



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 97th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 128

WASHINGTON, MONDAY, MARCH 8, 1982

No. 21

House of Representatives

The House met at 12 o'clock noon, and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. BEVILL).

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
March 3, 1982.

I hereby designate the Honorable Tom BEVILL to act as Speaker pro tempore on Monday, March 8, 1982.

THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

We thank You, O God, for all men and women who have encouraged us along life's way, who have inspired us and given of their concern in our behalf. We are grateful that You have raised up those people who become our counselors in perplexity, our companions in joy, and our friends in every season. For those personal colleagues who so freely give of their talents that we may know a more blessed life, we offer this our word of praise. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Sparrow, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment joint resolutions of the House of the following titles:

H.J. Res. 348. Joint resolution to provide for the awarding of a special gold medal to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix in recognition of the 1982 bicentennial anniversary of diplomatic and trade relations between the Netherlands and the United States; and

H.J. Res. 373. Joint resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of the Soviet Union should respect the rights of its citizens to practice their religion and to emigrate, and that these matters should be among the issues raised at the 38th meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at Geneva in February 1982.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed joint resolutions of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S.J. Res. 29. Joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating the calendar week of June 6 through June 12, 1982, as "National Garden Week"; and

S.J. Res. 145. Joint resolution authorizing and requesting the President to proclaim "National Orchestra Week."

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING AMOUNTS FROM CONTINGENT FUND OF HOUSE FOR EXPENSES OF INVESTIGATIONS AND STUDIES BY STANDING AND SELECT COMMITTEES

Mr. ANNUNZIO, from the Committee on House Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 97-448) on the resolution (H. Res. 378) providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of investigations and studies by standing and select committees of the House in the 2d session of the 97th Congress, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

LEGISLATION TO PROHIBIT FURTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR

(Mr. ROSENTHAL asked and was given permission to address the House

for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a joint resolution on behalf of myself and Representatives GEORGE BROWN, PHILLIP BURTON, JOHN CONYERS, DON EDWARDS, and ROBERT KASTENMEIER to prohibit all further military assistance to El Salvador.

The resolution prohibits all U.S. military assistance to El Salvador, with the exception of permitting articles presently in the pipeline to reach their destination. It also orders the immediate withdrawal of any military advisers in that country and prohibits any further training programs for El Salvadoran soldiers in this country. In short, no more arms, no more military advisers, and no more military training unless Congress expressly authorizes it.

It is ironic that the sponsors of this resolution were among the 11 Representatives in the 90th Congress that voted against any further appropriations for the then-escalating war in Vietnam.

We recognize the differences between El Salvador and Vietnam. What distresses us are the chillingly familiar similarities. What is civil war in a small country, we are told by the administration, is directed by Moscow through their Cuban intermediaries. American global strength, we are told, is being tested in the villages and mountains of this tiny country. Human rights violations, we are being told, are an inevitable consequence of this test. Political negotiations are a sign of weakness. Peace will be won by more war.

We have heard it all before; it was wrong then and it is wrong now.

The resolution is being introduced with the full understanding of its effect. It is the view of its sponsors that while it will have a serious and significant impact on events in El Sal-

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

vador, there is no other reasonable or viable alternative. All other avenues and options have either failed or are doomed to failure.

Unless America ceases its intervention in El Salvador, the conflict in the Caribbean Basin will escalate and spill over to other countries in the region. The Caribbean is in danger of becoming for the eighties what Southeast Asia was for the sixties.

It is time to get out before we are in over our heads. We had no business there in the first place. What is called for is a political settlement among the Salvadoran people themselves.

We recognize that both parties in El Salvador have committed their share of killings and atrocities. But the present administration is asking Congress to increase military assistance to a regime that is credited with the killing and torture of over 12,000 of its own citizens. Our military support has been increased during the period of time when the Salvadoran Army and its adjuncts have engaged in a campaign of increased repression and violence.

The sponsors of this resolution, while committed to the fullest use of the legitimate electoral process, do not believe that the conduct of the ruling Salvadoran junta will permit such an event to occur. In addition, we believe that the assertion of outside regional control and direction of the antigovernment forces in El Salvador—whether true or not—totally distorts the nature and character of the conflict and does not justify further U.S. involvement.

