them subsequently were arrested and deported, with the most familiar case being that of churchworker Jennifer Casolo. An additional 23 left voluntarily sometime between November 11 and December 8, 1989. As of December 8, 1989, there were only 44 of the original 88 foreign lay workers still in El Salvador.

Many of the churches offered temporary shelter to persons displaced from their homes by the fighting. By November 17, some 21 refugee centers were open and operating, the majority of them in Catholic schools, pastoral centers, parishes and the chapels themselves. The Archdiocese of San Salvador supplied food, medicines, and other relief supplies to centers attending more than 14,000 persons. Most of the displaced opted to return to their homes and neighborhoods as soon as the fighting subsided. Some of the refugee centers were forced to close, because of nearby fighting and continual harassment by the military and security forces. By December 1, only four locales were still operating a refugee centers, and there were fewer than 200 persons staying there.

The information in the chronology was compiled by church workers through interviews in El Salvador, press accounts, and reports by Tutela Legal (the legal assistance office of the Archdiocese).

**PARTIAL CHRONOLOGY  
OF ATTACKS ON THE CHURCHES IN EL SALVADOR**

NOVEMBER 13

**Aerial attacks, search:** San Antonio de Padua parish, in San Miguel, was bombed and strafed while eighteen persons were inside (including the parish priest and three medical personnel). Following the aerial attacks, soldiers from the Arce Battalion and Third Infantry Brigade entered the parish. They destroyed a banner on the main door and took away two wounded civilians, young men, ages 24 and 16. The whereabouts of these two men were still unknown by December.

**Military intimidation:** Soldiers attempted to enter Maria Madre de los Pobres parish in Soyapango. The soldiers shot at the feet of church workers when told that they could not enter the parish building. There were about 40 refugees inside at the time.

**Search:** Armed, uniformed soldiers entered and thoroughly searched the residence of the Jesuit priests at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA). They also searched the rooms of the Pastoral Center, adjacent to the Jesuits' residence. Father Ignacio Ellacuria, Rector of the UCA, offered the soldiers access so they could search the entire grounds of the UCA, if they would return the following day, during daylight hours.

NOVEMBER 14

**Search:** Divine Providence Hospital (site where Msgr. Oscar Romero was assassinated in March, 1980) was entered and searched by uniformed army soldiers who said they were looking for wounded persons.

**Search:** The parish house, offices and buildings of San Antonio de Padua parish, San Miguel, were entered and searched. The soldiers took everything, including 40,000 colones in cash belonging to the church cooperative, 50,000 colones worth of food to be distributed the following day, all the medicines and instruments from the clinic, an electrical plant, furniture, a television and the windows of the buildings.

**Death threats:** Two U.S. pastors living in Ciudad Credisa, Soyapango, Fr. Jim Barnett (a Dominican priest), and Rev. Bill Dexheimer (a Lutheran pastor) received an anonymous telephoned death threat, delivered in English. Rev. Dexheimer left the country on November 17, Fr. Barnett on November 20.

**Evacuation ordered:** Soldiers demanded that the 150-200 people taking refuge at Maria Madre de los Pobres parish in Soyapango

(including six injured) leave the area because bombing would begin half an hour later. The National Police later entered the parish and used it for a command post.

**Destruction of church property:** Archdiocesan workers found the parish of Immaculate Conception in Cuscatancingo seriously damaged by machine gun fire.

#### NOVEMBER 15

**Search:** Uniformed soldiers entered and searched the home of a lay worker and official of the Baptist Association of El Salvador.

**Search:** Uniformed men entered the offices of Catholic Relief Services in San Salvador at 12:30 p.m. The offices subsequently were closed during the week of November 20 and the CRS director, a U.S. citizen, left the country.

**Search:** Approximately eight armed, uniformed soldiers forced their way onto the grounds of the San Roque parish in Barrio San Jacinto, San Salvador and searched the premises for two hours. The soldiers confiscated some books and printed materials from the priest's room. They also took a photograph of some parish members.

**Military threats:** Uniformed soldiers entered the parish grounds of Maria Madre de los Pobres in Soyapango and told those seeking refuge to leave. The soldiers tossed a grenade onto the roof of the parish clinic, injuring two persons. The parish ceased to function as a refuge later that day.

#### NOVEMBER 16

**Assassinations:** Six Jesuit priests, a housekeeper and her 15 year-old daughter were assassinated in the early morning hours after assailants forcibly entered and searched the Jesuit residence on the UCA grounds. They also entered and destroyed the offices of the Monsignor Oscar Romero Pastoral Center.

**Death threats:** People in the Catholic Archdiocese building heard loudspeaker broadcasts saying, "Ignacio Ellacuria and Martin Baro were killed (han caido); other Communists will be killed (sigamanos matando comunists)." Shortly thereafter, the same voice was heard on the loudspeakers speaking on behalf of the First Infantry Brigade. The same day, an anonymous telephone call to the residence of Archbishop Rivera y Damas said, "Tell those priests we are going after them."

**Search and arrests:** Beginning at 5:00 p.m., the National Guard arrested 15 persons from various Lutheran Church offices and the sanctuary, including the following:

Germans: Tobias Muller, Brigitte Schwartz, Herbert Schmidt, Susana Kreiling, Simone Monechen, and Jutta Muller

U.S.: Thomas Gabriel, Paula Brentlinger, Paul Fitch, Bradley Field

Canadian: Brian Rude

Spanish: Luis Borges

Salvadoran: Salvador Ibarra, Carmen Fabian, Videlbina Flores de Fitch

The 12 foreigners were taken to the Treasury Police, and were released on November 17. All subsequently left the country. The Salvadorans were held by the National Police. The two women were released on November 19, Ibarra remained in custody.

**Search:** The Sagrado Familia Catholic school in San Salvador was entered and searched after the 6:00 p.m. curfew by about eight soldiers, while other soldiers remained outside.

**Search:** Armed, uniformed soldiers entered and searched the home of a deacon of the Emmanuel Baptist Church in Barrio San Jacinto at 8:00 p.m.

#### NOVEMBER 17

**Search:** The home of a group of Catholic lay workers was entered at 9:00 a.m. by uniformed soldiers and the first room of the house was searched. Two women were in the house at the time; they explained that the building was property of the Archdiocese of San Salvador. The soldiers left within an hour.

**Search:** Armed, uniformed soldiers from the CITFA (Center of Transmission Instruction of the Armed Forces) garrison in San Jacinto entered and searched the administrative offices of Emmanuel Baptist Church at 9:00 a.m.

**Search:** At 2:30 p.m. soldiers entered the Emmanuel Baptist church health center (CESE) and searched for two hours. They made inventory lists of the medicines in the center and wrote down the names and addresses of all of the church workers there.

**Search:** The Sagrado Familia school was searched again at 8:00 p.m. Approximately 20 armed, uniformed soldiers entered the school grounds and searched all of the rooms and the chapel.

NOVEMBER 18

**Military occupation of retreat house:** The military entered and occupied an Archdiocesan retreat house, Domus Marie, in Mejicanos. Soldiers were reported to be sleeping there and the retreat was being used as a command post. The nuns who normally live in the retreat house left on the same day.

**Military encirclement:** Uniformed soldiers surrounded the Ilopango parish in the afternoon. They did not enter or search.

**Destruction of church property:** The interior of the chapel of Cristo Salvador parish in Zacamil was discovered riddled with bullet holes, , pictures of church martyrs had been shot at and the office broken into. The chalice and hosts were scattered on the floor.

NOVEMBER 19

**Search:** Approximately 25 soldiers forced their way into the San Roque parish house at 6:15 a.m. and conducted a four hour search. They confiscated medicines from the parish health clinic and searched the refugees taking shelter at the parish. At 4:15 p.m. about 10 soldiers returned and conducted another search. By 5:30 the parish had ceased providing temporary shelter for displaced persons.

**Arrest:** Five church workers providing health care in the San Francisco de Asis parish church in Mejicanos were detained and questioned by armed, uniformed soldiers of the First Infantry Brigade at 7:00 a.m. One of the health workers, David Alexander Hernandez Amaya, a 22-year-old resident of Cuscatancingo, was arrested and taken away. The other four were released on the spot. All five had been working in the parish clinic since the fighting broke out on November 11. As of December 4, 1989, the whereabouts of David Hernandez were still unknown.

**Search and Arrests:** Three Salvadoran church workers of the Episcopalian Church were arrested in a home in Ciudad Satellite, San Salvador, at 9:00 a.m. Juan Antonio Berty Quinonez, Co-Director of the social services program (CREDHO) of the San Juan Evangelista Church, and co-worker Jose Francisco Paz Orantes were arrested by uniformed National Guardsmen who entered and searched the Quinonez home. The National Guardsmen left but returned to the house around noon and arrested Ana Julia Rodriguez de Quinonez, the wife of Juan Antonio Berty Quinonez. Jose Francisco Paz Orantes and Ana Julia Rodriguez de Quinonez were released from National Guard headquarters on December 1.

**Search:** The clinic and other buildings of San Francisco de Asis Parish, Mejicanos, were searched by soldiers who confiscated medicines. Seven wounded persons, all men whose names are unknown,

were taken from the clinic. As of December 4, 1989, their whereabouts were unknown.

**Search:** In the parish of Teotepeque, around eight members of the Civil Defense and one soldier from Cavalry Regiment conducted lengthy, thorough searches of home of five church workers from the parish of San Pedro, Teotepeque, La Libertad. They confiscated a book (about pastoral work) and some papers.

NOVEMBER 20

**Arrest:** Fr. Miguel Francisco Andurez Aramburu, a Spanish Dominican priest, was detained by soldiers of the Second Brigade at a farm called Maracy in San Juan Buenavista, Santa Ana. Army troops claimed they found large bags and barrels with surgical equipment buried on the farm, as well as boxes with clothes from the United States and "some items from Nicaragua, plus Marxist-Leninist literature in the house." An official from the Second Infantry Brigade stated that, "the priest met frequently with a guerrillera commander and other extremists." Andurez was released on November 21, left the country on November 22.

**Arrest:** Rev. Luis Serrano, a naturalized Salvadoran of Spanish origin and pastor of San Juan Evangelista Episcopal church in San Salvadore was arrested from a house in San Salvador by the National Guard.

**Arrests:** Seventeen persons working with the San Juan Evangelista Episcopalian Church in San Salvador were arrested by National Guardsmen who arrived at the church at 6:15 a.m. Those arrested include:

Spaniards: Fransisco Rivera, Esther Domenech, Luis Miguel Perez

Canadian: Karen Kidd

U.S.: Josephine Beecher

Colombian: Marcela Diaz Rodriguez

Guatemalan: Melinton Zea Melendez

Salvadoran: Jose Candelario Aguilar, Luis Gustavo Lopez Magana, Domingo Galtan, Randolpho Campos Benavides, Jose Vidal Enamorado, Alexander Antonio Tovar, Jose Emilio Alonso, Eduardo Castillo, Elva Ruth Alfaro de Archila, and Horacio Guzman

All of the foreigners except the Guatemalan were released the same day and left the country soon thereafter. The status of the

Guatemalan is still unknown. The Salvadorans were held at the National Guard headquarters.

**Search:** Army soldiers returned again to search the San Roque parish church. The military officer in charge of the search called the Archdiocese and asked that someone from the Archdiocese go to the parish to talk with him. One of the bishops went there, but the military officer had left.

NOVEMBER 21

**Threat:** Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez received an anonymous telephone call issuing a death threat. A caretaker answered the phone at La Resurreccion Lutheran Church. The caller told him they would cut Medardo Gomez into pieces.

**Search:** Uniformed National Guardsmen entered and searched the Lutheran Bible School in San Miguelito, San Salvador. Files, documents, and office equipment were taken.

**Search:** Uniformed, armed members of the National Guard entered the residence and offices of the Mennonite Central Committee in San Miguelito around 10:30 a.m. and searched the premises for several hours. They confiscated computers, printers, documents and files, books, cameras, valuables, and other miscellaneous personal belongings, including U.S. passports.

NOVEMBER 22-23

**Fliers distributed in town threatening church workers:** On Wednesday, November 22, a woman from the town of Teotepeque, La Libertad, witnessed a uniformed soldier or member of the civil defense drop a handwritten flier in front of her house in the late evening. By morning the fliers had been found distributed about town. The flier reads:

ATTENTION . . . ATTENTION . . .

"Teotepeque and surrounding area--these are the enemies of the people: Clelia Estrada, Silvia Estrada, Regina Cruz, Guadalupe Recinas, Tulia Melendez, Gloria; directed by the communists, they want to convert you into assassins of your own people, as they did in Chalatenango and Morazan.

REJECT THEM

(signed) PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SALVATION

The six persons named are all members of the parish of San Pedro, Teotepeque, La Libertad and active in the pastoral work of the Catholic church (one health promoter, four work with women's groups in development projects, one is a musician in the church choir). Three of the six had their homes searched on Sunday,



November 19 by members of the civil defense and at least one soldier from the Cavalry Regiment.

NOVEMBER 23

**Search:** Army soldiers entered the private home of a member of Cristo Salvador parish in Zacamil. They ransacked the home and stole electrical appliances and other personal belongings. The home is located next door to the chapel and often was visited by members of the church.

NOVEMBER 24

**Searches:** At 6 a.m. five or six soldiers of the Artillery Regiment entered and did a superficial search of "El Despertar" in San Antonio Abad, San Salvador. Around 8 a.m. about 20 uniformed soldiers from the Bracamonte Battalion entered and searched the place again for half an hour, entering all the rooms that were unlocked. They said they would return later. At the time of the searches about five people were present in El Despertar, including several Jesuit priests.

**Search:** Two uniformed, armed soldiers entered the parish of San Francisco de Asis, Mejicanos, saying maybe the guerrillas had left a bomb in the church. One of the parish priests earlier discovered that the church had been entered and ransacked sometime between November 19 and 21.

**Arrest:** Margarita Gomez, Episcopal church employee and Salvadoran citizen, who works in the accounting department of CREDHO (social service program of the Episcopal church), was arrested at her home at 6 p.m. by armed, uniformed National Guardsmen.

NOVEMBER 25:

**Released:** Lutheran attorney Salvador Ibarra was released from National Guard headquarters. He decided at that time to remain in the country to continue his legal assistance work for the Lutheran Church.

**Search and arrest:** National Police agents entered and searched the home of Julio Cesar Castro Ramirez and Julia Eugenia Aguilera de Castro in Santa Ana. He is an employee of the Episcopal Church and she is a nurse. Julia Eugenia Aguilera was taken to National Guard headquarters in San Salvador for investigations. She was released on December 1, 1989.

**Arrest:** Julio Cesar Castro Ramirez, Episcopal Church employee in Santa Ana, was arrested by armed men in civilian clothing in a park in Santa Ana as he was playing with his small children. The armed men took him away without saying where they were taking

him. Relatives later learned he was being held in National Guard headquarters for investigations.

**Exiled:** Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez left El Salvador under the protection of the United Nations. Rev. Edgar Palacios, a leader of the Permanent Committee for the National Debate also left on this date.

**Search:** The pastoral house of the Lutheran Church in San Miguel was entered and searched by soldiers of the Third Infantry Brigade and security forces.

NOVEMBER 26:

**Search:** Twelve armed, uniformed members of the Panther Battalion of the National Police entered and searched the premises of El Despertar. The search lasted an hour. A lieutenant, Joaquin Toledo, told several of those present that the military had been told that a truck carrying five boxes of ammunition that had been intercepted on November 19 had come from El Despertar.

**Search:** The "Fray Martin de Porres" health clinic of the Vicariate of Amatepec (which includes Ciudad Credisa, Colonia 22 de Abril, and Amatepec) was entered and search by army soldiers who said they had information that guerrillas were being treated there.

NOVEMBER 27

**Threats:** Armed men in civilian clothing went to a private home of members of Cristo Salvador parish in Zacamil. They were carrying a list of names of church members. They said all of those people had to leave the community "because they are Communists."

**Search and arrest:** The Rev. Ruth Mooney, a U.S. citizen and Baptist missionary who teaches at the Instituto Teologico Bautista de El Salvador (ITBES) in the city of Santa Ana, was arrested around 12:00 p.m. Armed, uniformed soldiers of the Second Infantry Brigade entered and searched her house and arrested Rev. Mooney and her housekeeper. The housekeeper was released the same afternoon. Rev. Mooney was released from Second Infantry Brigade garrison on November 28; "pending further investigations." She chose to leave the country several days later.

**Search:** The offices of the Instituto Teologico Bautista de El Salvador in Santa Ana were entered and searched by the Armed Forces. The secretary of the dean of ITBES was arrested, taken to an army garrison, questioned for an hour, and then released.

**Search:** The Jesuit residence in Amatepec was entered and searched around 2:30 p.m. Approximately six Treasury Police agents entered and searched the house, confiscating slides, some photographic negatives, and music cassettes. Police told neighbors they had information that there were ten "mercenaries" living there.

**Search:** Army soldiers entered and searched parish buildings of the Colonia 22 de Abril. The search included the day care center, the carpentry workshop, and buildings of other parish projects. The soldiers asked by name about the two parish priests.

**Search:** Armed, uniformed soldiers entered and searched the health clinic of the Emmanuel Baptist Church from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. (It was also searched on November 17.)

**Search:** The residence of Philip Anderson, representative of the Lutheran World Federation, was entered, searched and ransacked. At 10:00 the housekeeper arrived to find approximately 40 soldiers from the First Infantry Brigade inside and around the house, located in Barrio El Refugio.

**Search:** The Lutheran Guest House in Colonia El Refugio was entered and search by uniformed soldiers for two hours. The housekeeper was questioned for an hour. Soldiers told her "the Bishop (Medardo Gomez) was the principal "person responsible for what had occurred because he had incited (the people to) violence." The official also said it was "good the Bishop had left for the United States of wherever" because they were "going to do away with him."

#### NOVEMBER 28

**Search:** Armed, uniformed soldiers, their faces painted green, entered Emmanuel Baptist Church at 8:00 a.m. and searched the premises until 4:30 p.m. They asked for one of the pastors by name and took away a list of members of the church and persons who had stayed as refugees in the church during previous weeks.

**Search:** Treasury Police agents entered and searched the premises of Sagrado Corazon.

**Threat:** Around 5:30 p.m., a van with polarized windows circled the Ciudad Credisa parish house in Soyapango. A neighbor saw armed men in civilian dress inside the van. The van parked for half an hour across the street from the parish house and clinic.

**Search:** Five armed, uniformed army soldiers entered at 11:30 a.m. and searched the a San Antonio parish residence in

Soyapango. They dug holes in the yard and asked where the well was. The soldiers confiscated a small amount of medicines.

**Search:** Five armed, uniformed National Police agents at 9:00 p.m. entered and searched the chapel, offices, and residence of the Santa Ursula parish in Barrio Santa Anita, San Salvador. The police climbed over the metal fence around the parish grounds and entered the buildings. Police said they were conducting the search to see if there were "underground deposits" there. They checked personal identity documents of three lay workers present and noted their names as well as the name of the priest.

**Search:** Armed, uniformed National Police agents entered Colegio Asuncion, a Catholic school, at 10:20 p.m. There were no refugees, only the nuns there at the time. The police left around 10:45 p.m.

**Search:** Twenty five soldiers entered and searched the San Francisco Asis parish and adjacent convent. No refugees were inside, but several priests were there.

**Search:** Army soldiers entered and searched the "Fray Martin de Porres" health clinic.

**Interrogation:** The housekeeper of the Lutheran World Federation Representative, Philip Anderson, arrived at Anderson's residence at 9:00 a.m. and was detained by a National Police agent who took her into the house for questioning. She was questioned about Anderson and his wife and was shown a notebook containing a full sheet of names. The police agents took the housekeepers personal identity document, telling her she should go to the police the following day to pick it up.

**Search:** Armed, uniformed soldiers of the Third Infantry Brigade entered and searched the office of the legal assistance department of the Lutheran Church in San Miguel.

#### NOVEMBER 29

**Search:** Army soldiers entered and searched the private house of a member of Cristo Salvador church in Zacamil. The name of the member was on a list displayed to church members by armed men in civilian clothes on November 27.

**Search:** Armed, uniformed Treasury Police agents and soldiers from another unit entered and searched the home of a member of the governing board of Emmanuel Baptist Church. The soldiers carried the list of names that had been taken from the church the previous day. The home of the church member's daughter, who lives next door, was also searched.

**Search:** The home of the secretary of the Lutheran Church in San Miguel was entered and searched by uniformed Treasury Police agents.

NOVEMBER 30

**Search:** Armed, uniformed soldiers entered the UCA campus at 8:00 a.m., saying they were searching for weapons and persons. They did not enter or search any buildings.

**Search:** Colegio Asuncion, a Catholic school in San Salvador that earlier had provided temporary shelter for displaced persons, was entered and searched by armed, uniformed National Guardsmen at 5:00 a.m. The search lasted an hour.

**Search:** The residence of two nuns of the La Transformacion parish in San Salvador was entered at 8:30 a.m. and searched by armed, uniformed National Police agents. The police wrote down the names and the personal identity document information of the persons present, including two nuns (U.S. and Canadian) and a U.S. lay worker. The police stayed three hours, carefully searching books and papers.

**Arrest:** Teresa Rosario Castro Caceres, housekeeper for the staff of Lutheran World Federation, was arrested by two armed, uniformed Treasury Police agents at about 10 a.m. outside the Socorro Juridico Luterano (Lutheran Legal Aid) office in San Miguelito. She was brought before a judge on December 12 and consigned to the women's prison in Ilopango.

**Search:** The warehouse of the Lutheran Church of El Salvador in San Miguelito was entered and searched. It is not known whether anything was taken.

**Search:** The office of the legal assistance department of the Lutheran Church in San Miguel was again entered and searched by members of the Third Infantry Brigade.

**Search and arrest:** The parish center at Ciudad Credisa was entered and searched, reportedly by Treasury Police, who arrested a Spanish priest and four workers of the Dominican Order after conducting a search. Those arrested are:

Fr. Carlos Diez Rojo (Spanish)  
 Jose Santana (Salvadoran)  
 Estela Cruz Bustamante (Salvadoran)  
 Santiago de Jesus Vasquez (Salvadoran)  
 Scott Wright (U.S.)

Fr. Carlos Diaz was released to a representative of the Spanish Embassy December 1, and left El Salvador December 2. Wright was held at Municipal Police headquarters and released December 4.

The three Salvadorans were held at Treasury Police headquarters, then brought before a judge on December 12 on charges of being "terrorists" and were remanded to prison.

**Search:** The former home of a U.S. lay church worker was entered and search in Soyapango. The lay worker's father-in-law lives in the home.

**Search:** The home of a deacon of the Lutheran Church was entered and searched by Army soldiers. The home is located in Condominio Modelo.

**Intimidation:** Soldiers of the Third Infantry Brigade were stationed in front of the Lutheran Church in San Miguel. The soldiers called on their radios every time someone went in or out of the church. The pastor said this intimidated the people and no one wanted to go near the building.

#### DECEMBER 1

**Charges brought against detained church workers:** The following Episcopal church workers were charged with helping to prepare an attack against the buildings of the High Command of the Armed Forces on October 30, 1989:

1. Father Luis Serrano Lorente
2. Juan Antonio Berty Quinonez
3. Jose Horacio Guzman Rivas
4. Jose Eduardo Sanchez Castillo
5. Luis Gustavo Lopez Magana
6. Alex Antonio Tobar Flores
7. Jose Candelario Aguilar Alvarez
8. Randolpho Campos Benavides
9. Julio Cesar Castro Ramirez
10. Jose Emilio Alonso

The group was consigned to the Second Penal Court and were remanded to Mariona Prison.

**Released:** The following Episcopal church workers were released and not charged:

1. Aida Margarita Gomez de Leon
2. Jose Vidal Enamorado
3. Elba Ruth Alfaro
4. Jose Francisco Paz Orantes
5. Ana Julia Rodriguez de Quinonez
6. Julia Eugenia Aguilera

**Search:** Two armed, uniformed Air Force soldiers around 9:00 a.m. entered the residence of Maryknoll nuns in Jardines de Sel Sutt,

part of the Ilopango parish. They checked the rice, beans, and medicine in the home, then went away. About ten minutes later, a different group of Air Force soldiers arrived and did a second search.

**Exiled:** Rev. Pedro Morataya, pastor of Emmanuel Baptist Church, together with a member of the governing board of the church left El Salvador.

**Arrest:** Oscar Rene Castro Romero, an employee of the Lutheran University in San Salvador, was arrested by National Police agents at 2:00 p.m. as he waited at a bush stop near the Hotel Camino Real. He was released from Treasury Police headquarters on December 7, 1989.

#### DECEMBER 3

**Search:** The Maryknoll nuns' residence in Jardines de Sel Sutt was searched a third time. Two armed, uniformed soldiers with their faces painted entered at 8:00 a.m. and searched the house.

**Military encirclement:** Armed, uniformed Cavalry Regiment soldiers surrounded the Jayaque parish church as a Jesuit priest gave mass. One of the soldiers entered the church and stayed there, with his M-16 rifle during the entire service.

**Fliers distributed threatening church workers:** The same fliers criticizing the church that had been distributed in the town and villages of Teotepeque, La Libertad, on November 22 and 23, were distributed in Jayaque by uniformed soldiers.

#### DECEMBER 4

**Arrest:** Rev. Rolando Cerron, a Baptist pastor in Zacatecoluca, La Paz, was arrested by National Police agents and taken to their headquarters in Zacatecoluca. He was released on December 6 or 7.

#### DECEMBER 5

**Denied entry to El Salvador:** Two members of a delegation of Episcopal bishops, visiting on behalf of Presiding Bishop Edmund Browning, were denied entry to the country at the airport, despite holding valid visas. A third, who was not a U.S. citizen was allowed to enter. The others were returned to Miami. The following day, December 6, they attempted again to enter, along with a fourth member of the delegation and were permitted entry.

**Denied entry to El Salvador:** Two Maryknoll priests, both U.S. citizens, holding valid visas, also were denied entry. Upon consulting the Salvadoran Consul in Guatemala City, they were told that priests are not being allowed into El Salvador.

**Search:** The home of a Lutheran church worker (a foreign doctor who was arrested on November 16 and left the country on November 18) was entered and searched. Nobody was in the house at the time. It is believed some money was taken.

DECEMBER 8

**Search:** The residence of the pastoral team of Reina de la Paz parish in Soyapango, was entered around noon and searched by armed, uniformed Air Force soldiers.

**Released:** Randolfo Campos Benavides, an Episcopal lawyer arrested on November 20 and held in Mariona Prison, was released from prison.

**Property returned:** Some of the property confiscated from the Mennonite Central Committee office on November 21 was returned by the National Guard. They stated that they had sent other materials to the Armed Forces High Command along with an investigative report.

DECEMBER 9

**Search:** Uniformed Air Force soldiers returned to the residence of the pastoral team of Reina de la Paz parish and confiscated two books. They gave the priests a written statement that they had confiscated the books and instructing them to present themselves to the Air Force base within 72 hours to explain why they had these books in their house. The pastoral team reported the incidents to their consulates.

DECEMBER 11

**Search:** The San Salvador offices of Caritas were entered and searched in the morning by armed uniformed members of the National Guard. Caritas is a relief agency of the Catholic church, which receives in-kind donations and support from Caritas Internationalis and other ecclesiastical organizations.