We support the many other congressional initiatives presented so far. We invite still more. The overwhelming opposition to this administration's El Salvador policy by the vast majority of Americans should be taken as a demand that Congress put an end to this reckless course.

The time of reckoning has arrived. We see the handwriting on the wall. We must prevent the growth of war now or we will pay dearly for it later. We believe it is possible to stop this inevitable escalation of conflict, if the American people voice their opposition and Congress moves swiftly in response.

The resolution provides:

That the President may not—

(1) provide any assistance for El Salvador under chapter 2 (military assistance), including section 508 (special drawdown authority), or chapter 5 (International military education and training) of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

(2) issue any letters of offer, extend any credits, or issue any guarantees with respect to El Salvador under the Arms Export Control Act;

(3) enter into any leases of defense articles for El Salvador under chapter 6 of the Arms Export Control Act; and

(4) issue any licenses under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act for the export of defense articles or defense services sold commercially.

Sec. 2. The President shall immediately order the prompt withdrawal from El Salva-

dor of all members of the United States Armed Forces who are performing defense services under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act, conducting international military education and training activities under chapter 5 or part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or performing international military assistance and sales program management functions under section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Sec. 3. The requirements of this resolution may not be waived under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law.

I also want to submit for the RECORD the following two articles that appeared in the Sunday, March 7, 1982, editions of the New York Times and the Washington Post which cogently set forth the necessity of the resolution we are introducing today:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 7, 1982]

AN ERROR ON SALVADOR

(By Robert A. Manning and William M. LeoGrande)

WASHINGTON.—The Administration's policy of increasing the United States' military involvement in El Salvador is producing an outcome that is exactly the opposite of the one intended.

Washington's efforts to shore up the junta with increasing amounts of military aid has only deepened the war, and the Salvadoran military's brutality has become the guerrillas' best recruiter. According to United States intelligence estimates, for every civilian that the Salvadoran Army kills, at least 25 guerrilla sympathizers spring up.

As the military situation deteriorates, the Reagan Administration's options narrow. The guerrillas have refused to participate in the March 28 election, designed and administered by their opponents, for a constituent assembly to write a constitution and select an interim president. This election, which United States officials concede will not stop the war, might not produce a center-right Christian Democratic government, but rather one of right-wing extremists.

If current efforts fail to break the existing stalemate, Washington will be faced with only two options: allowing a victory for the leftist guerrillas or sending in ground combat troops on a large scale. Either outcome would profoundly destabilize Central America.

A guerrilla victory, which might radicalize El Salvador, would further polarize Guatemala, strengthen the hand of antidemocratic factions in the Honduran armed forces, and probably demolish relations between the United States and Nicaragua. United States intervention, on the other hand, could spread the war throughout the region with no guarantee of victory. Landing 50,000 Marines in Central America would be far easier than getting them home and would have cataclysmic domestic political consequences. Moreover, a wider war would only serve to create opportunities for greater involvement by the Soviet Union and Cuba—the very thing the Administration is determined to prevent.

By portraying the Salvadoran conflict as a superpower confrontation, President Reagan is painting himself into an ideological corner where nothing short of victory will vindicate Washington's investment of power and prestige. But the investment is still relatively small. Before raising the stakes any further, the Administration ought to reconsider a third option backed by a growing chorus in Congress and by key

allies such as President José López Portillo of Mexico: negotiations.

The essential conditions for beginning negotiations already exist: a bloody stalemate, a broad international consensus in favor of talks, and the dependency of both the Salvadoran Government and the opposition on external powers that can use their leverage to bring both sides to the bargaining table. Prompted by Mexico and Europe's Social Democratic parties, the opposition already has agreed to begin negotiations without conditions. Christian Democrats in the Government are also prepared to negotiate but have been blocked from doing so by the armed forces. Only Washington can force the military to the table.

For negotiations to succeed, both sides must be certain that they will not suffer militarily. Thus, the first step must be an in-place ceasefire and an end to all foreign military aid. The next step is to draw up a constitution and procedures for conducting free and fair elections. The constitution could guarantee a democratic outcome by committing all sides to a set of constitutional principles. To guarantee its honesty, the electoral process would have to be supervised by a nonpartisan international body such as the Organization of American States or a combination of countries acceptable to both sides. An international peace-keeping force would be necessary to monitor the ceasefire and oversee the transition process.