**Fliers distributed in town attacking church workers:** Fliers were anonymously distributed in Jayaque that read:

"ALERT INHABITANTS OF JAYAQUE AND SURROUNDING AREA"

"There are false catchists (catequizadores) who, abusing the faith that we have in God, preach Communist doctrine. The FMLN takes advantage of religion in order to bring the people to violence."



The reverse side reads:

"Inhabitant of Jayaque: This is a call we make to you, for your reflection because we know that in your community there are persons who do not want you to continue to live in tranquility, with liberty and peace. These persons believe they are very smart and speak with pleasant, easily understood words, thus taking advantage of your humility, your needs and even the faith that you profess in God. But what they really want is for you to commit yourself and get yourself involved. They do not care if they cause you harm. To risk your life is not important to them, because they are only fulfilling Communist orders.

God said, 'Beward of false prophets, that come to you in sheep's clothing but are inwardly ravenous wolves.' Inhabitants of Jayaque, do not listen to these false preachers of the bible. Do you know what the doctrine of the false preachers is called? It is called Communist = Pain, Hatred and Death. It is our duty to inform." (signed) Committee of National Salvation.

#### DECEMBER 13

**Exiled:** Salvadora Ibarra leaves the country after receiving death threats and being followed by unknown armed persons. In preceding days he had served as attorney for U.S. church worker Jennifer Casolo.

#### DECEMBER 14

**Search and arrests:** Treasury Police agents, at 6:00 a.m., entered and searched the residence of Salvadora Ibarra. Wilma Ibarra, sister of Salvador Ibarra and herself a Lutheran Church employee, Ulises Milton Campos Jarquin, a member of the board of the Lutheran Synod and director of the communications office of the Lutheran Synod, and Nicole Amorux, a French nurse and employee of the social services program of the Lutheran Church, were arrested. The three were taken to Treasury Police headquarters in San Salvador and were released later that evening.

#### DECEMBER 15

**Mistreatment of detainee:** A report of serious mistreatment of Teresa Rosario Castro Caceres, housekeeper for the staff of the Lutheran World Federation was received. She is being held at the women's prison at Ilopango and has been there three days. She has been beaten, raped, and suffered a miscarriage, having been two months pregnant.

**Church facility reopened:** El Despertar, a pastoral retreat center in San Antonio Abad, was reopened for use during daylight hours.


JANUARY 5, 1990

**Released:** The following Episcopal church workers were released from prison:

Luis Serrano Lorente, Juan Antonio Berty Quinonez, Jose Horacio Guzman Rivas, Jose Eduardo Sanchez Castillo, Luis Gustavo Lopez Magana, Alex Antonio Tobar Flores, Jose Candeloario Aguilar Alvarez, and Jose Emilio Alonso

Luis Serrano left El Salvador for Spain on January 6. Juan Antonio Berty Quinonez also planned to leave the country. The others hoped to leave the country for some period of time as soon as arrangements could be made.

1/10/90



**THE WORLD**

**EL SALVADOR MURDER OF JESUITS**

**New Evidence Points to Coverup**

*US intervention prompted deeper probe into higher-level Army involvement in murders*

**By Brook Larmer,**

*Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor*

**SAN SALVADOR**

**EVIDENCE** has appeared here that higher-level military officials were involved in or helped cover up the murders of six Jesuit priests last November.

While the government's official investigation stopped at the level of an Army colonel and seven other soldiers, two questions have remained:

Did Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benavides disregard the Army's strict command structure and make a unilateral decision to kill

lateral the meeting's general mandate into a specific order to eliminate the priests. Such an interpretation would not require a huge leap of faith, diplomats say, since the Army had always labeled the priests as "intellectual authors" of the guerrilla movement.

An official radio station broadcast death threats against Fr. Ignacio Ellacuria and other leftist figures from the first day of the offensive. The Jesuits were the only prominent leftists who did not go into hiding.

"Looking at this as the Army does, killing Ellacuria would be the right thing to do," says one source with close ties to the high command. "It would be perfectly consistent with the goals of elimi-

tor President Alfredo Cristiani.

The right-wing leader faced a stark choice: Either find and prosecute the murderers or jeopardize more than \$300 million in annual United States aid.

Frustrated in part by the US Embassy here, the government investigation broke through the military's code of silence and led to the arrest last month of eight Army soldiers involved in the murders. Among them was Benavides, an ex-intelligence chief and now the highest ranking officer ever arrested for human-rights abuses in El Salvador.

Despite a climate that perhaps encouraged the killings, no direct evidence has emerged to tie the massacre itself to the high com-

mand. Critics complain that the official investigation has avoided looking for links, preferring to focus largely on material evidence.

But the doubts won't go away. An article scheduled for the next issue of Central American Studies (CEAS), a UCA journal, says that "it's unthinkable that a reasonable person would dare to carry out such a brutal act without someone behind him."

Such US intervention has spurred an angry backlash in some sectors of the military. Meanwhile, lawyers warn that successfully prosecuting Benavides will be difficult since, under Napoleonic law, codefendants cannot testify against each other. Benavides' only accusers so far are three lieutenants who are also codefendants in the case.

But analysts suggest that the case is so important for El Salvador that charges against one soldier will be dropped to have a material witness in the Benavides case.

Says Gerardo LeChevalier, a Christian Democrat leader, referring to the importance of US assistance: "There are \$85 million reasons to have him convicted."

For their part, the 47 elite Atlacal troops who participated in the Jesuit operation used one guerrilla-style AK-47 rifle and left a crudely written sign to implicate the guerrillas.

As they departed at around 3 a.m., the soldiers say they staged a mock firefight whose site, intensity, and damage coincide perfectly with a 12:30 a.m. entry already penned into Benavides' log book.

"All this organization shows that there was some kind of conspiracy either before or after," says one source close to the investigation. Even President Cristiani and US Ambassador William Walker were shielded for a time from the true story by the wall of military loyalty.


The case was pushed forward in early January in part because the US confronted the high command with evidence of Army involvement, saying the information had come from a Salvadoran source.

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**TEGUZIA, EL SALVADOR:** Military troops rest after battle with FMLN guerrillas last March.

the Jesuits? Or did the well-disciplined military man have the backing of a higher authority?

Emerging evidence, while inconclusive, suggests that Colonel Benavides's superiors in the high command either implicitly made the Jesuits an acceptable target or helped protect those who carried out the crime afterward — or both.

At approximately 9 p.m. on Nov. 15, the Minister of Defense, Col. René Emilio Ponce, convened an emergency meeting of senior military officers — including Benavides — in which they vowed to go after the rebels more aggressively, says Army spokesman Mauricio Chavez Careres.

Staken by the snowballing strength of the five-day-old rebel offensive, the senior officers decided to escalate the war by using heavier artillery and a beefed-up air attack to force the guerrillas out of their strongholds in San Salvador's poorest neighborhoods. Major Chavez Careres says it was agreed to "put more emphasis on guerrilla command posts" in each zone.

Benavides apparently trans-

mitted the meeting's general mandate into a specific order to eliminate the priests. Such an interpretation would not require a huge leap of faith, diplomats say, since the Army had always labeled the priests as "intellectual authors" of the guerrilla movement.

Shortly before midnight last Nov. 15, at the height of a fierce urban offensive launched by leftist rebels here, Benavides summoned two lieutenants from the elite Atlacal Battalion into his office at the General Gerardo Barrios Military School.

According to the testimony of Lt. José Ricardo Espinoza, Benavides gave them urgent instructions: "OK, men, we're playing all or nothing. This is a situation in which it is us or them," he said. "We will start with the ringleaders. Within our sector we have the university and Ellacuria is there."

Two hours later, Lieutenant Espinoza watched as his troops carried out his orders to assassinate Father Ellacuria — a prominent leftist intellectual and rector of the Central American University (UCA) — along with five other Jesuit priests and two employees.

By wiping out El Salvador's most thoughtful proponents of a negotiated solution to the 10-year-old civil war, the massacre became a potent symbol for the elimination of reasoned dialogue. It also became an instant crisis

mand. Critics complain that the official investigation has avoided looking for links, preferring to focus largely on material evidence.

But the doubts won't go away. An article scheduled for the next issue of Central American Studies (CEAS), a UCA journal, says that "it's unthinkable that a reasonable person would dare to carry out such a brutal act without someone behind him."

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## CHRONOLOGY OF JESUIT KILLINGS INVESTIGATION

### November 16

- Father Ignacio Ellacuria, five other Jesuit priests, and a domestic employee and her daughter are killed by gunmen at the University of Central America.
- At approximately 06:30 civilians discover the bodies and church officials are notified. The crime scene is contaminated by civilian on-lookers and media personnel before investigators arrive.
- Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani condemns the murders and orders an immediate investigation by the U.S. - funded and trained Special Investigative Unit (SIU).
- The SIU seals the crime scene, gathers evidence, and begins to interview possible witnesses. Autopsies are performed on the victims.
- U.S. Ambassador William G. Walker publicly expresses the U.S. Government's outrage at the crime, calling it "a barbaric act."

### November 17

- U.S. pathologists view the bodies and review the autopsies' reports. In a preliminary assessment, they conclude that the SIU is performing a competent investigation and that the autopsies are thorough and professional.
- President Cristiani requests investigative assistance from the U.S., Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

### November 19

- Funeral services for the Jesuits are held at the Central American University. Ambassador Walker and President Cristiani attend.

### November 22

- FBI agent arrives in country to provide technical assistance to the SIU and to receive a briefing on the investigation.

November 23

- Embassy is advised that a possible eye-witness to the murders, Lucia Barrera de Cerna, is leaving El Salvador for the U.S. for security reasons, with the assistance of the French and Spanish Embassies. Embassy legal officer and FBI agent accompany Mrs. Cerna to Miami in a French military aircraft, after State Department arranges air clearance and immigration authorization.
- Party is met by French and Spanish consuls and local Jesuits. The Jesuits express concerns about security and it is agreed to meet the next day, after the Cernas have completed immigration documentation.

November 24-December 1

- The SIU Director and polygrapher arrive in Miami. Mrs. Cerna and husband are questioned at FBI headquarters by the SIU Director and FBI agents. The Cernas give contradictory versions of what they may have heard and/or seen the night of the murders. After the interviews, the Jesuit community assumes responsibility for the Cernas.

November 30

- The Embassy establishes a task force to formally coordinate on-going U.S. Government assistance to the Jesuit investigation.

December 1

- Ambassador Walker, accompanied by U.S. Southern Command Commander General Thurman, stress the importance of a thorough investigation into the Jesuit killings to the Salvadoran military high command.

December 4

- Embassy officials meet with Roberto D'Aubuisson, (ARENA party President-for-life and Legislative Assembly Deputy) to discuss media reports of his possible responsibility for the killings. He denies any involvement and promises full support to the investigation, including his willingness to be polygraphed.

December 9

- President Cristiani offers a reward (250,000 dollars) for information leading to the arrest of the murderers, as well as relocation outside of El Salvador, if requested.

December 10

- The SIU completes interviewing all officers commanding units in the University area the night of the killings.

December 11

- The SIU establishes a hotline for anonymous callers having information on the murders.
- The SIU identifies the army unit that had conducted a search of the University on November 13, three nights before the murders. The unit is part of the Atlacatl immediate reaction battalion and was under the temporary operational control of Col. Guillermo Benavides, Director of the Military Academy.
- The SIU begins polygraphing soldiers from the units stationed in the area the night of the crime. It also identifies the lot number of the bullets used in the murders.

December 15

- The SIU reports having conducted 147 interviews of soldiers and having run over 300 ballistics tests on the weapons of soldiers who were near the University on November 16.

December 16

- The police officials sent by the Spanish Government to monitor the investigation depart El Salvador. They report that the SIU is conducting an objective, professional and thorough investigation.

December 22

- Col. Aviles, Father Tojeira, the Jesuit Provincial, and Father Estrada, the new Rector of the Central American University, receive a full and detailed briefing on progress in the investigation.

December 20-22

- A member of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador receives third-hand information implicating Col. Benavides as the intellectual author of the murders. The U.S. military officer does not pass the information to his superior officer.

December 28

- An FBI polygraph expert performs quality control checks on the SIU's polygraph tests.
- The head of the Jesuit order arrives in El Salvador to review progress in the investigation. He meets with President Cristiani and receives a briefing from the SIU.

January 2

- President Cristiani reiterates that the focus of the SIU's investigation is on the military.
- The MilGroup officer tells his superior of the information he received implicating Col. Benavides. Col. Menjivar, the MilGroup Commander, with an Embassy political officer, report this information to Salvadoran Chief of Staff Col. Ponce.

January 3

- The prosecutors and judge assigned the case begin to review the SIU's evidence.

January 6

- Scotland Yard sends a team to review developments in the investigation.

January 7

- President Cristiani announces that the SIU has developed evidence implicating members of the Atlacatl unit in the murders. Two officers and 45 enlisted men in the unit are ordered confined to barracks. President Cristiani also announces the formation of a special military honor board to review the SIU's evidence.

January 8-10

- Staff members of the House Task Force on the Jesuit murders investigation visit El Salvador.

January 9

- A U.S. Department of Justice expert provides quality control on the SIU's ballistics tests.

January 10

- Auxiliary Bishop Msgr. Rosa Chavez publicly states that he and the Catholic Church are satisfied with the progress in the investigation.

January 11

- Supreme Court President Mauricio Gutierrez publicly applauds the investigation and assures that the accused will receive a fair trial. If found guilty they will be punished, whether they are civilians, military, or influential people, he is reported saying in a local journal.

January 13

- President Cristiani announces the findings of the military honor board, concluding that nine members of the military (Col. Benavides, three lieutenants, and five enlisted men) are under suspicion for the murders. Eight are taken into custody, while the ninth, who deserted the army in December, is being sought.

January 18

- Salvadoran Attorney General Colorado announces that his office will act as the official prosecutors of the military personnel implicated in the murders of the Jesuits.

January 19

- The judge announces that there is sufficient evidence to hold all eight prisoners under provisional arrest for the next stage in the judicial process.

January 22

- Defense attorneys file writs of habeas corpus demanding that the eight be released on the ground that the provisional detention order was improperly filed. In addition, the release of Col. Benavides is demanded on the additional ground that he has been implicated by accomplices and under Salvadoran law the testimony of co-conspirators is inadmissible as evidence against other co-conspirators.



A8

## SALVADOR EVIDENCE ESCAPED U.S. ENVOY

### He Wasn't Told Promptly of Facts Implicating Military in Killing of 6 Priests

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 — The American Ambassador to El Salvador recently suggested that six Jesuit priests there might have been killed by leftist guerrillas wearing Salvadoran military uniforms, a member of Congress said today. The Ambassador was unaware of evidence already available to the United States Army implicating Salvadoran military men.

A United States Army major assigned to the American Embassy in El Salvador received information in December suggesting that Salvadoran military men had killed the priests, but the Ambassador, William G. Walker, was not told for at least 10 days, Administration officials said today.

Representative Joe Moakley, the chairman of a House Democratic panel monitoring events in El Salvador, met with the Ambassador in Washington on Jan. 2. In that meeting, Mr. Moakley said, the Ambassador asserted that there was no evidence to implicate any individual or group in the killings.

Mr. Moakley recalled that the Ambassador said there was a possibility that the priests had been killed by leftist guerrillas wearing Salvadoran Army uniforms.

#### 'Anybody Can Get Uniforms'

Mr. Moakley quoted the Ambassador as saying that "anybody can get uniforms" and that leftist guerrillas could easily have obtained them. Accordingly, the Congressman said, Mr. Walker "was not sure that the Salvadoran military" was involved in the killings and "made arguments to the effect that it could have been the rebels" who were responsible.

The Congressman said he found such arguments hard to believe, but did not argue with Mr. Walker, who was "affable and congenial" at their meeting.

Reached tonight at his home in San Salvador, Mr. Walker said that at the time of his meeting with Mr. Moakley, "there was no hard evidence to confirm the conclusion that a lot of people had jumped to: that the military was responsible" for the killings. Salvadoran investigators made a breakthrough when they got "ballistics evidence" relating to bullets and firearms a few days later, Mr. Walker said.

Mr. Walker said he hoped Salvadoran military officers would now realize that "if they engage in this type of activity, they will be brought before the bar of justice and, if convicted, will be punished."

President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador announced on Jan. 7 that "some elements of the armed forces" of El Salvador were responsible for the killings. On Jan. 13, Mr. Cristiani said eight military men, including four officers, had been arrested in connection with the Nov. 16 killings of the Jesuit priests.

Members of Congress from both parties say Congress is likely to restrict or reduce aid to El Salvador, which is nearly \$500 million a year, if the Government does not prosecute those responsible for killing the priests.

#### Concern About a Cover-Up

Mr. Moakley, a Massachusetts Democrat who serves as chairman of the Speaker's Special Task Force on El Salvador, said the Salvadoran investigation of the killings had made substantial progress. But he added, "I worry that the possibility of a cover-up remains."

Mr. Moakley said he wanted to interview a United States Army major who apparently delayed the disclosure to American officials of information about the killings.

The major, assigned to the United States Embassy in El Salvador, heard in December that the head of the Salvadoran military college, Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, "felt he was somehow responsible" for the killings, an American official said. The American major did not inform his military superiors or the American Ambassador.

Colonel Benavides was among the eight soldiers arrested last week as suspects in the slayings of the priests.

The head of the United States military group in El Salvador, Col. Milton R. Menjivar, reported the information about Colonel Benavides's possible involvement to the Salvadoran Government immediately after he received it on Jan. 5, American officials said.

Colonel Menjivar apparently passed along the information to Col. René Emilio Ponce, the head of El Salvador's joint chiefs of staff, before sharing it with the United States Ambassador, American officials said.

Moreover, they said, he relayed the information in such a way as to identify and expose the Salvadoran source of the information. The source is thought to have been Col. Carlos Armando Avilés, the head of a psychological operations unit of the Salvadoran armed forces.

Officials at the State Department and the Defense Department said today that they knew the name of the American major but would not disclose it because the whole sequence of events was under investigation.

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Members, Speaker's Task Force on El Salvador  
From: Task Force staff

This memo is intended to provide a summary of selected information, issues and questions for use during the Task Force visit to El Salvador.

Although the primary emphasis is on the Jesuits case, some other issues are outlined.

CONFIDENTIAL

CAST OF KEY CHARACTERS

SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- o President Alfredo CRISTIANI
- o Vice-President Jose Francisco MERINO Lopez
- o Minister of Justice Oscar Alfredo Santamaria
- o Minister of Defense Gen. Rafael Humberto LARIOS Lopez
- o Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo COLORADO
- o Pres. of the Assembly Ricardo Alberto ALVARENGO Valdivieso
- o Majority Leader of the Assembly Roberto D'AUBUISSON

ARMED FORCES

- o Vice-Minister of Defense Col. Juan Orlando ZEPEDA
- o Chief of Staff Col. Rene Emilio PONCE
  
- o Commander, National Guard, Col. Juan Carlos Carrillo Schlenker
- o Commander, National Police, Col. Carlos Mauricio Guzman Aguilar (recently transferred to Costa Rica?)
- o Commander, Treasury Police, Col. Ciro Lopez Roque (replaced Col. Hector Heriberto HERNANDEZ on Feb. 1)
- o Commander, Air Force, Gen. Rafael Antonio Villamariona
- o Commander, Navy, Col. Humberto Pineda Villalta

General staff

- o C-1 Col. Nelson LOPEZ (personnel)
- o C-2 Col. Ivan DIAZ (intelligence)
- o C-3 Col. Ramon Alfonso BARRERA (operations)
- o C-4 Col. Francisco LOPEZ (logistics)
- o C-5 Col. Carlos Armando Aviles (psy. ops) (due to be transferred to new assignment, formal status unclear)
- o C-6 Col. Jose FUENTES
  
- o Commander of First Brigade Col. Francisco ELENA Fuentes

(SIU)

Head of Special Investigations Unit: Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio RIVAS Mejia

Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benevides, director of the Army Military School until Feb. 1 -- arrested for ordering the murder of the Jesuits. (replaced by Col. Ricardo Alfonso Casanova)

Judge, 4th District, San Salvador, Ricardo Zamora (has jurisdiction in the Jesuits case)

JESUITS

victims of the murders of November 16

Dr. Ignacio Ellacuria, rector of the University of Central America (UCA)

Dr. Segundo Montes, director, UCA, human rights institute

Ignacio Martin-Baro, academic vice-rector

Amando Lopez Quintanilla

Joaquin Lopez y Lopez

Juan Ramon Moreno

Julia Elba Ramos (cook)

Celia Marisette Ramos (daughter of cook)

U.S. EMBASSY

William Walker, Ambassador

Jeffrey Dietrich, DCM

Head of Military Group, Col. Milton Menjivar

Legal Officer, Richard Chidester

Political Officers, Phil Chicola, Janice Elmore

Human Rights Officer, Francisco (Paco) Palmieri

CENTRAL QUESTIONS

1. Are the human rights problems in El Salvador a result of the

actions of a few renegade military and political figures operating at the margins of Salvadoran society, or do they stem from attitudes and actions that go to the very heart of the armed forces and ARENA as institutions?

Related to that are questions of whether or not there was a coverup in the Jesuits case, and whether the murders were ordered by the Army high command or others not presently charged.

Also related is the question of whether ARENA officials ordered the murder of Hector Oqueli (see discussion below), and whether Joya Martinez (also see below) is correct in alleging that death squad operations were carried out, on an institutionalized basis, in the First Brigade and elsewhere.

2. What factors contributed to the murder of the Jesuits and how do these factors relate to the prospects for success of U.S. policy? Possible factors include:

- o the long-held perception by military and ARENA that church leaders like the Jesuits are, by the very nature of their teachings and values, a subversive force;
- o the military's continued sense of being above the law;
- o the inability of civilian leaders, such as President Cristiani, to exert authority over the military; and
- o the lack of institutional reform in the judiciary and in placing security forces under direct civilian authority.

## CHRONOLOGY OF THE JESUITS CASE

11/11 -- FMLN begins major nationwide offensive. Heavy fighting in San Salvador

11/13 -- unit of the Atlacatl Brigade searches UCA in response to alleged firing on troops from inside the UCA campus. Search is authorized personally by Chief of Staff Ponce and President Cristiani

11/15 -- evening, High Command holds meeting in San Salvador. Among those present are Col. Ponce and Col. Benevides. The decision is made to respond to the guerrilla offensive with the Air Force and the artillery. Ponce and Air Force Commander Bustillo (since transferred) discussed the need to go after rebel leaders in each sector of the capital and to target rebel command centers. After the meeting, Cristiani was asked--and agreed to--authorize use of the Air Force and artillery. (this is according to press reports).

11/16 -- early morning, Atlacatl unit, operating under orders from Col. Benevides, returns to UCA, murders the 6 Jesuits, the cook and daughter. SIU investigation begins. Case assigned to Ricardo Zamora, Judge of the 4th criminal court in San Salvador.

o According to church officials, a unit from the First Army Brigade drives by the Archbishop's office in San Salvador, saying through a bullhorn that the Jesuits have been killed and that other terrorists will meet the same fate.

11/18 -- Archbishop Rivera y Damas says there is a strong indication that the Army was responsible for the deaths. AG Mauricio Eduardo Colorado charges that rebels are plotting to kill Catholic leaders and warns them (the Catholic leaders) to leave the country.

11/19 -- Cristiani says that "the armed forces high command 'does

not dismiss' the possibility that those who instigated the assassination of the Jesuits could have been military."

11/24 -- AG Colorado says his office has not determined whether any gvt. troops were near the university campus when the priests were killed and had not questioned any soldiers. Also says that the witnesses "are not conclusive, nor have they shed any light" on the identity of the killers.

11/30 -- Archbishop's Human Rights office Tutela Legal releases a 38 page report saying that "all the evidence and the indicators establish that those responsible for the murder of the 6 Jesuit priests and their two domestics were members of the armed services."

First week of December -- Witness Lucia Barrera de Cerna, after giving a statement in San Salvador, is transported to Miami, where she undergoes four days of questioning from two FBI agents and from SIU head Lt. Col. Rivas. Catholic leaders, both in the U.S. and El Salvador, subsequently claim the witness was subjected to unduly harsh questioning and to threats that she would be deported if she did not change her story. Allegations of mistreatment are denied by U.S. Embassy officials.

12/11 issue of Newsweek--"Citing a CIA report, US officials told Newsweek last week that on the night before 6 Jesuit priests were murdered in El Salvador last month, Roberto D'Aubuisson said something had to be done about the priests and specifically mentioned Ellacuria."

12/15 Tutela Legal issues statement to support contention that the Armed Forces were responsible:

"The operation...lasted longer than one hour. During all that time, the perpetrators fired their weapons and set off explosives. This was proved by the many shell casings found near the Jesuit residence. The number of individuals who committed the crime was large. They were wearing Army uniforms. The witness saw

approximately five individuals in uniform...She also heard the shooting, the closing of doors, and the breaking of glass in various parts of the facilities. The witness said the five individuals entered the servants' entrance of the Jesuits residence. Other individuals entered the residence by the door in the northwestern end of the building, the area where the priests have their rooms.

The scene of the crime is located inside an Army control and security area...the Army maintains permanent military surveillance posts at the Democracia building, the Manual Jose Arce military neighborhoods, the northern UCA entrance, the various UCA schools, and at La Ceiba de Guadalupe and Jardines de Guadalupe neighborhoods. All those areas are well guarded by soldiers.

Despite...the curfew, the extended and heavy firing...(and) the detonation of explosives for an extended period of time...the Armed Forces did not react."

12/19 -- Wash. Post. " (U.S. Ambassador William) Walker said that polygraph exams have been administered to between 200 and 300 Salvadoran soldiers who were in the vicinity of the murder scene. "We're going to try to polygraph all the commanders and all the commanders' commanders."

12/19 -- Col. Ponce and Col. Aviles meet privately with Jesuit leaders Fr. Estrada (new head of UCA) and Fr. Tojeira (the Jesuit Provincial) to pledge the military's support for finding the killers and to ask for Jesuit cooperation.

12/21 -- Jesuit leaders briefed on investigation by SIU. SIU says it received full cooperation from Jesuits thereafter.

(approximately 12/22 -- U.S. Major Buckland told by Col. Aviles of alleged conversation between Col. Benevides and SIU head Lt. Col. Rivas in which Benevides admits responsibility for the killings of the Jesuits. The date of the alleged conversation



8

between Benevides and Rivas is not known.)

12/24, as of this date, the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) had administered 14 polygraph tests (two to members of the Atlacatl unit--both passed; one from the military school--also passed), taken 385 ballistics samples (45 from the Atlacatl) and checked the fingerprints of 385 individuals (45 from the Atlacatl).

1/2 -- Major Buckland tells superiors of conversation with Aviles. Embassy officers Menjivar and Elmore confront Col. Ponce with information. Ponce calls in Aviles who denies conversation with Buckland.

1/2 -- Ambassador Walker, in D.C., briefs Chairman Moakley and Task Force staff on investigation.

Between 1/3 and 1/7 -- SIU matches ammunition found at the scene of the murder with weapons belonging to Atlacatl unit.

1/7 -- Cristiani, in televised address, says the armed forces are responsible. Orders members of the Atlacatl unit and Col. Benevides held for questioning. Appoints military honor board to determine whether those being held should be turned over to civilian courts for trial.