The most difficult task would be integrating the opposing armies. But reformist army officers, who, led by the now-exiled Col. Adolfo Majano, ousted the dictator Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero in 1979, and pragmatic guerrilla leaders could form the core of a unified force, perhaps under Colonel Majano's leadership.

Under very similar conditions, a comparable formula—including the merger of opposing armies—succeeded in ending the war in Zimbabwe. And the process was overseen by a British Government no less conservative than Mr. Reagan's and equally opposed to nationalist guerrillas similarly dubbed "Marxist terrorists."

Successful negotiations would not only end the war in El Salvador but would reduce tensions throughout the region, remove the main obstacle to better relations between the United States and Nicaragua, allow Honduras to continue its transition to democracy, and increase Guatemala's chances of avoiding a full-scale civil war. If the guerrillas are as unpopular as the Reagan Administration claims, Washington has nothing to fear from such a negotiated settlement. Without negotiations, the war will go on, and a stable, democratic El Salvador will be the least likely outcome.

(Robert A. Manning writes on foreign affairs for magazines in the United States and abroad. William M. LeoGrande is professor of political science at American University.)

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1982]

IS SALVADOR VIETNAM? THE VERY QUESTION IS ALTERING THE SCRIPT

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

George Ball was the undersecretary of state when the United States was sucked into Vietnam like a long piece of thread drawn into a vacuum cleaner. Ball was the highest American official in those days who fought against military involvement in Vietnam. Now an investment banker, Ball is watching the United States fight against the suction in El Salvador.

He likens the spectacle to a song, or the soundtrack of a movie: "The music and words seem to be almost a plagiarism. I

have the feeling we've heard it all before, but in another setting."

No, no, reply officials of the Reagan administration—El Salvador is not Vietnam. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig insists that any attempt to draw a parallel between the two "is a terrible distortion of reality and one which overlooks a number of fundamental differences."

Curiously, Ball and Haig are both right. El Salvador is profoundly different from Vietnam, but it is also eerily familiar. The setting has changed, but it looks like the same old movie.

The Reagan administration involuntarily evokes Vietnam in almost every public statement it makes about El Salvador. This is an East-West test. The rebels are controlled from Nicaragua or Cuba or Moscow. If we don't stop them now the other dominoes will begin to tumble. Oh yes, and please trust us. We have the real dope. We know.

But for Americans El Salvador is different from Vietnam in one overriding respect: It comes to us after Vietnam. We were willing to go to war in Vietnam because the president, his State Department and his Pentagon told us we had to fight to protect the national interest. Not this time.

According to a recent Gallup Poll, the American public opposes sending U.S. troops to El Salvador by 89 percent to 8 percent. Even sending military supplies or advisers is opposed by substantial majorities.

In Vietnam we were more malleable. At the end of 1965, for instance, after the first U.S. combat forces had gone to fight in Vietnam, Gallup found that the public still supported the war effort by 3 to 1.

Secretary Haig, of course, notes other distinctions between El Salvador and Vietnam. Pressed on the question last week, this was his answer:

"First and foremost is the difference with respect to the strategic importance of Central America . . . to the United States today . . . This is a vitally important region . . . The outcome of the situation there is in the vital interest of the American people and must be so dealt with."

In other words, in Haig's opinion the country where America lost 57,639 lives and squandered \$130 billion was not of vital importance to the United States; but El Salvador is.

And what is the "reality" Haig thinks is being distorted? In his view it is a case of external aggression against El Salvador. In Haig's words (speaking of the leftist Salvadoran rebels): "They're being commanded, controlled, and run externally—completely. They are being armed and trained externally, and they are not espousing the wishes of the people of Salvador." There goes the old movie again.

What about the history of El Salvador? What about the story of the 14 families that ran the place like a family farm for decades? What about the supposedly anti-communist Christian Democratic politicians in El Salvador who have joined the rebels? What about the accusations that the army and police are responsible for most of the deaths and arbitrary violence? The list of "what abouts" could be a long one indeed, but the movie skips over those questions, leaves them unasked—as the old one did for so long.

Perhaps modern life is a series of movies, some new, some reruns. While the Vietnam movie certainly seems to be running again at times, whoever is up there in the projection booth is playing with the machinery. This time the movie is running much faster than it did in the 1960s.