1/8-10 -- Task Force staff delegation visits El Salvador

1/8-12 -- SIU/Honor Board continues investigation and questioning. Matches handwriting on sign found at the scene of the murders with that of a member of the Atlacatl unit. Some of the Atlacatl members apparently confess to the murders.

1/13 -- Cristiani announces the arrest of Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benevides, the head of the General Gerardo Barrios Military Academy. Benevides is a former chief of military intelligence.

Also arrested were Lt. Yuri Rene Mendoza, Lt. Jose Rocardo Espinosa, sub. lt. Gonzalo Guevara Serrito, two sub-sergeants, a

corporal and a soldier. Another soldier deserted the Army in December.

Col. Aviles is restricted to headquarters. Designation as new military attache to the United States is put on hold.

1/14 -- Judge Zamora rules that sufficient evidence exists to arrest and provisionally charge the nine. Both sides now have 90 to 120 days to examine evidence, after which the judge can dismiss the case if there is not enough evidence for a trial.

According to the Judge's statement, the soldiers admitted under questioning that they were taken to the university campus in two beige Ford pickup trucks with 35 other soldiers and orders to kill the priests and leave no witnesses, and that "at the moment of withdrawal, there would be a flare and later a simulation of a confrontation would take place."

Sgt. Avalos testified that Amaya Grimaldi and Perez Vazquez shot the priests after being ordered to by Lt. Espinoza Guerra.

Avalos admits ordering the murder of the housekeeper Elba Ramos and her daughter. He found the two women "hugging and weeping" in a dark corner of the women's room, and ordered Sierra Ascencio to kill them. He "fired about ten shots at the bodies of the women until they stopped crying." Sierra Ascencio has since deserted.

Two of the lieutenants testified that Col. Benevides gave the order to kill the Jesuits, but claimed they carried their orders out only after first refusing to do so.

According to 2nd Lt. Guevara Cerritos, Benevides said "Well, gentlemen, we are betting it all. It is either them or us. They have been the intellectuals who have led the guerrillas for a long time."

According to Lt. Espinoza, Benevides said "this is a situation where it's them or us; we are going to begin with the leaders,

inside the sector of ours we have the university and there is Ellacuria."

1/21 -- Archbishop Rivera y Damas says "It is known that the archbishopric was right to point out where it believed the murderers were. This position was confirmed by President Alfredo Cristiani who, by fulfilling his promise to get to the very bottom of the case through investigations, has become worthy of worldwide recognition."

1/27 -- Cristiani tells news conference in Honduras, "I think we've been able to get the investigation down where we have those who directly were involved in the assassination and, with their testimony, those who gave the order to commit the crime. But during the judicial process, there might be new testimony coming out that has new leads, and the investigation would follow those leads to see if there is any more involvement."

2/4 and 5 -- Washington Post, Boston Globe and Baltimore Sun report that a meeting of the High Command was held on the evening of November 15th, after which Benevides returned to his command at the military school and ordered the murders. The reports also indicate that a meeting in the National Intelligence Directorate on the morning of the killings was interrupted by a captain whose statement that Ellacuria had been killed was greeted by cheers and applause.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS.

1. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to comment on the press reports concerning the alleged meeting of the High Command on November 15th. Did such a meeting occur? Who was present? What was discussed? Have participants been questioned in detail about the nature of the discussion and the relationship between the meeting and Benevides' subsequent actions? If not, why not? Wouldn't any serious inquiry into the source of orders to kill the Jesuits have begun with this meeting? What is the full extent of U.S. knowledge about the discussion that took place during this meeting?

(Note: according to the press reports, the High Command decided, at the meeting, to go after rebel leaders in each sector of the capital. Benevides, according to one of lieutenants arrested in the case, said that night that "inside the sector of ours we have the university and there is Ellacuria.")

2. It might be useful to ask what the movements of the Atlacatl unit were following the murders. Were they transported somewhere away from the military school? If so, where and why and by whose orders?

3. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to respond to the circumstantial evidence that exists to indicate that the crimes were ordered by individuals senior to Col. Benevides. This evidence includes:

- o Col. Benevides reputation as a relatively non-political officer, with no history of anti-clerical attitudes;

- o the fact that the Salvadoran military system and structure would seem to make it unlikely that Benevides would have taken an action as serious as murdering the Jesuits without the approval of his superiors; and

- o the virtual certainty that members of the Atlacatl unit would be identified as the killers unless other military officials cooperated in a coverup (see below).

4. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be questioned about direct and circumstantial evidence that a cover-up occurred. This evidence includes:

- o the fact that the trucks carrying the Atlacatl unit from the military school to UCA on the night of the murders would have had to pass through at least one military road block. Why was this not reported? Were the officers at these roadblocks questioned?

- o El Salvador has a very extensive military intelligence system. Were senior intelligence officers questioned to ascertain any information they might have had about the crime? How did the captain who reportedly interrupted a meeting of the National Intelligence Directorate on the morning of the crime learn that it had been committed?

5. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked detailed questions about the alleged conversation between an American major and Salvadoran Lieutenant Col. Aviles about another alleged

conversation between Benevides and Lt. Col. Rivas in which Benevides apparently took responsibility for the crime (see discussion below).

6. Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to describe the potential obstacles within the Salvadoran judicial system to a conviction of those presently charged with the murders.

#### THE MENJIVAR-AVILES AFFAIR

(note: this information is based on staff, and some Member-level discussions with U.S. Embassy personnel)

On January 2nd, U.S. Mil. Group leader Col. Milton Menjivar was told that an American Major in his unit had been told some ten days previously of a conversation between the Col. Benevides and SIU head Lt. Col. Rivas in which Benevides admitted at least some responsibility for killing the Jesuits. This information was passed to the Major by Col. Aviles, a friend, who said he had obtained it from Lt. Col. Lopez y Lopez, a former head of the SIU, who was then providing assistance to Rivas.

Acting without the permission either of the Ambassador or DCM Jeffrey Dietrich, Menjivar and political officer Janice Elmore immediately confronted Col. Ponce and unspecified other members of the high command with the information. Ponce responded by telling Menjivar to put the accusation in writing.

Menjivar returned to the Embassy and prepared the statement and returned to the High Command. Col. Aviles and Lopez y Lopez are brought in, both deny they said anything to the American Major. Both Aviles and the Major are polygraphed, both fail.

Five days later, SIU has produced evidence from ballistics tests that prove Atlacatl involvement in the murders. Cristiani makes the announcement of military involvement and arrests follow soon thereafter.

## POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:

1. Given the importance of the alleged conversation between Rivas and Benevides to any assessment of the integrity of the investigation; and given the fact that an American major has been accused of lying about this conversation; why haven't the two people who could confirm the truth of the American major's story been polygraphed: Lt. Col. Rivas and Lt. Col. Lopez y Lopez.
2. Why did Col. Menjivar act without permission from senior Embassy officials? Who, other than Col. Ponce, was present when Menjivar and Elmore went to the High Command? Why did Ponce demand that the accusations be put in writing? Can the Task Force obtain a copy of the written statement taken back to the High Command by Menjivar?
3. Was this sequence of events the triggering factor in the SIU's production of evidence to implicate the Atlacatl?
4. What were the results of subsequent polygraph tests of the American Major?
5. Why did Col. Aviles confide in the American major?
6. If, in fact, Benevides told Rivas of his involvement--when did this conversation occur? What actions did Rivas take as a result of this knowledge? More basically--if Rivas was aware, at an early date, of Benevides' guilt, why did it take until early January before this information went public and then only as the result of Menjivar's willingness to confront Ponce?

## THE ATMOSPHERE OF THREATS AND INTIMIDATION

Church officials and human rights organizations point to the prevailing atmosphere of threats and intimidation in El Salvador as an obstacle to any assurance that incidents like the murder of the Jesuits will not be repeated.

Since the late 1970's, there have been periodic incidents of harassment and sometimes violence perpetrated against church officials and workers, often by the military. A highly-publicized example of this was the murder of four American churchwomen by a unit of the National Guard in December, 1980.

During the months leading up to the murder of the Jesuits, specific threats were made on several occasions against Father Ellacuria and other Jesuit leaders. On July 3, in a paid ad, a group called the "Crusade for Peace and Work" attacked Segundo Montes and Ellacuria by name, calling them 'commanders' of the 'terrorist hordes bringing violence to our country.'

According to a Danish press report in October, "Col. Orlando Zepeda averred that the Jesuit Univ. of Central America is a stronghold for urban guerrilla groups."

During the five days between the start of the guerrilla offensive and the murder of the Jesuits, a military-controlled radio station broadcast numerous personal threats against the Jesuits, other church leaders, and opposition political leaders Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo.

After the crime, many church leaders complained about searches, harassment and expulsions of foreign workers from their offices. Colonel Ponce responded to these complaints by saying that: "There's no persecution of the church. There's persecution of subversive terrorists. Unfortunately, some of them hide in the skirts of the religious workers."



In addition, Attorney General Mauricio Colorado publicly urged Catholic leaders to leave the country and called on senior church officials to investigate Archbishop Rivera y Damas and other church officials, saying "if the people do not support the FMLN, then why do Monsignor Rivera y Damas and Msgr. Rosa Chavez give the impression that they do?"

In January, the Task Force's staff delegation asked the Army High Command to discuss the issue of church involvement with the FMLN. Deputy Defense Minister (and former Chief of Intelligence) Orlando Zepeda replied by saying that no one can deny that those at the University of Central America have had some kind of advisory role to the FMLN. As a University, it is a center of information inclined to the left, and a certain concept of the revolutionary struggle was generated there. But UCA leaders did not have any direct armed participation. Even though soldiers were fired on from inside UCA during the offensive, those firing were probably not UCA people.

Colonel Ponce told the staff delegation that it is wrong to believe that the military is anti-church. He pointed out, for example, that there are chaplains in all the military cuartels.

The staff delegation also raised this issue with President Cristiani, who agreed it was serious, but who also said that the climate could not be changed in a single day. He said that he had personally sought to improve the situation by asking Monsignor Rosa Chavez to offer a prayer prior to a meeting that Cristiani had with military leaders. Unfortunately, Rosa Chavez was booed and whistled at and the experiment did not go well.

A related issue concerns the state of feelings between church leaders and the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. Although Ambassador Walker has made a vigorous effort to maintain good relations, serious problems did arise in the aftermath of the Jesuits case. Jesuit leaders told the staff delegation that they were misled by one Embassy officer about the treatment of Lucia Berna, the

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witness in the case, and Archbishop Rivera y Damas accused the Embassy of participating in an effort to "brainwash" her.

#### POSSIBLE QUESTIONS

1. Ambassador Walker could be asked whether he has ordered Embassy personnel to refrain from making any statements, formal or informal, that could be interpreted as "anti-church", whether those statements refer to individuals or to institutions.
2. Both military and church officials could be asked about their willingness to increase personal contacts, and to participate in joint discussions, especially about social issues and about the prospects for successful peace negotiations.
3. President Cristiani and military leaders could be asked to explain the rationale for raids, searches, detentions and arrests of church workers. What standard of evidence is used to prompt such a search? Are these merely fishing expeditions, or is some sort of concrete evidence required before a search is made?
4. Ambassador Walker could be asked what efforts he has made to persuade the government not to undertake searches or detain people for questioning without concrete evidence to justify the action.

CESAR VILEMAN JOYA MARTINEZ

Joya Martinez met with Task Force members on January 31st. He is a 28 year old, former intelligence officer of the First Brigade, which is stationed in San Salvador.

According to Martinez, he was assigned to a specialized unit whose function, in addition to normal intelligence work, was to kill suspected subversives. In the course of his work between the end of 1987 and July, 1989, he claims to have participated in operations that assassinated more than 70 people, and that he personally killed 8. These actions were carried out under direct orders from his superiors, who included unit commander Major Diaz Hernandez, and First Brigade Commanders Col. Orlando Zepeda (until June, 1989) and Col. Elena Fuentes. Zepeda is now the Deputy Minister of Defense.

Throughout this time, two Americans, code-named "William" and "Major" were assigned to the unit. The Americans provided expenses for unit operations and regularly received reports of unit operations, excluding the killings. Martinez says that the Americans rebuffed efforts on his part to inform them that the killings were being done.

The staff delegation was told by one Embassy officer that the charges made by Joya Martinez were "credible" and by another that the charges were "worth looking into".

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS.

1. Ambassador Walker could be asked to describe his efforts to investigate Martinez' charges, which were highly publicized at the time of Martinez' escape from El Salvador. Were two Americans assigned to the unit? In what capacity? Have they been questioned? Who are they? Could the Task Force interview them?

2. President Cristiani could be asked about any efforts he has,

himself, made to investigate the charges.

3. The Ambassador, other Embassy officials and military leaders could be asked explicitly whether the type of death squad operation described by Martinez was, in fact, carried out by the First Brigade.

HECTOR OQUELI

Hector Oqueli, an opposition political leader of the same party as leftist Presidential candidate Guillermo Ungo was murdered in Guatemala January 12th. His case is important because Oqueli was among those threatened by name in broadcasts on Salvadoran radio shortly after the guerilla offensive began. Moreover, close links have long existed between right wing extremists in Guatemala and ARENA party leader Roberto D'Aubuisson:

o D'Aubuisson associate Denis Moran presently serves as Salvadoran military attache in Guatemala City. Moran is widely believed to have participated in death squad activities, under D'Abuisson's direction, in the early 1980's.

o Guatemalan Defense Minister Gramajo told reporters recently that ARENA has provided Guatemalan extremists with two safehouses in San Salvador.

o In addition, Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo recently accused D'Aubuisson and other ARENA members of arming Guat. paramilitary groups, which conducted a series of attacks against human rights and opposition groups in Guat. beginning in August, 1989.

Guat. Int. Min. Gen. Carlos Morales Villatoro said on Jan. 14 that Oqueli was killed by 'foreign commandos' operating in his country. Morales said that the identity of the foreign commandos had been known for weeks and was responsible for many terrorist attacks. He said the group has killed several people and carried out bomb attacks.

On January 27, Guatemalan authorities arrested six Guatemalans found with a cache of weapons and accused them of the crime.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS.

1. Ambassador Walker and President Cristiani could be asked about the status of the investigation and about efforts to investigate the potential involvement of D'Aubuisson and other ARENA leaders. For example, has Salvadoran right wing leader Orlanda de Sola been questioned about his presence in Guatemala shortly before the killings? What efforts have been made to investigate the charges made by Cerezo and Gramajo about ARENA's alleged assistance to Guatemalan terrorists?

#### STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

Most recent positions on the status of negotiations:

Central American Presidents agreement, December 12:

The Presidents...support the Government of El Salvador in its repeated proposal to find a solution to the Salvadoran conflict through peaceful and democratic means, and in that sense, repeat their vehement appeal that the FMLN immediately and effectively cease its hostilities in that fraternal country and that it join the process of dialogue which has already begun. They energetically demand in addition that the FMLN publicly renounce all types of violent actions that may directly or indirectly affect the civilian population. The five Presidents decided...to ask the Secretary General of the United Nations...to take the necessary actions to renew a dialogue between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN and thus contribute to its successful development... "

President Cristiani: Supports UN mediation; recently met with UN Sec. Gen. Perez Cuellar to discuss modalities. In negotiations last fall, the government said that the FMLN should cease hostilities as a precondition to serious negotiations.

FMLN: Also accepts UN mediation. In recent statements, the FMLN

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has emphasized the difficulty of reaching an agreement with the government in the midst of continued human rights violations and called for discussions that would involve a broad range of Salvadoran society--not just the two armed groups.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:

1. Opposition leader Ruben Zamora has said that the reason the FMLN launched its offensive was because it felt that the military did not consider it (the FMLN) a strong enough threat to require serious treatment in negotiations. In other words, the armed forces believe they can win the war, and therefore they have no interest in negotiating. If true, this would lead one to conclude that the FMLN will keep fighting to prove its strength, and the military will keep resisting negotiations because it considers them unnecessary.

-- Embassy and Salvadoran officials could be asked to comment on the above analysis, both as the rationale for the November offensive and as an ongoing obstacle to serious talks.

2. Salvadoran leaders could be asked whether they believe any preconditions should be placed on negotiations with the FMLN.

JANUARY 31st

o It is important to note the physical relationship of the buildings and institutions involved in the Jesuits case. All were located in an extremely important zone that included military installations, housing for the families of senior military officers and UCA.

o The Military school is bordered by buildings that house the Salvadoran equivalent of the CIA. Nearby is the school of intelligence and the Democracy Tower.

o The sequence in the Buckland-Aviles affairs is as follows:

--Benevides tells Lt. Col. Rivas that he is responsible for the crimes;

--Rivas tells Lt. Col. Lopez y Lopez;

--Lopez y Lopez tells Col. Aviles;

--Col. Aviles tells Maj. Buckland;

--Buckland waits almost two weeks and, on Jan. 2, tells Major Hunter in the Milgroup who tells Milgroup leader Col. Milton Menjivar;

--Menjivar and political officer Janice Elmore confront Col, Ponce and unspecified other members of the high command. Ponce responds by telling Menjivar to put the accusation in writing.

--Menjivar returns to Embassy and prepares the statement; DCM Jeffrey Dietrich refuses to sign; Menjivar signs himself (question? Can we get that statement). Returns to High Command. Aviles denies, is polygraphed, fails. Buckland also polygraphed, also fails. Buckland's failure may hinge on statement about



whether Aviles admitted foreknowledge of the murders.

o Aftermath: Aviles not in danger, but believes his career is ruined.

--High Command is, for the first time, faced with tangible evidence of U.S. knowledge of truth.

--SIU almost immediately produces concrete evidence of Atlacatl involvement (ballistics).

--Cristiani makes allegations public.

Question:

-- why haven't Rivas and Lopez y Lopez been polygraphed?

Rhetorical question: Why did Benevides talk to Rivas?

Answer is complicated.

1. There was a meeting of the high command shortly after the offensive began. Several officers expressed the fear they would lose. Decision was made to strike back hard. To use air power. To use artillery. To go against guerrilla command centers. And to go against those who have been fronting for the guerrillas. Each officer instructed to go after targets in his area.

2. The atmosphere of anger within the military had been heightened, not only by the offensive, but by other attacks and assassinations perpetrated by the FMLN in previous months. Officers were especially angry about the murder of the 23 year old daughter of Col. Oscar Casanova Vejar. Casanova Vejar's father (uncle?), Chato Casanova, was a former head of the National Guard and one of two "godfathers" of the Tandoná.

3. Benevides had been given units of the Treasury police, National Guard, Intelligence, Ahuachapan detachment and Atlacatl to command. The UCA was in his zone. He gave the direct order to

carry out the killings.

4. Five Salvadoran military officers, including 3 from intelligence, had rented a house across the street from UCA. The house was used to entertain women. The officers were in the house on the night of the killings (question: is this any way to act while a war's on?). They saw the Atlacatl arrive and recognized the officers. In the morning, they went to look at the bodies. The 3 intelligence officers then returned to Intelligence headquarters (next to the military school, to which the Atlacatl returned). The intelligence officers reported what they had seen. The Atlacatl unit was then transported to the headquarters of the first brigade, away from the scene of the crime.

(Note: members of the Atlacatl told members of the first brigade what had occurred. This explains the account of Msgr. Rosa Chavez that he heard first brigade members bragging about the crime later that day and threatening to kill more Jesuits)

5. Late afternoon on the day of the killings, a meeting of high intelligence officers was held at which the crimes were discussed. Guzman Aguilar, head of National Police, recommended that nothing be said. He was challenged by one officer. Guzman Aguilar (whose father? was also a "godfather" to the Tandonas) grew angry at being challenged and left the meeting, possibly to report the dissident to the high command.

6. The result of all this was that many in the armed forces knew almost immediately which unit had committed the crime and under whose control that unit was--Benevides. Thus, Benevides had to find out where he stood. Since Rivas had been put in charge, Benevides felt he had to talk to him. Speculation is that the conversation with Rivas took place within a few days of the killings.

Question:

--Can we verify that the Atlacatl was transported to the First

*any  
address to  
this*

Brigade after the crime was committed? Who gave the order?

#### DID BENEVIDES ACT ON HIS OWN?

Two possibilities: yes and no.

1. YES. According to one Salvadoran Col., the head of the National Guard saw Benevides after his arrest and asked him how he could possibly have misunderstood his instructions and ordered the murders. Theory is that Benevides misinterpreted the discussion at the meeting of the high command and felt he had been instructed to carry out the killings when, in fact, he had not. This theory is supported by the indirect way that Salvadorans have of talking to each other and also by the possibility that Benevides may have been prompted to act by the sudden illness of his son, which he may have attributed to stress brought on by the guerrilla offensive.

2. NO. Just theory, but members of the Tandonas have been virtually living with each other for 30 years. They don't misunderstand each other. This theory is also supported somewhat by the coverup that took place after the crime. Also, Benevides reportedly told his family that he had been ordered to kill the Jesuits.

#### CURRENT STATUS OF INVESTIGATION

Is it likely that others will come forward? One civilian witness who lives near UCA was told by a SIU investigator, only a few days ago, not to say anything and preferably to leave the country. This is a message that presumably everybody in the armed forces is getting, as well.

Questions:

--why haven't others at the military school been questioned...they saw the Atlacatl leave/they saw it come back.

*Resumed*  
→

--why haven't the drivers who took the unit to UCA been questioned?

#### TRANSFERS

What has happened to some of the key figures in the case?

1. Bustillo, present at high command meeting, transferred to Israel.
2. Guzman Aguilar, the head of National Police, given the "tough" job of military attache to Costa Rica, which has no military.
3. Col. Cerna Flores, in overall charge of operations at the time of offensive, transferred.
4. Another individual with information on the case transferred.
5. Aviles, supposed to be assigned to Washington, is in limbo.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

The fact that Salvadoran military intelligence was immediately aware of the identity of the real killers supports the possibility that the Newsweek report indicating D'Aubuisson's involvement was deliberately planted disinformation.

It is possible that Ponce authorized the search of UCA on the 13th, and that Cristiani's authorization was added later, for some reason.

It is possible that Fr. Ellacuria gave the Atlacatl the keys to UCA on the night of the 13th.

# Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

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November 30, 1989

The Honorable James A. Baker III  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
2201 C Street, N.W.  
7th Floor  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

We are writing to express our serious concerns about the current investigation of the November 16 murder of six Jesuit priests and two women at the Central American University (UCA) in San Salvador. The Lawyers Committee has closely monitored human rights and the administration of justice in El Salvador for ten years. The Committee represents the families of the four U.S. Churchwomen who were murdered in El Salvador in December 1980. Earlier this year we published a book-length report on human rights and the administration of justice in El Salvador, a copy of which we enclose.

The author of that report, Martha Doggett, was in El Salvador from November 2-22. While in the country, Ms. Doggett, who coordinates the Committee's program on Latin America and the Caribbean, had an opportunity to interview a number of people with information about the killing of the priests, including persons who had access to the eyewitness to the attack. These interviews and other information we have reviewed lead us to conclude that members of the Salvadoran Armed Forces are implicated in the murders. This conclusion rests on strong circumstantial evidence.

First, the area surrounding the university campus had been controlled by the military since Saturday November 11, when the FMLN offensive began. Early that evening fighting broke out at the Torre Democratico, roughly one block from the Pastoral Center where the priests were killed. In a chronology of events surrounding the murders, the Central American Province of the Society of Jesus reports that soldiers arrived at the UCA within ten minutes of the outbreak of fighting on the evening of November 11 and "controlled the situation."

On Monday, November 13 Father Ignacio Ellacuria, the UCA Rector, returned from a visit abroad and entered the campus by the main gate, which had been guarded by the Armed Forces since Saturday evening. Soldiers questioned the rector and he was only allowed to enter after he told them he lived on the campus. At approximately 7:00 pm that evening, uniformed members of the Salvadoran Armed Forces arrived at the Pastoral Center, where the Jesuits were living, and conducted a thorough search of the premises. Unlike earlier raids of the university, the soldiers took no interest in books, files, or other written materials, instead focusing exclusively "on the place and the people," according to a source familiar with the raid who was interviewed by the Lawyers Committee. The source added that the soldiers took notes. Though Father Ellacuria invited the soldiers to return to the campus during daylight hours to search the rest of the institution, the men seemed only interested in the Pastoral Center and did not return to the UCA the following day.

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Susan Berkwit-Malefakis

On Wednesday, November 15 the military continued to patrol the area surrounding the UCA. That morning an officer told one Jesuit that in the afternoon or evening there would be "a lot of movement." It should be noted that since Sunday, November 12, San Salvador had been under a 6:00 pm to 6:00 am curfew. Areas of the city where the heaviest combat occurred were under a 24-hour curfew.

Some time between 2:00 and 3:00 am on November 16, uniformed soldiers entered the campus by the back gate and opened fire on the Pastoral Center, according to the eyewitness. During an attack which lasted from 30 to 45 minutes, the soldiers dragged the six Jesuits out onto the lawn, forced them to lie face down, and killed them, five of them with a shot to the head. Two of the priests were then moved back into the house, according to a reconstruction of the events by those with knowledge of the autopsy and who examined the scene shortly after the shootings. A cook and her daughter were also shot and killed in the room where the two slept. While the exact sequence of events is not known, the assassins also ransacked and burned an office in the Pastoral Center and sprayed parked cars with gunfire. The length of the assault and the amount of firepower used indicate that the killers did not fear detection or interruption by members of the Armed Forces guarding the area during the curfew.

Now some two weeks after the killings it is clear that the investigation is already floundering. Judge Ricardo A. Zamora, San Salvador's Fourth Penal Judge, has to date recorded only two testimonies. As you know, under the Salvadoran civil law system an investigating judge is responsible for gathering evidence in the case. Judge Zamora told an associate of the Lawyers Committee last week that given his already enormous caseload and the difficulties posed by the war, it would be very difficult for him to devote substantial effort to the case.

Especially disturbing to the Lawyers Committee are the pronouncements of El Salvador's Attorney General (Fiscal General), Mauricio Eduardo Colorado, whose office is responsible for prosecuting the case. On November 18, the Attorney General wrote a letter to Pope John Paul II suggesting that those members of the Salvadoran Bishops Conference who "persist in keeping alive this questionable ideology 'church of the poor'" be sent out of El Salvador. Stating that he was not acting in an official capacity but as a Catholic layman, Mr. Colorado said that while he intended to investigate the Jesuit slayings, it was better to head off the need for future investigations. In suggesting that clergy who support "a tendency called 'the popular church'" were in danger, Mr. Colorado inferred that forces of the Right were responsible for the Jesuit killings. Yet in a subsequent press conference the Attorney General said he had uncovered an FMLN plot to assassinate priests and that Archbishop Rivera y Damas and Auxiliary Bishop Rosa Chavez were next on the list.

In the two weeks since the Jesuit priests were killed there have been a number of official pronouncements made in San Salvador and Washington about the murders and official efforts to investigate these horrible crimes. President Cristiani has on several occasions pledged to prosecute all of those responsible to the full extent of Salvadoran law. He has said that "if there are people involved who turn out to be members of the Armed Forces then the weight of the law must fall on them."<sup>1</sup>

While we welcome these public assurances by President Cristiani, we are concerned that the effect of his statements has been seriously undermined by contradictory statements made by other senior Salvadoran officials. Twice last week Salvadoran Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Pacas Castro told interviewers from U.S. television networks that in his opinion the Jesuits were killed by members of the Salvadoran left.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Richard Boudreaux and Marjorie Miller, "Six Jesuit Priests Slain in El Salvador," *Los Angeles Times*, November 17, 1989.

<sup>2</sup>PBS, MacNeil-Lehrer, November 17, 1989; Face the Nation, CBS, Sunday November 26, 1989.

Further, Attorney General Colorado told reporters last Friday that his office had not determined whether any government troops were near the university campus when the priests were killed. Given extensive eyewitness testimony to conditions on the campus during the period preceding the killings and information gathered by Ms. Doggett in San Salvador, we believe that Mr. Colorado's statement indicates a serious disregard for the facts. Further, he said that no one in his office had questioned any soldiers.

As you know, Mr. Colorado is responsible for prosecuting this case. His comments suggest a shocking lack of commitment to the type of aggressive, professional investigation that is so urgently needed. At his news conference, Mr. Colorado said that his office had received no information to support charges that the Salvadoran Army was involved in the murders of the priests. He concluded, "From what we know now, it would be reckless to say it had been the Army."<sup>3</sup>

According to one news report following the press conference, a "high-level (U.S.) embassy official said [that] Colorado was blocking the investigation of the November 16 assassination...."<sup>4</sup> The same article quoted an unnamed U.S. embassy official in San Salvador as warning: "There are a group of second-tier officials who are saying things that aren't in sync with what Cristiani is saying. You aren't really seeing any effort to desmentir (retract) what they said."<sup>5</sup>

We find the Attorney General's comments particularly troubling. It is clear that successful prosecution of this case will not be possible without his wholehearted support and involvement. We are interested in learning if Ambassador Walker or any other senior embassy officials have met with the Attorney General since Friday to discuss his remarks. We would be interested in your assessment of his handling of the case thus far, and how he plans to conduct the investigation in the weeks and months ahead. Has Mr. Colorado assigned one or more deputy prosecutors to handle the case? Are they from the group of prosecutors in his office assigned to handle human rights cases?

The human rights department within the Attorney General's office is funded in part by AID's Administration of Justice program. We are concerned by views toward the work of this department expressed by Mr. Colorado in an interview with Ms. Doggett on the day the FMLN offensive began. His remarks suggested a diminishing focus on human rights. He said the department had adopted a "wider concept of human rights violations. There are no precise norms. We think any crime violates human rights." In our view, this attitude does not reflect the kind of commitment necessary to vigorously pursue a serious human rights case like the Jesuit killings.

Mr. Colorado, an attorney with no previous experience in government or demonstrated commitment to human or civil liberties, also expressed especially strong and negative views of the Special Investigative Unit (SIU), the U.S.-funded investigative body that has been involved in the Jesuit case. Mr. Colorado emphasized that the composition of the SIU poses a serious obstacle to justice. As you know, SIU investigators are drawn from the Salvadoran Security Forces, which have historically been implicated in serious rights violations themselves. Since the unit is charged with investigating the most sensitive human rights cases--in which military men and powerful civilians are often implicated--it is, in effect, charged with investigating its own personnel and allies, thus, the chances of a serious, independent investigation conducted by the SIU in this case are slim. Are Mr. Colorado's obviously negative feelings toward the SIU causing any difficulties in coordinating the investigation of this case? We are interested in learning what actions have been taken thus far by the SIU. Is their work being directed by civilian authorities within the justice system and coordinated

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<sup>3</sup>Mark Fazlollah, "Officials: Salvador Situation Worsens," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 26, 1989.

<sup>4</sup>Id.

<sup>5</sup>Id.

with the work of the Attorney General's office and of Judge Zamora? We are interested in knowing how fingerprint and ballistics testing and other technical assistance that has been provided by the United States and other foreign governments has been incorporated into this process.

We are also interested in learning whether an investigation has been ordered by Army Chief of Staff Rene Emilio Ponce or the chief of any other unit of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. It is our understanding that under Salvadoran law, in order to prosecute a member of the Armed Forces who has committed a criminal act against a civilian, the Armed Forces themselves must bring the case to civilian authorities by removing soldiers from active duty and relinquishing jurisdiction over them. This would suggest that the military must conduct its own internal investigation in order to identify potential suspects, as was the case in the San Francisco (San Sebastian) massacre of September 1988 and in the 1980 Churchwomen's case. In our view, compelling evidence of military involvement in the Jesuit killings mandates such a military inquiry. If such an investigation has commenced, we are interested in learning who within the Salvadoran Armed Forces is responsible for this investigation. Have Ambassador Walker or other embassy officials met with Col. Ponce or others involved in the military's investigation? How long do they estimate this investigation will take to complete?

Further, we would like information concerning which units were assigned to the area surrounding the Central American University on November 15-16. Given the nature of military command structures, it is our understanding that this kind of information should be readily available.

Finally, we would like to know whether the U.S. government has any information supporting Mr. Colorado's assertion that there may not have been any soldiers around the campus that day and night, or any evidence supporting Foreign Minister Pacas' assertion that the FMLN may have been implicated in the killings. We would like to know the State Department response to these assertions and whether your concerns have been conveyed to the appropriate Salvadoran officials.

Over the last ten years the Lawyers Committee has monitored and documented the inability of the Salvadoran justice system to achieve accountability for even the most outrageous criminal acts. Frustration in Washington with the lack of prosecutions of human rights violators within the military was among those factors motivating AID's Administration of Justice program attempting to reform El Salvador's justice sector. In our study of El Salvador's justice system we trace the path of some 20 human rights cases, and concluded that despite the commitment of extensive U.S. resources, the Salvadoran justice system is no more capable of prosecuting military offenders than before the AID program began. In our view, AID's efforts to create parallel structures such as the Special Investigative Unit have weakened rather than strengthened existing institutions. If progress is to be made in beginning to improve the appalling record of the last decade, it is critical that utmost priority be given to investigating and prosecuting cases like the killing of the Jesuits.


In light of the obvious difficulties with this case and the recent indications of a lack of commitment by Salvadoran authorities to conduct a thorough and expeditious investigation, we ask you to consider sending a senior U.S. team to El Salvador to evaluate the current state of the investigative process. Such a team would follow the precedent of the Rogers-Bowdler mission that visited El Salvador following the killing of the four Churchwomen in 1980. We would strongly recommend that such a delegation be appointed and charged with producing a public report upon return.



Given the escalation in political violence in El Salvador, successful prosecution of all those responsible for ordering and carrying out these brutal murders must be given the highest priority.

We eagerly await your reply, and appreciate your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Michael Posner  
Executive Director

Enclosure

cc. Lawrence Eagleburger  
Thomas Pickering  
Bernard Aronson  
Dennis Ross  
Richard Schifter  
Abraham Sofaer  
Luigi Einaudi  
William Walker  
Claiborne Pell  
Richard Lugar  
Christopher Dodd  
Nancy Kassebaum  
Dante Fascell  
William Broomfield  
Archbishop Rivera y Damas  
Rev. Jose Maria Tojeira, S.J.  
Rev. Simon Smith, S.J.  
Rev. Patrick J. Burns, S.J.  
Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk



(Translation - Spanish)

**Summary on the Murder of Six Priests of the Society of Jesus and Two Women in their Service, on the Grounds of "José Simeón Cañas" Central American University (UCA).**

**Time:** From 2:00 to 4:00 a.m. approximately

**Date:** November 16, 1989

**Place:** University Residence of the School of Theology of "José Simeón Cañas" Central American University (UCA)

**Victims:** Priest Dr. Ignacio Ellacuría  
Priest Dr. Segundo Montes  
Priest Dr. Amando López  
Priest Dr. Ignacio Martín Baro  
Priest F. Juan Ramón Moreno Pardo  
Priest F. Joaquín López y López  
Cooks: Mrs. Elba Julia Ramos  
Miss Celina Ramos

**Persons Responsible:** Under investigation

**1. Preliminary Investigation**

**a. Work carried out by the Forensic Technical Unit**

**1) At site of event**

- a) Photographs were taken of a general and specific nature
- b) Preparation of maps, general and detailed
- c) Gathering of evidence
  - (1) 19 cartridges, 7.62 x 39 mm. calibre
  - (2) 126 cartridges, 5.56 mm.
  - (3) 73 cartridges, 7.62 x 51 mm. calibre
  - (4) 5 shells, 7.62 x 39 calibre
  - (5) 3 cigarette butts
  - (6) 4 shell fragments
  - (7) Lifting of footprint

**b. Work carried out by the National Police Laboratory**

- 1) At site of event
  - a) Taking of photographs of general and detailed nature
  - b) Preparation of rough draft
  - c) Lifting of fingerprints
- c. Work carried out by the Explosives Section of the National Police
  - 1) At site of event
    - a) Taking of photographs of the scene of the crime
    - b) Preparation of draft
    - c) Gathering and establishment of evidence related to explosive devices
- d. Work carried out by Forensic Doctor of the Forensic Technical Unit and Forensic Doctors of the "Isidro Menéndez" Judicial Center
  - 1) Legal Medical Examination
  - 2) Localization of lesions caused by firearm
  - 3) Autopsies of each of the cadavers
  - 4) Gathering up of garments in order to carry out analysis

## 2. Subsequent Activities

- a. Police Visual Technical Inspection in the parking lot where the following vehicles were found: License plates 41469/88; 96161/88; 47359/88; 30890/88; 91904/88, which show damage caused by explosive device and firearms.
  - 1) Photos were taken
  - 2) Draft was prepared
- b. Police Visual Technical Inspection at residence No. 16, Cantábrico Street, Colonia Jardines de Guadalupe, where supposedly Mrs. Lucía Barrera remained during the night on which the Jesuit priests and the two women were murdered, the place where they gathered
  - 1) Hair samples
  - 2) Fiber samples
  - 3) Cigarette butts
  - 4) Fragments of semi-legible prints
- c. Preparation of diagrams of the human body with relation to the lesions that the victims display.

## 3. Analysis of Evidence Gathered

- a. Ballistics
  - 73 cartridges, 6.62 x 51 mm calibre, found opposite the School of Theology of "José Simeón Cañas" Central American University, all fired by the same weapon.
  - 19 cartridges, 7.62 x 39 mm. calibre, found in the following distribution:
    - 11 cartridges on the west side of the School of Theology;

- 1 cartridge in the room where the body of the priest Joaquín López y López was found
- 7 cartridges in the place where the rest of the Jesuit priests died, all fired by the same weapon
- 53 cartridges, 5.56 mm calibre, fired by the same weapon
- 41 cartridges, 5.56 mm calibre, fired by the same weapon
- 15 cartridges, 5.56 mm calibre, distributed as follows:
  - 4 cartridges, 5.56 mm. calibre, in the east side of the School of Theology
  - 2 cartridges inside the room where the priest Joaquín López y López died
  - 1 cartridge, 5.56 mm. calibre, inside corridor, lower level
  - 8 cartridges in the place where the priests died, all fired by the same weapon
- 8 cartridges, 5.56 mm calibre, found in the room where the woman and her daughter died, fired from the same weapon.
- 4 cartridges, 5.56 mm calibre, found where the woman and her daughter died, fired by the same weapon
- 5 cartridges, 5.56 mm calibre, that are under study

b. Study of the Fingerprints

1) Necrodigital impressions were taken of the six priests who were murdered in the residential complex of "José Simeón Cañas" Central American University (UCA) with the fingerprints of driver registration kept by the National Police, for better identification, having obtained positive results.

2) The fragments of digital prints were compared, those that were found and lifted from the drawers of the desks that are in rooms 1, 11, 12, and 14, located inside of the UCA residential complex, with the necrodigital impressions of the priests, giving a negative result.

3) The fragments of semi-legible digital prints that were found at residence No. 16, located on Cantábrico Street of Colonia Jardines de Guadalupe were compared with the digital impressions taken of witnesses Lucía Barrera and Mr. Jorge A. Cerna Ramírez, the result being that they display some characteristics with those of Jorge A. Cerna Ramírez, but due to the minimum amount of characteristics one cannot be categorical in determining their identity.

4) Still pending study are the fingerprints gathered from the bedrooms of the Jesuit priests with possible suspects.

c. Microanalysis

1) Analysis of clothing

- a) In making the microscopic analysis of all of the tears and scrapes displayed on the clothing of the six priests, the following was found:
- On the clothing of Dr. Ignacio Ellacuría, two perforations that show a ring of dirt

- On the clothing of Dr. Joaquín López y López, four granules of powder

b) The chemical analysis being pending, in order to determine its components, this clothing having been sent to the FBI labs, for its respective chemical analysis, in order to determine the elements that result from a shot of a firearm.

2) Hair analysis

a) In proceeding to the comparative analysis of the hairs collected at residence No. 16 with the hair samples taken from Mrs. Lucía Barrera and Jorge A. Cerna Ramírez, they do not display similar characteristics.

3) Analysis of blackened material

a) Remains of blackened material from the offices located on the lower floor of the School of Theology were collected, in order to send them to the FBI laboratories, in order to determine the physical- chemical substances that produced the fire.

d. Explosives Unit of the National Police

1) In proceeding to the inspection of the case four explosions were located, from which the following was collected:

a) In the first explosion one pipe to hold propelling charge for an M72A2 anti-tank rocket, 66 mm calibre, of U.S. manufacture, also four fins with directional setting of the same weapon and fragments of the device mentioned so that it is deduced that the explosion was due to a light anti-tank "LAW" M72A2 rocket of U.S. manufacture.

**Work Carried Out by the Investigations Unit**

**9:30 a.m., November 16, 1989**

- Priests of UCA and immediate neighbors who were found at their houses, located on Catábrico Street are interviewed, stating: That at 2:00 a.m. November 16, 1989, they only heard shots and explosions of bombs.

**7:00 a.m., November 17, 1989**

- Inspection conducted in the surroundings of the University, in search of the place where the perpetrators supposedly could have entered or left, finding an opening about 100 meters north of the main door to the residence, also tire tracks of vehicles on the sidewalk and pavement, opposite the opening. (See photo)

- On the western side of UCA a wooden door was found that leads to the inside of the

facilities, a short distance away tracks of combat boots being found on the soil; according to attachment, they were left the day of the search. (See photo)

- A witness who watches over the DUA store, located opposite the opening, stated that at 11:30 p.m. on November 15, 1989, he heard bullet fire that lasted 15 minutes; 15 minutes later, he heard a distant siren of an ambulance or police vehicle that he did not see, nor did he hear the sound of a vehicle in front, that the opening was made a few days before.

- A witness who takes care of the Alpes de Dios Condominium states: That he woke up from a strong explosion, not seeing anything in the street, then right after that he heard shots and the sound of vehicles racing along the South Expressway, such as from la Ceiba to the East.

- Personnel of the National Police and Treasury Police, who provide security in the "Torre Democracia" Building state: Not having seen vehicles pass by, nor having heard sound of engines, but they did hear shots in the UCA sector.

2:00 p.m., November 20, 1989

- In Acajutla, Obdulio Lozano López, husband of the deceased Elba Julia Ramos and father of Celina Ramos, testifies, stating: That at 8:00 p.m. on November 11, 1989, they placed a bomb at the main door to the residence of the priests; 2:00 a.m., November 16, 1989 he heard shots that lasted 15 minutes, throwing himself to the floor; 7:00 a.m., November 16, 1989, he saw the bodies.

11:00 a.m., November 21, 1989

- The residence where the murdered priests were sleeping is inspected, the priests Estrada and Pedraz stating that they had stolen from the room of Father Ellacuría a music apparatus, Sony brand, laser compact disks, a Panasonic radio-television, \$5,000 in 100 colon bills, a check in florins, another in marks and content of attache case; in the room of Father Segundo Montes they stole a Sony portable radio, JCR type; they handed over a manual on what had been stolen.

2:45 p.m., November 21, 1989

- Father Rogelio Pedraz Esteves testifies, stating: 10:00 a.m., November 13, 1989, he put up a sign on the west entrance of UCA announcing that there were no classes; Wednesday, November 15, 1989, he saw the sign in the same form; Thursday, the 16th, in the morning, he saw the same sign in the hands of Father Estrada, which said something about traitors, not in block letters, black color.

3:00 p.m., November 21, 1989

- Father Miguel Francisco Estrada Lemus testifies, stating: That the sign found on the UCA gate said "that they had executed the traitors, win or die, FMLN," he too gathered up cartridges and shells. In a later interview he stated: That the cartridges, shells and sign he had handed over to Lic. Maria Julia Hernández, Chief of Legal Assistance of the Archbishopric.

2:00 p.m. November 22, 1989

- At the Embassy of Spain, Lucía Barrera de Cerna testifies, stating: That she had seen 5 armed subjects through the main door near the chapel, two of them uniformed in camouflage and dark wool caps, who were firing at the residence of the priests, she cannot recognize them.

7:00 a.m., November 23, 1989

- At Embassy of France, Lucía Barrera de Cerna expands statement, saying: That she heard voices of Father Martín Baro, which she could not distinguish, but when the latter talked loudly she heard that he said, "It is an injustice, you're cowards," and sounds as if they were moving furniture.

7:20 a.m., November 23, 1989

- Jorge Alberto Cerna Rodríguez testifies, stating: That he only heard rounds of bullets and sounds as if they were moving furniture, since he did not get up.

- Eight witnesses testify, whose residences are on Cantábrico Street, the back part of their rooms borders lands of UCA, stating:

- That at 7:30 p.m. November 11, 1989, they heard explosions and shots; the night of Wednesday, November 15, 1989 they heard shots in that sector and far from there, not hearing voices or other sounds.

- That at 8 p.m. November 11, 1989 he heard rounds of shots and at the intersection of Mediterráneo St. and Río Lempa Ave., he saw 8 persons in uniform and with rifles, who were being directed by a woman; he does not describe uniforms, because at that moment the electricity went out, but they were D/T. Also they set bombs at the main door of the residence of the Jesuits, in the early morning hours of November 16, 1989, he heard shots and a bomb near their residence; he did not see anything, nor did he hear more sounds, or voices.

Another stated:

- That at 2:00 a.m. November 16, he heard shooting, which lasted 20 minutes, after that a bomb blast, then silence, then he heard blows, as if they were kicking in some door, immediately more shots that lasted 2 or 3 minutes, not hearing other sounds, nor did he see anything.

10:00 a.m., November 28, 1989

- At house No. 50, Mediterráneo Ave., a woman is interviewed who helps out with domestic chores for the priests and resides in house 21-A, Cantábrico Street, who had been summoned, but she refused to make a statement, saying that in doing so she would have to leave the country. In that same house, Father Tojeira states: That father Pedroza informed him that the watchmen and the men who reside at UCA were not going to testify because they didn't know anything, the same was said by Father Estrada, days before.

10:30 a.m., December 11, 1989

- At house 21-A, again a woman is interviewed, saying: That behind her house and on the UCA campus, at midnight of November 15, 1989, she heard two persons walking, two hours later in the same place she heard a loud explosion, followed by a lot of shooting that lasted 45 minutes, hearing movement such as of 40 persons who were carrying out planned work; that they were kicking at the doors, that they would open and close them; she heard the voice of father Martín Baro; the same when they killed them and they fell to the ground; that she heard that several persons were talking loudly, as in giving orders and for reasons of safety she did not say what they were saying; that she saw flares; that she heard on the roof of her house two subjects that were talking, sharing cigarettes and beers, finding cigarette butts and an empty "Tecate" beer can, not knowing who drank and has that; after the round of shots she heard the sound of the engine of a vehicle that was passing in front of her house; that the perpetrators fled in a northern direction toward the interior of UCA; that they recorded all of this and sent it abroad; that before and after the events she saw members of the Armed Forces around UCA; that her children were there, but they are out of the country. Investigators observed that from the incline behind the residence there is visibility to the place of the events.

10:20 a.m., November 28, 1989

- Father José María Tojeira Pelaya testifies, stating: That at 8:00 p.m., November 11, 1989, guerrillas of the FMLN placed a bomb at the main door to the residence of the murdered priests; that they entered the UCA campus when they were being pursued by the Army; the next day members of the Armed Forces find the bomb inside UCA, which the D/T had left; on November 13, 1989, in the morning hours, on National Radio, unidentified persons made death threats against Mons. Rivera, Rosa Chávez, Father Ignacio Ellacuría and other UCA Jesuits; 5:30 p.m., November 13, 1989, Father Ellacuría came from Spain via



Guatemala, entering through the main door that is along the South Expressway; 8:00 p.m., November 13, 1989, members of the Armed Forces carry out a search of the inside of UCA. November 14, 1989, in the morning, Father Rodolfo Cardenal, who was sleeping in that residence, moved to the Community of Santa Tecla, because of the search and at the suggestion of the declarant, he left for Nicaragua after the burial of the priests since he was nervous; 10:00 p.m., November 15, 1989, he saw pass in front of house No. 50 three uniformed soldiers who were going toward the south along Ave. Río Lempa; that during the night he heard shots that lasted something like 20 minutes, not knowing what was happening; 6:50 a.m., November 16, 1989, Father Estrada informed him that Obdulio was there and who reported the deaths; he handed over 5.56 cartridges, which he found in the place where they murdered the woman for their study; that what Lucía said, when she heard the shots and comments of her companion, he deduces that there were something like 30 persons who had participated in the act; but he did not remember the sources, because of the confusion, but they had told him that they had seen flares and that the perpetrators had remained from 1:00 to 5:00 a.m.; that he named Lic. María Julia Hernández to investigate the events, and for him to report to his superiors in Rome; he does not know what results Lic. Hernández has, in her investigation.

11:00 a.m., November 28, 1989

- Father Francisco Javier Ibisate San Miguel testifies, stating: That during the night of November 15, 1989, he heard quite heavy firing with explosions of bombs and sound of glass breaking; that he did not see flares, even though the sector was dark. All the witnesses say that the sector was without electrical energy.

November 29, 1989

- All the residents in the houses of Cantábrico and Mediterráneo Street are interviewed, also those of Albert Einstein Avenue, stating:

- Some stated that they had not slept in their house that night

- Others only heard the bullets and bombs

- A couple from house 21-B, on Cantábrico Street said: That they heard shots at about 2:00 a.m. on November 16, 1989, also the sound of the engine of a heavy vehicle seemingly from the same truck that comes to provide the relief for the soldiers who are in front of the UCA main entrance, along the South Expressway.

8:30 a.m., December 5, 1989

- The UCA watchmen begin to make statements, stating: That two of them were on duty in the daytime, leaving for their houses; five remained at the UCA facilities.

- That from November 11, 1989, when the conflict began, they stayed at night, on UCA property, behind the food store.
- That the night of November 11, 1989, D/T placed a bomb at the main door of the residence of the fathers, through which they entered UCA.
- That the morning of November 12, 1989, members of the Armed Forces deactivated a bomb that did not go off and that was adjacent to that main door on the inside.
- That the night of November 13, 1989, they searched UCA, entering through a wood door which is by undeveloped property along Ave. La Sultana.
- That at 2:00 a.m. on November 16, 1989, they heard an exchange of shots and bombs, which lasted about a half an hour.
- That on days previous, they only saw movement of troops along the South Expressway.
- Four of them add that at 6:30 a.m. on November 16, 1989, they woke up and saw opposite the food store some vehicles with broken glass, so that immediately they left UCA for their houses and when they were going out the main door that leads to Cantábrico St., they saw soldiers around that place. That they did not see Lucía Barrera or the bodies.
- One of the five added that they all went to check the inside of UCA, seeing some vehicles with the glass broken in the parking lot opposite the food store and one with the doors open; immediately they went to the chapel and from there they saw the shapes of four persons, who were down on the grass in front of the residence of the fathers.
- Another of the five added that two watchmen left through the chapel in order to try to find some priests, in order to check UCA, because of the rounds of shots and about three minutes later they returned, saying: That they had seen four shapes in front of the residence of the priests and that they had also run into Lucía Barrera.

1:30 p.m., December 7, 1989

- A person who resides by the main entry gate to UCA, South Expressway side, testifies, stating: That at 8:00 p.m. on November 11, 1989, he heard shots and bombs, around Jardines de Guadalupe and the surrounding area which lasted until midnight; - November 12, 1989, in the morning, there were already troops at that entrance; - November 13, 1989, in the afternoon Father Ellacuría opens that gate, he was coming from abroad, being accompanied by Father Amando López; November 14, 1989, in the morning, on checking where those of the search had entered from, he observed that they had done it through a wooden door that is on Ave. La Sultana; 2:00 a.m., November 16, 1989, he only heard rounds of shots quite near, not pinpointing the place; in the morning when he got up he saw the lock of that main door on the street side.

12:00 noon, December 11, 1989

- The person who resides in the UCA printing shop testifies, stating: That by public voice he learned that on the night of November 11, 1989, D/T placed a bomb at the main door of the residence of the priests, entering UCA; that the night of November 13, 1989, they searched UCA; November 14, 1989 in the morning, he observed that the ones of the search had broken the lock of the main door that faces Cantábrico St., and they had also knocked down a wooden door on the side of Ave. La Sultana, places through which they had entered; at 1:00 a.m. on November 16, 1989, he heard a round of shots and bombs, which lasted an hour and a half, not pinpointing where it was; 8:00 a.m., November 16, 1989, together with the priests Estrada, Pedraz and Salazar, he found at the main entry of Cantábrico Street a sign that said "There are no classes" and on the reverse, "Massacre of the Jesuits priests for being traitors, FMLN," remaining in the possession of father Estrada; that also this father picked up three or four cartridges, around the parking lot of the chapel.

December 11, 1989

- Published in the newspapers is the reward of a quarter of a million dollars, which the Government of El Salvador offers, for information on the case; that same day telephone 23 11 67 goes into service to receive information.

- All the military personnel that provided security for the Military Complex during the days November 15 and 16, 1989 are being investigated, in order to determine their guilt or innocence in the event being investigated.

#### STATISTICAL CHART ON STEPS TAKEN

#### CASE: "JESUITS"

FROM NOVEMBER 16 TO DECEMBER 24, 1989

Interviews	77
Statements of neighbors	14
Statements of circumstantial witnesses	01
Statements of D/T informants	01
Statements of UCA priests	04
Statements of UCA residents	03
Statements of UCA watchmen	07

**Statements of Chiefs of the Armed Forces**

Treasury Police	01
CITFA	01
Total	<u>02</u>

**Statements from Armed Forces Officers**

DM-7	04
Military School	01
DM-6	03
"CEAT" Treasury Police	04
"CITFA"	01
Treasury Police	01
DM-4	01
Atlatcatl Battalion	02
TOTAL	<u>17</u>

**Statements of Troops of the Armed Forces**

Treasury Police	07
National Police	12
DM-7	10
"CEAT" Treasury Police	07
Atlatcatl Battalion	31
TOTAL	<u>67</u>

**Documents Sent to Different Institutions**

01. - Document No. 0441, dated December 5, 1989, to the Chief of EMCFA / Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces/, asking for a list of the personnel that carried out the search of UCA on November 13, 1989.

02. - Document No. 0445, dated December 7, 1989, addressed to the Chief of EMCFA, asking him for a report whether the ammunition types used in the death of the Jesuits belong to the Armed Forces; affirmative case, that Units have been equipped with that type of ammunition.

03. - Document No. 0448, dated December 11, 1989, addressed to the Chief of EMCFA, asking him to send list of personnel that gave protection in the area of the Military

Complex and its surroundings, especially on November 15, and 16, 1989.