At the beginning in Vietnam, only a few people paid much attention. The networks didn't start their half-hour evening news

programs until 1962, well after the first U.S. military advisers took up the cudgels against the Vietcong, and they didn't devote much air time to this far-off counterinsurgency effort. Of course no one knew then what was coming. The thread was already caught in the pull of the Vietnam vacuum, but almost no one realized it. The first time around this was a new movie, and the plot had to unfold one scene at a time.

Now everyone thinks they know how the movie ends, and no one wants it to get that far.

So the networks have camera crews scurrying around Salvador like ants on a picnic blanket. Every night the network correspondents share a one-hour satellite "feed" to the states—instant communications, not shipping film to Hong Kong or Bangkok the way they did in Vietnam, even at the height of the war. Congressional committees are already giving administration officials skeptical, even hostile, grillings of a kind they didn't get until late in the Vietnam war.

Government officials want to rewrite the ending to this movie, too. Privately, it is reliably said, Alexander Haig rules out the use of American ground forces in Central America as definitively as any of the members of Congress who are shouting out against the possibility in public. Professional soldiers at the Pentagon show no appetite for a military adventure in the Central American mountains. Civilian officials at the Defense Department are impressed by the professional military's unwillingness to contemplate any new use of American armed force that is not enthusiastically supported by the public.

Stop the movie; we want to get off.

There are many other differences and similarities between El Salvador and Vietnam. Consider some differences:

Vietnam is nearly the size of California, with 47 million inhabitants (including both north and south). El Salvador, the size of Massachusetts, has just 3 million citizens.

Vietnam is on the other side of the world, and it shares a South Asian peninsula with Cambodia, Laos and Thailand—hardly a strategic location. El Salvador is just 1,400 miles from Florida and 800 miles from the Panama Canal, still a vital link for American commerce and military logistics. It is surrounded by similarly impoverished countries long ruled by feudal oligarchies and ripe for insurgencies of their own. Guatemala, the biggest and richest nation in Central America, already has one; Nicaragua already has a radical leftist regime because its insurgency prevailed. Cuba, nearby, is eager to help leftist rebels in all of these countries, and appears to have weapons and materiel that they can use.

Vietnam before 1975 was an artificially divided country, whose northern half was ruled by a ruthlessly efficient—and nationalistic—totalitarian regime. Reunification of the country was the overriding preoccupation of that regime, which could get all the arms and equipment it needed from China and the Soviet Union. Vietnam's southern half was ruled by a Catholic family whose connections to the United States were stronger than its nationalist credentials. Thanks to the superpower patrons of both sides and the large populations in both halves of the country, the Vietnam war involved hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides—not to mention the Americans involved.

In El Salvador there are only about 32,000 armed troops in the continuing civil war. The leftist insurgents have friendly almost-neighbors in Nicaragua (they are separated by about 30 miles of the Pacific Ocean or 70 miles of Honduran territory) and more powerful friends in Cuba. But there is no pros-

pect that a Salvadoran civil war could ever assume the proportions of the Vietnam war. The soundstage for this movie is just too small.

There is no American Armed Forces Network radio station in El Salvador, probably because there are only about 50 U.S. military men in the country. When John F. Kennedy entered the White House in 1961, there were already 3,200 American advisors in South Vietnam.

Then ponder other similarities:

The American government has committed itself rhetorically to an outcome in El Salvador, just as it committed itself to an outcome in Vietnam, long before it was clear that this outcome could be achieved. "We will do whatever is prudent and necessary to ensure the peace and security of the Caribbean area," President Reagan said last month. Haig has been more specific, committing the United States to do "whatever is necessary" to head off a rebel victory in El Salvador.

It was the same in Vietnam. As early as the Truman administration, American policymakers were insisting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the United States. The Tonkin Gulf resolution during the Johnson administration formally declared America's commitment to stop "aggression."

Reading through old speeches one is reminded of a form of rhetoric that has been resurrected for El Salvador.

"I believe, and I am supported by some authority, that if the communists are not checked now the world can expect to pay a greater price to check them later." So said Lyndon B. Johnson in January 1967, speaking of Vietnam.