04. - Document No. 0449, dated December 11, 1989, addressed to the President of the Lempa River Hydroelectric Executive Commission (CEL), asking him the reason for the electrical energy blackout in the Antiguo Cuscatlán sector and its surroundings, especially UCA, during November 15 and 16, 1989.

05. - Document No. 0450, dated December 11, 1989, addressed to the Director of Cartography, asking him for an updated photographic map of UCA and its surroundings.

06. - Document No. 0451, dated December 11, 1989, addressed to the Director of DUA, asking him for maps on distribution of rainwater existing in UCA and surrounding area

07. - Verbally coordination is going on with EMCFA, so that the personnel that provided security service in the area of the Military Complex and surroundings will appear to testify; at the same time, taking of their fingerprints, polygraph test and ballistic test of their respective weapon.

08. - Document No. 0458, dated December 15, 1989, addressed to the Director of DNI, asking him for information on the ERP /People's Revolutionary Army/ terrorist group at the metropolitan level.

09. - Document No. 0459, dated December 15, 1989, addressed to the Chief of EMCFA, asking him for information on the results obtained in the search conducted on November 15, 1989 in the retreat house "San Ignacio Noyola," name of institution and staff of the Armed Forces who carried it out.

10. -Document No. 0460, dated December 16, 1989, addressed to the Chief of EMCFA, asking him for information on whether vehicles of the CUSEP were stolen by D/T during the days November 11, 1989 to November 16, 1989; case affirmative detail on the same. In addition in it a certified photocopy is requested of the sworn statement given by that office in relation to the murder of the UCA Jesuits.

11. -Document No. 0469, dated December 19, 1989, addressed to the President of the National Telecommunications Administration (ANTEL), asking him for recordings or transcripts of radio broadcasts of "Radio Venceremos" and "Radio Farabundo Marti," corresponding to the early evening and night hours of November 15, 1989.

12. -Document No. 0467, dated December 20, 1989, addressed to the Chief of EMCFA, asking him for the list of personnel of the Military Police that provided security to the Military Complex, on a hill located on the east side of UCA and south of Torre Democracia, between 6:00 p.m. November 15, 1989 and 7:00 a.m. on November 16, 1989.

13. -Document No. 0468, dated December 20, 1989, addressed to the Director of the National Guard, asking him for the name of the agent of that group that died between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. November 15, 1989 near the Colonial Theater in Antiguo Cuscatlán

and names of agents that were accompanying him at the time of the event.

**Gathering of Ballistic Samples**

"CEAT" of the Treasury Police	122
DM-7	090
DM-6	104
Atlatcatl Battalion	045
Monserrat Battalion, National Police	017
Libertadores Battalion, Treasury Police	007

Total: 385

**Polygraph Tests and Results**

<b>Chiefs, Armed Forces</b>	
Treasury Police	001
Results: (Positive (True))	

<b>Officers of Armed Forces</b>	
Treasury Police	001
Results: Positive (True)	

<b>Military School</b>	001
Results: Positive (True)	

<b>DM-7</b>	003
Results: Positive (True)	

<b>Atlatcatl Battalion</b>	002
Results: Positive (True)	

**Personnel of Armed Forces Troops**

<b>DM-7</b>	002
Results: Positive (True)	

<b>Civilians</b>	002
Results: Negative (Lying)	

<b>Civilian Person</b>	001
Results: Positive (True)	

<b>D/T Informant</b>	001
Result: Negative (Lying)	

TOTAL: 14

Fingerprints

Treasury Police	122
DM-7	092
DM-6	103
Atlatcatl Battalion	045
Monserrat Battalion, National Police	017
Libertadores Battalion, Treasury Police	006
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	385

*Translated by  
Deanna Hammond  
CRS - Language Services  
February 1, 1990*

**CARNAGE AGAIN:**

**Preliminary Report on Violations  
of the Laws of War By Both Sides  
in the November 1989 Offensive  
In El Salvador**

**November 24, 1989**

**An Americas Watch Report**



1. Massacre of Jesuits:

a. The Events of November 16:

At approximately 2:30 a.m. on Thursday, November 16, some thirty heavily armed and uniformed soldiers entered the rectory on the grounds of the Central American University (Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas - UCA) and murdered six Jesuit priests who lived there, their cook, and her 15-year-old daughter, according to church sources who based their account on the testimony of at least one eyewitness.\* Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the massacre was carried out by the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

The victims included some of El Salvador's most prominent liberal intellectuals and human rights monitors. Several of the victims, as well as the Jesuit order and the UCA, had long been subjected to threats and harassment attributed to right wing death squads (see below). In his weekly sermon on November 19, Archbishop Arturo Rivera Damas stated that there is a "strong indication" that the eight were killed by members of the military or people associated with them.\*\*

The victims are Fathers Ignacio Ellacuría, 59, Segundo

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\* Although church sources interviewed by Americas Watch and cited by other news accounts referred to a sole witness, The Los Angeles Times quoted Father José María Tojeira, head of the Jesuit order in Central America, saying there were two witnesses to the executions. Richard Boudreaux and Marjorie Miller, "Six Jesuit Priests Slain in Salvador," The Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1989.

\*\* Lindsey Gruson, "Salvador Bishop Links Military to Killing of Six," The New York Times, November 20, 1989.

Montes, 56, Ignacio Martín Baró, 47, Juan Ramón Moreno, 56, Amando López, 53, and Joaquín López y López, 71. Also killed were the priests' cook, Julia Elba Ramos, 42, and her daughter, Celina Marisela Ramos, 15. Father Ellacuría was the Rector (President) of the UCA, Father Martín Baró its Vice-Rector, and Father Montes was the head of its human rights institute (Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centro-Americana - IDHUCA).

Several factors point to army responsibility for the crime:

\* The slayings occurred in an area which, according to witnesses, had been under strict army control for several days prior to the killings.\* That control was in place since the preceding Saturday, when some FMLN soldiers had escaped through the house at the beginning of the offensive. Church officials and residents of the neighborhood were quoted by The Washington Post stating that "army troops and tanks were posted around the priests' residence starting Wednesday afternoon and into Thursday morning,"\*\* when the massacre took place.

\* Under an army-imposed curfew, no one in the area was allowed out of doors from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Soldiers patrolled the UCA campus and surroundings starting at 10 p.m. on Wednesday, November 15, passing about twenty yards from the entrance to the rectory where the killings took place.

\* A witness inside the UCA campus saw some 30 men in army uniform as they shot at the offices of a pastoral center and at the upstairs residence of the Jesuits, both part of the same building.

\* The murderers also ransacked the pastoral center on the ground floor, destroying books, documents and computers that were set on fire. The offices of the pastoral center and the priests' private rooms had been searched two days earlier by army

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\* "Chronology of Events Relating to the Assassination of the Six Jesuits of El Salvador," Provincia Centroamericana de La Compañía de Jesús.

\*\* Lee Hockstader, "Army Role in Killings Suggested," The Washington Post, November 18, 1989.

soldiers. This had taken place hours after Father Ellacuría had returned from abroad. In his presence, the soldiers meticulously searched every room.

\* The shootings, movement of the bodies, destruction of offices, and breaking of doors is all believed to have taken about 40-45 minutes. Throughout this period, the assassins were undisturbed by troops occupying the area. They took the time to spray bullets at cars parked in a lot nearby, apparently unconcerned that the noise might alert surrounding soldiers.\*

\* Father Ellacuría, other Jesuits of the UCA, Archbishop Arturo Rivera Damas, and Auxiliary Archbishop Gregorio Rosa Chávez were denounced and explicitly threatened on a radio station under government control on November 12, days before the assassinations.\*\* These condemnations, reprinted in the newspaper the next day, said "categorically that it is of great urgency that they throw the Jesuits out of the country, because they have been hiding arms in the UCA for about 10 years. They singled out as the main responsible party, the Spanish Jesuit priest, Ignacio Ellacuría."\*\*\*

\* The Jesuit order in El Salvador, the UCA, and several of the murdered priests, have been targets of right wing violence and intimidation for at least a decade (see below).

\* On the morning of November 16, according to Monsignor Gregorio Rosa Chávez, Auxiliary Archbishop of San Salvador, men in a car drove past the offices of the Catholic Archdiocese, calling over a loudspeaker "Ignacio Ellacuría and Martín Baró are now dead. We'll continue killing communists." Moments later, the same loudspeaker said: "We are the First Brigade."

\* All of the victims were shot dead with high-powered rifles of the caliber used by the army and security forces.\*\*\*\*

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\* "Chronology of Events Relating to the Assassination of the Six Jesuits of El Salvador." The Jesuits originally estimated that the events took 30 minutes, then revised this estimate to 40-45 minutes.

\*\* "Chronology of Events Relating to the Assassination of the Six Jesuits of El Salvador."

\*\*\* La Prensa Gráfica, November 13, 1989, page 2.

\*\*\*\* According to The Los Angeles Times, President Alfredo Cristiani has stated that investigators found cartridges from AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles at the scene of the crime. Boudreaux and Miller, "Six Jesuit Priests Slain in Salvador." The M-16 is used by the army; the AK-47 was only recently introduced in El

A sign was found on the back gate of the UCA purportedly taking credit for the killing on behalf of the FMLN. The sign read "El FMLN hizo un ajusticiamiento a las orejas contrarias. Vencer o morir. FMLN." (The FMLN brought to justice the enemy spies. Victory or death. FMLN). The guerrillas have denied any responsibility, and most observers attributed the sign to a clumsy effort to sow confusion.

The victims' bodies were found by the cook's husband at 6:30 a.m., and he immediately notified other priests. At 9:00 a.m., the husband suffered a heart attack and was taken away by the Green Cross.

The bodies of Fathers Ellacuría, Montes, Martín Baró and Amando López were all found on the lawn in front of the priests' residence, a few feet from a concrete wall that was sprayed with blood.\* Although church sources said they did not know whether the four had been killed in the yard or in their rooms, a trail of blood seemed to indicate that someone had been dragged bleeding between the yard and the dormitory. Parts of the skulls of the four men had apparently been blown away by gunfire. Inside, the bodies of Juan Ramón Moreno and Joaquín López y López each lay in different rooms. Father López y López had been shot with a single bullet in the chest. Father Moreno had been shot in the head. The front of the building had been shot with

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Salvador, mostly by the FMLN.

\* Boudreaux and Miller, "Six Jesuit Priests Slain in Salvador."

automatic weapons and may have been bombed, and an office burned and ransacked. The cook and her daughter were believed to have been slain in their room so there would be no witnesses to the crime.

U.S. Ambassador William Walker has urged, and President Cristiani has promised, an immediate investigation to determine responsibility for the mass slaying at the UCA. "If there are people involved who turn out to be members of the armed forces," Cristiani has promised, "then the weight of the law must fall on them."\* Nonetheless, the prospects for a serious investigation into the massacre are cast in grave doubt by statements made by Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo Colorado. In a November 19 press conference, Colorado denounced the nation's Catholic bishops for what he termed their "questionable [political] tendencies." Colorado made similar accusations in a letter to Pope John Paul II (see below). Remarkably, the ARENA law enforcement chief added, "I personally think no one is being persecuted by anyone" in El Salvador.\*\*

Ambassador Walker has been outspoken in his condemnation of the killings, and on November 17, even offered protection to any witnesses.\*\*\* The Bush Administration has offered to help in the

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\* Boudreaux and Miller, "Six Jesuit Priests Slain in Salvador."

\*\* Douglas Farah, "Guerrilla Gamble Proving Costly," The Washington Post, November 20, 1989.

\*\*\* Lindsey Gruson, "Witnesses Sought in Slayings of Salvadoran Priests," The New York Times, November 18, 1989.

investigation and has reportedly sent pathologists and laboratory technicians to assist Salvadoran investigators.\* People close to the investigation of the killings told The New York Times that the criminals had left "a large number of fingerprints and other evidence at the scene."\*\* Nonetheless, U.S. officials have, despite strong circumstantial evidence, sought to deflect blame from the Salvadoran military for the crime (see below).

b. Prior Attacks and Harassment of the Church, Jesuits and UCA:

Threats and repression against the Catholic Church and, specifically, the Jesuits, are not a new phenomenon in El Salvador. In the period preceding the October 1979 coup, six priests were killed in separate incidents by right-wing death squads and the military. Among these was Father Rutilio Grande, the Jesuit parish priest of Aguilares, killed March 12, 1977.

In 1980, El Salvador achieved worldwide notoriety following the killings of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero and four U.S. churchwomen. The persecution of the Church in El Salvador originates in its historic role in taking up the "preferential option for the poor," a doctrine based on the teachings of the Second Vatican Council, on the Conferences of Latin American Bishops in Medellin (1968) and Puebla (1979), and on the

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\* Robert Pear, "U.S. Official Links Salvadoran Right to Priests' Deaths," The New York Times, November 18, 1989.

\*\* Mark A. Uhlig, "Salvadoran Army Continues Attack," The New York Times, November 19, 1989.

teachings of Popes John XXIII and Paul VI.\*

In June 1977, the Inter-Diocesan Social Secretariat published a 103-page booklet that lists the following acts of persecution against the Church for the period January 1976 to June 1977:

10 bomb explosions; 2 searches; 1 ransacking and desecration of the Blessed Sacrament; 1 threat to close the church radio; 7 prohibitions for priests wanting to enter El Salvador; 3 priests tortured and 2 mistreated; 3 priests arrested; 2 priests and 47 laypersons assassinated; 3 priests forced to leave the country due to death threats; a defamation campaign; threats to expel an order of women religious; 15 parishes without priests.\*\*

Following its January 1978 visit to El Salvador, the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that priests, members of religious orders, and lay persons working with the Catholic Church have been the object of systematic persecution by Government authorities and "organizations that enjoy the favor of the government."\*\*\*

The U.S. State Department Annual Report on Human Rights for 1979 stated:

Most protests of infringement of freedom of religion have come from the activist wing of the Catholic Church. There are frequent allegations of open or disguised Government harassment and persecution of lay leaders, nuns and priests.

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\* See generally: Americas Watch Committee and the American Civil Liberties Union, Report on Human Rights in El Salvador, New York, Vintage Books, 1982, Chapter 7: "The Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion."

\*\* Secretariado Social Inter-Diocesano, Persecución de la Iglesia en El Salvador, San Salvador, 1977, pp. 16-21.

\*\*\* Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Washington, D.C., November 17, 1978.

Three priests were killed in 1979, one in front of the altar of his church, presumably by right-wing terrorists. Several foreign-born nuns and priests were expelled during the year by the Romero Government. Smaller religions and sects have apparently not been the target of similar treatment.... In practice, freedom of association has been somewhat inhibited by excessively technical or otherwise inadequate legislation. The activist wing of the Catholic Church made frequent allegations of open or disguised government harassment.\*

The Archbishop of Washington, Msgr. James A. Hickey, described the Church's role in testimony before a House of Representatives Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee, March 5, 1981, and noted that:

For attempting this renewed Christianization of their country, they have been called communists, subversives; and they have suffered persecution, even death, for the Gospel. An archbishop, eleven priests, thousands of lay people and now four American missionaries are dead in that effort.

.....  
The Church's ministry in El Salvador and throughout Latin America since Medellin has been at the service of human dignity and human rights. It is my conviction that one cannot understand the role of the Church in El Salvador today apart from these themes. Furthermore, one cannot understand the situation in El Salvador apart from the Church and its ministry.

Assassinations, bombings, machinegunnings, threats, detentions, militarization and searches of churches, interference with church relief efforts and harassment of workers continued to be documented by the Archdiocesan legal aid office, Socorro Juridico. For 1981 as a whole, Socorro Juridico documented:

- 14 assassinations of church workers
- 1 wounded
- 41 arbitrary detentions
- 14 public defamations of religious officials and institutions

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\* U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979, Washington, Feb. 1980, p. 318.



- 3 bombings of religious buildings
- 4 machinegun attacks on churches and other religious centers
- 22 raids on churches and religious organizations providing education or humanitarian assistance
- 3 military occupations of churches and religious institutions.\*

On October 8, 1981, the "Salvadoran Anticommunist League" circulated a leaflet in San Salvador which was headed: "Out with Marxist Jesuits! Out with the creators of violence and crime in El Salvador. Out with the founders of the FPL [Popular Forces of Liberation]!" The leaflet accused the Society of Jesus of, among other things, directing subversion from Panama. In addition to ten individuals, it named the major Catholic educational centers as organizations to be watched.\*\*

Father Segundo Montes, Director of IDHUCA and one of the six priests killed on November 16, testified in federal court in Los Angeles in Orantes-Hernández v. Meese, a case involving the rights of Salvadoran refugees in the United States. In his January 1987 testimony, he described past threats and violence against the Jesuits in El Salvador:

In 1977 I believe they gave us one month, to the Jesuits of El Salvador, to leave the country or be murdered. And you could see slogans throughout the city saying "promote the country, kill a priest."

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\* Solidaridad, No. 37, February 1982. Socorro Jurídico was created by the late Archbishop Oscar A. Romero. In 1982, it was replaced by the Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado as the official archdiocesan human rights organization. From that moment on, Socorro changed its name to Socorro Jurídico Cristiano "Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero" and continued to monitor human rights under the auspices of the Society of Jesus.

\*\* Socorro Jurídico, Solidaridad, No. 33, October 30, 1981 reprints the leaflet.

In 1980 they strafed our house, machine-gunned our house. Afterwards bombs exploded on two occasions in that same year of 1980. One of the bombs exploded at the wall to my room and it opened up a three-foot diameter hole at the foot of the bed where I was.

In 1983 when we returned after two and a half years of having had to be relocated in another house, again they exploded another bomb on us in September and they left some literature in which they accused us as traitors to the country because we supported the dialogue.

At the university they have set bombs on us more than 12 times. Continuously in the papers there are attacks and threats against us.

There are lists of people who can be eliminated and we're on those lists, several of us, and I am personally.\*

Father Ignacio Ellacuría, the Rector of the Central American University who was also killed on November 16, wrote in a letter to The Boston Globe:

We have endured a great deal during these recent years; one of us, Rev. Rutilio Grande, was murdered, and the rest of us have received an ultimatum: Get out of the country or be killed. We decided to stay. Since then our home and our university have been bombed 14 times.\*\*

In the last several months of 1983, the Catholic Church denounced an increase in death squad threats against it as well as against related individuals and institutions, again caused by the role of the church in promoting human rights and defending

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\* U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Transcript, January 16, 1987, pp. 49-51.

\*\* "The Jesuit Vision," The Boston Globe, November 17, 1989, p. 19, excerpted from a letter written by Father Ellacuría three years ago in response to a series on Central America by Edward R. F. Sheehan.

the poor.\* According to our January 1984 Report:

In mid-September, the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) took credit for four bombing attacks in the capital. Bombs were placed at the residence of the Jesuits teaching at the Catholic University (UCA), and at the home of UCA professor Italo López Vallecillos. An ESA communique on September 13 called López Vallecillos a "spokesman for international communism" and accused the Jesuits of "open membership in the terrorist organizations that make up the FMLN." Some faculty members at the UCA have supported a negotiated settlement in El Salvador.\*\*

In October 1983, Mons. Gregorio Rosa Chávez condemned a threat made by the Salvadoran Nationalist Command to a private Catholic school, saying that it was not an isolated case. On October 31, 1983, the "Maximiliano Hernández Martínez Anti-Communist Brigade" delivered a communique to San Salvador radio stations "duly notifying" Msgrs. Rivera y Damas and Rosa Chávez "that they must immediately suspend their disturbing homilies. Otherwise they will be the objects of drastic penalties..."\*\*\*

Attacks against the Church and the Jesuits decreased but did not disappear during the years of the Duarte administration. Church relief projects for the displaced continued to face persecution and in 1986 the government launched a campaign against the Social Secretariat of the Archdiocese as well as the Lutheran, Baptist and Episcopal Churches, accusing all of them of aiding guerrilla forces. In May 1986, the security forces

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\*Americas Watch Committee & the American Civil Liberties Union, "As Bad as Ever: A Report on Human Rights in El Salvador," January 31, 1984.

\*\*Ibid., p. 34-35.

\*\*\* Ibid., p. 35.

publicized the claims of Luz Janeth Alfaro, a former member of the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission, who said -- among other sensational accusations -- that 95% of the food and other assistance that church-sponsored relief groups collected from foreign donors went to the FMLN with the approval of Archbishop Rivera Damas.\* In June 1986, eight Archdiocese employees received telephone death threats. A strong response by these Church groups and the international religious community succeeded in ending this campaign, at least temporarily.

During this period, Father Ellacuria was repeatedly accused of defending the FMLN's use of mines. He and other Jesuits at the UCA were accused of being the intellectual fathers of the revolution. When union groups held meetings in the UCA's auditorium, newspaper headlines said that subversive strategies were planned in the UCA.

The UCA has played a crucial role during these years of conflict in El Salvador. Its principal publications, Proceso, a weekly summary of news developments, and Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA), a monthly analysis magazine, have consistently published articles critical of the government. They have not hesitated to criticize FMLN actions or strategies when those conflicted with the UCA's sense of justice or respect for human rights. But they placed the brunt of the responsibility for the current violence in El Salvador squarely on the government and its supporters; unlike many other

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\* Americas Watch, The Civilian Toll 1986-1987, at 283.

government critics, they were never silenced. While other opposition publications and the National University were shut down, the UCA continued to function.

Three of those killed on November 16, Ellacuría, Martín Baró and Montes, frequently appeared in public and on television commenting on current political developments. Both inside the country and internationally, they were constantly called upon to speak at all kinds of events. The UCA always advocated social justice, human rights, and the interests of the popular majority ("las mayorías populares"). Ellacuría, a theologian and philosopher, had become one of the most prominent political commentators in El Salvador. He and others at the UCA played a crucial role in advocating a negotiated solution to the war. The UCA lauded the efforts of the Central American presidents to achieve a regional peace agreement and had recently conferred an honorary doctorate on Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, to urge him to continue his efforts.

Ignacio Martín Baró, a psychologist, was also a widely respected analyst of the situation in El Salvador. He was the El Salvador representative of the Network on Mental Health and Repression and supported the efforts of psychologists in El Salvador to treat the traumas of war. He also headed the Public Opinion Institute at the UCA which conducted frequent and respected polls to gauge public sentiment on the crucial issues confronting the country.

Sociologist Segundo Montes devoted his efforts in recent

years to studying the situation of refugees and the displaced, as well as running the UCA's Human Rights Institute, founded in 1985. One of his most recent publications dealt with the social forces in the country and their participation in the Church-sponsored National Debate for Peace. He was El Salvador's leading academic expert on the problem of refugees and the displaced and was constantly sought out for his opinions.

The following incidents occurred in the past year alone:

\* Bomb attack on UCA printing press: Between 1:50 and 1:55 a.m. on July 22, 1989, four bombs exploded at the UCA, two in the computer and photocopier area of the printing press, one in the transformer just outside the printing press, and one under a nearby bus. Three other bombs were deactivated by the National Police. Computers, photocopy machines, office equipment, transformers, and printing machines were destroyed. Damage was estimated at between 400,000 and 500,000 colones (\$62,000 - \$77,500). No one was injured. Three people sleeping in the bus heard the first explosion in the printing press and were able to flee. Tutela Legal held a death squad responsible.\*

\* Several bombs were thrown at the building housing the UCA printing press on April 28, 1989, causing some material damage.

\* In April 1989, Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda, then commander of the First Brigade and now Vice-Minister of Defense, publicly accused the UCA of "planning strategies of the FMLN, being a refuge and haven for terrorist leaders, and being accomplices in

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\* Tutela Legal, Weekly Report, July 21-27, 1989 p. 28.

the April 19 assassination of the Attorney General." On July 2, the Vice Minister of Defense for Public Security, Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano, accused the UCA, the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission (CDHES), and "other front groups" of attempting to discredit the Armed Forces by publishing paid announcements with "lies, giving a negative image of the Armed Forces."

\* In April 1989, ARENA and COPREFA publicly accused Father Segundo Montes of having said that FMLN terrorism was "justified." Father Montes denied having said this. The accusation was apparently drawn from his statement in a television interview that, in the absence of a negotiated solution, the FMLN and the military could be expected to continue military actions.

\* On July 3, 1989, the Crusade for Peace and Work, a right-wing political group linked to ARENA, published an open letter to President Cristiani calling for the arrest and punishment, through the application of "summary justice," of Fathers Ellacuría and Montes, as well as others on a list of prominent political, union, and popular movement figures.

2. Norma Guirola de Herrera, Mario Gálvez, and Others:

At 5:00 p.m. on November 12, soldiers of the CITFA (Instruction Center of the Armed Forces) captured Norma Guirola de Herrera, 42, Mario Gálvez, and three other people from the Santa María neighborhood of San Marcos, department of San Salvador, where they were working to form a community health

committee to cope with the effects of the violence. All five were taken to the Zapote barracks where they were held in a dark room, interrogated, and accused of being FMLN combatants. That evening soldiers shot and killed Guirola, Gálvez, and possibly three or four others. There was a witness to the captures and assassination. The body of Mrs. Herrera was buried as "unidentified," but, following a judicial exhumation, it was identified by her relatives. The body had two bullets in the head and one in the stomach. Norma Guirola de Herrera was the director of a women's institute. In April 1989, the institute had inaugurated a legal center for Salvadoran women, which included the provision of legal assistance to political detainees.

### 3. Murder of Indians in La Libertad:

According to the South and Meso-American Indian Information Center (SAIIC), an organization based in Berkeley, California, on November 17, between 2 and 3 a.m., the Salvadoran army and National Guard searched the homes of members of an Indian cooperative called La Independencia in Teotepequec, La Libertad. After accusing the members of being communists and aiding the guerrillas, they shot and killed ten of them, including three or four children. Two surviving members of the cooperative went to Sonsonate and reported the massacre to the National Association of Indian Peoples of El Salvador (Asociación Nacional de Indígenas Salvadoreños - ANIS). SAIIC also reported that two ANIS members who had just returned from a conference in Panama, were



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# PAX AMERICAS

## FOR PEACE IN THE AMERICAS

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DATE: December 6, 1989

TO: Foreign policy legislative staff

FROM: Cindy M. Buhl, Legislative Director, Pax Americas (546-0116)

SUBJECT: Threats and crackdown against churches, unions, press and political opposition in El Salvador

Since the very beginning of the November 11th military offensive launched by the Salvadoran guerrillas, the Salvadoran military and government have made direct and public threats against religious workers and all forms of civic opposition groups, and the military and security forces have detained dozens of foreigners and hundreds of Salvadorans employed or associated with such organizations. There is nothing haphazard about the threats, raids, searches, detentions and deportations which have taken place.

Attached you will find recent quotes from government and military officials, as well as an abbreviated chronology of threats and threatening actions which demonstrate an extensive pattern of repression against all independent or dissenting voices inside El Salvador. I want to acknowledge the impressive preliminary report of the Americas Watch Committee, Carnage Again, published on November 24th (and cited throughout this document as AWC). I also used the detailed daily chronologies compiled by El Rescate's Human Rights Office in Los Angeles.

This wide-spread crackdown is a devastating escalation, which many have described as a persecution, of a pattern of threatening actions which have occurred throughout the year:

- \* As early as March 1989, U.S. private voluntary organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief, the Mennonite Central Committee, Oxfam-America and the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee were testifying before the Congress on the serious difficulties their personnel and their Salvadoran counterparts were having in carrying out humanitarian and relief projects in El Salvador. As recently as October 19th, thirty-seven senators sent a letter to President Alfredo Cristiani protesting the recent harassment and efforts by Salvadoran officials to expel religious and humanitarian workers.
- \* In the six weeks preceding the November 11th offensive, bombings had occurred at the homes of political opposition leaders Ruben Zamora and Aronette Diaz, on property of the Lutheran Church and at the headquarters of a major trade union confederation, FENASTRAS, which left eleven labor activists dead. On November 6th, nine bodies, including two members of the Popular Social Christian Movement (the party of Ruben Zamora) were found in Sonsonate. The initial press reports suggest that troops from the Sixth Military Detachment

(continued on reverse)

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122 Maryland Ave., N.E., Third Floor, Washington, D.C. 20002

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were involved (New York Times and Washington Post, 11/9/89).

- \* The penal code reform approved by the Salvadoran National Assembly on November 23rd was actually introduced in June and had been slowly moving through the legislative process. On October 1st, in his Sunday homily, Archbishop Rivera y Damas stated that changes in the penal code "could create a dictatorial system and a series of unjust dispositions" and should be "continually condemned."
- \* Detentions and arrests greatly increased throughout 1989. According to La Prensa Grafica, a conservative Salvadoran daily, El Salvador has the third highest number of prisoners serving time without trial in Latin America. President of the Criminal Court, Dr. Oscar Rodriguez Diaz, stated that of the 2508 prisoners currently held in Mariona Prison, only 200 have been sentenced, 85% are held without benefit of trial. (La Prensa Grafica, 10/8/89)
- \* Throughout 1989, but especially following the March 1989 electoral victory by the ARENA party, government and military officials have publicly and repeatedly denounced religious groups, political opponents, unions and community organizations. A few examples:
  - On April 19th, following the assassination of the Attorney General, Col. Juan Orlando Zepeda, then commander of the First Brigade and now the Vice-Minister of Defense, publicly accused the Central American University/UCA (the Jesuit university) of "planning strategies of the FMLN, being a refuge and a haven for terrorist leaders, and being accomplices in the April 19th assassination of the Attorney General." These remarks were printed in all the newspapers on 4/20/89. In El Mundo, he was further quoted as saying: "The enemy is among us. They should be identified and denounced. Therefore, we ask the people to trust us, because we are going to make a final decision to resolve this situation."
  - Beginning June 10th in El Mundo, COPREFA (the armed forces press office) ran a series of ads in the Salvadoran papers accusing UNADES (the National Union of Earthquake Victims), FENASTRAS (a labor federation) and UNTS (coalition of unions and popular organizations) of guerrilla fronts. The ads often ran pictures of these organizations leaders, as well.
  - On July 3rd, the Crusade for Peace and Work, a right-wing group associated with ARENA, printed an open letter to President Cristiani to arrest and punish, through the application of "summary justice," the "terrorist hordes" commanded by Fr. Ignacio Ellacuria, Fr. Segundo Montes [both priests were murdered on November 16th], Ruben Zamora (leader of the Popular Social Christian Movement) and Guillermo Ungo (presidential candidate of Democratic Convergence). One of the charges cited in the ad is the practice of liberation theology. (Diario de Hoy, 7/3/89)

The attached report only attempts to clearly outline the pattern of repression. Unfortunately, the report could go on forever, and I hope everyone will read the final week of November 27th through December 4th (and President Cristiani's words on that last page) to understand that the crackdown continues and is gaining strength. Some sectors are quite underreported, such as trade unions, because so many labor activists and sources of information were forced to go into hiding. Hopefully, future information will rectify this lack in other reports. Follow-up information on this document may be obtained from Bill Spencer at the Central America Working Group during December 7-30 (797-7010); or from Cindy Buhl at Pax Americas after Jan. 2nd.

## SELECTED QUOTES

"The terrorist offensive of the last week and a half is a result of a joint action of the FMLN and the Democratic Convergence [the party of Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo]. The Armed Forces now have the moral justification to annihilate them."

-- Robert D'Aubuisson, ARENA party member  
Radio Cadena Nacional (the government-controlled  
radio news broadcasts), 11/21/89

"By means of a radio channel, during the entire night, hundreds of condemnations were heard against Humberto Centeno [labor leader], Ruben Zamora [political opposition leader], Guillermo Manuel Ungo [opposition presidential candidate] and other leaders of the [Democratic] Convergence and the FDR, to whom were attributed the responsibility for what the FMLN is doing.

"Men and women who spoke on the radio asked the government to bring to justice Centeno, Zamora, Ungo and other elements. Since their return to El Salvador, the subversives have oriented themselves more toward perpetrating acts of violence and every class of vandalism.

"There were also heard by means of the national radio broadcast condemnations and severe criticisms against the Archbishop Msgr. Rivera y Damas, and against auxiliary bishop Msgr. Rosa Chavez, because on Sunday, instead of evangelical words, they gave communist speeches in favor of the FMLN, the Convergence and FENASTRAS.

"Categorically, said these same condemnations, it is of the greatest urgency to remove the Jesuits from the country because arms have been hidden in the Catholic University for nearly ten years now. They identified the Spanish Jesuit priest Ignacio Ellacuria as the one chiefly responsible."

-- La Prensa Grafica, 11/13/89  
The article reports denunciations made on the Radio Cadena Nacional, the government-controlled news radio, which began on November 12th and continued at least through November 21st. As in this case, the denunciations were often reprinted the next day as "news articles" in the Salvadoran newspapers.

"For a long time in this suffering country, there has existed a tendency called the Popular Church, which large sectors of society blame for the violence that has shaken El Salvador for many years and has culminated in the rebels violent actions this week. This, beloved Father, makes your most humble servant fear for the lives of some bishops. . . who have persisted in keeping alive the dubious ideology of the 'church of the poor.'"

-- Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo Colorado  
Letter sent to Pope John Paul II (on official  
government stationary), 11/18/89

"We can no longer allow there to be political parties that doubt whether the FMLN is trying to restrict the freedom of the Salvadoran people."

- President Alfredo Cristiani, 11/12/89  
President Cristiani appears on national radio and television broadcasts to announce the state of emergency. He specifically issues a warning to politicians of the Democratic Convergence that they would have to formally break with the FMLN rebels or leave the country. (Los Angeles Times, 11/13/89)

"It is very difficult for me personally to protect these dignitaries from this Communist avalanche, because in a church or public place anything can happen. . . Msgr. Rosa Chavez has had a participation, and his brother is known by everyone to belong to the guerrillas. Msgr. Rivera y Damas has had very controversial opinion and that puts him in grave danger."

- Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo Colorado  
Press conference held at the same time as the funeral of the six murdered Jesuit priests, 11/19/89  
(Los Angeles Times, 11/20/89)

"People like Ruben Zamora [opposition political leader] who travel abroad and ask for a suspension of aid to this country fall in this category."

- ARENA legislator Raul Alfaro Zamora (no relation to Ruben), clarifying who might fall under penalties in the just-approved penal code reform legislation  
(Baltimore Sun, 11/24/89)

"Col. Mauricio Vargas, commander of the Third Brigade in San Miguel, says the situation in San Miguel is under control, but it is difficult because 'any person can have the appearance of a Marxist-Leninist.'"

- TV 12, San Salvador, 11/19/89  
Evening news report on the military situation around the country, including a brief interview with Col. Vargas

"They had to be taught a lesson. They had to be punished."

- Leading Salvadoran businessman attempting to explain the right-wing view of the killings of the six Jesuit priests and two women on November 16th, as reported in the New York Times, 11/21/89

CHRONOLOGY OF THREATS AND THREATENING EVENTS: NOVEMBER 11TH THRU NOVEMBER 15th

November 11th and 12th:

- \* At 11:00 PM on November 11th, all radio and television stations were ordered to switch over to a national news hook-up or "chain," Radio Cadena Nacional, which would be under the control of the Salvadoran armed forces and government. Two stations, including the Catholic radio station YSAX, did not do so immediately and received telephone death threats. The two stations subsequently switched to the national hook-up. Within 24 hours, the national radio chain begins broadcasting hundreds of denunciations from "callers-in" threatening organizations, religious leaders, political opposition leaders, trade unionists and other community groups. Until November 21st, when the radio broadcast threats diminish, at no time did the armed forces or the radio station disassociate itself from the denunciations or seek to impede or interrupt their broadcast.
  
- \* On November 12th, at 5:00 PM, President Cristiani declares a state of siege, the first since January 1987. Among the rights suspended during the emergency are freedom of expression, movement, association and the inviolability of correspondence. Due process for detainees is suspended and military and security forces are authorized to hold prisoners incommunicado for 15 days before charging them with a crime and bringing them before a judge. Those charged with crimes related to the insurgency, including belonging to a "subversive" organization, will be tried in military, not civilian, courts. In his statement, President Cristiani singles out politicians of the Democratic Convergence (e.g. Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora) to formally break with the FMLN or leave the country (see "quotes" page 2). (Los Angeles Times, 11/13/89)
  
- \* Threats and denunciations begin on government-controlled radio against Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo ("They should be hung!") and against Catholic Archbishop Rivera y Damas, Fr. Ignacio Ellacuria, Fr. Martin-Baro and Fr. Segundo Montes ("Jesuits should be eradicated!"). (Los Angeles Times, 11/13/89)
  
- \* On November 12th, soldiers of the CITFA (Instruction Center of the Armed Forces) arrested Norma Guirola de Herrera, 42, Mario Galvez and three other people from the Santa Maria neighborhood of San Marcos where they were attempting to put together a community health committee to cope with civilian casualties. All five were taken to the Zapote barracks where they were held, interrogated and killed. Norma Guirola de Herrera was the director of a women's institute which in April 1989 had inaugurated a legal center for Salvadoran women. (Americas Watch Committee report, 11/24/89, pages 28-29) (Below, report will be cited as AWC).

November 13th, 14th and 15th:

- \* On November 13th, soldiers enter the Catholic parish Santa Maria de los Pobres in Soyapango, spraying bullets at the feet of lay workers who were attending homeless who had taken shelter in the church (AWC, page 43). Also on the 13th, U.S. new photographer, Jeremy Bigwood, wearing army-issued press ID, was struck, detained and interrogated for two hours by agents of the National Police and Treadury Police (AWC, page 45).

(continued on reverse)

- \* On November 14th, government troops enter the campus of the Central American University (UCA) and raid the pastoral center and private rooms of the six Jesuit priests who will later be murdered on November 16th, "searching papers, books and personal belongings." (Washington Post, 11/18/89)
- \* Also on November 14th, U.S. citizen and Lutheran pastor William Dexheimer receives death threats at his parish in Ciudad Credisa in Soyapango neighborhood. He leaves the country on the 17th. (Los Angeles Times, 11/20/89) At the same parish, Fr. James Barnett, a Catholic priest from Sioux Falls, SD, receives telephoned death threats. Fr. Barnett leaves the country on the 19th. (LAT, 11/20/89)
- \* Americas Watch Committee reports that, on November 14th, U.S. free lance journalist Ms. Sandy Smith, received two threatening phone calls at her home, the first saying: "You have 24 hours to leave the country or you can kiss your family good-bye." (AWC, page 45) The same day, Treasury Police search the office of the Centro de Comunicaciones, a general headquarters for many free-lance journalists in San Salvador. They confiscate videotapes, papers, files and photos of the journalists. (AWC, page 46)

November 15th:

- \* On the morning of November 15th, soldiers search the offices of Catholic Relief Services (AWC, page 38). In the evening, soldiers surround the Lutheran Church of El Salvador and tell people standing outside the church they want "the subversive refugee centers closed." (AWC, p. 38). Soldiers search the Catholic Hospital of Divina Providencia, and food and medicine that the Catholic Archdiocese was trying to deliver to the Cristo Salvador parish in the Zacamil neighborhood is confiscated by the army; a priest and a lay worker are briefly detained. (AWC, page 43)
- \* The Salvadoran army raids the refugee center in San Roque Church demanding that all refugees leave the premises. This church is raided again on November 20th. (New York Times, 11/21/89) Soldiers return to the parish Santa Maria de los Pobres (see Nov. 13th) and demand the refugees be removed from the parish. (Christian Science Monitor, 11/22/89)
- \* The office of CONAMUS (women's organization) is raided. The National Police raid the office of COMADRES (mothers of the disappeared and political prisoners) and arrest seven Salvadorans and two U.S. citizens. (AWC, p. 36)

CHRONOLOGY OF THREATS AND THREATENING EVENTS: NOVEMBER 16TH THRU NOVEMBER 19TH

November 16th:

- \* At approximately 2:30 AM, some thirty heavily armed and uniformed soldiers enter the rectory on the grounds of the Central American University (UCA) and murder six Jesuit priests, their cook and her 15-year-old daughter. (Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, New York Times, 11/17/89)
- \* Gregorio Rosa Chavez, the auxiliary bishop of San Salvador, told a press conference that just hours after the bodies of the priests were discovered, he heard military personnel gloating over the deaths of the six priests: "Ignacio Ellacuria and Ignacio Martin-Baro have already fallen and we'll continue murdering communists." The chant came from a loudspeaker on a vehicle that drove near the Catholic church headquarters. The announcers claimed to be from the Army's First Brigade. (Washington Post, 11/18/89) Anonymous death threat is phoned into the Catholic Archbishop's office: "Tell those priests we will come for them." (AWC, page 39)
- \* Uniformed National Guard troops seize twelve foreign churchworkers, including four U.S. citizens, working with the Lutheran Church. A block and a half away, the National Police ransack their offices. (AWC, p.39) The National Guard arrests Salvador Ibarra, attorney for the Lutheran Church's human rights office, when he accompanies the churchworkers to National Guard headquarters in order to represent them. Even under a state of siege, appearing as counsel for detainees is not a crime. (AWC, p. 40)
- \* Soldiers return to the parish Santa Maria de los Pobres and shut down the refugee center, leaving 200-300 refugees without shelter or protection. "Troops threw a grenade into the parish house, injuring one American and forcing 200 refugees to evacuate. . ." (Christian Science Monitor, 11/22/89)
- \* The Salvadoran army raids and searches the refugee center at the Church of the Sacred Family. They return the next day for another raid, demanding all who shelter there leave. (AWC, p. 72)
- \* Treasury Police raid the UNTS (coalition of unions and popular organizations) offices, confiscating "medicine, a megaphone, a mimeograph machine, paint, paper and a large quantity of documentation." (Diario de Hoy, 11/17/89) Treasury Police detain Lawrence Ross, a U.S. journalist with the Pacific Sun, a northern California daily. (AWC, p. 46)

November 17th:

- \* Another office of the Popular Social Christian Movement is raided (the first occurred on November 15th). The MPSC is the party of Ruben Zamora and part of the Democratic Convergence. This time all furniture, files and materials are confiscated. (AWC, p. 47)
- \* Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, confirms that death threats against left-of-center politicians and religious leaders are being broadcast over government-controlled radio. He further reveals that he'd sent a telegram to President Cristiani on Tuesday, November 14th, requesting Cristiani to halt and condemn these denunciations. The threats continue on the radio at least through November 21st.

(continued on reverse)

- \* The offices of the Emmanuel Baptist Church and of CESE, its relief agency, are searched by soldiers arriving in a tank and a truck. In previous days, the homes of Baptist lay workers have been searched. (AWC, p. 44)

November 18th:

- \* In a personal letter to Pope John Paul II, written on government stationery, Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo Colorado said the [Catholic] bishops should be withdrawn for their own good (see "quotes" pp 1-2). (Miami Herald, 11/19/89)
- \* Col. Francisco Elena Fuentes, commander of the First Brigade in San Salvador, orders that neither the Red Cross nor any other humanitarian organization can be allowed into the neighborhood of Mejicanos. Press are also barred. (Washington Post, 11/19/89)
- \* The parish house of the Cristo Salvador Catholic Church in Zacamil is found ransacked, with religious images shot at, chalice and hosts scattered on the floor. The area had been under military control for days. (AWC, p. 44)

November 19th:

- \* Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo Colorado holds a press conference to further explain his concerns regarding the Catholic bishops and his letter to the pontiff. His press conference is scheduled at the same time as the funeral for the six murdered Jesuit priests. "Colorado, who as attorney general is responsible for the investigation of the Jesuit murders, also said he blamed the leftist FMLN in advance for 'any nefarious act' that might take place against the bishops, and said the guerrillas had a plan to inflict 'pain and suffering' on the nation by killing top church officials." (Washington Post, 11/20/89) At his press conference, Colorado went even further "saying the bishops [Rivera y Damas and Rosa Chavez] have contacts with the FMLN." (Christian Science Monitor, 11/22/89) (also, see "quotes", page 2)
- \* Army soldiers arrest 5 health workers at a Catholic health clinic in the church of San Francisco de Asis in the neighborhood of Mejicanos. Soldiers call the center a "guerrilla clinic." (AWC, p. 44) National Guard troops seize two Salvadoran Episcopal churchworkers, Juan Antonio Berty Quinonez and Francisco de Paz, from Berty's house. Mr. Berty is assistant director of CREDHO, the social service program of the Episcopal Church. Later that same day, his wife, Ana Berty Quinonez, is also arrested. (AWC, p. 42)
- \* Relief officials "accused the government of using ambulances and other vehicles with medical markings to carry weapons. . ." (New York Times, 11/19/89)
- \* Joe Gannon, a U.S. citizen and reporter for the Canadian magazine, McLeans, and a contributor to the Christian Science Monitor, is arrested by the Air Force security forces in Soyapango. Detained for 14 hours, he is transferred to the Belloso Battalion, the National Police and, finally, to the Treasury Policy. (AWC, p. 46; and Washington Post, 11/21/89)
- \* National Police enter the Social Security Hospital, Primero de Mayo, and arrest eleven health workers: 5 STISS union members (including the vice-president), 3 nurses and 3 others. The hospital is militarized. (church and union sources in El Salvador)



CHRONOLOGY OF THREATS AND THREATENING EVENTS: WEEK OF NOVEMBER 20TH

November 20th:

- \* National Police enter the Camino Real Hotel and search the room of Joe Gannon (see Nov. 19th) and CBS Radio reporter Scott Wallace. In their presence, the police search Gannon's bag, look in his phone/address book and leave when TV cameras arrive. (Washington Post, 11/21/89; AWC, p. 46)
- \* National Guard arrest ten Salvadoran Episcopal churchworkers at St. John the Evangelist Church, including Randolpho Campos, an attorney for the church. "The soldiers asked for church officials by name, seized layworkers and ransacked files." (New York Times, 11/21/89) National Guard arrest the pastor of St. John the Evangelist Church, the Rev. Luis Serrano Lorente, at a friend's house where he'd been staying. (AWC, p. 44) National Guard seize six foreign relief workers of the Episcopal Church, including one U.S. citizen, Josephine Beecher. (Miami Herald, 11/21/89)
- \* Troops from the Third Brigade stationed in San Miguel are searching houses of all offices and organizations in the city of San Miguel. In San Salvador, the office of the Association of Salvadoran Health Care Workers is ransacked. (El Mundo, 11/20/89)
- \* Col. Elena Fuentes of the First Brigade in San Salvador states that the National University will be closed "at least until next year. . . No one will be allowed access to the premises until the leadership of the University changes. . ." (TV 6, San Salvador)

November 21st, 22nd and 23rd:

- \* For the past ten days, "government-prepared national broadcasts included phone calls by people who denounced the international press. But in a meeting with members of the foreign press, President Cristiani promised an end to those messages." (Baltimore Sun, 11/24/89)
- \* On November 22nd, Al Día, the evening news program of TV Channel 12, leaves the air because it cannot do objective, independent news reporting under the current censorship. Narciso Castillo, director of Al Día, said he had been banned from broadcasting statements by the bishops of the Catholic Church, leaders of the Christian Democrats and even ARENA party member, Roberto D'Aubuisson. (Washington Post, 11/24/89)
- \* Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez has reportedly been forced into hiding by death threats. (New York Times, 11/22/89) On November 21st, the offices of the Lutheran Church and the Mennonite Central Committee are ransacked by the military, confiscating all church property and personal belongings. The military also surround the church of El Calvario and prevent anyone from entering or leaving. (AWC, p. 72)
- \* On November 22nd, ARENA party leader Col. Sigifredo Ochoa Perez calls Christian Democrat leaders "servile to marxists" because the PDC will not join in a resolution to form a commission in support of the government and armed forces. (Diario de Hoy, 11/22/89) That same day, San Salvador Mayor Armando Calderon Sol, president of the ARENA party, accuses the Christian Democrats of "high treason" for calling for an end to the curfew. (AWC, p. 48)

(continued on reverse)

November 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th:

- \* On November 23rd, the Red Cross reports to union sources in El Salvador that it has a list of 100 detained trade unionists. Most union offices in San Salvador have been raided, materials confiscated and files containing complete lists of union memberships are missing. (union sources in San Salvador and in the U.S.)
- \* On November 23rd, by a vote of 45-to-0, with all Christian Democrat legislators abstaining, the ARENA-controlled National Assembly approved "penal code reform" legislation, "severely limiting civil rights, including freedom of the press, free speech and freedom of assembly." (Washington Post, 11/24/89) (Baltimore Sun, 11/24/89) (AWC, p. 11)
- \* On November 25th, Diario de Hoy runs a lengthy article on the military situation and quotes extensively from a "high military official:" "Enough of the Christian Democrats, the famous churches allied with the terrorism and with socialist governments. . . They are all clamoring for a cease-fire and negotiations. . . To accept a cease-fire would be treason, would perpetuate the destruction, massacres and misery of the population."
- \* Attorney General Mauricio Eduardo Colorado says there is "no indication as to whether (the murders of the Jesuits) were caused by the army, terrorists or private persons." (El Mundo, 11/25/89)
- \* The home of presidential candidate Guillermo Ungo is raided by the military. (Reported on Cable News Network, El Salvador, 11/26/89). Since the beginning of the offensive, CNN/El Salvador has had its broadcasts frequently interrupted or pulled off the air due to censorship.

CHRONOLOGY OF THREATS AND THREATENING EVENTS: WEEK OF NOVEMBER 27TH

November 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th:

- \* Diario de Hoy prints a number of "confessions" it obtained from the Salvadoran military of "captured terrorists" who denounce unions, church groups and political parties as "supporters of the FMLN." The article describes the Permanent Committee of the National Debate for Peace in El Salvador (a pro-negotiations coalition initiated by the Catholic Church in 1988) as "organized by priests of the Archdiocese and only sectors linked to the marxist left participated." (Diario de Hoy, 11/27/89)
- \* On November 27th, according to church sources in El Salvador, the military search the Lutheran guest house, looking for and making threatening remarks about Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez. On November 28th, Emmanuel Baptist Church is searched for the fourth time.
- \* The Director of Immigration says controls on foreigners have been increased and admits to the existence of a book listing undesirable foreigners. (Diario Latino, 11/27/89)
- \* On November 29th, National Police raid the office of the Council of Marginal Communities. Twelve adults and two children are detained. (Church sources in El Salvador)
- \* On November 29th, Col. Emilio Ponce, Army Chief of Staff, accuses the FMLN of arming repatriated refugees. (Radio Candena Nacional, 11/29/89)
- \* On November 28th, the InterAmerican Press Society, representing 1300 publications in the hemisphere, condemns restrictions on the media and harassment or pressure against Salvadoran press of Radio Sonora, El Mundo, Diario Latino, Teleprensa and TV Channel 12; as well as against international press Agence-France, Reuters, Washington Post, Chicago Sun-times, Sygma, Univision and Cable News Network/CNN.
- \* The National Democratic Union (UDN), a left-of-center political coalition headed by Aronette Diaz, denounces the captures of two of its members, Rafael Argueta and Antonio Valle, as they were entering the UDN office on November 28th. The UDN offices were searched by military personnel the same day. (El Mundo, 11/30/89)

December 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th:

- \* The National Guard accuse Rev. Luis Serrano and eight other Episcopalians (see Nov. 20th) of responsibility for the October 30th FMLN attack against the High Command (Estadio Mayor). The National Guard charges that the two trucks used in the attack were constructed and outfitted in the offices of CREDHO, the Episcopalian Church relief agency. The report also names Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez, Catholic priest Octavio Cruz and Baptist pastor Pedro Morataya as possible co-conspirators. (TV Channel 2, El Salvador, 12/1/89) Later in the day, Col. Juan Carlos Schlenker, Commander of the National Guard, includes in the subversion charges Episcopalian lawyer Rodolfo Campos and the head of CREDHO, Berty Quinonez (see Nov. 20th). Col. Schlenker also accuses DIACONIA, the ecumenical funding agency of the churches, of working out of the CREDHO office and "channelling aid" to the guerrillas. (El Mundo, 12/1/89)

(continued on reverse)

- \* On December 1st, the director of the U.N. Development Project, Gonzalo Perez del Castillo, formally announces the evacuation of all personnel to Guatemala "to await instructions from the Secretary-General." Perez del Castillo says the army entered the office as all personnel were evacuated and ransacked the premises. (TV Channel 12, San Salvador, 12/1/89)
  
- \* At a press conference held on December 2nd, President Cristiani denies any religious persecution in the country, but says "many pastors and clergy have been serving the guerrillas and have been captured." (La Prensa Grafica, 12/4/89)

SUPPLEMENT ONE: ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS FOR THE FEBRUARY 8, 1990, HEARING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE BERNARD ARONSON

On January 24th, testifying before Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson stated: "Every year in which we've been engaged with El Salvador, political violence has gone down. That doesn't mean political violence is acceptable, but I think our money has changed something."

FACT: Throughout 1988 and 1989 the human rights situation in El Salvador deteriorated significantly, according to Amnesty International, the Americas Watch Committee and the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations (published report October 26, 1989)

FACT: Torture by the Salvadoran Armed Forces was again on the rise, according to both the U.N. Special Representative (10/26/89, paragraphs 61-63) and the Americas Watch Committee (10/18/89, Special Memorandum to House-Senate Conferees on FY 90 Foreign Aid Appropriations: Torture by Salvadoran Security Forces).

FACT: On the very day, November 6th, Assistant Secretary Aronson was meeting with labor and political activists in San Salvador, following the bombing of the FENASTRAS trade union headquarters, killing nine, the bodies of nine other people were being found in Sonsonate, three of whom were members of Ruben Zamora's party, the Popular Social Christian Movement. These deaths and bombings followed hard on the heels of other murders and "disappearances," especially in the labor movement, and the bombings of the Lutheran Church's property, and the homes of Ruben Zamora and his sister-in-law, Aronette Diaz.

FACT: Political violence against civilians by the FMLN also increased in 1988, with the assassination of 12 mayors, and in 1989, with the murders of ten prominent civilians and one military officer. Mr. Aronson's testimony covers these cases in detail.

On January 24th, testifying before Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson stated: "The point I'm making is that the FMLN launched their final offensive not because they thought things were getting worse in El Salvador, but because they feared that over an evolutionary period things were getting better. . ."