"There is no question that the decisive battle for Central America is under way in El Salvador . . . If after Nicaragua El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, who in Central America would not live in fear? How long would it be before major strategic United States interests—the Panama Canal, sea lanes, oil supplies—were at risk?" So said Thomas O. Enders, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, just last month.

Because Americans like to act, rhetoric has not stood alone, just as it didn't in Vietnam. We already have military advisers on the scene in El Salvador—though we have renamed them "trainers." Trainers, advisers, whatever—they are our tribute, our tangible contribution meant to make our commitment look good.

Of course advisers in Vietnam proved inadequate to the task at hand, a task that wasn't carefully measured before the commitment was made. In El Salvador, again, the advisers don't seem sufficient to stem the rebel tide. Haig now bridle at suggestions that with all the help we've already given, our side in El Salvador should have done better in the civil war.

"Nobody had hoped they would go any better," Haig said of the government's forces in a recent interview with *The Post*. "That's the one thing I want to disabuse you of. All we did in the first stages of our assistance program where we sent 50 guys and a few helicopters and \$30 million more to El Salvador was to help to slow down a tide that we inherited. And nobody deluded himself that this was going to solve El Salvador . . ."

Our side also looks weak again. In Vietnam our side looked so weak in 1963 that the United States encouraged a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, the Vietnamese patriot on whose behalf we made our original commitment to South Vietnam. That left us with no leader on our side, just army officers, against Vietnamese nationalists led by

Ho Chi Minh. For 12 years we tried to transform those generals into popular political leaders, with no real success.

In El Salvador our side is an army junta nominally led by a civilian politician, Jose Napoleon Duarte. Duarte was once undeniably popular, but his standing now seems problematical. Reports from El Salvador suggest that he may be ousted after the March 28 elections (which the rebels are boycotting and trying to subvert) and replaced by a rabid right-winger who—is this in the script?—got his start as an army officer.

A final similarity: The actual situation "on the ground" is baffling. El Salvador's history—like Vietnam's—did not begin the moment the United States took an intense interest in the place. Salvadoran actors are playing out a Salvadoran drama that isn't part of our movie. There are ancient enmities, a well-established social and economic order, old traditions of leadership and much else in El Salvador that can't be explained away by "external aggression." Who and what is our side fighting for?

Our movie skipped over these tough, fundamental questions in Vietnam. The rerun is skipping over them, too.

Walt W. Rostow was Lyndon Johnson's national security adviser during the Vietnam war. He is now a professor at the University of Texas. Rostow also sees similarities between Vietnam and El Salvador.

"I'm not an expert on El Salvador," Rostow said in a recent conversation in Austin. Nevertheless, he went on, this moment has a familiar quality. "It's the same bunch" of "left-intellectuals" and journalists who undermined the Vietnam war effort who are at work now undermining our efforts to help Salvador, he said. "I fear for my country," he added, complaining of the "knee-jerk" reaction he perceived in the media that "romanticizes terrorists" and denigrates American policy.

George Ball sees a similarity of a different kind. "We are making essentially the same mistake in thinking that all local situations must be resolved in terms of the East-West conflict," Ball said. "What's going on in Salvador is only tangentially related to the Soviets," he added. "This is not a problem that can be solved by military means. It's total nonsense to say that it is."

Another perspective—the perspective from television that helped create the old film—is offered by Gary Shepard of CBS, who covered Vietnam and just returned from three weeks in El Salvador. "The most vivid recollection I've got that ties these two stories together is the Huey Helicopter," Shepard said. In Vietnam that warhorse chopper landed beside rice paddies; in Salvador it's sugar cane fields—same helicopter.

Does the local life and culture seem as opaque and foreign as it did in Vietnam? "I think we have a better handle on it in Salvador," he replied. He said it wasn't too hard to see how years of oligarchic rule by a few families had helped radicalize the peasantry and lay the groundwork for civil war.

"It really is a civil uprising to a great degree . . . a pure version of a civil war," Shepard said. Cuba and the Soviet Union can't be helping very much, he added.

According to Shepard, the insurgents are better at public relations than the government. Whereas it is easy to visit rebel forces, interview their commanders and watch them in action, the Salvadoran army doesn't accommodate the TV crews, he said.

Is CBS in New York receptive to material from El Salvador? Oh, yes, Shepard replied, they took everything he could send during a recent three-week assignment. The network still likes "bang-bang" (this is, battlefield) coverage, as it did in Vietnam, he said, "but

they want bang-bang with a message"—explanations of what's really going on on the ground.