\*\*\* "The human rights situation in El Salvador has worsened markedly in 1989, with murders by government and left-wing forces continuing and torture in jails becoming a frequent practice, a U.N. study issued today concluded. Hundreds of people have been executed in the past year by Salvadoran troops, right-wing death squads and guerrillas. . . Hundreds -- perhaps thousands -- more have been arrested for political reasons, with scores reported missing after their arrests, it said." ("El Salvador's Rights Picture Growing Worse, U.N. Says," Washington Post, 11/18/89)

\*\*\* "Unknown assailants exploded a powerful bomb yesterday in the house of the opposition leader, Ruben Zamora, and threw

(CONTINUED)

three hand grenades at the nearby house of another prominent left-leaning politician, wounding two guards and leaving extensive damage. Another bomb exploded in a building belonging to the Lutheran Church. . . Diplomats and politicians said they feared that the attacks could be rightists retaliation for assaults and the beginning of an escalation in the political violence that has wracked the country for the past decade." ("Houses of 2 leftist opposition leaders are attacked in San Salvador," Boston Globe, 10/20/89)

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"Three members of Ruben Zamora's small Popular Social Christian Movement were found dead in the Salvadoran city of Sonsonate today after having been picked up by heavily armed men in civilian dress Monday night. . . Their bodies, with M-16 bullet wounds, were found dumped near a cemetery. . . [S]tatements by witnesses charged that the kidnapers were soldiers of the 6th Military Detachment based in Sonsonate." ("3 Salvadoran Politicians Found Dead," Washington Post, 11/8/89)

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"The Salvadoran military has conducted a nationwide campaign of killings, harassment and torture against doctors and health care workers and attacked guerrilla field hospitals in violation of the Geneva convention . . ." ("Salvador's Armed Forces Accused by a Medical Team from the U.S.," New York Times, 10/19/89)

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"Despite assurances by President Alfredo Cristiani that human rights are being respected, diplomats and human rights groups say torture by the Salvadoran police and military is on the rise. . . An official of the government's Human Rights Commission privately says that 'torture is the biggest problem we have with the armed forces.' . . . Electric shocks and the capucha - a hood that can be used for suffocation - were used on some of 61 members of the Fenastras union arrested Sept. 18. Several rapes and beatings were also reported. Union and student leaders have also reported arrests, beatings and torture at the hands of police and security forces in the last few months." ("Torture on Rise in Salvador," Christian Science Monitor, 10/18/89)

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"Both ARENA and the Salvadoran Army have taken swipes at the church, accusing some of its members of siding with the guerrillas and calling into question the church's loyalty.

"Several new death squads have recently emerged. . . and announced plans to target progressive church and human rights groups and other popular organizations. . .

"More significant, the army press office has accused the respected archbishop's human rights office, Tutela Legal, of being a guerrilla front.

"Clerics working with the rural poor or refugees in conflict zones are often open to suspicion and army harassment. Americas Watch cites a number of attacks against church-administered relief programs in such areas."

("Salvadoran Church, State Tensions Rise," Washington Post, June 24, 1989)

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"Trade Unions Targetted: Specter of Terror in El Salvador, Political Violence rises, mainly against less prominent unionists" Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 1989.

On January 24th, testifying before Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson stated: "If you talk to most Salvadorans, whether they are left of center, right of center, or center, or apolitical, they are not urging us to suspend aid right now. . . . What they want us to do, and what I think the Committee wants us to do is to vigorously and energetically use that aid as a lever to advance human rights and the rule of law in negotiations. And I think we need to do that and it doesn't hurt to get pressure." [Mr. Aronson spoke against specific ideas to cut, suspend or condition the aid.]

\*\*\* "Salvadoran Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas said Tuesday he supports demands that the U.S. government condition aid to El Salvador on the improvement of human rights, including prosecution of the killers of six Jesuit priests last month. Setting conditions for U.S. aid -- a move supported by some church groups and liberals -- 'would be beneficial for all', he said [in a meeting with Miami Herald editors]. But he added that U.S. conditions should be focused on widespread human rights abuses and not just the Nov. 16 murders of the priests." ("Salvador Archbishop Decries Rights Abuses," Miami Herald, 12/6/89)

\*\*\* "All aid that comes to the country must be destined for development, not for the continuation of the war."  
-- Bishop Rosa Chavez, January 28, 1990  
Sunday homily, San Salvador

\*\*\* "A year ago while testifying before this very Committee [House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs], I presented a proposal to link automatic percentage cuts to military aid if negotiations were not opened. Today, the situation in El Salvador is so serious that, in my opinion, percentage cuts ought to be applied immediately and be contingent not only upon the initiation of serious negotiations, but also upon their progress."  
-- Ruben Zamora, Secretary General, Popular Social Christian Movement of El Salvador  
February 6, 1990, Washington, D.C.

\*\*\* "We reached a consensus on November 11th. More than 100 social forces [i.e. groups affiliated with the National Debate for Peace in El Salvador] and four political parties [i.e. the Christian Democrats, the Popular Social Christian Movement, the Social Democrats and the National Revolutionary Movement/MNR] requested that the governments of the world which militarily support the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN suspend their aid. We want no more weapons in the hands of Salvadorans to kill other Salvadorans."  
-- The Rev. Edgar Palacios, General Coordinator, Permanent Committee of the National Debate for Peace in El Salvador  
February 6, 1990, Washington, D.C.

On January 24th, testifying before Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson stated: "I don't want to sound glib because there is a burden on the Salvadoran military based on the past, which I don't want to ignore, but this is a very dirty war in El Salvador. . . And that doesn't excuse anything. That doesn't give them [the armed forces] license. I'm trying to say the atmosphere in which this war is being conducted -- I don't think that it indicts the armed forces if a unit committed an atrocity. We had units in our armed forces commit atrocities in another war in which you didn't know who the enemy was, in which people were afraid. It happened in Vietnam on many occasions. It seems to me the testis, is this the norm, is it tolerated and is it investigated? I don't think it's the norm; I don't think it's tolerated."

\*\*\* "Based on interviews with church workers and refugees during the offensive, some common themes emerge: the Salvadoran Armed Forces blame the church for the recent FMLN offensive; believe that the churches are harboring combatants and wounded combatants, and are storing weapons, food and medicine destined for the guerrillas; believe that if the church had 'stuck to the Bible,' to quote an officer who raided one San Salvador parish, the FMLN would never have existed; and finally, that El Salvador's civil war would never have occurred if it were not for the presence of foreigners working for the churches and other humanitarian agencies."

-- Martha Doggett, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights  
Congressional testimony; January 31, 1990

\*\*\* "[Our orders were] to locate some priests who were inside the UCA, because they were the ringleaders of the delinquent terrorists, who they helped with everything, be it logistics, transmissions, planning attacks on military installations and the civilian population."

--Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas, Statement before San Salvador's Fourth Penal Court, 3:45 PM, January 18, 1990, regarding the November 16th murders of the Jesuit priests

\*\*\* "Army soldiers who searched the Lutheran Guest House in Colonia El Refugio on November 27th, told the housekeeper, whom they interrogated for nearly an hour, that Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez 'was the principal person responsible for [the FMLN offensive] because he had incited the people to violence."

--Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Congressional testimony, January 31, 1990

\*\*\* On April 19, 1989, following the assassination of the Attorney General, Col. Juan Orlando Zepeda, the commander of the First Brigade and currently the Vice-Minister of Defense, publicly accused the Jesuit Central American University of "planning strategies of the FMLN, being a refuge and a haven for terrorist leaders, and being accomplices in the April 19th assassination of the Attorney General." These remarks were reprinted in all the Salvadoran dailies on 4/20/89. -

\*\*\* Beginning on June 10, 1989, in El Mundo, COPREFA (the Salvadoran armed forces press office) ran a series of ads in the Salvadoran papers accusing UNADES (the National Union of Earthquake Victims), FENASTRAS (a trade union confederation which was bombed 10/31/89) and the UNTS (a coalition of labor and community groups) of being guerrilla fronts, often running pictures of these groups' leadership.



\*\*\* At the Salvadoran international airport there is a booth which gives out free posters listing different labor and community organizing groups as FMLN front groups and "enemies of the people." The booth is run by a government agency ostensibly charged with protecting human rights.

\*\*\* "Army chief of staff, Col. Rene Emilio Ponce, said during a press conference, 'Tutela Legal is completely inclined to record those actions that are in favor of the FMLN. . . when there are human rights violations that are not by members of the armed forces, well, no one declares them.'  
("Salvadoran Church, State Tensions Rise," Washington Post, June 24, 1989)

\*\*\* "There is no persecution of the church," said Col Rene Emilio Ponce, the armed forces chief of staff. "There's persecution of subversive terrorists. Unfortunately, some of them hide in the skirts of the religious workers."  
("Agencies Targeted by Salvador Army," New York Times, 12/8/89)

FACT: The November - December crackdown against religious, humanitarian, labor, community and political organizations was carried out by all branches of the Salvadoran armed forces, including the Army, the First Brigade, the National Guard, the National Police, the Treasury Police, the training academy and other security forces.

Indeed, on January 24, 1990, the Treasury Police arrested three Baptist lay workers as they were leaving Bible study class at the Emmanuel Baptist Church. They were released, after interrogation, several days later. (Americas Watch Committee)

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SUGGESTED QUESTIONS AND TALKING POINTS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE BERNARD ARONSON FOR FEBRUARY 8, 1990, SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

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A. The November-December Crackdown Against the Churches, Unions, Humanitarian Agencies, Opposition Political Parties and Community Organizing Groups

- 1) According to reports in the February 4th Baltimore Sun and the February 6th Washington Post, a meeting of thirty Salvadoran officers took place the evening of November 15th, just hours before the murders of the six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter. Besides Chief of Staff Col. Rene Emilio Ponce, Commander of the Air Force Col. Juan Rafael Bustillo and Col. Guillermo Alfredo Benavides, who else was at that meeting on November 15th?
- 2) The purpose of this November 15th meeting was to discuss how to respond to the urban guerrilla offensive underway. Besides military tactics, news reports indicate the assassination of guerrilla leaders, elimination of rebel command posts and their "front groups" was a part of this tactical discussion. In relation to these so-called "front groups" -- which in the language of the Salvadoran military includes churches, humanitarian agencies, opposition political parties, trade unions, human rights monitors and community organizing groups which work with marginal communities, earth quake victims and the displaced -- what was discussed regarding the Salvadoran military and security forces approach to these groups during the offensive? If you don't know, what are you doing to find out about the nature of this part of the discussion?
- 3) How would you, Secretary Aronson, characterize the average Salvadoran officer's or rank-and-file uniformed military's attitude towards the churches and popular organizations?

Sunday, February 4th homily by Archbishop Rivera y Damas: "Is there or is there not persecution of the Church?" [He then cites the attitude of soldiers toward churchworkers and catechists at military checkpoints. . .] "They are scorned, sometimes treated violently, interrogated and taken prisoner. . . . They [the soldiers] have been taught this hostility by their superiors. It reflects a lack of understanding about the role of the Church. . . It is clear that errors can be made, but the greatest error would be to appear indifferent [to these abuses and attitudes]."

Do you agree with Archbishop Rivera y Damas that the Salvadoran military's attitude remains hostile to the Church? To the Church which aligns itself with the poor? Is not this attitude throughout the institutional military, an attitude taught to new recruits and nurtured in young officers, one of the major obstacles to respect for human rights in El Salvador? Is this not the attitude which led to the murders of the Jesuits? The crackdown against the churches and popular groups in December and November? An attitude which has remained virtually intact throughout the past decade, despite billions of U.S. dollars for training and advice?

- 4) On January 24th, Mr. Aronson, you testified before the House that: "The vast majority of church people and humanitarian workers in El Salvador over the last six weeks starting with the final offensive have said nothing has hap-

(continued)

pened to them -- they've gone about their daily work and they haven't been bothered." Do you still stand by that statement?

The week of January 22nd, my colleague, Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and Cong. Les AuCoin (D-OR) circulated a report, prepared by Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief, which cited 102 instances of hostile acts taken against the churches in El Salvador by the uniformed military and security forces -- including murder, torture, beatings, detentions, death threats, destruction of personal and church property, raids, searches and continual harassment.

So, would your response regarding repression against the churches remain the same if we defined those churches as those involved in health and education programs; those who criticize or make demands on the government in support of a negotiated settlement to the war; those who seek to empower the poor; and those who work with refugee, repatriated, repopulated or displaced communities? Would you not agree that those religious and humanitarian agencies were harshly repressed in November and December? Would you not also agree, then, that such a conclusion is even more ominous because it implies a sector, a significant sector, of the churches was TARGETTED, was SELECTED, for these acts of repression?

- 5) Do you believe that there might be some correlation between the officers meeting the night of November 15th, that part of the discussion at that meeting which discussed so-called "front groups", and the subsequent crackdown which took place in the following five weeks against the churches, unions, popular organizations and political parties? A crackdown which employed units from every single branch of the Salvadoran military, including the Army, the National Guard, the National Police, the Treasury Police, the First Brigade, the security forces of the Air Force, the training academy and military detachments assigned to the capital during the offensive? Does this not imply either an order or an authorized understanding to crack down on these types of civilian groups?
- 6) We know that there is an intensive investigation into the case of the Jesuits murders. We also know that President Cristiani apologized to the United Nations for the ransacking and defacement of its offices in El Salvador. Has any other unit of the Salvadoran military or security forces been reprimanded for their activities in carrying out the crackdown on religious, labor or other political groups? Has any one in the military been reprimanded for permitting the types of threats aired on the military-controlled radio between November 12th and November 22nd?
- 7) Last week, President Cristiani gave his personal assurances, both to Members of Congress and to U.S. religious leaders, that the extraordinary pressures brought against the churches and humanitarian agencies will end. He said that the government will establish an Office of Religious Affairs to serve as a liaison with the Salvadoran religious and humanitarian groups. We welcome these assurances and will be watching the effectiveness of the new liaison office.

Has the U.S. government received similar assurances from:

- Col. Juan Orlando Zepeda, Vice-Minister of Defense?
- Col. Inocente Orlando Montano, Vice Minister of Security?
- Col. Francisco Elena Fuentes, Commander of the First Brigade?
- Col. Mauricio Vargas, Commander of the Third Brigade?
- Col. Juan Carlos Carrillo Schlenker, Commander of the National Guard?
- Col. Carlos Mauricio Guzman Aguilar, Commander of the National Police?

- Col. Hector Heriberto Hernandez, the head of the Treasury Police who was just transferred February 1st to command the 6th Brigade?
- Col. Ciro Lopez Roque, now the current head of the Treasury Police, who was transferred to that post on February 1st from his command of the 4th Brigade?
- or Col. Roberto Mauricio Staben, Commander of the 7th Military Attachment at Ahuachapan?

(all the above named officers are members of the Tandonia)

Given our previous questions regarding the hostile attitude of the military towards the churches and popular organizations, is it also advisable to get the personal assurances of these men, and other officers, to protect rather than harass the organizations and their leaders?

Prepared by Cindy M. Buhl  
Legislative Director  
Pax Americas  
2/7/90

1. MEMBERS OF A MILITARY HONOR TRIBUNAL:

--GENERAL RAFAEL VILLAMARIONA, AIR FORCE COMMANDER

--COL. DIONISIO MACHUCA, NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR

--UNKNOWN MAJOR.

--CAPTAIN MANUEL GRIJALVA, PRESIDENTIAL HOUSE

--LTC. JUAN EGUIZABAL, EMC

KEY ESAF PERSONNEL ROSTER

JULY 1989

(C/NP)

KEY E S A F PERSONNEL ROSTER

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES

POSITION/UNIT	TELEPHONE	RANK/NAME
MINISTER	23-0233 98-0033	GEN RAFAEL HUMBERTO ((LARIOS)) LOPEZ (St. Cañada)
SECRETARY GENERAL	23-0233	<del>COL CARLOS ANGEL ((AVILES))</del> Brito 24-6280
VICE-MINISTER-DEFENSE	23-0233	COL JUAN ORLANDO ((ZEPEDA)) Castro Chovy
VICE-MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY	23-0233/4690	COL INOCENTE ORLANDO ((MONTANO)) -> 71-5544 ↳ Anita. Escalante
D-I		COL ROBERTO ((MONGE)) RUIZ
D-II		COL GUSTAVO ATILIO ((HERNANDEZ))
D-III		MAJ OSCAR ARMANDO ((ANAYA)) DE PAZ
D-IV		COL JOSE ROBERTO ((LOPEZ)) OLIVARES
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF		COL JOSE CIRO ((MELGAR)) BATRES
ASSISTANT		

1 - ADMIN; II - INTEL; III - OPERATIONS; IV - LOGISTICS; V - PSYOPS



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 JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMC)  
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IN ADDITION TO TELEPHONE NUMBERS GIVEN, PERSONNEL CAN BE REACHED THROUGH THE MAIN TELEPHONE NUMBER - 23-7166.

CHIEF	24-1599/0880	COL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE))	<i>Fte. Gonzalez 24-159</i>
VICE-CHIEF	24-4965	COL GILBERTO ((RUBIO))	
CHIEF, C-I	24-4882	<del>COL NELSON IVAN ((LOPEZ))</del>	<i>- Stef</i>
C-I OFFICERS		COL RAFAEL ANTONIO ((HERERRA))	
		LTC SERGIO FRANCISCO ((GONZALEZ))	AGUILAR
		LTC ELBELMORE ((ANAYA))	MEJIA
		MAJ JOSE SALVADOR ((PALOMEKE))	MORENO
CHIEF, C-II	23-7166/24-6682	COL IVAN REYNALDO ((DIAZ))	
C-II OFFICERS		MAJ JUAN VICENTE ((EQUIZABAL))	FIGUEROA
		COL ELISEO ((LOPEZ))	ABARCA ((ATTACHE LIAISON))
	24-6944	MAJ RENE GUILLERMO ((CONTRERAS))	BARRERA
CHIEF, C-III	24-4948	<del>COL JOAQUIN ARNOLDO ((CERNA))</del>	<i>FLORES (and to ANOTEK)</i>
		<i>COL ROMAN BARRERA</i>	
C-III OFFICERS		COL SALVADOR BALTAZAR ((CASTRO))	ALVARADO
		MAJ MIGUEL FRANCISCO ((BENNET))	ESCOBAR
		MAJ BENJAMIN AUGUSTO ((SOLER))	ECHEVERRIA
MILGP/EMC (DORIS)	24-5311		
	24-5725		

JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMC) CONTINUED

CHIEF, C-IV

23-5653

COL FRANCISCO RAUL ARTURO ((LOPEZ))

C-IV OFFICERS

COL GUSTAVO ((RIVAS)) RODRIGUEZ  
LTC OSCAR EDGARDO ((VELASQUEZ)) RIVERA  
MAJ JORGE ALBERTO ((MONTALVO)) REYES  
MAJ JOSE ANTONIO ((BONILLA)) SALAVERRIA  
(SUPPLY OFFICER)  
MAJ JORGE ALBERTO ((MEDINA)) GARAY  
(AMMO INSPECTOR)

CHIEF, C-V

24-4171/4386  
24-4297/4413

*Julio Cesar Apigalva*  
COL ~~CARLOS ARMANDO SREYADOR~~ ((AVILES))  
BUITRAGO

C-V OFFICERS

COL TOMAS REMBERTO ((PINEDA)) RAMIREZ  
LTC SALVADOR ANTONIO ((SOSA)) CARRANZA  
MAJ JULIO CESAR ((PORTILLO)) NAVAS

CHIEF, C-VI

24-5877/7166

~~COL CARLOS ARMANDO SREYADOR~~ *gtf M. L. ...*

BN CDR, MILITARY POLICE, EMC

CPT JOSE ANTONIO ((FAGOAGA)) CRUZ

10021.

PRESIDENTIAL MILITARY STAFF  
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CHIEF	71-5544	COL HECTOR LEONEL ((LOBO)) PEREZ
DEPUTY CHIEF	<del>74-1259</del>	LTC ALFREDO ((GONZALEZ)) TORRES
S-I	71-1651	1LT RAFAEL ANTONIO ((CRUZ)) SANTOS
S-II	<del>74-2625</del>	MAJ MIGUEL FRANCISCO ((BENNET)) ESCOBAR
ASSISTANT S-II	71-1555	1LT DAGOBERTO ((CABRERA)) ARGUETA
S-III		MAJ RAFAEL ALFONSO ((MONTALVO)) GUZMAN
ASSISTANT S-III		1LT VICTOR MANUEL ((SALINAS)) AGUIRRE
S-IV		2LT ROBERTO ((GIRON)) FLORES
ASSISTANT S-IV		CPT JUAN MANUEL ((GRIJALVA)) TORRES
		2LT ISRAEL ALEJANDRO ((NAVAS)) PRESA

## MILITARY ZONES AND BRIGADES

MILITARY ZONE/BRIGADE	TELEPHONE	POSITION	NAME AND RANK
FIRST MILITARY ZONE	25-2588/2565	CDR	COL FRANCISCO ((ELENA)) FUENTES
1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE	26-9021/9242	XO	LTC LEOPOLDO ANTONIO ((HERRERA)) AMAYA
SAN SALVADOR DEPT.		D-1	
	26-6348	D-II	MAJ RAMON ((DIAZ)) HERNANDEZ
	26-6701	D-III	MAJ ALFREDO ALY ((PARKER)) ESTRADA
		D-IV	MAJ HERVER ARNOLDO ((GUARDADO)) JUAREZ
	26-8807	D-V	MAJ RODOLFO EUGENIO ((AGUIAR)) TREJOS
	SAN CARLOS BIAT		1LT JOSE AMILCAR ((ALCANTARA)) DOMINGUEZ
	SORIANO BIAT		CPT JUAN MANUEL ((GRIJALVA)) TORRES
	LIBERTAD BIAT		CPT ERICK ANTONIO ((SAMAYOA)) LEIVA
	CBT SPT BN		CPT MARCOS ANTONIO ((ORELLANA)) MEJIA
SECOND MILITARY ZONE	41-0511/1222	CDR	COL JOSE HUMBERTO ((GOMEZ))
2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE	41-1442/0723	XO	LTC JOSE DOMINGO ((FLORES)) PORTILLO
SANTA ANA DEPT.	41-0200	D-I	MAJ JOSE ANTONIO ((RODRIGUEZ)) MOLINA
		D-II	MAJ JOSE REYNALDO ((AYALA)) RODRIGUEZ
	41-0723	D-III	LTC RIGOBERTO ((HERNANDEZ)) Y HERNANDEZ
		D-IV	CPT JULIO CESAR ((MENDOZA)) RAMOS
		D-V	
			CPT ISRAEL ANTONIO ((RUIZ)) FLORES
			CPT NELSON HUMBERTO ((AREVALO)) DUARTE
			CPT HECTOR ANTONIO ((PORTILLO)) HERNANDEZ
THIRD MILITARY ZONE	61-2644/2293	CDR	COL MAURICIO ERNESTO ((VARGAS))
3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE	61-2524	XO	LTC JOSE EDUARDO ANGEL ((ORELLANA))
SAN MIGUEL DEPT.	61-2840	D-I	MAJ VIRGILIO ((PARADA)) ESCOBAR
	61/2697/2337/	D-II	MAJ HECTOR ANTONIO ((GUTIERREZ)) VELASQUEZ
	2310		
	61-2161.	D-III	MAJ CARLOS CAMILO ((HERNANDEZ))
		D-IV	CPT JOSE GILBERTO ((SALGADO)) ARANA
		D-V	LTC MAURICIO ((VELASQUEZ)) FERRUFINO

MILITARY ZONES AND BRIGADES CONTINUED

61-2432	CUSCATLAN BIAT PONCE BIAT LEON BIAT SEC BN	24-6744 <del>24-6685</del> 24-6988 24-6855 24-6777	CPT MAURICIO ((SOMOZA)) MELENDEZ CPT CESAR RENE FLORENTIN ((REYES)) DHEMING CPT FRANCISCO AMERICO ((CUELLAR)) AGUILAR CPT FABRICIO ANTONIO ((ALFARO)) ABARCA
FOURTH MILITARY ZONE 4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE CHALATENANGO DEPT.	CDR XO D-I D-II D-III D-IV D-V COBRA BIAT AZMITIA BIAT CAYAGUANCA BIAT		COL CIRO ((LOPEZ)) ROQUE LTC MAURICIO ISAAC ((DUKE)) LOZANO MAJ CARLOS ELISEO ((RODRIGUEZ)) MURCIA MAJ VICTOR EFRAIN ((CARTAGENA)) MARTINEZ MAJ GILBERT HENRIQUEZ ((CACERES)) MAJ MARIO ALBERTO ((BURGOS)) MOLINA CPT ANGEL ((FIEGUEROA)) PEREZ CPT LEVYN HERBERT ((ANDRADE)) CRUZ CPT JOSE ERNESTO ((ALAS)) SANZUR CPT MANUEL ANTONIO ((PINEDA)) DURAN
FIFTH MILITARY ZONE 5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE SAN VICENTE DEPT.	CDR XO D-I D-II D-III D-IV D-V JIBOA BIAT TEHUACAN BIAT CANAS BIAT	33-0183/0133 33-0111 33-0171 33-0192 33-0443 33-0415 33-0444	COL JOSE EMILIO ((CHAVEZ)) CACERES LTC JOSE MANUEL ((GARCIA)) PRIETO MAJ ALEJANDRO ((DIAZ)) HERNANDEZ MAJ LUIS ALONSO ((ANAYA)) ALFARO MAJ ALVARO ((RIVERA)) ALEMAN MAJ MAURICIO DE JESUS ((BELTRAN)) GRANADOS MAJ JULIO CESAR ((PORTILLO)) NAVAS CPT FERNANDO RENE ((VILLALTA)) SALINAS CPT MANUEL DE JESUS ((IBARRA)) CARCAMO CPT JUAN JOSE ((BERNAL)) CASTILLO
SIXTH MILITARY ZONE 6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE USULUTAN DEPT.	CDR XO D-I D-II D-III D-IV D-V JUCUARAN BIAT LEMPA BIAT OROMONTIQUE BIAT	62-0444 62-0300 62-0118 62-0200 62-0119/0585 62-6200 62-0499	COL RICARDO ALFONSO ((CASANOVA)) SANDOVAL LTC NICOLAS ((HERNANDEZ)) QUINTANILLA MAJ MARGARITO ((AMAYA)) CHAVARRIA MAJ MARCIAL ((VELA)) RAMOS MAJ DAVID ERNESTO ((NAVAS)) TENORIO CPT MAXIMO ((BLANCO)) LAZO 1LT JOSE ANTONIO ((CANIZALES)) ROMERO CPT MARIO ANTONIO ((MIRANDA)) CPT JORGE ROBERTO ((SALGUERO)) KREITZ CPT EINER VALENTIN ((VILLAFUERTE)) CEDILLOS

MILITARY DETACHMENTS  
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MILITARY DETACHMENT 1  
CHALATENANGO DEPT.

35-2004/2192	CDR	COL JORGE ANTONIO ((MEDRANO)) VILLEDA
35-2185	XO	LTC HERNAN ((MARTINEZ)) COLOCHO
35-2026	S-1	CPT JOSE EUSEBIO ((CORNEJO)) CORDOVA
35-2101	S-2	MAJ CARLOS ANTONIO ((ZALDIVAR)) AGUILAR
	S-3	MAJ LUIS ADOLFO ((ORELLANA)) CISNEROS
	S-4	CPT DOMINGO ORLANDO ((LEAL)) CHACON
	S-5	

SIERPE BIC  
SUCHITLAN BIC  
SUMPUL BIC

1LT CARLOS ERNESTO ((MARCENARO)) VEGA  
CPT JOSE CLEMENTE ((VASQUEZ)) ALVARADO  
1LT DAVID SALOMON ((GARCIA)) GARCIA

MILITARY DETACHMENT 2  
CABANAS DEPT.

32-3027/3338	CDR	COL RENE ARNOLDO ((MAJANO)) ARAUJO
	XO	LTC JOSE ALEJANDRO ((MONTERROSA)) AMAYA
32-3384/3097	S-1	<del>MAJ TOMAS ANTONIO ((CALVO)) ALFARO</del>
32-3144/3238	S-2	MAJ LUIS ALONSO ((AMAYA)) ALFARO
32-3312	S-3	MAJ JUAN BAUTISTA ((ESCOBAR)) PARADA
	S-4	MAJ AGUSTIN ARMANDO ((MORALES)) ARTIGA
	S-5	

CABANAS BIC  
VICTORIA BIC  
JRRRL BIC

CPT OSCAR ALEJANDRO ((ORELLANA)) MARTINEZ  
CPT ROMEO ORLANDO ((MARTINEZ)) MORALES  
CPT JUAN FRANCISCO ((ARBIZU)) CHAVARRIA

MILITARY DETACHMENT 3  
LA UNION DEPT.

64-4122/4047	CDR	<del>LTC JULIO CESAR ((GRIJALVA))</del>
64-4389/4048	XO	LTC ELBELMORE ((AMAYA)) MEJIA
64-4074	S-1	CPT JULIO ORLANDO ((MONGE)) GARCIA
64-4286	S-2	MAJ LEX JOSE ((PARKER)) ESTRADA
64-4063	S-3	MAJ JOSE ROBERTO ((ZAMORA)) HERNANDEZ
	S-4	MAJ FRANCIS ((ALVAREZ)) SILVA
	S-5	1LT JOSE LUIS ((MATHUS)) ESCOBAR

CONCHAGUA BIAT  
FONSECA BIAT  
SEC BN

CPT GILBERTO ((ROBLES)) JIMENEZ  
CPT GINO ROSSANO ((CAPRILE)) CASTILLO  
1LT RAFAEL ANTONIO ((UMANZOR)) MELGAR

*Col Nelson Juan Lopez y Lopez*

MILITARY DETACHMENTS CONTINUED

MILITARY DETACHMENT 4 MORAZAN DEPT.	64-0052/3 64-0015/20 64-0073/89  64-0061	CDR XO S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5  MORAZAN BIAT LENCA BIAT CACAHATIQUE BIAT SEC BN CBT SPT BN	<del>COL</del> <del>ETC</del> HUMBERTO ((CORADO)) FIGUEROA LTC OMAR ARTURO ((VAQUERANO)) QUINTANILLA CPT RENE ABDULIO ((FLORES)) CRUZ MAJ JOSE ANTONIO ((GUZMAN)) BLANCO MAJ ALVARO ANTONIO ((PALOMO)) MAYORGA <del>EPT</del> FRANCISCO ALCIDES RUBI ((SILVA)) <del>MAJ</del> CPT SALVADOR ((MARTINEZ)) ALVARENGA CPT RENE ABDULIO ((FLORES)) CRUZ CPT ALAN BALMORE ((DEL CID)) LEMUS CPT JULIO ARMANDO ((GARCIA)) OLIVA 1LT JORGE ALBERTO ((ROSA)) ROSALES
MILITARY DETACHMENT 5 CUSCATLAN DEPT.	32-0307  32-0329  32-0444 32-0944	CDR XO S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5  TRUENO BIAT RELAMPAGO BIAT	COL <del>ROBERTO PINOBA GUERRA</del> COL FRANCISCO JOSE ((MARTINEZ)) CALDERON COL JOSE MARIO ((GODINES)) CASILLO MAJ SALVADOR ANTONIO ((FIGUEROA)) MENDOZA CPT FRANCISCO LUIS ((SILVA)) AVALOS MAJ VIRGILIO ((PARADA)) ESCOBAR MAJ MARIANO FERNANDO ((HERRERA)) MOLINA MAJ RANCISCO ANTONIO ((VILLACORTA)) GUANDIQ CPT RAFAEL ANTONIO ((MARTINEZ)) PACAS CPT ROMULO EDGARDO ((ROMERO)) GALDAMEZ
MILITARY DETACHMENT 6 SONSONATE DEPT.	51-0444 51-1222	CDR XO S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5  IZALCO BIC JAGUAR BIC	COL JUAN ARMANDO ((RODRIGUEZ)) MENDOZA LTC ANGEL ELISEO ((RAMOS)) ESCALANTE JULIO TRINIDAD ((MARTINEZ)) MAJ AQUILINO ((DIAZ)) HERNANDEZ MAJ FRANCISCO EMILIO ((MENJIVAR)) FIGUEROA MAJ RENE ERNESTO ((SANTACRUZ)) CASTILLO  CPT VICTOR HUGO ((LOPEZ)) MADRID CPT ALFREDO ADOLFO ((DE LEON)) LOPEZ

## MILITARY DETACHMENTS CONTINUED

MILITARY DETACHMENT 7	43-0075	CDR	COL ROBERTO MAURICIO ((STABEN))
AHUACHAPAN DEPT.	43-0111	XO	
	43-0064	S-1	COL RODOLFO ((OLIVA)) CORTES
	43-0300	S-2	CPT RICARDO ARTURO ((TEJADA)) MURCIA
		S-3	MAJ ARMANDO ANIBAL ((RODRIGUEZ)) SANTELIZ
		S-4	CPT JOSE LUIS ((ALVARDO)) GUEVARA
		S-5	1LT JOSE RICARDO ((GALLARDO)) MATA
			CPT JOSE RENE ((MEDINA)) MONTES
			CPT LUIS WALTER ((ESCOBAR)) FERNANDEZ
			PANTERA BIC
			PUMA BIC
MILITARY DETACHMENT - ENGINEERS		CDR	COL RICARDO ANTONIO ((MARTINEZ)) CUELLAR
LA PAZ DEPT.	<del>34-0617</del>	XO	LTC JUAN ERNESTO ((MENDEZ)) RODRIGUEZ
	34-0351	S-1	
		S-2	CPT ERNESTO ((ROLDAN)) MURGA
	34-0172	S-3	MAJ WILFREDO ((ZAVALETA)) CORTEZ
	34-0167	S-4	MAJ JOSE LUIS ANTONIO ((CARCAMO)) CARCAMO
		S-5	
	34-0533		CPT NICOLAS ((PONCE)) PONCE
			CPT ROBERTO ((ARTIGA)) CHICAS
			NONUALCO BIAT



IMMEDIATE REACTION INFANTRY BATTALIONS (BIRI)

ATLACATL BIRI  
SITIO DEL NINO

28-3211  
  
28-4473  
28-3977/3422  
28-3866/4946

CDR  
XO  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4

~~COL~~ OSCAR ALBERTO ((LEON)) LINARES  
LTC RIGOBERTO ((HERNANDEZ)) Y HERNANDEZ  
CPT CESAR AUGUSTO ((MILLA)) FLOR  
CPT JOSE NELSON ((SILVA)) AVALOS  
CPT MANUEL ANTONIO ((MOLINA)) HERNANDEZ  
MAJ JOSE ANTONIO ((CARRANZA)) DE LEON

BELLOSO BIRI  
SAN SALVADOR

27-3011 *27-*  
~~27-0949~~ 3299

CDR  
XO  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4

~~COL~~ ORLANDO ((CARRANZA)) *Henry J. no. B. 10*  
LTC ~~SERGEANT~~ FRANCISCO ~~(CARRANZA))~~ AGUILAR  
CPT HUGO ALFREDO ((SEAVEDRA)) CASTRO  
CPT VICTOR MULATO ((JOYA)) CORTEZ  
CPT CESAR RENE FLORENTIN ((REYES)) DHEMING  
CPT RAFAEL ((SANTIAGO DEL CID)) AGUIRRE

ATONAL BIRI  
USULUTAN

62-0230  
62-0187

CDR  
XO  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4

*P. Cruz*  
LUIS MARIANO ((TURCIOS)) CHEVEZ  
LTC FELIX RANULFO ((RAMIREZ)) GONZALEZ  
CPT JOSE CARLOS ((VIERA)) AMAYA  
1LT LUIS FREDY ((CANALES)) BENITEZ  
CPT CARLOS EDUARDO ((CACERES)) FLORES  
CPT JOSE ROBERTO ((PAZ)) RODRIGUEZ

ARCE BIRI

61-2233  
61-0385  
61-0723  
61-0909

CDR  
XO  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4  
S-5

COL ROBERTO ((TEJADA)) MURCIA  
LTC JUAN CARLOS ((AZCUNAGA)) SANCHEZ  
CPT FELIX ENRIQUE ((AYALA)) MARTINEZ  
CPT VLADIMIR ((IGLESIAS)) QUEZADA  
CPT JULIO CESAR ((ARRIAGA)) APARICIO  
1LT JOSE RENAN ((ORANTES)) JOVEL

BRACAMONTE BIRI

39-9619  
39-9307  
39-9561  
39-9131

CDR  
XO  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4

LTC JUAN EMILIOR ((VELASCO)) ALFARO  
LTC RAFAEL ANTONIO ((LOPEZ)) DAVILA  
1LT MARIO ARNOLDO ((VELASCO)) ALFARO  
CPT RUBEN ALCIDES ((NIETO)) NOVOA  
CPT WILLIAM IGDALI ((MORENO)) SEGOVIA  
1LT SAUL GIL ((URBINA))

INDEPENDENT UNITS

ARTILLERY BRIGADE	28-2022	CDR	<del>COL ROMAN ALFONSO ((BARRERA))</del>
	28-2611	XO	COLTC JOSE ((ALEXANDER)) MENDEZ
	31-3199	D-I	MAJ CESAR ARMANDO ((LOPEZ)) HERRARTE
		D-II	CPT SIMON ALBERTO ((MOLINA)) MONTOYA
		D-III	MAJ JULIO ALBERTO ((PORTILLO)) MANCIA
		D-IV	MAJ ORLANDO ((BORJAS)) RIVAS
		D-V	
CAVALRY REGIMENT	28-2028/2494	CDR	COL CARLOS ROLANDO ((HERRARTE))
SITIO DEL NINO	28-2420	XO	LTC JOSE RODOLFO ((CHAVARRIA)) BUITRAGO
	28-2408	S-1	CPT ARTURO ALFREDO ((FERRUFINO)) DIAZ
	28-4571	S-2	CPT ALEJANDRO ((MARTINEZ)) MEJIA
		S-3	CPT JUAN HORACIO ((MARTINEZ)) MARTINEZ
		S-4	LTC JOSE EFRAIN ((ORELLANA))
		S-5	MAJ JORGE ANTONIO ((DARDANO)) SOSA
LOGISTICS SUPPORT COMMAND	25-2665	CDR	COL AUGUSTO CANDELARIO ((MARAVILLA)) REYES
	76-1920	XO	COL ROLANDO ADRIAN ((TICAS))
		S-1	MAJ JOSE ANTONIO ((RIVERA)) AGUILERA
MAESTRANZA	26-7222	CDR	COL OSWALDO ((MARENCO)) CARBALLO
	26-7388	XO	MAJ WIDO ANTONIO ((ANDREATTA)) MARTINEZ
	26-7400		
NATIONAL FIRE DEPARTMENT	21-7222	DIRECTOR	COL SAUL ((ZELAYA)) CAMPOS
NATIONAL MILITARY HOSPITAL	23-1892	DIRECTOR	COL GUILLERMO ((IRAHETE)) LUNA
	23-7855	ASST DIR	COL GILBERTO ((ALONSO)) RIVERA
	22-5498		
	24-4232X184		COL LISANDRO ((VASQUEZ)) SOSA

SALVADORAN AIR FORCE (FAES)

SALVADORAN AIR FORCE	77-0022	CDR	GEN JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO))
	27-1404/2043	XO	GEN RAFAEL ANTONIO ((VILLAMARIONA))
	27-2011	A-I	CPT WILLIAM ((PENNA)) MERLOS
	27-2035	A-II	CPT JORGE ALBERTO ((QUINONES)) ROBLES
OPERATIONS	27-4248	A-III	MAJ ROBERTO ANTONIO ((LEIVA)) JACOBO
		A-IV	MAJ GUILLERMO ERNESTO ((RIVERA)) RODRIGUEZ
		A-V	
ILOPANGO AIR BASE	27-1404/2043	CDR	
		XO	
COMALAPA BASE	24-6089	39-9089	COL GALILEO ((CONDE)) VASQUEZ
	23-4756	39-9372	LTC JUAN ANTONIO MARTINEZ ((VARELA))
	39-9356		
	23-0142		
MILITARY AVIATION SCHOOL		DIR	<sup>COL</sup> LTC MANFREDO ERNESTO ((KOENIGSBERG))
		XO	CUBIAS
AIRBORNE BATTALION (ILOPANGO BASE)	77-0022	CDR	MAJ JOSE RICARDO ((CASTRO)) AGUIRRE
	77-2323	XO	MAJ RENE ALCIDES RODRIGUEZ ((HURTADO))
		S-I/4	CPT ANGEL ROMAN ((SERMENO)) NIETO
		S-II-III	CPT PEDRO ANTONIO ((JUAREZ)) SILIEZAR
SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (GOE)	27-3098		MAJ GUSTAVO ((ADOLFO)) PERDOMO

SALVADORAN NAVY  
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NATIONAL NAVY, HQ SAN SALVADOR	22-3234 22-5056/2992	CDR XO	COL/CPT DE NAVIO HUMBERTO P. ((VILLALTA)) COL/CPT DE NAVIO FERNANDO ((MENJIVAR)) CAMPOS
		N-1 N-2 N-3 N-4 N-5	LTC/CDR SALOMON DE JESUS ((QUIJADA))
NAVAL BASE LA UNION	64-4005 64-4219 64-4062 64-4279	CDR XO N-1 N-2 N-3 N-4	COL RIGOBERTO ((VASQUEZ)) ALVARADO  LTC MARIO ((ARGUETA)) FRANCO MAJ FRANCISCO W. ((SCHISHKIN)) AGUIRRE CPT JOSE DANIEL ((CASTELLANOS)) CABEZAS 1LT MIGUEL ANGEL ((MEJIA)) LINARES CPT NELSON ARISTIDES ((ANGULO)) LOPEZ CPT MANUEL ANTONIO ((SOLANO)) MORENO
PORT CAPTAIN - ACAJUTLA		CDR	LTC HIGINIO ((MELCHOR)) PALACIOS
PORT CAPTAIN - LA LIBERTAD	28-1532	CDR 2ND CDR	LTC SALOMON DE JESUS ((QUIJADA)) 1LT RUBEN EBERTO ((CARDONA)) MENDEZ
PORT CAPTAIN - EL TRIUNFO		CDR	CPT JOSE MISAEL ((VANEGAS)) FONSECA
MARINE INFANTRY BATTALION (BIM) (12 DE OCT)		CDR XO N-1/4 N-2/3	CPT MARCO ANTONIO ((PALACIOS)) LUNA CPT JOSE ROBERTO ((GARCIA)) BURGOS 1LT FRANCISCO TEODORO ((GIRON)) RIVERA 1LT GUILLERMO ARTURO ((ALVARADO)) VILLEDA
SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION		CDR XO	1LT RENE ERWIN ((HERRRERA)) MENA
U.S. MILGP PERSONNEL	64-4279/4219		MAJ APODACA, USMC

SECURITY FORCES

*Sgt. Ramirez*

NATIONAL GUARD (GN)

25-3277      DIR GEN  
 25-3364      XO  
 25-3573      D-1  
 26-9871      D-2  
                  D-3  
                  D-4  
                  D-5

*W. M. ...*

COL JUAN CARLOS ((CARRILLO)) SCHLENKER  
 COL LUIS ALBERTO ((GALVEZ))

MAJ RICARDO ((ARANGO)) MACAY  
 MAJ JOSE SIDNEY ((RENDON)) YUDICE  
 LTC JESUS HERIBERTO ((PEREZ)) VALLE  
 LTC JOSE ADOLFO ((MEDRANO))

TREASURY POLICE

25-6699      DIR GEN  
 25-5855      XO  
 25-5052      D-1  
 25-5109      D-2  
 25-5451      D-3  
 25-8291      D-4  
 25-5536      D-5

*HERIBERTO MEDRANO*

COL SANTIAGO JOSE RODOLFO ((AVENDANO))  
 CPT ROLANDO ROBERTO ((BRIZUELA)) RAMOS  
 LTC JAIME ALBERTO ((JUAREZ)) GARCIA  
 MAJ OSCAR ARMANDO ((ANAYA)) DE PAZ ((ETA Bds))  
 LTC SALVADOR ANDRE JULIO ((AZAHAR))  
 MAJ RICARDO AMAURY ((CHORIEGO)) ECHEVERRIA

LIBERTADORES BIAT

CPT SALVADOR AUGUSTO ((GUZMAN)) PARADA

CEAT

CPT JOSE ALFONSO ((CHAVEZ-GARCIA))

NATIONAL POLICE (PN)

71-4422      DIR GEN  
 71-5333      XO  
 71-5684      D-1  
                  D-2  
                  D-3  
                  D-4  
                  D-5

*Porfirio Manuel Machuca*  
 COL CARLOS MAURICIO ((GUZMAN)) AGUILAR  
 COL ALEJANDRO JOEL ((SANCHEZ)) PAREDES  
 MAJ JORGE ALBERTO ((MANTALVO)) REYES  
 MAJ JOSE SANTIAGO ((ZELAYA)) DOMINGUEZ  
 MAJ RAFAEL ALFONSO ((MONTALVO)) GUZMAN  
 MAJ FAUSTO HUMBERTO ((SEGOVIA)) BATRES

TRANSITO

26-7233/7111  
 26-7300

*Alonso*  
 COL ALONSO ((AMAYA)) GARCIA

PANTERA BIAT

CDR      1LT JESUS REYNALDO ((BARRA)) MENDOZA

CUSTOMS POLICE (PA)

71-4550, 22-9767 S-1/DIR  
 22-9394

COL OMAR NAPOLEON ((AVALOS))

CENTRO DE REHABILITACION DE LA F. A. (CERPROFA)

24-0303      DIR  
 24-5447

## STUDY/TRAINING CENTERS

MILITARY ACADEMY	24-4797	DIR	COL GUILLERMO ALFREDO ((BENAVIDES)) MORENO
	23-6265/69	ASST DIR	MAJ CARLOS ((CAMILO)) HERNANDEZ
	24-4393/94		
	23-5391/95/7497		
	23-4478		
ARMED FORCES STUDY CENTER (CEFA)	24-0041/1508	DIR	<del>COL OSCAR EDGARDO ((CASANOVA)) VEJAR (Yanote)</del>
	24-1073	ASST DIR	COL JULIO AGUSTIN ((TRUJILLO)) QUEZADA
	23-7294	D-1	COL MAURICIO ((VIDES)) CEVALLOS
	23-7382	D-2	COL JOSE FLORENCIO ((IRAHETA))
		D-3	COL LUIS ERNESTO ((MARTINEZ)) ALVARENGA
		D-4	COL ANIBAL ((PALMA)) GUZMAN
ARMED FORCES TRAINING CENTER (CEMFA)	64-4220/28/89	CDR	COL CARLOS ALFREDO ((RIVAS))
	64-4373/4009	XO	COL OSCAR ROBERTO ((LARA)) AGUILAR
	64-9988	S-1	CPT JAIME ARTURO ((AVALOS)) JIMENEZ
		S-2	MAJ NELSON STANLEY ((AVALOS)) TURCIOS
		S-3	CPT SAMUEL BENICIO ((ORELLANA)) DIAZ
	64-4099/4066	S-4	2LT RAFAEL ((ACEVEDO)) PINO
ARMED FORCES SIGNAL INSTRUCTION CENTER (CITFA)	22-0062	CDR	COL BENJAMIN ELADIO ((CANJURA)) ALVAYERO
	22-8810	XO	LTC MARIO ALFREDO ((CRUZ)) PAIZ
DIRECT CDR - 71-6093	71-4737	S-1	CPT JULIO CESAR ((VILANOVA)) GUARDRON
DIRECT COT - 71-5758	28-9090	S-2	CPT OSCAR ERNESTO ((AZAHAR)) MARTINEZ
		S-3	MAJ WALTERS OSWALDO ((GARCIA)) OLIVIA
		S-4	CPT JOSE HUMBERTO ((SERPAS)) GOMEZ
		S-5	CPT GILBERTO LAUREANO ((LEMUS)) ACOSTA
INSTITUTO DE PREVISION SOCIAL DE LA F.A. (IPPSFA)	22-2422	DIR GEN	COL SALVADOR BALTAZAR ((CASTRO)) ALVARADO
	71-4024		

OTHER  
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TERRITORIAL SERVICES (CIVIL DEFENSE)  
21-4946

CDR COL OSCAR ARMANDO ((CARRANZA))  
XO MAJ CARLOS ALBERTO ((SERVELLON)) RODRIGUEZ  
S-1 MAJ ROMMEL ARTURO ISIDRO ((LAZO))  
S-2  
S-3

LTC JOSE ROBERTO ((GONZALEZ)) AGUILAR

INTENDENCIA OF THE  
ARMED FORCES

75-7249

CDR COL OSCAR ARMANDO ((AMAYA)) PEREZ  
XO COL ENZO GUILLERMO ((RUBIO)) MORAN

COPREFA

24-4847/4607  
23-0233

INTERIM DIR <sup>MAG</sup> ~~COL JOSE GALLEGO ((TORRES))~~ CHAVEZ ACERES  
ASST DIR CPT JUAN CRISTOBAL ((GRANDE)) GARCIA

CIVIC ACTION DEPARTMENT (ACM)

DIR COL CARLOS ((CHAVEZ)) MELENDEZ

CONARA

24-4812  
23-0803

REPRESENTATIVE (VACANT)

COL Fco. JOSE MARTINEZ CARDEÑAN  
Carballo Martínez Sarmiento Aguilera

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

23-5468  
24-5288

DIR COL DIONISIO ISMAEL ((MACHUCA))  
VICE-DIR LTC NELSON IVAN ((SALDANA)) ARAUJO.

Cooperativa

24-5676

Col José Dionisio Hernández

Escuela DNOI

71-4411

↓  
Servicio

Intel School

Da

LTC Luis Fco. Salinas

Moakley Dialogue with Ambassador Walker

1. We are pleased with the progress that has been made so far in the investigation. But we want to be sure that the whole truth, not just part of the truth, comes out.

2. We want to learn everything we can about efforts to investigate the involvement of others, either in ordering the murders or in covering them up.

3. We already have some information on these questions, but I thought we'd begin by asking you to confirm -- or tell me where we're wrong -- with this information.

4. For example, we've read that a meeting of the military high command was held in San Salvador on the evening before the Jesuits were killed; that it was attended by Colonel Ponce and Col. Benavides, among others; that a decision was made at that meeting to strike back harder at the guerrillas with the Air Force and artillery, and that each commander was told to go after the guerrilla command centers in his sector. Without reading anything particular into those facts, do you agree that they are facts?

*Creating story of event*

*all correct - except probably last part*

5. Is it a fact that, according to testimony by his own men, Col. Benavides returned to his command following that meeting of the high command, and ordered them to carry out the murders, using the words:

"this is a situation where it's them or us; we are going to begin with the leaders, inside the sector of ours we have the university and there is Ellacuria."

Is that, to the best of your knowledge, true?


6. According to the testimony, the murders were carried out by ~~about~~ ~~3-4000~~ soldiers who were transported in two Ford pickup trucks from the military school to the University. To get there, and to return from there, they would have to have been seen by other military units and would have to have had gone through at least one military roadblock or checkpoint. True?

*probably yes. none have admitted it*

7. According to the testimony, the unit that carried out the murders was asked to set up a flare and to simulate a firefight before the left the University. True?

*you  
Plan signal to retreat*





make sure you thank

Walker and his staff -

written

on

back

*Embassy  
been told no* — *Walker says there  
was a meeting —  
but intel sources say so  
in present*

8. In the morning of November 16th, a meeting of the National Intelligence Directorate was interrupted by an officer whose statement that the Jesuits had been killed was greeted by cheers and applause. To the best of your knowledge, is that true or untrue?

\*(If Walker says "no" or that he "doesn't know" -- ask him whether he can confirm that there was, in fact, a meeting of the National Intelligence Directorate that morning.)

*— many versions — not sure.*

9. Later that day, people in the Archbishop's office heard someone, identifying themselves as with the First Brigade, speaking through a megaphone, say -- and I'm paraphrasing -- that the Jesuits had been killed and the the army would continue killing communists. Is that true?

*↳ Don't know*

10. According to a United States military officer, Salvadoran Colonel Aviles told him in December that he had been told that a conversation took place between Colonel Benavides and Lt. Col. Rivas, the head of the special investigative unit, in which Benavides admitted responsibility for the killings. That conversation has since been denied by both Aviles and Rivas. True?

*—>*

11. Neither the special investigative unit, nor anyone else, has polygraphed Col. Ponce or others who were at the meeting of the high command the day before the murders; no one has polygraphed Col. Rivas about his alleged conversation with Benavides; and not a single member of the military on duty near the University that night has come forward voluntarily with information about the Atlacatl battaliion's involvement in the crime. Is that all true?

*True*

## Moakley Dialogue with Col. Menjivar

1. Colonel Menjivar there has been much written in the press about the controversy surrounding the U.S. Major who apparently withheld certain information about the Jesuit case. I would like, with your permission, to tell you what I think we know about the incident and would appreciate it if you would tell me if I am correct -- or if I am mistaken.
2. On January 2, you were informed that a U.S. major in our military group had information that linked Col. Benavides to the killings of the Jesuits. The story goes something like this: Col. Benavides told Col Rivas, the head of the SIU, that he (Benavides) felt somehow responsible for the murders. Rivas then told Col. Lopez y Lopez who then tells Col. Aviles. Aviles then tells the U.S. major. Is that essentially correct?
3. You, feeling there was good reason to believe Col. Ponce, Army Chief of Staff, knew about this information went directly to the military headquarters to discuss this with him. You went, along with Janice Elmore, to meet with Ponce. Is that correct? *did not know - 20th of Dec. 19 days*
4. Was the meeting on Jan. 2? Did anyone else from the Embassy go? Who else from the Salvadoran military was present?
5. You tell Col. Ponce what you know -- and Ponce is surprised, claiming he does not know. Ponce then asks you to put all this in writing. Am I correct?
6. Why does Ponce want this in writing?
7. You return to the Embassy and prepare a written statement detailing what the U.S. major knows -- and you sign it. Correct?
8. Why didn't Mr. Dietrich, the DCM, sign it?
9. Col. Aviles is then called in by Ponce and confronted with the story. Aviles denies it and is asked to take a polygraph test which he fails. Correct? Is this still on Jan. 2?
10. The U.S. major is also polygraphed and he fails. Correct? Was he polygraphed at our embassy?
11. The U.S. major is then sent to the United States where he was to undergo another polygraph test. Did he ever take another test? If so, what happened?
12. As you know, only a few days later, President Cristiani announces that there was military involvement in the killings and the SIU produces ballistics evidence to implicate soldiers under Col. Benavides' command. How significant do you think your meeting with Ponce was in focusing this case on a particular unit -- and, in turn, prompting President Cristiani's announcement a few days later?

Frank Smyth

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