Gen. Samuel V. Wilson was in the thick of the Vietnam war in its early stages. Later he was the U.S. military attache in Moscow. Later still he was director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He's now retired in Rice, Va.

"We sort of came wretching and vomiting out of our Vietnam experience saying 'Never Again!'" Wilson said the other day. "We've sort of spooked ourselves."

Like Secretary Haig, Wilson believes that America's vital interests are more clearly at risk in Central America than they ever were in Vietnam. He thinks that despite Vietnam, Americans could be persuaded to support "reasonable steps in this area" to secure those interests, provided they understood what was involved.

"But I don't see evidence that we learned a helluva lot from our experience in Southeast Asia," Wilson said. The main lesson he learned, Wilson went on, is that a man in one of these third-world countries racked by internal strife "has got to be able to see fairly clearly what his options are . . . If he sacrifices himself, what are his possible gains?"

The man in the rice paddy, like the man in the sugar cane field, wants security, social justice, educational opportunity for his children, rudimentary health care and some basic economic opportunity. Wilson suggested, "You have to look at your programs and see how well you satisfy these five," he said. "You start dealing with these first."

Americans are too quick to make others' problems their own, Wilson remarked. "Hell, this is a much bigger problem for Mexico than it is for us." He suggested the United States encourage Mexico to take initiatives in El Salvador that we could endorse and support. "We'd be so much better off getting somebody else into this instead of playing the dominant Yankee role from the North."

Secretary Haig has already looked ahead to the end of the movie. He does not see a light at the end of the tunnel; he sees refugees.

"Just think what the level [of illegal Central American immigration into the United States] might be," Haig said recently, "if the radicalization of this hemisphere continues with the only alternative a totalitarian model in one state after the other. Why, it will make the Cuban influx look like child's play."

Will there also be boat people? Please, somebody change the script.

LAW OF THE SEA TREATY IS FLAWED

(Mr. FIELDS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FIELDS. Mr. Speaker, as a congressional adviser to the Law of the Sea Conference, I want to bring to my colleagues' attention the fact that this is the first day of what has been presented as the last negotiating session of the Law of the Sea Treaty before signatures are to be attached to this treaty in Caracas, Venezuela, in the fall.

Mr. Speaker, this treaty is fundamentally flawed. It does not represent the best interests or the national interests of the United States of Amer-

ica. This treaty as drafted would create an entity much stronger than the United Nations.

It would create an international seabed authority which would not only make laws but would control two-thirds of the Earth's surface. Quite simply, we would be giving up the right to explore two-thirds of the Earth's surface without firing a shot.

In this international seabed authority, in the Assembly, each country has one vote. Our country has no veto. We have received no guarantee of a seat on any important committee in this particular international seabed authority. The orientation is toward the Third World and the Communist bloc.

Under this treaty we would not have unfettered access to deep ocean bed minerals. There would be a mandatory technology transfer provision in this particular treaty. There would be production ceilings. There would be anti-monopoly provisions. To top it all off, the United States would end up funding 25 percent of the cost of the international seabed authority.

The Law of the Sea Treaty should be lost at sea. This is not in the best interest of this country and our efforts as a country should be placed toward the Reciprocating States Agreement which is currently a law and something that will be ratified by our country, as I understand it, this week.

COMMUNICATION FROM MARY LEE DUNCAN

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from Mary Lee Duncan:

FEBRUARY 25, 1982.

HON. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR.,
Speaker of the House,
Room H-205, Capitol,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This is to notify you, pursuant to the provisions of Rule L(50), paragraph 2, of the Rules of the House, that this afternoon I was served with a subpoena to testify in a case pending in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

I am to appear on Friday, March 5th at 9:30 a.m., at the United States District Court House, Washington, D.C.

Sincerely yours,

MARY LEE DUNCAN.

DUBIOUS ARMS PACKAGE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DERWINSKI) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I am especially concerned over the possible sale to Jordan of F-16 fighter bombers and I-Hawk missiles because of the foreign policy questions it raises as well as the question of the overall arms balance in the Middle East. Therefore, I have written to Secretary of Defense Weinberger to express my opinion that it is essential that interested Members of Congress